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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8614 OF 2014 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 38519 of 2012)

MADHYA PRADESH STATE LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PRATEEK JAIN & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

Leave granted.

2) Madhya  Pradesh  State  Legal  Services  Authority,  the  appellant  

herein,  has filed the instant  appeal challenging the propriety of  

orders  dated  February  27,  2012 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Madhya Pradesh in Writ  Petition No. 1519 of 2012, which was  

filed  by  one  Rakesh  Kumar  Jain  (respondent  No.2  herein)  

impleading  Prateek  Jain  (respondent  No.1  herein)  as  the  sole  

respondent.  Essentially the  lis  was between respondent Nos. 1  

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and 2.  Respondent No.1 had filed a complaint under Section 138  

of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as  

the 'Act') against respondent No.2.    Matter reached before the  

Additional Sessions Judge in the form of criminal appeal.  During  

the pendency of the said appeal, the matter was settled between  

the parties.  On their application, the matter was referred to Mega  

Lok Adalat.  However, the concerned Presiding Officer in the Lok  

Adalat did not give his imprimatur to the said settlement in the  

absence  of  deposit  made  as  per  the  direction  given  in  the  

judgment of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal   

H., (2010) 5 SCC 663.  Against the order of Additional Sessions  

Judge, a writ petition was filed by respondent No.2 but the same  

is also dismissed by the High Court, accepting the view taken by  

the Additional Sessions Judge.

3) From the aforesaid, it would be clear that the matter in issue was  

between  respondent  Nos.  1  and  2.   The  appellant  comes  in  

picture only because the parties had approached the  Mega Lok  

Adalat organised  by  the  appellant.   The  reason  for  filing  the  

present  appeal is  the apprehension of  the appellant  that  if  the  

settlement arrived at in the Lok Adalats are not accepted by the  

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Courts, one of the essential function and duty of Legal Services  

Authority cast upon by the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  '1987  Act')  would  be  greatly  

prejudiced and, therefore, it is necessary to straighten the law on  

the subject matter.  Acknowledging the significance of  the issue  

involved,  permission  was  granted  to  the  appellant  to  file  the  

special leave petition and notice was issued in the special leave  

petition on December 06, 2012.  Operation of the impugned order  

of the High Court was also stayed in the following words:

“In the meantime, having regard to the objects to  be achieved by the provisions of the Legal Services  Authorities  Act,  1987,  the  operation  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Lok  Adalat-I,  Gwalior,  Madhya  Pradesh, on 30th July, 2011, and that of the High  Court  impugned  in  this  petition,  shall  remain  stayed.”

4) Notice  has  been  duly  served  upon  both  the  respondents,  but  

neither of them have put in appearance.  Be that as it may, since  

we are concerned with the larger question raised in this appeal,  

we hard the learned counsel for the appellant in the absence of  

any representation on the part of the respondents.

5) With  the  aforesaid  gist  of  the  controversy  involved,  we  now  

proceed to take note of the relevant facts in some detail.

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6) As  pointed  out  above,  there  was  some  dispute  between  

respondent Nos. 1 and 2.  Nature of the dispute is not reflected  

from the papers filed by the appellant.  However, since it pertains  

to a complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act, one can safely  

infer  that  the complaint  was filed  because of  dishonour  of  the  

cheque.  It also appears from the record that this complaint was  

filed  by  respondent  No.1  against  respondent  No.2  and  had  

resulted  in  some  conviction/adverse  order  against  respondent  

No.2, though exact nature of the orders passed by the learned  

Magistrate is not on record.  Be that as it may, respondent No.2  

had filed the appeal  against  the order  of  the Magistrate in the  

Court of Additional Sessions Judge.

7) During the pendency of this appeal, a joint application was filed by  

both  the  parties  stating  that  a  compromise  had  taken  place  

between them with mutual consent and they have reestablished  

their relationship and wanted to maintain the same cordial relation  

in future as well.  On that basis it was stated in the application that  

respondent  No.1  herein  did  not  want  to  proceed  against  

respondent No.2 and wanted the appeal to be disposed of on the  

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basis of compromise by filing a compromise deed in the appeal.  

This  application  was filed  under  Section  147  of  the  Act  which  

permits compounding of such offences.  We would like to point  

out at this stage that on what terms the parties had settled the  

matter is not on record as compromise deed has not been filed.

8) When  this  application  came  up  for  hearing  on  July  30,  2011  

before the learned appellate Court, counsel for both the parties  

requested that the matter be forwarded to the  Mega Lok Adalat  

which  was  being  organized  on  the  same  date.   On  this  

application, following order was passed by the learned Additional  

Sessions Judge:

“30.07.2011

xx xx xx

An application under section 147 Negotiation (sic)  Instrument  Act  filed  on  behalf  of  both  sides  for  compromise  and  request  is  made  to  direct  the  matter be taken up before the Lok Adalat organized  today's date.

In view of the facts mentioned in the application, for  abrogation  of  the  compromise  application,  the  matter  be  taken  up  today  before  the  concerned  bench of Lok-Adalat.”

9) When the matter was placed before the Lok Adalat, the Presiding  

Officer refused to act upon the settlement recorded between the  

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parties on the ground that the accused person had not deposited  

15% amount  of  the  cheque  for  compounding  of  matter  at  the  

appeal stage as per “The Guidelines” contained in the judgment  

of this Court in the case of  Damodar S. Prabhu  (supra).  The  

exact order passed is reproduced below:

“30.07.2011

The  matter  produced  before  the  bench  of  Lok  Adalat No.1.

Appellant along with Shri N.S. Yadav, Advocate.

Non-Applicant along with Shri Mohan Babu Mangal  Advocate.

The  instant  matter  is  related  to  the  appeal  filed  against the conviction order passed under Section  138 of Negotiation (sic) of Instrument Act, wherein,  both  parties,  being  appeared  along  with  their  counsels,  while  filing  application  for  compromise,  have  requested  to  mitigate  the  matter.   But,  the  defendant/accused has  not  deposited  15  percent  amount  of  cheque for  mitigation of  matter  at  the  appeal  stage  according  to  the  guide  lines  of  judgment  dated  3.5.2010  passed  in  Criminal  Appeal No. 963/2010 in the matter of Damodar M.  Prabhu  Vs.  Sayyad  Baba  Lal  passed  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court,  in  the  District  Legal  Services  Authority,  due  to  said  reason,  it  is  not  lawful  to  grant  permission  of  mitigation  of  the  matter  to  both  sides.   Hence,  the  compromise  application is hereby dismissed.

The matter be returned back to the Regular Court  for abrogation in accordance with law.”

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10) It is this order which was challenged by respondent No.2 by filing  

a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  The  

High Court has dismissed the said writ  petition stating that the  

judgment of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) is binding  

on the subordinate Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution  

and, therefore, the subordinate Court had not committed any legal  

error.

11) “The Guidelines” in the form of directions given in the aforesaid  

judgment read as under:

“THE GUIDELINES

(I)  In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:

(a)  That directions can be given that the Writ of  Summons be suitably modified making it  clear to  the accused that he could make an application for  compounding of the offences at the first or second  hearing of the case and that if such an application  is made, compounding may be allowed by the court  without imposing any costs on the accused.

(b)  If the accused does not make an application for  compounding as aforesaid,  then if  an application  for compounding is made before the Magistrate at  the  subsequent  stage,  compounding  can  be  allowed subject to the condition that the accused  will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount  to  be  deposited  as  a  condition  for  compounding  with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority  as the Court deems fit.

(c)  Similarly, if the application for compounding is  made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in  

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revision  or  appeal,  such  compounding  may  be  allowed  on  the  condition  that  the  accused  pays  15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d)   Finally,  if  the application for  compounding is  made before the Supreme Court, the figure would  increase to 20% of the cheque amount."

12) The question of consideration in the aforesaid backdrop is as to  

whether directions/guidelines given by this Court in the aforesaid  

judgment are inapplicable in cases which are resolved/settled in  

Lok Adalats.

13) What  was  argued  before  us  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant  was that  these guidelines containing the schedule of  

costs should not be made applicable to the settlements which are  

arrived at in the Lok Adalats inasmuch as provision for imposition  

of  such  costs  would  run  contrary  to  the  very  purpose  of  Lok  

Adalats  constituted under  Section 19 of  the 1987 Act.   It  was  

emphasized  that  Lok  Adalats  were  constituted  to  promote  the  

resolution  of  disputes  pending  before  Court  by  amicable  

settlement  between  the  parties  and  in  order  to  reduce  the  

pendency of cases before the Courts, including appellate Courts.  

Learned counsel  also referred to the judgment of  this  Court  in  

K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon  v.  C.D. Shaji,  (2012) 2 SCC 51,  

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wherein  it  is  held  that  a  compromise  or  settlement  arrived  at  

before the Lok Adalat and award passed pursuant thereto is to be  

treated as decree of  civil  Court  by virtue of  deeming provision  

contained in Section 21 and Section 2(aaa) and (c) of the 1987  

Act.   The  Court  held  that  even  a  settlement  of  a  case  under  

Setion  138  of  the  Act  and  Lok Adalat  award  passed pursuant  

thereto would be a decree executable under the Code of  Civil  

Procedure, 1908.  The position in this behalf  is summed up in  

para 26 of the said judgment, which reads as under:

“26.   From  the  above  discussion,  the  following  propositions emerge:

(1) In  view  of  the  unambiguous  language  of  Section  21  of  the  Act,  every  award  of  the  Lok  Adalat shall  be deemed to be a decree of a civil  court and as such it is executable by that court.

(2) The  Act  does  not  make  out  any  such  distinction between the reference made by a civil  court and a criminal court.

(3) There is no restriction on the power of the  Lok  Adalat  to  pass  an  award  based  on  the  compromise  arrived  at  between  the  parties  in  respect of cases referred to by various courts (both  civil  and  criminal),  tribunals,  Family  Court,  Rent  Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor  Accidents  Claims  Tribunal  and  other  forums  of  similar nature.

(4) Even if  a  matter  is  referred  by  a  criminal  court  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming  provisions,  the  award  passed  by  the  Lok  Adalat  based on  a  compromise  has  to  be  treated  as  a  

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decree capable of execution by a civil court.”

14) Taking sustenance from the  aforesaid  dicta,  the submission of  

learned counsel for the appellant was that even the proceedings  

under  Section  138  of  the  Act  were  governed  by  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973, such an award was executable as a  

decree of the civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  

The submission, therefore, was that once award of the Lok Adalat   

is given the effect of the decree and attaches this kind of sanctity  

behind  it,  it  should  be  carved  out  as  an  exception  to  'The  

Guidelines' framed by this Court in  Damodar S. Prabhu's  case  

(supra).

15) We  have  considered  the  aforesaid  submission  of  the  learned  

counsel  with  utmost  intensity  of  thought.   It  appears  to  be  of  

substance  in  the  first  blush  when  this  submission  is  to  be  

considered in the context of the purpose and objective with which  

Lok Adalats have been constituted under Section 19 of the 1987  

Act.  No doubt, the manifest objective is to have speedy resolution  

of the disputes through these Lok Adalats, with added advantage  

of cutting the cost of litigation and avoiding further appeals.  The  

advent of the 1987 Act gave a statutory status to  Lok Adalats,  

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pursuant  to  the  constitutional  mandate  in  Article  39-A of  the  

Constitution of India, contains various provisions of settlement of  

disputes  through  Lok  Adalat.   It  is  an  Act  to  constitute  legal  

services authorities to provide free and competent legal services  

to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities  

for  securing justice are not  denied to any citizen by reason of  

economic  or  other  disabilities,  and  to  organize  Lok  Adalats  to  

secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on  

a basis of equal opportunity.  In fact, the concept of Lok Adalat is  

an innovative Indian contribution to the world jurisprudence.  It is  

a new form of  the justice dispensation system and has largely  

succeeded in providing a supplementary forum to the victims for  

settlement of their disputes.  This system is based on Gandhian  

principles.   It  is  one  of  the  components  of  Alternate  Dispute  

Resolution  systems  specifically  provided  in  Section  89  of  the  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as well.  It has proved to be a very  

effective alternative to litigation.  Lok Adalats have been created  

to restore access to remedies and protections and alleviate the  

institutional  burden  of  the  millions  of  petty  cases  clogging  the  

regular courts.  It offers the aggrieved claimant whose case would  

otherwise  sit  in  the  regular  courts  for  decades,  at  least  some  

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compensation now.  The Presiding Judge of a  Lok Adalat  is an  

experienced  adjudicator  with  a  documented  record  of  public  

service and has legal acumen.  Experience has shown that not  

only huge number of cases are settled through Lok Adalats, this  

system has definite advantages, some of which are listed below:

(a)  speedy justice and saving from the lengthy court procedures;  

(b)  justice at no cost;

(c)  solving problems of backlog cases; and

(d) maintenance of cordial relations.

Thus,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  Lok  Adalats are  serving  an  

important public purpose.

16) Having said so,  it  needs to be examined as to whether in the  

given case it  becomes derogatory to the movement of the  Lok  

Adalats if the costs amounting to 15% of the cheque amount, as  

per the guidelines contained in  Damodar S. Prabhu  (supra), is  

insisted? However, before discussing this central issue, we would  

like to analyse the events of the present case, as that would be of  

help to answer the pivotal issue raised before us.

17) As pointed out above while taking note of the factual details of the  

case, it was not a situation where the Court persuaded the parties  

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to  use  the  medium  of  Lok  Adalat  for  the  settlement  of  their  

dispute.   On  the  contrary,  the  parties  had  already  settled  the  

matter between themselves before hand and filed the application  

in  this  behalf  before the learned Additional  Sessions Judge on  

July 30, 2011 with a request which the matter be taken up before  

the Lok Adalat that was being organized on the same date.  It is  

clear from the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions  

Judge on July 30, 2011, which is already extracted above.

18) In the first instance, we do not understand as to why the matter  

was sent to  Lok Adalat when the parties had settled the matter  

between themselves and application to this effect was filed in the  

Court.  In such a situation, the Court could have passed the order  

itself, instead of relegating the matter to the Lok Adalat.  We have  

ourselves  highlighted  the  importance  and  significance  of  the  

Institution of Lok Adalat.  We would be failing in our duty if we do  

not mention that, of late, there is some criticism as well which,  

inter alia, relates to the manner in which cases are posted before  

the Lok Adalats.  We have to devise the methods to ensure that  

faith in the system is maintained as in the holistic terms access to  

justice is achieved through this system.  We, therefore, deprecate  

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this tendency of referring even those matters to the  Lok Adalat  

which  have  already  been  settled.   This  tendency  of  sending  

settled matters to the  Lok Adalats  just  to  inflate  the figures of  

decision/settlement therein for statistical purposes is not a healthy  

practice.   We  are  also  not  oblivious  of  the  criticism  from  the  

lawyers, intelligentsia and general public in adopting this kind of  

methodology for window dressing and showing lucrative outcome  

of particular Lok Adalats.  

19) Be that as it may, reverting to the facts of the present case, we  

find that when the case had been settled between the parties and  

application in this behalf was made before the Court, it cannot be  

denied that had the Court passed the compouding order on this  

application under Section 147 of  the Act,  as per the rigours of  

Damodar S. Prabhu (supra), 15% f the cheque amount had to be  

necessarily deposited by the accused person (respondent No.2).  

If we hold that such a cost is not to be paid when the matter is  

sent to the Lok Adalat, this route would be generally resorted to,  

to bypass the applicability of the directions contained in Damodar  

S. Prabhu (supra).  Such a situation cannot be countenanced.

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20) The  purpose  of  laying  down  the  guidelines  in  Damodar  S.   

Prabhu  (supra)  is  explained  in  the  said  judgment  itself.   The  

Court in that case was concerned with the stage of the case when  

compounding of  offence under Section 147 of  the Act  is to be  

permitted.  To put it  otherwise, the question was as to whether  

such a compounding can be only at the trial Court stage or it is  

permissible even at the appellate stage.  It was noted that even  

before  the  insertion  of  Section  147  of  the  Act,  by  way  of  

amendment in the year 2002, some High Courts had permitted  

the compounding of offence contemplated by Section 138 of the  

Act during the later stages of litigation.  This was so done by this  

Court also in  O.P. Dholakia  v.  State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC  

672 and in some other cases which were noticed by the Bench.  

From these judgments the Court concluded that the compounding  

of offence at later stages of litigation in cheque bounding cases  

was held to be permissible.

21) While  holding  so,  the  Court  also  took  note  of  the  phenomena  

which was widely prevalent in the manner in which cases under  

Section 138 of  the Act  proceed in this  country.   It  noticed that  

there was a tendency on the part of the accused persons to drag  

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on these proceedings and resort to settlement process only at a  

stage when the accused persons were driven to wall.  It is for this  

reason that most of the complaints filed result in compromise or  

settlement before the final judgment on the one side and even in  

those  cases  where  judgment  is  pronounced  and  conviction  is  

recorded, such cases are settled at appellate stage.  This was so  

noted in para 13 of the judgment, which reads as under:

“13.   It  is  quite  obvious  that  with  respect  to  the  offence  of  dishonour  of  cheques,  it  is  the  compensatory aspect of the remedy which should  be given priority over the punitive aspect.  There is  also some support for the apprehensions raised by  the  learned  Attorney  General  that  a  majority  of  cheque  bounce  cases  are  indeed  being  compromised or  settled  by  way  of  compounding,  albeit  during  the later  stages of  litigation thereby  contributing to undue delay in justice-delivery.  The  problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to  belatedly  choose  compounding  as  a  means  to  resolve  their  dispute.   Further  more,  the  writen  submissions filed on behalf of the learned Attorney  General  have  stressed  on  the  fact  that  unlike  Section  320  of  the  CrPC,  Section  147  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act  provides  no  explicit  guidance  as  to  what  stage  compounding  can  or  cannot be done and whether compounding can be  done at the instance of the complainant or with the  leave  of  the  court.   As  mentioned  earlier,  the  learned Attorney General's submission is that in the  absence  of  statutory  guidance,  parties  are  choosing compounding as a method of last resort  instead of opting for it as soon as the Magistrates  take  cognizance  of  the  complaints.   One  explanation for  such behaviour  could  be that  the  accused persons are willing to take the chance of  progressing through the various stages of litigation  

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and then choose the route of settlement only when  no other route remains.  While such behaviour may  be viewed as rational from the viewpoint of litigants,  the hard facts are that the undue delay in opting for  compounding  contributes  to  the  arrears  pending  before the courts at various levels.  If the accused  is  willing  to  settle  or  compromise  by  way  of  compounding  of  the  offence  at  a  later  stage  of  litigation, it is generally indicative of some merit in  the complainant's case.  In such cases it would be  desirable if parties choose compounding during the  earlier stages of litigation.  If however, the accused  has a valid defence such as a mistake, forgery or  coercion among other grounds, then the matter can  be litigated through the specified forums.”

22) This particular tendency had prompted the Court to accept the  

submission  of  the  Attorney  General  to  frame  guidelines  for  a  

graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly delay  

compounding of the offence inasmuch as such a requirement of  

deposit  of  the  costs  will  act  as  a  deterrent  for  delayed  

composition since free and easy compounding of offences at any  

stage, however belated, was given incentive to the drawer of the  

cheque to delay settling of cases for years.  For this reason, the  

Court  framed  the  guidelines  permitting  compounding  with  the  

imposition of varying costs depending upon the stage at which  

the settlement took place in a particular case.  

23) After formulating “The Guidelines”, which are already extracted  

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above, the Court made very pertinent observations in para 17 of  

the said judgment which would have bearing in the present case.  

Thus, we reproduce the same below:

“17.  We are also conscious of the view that the  judicial  endorsement  of  the  above  quoted  guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law- making  and  therefore  an  intrusion  into  the  legislative domain.   It  must  be kept  in  mind that  Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance  on  how  to  proceed  with  the  compounding  of  offences under the Act.  We have already explained  that the scheme contemplated under Section 320  of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense.  In view of the legislative vacuum, we see no hurdle  to  the  endorsement  of  some  suggestions  which  have  been  designed  to  discourage  litigants  from  unduly delaying the composition of the offence in  cases involving Section 138 of the Act.  The graded  scheme  for  imposing  costs  is  a  means  to  encourage  compounding  at  an  early  stage  of  litigation.  In the status quo, valuable time of the  Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the  parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the  proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal  Procedure, even though the impact of the offence  is  largely  confined  to  the  private  parties.   Even  though the  imposition  of  costs  by  the competent  court  is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs  has been suggested in  the interest  of  uniformity.  The  competent  Court  can  of  course  reduce  the  costs  with  regard  to  the  specific  facts  and  circumstances of a case, while recording reasons  in  writing  for  such  variance.   Bona  fide  litigants  should of course contest the proceedings to their  logical end.  Even in the past, this Court has used  its power to do complete justice under Article 142  of the Constitution to frame guidelines in relation to  subject-matter  where  there  was  a  legislative  vacuum.”

24) It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid para that the Court  

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made it clear that framing of the said guidelines did not amount to  

judicial legislation.  In the opinion of the Court, since Section 147  

of  the Act  did not  carry any guidance on how to proceed with  

compounding of the offences under the Act and Section 320 of  

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not be followed in  

strict sense in respect of offences  pertaining to Section 138 of the  

Act, there was a legislative vacuum which prompted the Court to  

frame those guidelines to achieve the following objectives:

(i) to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition  

of offences in cases involving Section 138 of the Act;

(ii) it  would  result  in  encouraging  compounding  at  an  early  

stage of litigation saving valuable time of the Court which is  

spent on the trial of such cases; and

(iii) even though imposition of costs by the competent Court is a  

matter of discretion, the scale of cost had been suggested  

to attain uniformity.

At the same time, the Court also made it abundantly clear  

that the concerned Court would be at liberty to reduce the costs  

with regard to specific facts and circumstances of a case, while  

recording reasons in writing for such variance.

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25) What follows from the above is that normally costs as specified in  

the guidelines laid down in the said judgment has to be imposed  

on the accused persons while permitting compounding.   There  

can be departure therefrom in a particular case, for good reasons  

to be recorded in writing by the concerned Court.  It  is for this  

reason  that  the  Court  mentioned  three  objectives  which  were  

sought to be achieved by framing those guidelines, as taken note  

of above.  It is thus manifestly the framing of “Guidelines” in this  

judgment was also to achieve a particular public purpose.  Here  

comes the issue for consideration as to whether these guidelines  

are to be given a go by when a case is decided/settled in the Lok  

Adalat? Our answer is that it may not be necessarily so and a  

proper balance can be struck taking care of both the situations.

26) Having regard thereto, we are of the opinion that even when a  

case is decided in  Lok Adalat,  the requirement of following the  

guidelines  contained  in  Damodar  S.  Prabhu  (supra)  should  

normally  not  be  dispensed  with.   However,  if  there  is  a  

special/specific  reason  to  deviate  therefrom,  the  Court  is  not  

remediless  as  Damodar  S.  Prabhu  (supra)  itself  has  given  

discretion to the concerned Court to reduce the costs with regard  

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to specific facts and circumstances of the case, while recording  

reasons  in  writing  about  such  variance.   Therefore,  in  those  

matters  where  the  case  has  to  be  decided/settled  in  the  Lok  

Adalat, if the Court finds that it is a result of positive attitude of the  

parties, in such appropriate cases, the Court can always reduce  

the costs by imposing minimal costs or even waive the same.  For  

that, it would be for the parties, particularly the accused person, to  

make out a plausible case for the waiver/reduction of costs and to  

convince the concerned Court about the same.  This course of  

action, according to us, would strike a balance between the two  

competing but equally important interests, namely, achieving the  

objectives delineated in Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) on the one  

hand and the public interest which is sought to be achieved by  

encouraging settlements/resolution of case through Lok Adalats.

27) Having straightened the position in the manner above, insofar as  

the present case is concerned, as we find that the parties had  

already settled the matter and the purpose of going to the  Lok  

Adalat was only to have a rubber stamp of the Lok Adalat in the  

form of  its  imprimatur  thereto,  we do not  find any error  in  the  

impugned judgment,  though we are giving our  own reasons in  

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support  of  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  in  

dismissing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  respondent  No.2,  while  

straightening the approach that should be followed henceforth in  

such matters coming before the Lok Adalats.  

28) The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

.............................................J. (J. CHELAMESWAR)

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 10, 2014.

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