REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1215 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.26391/10)

M. Nagabhushana  ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

State of Karnataka & Others ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  

judgment  and  order  dated  23rd July  2010  

passed by Division Bench of the High Court  

of  Karnataka  whereby  the  learned  Judges  

dismissed the W.A. No.1192 of 2007 which  

was  filed  impugning  an  acquisition  

proceeding to the State of Karnataka. It  1

may also be noted that while dismissing the  

appeal,  the  Division  Bench  affirmed  the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge dated  

28th May 2007.  

3. From the perusal of the judgment of learned  

Single Judge it appears that the appellant  

claims to be the owner of the land bearing  

Sy.  No.76/1  and  Sy.  No.76/2  of  

Thotadaguddadahalli  Village,  Bangalore  

North  Taluk.  The  appellant  alleged  that  

these two plots of land were outside the  

purview  of  the  Framework  Agreement  (FWA)  

and  notification  issued  under  Sections  

28(1)  and  28(4)  of  Karnataka  Industrial  

Areas  Development  Act  (KIAD  Act).  While  

dismissing the writ petition, the learned  

Single  Judge  held  that  the  acquisition  

proceedings in question were challenged by  

the writ petitioner, the appellant herein,  

in  a  previous  writ  petition  No.46078/03  

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which  was  initially  accepted  and  the  

acquisition proceedings were quashed. Then  

on  appeal,  the  Division  Bench  (in  writ  

appeal Nos.713/04 and 2210/04) reversed the  

judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge.  

Thereafter,  the  Division  Bench  order  was  

upheld  before  this  Court  and  this  Court  

approved the acquisition proceedings.  

4. Therefore, the writ petition, out of which  

this present appeal arises, purports to be  

an attempt to litigate once again, inter  

alia,  on  the  ground  that  the  aforesaid  

blocks of land were outside the purview of  

FWA dated 3.4.1997. The learned Judges of  

the Division Bench held the second round of  

litigation is misconceived inasmuch as the  

acquisition proceedings were upheld right  

upto this Court. The Division Bench in the  

impugned judgment noted the aforesaid facts  

which were also noted by the learned Single  

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Judge. Apart from that the Division Bench  

also  noted  that  another  batch  of  public  

interest litigation in W.P. No.45334/04 and  

connected matters were also disposed of by  

this Court directing the State of Karnataka  

and all its instrumentalities including the  

Housing  Board  to  forthwith  execute  the  

project as conceived originally and upheld  

by this Court and it was also directed that  

FWA  be  implemented.  The  Division  Bench,  

however,  noted  that  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant  an  additional  ground  has  been  

raised that the acquisition stood vitiated  

since no award was passed as contemplated  

under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition  

Act (hereinafter “the said Act”).  

5. One of the contentions raised before the  

Division Bench on behalf of the appellant  

was  that  the  question  of  principle  of  

Constructive Res Judicata is not applicable  

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to  a  writ  petition.  This  contention  was  

raised  in  the  context  of  alleged  non-

publication of award and the consequential  

invalidation of the acquisition proceeding.  

Even though that contention was raised for  

the first time before the Division Bench.  

The  Division  Bench,  after  referring  to  

several judgments of this Court, held that  

the said contention is not tenable in law.  

The Division Bench also noted that in the  

earlier round of litigation the contentions  

relating to the land falling outside the  

area of FWA being acquired, were raised and  

were  repelled.  In  fact  the  contentions,  

raised in the previous round of litigation,  

have been noted expressly in para 17 of the  

impugned judgment, which are as under:

“Most  of  the  lands  in  question  fall  outside the area required for peripheral  road  etc.  and  they  are  fully  developed.  The acquisition for the benefit of private  company like the NICE Ltd. could not be  termed as public purpose.” “The acquisition for peripheral road etc.  would  be  illegal  notwithstanding  the  

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definition  of  infrastructural  facilities  as  incorporated  under  Section  2  (8a)  of  the  Act.  The  proposed  acquisition  is  in  respect  of  the  alleged  contract  between  the  State  and  M/s.  NICE  Ltd.  which  is  stated  to  be  based  on  agreement  dated  3.4.1997.” “It amounts to colorable exercise of power  and fraud on power and in such an event,  the entire acquisition proceedings are to  have  been  quashed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge.” “On reading of para 23(2) of the impugned  order,  it  is  clear  that  the  proposed  acquisition  of  land  as  notified  under  Section 28(1) of the Act is different from  the  alleged  purpose,  which  are  quite  different and from the same, it is clear  that  the  acquisition  initiated  is  not  bonafide, but the same is as a result of  colorable exercise of power coupled with  exercise  of  fraud  on  power  and  on  this  count also, the notification issued under  Section  28(1)  also  ought  to  have  been  quashed.” “The Government did not apply its mind to  the acquisition proceedings and there is  total  non  application  of  mind  by  the  government  to  the  relevant  facts  in  initiating  the  acquisition  proceedings  under the KIADB Act.” “There was a total change in the stand of  the opponents with regard to the ‘public  purpose’  which  was  stated  in  the  preliminary  notification  vis-à-vis  their  statement  of  objection  filed  before  the  Court  and  moreover  the  conduct  of  M/s.  NICE Company in allotting certain extent  of  lands  to  the  Association  of  India  Machine Tool Manufacturers (AIMTM) to put  

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up a big conventional centre, even before  the acquisition proceedings are complete,  disentitles  them  from  supporting  the  acquisition of lands.” “Since admittedly no industrial area was  being framed in the lands proposed to be  acquired,  the  KIADB  could  never  be  permitted  to  acquire  lands  for  the  formation  of  infrastructural  facility  without there being any industries.”

6. In the impugned judgment at para 18, the  

findings of the previous Division Bench, on  

the contentions extracted above, were also  

noted. Relevant parts of it are extracted:

“In  so  far  as  the  appeals  filed  by  the  appellant  –  Indian  Machine  Tools  Manufacturers  Association  in  Writ  Appeal  Nos.3326-27/2004  are  concerned,  we  find  that  there  is  considerable  force  in  the  submission made by the learned counsel for  the appellant that the writ petition filed  by the respondents 1 and 2 itself was not  maintainable. In fact the learned Senior  Counsel  for  the  contesting  respondent  fairly  conceded  the  same.  The  writ  petition  filed  by  the  2  nd   respondent  M.    Nagabhushan in W.P. No.39559/2003 came to  be dismissed by this court holding that he  had  purchased  the  land  in  question  from  its  previous  owner  D.R.  Raghavendra  subsequent  to  final  notification  issued  under  Sec.28(4)  of  the  Act  and  that  further  the  previous  owner  D.R.  Raghavendra  had  already  handed  over  possession of the land in question to the  

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Land Acquisition Officer by accepting the  award.”

“Therefore apart from the fact that there  is  no  merit  in  any  of  the  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the  land  owners,  we  find  that  the  appeals  filed  by  the  appellant  –  Indian  Machine  Tool  Manufacturers  Association  has  to  succeed  on the ground that the writ petition filed  by the respondents 1 and 2 itself was not  maintainable. Since the appellant – IMTMA  was not a party before the learned Single  Judge, the leave sought for is granted.”  

7. Challenging  the  aforesaid  judgment,  the  

present  appellant  filed  a  special  leave  

petition before this Court, which, on grant  

of  leave,  was  numbered  as  Civil  Appeal  

No.3878/2005.  The  grounds  which  were  

substantially  raised  by  the  present  

appellant  in  the  previous  appeal  

(No.3878/2005)  have  been  raised  again  in  

this  appeal.  The  alleged  grounds  in  the  

present  appeal  about  acquisition  of  land  

beyond the requirement of FWA were raised  

by the present appellant in the previous  

appeal No.3878/2005 also.

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8. On those contentions, a three-judge Bench  

of this Court, while dealing with several  

appeals  including  the  one  filed  by  the  

present appellant, rendered a judgment in  

State  of  Karnataka  and  another Vs.  All  India Manufacturers Organisation and others  – (2006) 4 SCC 683, wherein the said three-

judge Bench held:

“The  next  contention  urged  on  behalf  of  the landowners is that the lands were not  being acquired for a public purpose. The  counsel who have argued for the landowners  have  expatiated  in  their  contention  by  urging  that  land  in  excess  of  what  was  required under the FWA had been acquired;  land far away from the actual alignment of  the road and periphery had been acquired;  consequently, it is urged that even if the  implementation of the highway project is  assumed  to  be  for  a  public  purpose,  acquisition  of  land  far  away  therefrom  would not amount to a public purpose nor  would it be covered by the provisions of  the KIAD Act.”

(Paragraph 76, page 711 of the report)

9. In paragraph 77 of the said report, it was  

further held:

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“In  our  view,  this  was  an  entirely  misconceived argument. As we have pointed  out in the earlier part of our judgment,  the  Project  is  an  integrated  infrastructure development project and not  merely a highway project. The Project as  it  has  been  styled,  conceived  and  implemented  was  the  Bangalore-Mysore  Infrastructure  Corridor  Project,  which  conceived  of  the  development  of  roads  between  Bangalore  and  Mysore,  for  which  there  were  several  interchanges  in  and  around  the  periphery  of  the  city  of  Bangalore,  together  with  numerous  developmental  infrastructure  activities  along with the highway at several points.  As an integrated project, it may require  the acquisition and transfer of lands even  away from the main alignment of the road.”

10. In paragraph 79 at page 712 of the report,  

this Court affirmed the previous judgment  

of the Division Bench of the High Court in  

the following words:

“The  learned  Single  Judge  erred  in  assuming  that  the  lands  acquired  from  places away from the main alignment of the  road were not a part of the Project and  that  is  the  reason  he  was  persuaded  to  hold that only 60% of the land acquisition  was justified because it pertained to the  land  acquired  for  the  main  alignment  of  the  highway.  This,  in  the  view  of  the  Division  Bench,  and  in  our  view,  was  entirely erroneous. The Division Bench was  right in taking the view that the Project  was  an  integrated  project  intended  for  public purpose and, irrespective of where  the land was situated, so long as it arose  from the terms of the FWA, there was no  

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question  of  characterising  it  as  unconnected with a public purpose. We are,  therefore, in agreement with the finding  of the High Court on this issue.”

11. The  Division  Bench  judgment  of  the  High  

Court was further affirmed by this Court in  

clear and express words in paragraph 81 of  

the report:

“In  summary,  having  perused  the  well- considered judgment of the Division Bench  which is under appeal in the light of the  contentions  advanced  at  the  Bar,  we  are  not satisfied that the acquisitions were,  in any way, liable to be interfered with  by the High Court, even to the extent as  held by the learned Single Judge. We agree  with  the  decision  of  the  Division  Bench  that  the  acquisition  of  the  entire  land  for  the  Project  was  carried  out  in  consonance with the provisions of the KIAD  Act  for  a  public  project  of  great  importance  for  the  development  of  the  State of Karnataka. We do not think that a  project of this magnitude and urgency can  be  held  up  by  individuals  raising  frivolous  and  untenable  objections  thereto.  The  powers  under  the  KIAD  Act  represent  the  powers  of  eminent  domain  vested in the State, which may need to be  exercised  even  to  the  detriment  of  individuals’ property rights so long as it  achieves a larger public purpose. Looking  at the case as a whole, we are satisfied  that the Project is intended to represent  the  larger  public  interest  of  the  State  and that is why it was entered into and  implemented all along.”

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12. We  find  that  disregarding  the  aforesaid  

clear finding of this Court, the appellant,  

on identical issues, further filed a new  

writ  petition  out  of  which  the  present  

appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted  

above,  was  rejected  both  by  the  learned  

Single Judge and by the Division Bench in  

clear terms.

13. It  is  obvious  that  such  a  litigative  

adventure  by  the  present  appellant  is  

clearly  against  the  principles  of  Res  

Judicata  as  well  as  principles  of  

Constructive  Res  Judicata  and  principles  

analogous thereto.

14. The  principles  of  Res  Judicata  are  of  

universal application as it is based on two  

age  old  principles,  namely,  ‘interest  

reipublicae  ut  sit  finis  litium’  which  

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means that it is in the interest of the  

State  that  there  should  be  an  end  to  

litigation and the other principle is ‘nemo  

debet his ve ari, si constet curiae quod  

sit  pro  un  aet  eademn  cause’  meaning  

thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice  

in a litigation if it appears to the Court  

that  it  is  for  one  and  the  same  cause.  

This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to  

all  civilized  system  of  jurisprudence  to  

the extent that a judgment after a proper  

trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction  

should be regarded as final and conclusive  

determination  of  the  questions  litigated  

and should for ever set the controversy at  

rest.   

15. That principle of finality of litigation is  

based on high principle of public policy.  

In the absence of such a principle great  

oppression  might  result  under  the  colour  

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and pretence of law in as much as there  

will be no end of litigation and a rich and  

malicious  litigant  will  succeed  in  

infinitely  vexing  his  opponent  by  

repetitive  suits  and  actions.  This  may  

compel the weaker party to relinquish his  

right.  The  doctrine  of  Res  Judicata  has  

been evolved to prevent such an anarchy.  

That is why it is perceived that the plea  

of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine  

but a fundamental principle which sustains  

the  Rule  of  Law  in  ensuring  finality  in  

litigation.    This  principle  seeks  to  

promote honesty and a fair administration  

of  justice  and  to  prevent  abuse  in  the  

matter of accessing Court for agitating on  

issues which have become final between the  

parties.   

16. Justice Tek Chand delivering the unanimous  

Full  Bench  decision  in  the  case  of  

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Mussammat Lachhmi Vs. Mussammat Bhulli (ILR  Lahore Vol.VIII 384) traced the history of  

this doctrine both in Hindu and Mohammedan  

jurisprudence as follows:-

“In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chap.  I, Section V, verse 5) one of the four  kinds of effective answers to a suit  is “a plea by former judgment” and in  verse  10,  Katyayana  is  quoted  as  laying down that “one against whom a  judgment had formerly been given, if  he  bring  forward  the  matter  again,  must be answered by a plea of Purva  Nyaya or former judgment” (Macnaughten  and  Colebrooke’s  translation,  page  22).  The doctrine, however, seems to  have been recognized much earlier in  Hindu Jurisprudence, judging from the  fact  that  both  the  Smriti  Chandrika  (Mysore Edition, pages 97-98) and the  Virmitrodaya  (Vidya-Sagar  Edition,  page  77)  base  the  defence  of  Prang  Nyaya  (=former  decision)  on  the  following  text  of  the  ancient  law- giver Harita, who is believed by some  Orientalists to have flourished in the  9th Century B.C. and whose Smriti is  now extant only in fragments:-

“The  plaintiff  should  be  non- suited  if  the  defendant  avers:  ‘in  this very affair, there was litigation  between  him  and  myself  previously,’  and it is found that the plaintiff had  lost his case”.

There are texts of Prasara (Bengal  Asiatic Society Edition, page 56) and  of the Mayukha (Kane’s Edition, page  15) to the same effect.

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Among  Muhammadan  law-givers  similar effect was given to the plea  of  “Niza-i-munfasla”  or  “Amar  Mania  taqrir mukhalif.”  Under Roman Law, as  administered by the Proetors’ Courts,  a  defendant  could  repel  the  plaintiff’s  claim  by  means  of  ‘exceptio  rei  judicatoe”  or  plea  of  former judgment.  The subject received  considerable attention at the hands of  Ruman jurists and as stated in Roby’s  Roman Private Law (Vol.II, page 338)  the  general  principle  recognised  was  that “one suit and one decision was  enough  for  any  single  dispute”  and  that “a matter once brought to trial  should not be tried except, of course,  by way of appeal”.

(Page 391-392 of the report)

17. The  learned  Judge  also  noted  that  in  

British India the rule of Res Judicata was  

first  introduced  by  Section  16  of  the  

Bengal  Regulation,  III  of  1973  which  

prohibited the Zilla and City Courts from  

entertaining  any  cause  which,  from  the  

production of a former decree or the record  

of the Court, appears to have been heard  

and  determined  by  any  Judge  or  any  

Superintendent of a Court having competent  

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jurisdiction.  The learned Judge found that  

the  earliest  legislative  attempt  at  

codification of the law on the subject was  

made  in  1859,  when  the  first  Civil  

Procedure  Code  was  enacted,  whereunder  

Section 2 of the Code barred every Court  

from taking cognizance of suits which, on  

the same cause of action, have been heard  

and  determined  by  a  Court  of  competent  

jurisdiction.   The  learned  Judge  opined,  

and  in  our  view  rightly,  that  this  was  

partial recognition of the English rule in  

so  far  as  it  embodied  the  principles  

relating to Estoppel by judgment or Estopel  

by record.   

18. Thereafter, when the Code was again revised  

in  1877,  the  operation  of  the  rule  was  

extended in Section 13 and the bar was no  

longer confined to the retrial of a dispute  

relating to the same cause of action but  

the  prohibition  was  extended  against  1

reagitating an issue, which had been heard  

and  finally  decided  between  the  same  

parties  in  a  former  suit  by  a  competent  

court.  The learned Judge also noted that  

before  the  principle  assumed  its  present  

form in Section 11 of the Code of 1908, the  

Section was expanded twice.  However, the  

learned Judge noted that Section 11 is not  

exhaustive of the law on the subject.

19. It is nobody’s case that the appellant did  

not know the contents of FWA. From this it  

follows that it was open to the appellant  

to  question,  in  the  previous  proceeding  

filed  by  it,  that  his  land  which  was  

acquired was not included in the FWA. No  

reasonable explanation was offered by the  

appellant to indicate why he had not raised  

this  issue.  Therefore,  in  our  judgment,  

such  an  issue  cannot  be  raised  in  this  

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proceeding  in  view  of  the  doctrine  of  

Constructive Res Judicata.

20. It may be noted in this context that while  

applying the principles of Res Judicata the  

Court  should  not  be  hampered  by  any  

technical rules of interpretation.  It has  

been  very  categorically  opined  by  Sir  

Lawrence Jenkins that “the application of  

the  rule  by  Courts  in  India  should  be  

influenced by no technical considerations  

of form but by matter of substance within  

the limits allowed by law”. [See Sheoparsan  Singh Vs. Rammanandan Prasad Singh, (1916)  1 I.L.R. 43 Cal. 694 at page 706 (P.C.)].

21. Therefore,  any  proceeding  which  has  been  

initiated in breach of the principle of Res  

Judicata is prima-facie a proceeding which  

has been initiated in abuse of the process  

of Court.

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22. A  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Devilal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam  & Ors. – AIR 1965 SC 1150, has explained  this principle in very clear terms:

“But the question as to whether a citizen  should  be  allowed  to  challenge  the  validity of the same order by successive  petitions  under  Art.  226,  cannot  be  answered  merely  in  the  light  of  the  significance  and  importance  of  the  citizens' fundamental rights. The general  principle underlying the doctrine of res  judicata  is  ultimately  based  on  considerations  of  public  policy.  One  important  consideration  of  public  policy  is that the decisions pronounced by courts  of competent jurisdiction should be final,  unless  they  are  modified  or  reversed  by  appellate  authorities;  and  the  other  principle is that no one should be made to  face  the  same  kind  of  litigation  twice  over,  because  such  a  process  would  be  contrary  to  considerations  of  fair  play  and justice, vide : Daryao Vs. State of  U.P., 1962-1 SCR 575; (AIR 1961 SC 1457).”

23. This  Court  in  All  India  Manufacturers  Organisation (supra)  explained  in  clear  terms that principle behind the doctrine of  

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Res Judicata is to prevent an abuse of the  

process of Court.   

24. In explaining the said principle the Bench  

in  All  India  Manufacturers  Organisation  (supra) relied on the following formulation  

of  Lord Justice Somervell in  Greenhalgh  Vs. Mallard – (1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA):

“I think that on the authorities to which  I will refer it would be accurate to say  that res judicata for this purpose is not  confined to the issues which the court is  actually  asked  to  decide,  but  that  it  covers  issues  or  facts  which  are  so  clearly part of the subject-matter of the  litigation and so clearly could have been  raised that  it would be an abuse of the  process  of  the  court  to  allow  a  new  proceeding  to  be  started  in  respect  of  them.”

25. The Bench also noted that the judgment of  

the  Court  of  Appeal  in  “Greenhalgh”  was  

approved by this Court in State of U.P. Vs.  Nawab Hussain – (1977) 2 SCC 806 at page  809, para 4.

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26. Following  all  these  principles  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct  Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra –  (1990)  2  SCC  715  laid down the following principle:

“……an adjudication is conclusive and final  not  only  as  to  the  actual  matter  determined  but  as  to  every  other  matter  which the parties might and ought to have  litigated  and  have  had  decided  as  incidental  to  or  essentially  connected  with subject matter of the litigation and  every  matter  coming  into  the  legitimate  purview  of  the  original  action  both  in  respect  of  the  matters  of  claim  and  defence.  Thus,  the  principle  of  constructive  res  judicata  underlying  Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure  was  applied  to  writ  case. We, accordingly hold that the writ  case is fit to be dismissed on the ground  of res judicata”

27. In view of such authoritative pronouncement  

of the Constitution Bench of this Court,  

there can be no doubt that the principles  

of Constructive Res Judicata, as explained  

in explanation IV to Section 11 of the CPC,  

are also applicable to writ petitions.

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28. Thus,  the  attempt  to  re-argue  the  case  

which has been finally decided by the Court  

of last resort is a clear abuse of process  

of the Court, regardless of the principles  

of Res Judicata, as has been held by this  

Court in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and Ors. –  (1998) 3 SCC 573. In paragraph 44 of the  

report,  this  principle  has  been  very  

lucidly  discussed  by  this  Court  and  the  

relevant  portions  whereof  are  extracted  

below:

“One of the examples cited as an abuse of  the process of the court is relitigation.  It is an abuse of the process of the court  and contrary to justice and public policy  for a party to relitigate the same issue  which has already been tried and decided  earlier against him. The reagitation may  or may not be barred as res judicata...”

29. In  coming  to  the  aforementioned  finding,  

this  Court  relied  on  the  Supreme  Court  

Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell.  

The relevant principles laid down in the  

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aforesaid  practice  and  which  have  been  

accepted by this Court are as follows:

“This  term  connotes  that  the  process  of  the  court  must  be  used  bona  fide  and  properly and must not be abused. The court  will prevent improper use of its machinery  and  will  in  a  proper  case,  summarily  prevent its machinery from being used as a  means  of  vexation  and  oppression  in  the  process of litigation. ... The categories  of  conduct  rendering  a  claim  frivolous,  vexatious or an abuse of process are not  closed  but  depend  on  all  the  relevant  circumstances.  And  for  this  purpose  considerations  of  public  policy  and  the  interests  of  justice  may  be  very  material.”

30. In the premises aforesaid, it is clear that  

the attempt by the appellant to re-agitate  

the same issues which were considered by  

this Court and were rejected expressly in  

the  previous  judgment  in  All  India  Manufacturers  Organisation (supra),  is  a  clear instance of an abuse of process of  

this Court apart from the fact that such  

issues  are  barred  by  principles  of  Res  

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Judicata or Constructive Res Judicata and  

principles analogous thereto.

31. The other point which has been argued by  

the  appellant  is  that  notification  dated  

30.3.2004  issued  under  Section  28(4)  of  

KIAD  Act  stands  vitiated  in  view  of  the  

provisions of Section 11A of the said Act  

inasmuch as no award was passed within two  

years from the date of the notification.

32. This  Court  is  unable  to  accept  the  

aforesaid  contention  for  the  following  

reasons.

33. It may be noted that the said question was  

not  urged  by  the  appellant  in  its  writ  

petition before the learned Single Judge.  

Of  course,  this  was  urged  before  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  

unsuccessfully.  Apart  from  that  we  also  

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find  no  substance  in  the  aforesaid  

contentions.

34. If we compare the provisions of Sections  

28(4)  and  28(5)  of  KIAD  Act  with  the  

provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the said  

Act,  we  discern  a  substantial  difference  

between the two.

35. In order to appreciate the purport of both  

Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act,  

they are to be read together and are set  

out below:

“28. Acquisition of land-  

xxx xxx

(4) After  orders  are  passed  under  sub-Section (3), where the State  Government is satisfied that any  land should be acquired for the  purpose  specified  in  the  notification  issued  under  sub- section(1), a declaration shall,  by notification in the official  Gazette, be made to that effect.

(5) On  the  publication  in  the  official  Gazette  of  the  

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declaration  under  sub-section  (4),  the  land  shall  vest  absolutely  in  the  State  Government  free  from  all  encumbrances.”

36. The  appellant  has  not  challenged  the  

validity  of  the  aforesaid  provisions.  

Therefore,  on  a  combined  reading  of  the  

provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of  

the  KIAD  Act,  it  is  clear  that  on  the  

publication  of  the  notification  under  

Section  28(4)  of  the  KIAD  Act  i.e.  from  

30.3.2004, the land in question vested in  

the  State  free  from  all  encumbrances  by  

operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act,  

whereas the land acquired under the said  

Act vests only under Section 16 thereof,  

which runs as under:

“16. Power to take possession:- When the  Collector has made an award under section  11, he may take possession of the land,  which shall thereupon vest absolutely in  the Government free from all encumbrances”

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37. On  a  comparison  of  the  aforesaid  

provisions,  namely,  Sections  28(4)  and  

28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of  

the said Act, it is clear that the land  

which is subject to acquisition proceeding  

under  the  said  Act  gets  vested  with  the  

Government only when the Collector makes an  

award under Section 11, and the Government  

takes possession. Under Sections 28(4) and  

28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes  

place  by  operation  of  law  and  it  has  

nothing to do with the making of any award.  

This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of  

the  KIAD  Act  are  vitally  different  from  

Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.

38. A  somewhat  similar  question  came  up  for  

consideration before a three-judge Bench of  

this Court in Pratap and Another Vs. State  of Rajasthan and Ors. – (1996) 3 SCC 1. In  that  case  the  acquisition  proceedings  

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commenced under Section 52(2) of Rajasthan  

Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the same  

contentions were raised, namely, that the  

acquisition  notification  gets  invalidated  

for not making an award within a period of  

two years from the date of notification.

39. Repelling the said contention, the learned  

Judges held that once the land is vested in  

the Government, the provisions of Section  

11A are   not attracted and the acquisition  

proceedings  will  not  lapse.  (para  12  at  

page 8 of the report)

40. In Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Karnataka and  others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 326 this  Court held that the provisions of Sections  

6 and 11A of the said Act do not apply to  

the  provisions  of  Bangalore  Development  

Authority Act, 1976 (BDA Act). In paragraph  

15 at page 335 of the report this Court  

made a distinction between the purposes of  2

the two enactments and held that all the  

provisions of said Act do not apply to BDA  

Act.

41. Subsequently,  the  Constitution  Bench  of  

this Court in  Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Bangalore  Development  Authority  and  Ors., reported in 2011 (1) SCALE 533 – 574,  held that Section 11A of the said Act does  

not apply to acquisition under BDA Act.  

42. The  same  principle  is  attracted  to  the  

present  case  also.  Here  also  on  a  

comparison between the provisions of said  

Act and KIAD Act, we find that those two  

Acts were enacted to achieve substantially  

different purposes. In so far as KIAD Act  

is concerned, from its Statement of Objects  

and Reasons, it is clear that the same was  

enacted to achieve the following purposes:

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“It  is  considered  necessary  to  make  provision  for  the  orderly  establishment  and development of Industries in suitable  areas  in  the  State.  To  achieve  this  object, it is proposed to specify suitable  areas  for  Industrial  Development  and  establish  a  Board  to  develop  such  areas  and  make  available  lands  therein  for  establishment of Industries.”

43. KIAD  Act  is  of  course  a  self  contained  

code.  The  said  Act  is  primarily  a  law  

regulating acquisition of land for public  

purpose  and  for  payment  of  compensation.  

Acquisition of land under the said Act is  

not concerned solely with the purpose of  

planned development of any city. It has to  

cater  to  different  situations  which  come  

within  the  expanded  horizon  of  public  

purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of  

this Court in  Girnar Traders Vs.  State of  Maharashtra & Others, reported in 2011 (1)  SCALE 223 held that Section 11A of the said  

Act does not apply to acquisition under the  

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provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town  

Planning Act, 1966.  

44. The learned counsel for the appellant has  

relied on the judgment of this Court in the  

case of  Mariyappa and others Vs.  State of  Karnataka and others reported in (1998) 3  SCC 276. The said decision was cited for  

the purpose of contending that Section 11A  

is applicable to an acquisition under KIAD  

Act. In Mariyappa (supra) before coming to  hold that provision of Section 11A of the  

Central  Act  applies  to  Karnataka  

Acquisition  of  Land  for  Grant  of  House  

Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter “1972 Act”),  

this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a  

self-contained  code.  The  Court  also  held  

that the 1972 Act and the Central Acts are  

supplemental to each other to the extent  

that unless the Central Act supplements the  

Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function.  

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The Court further held that both the Acts,  

namely, 1972 Act and the Central Act deals  

with the same subject. But in the instant  

case the KIAD Act is a self-contained code  

and the Central Act is not supplemental to  

it.  Therefore,  the  ratio  in  Mariyappa  (supra) is not attracted to the facts of  

the present case.  

45. Following  the  aforesaid  well  settled  

principles, this Court is of the opinion  

that  there  is  no  substance  in  the  

contention  of  appellant  that  acquisition  

under  KIAD  Act  lapsed  for  alleged  non-

compliance with the provisions of Section  

11A of the said Act.  

46. For  the  reasons  aforesaid  all  the  

contentions of the appellant, being without  

any  substance,  fail  and  the  appeal  is  

dismissed.

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47. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, this  

Court holds that the filing of this appeal  

before  this  Court  is  an  instance  of  an  

abuse  of  the  process  of  Court.  The  main  

purpose was to hold up, on one or other  

pretext,  the  land  acquisition  proceeding  

which, as held by this Court in All India  Manufacturers  Organisation (supra),  was  initiated  to  ‘achieve  a  larger  public  

purpose’.  

48. In  that  view  of  the  matter,  this  court  

makes it clear that the State Government  

should  complete  the  project  as  early  as  

possible  and  should  not  do  anything,  

including releasing any land acquired under  

this  project,  as  that  may  impede  the  

completion of the project and would not be  

compatible with the larger public interest  

which the project is intended to serve.  

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49. This  Court,  therefore,  dismisses  this  

appeal with costs assessed at Rs.10 Lacs,  

to be paid by the appellant in favour of  

Karnataka  High  Court  Legal  Services  

Authority within a period of six weeks from  

date.  In  default,  a  proceeding  will  be  

initiated  against  the  appellant  on  a  

complaint by the Karnataka High Court Legal  

Services  Authority  by  the  appropriate  

authority under the relevant Public Demand  

Recovery  Act  for  recovery  of  this  cost  

amount as arrears of land revenue.  

50. The appeal is, thus, dismissed with costs  

as aforesaid.  Interim orders, if any, are  

vacated.

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

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.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) February 02, 2011  

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