REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  611    OF 2011                      (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2550/2010)   

M. MOHAN            ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE  DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE        ... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  612   OF 2011                      (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2687/2010)   

VELMURUGAN & ANR.             ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE  DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE          ... RESPONDENT

J U D G     M E N T   

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. Leave granted in both the matters.

2. Since the facts of both the appeals are common, therefore,  

these appeals are decided by a common judgment.

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.  612   OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2687/2010)

3. We  deem it  proper  to  take  the  facts  of   Criminal  Appeal  

arising  out  of  SLP  (Crl.)No.2687  of  2010   filed  by  Velmurugan,  

Accused No.4 and Anna Lakshmi,  Accused No.5 (for short 'A-4 and  

A-5'  respectively).  This  appeal  emanates  from the  judgment  and  

order dated 22.02.2010 delivered by the Madurai Bench of the High  

Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Original Petition (MD)  

No.94 of 2006.  

4. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are  

recapitulated as under:

5. One  Kamatchi  (deceased),  daughter  of  Duraipandi  Nadar  

(complainant)  was  married  to  Anandraj  (A-1),  son  of  Mahalinga  

Nadar on 6.9.2001. Mahalinga Nadar and his wife Anna Lakshmi  

(A-5) had three sons whose names are shown as under :

              Mahalinga Nadar   

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     Son(A-1)  Son(A-2) Son(A-4)        |                 |                |    Anandraj  M. Mohan Velmurugan    Husband of          married                          deceased            to                 Kamatchi            Easwari (A-3)

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Anandraj  (A-1)  even  after  marriage  with  Kamatchi  (the  

deceased)stayed  with  his  two  brothers  and  parents  in  the  joint  

family.   Kamatchi  delivered a female child on 7.1.2003. Accused  

Anandraj's elder brother, M. Mohan (A-2) and his wife Easwari (A-3)  

owned a Qualis  car.  On the date  of  Pongal,  i.e.,  on 14.01.2005,  

Kamatchi's  in-laws  family  planned  a  visit  to  the  Theme Park  at  

Madurai  from  Karaikudi.  Deceased  Kamatchi,  her  husband  

Anandraj (A-1) were denied the use of the said family car.  Other  

members of the family had gone to the Theme Park in the family car  

whereas the deceased Kamatchi and her husband Anandraj (A-1)  

were told by Easwari (A-3) to reach the destination by public bus  

who is alleged to have said to Kamatchi that “if you want to go by a  

car, you have to bring a car from your family”.

6. Kamatchi  along  with  her  husband  Anandraj  and  a  child,  

took a public transport(bus) from Karaikudi to Madurai for reaching  

the said Theme Park and returned to her matrimonial home in a  

bus.  Kamatchi  was  deeply  hurt  by  the  taunting  statement  of  

Easwari (A-3) regarding denial of the use of family car.  

7. Immediately thereafter, Kamatchi demanded a car from her  

father for personal use and after four days, i.e., on 18.1.2005 at  

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about 1.30 p.m. she committed suicide by hanging herself in her  

bedroom using her sari.   

8. On  receipt  of  the  information,  the  father  of  the  deceased  

Kamatchi  reached  Karaikudi  and  filed  a  complaint  with  the  

Karaikudi  Police Station (South) at about 5.00 p.m. alleging that  

his son-in-law Anandraj (A-1) and his elder brother's wife Easwari  

(A-3) were responsible for his daughter's suicide. On receipt of the  

said  complaint,  the  Sub-Inspector  of  Police,  Karaikudi  (South)  

Police Station registered a case under Section 174 of the Criminal  

Procedure Code (for short 'Cr.P.C.') by assigning Crime No.13/2005  

on 18.01.2005.

  9. The Sub Inspector of  Police  forwarded a copy of  the First  

Information  Report  (for  short  'F.I.R.')  to  the  Revenue  Divisional  

Officer (for short 'R.D.O.') to hold an inquest and also a copy to the  

Deputy Superintendent of Police (for short 'D.S.P.'), Karaikudi, for  

further investigation, who commenced inquiry on the same day as  

Kamatchi had committed suicide within three and a half years of  

her marriage.  

10. The  D.S.P.,  Karaikudi  on  receipt  of  the  F.I.R.  from  the  

Karaikudi  South  Police  Station,  took  up  the  complaint  for  

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investigation and filed an Alteration Report on 19.1.2005 before the  

Jurisdictional Magistrate, Karaikudi under Sections 498-A and 306  

I.P.C. against Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3) respectively.

11. The R.D.O. commenced enquiry on 18.1.2005 and examined  

many witnesses and on 3rd February, 2005 a report was sent by  

him to the D.S.P. in which he had categorically stated that there  

was no dowry harassment in the  suicide case, especially in view of  

the fact that even the parents of the deceased had not informed him  

about the harassment of dowry.  The parents of the deceased had  

specifically  stated  before  the  R.D.O.  that  because  of  the  taunts  

made by Easwari (A-3) their daughter had committed suicide. The  

D.S.P., in addition to the inquest held by the R.D.O., proceeded to  

investigate the case and filed a Charge Sheet on 29.4.2005 not only  

against Anandraj (A-1), the deceased's husband and M. Mohan (A-

2), her brother-in-law and his wife, Easwari (A-3), but also against  

the appellants herein  who are elder brother of the husband of the  

deceased  and  the  mother  of  appellant  No.1  respectively  under  

Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (for short  

'I.P.C.'). A copy of the charge sheet dated 29.4.2005 was filed before  

the learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi.  

12. The learned Magistrate, on perusing the final report, took the  

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same on file  by assigning  P.R.C.No.11/2005 and summoned the  

accused to furnish copies before committing the case to the Court  

of Sessions for trial.  

13. The  appellants,  aggrieved  by  the  vexatious  prosecution  

initiated at the behest of the respondent approached the High Court  

of Judicature at Madras for quashing the proceedings against them  

under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.   The  learned  Single  Judge,  while  

quashing  the  charges  under  Sections  498-A  and  304-B  I.P.C.  

against the appellants, partly allowed their petition and held that  

they  have  to  face  trial  for  the  offence  under  Section  306  I.P.C.  

insofar as challenge to Section 306 I.P.C. was concerned.

14. The High Court in the impugned judgment observed that in  

the  F.I.R.  lodged by the  complainant,  no whisper  of  demand for  

dowry  has  been made  against  the  appellants.   A  perusal  of  the  

F.I.R.  would  reveal  that  Anandraj  (A-1)  and  Easwari,  A-3  were  

torturing the deceased on some pretext or the other especially in  

connection with getting a car from her father.  The deceased was  

denied use of the car for going to the Theme Park near Madurai on  

14.01.2005.  The deceased was also abused by Anandraj  (A-1)  in  

this regard.   They had  to go to the Theme Park at Madurai by bus.  

After returning, the deceased contacted her father on phone and  

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narrated the entire incident and on 18.1.2005 at around 1.30 p.m.,  

Kamatchi committed suicide by hanging herself.  On registration of  

the case under Section 174 Cr.P.C., the complainant and his wife  

and others were examined.  Even in the statement, the complainant  

had not made a whisper about the demand of dowry on the part of  

the appellants but harped upon the ill treatment to his daughter at  

the hands of Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3).  Even at the inquest  

conducted by the R.D.O., the complainant has not even whispered  

with regard to the demand of dowry on the part of the appellants.  

The statement of witnesses including that of the complainant were  

recorded on 27.01.2005. The relevant portion of the exact version  

given in the F.I.R. reads as under :

“.....My eldest daughter is aged about 21 years.  She was  given  in  marriage  by  me  to  one  Anandaraj  son  of  Mahalinga Nadar of  Karaikudi  3 years ago in the year  2002,  and  next  daughter  was  given  in  marriage  at  Coimbatore  and  other  two  daughters  are  yet  to  be  married.   At  the  time  of  marriage  of  my  daughter  Kamatchi,  to Anandraj,  I  gave them  one Kilo of Gold,  Diamonds  and  jewels,  and other  utensils  and  articles.  They were living along with his elder brother Mohan as  joint family. They possess one Qualis car of their own.  The said car was purchased in the name of Easwari my  son-in-law's brother's wife.  My daughter felt very hurt  when she was not allowed to use the said car and was  taunted  by  my  son-in-law  Anandraj  and  Mohan's  wife  Easwari  to  get  a  car  from  her  parental  home  if  she  wished to go by a car.  When she disclosed this matter to  me I was ready to give her a car.  At this junction, during  last  Pongal  festival,  her  family  had  gone  to  Madurai  ('Athisayam') in the said Qualis car. They refused to take  

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my daughter along with them in the said car, and they  have also teased and insulted her and told her to come in  the bus and also said 'do you want to use a car then why  you did not get a car'.  My daughter informed about this  incident to me over the phone and before I could get a car  ready for her today on 18.1.2005, at about 1.30 hours,  my son-in-law, Anandraj, informed over phone that my  daughter had hanged herself  and  is   dead. My son-in- law Anandraj and  Mohan's wife Easwari who were cause  for my daughter's death.....”

The  above  quoted  portion  of  the  F.I.R.  also  indicates  that  all  

allegations  are  confined  to  Anandraj  (A-1),  the  husband  of  the  

deceased  and  his  sister-in-law,  Easwari  (A-3).  According  to  the  

appellants,  from  the  entire  material  available  on  record,  by  no  

stretch  of  imagination,  an  offence  under  Section  306  I.P.C.  was  

made out against the appellants and the impugned judgment of the  

High Court is contrary to the law as has been laid down by this  

court in a series of judgments.   

15. According to the appellants, the High Court in the impugned  

judgment  has  seriously  erred in  not  quashing  the  charge  under  

Section  306  I.P.C.  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  absolutely  no  

material  on  record  to  proceed  against  the  appellants  either  for  

cruelty or for dowry harassment.  

16. The  appellants  contended  that  the  learned  Single  Judge,  

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after  examining  the  F.I.R.,  R.D.O.  report  and  Statements  of  the  

Witnesses  under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.  found  that  there  were  no  

allegations against the appellants herein from the inception either  

by  the  complainant  or  by  the  mother  of  the  deceased  and  has  

further held that there was no element of dowry related harassment  

and/or any cruelty meted out to the deceased by her sister-in-law  

or  for  that matter  by any of  the  accused.   In view of  the above  

categorical findings, the learned Single Judge quashed the charges  

under Sections 304-B and 498-A I.P.C.  However, the learned Single  

Judge failed to appreciate that on the basis of the material available  

on record and in the absence of any allegation, if no offence is made  

out against the appellants under Sections 304-B and 498-A, then  

the appellants cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C. It is  

stated  that  to  attract  the  provisions  of  Section  306  I.P.C.,  the  

allegations as to the existence of cruelty,  dowry harassment and  

abetment to suicide are all integrated. In absence of any allegations  

under Sections 498-A and 304-B I.P.C. provisions of Section 306  

I.P.C. cannot be attracted.  

17. The  appellants  submitted  that  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Gangula Mohan Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh  one of us,  

Dalveer Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment), reported in  

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(2010)(1) SCC 750, while interpreting Section 306 I.P.C. held that  

abetment  involves  a  mental  process  of  instigating  a  person  or  

intentionally  aiding  a  person in  doing  of  a  thing  and without  a  

positive  act  on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  instigate  or  aid  in  

committing suicide, there cannot be any conviction.  It was further  

held that to attract Section 306 I.P.C. there has to be a clear mens  

rea to commit the offence. It is further stated that the present case  

is squarely covered by the above decision as even if the case of the  

prosecution is taken to be true and the finding of the High Court  

that there are no elements of cruelty or dowry related harassment  

and that the witnesses have improved upon their earlier statements  

is ignored, then also Section 306 I.P.C.. is not attracted in the facts  

of the present case.

18. According to the appellants,  the present case is a fit  case  

wherein  the  charges  under  Section  306  I.P.C.  are  liable  to  be  

quashed for the following sequence of events and reasons:

“On 06.09.2002, Kamatchi, (the deceased in the case) got  married to Anandaraj (A-1). After the marriage they lived  with two other brothers of the AI and the parent in laws  jointly.  Deceased is stated to have had cordial relations  with every member of the family.  

On 7.1.2003, Anandaraj (A-1) and Kamatchi were blessed  with  one  female  child.   The  child  was  christened  as  Nithyasree.

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On 14.1.2005, the entire family decided to go to  'Adisayam'  a  Theme park  at  Madurai  to  celebrate  and  enjoy the Pongal Holidays. Kamatchi was prevented from  travelling in a Qualis car by Easwari (A-3) and is alleged  to have taunted Kamatchi, “if you want to travel by a car  please get a car from your parents”.  Thereafter, leaving  Anandaraj, Kamatchi and their child, they proceeded to  Madurai to visit the Theme Park 'Adisayam' by a Qualis  car.

Anandaraj and his family also proceeded to Madurai to  visit the Theme Park and after their visit they returned to  their  native  Karaikudi.  Both  to  and  fro,  the  family  traveled by bus.  

On 18.01.2005 at about 1.30 p.m. Kamatchi committed  suicide at her matrimonial home, using her sari to hang  herself.

At about 5.00 p.m. Mr.Duraipandi Nadar, the father of  the  deceased  Kamatchi  lodged  a  complaint  before  Karaikudi  South  Police  Station.  It   is   the   specific  allegation in the complaint that A1 and A3 alone are the  cause of the suicide of his daughter.

The Sub Inspector of Police, Under Section 174 of Cr.P.C.  Registered  the  said  complaint  by  assigning  Cr.No.13/2005.

At  about  6.00  p.m.  R.D.O.  conducted  an  enqury  and  prepared  and  Mahazar  and  seized  the  diary  of  the  deceased, a letter and the sari which was used by her  commit suicide.

D.S.P. Karaikudi, examined S.V.Duraipandi, the father of  the deceased (L.W.1) and recorded his statement.

D.S.P. Karaikudi examined Mrs.Tamil Selvi,  the mother  of the deceased (L.W.2).

On 19.01.2005 alteration report filed by the D.S.P. under  Section 306 and 498 A IPC against A-1 and A-3 alone.

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On 3.2.2005 RDO who commenced enquiry from the date  of  incident  itself  and  examined  the   records  and  the  statements of various witnesses.  He filed a report with a  recommendation  from  the  D.S.P.  to  conduct  further  investigation to determine the real reasons for the suicide  with a specific finding that the suicide death is not due to  any  dowry  harassment.  R.D.O.  has  also  recorded  the  statement of the de facto complainant and the mother of  the deceased to the effect that the deceased was having a  very  cordial  relationship  with  every  one  in  the  family  including  the  husband  except  the  A-3  the  second  daughter in law”.

19. All  these  facts  would  clearly  show  and  demonstrate  that  

neither at the time of inquest nor during the R.D.O. enquiry or at  

the  time of  the  complaint  by  the   complainant,  who is  also  the  

father of  the deceased, any allegation was attributed against the  

appellants and, on the contrary, it was the case of the complainant  

that allegedly Easwari (A-3) alone was responsible for the suicide of  

the deceased and this formed the basis of the learned Single Judge  

to come to the conclusion that Sections 304-B and 498-A-I.P.C. are  

not attracted.

20. The appellants submitted that there is no allegation against  

the appellants Velmurugan and Anna Lakshmi, who are arrayed as  

Accused 4 and  5 respectively in the final report either at the time  

of lodging of the complaint and registration of FIR or at the time of  

inquest enquiry or even in the statements before the R.D.O. On the  

contrary the complainant has alleged that it is only Easwari (A-3)  

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who is  the  cause  of  the  suicide.   It  may  be  relevant  to  extract  

certain  portions  of  the  F.I.R.,  R.D.O.  Report  and  the  Alteration  

Report filed by the respondent.

21. In the R.D.O. Report dated 3.2.2005, the following statement  

of the complainant is extracted :

“My son-in-law Thiru M.Anandraj is running a provision  shop at Karaikudi of his own.  In that his brother Mohan  is also having a share.  My son-in-law looked after my  daughter in  good manner.  All of them in their house  treated my daughter  in  a  good way.  He  informed that  Smt.Eswari, wife of Mohan alone used to quarrel with my  daughter often.  Due to her torture alone my daughter  might have hanged herself and committed suicide.  In the  death, apart from Smt.Eswari, he informed that no other  is having any part.  He has also stated that there is no  dowry harassment in the death. (emphasis added)”

22. Again  in  the  said  Report   the   R.D.O.  concludes  as  

under :

“From the inquest it can be found that the death did not  happen due to dowry harassment.   The reason is  that  even the father and mother of the deceased girl said the  death  has  not  happened  due  to  dowry  harassment.  Therefore, I inform that the death is not caused due to  dowry harassment. Further, the father and mother of the  deceased girl  said that the death is caused due to the  torture of Smt.Easwari.  Therefore, the police may take  up the case for investigation and on proper investigation  the cause for the death may be found out.”

23. Again in the Alteration Report  by 'D.S.P.',  the following is  

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recorded :

“It  is  found  that  the  deceased  Kamatchi  committed  suicide  only  due  to  the  harassment  by  her  husband  Anandaraj  and  his  elder  brother's  wife  Eswari  often  demanding car as dowry from her parents.”  

24. Again in the F.I.R. the only allegation is that:

“My  son-in-law  Anandraj  and  Easwari,  wife  of  Mohan  have abetted my daughter Kamatchi to commit suicide.  They are responsible for my daughter's death. Therefore,  I  request  that  action may  be  taken against  Anandaraj  and Easwari alone for the death of my daughter.”

25. The appellants  also  submitted  that  the  entire  case  of  the  

prosecution  does  not  reveal  even  remote  connection  of  the  

appellants  with  the  commission  of  an  offence  punishable  under  

Section 306 I.P.C.   

26. The case of the prosecution is that on 14th January,2005, the  

deceased wanted to use the family car to go to the Theme Park at  

Madurai from Karaikudi along with other family members but she  

was denied the permission to use the car.  At that juncture Easwari  

(A-3) taunted the deceased that if she wanted to go around in a car,  

she has to get a car from her parents. These words deeply hurt the  

deceased and she had committed suicide on 18th January,2005 at  

1.30 p.m. at her matrimonial home.  

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27. The appellants submitted that even if the prosecution story  

that she was denied permission to use the car on 14th January,  

2005 and the suicide had taken place on 18th January,  2005 is  

believed, it cannot be said that the suicide by the deceased was the  

direct  result  of  the expressions exchanged between the deceased  

and Easwari (A-3) on 14th January, 2005. Viewed from the aforesaid  

circumstances independently, still the ingredients of the “abetment”  

are  totally  absent  in  the  case  at  hand.  In  these  facts  and  

circumstances, to compel the appellants to face the rigmarole of a  

trial would be an abuse of law.  

28. The appellants also submitted that there is no material on  

record to proceed against the appellants  for an offence punishable  

under Section 306 I.P.C. No conviction can be recorded in absence  

of  legal  evidence.   According  to  the  appellants,  any  further  

proceeding in this case will be an abuse of the process. According to  

them, this is a fit case warranting interference by this Court.  

29. The appellants contended that the genesis of the prosecution  

is  on  the  basis  of  the  complaint  preferred  by  the  father  of  the  

deceased Kamatchi. He had categorically stated that his daughter  

had  committed  suicide  due  to  the  taunts   of   Easwari  (A-3).  

According to the complainant, his son-in-law, Anandraj (A-1)  and  

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the said Easwari (A-3) alone were responsible for the death of his  

daughter.

30. The  appellants  also  contended  that  in  pursuance  to  that  

complaint, the R.D.O. held an inquest by examining few witnesses  

including  the  father,  the  mother  and  the  brother-in-law  (sister's  

husband)  of the deceased and others.  In their statements, none of  

them had stated any dowry harassment against the accused or any  

other member of the family of the accused.  On the contrary, they  

have  categorically  stated  that  there  was  no  dowry  harassment  

suffered  by  the  deceased  in  her  in-law's  house.   Thus,  the  

requirement  to  bring  home  the  ingredient  of  the  offence  Under  

Section 304-B I.P.C., namely, the 'dowry' demand as found by the  

learned Single Judge was absent in the  prosecution case.  They  

contended that the High Court has held that no allegation of cruelty  

against the appellants were found from the very inception and the  

charge  under  Section  498-A  was  liable  to  be  quashed.  In  this  

background, by no stretch of imagination, the appellants can ever  

be convicted under Section 306 IPC.  

31. The appellants submitted that the summoning of an accused  

in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set  

into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant  

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has  to  bring  only  two  witnesses  to  support  allegations  in  the  

complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the  

Magistrate  summoning  the  accused  must  reflect  that  he  has  

applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable  

thereto.  He has to examine the nature of the allegations made in  

the  complaint  and the  evidence,  both oral  and  documentary,  in  

support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to  

succeed in bringing home the charge against the accused? It is not  

that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of  

preliminary evidence before the summoning of the accused.  The  

Magistrate  has  to  carefully  scrutinize  the  evidence  brought  on  

record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and  

his witnesses to elicit answers to point out the truthfulness of the  

allegations or  otherwise  and  then  examine  if  any offence is  

prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.

32. The appellants submitted that the prosecution must produce  

evidence before the Court, which is capable of being converted into  

legal evidence after the charges are framed. In this case admittedly,  

there is no legal evidence connecting the appellants with any crime,  

much less the offences alleged, as the materials are not  capable of  

being converted into legal evidence.  Hence, in the absence of any  

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material  which  can  be  converted  into  legal  evidence,  the  

proceedings as against the appellants under Section 306 IPC are  

also liable to be quashed.

 33. The  appellants  has  placed  reliance  on  a  judgment  of  this  

Court  in  Mahendra  Singh  & Another v.  State  of  M.P.  1995  

Supp. (3) SCC 731.  In this case the allegations levelled were as  

under:-

“My  mother-in-law  and  husband  and  sister-in-law  (husband’s elder brother’s wife) harassed me.  They beat me  and abused me.  My husband Mahendra wants to marry a  second time.  He has illicit connections with my sister-in- law.  Because of these reasons and being harassed I want  to die by burning.”

34. This  Court  while  acquitting  the  appellant  observed  that  

neither  of  the  ingredients  of  abetment  are  attracted  on  the  

statement of the deceased.

 35. In the instant case, what to talk of existence of instances or  

illustrations of instigation, there are no specific allegations levelled  

against the appellants. On a careful perusal of the entire material  

on  record,  no  offence  under  Section  306  IPC  can  be  made  out  

against the appellants, in view of our clear and definite finding that  

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there is no material whatsoever against the appellants much less  

positive  act  on  the  part  of  the  appellants  to  instigate  or  aid  in  

committing the suicide.

36. The main substantial  questions of law which arise in this  

appeal are whether the conviction of the appellants under Section  

306  I.P.C.  is  sustainable  and  whether  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  this  case,  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  not  

quashing the proceedings against the appellants under its inherent  

powers.  

37. We would like to deal with the concept of 'abetment'. Section  

306 of the Code deals with 'abetment of suicide'  which reads as  

under:

“306. Abetment  of  suicide  –  If  any  person  commits  suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of  either  description for a term which may extent to ten years, and  shall also be liable to fine.”

38. The word 'suicide' in itself is nowhere defined in the Indian  

Penal Code, however, its meaning and import is well  known and  

requires no explanation. ‘Sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’,  

thus implying an act of self-killing. In short a person committing  

suicide  must  commit  it  by  himself,  irrespective  of  the  means  

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employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.  

39. In  our  country,  while  suicide  itself  is  not  an  offence  

considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach of law,  

attempt to suicide is an offence under section 309 of I.P.C.

40. ‘Abetment of a thing’ has been defined under section 107 of  

the Code.  We deem it appropriate to reproduce section 107, which  

reads as under:

“107. Abetment of a thing – A person abets the doing of a  thing, who –

First –  Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly –  Engages with one or  more  other  person or  persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if  an act or illegal omission takes places in pursuance of  that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing;  or

Thirdly  –    Intentionally  aides,  by  any  act  or  illegal  omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with  

section 107 reads as under:

“Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  an  act,  does  anything in order to facilitate the commission  of  that  act,  and  thereby  facilitate  the  commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of  that act.”

41. Learned  counsel  also  placed  reliance  on  yet  another  

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judgment  of  this  court  in  Ramesh  Kumar  v.  State  of  

Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, in which a three-Judge Bench of  

this  court  had  an  occasion  to  deal  with  the  case  of   a  similar  

nature.  In a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant  

husband uttered  “you are  free  to  do whatever  you wish and go  

wherever you like”.  Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh  

Kumar  committed  suicide.  This  Court  in  paragraph  20  has  

examined different shades of the meaning of “instigation’.  Para 20 reads  

as under:

“20.  Instigation  is  to  goad,  urge  forward,  provoke,  incite  or  encourage  to  do  "an  act".  To  satisfy  the  requirement of instigation though it is not necessary  that actual words must be used to that effect. or what  constitutes  instigation  must  necessarily  and  specifically  be suggestive  of  the  consequence.  Yet  a  reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must  be capable of being spelt out. the present one is not a  case where the accused had by his acts or omission or  by  a  continued  course  of  conduct  created  such  circumstances  that  the  deceased  was  left  with  no  other option except to commit suicide in which case  an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered  in the fit  of anger or emotion without intending the  consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be  instigation.”

42. In the said case this court came to the conclusion that there  

is  no  evidence  and  material  available  on  record  wherefrom  an  

inference of  the accused-appellant  having abetted commission of  

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suicide  by  Seema  (appellant's  wife  therein)  may  necessarily  be  

drawn.

43. In  State  of  West  Bengal v.  Orilal  Jaiswal  & Another  

(1994) 1 SCC 73, this Court has cautioned that the Court should  

be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of  

each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of  

finding  whether  the  cruelty  meted out  to  the  victim had in  fact  

induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to  

the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to  

ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life,  quite  

common to  the  society,  to  which  the  victim belonged  and  such  

petulance,  discord and difference were not expected to induce a  

similarly  circumstanced  individual  in  a  given  society  to  commit  

suicide,  the  conscience  of  the  Court  should  not  be  satisfied  for  

basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of  

suicide should be found guilty.

44. This court in  Chitresh Kumar Chopra v.  State (Govt. of  

NCT of Delhi)  2009 (16) SCC 605,   had   an  occasion to deal with  

this  aspect  of  abetment.  The  court  dealt  with  the  dictionary  

meaning of the word “instigation” and “goading”.  The court opined  

that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the  

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doing of an act by the latter.  Each person’s suicidability pattern is  

different from the others.  Each person has his own idea of self-

esteem and self-respect.  Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any  

straight-jacket formula in dealing with such cases.  Each case has  

to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

45. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person  

or  intentionally  aiding  a  person  in  doing  of  a  thing.  Without  a  

positive  act  on  the  part  of  the  accused  to  instigate  or  aid  in  

committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

46. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases  

decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person  

under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit  

the offence.  It also requires an active act or direct act which led the  

deceased to  commit  suicide  seeing no option and this  act  must  

have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that  

he/she committed suicide.

47. In  V.P.  Shrivastava v.  Indian  Explosives  Limited  and  

Others (2010) 10 SCC 361, this court has held that when  prima  

facie no case is made out against the accused, then the High Court  

ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under section 482 of the  

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Cr.P.C. and quashed the complaint.

48. In a recent judgment of this Court in the case of  Madan  

Mohan Singh v.  State of Gujarat and Anr. (2010 ) 8 SCC 628,  

this Court quashed the conviction under Section 306 IPC on the  

ground  that  the  allegations  were  irrelevant  and  baseless  and  

observed that  the  High Court  was in  error  in  not  quashing  the  

proceedings.  

49. In the instant case, what to talk of instances of instigation,  

there are even no allegations against the appellants.  There is also  

no  proximate  link  between  the  incident  of  14.1.2005  when  the  

deceased was denied permission to  use the  Qualis  car  with  the  

factum of suicide which had taken place on 18.1.2005.  

50. Undoubtedly,  the  deceased  had  died  because  of  hanging.  

The  deceased  was  undoubtedly  hyper-sensitive  to  ordinary  

petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day  

life.   In  a  joint  family,  instances  of  this  kind  are  not  very  

uncommon.  Human  sensitivity  of  each  individual  differs  from  

person to person. Each individual has his own idea of self-esteem  

and self-respect.  Different people behave differently in the same  

situation.  It  is  unfortunate  that  such an episode  of  suicide  had  

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taken place in the family.  But the question remains to be answered  

is whether the appellants can be connected with that unfortunate  

incident in any manner?  

51. On a careful perusal of the entire material on record and the  

law, which has been declared by this Court, we can safely arrive at  

the conclusion that the appellants are not even remotely connected  

with the offence under Section 306 of the I.P.C.. It may be relevant  

to  mention  that  criminal  proceedings  against  husband  of  the  

deceased  Anandraj  (A-1)  and  Easwari  (A-3)  are  pending  

adjudication.

52. Next question which arises in this case is that in view of the  

settled  legal  position  whether  the  High  Court  ought  to  have  

quashed the proceedings under its inherent power under Section  

482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the facts and circumstances  

of this case?  

53. This Court had an occasion to examine the legal position in  

a large number of cases. In  R.P. Kapur v.   State of Punjab   AIR  

1960  SC 866,  this  Court  summarized  some  categories  of  cases  

where  the  High  Court  in  its  inherent  power  can  and  should  

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exercise to quash the proceedings:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal  bar against the institution or continuance of the  proceedings;

(ii) where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report  or  complaint  taken  at  their  face  value  and  accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  constitute  the  offence  alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but  there  is  no  legal  evidence  adduced  or  the  evidence  adduced  clearly  or  manifestly  fails  to  prove the charge.

54. In  Smt. Nagawwa v.  Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi  

and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process  

against the accused can be quashed or set aside :

“(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the  statements of the witnesses recorded in support of  the  same  taken  at  their  face  value  make  out  absolutely  no  case  against  the  accused  or  the  complaint  does  not  disclose  the  essential  ingredients  of  an offence which is  alleged against  the accused;

(2) where  the  allegations  made  in  the  complaint  are  patently absurd and inherently improbable so that  no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that  there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the  accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in  issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having  been based either on no evidence or on materials  which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

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(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal  defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a  complaint  by  legally  competent  authority  and the  like”.

55. This  court  in  State  of  Karnataka v.  L.  Muniswamy &  

Others (1977)  2  SCC  699,  observed  that  the  wholesome  power  

under  section  482  Cr.P.C.  entitles  the  High  Court  to  quash  a  

proceeding  when  it  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  allowing  the  

proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the  

court  or  that  the  ends  of  justice  requires  that  the  proceedings  

ought  to  be quashed.  The High Courts  have  been invested  with  

inherent powers, both in civil  and criminal matters, to achieve a  

salutary  public  purpose.  A  Court   proceeding  ought  not  to  be  

permitted  to  degenerate  into  a  weapon  of  harassment  or  

persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice  

are  higher  than  the  ends  of  mere  law  though  justice  must  be  

administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case  

has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this  

court and other courts.

56. In  Madhu Limaye v.  The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4  

SCC 551, a three-Judge Bench of this court held as under:-

".....In  case  the  impugned  order  clearly  brings  out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the  court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice  

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interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,  then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or  affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High  Court.  Such  cases  would  necessarily  be  few  and  far  between. One such case would be the desirability of the  quashing  of  a  criminal  proceeding  initiated  illegally,  vexatiously  or  as  being  without  jurisdiction.  The  present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the  power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482  of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of  the  revisional  power  of  the  High  Court  is  impermissible."

57. This court in  Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v.  

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692,  

observed in para 7 as under:

"The  legal  position  is  well  settled  that  when  a  prosecution  at  the  initial  stage  is  asked  to  be  quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to  whether  the  uncontroverted  allegations  as  made  prima  facie  establish  the  offence.  It  is  also  for  the  court to take into consideration any special features  which appear in a particular case to consider whether  it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit  a prosecution to continue. This is so on      the basis  that  the  court  cannot  be  utilized  for  any  oblique  purpose  and  where  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  chances  of  an  ultimate  conviction  is  bleak  and,  therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by  allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court  may while taking into consideration the special facts  of a case also quash the proceeding even though it  may be at a  preliminary stage."

58. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992) 4 SCC  

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305 the court observed as under :

“131.  Section  482  which  corresponds  to  Section  561-A of  the old Code and to Section 151 of  the Civil  Procedure  Code  proceeds  on  the  same  principle  and  deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The  rule  of  inherent  powers  has  its  source  in  the  maxim  “Quadolex  aliquid  alicui  concedit,  concedere  videtur  id  sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest” which means that when the  law  gives  anything  to  anyone,  it  gives  also  all  those  things without which the thing itself could not exist.

132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent  power to make such orders as may be necessary for the  ends  of  justice.  Such  power  though  unrestricted  and  undefined  should  not  be  capriciously  or  arbitrarily  exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases,  ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for  the administration of which alone the courts exist. The  powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482  of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the  power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must  be  careful  to  see  that  its  decision  in  exercise  of  this  power is based on sound principles.”

59. In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad  AIR 1945 PC 18 and  

Lala  Jairam  Das v.  Emperor AIR  1945  PC  94   the  Judicial  

Committee has taken the view that Section 561-A of the old Code  

which  is  equivalent  to  Section  482  of  the  Cr.P.C.  gave  no  new  

powers but only provided that already inherently possessed should  

be preserved. This view holds the field till date.

60. In Dr Raghubir Sharan v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR 336,  

this court observed as under

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“...  [E]very  High  Court  as  the  highest  court  exercising  criminal  jurisdiction  in  a  State  has  inherent power to make any order for the purpose of  securing  the  ends  of  justice  ....  Being  an  extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed  in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a  subordinate court of its powers ....”

61. In the said case, the court also observed that the inherent  

powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to  

give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse  

of  the  process  of  the  court;  (3)  otherwise  to  secure  the  ends  of  

justice.

62. In  Connelly v.  Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC  

1254,  Lord  Ried  at  page  1296  expressed  his  view  “there  must  

always be a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours  

of abuse of process” with which view all the members of the House  

of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this entitled a Court to  

stay a lawful prosecution.

63. In  Kurukshetra  University  and  Another v.  State  of  

Haryana and Another (1977) 4 SCC 451, this court observed as  

under:  

“Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction  on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.  That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with  circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Thus, the  High Court in exercise of inherent powers under Section  482,  Criminal  Procedure  Code  cannot  quash  a  first  information report more so when the police had not even  

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commenced the investigation and no proceeding at all is  pending in any Court in pursuance of the said FIR.”

64. In  State of Haryana & Others v.  Bhajan Lal & Others  

reported in (1992) Suppl.1 SCC p.335,  this court had an occasion  

to examine the scope of the inherent power of the High Court in  

interfering with the investigation of an offence by the police and laid  

down the following rule:  [SCC pp. 364-65, para 60: SCC (Cri)  p.  

456, para 60].

“The sum and substance of the above deliberation results  in a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the  field  exclusively  reserved  for  the  police  officers  whose  powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to  investigate  into  the  cognizable  offences  is  legitimately  exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling  under Chapter  XII  of  the Code and the courts are not  justified in obliterating  the  track of  investigation when  the  investigating  agencies  are  well  within  their  legal  bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature  of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a  Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police  investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with  the actual investigation or to direct the police how that  investigation is  to be conducted.  But if  a police officer  transgresses  the  circumscribed  limits  and  improperly  and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach  of  any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to  the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then  the court on being approached by the person aggrieved  for  the  redress  of  any  grievance,  has  to  consider  the  nature  and extent  of  the  breach and pass appropriate  orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to  the mercy of  police echelons since human dignity  is  a  dear value of our Constitution.”

65. In  State of Haryana & Others v.  Bhajan Lal & Others  

(supra),  this  court  in  the  backdrop  of  interpretation  of  various  

relevant  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  under  

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Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in  

a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary  

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent  

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., gave the following categories of  

cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised  

either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to  

secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it  

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and  

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae  

and to give  an exhaustive  list  to  myriad kinds of  cases wherein  

such power should be exercised:

(1)  Where the allegations made in the first  information  report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their  face value and accepted in their  entirety  do not  prima  facie constitute any offence or make out a case against  the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report  and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not  disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation  by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except  under  an  order  of  a  Magistrate  within  the  purview  of  Section 155 (2) of the Code.

3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR  or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the  same do not disclose the commission of any offence and  make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a  cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable  offence, on investigation is permitted by a police officer  

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without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under  Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint  are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever  reach  a  just  conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding  against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of  the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under  which  a  criminal  proceedings  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and continuance  of  the  proceedings  and/or  where  there  is  a  specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,  providing  efficacious  redress  for  the  grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7)  Where a criminal  proceeding is  manifestly  attended  with  mala  fide and/or  where  the  proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior  motive  for  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to  spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

66. In  G.  Sagar Suri  & Another v.  State  of  UP & Others  

(2000)  2  SCC 636,  this  Court  observed  that  it  is  the  duty  and  

obligation  of  the  criminal  court  to  exercise    a   great   deal   of  

caution   in   issuing  the  process  particularly  when  matters  are  

essentially of civil in nature.

67. In  State  of  A.P. v.  Golconda  Linga  Swamy  and  

Another (2004) 6 SCC 522, this court observed as under:-

“Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a  case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The  

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section  does  not  confer  any  new  powers  on  the  High  Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court  possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages  three  circumstances  under  which  the  inherent  jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to  an  order  under  the  Code,  (ii)  to  prevent  abuse  of  the  process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of  justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down  any  inflexible  rule  which would  govern  the  exercise  of  inherent  jurisdiction.  No  legislative  enactment  dealing  with  procedure  can  provide  for  all  cases  that  may  possibly  arise.  Courts,  therefore,  have  inherent  powers  apart from express provisions of law which are necessary  for  proper  discharge  of  functions  and  duties  imposed  upon  them  by  law.  That  is  the  doctrine  which  finds  expression in the section which merely recognizes  and  preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,  whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any  express provision,  as inherent in their  constitution,  all  such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo  a  wrong  in  course  of  administration  of  justice  on  the  principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et  id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a  person  anything,  it  gives  him  that  without  which  it  cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section,  the  Court  does  not  function  as  a  court  of  appeal  or  revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though  wide  has  to  be  exercised sparingly,  carefully  and with  caution and only when such exercise is justified by the  tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be  exercised ex debito justitiae  to do real  and substantial  justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.  Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice  and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as  to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such  abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to  allow  any  action  which  would  result  in  injustice  and  prevent promotion of  justice.  In exercise of  the powers  court  would  be  justified  to  quash any proceeding  if  it  finds  that  initiation  or  continuance  of  it  amounts  to  abuse  of  the  process  of  court  or  quashing  of  these  proceedings would otherwise  serve  the  ends of  justice.  When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court  

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may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is  sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the  materials  to  assess  what  the  complainant  has  alleged  and  whether  any  offence  is  made  out  even  if  the  allegations are accepted in toto.

68. This  court  in  Zandu  Pharmaceutical  Works  Ltd.  &  

Others     v.  Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122,  

observed thus:-

"It would be an abuse of process of the court to     allow  any action which would result in injustice and prevent  promotion of  justice.  In exercise of  the powers,  court  would be justified to quash any proceeding if it  finds  that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of  the process of court or quashing of these proceedings  would  otherwise  serve  the  ends  of  justice.  When  no  offence  is  disclosed by the  complaint,  the  court  may  examine  the  question  of  fact.  When  a  complaint  is  sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the  materials to assess what the complainant has alleged  and  whether  any  offence  is  made  out  even  if  the  allegations are accepted in toto."

 69. In  Devendra and Others v.  State of Uttar Pradesh and  

Another (2009) 7 SCC 495, this court observed as under:-

“There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned  propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that  the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction  under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if  the allegations made in the first information report, even  if  given  face  value  and  taken  to  be  correct  in  their  entirety,  do  not  make  out  any  offence.  When  the  allegations  made in  the  first  information  report  or  the  evidences collected during investigation do not satisfy the  ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not  encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for  

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nothing.”

70. In  State of A.P. v.  Gourishetty Mahesh and Others 2010  

(11) SCC 226, this court observed that the power under section 482  

of the Code of Criminal Procedure is vide and they require care and  

caution in its exercise.  The interference must be on sound principle  

and  the  inherent  power  should  not  be  exercised  to  stifle  the  

legitimate  prosecution.  The  court  further  observed  that  if  the  

allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of  

which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the  

High  Court  to  quash the  same in  exercise  of  its  inherent  power  

under section 482 of the Code.

71. In the light of the settled legal position, in our considered  

opinion, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition  

filed  by  the  appellants  under  Section  482  of  the  Cr.P.C.  for  

quashing the charges under Section 306 I.P.C. against them.  The  

High  Court  ought  to  have  quashed  the  proceedings  so  that  the  

appellants who were not remotely connected with the offence under  

Section  306  I.P.C.  should  not  have  been  compelled  to  face  the  

rigmaroles of a criminal trial.   

72. As a result, the charges under Section 306 I.P.C. against the  

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appellants are quashed.

73. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and the  

appeal arising out of  Special  Leave  Petition (Crl.)No.2687 of 2010  

filed by the appellants is allowed and disposed of.

Crl.Appeal No. 611  of  2011 (arising out of SLP Crl.) No.2550/2010)

74. In  view  of  the  decision  in  Criminal  Appeal  arising  out  of  

Special  Leave Petition (Crl.)  No.2687 of 2010, this appeal  is  also  

allowed and disposed of.

….……………........................J       (DALVEER BHANDARI)

…..…………….......................J               (SURINDER SINGH  

NIJJAR)

New Delhi; March 1, 2011

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