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    REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8069  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.11852 of 2019)

M. Hariharasudhan          ...Appellant  

Versus

R. Karmegam and Ors.       …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.  

Leave granted.

2. The  instant  appeal  arises  from  the  final  judgment  and

order dated 29.03.2019 passed by the Madurai Bench of the

High Court of Madras in A.S. (M.D.) No. 143 of 2018 allowing

the appeal filed by the unsuccessful defendants in O.S. No. 186

of  2016  (the  Respondents  herein),  wherein  the  suit  for

damages filed by the Appellant herein had been decreed by the

First  Additional  District  Judge,  Madurai,  vide  order  dated

03.04.2018.

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3. The short question in this appeal is whether the suit for

damages filed by the Appellant is maintainable in light of the

Tamil  Nadu  Property  (Prevention  of  Damage  and  Loss)  Act,

1992 (in short “the Act”), which depends on whether the Act

excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court. In this respect, the

brief  facts  of  the  case  as  alleged  by  the  Appellant  are  as

follows:

3.1  The Appellant runs a hotel at Madurai. He had purchased

a plot of land adjacent to a plot owned by his father, where he

started construction in 2014. The Appellant’s father filed O.S.

No.  783  of  2014  against  Respondent  No.  1  for  the  relief  of

injunction,  since Respondent  No.  1  had started putting up a

construction  in  front  of  the  Appellant’s  property  obstructing

free access to the property of the Appellant’s father. Though an

order for  maintaining the status quo was passed in the said

suit, Respondent No. 1 completed his construction regardless.

Later,  aggrieved by the filing of  the suit,  Respondent No.  1,

along  with  some  henchmen,  damaged  certain  construction

materials on the Appellant’s property, causing damage to the

tune of Rs. 2.27 lacs. The Appellant resultantly lodged the first

information  before  the  police  and  a  crime  came  to  be

registered  against  Respondent  No.  1,  who  later  further

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damaged  the  show-case  glass  at  the  Appellant’s  hotel  by

pelting stones at it and damaged its automatic glass door by

driving  a  car  into  the  hotel.  Respondent  Nos.  2  and  3

trespassed into the hotel and took away cash of more than Rs.

1 lac. The Appellant spent Rs. 73,000/- on medical expenses for

his injured employees, and subsequently filed O.S. No. 186 of

2016.

3.2 The Trial Court decreed the suit, i.e. O.S. No. 186 of 2016,

holding  that  the  Appellant  was  entitled  to  damages  of  Rs.

18,28,941/- with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of

filing of the suit till the date of realization, with proportionate

costs. The maintainability of the suit was not an issue before

the Trial Court.  

3.3 The High Court, in appeal, framed points for consideration

with respect to the maintainability of the suit,  non-joinder of

necessary  parties,  and  the  accrual  of  the  cause  of  action.

Though it was held that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of

necessary parties and was not  prematurely filed,  the decree

was set aside solely based on the finding that the suit was not

maintainable. The High Court found that there was no express

bar on civil jurisdiction in the Act. However, it held that since

the  Act  specified  a  particular  method  for  claiming

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compensation for damage to property in Sections 10 and 11 of

the  Act,  as  well  as  Rule  4  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Property

(Prevention of  Damage and Loss)  Rules,  1994 (in  short  “the

Rules”),  all  other  methods  for  claiming  compensation  were

excluded by implication, and thus the jurisdiction of the civil

court was impliedly barred. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed the

instant appeal.

4. Learned  Senior  Counsel  Mr.  V.  Giri,  appearing  for  the

Appellant, argued that though the High Court had correctly held

that there was no express bar on the jurisdiction of the civil

court,  it  erred  in  holding  that  the  Act  impliedly  ousted  the

jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court—in  fact,  the  provisions  thereof

indicate  that  such  jurisdiction  exists  concurrently  with  the

remedies provided under the Act.  

4.1 Learned Senior Counsel first referred to Section 7(4) of the

Act, which provides that compensation ordered by the Court to

be paid under Section 7 shall be accounted for at the time of

awarding compensation in a subsequent civil suit relating to the

same matter. He contended that Section 7(4) thus recognizes

the  possibility  of  a  civil  suit  being  filed,  and  thus  impliedly

recognizes  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  to  award

compensation. He also submitted that the scheme of Section 7

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was a near verbatim reproduction of Section 357 of the Code of

Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (in  short  the  “Cr.P.C.”),  which

pertains to the power of a criminal court to order the payment

of  compensation,  but  also  accounts  for  the  filing  of  a

subsequent civil suit for compensation.  

4.2 Secondly,  our attention was drawn to Section 14 of the

Act, which saves proceedings instituted outside of the Act, to

argue  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  was  also  saved

under Section 14. Learned Senior Counsel stressed that ouster

of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred,

referring  to  the  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Bench  of  this

Court in  Dhulabhai  v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 (3)

SCR 662.  

5. Learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand,

argued that the Act and Rules constituted a self-contained code

and  ousted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  by  necessary

implication.  He  submitted  that  the  Rules  create  a  specific

authority for the determination and payment of compensation,

and  thus  the  decision  in  Dhulabhai (supra)  would  squarely

apply, where it was also held that the jurisdiction of the civil

court must be held to excluded when there is an adequate and

sufficient remedy specifically provided in a statute which would

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normally be associated with actions in a civil court. He further

argued  that  the  scheme  of  the  Act  and  Rules  would  be

rendered redundant if the jurisdiction of the civil court to award

compensation were to be recognized.

6. It  has  not  been  disputed  that  there  is  no  express  bar

under the Act on the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a

suit for damages. As set out above, all we need to determine is

whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by necessary

implication. The principles laid down in Dhulabhai (supra) are

pertinent  in  this  regard.  While  dealing  with  the  question  of

ouster  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  by  specially

constituted tribunals, this Court concluded that such ouster was

not to be readily inferred unless the conditions set out by the

Court  were  satisfied.  For  the  purposes  of  determining  the

question  before  us,  we  need  only  refer  to  the  following

conditions laid down by this Court in Dhulabhai (supra):   

“…  (1)  Where  the  statute  gives  a  finality  to  the orders  of  the  special  Tribunals  the  civil  courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if  there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular  Act  have not  been complied  with  or  the statutory Tribunal  has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court,  an examination of the scheme of the

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particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.  Where  there  is  no  express  exclusion  the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular  Act  to  find out  the  intendment  becomes necessary  and  the  result  of  the  inquiry  may  be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute  creates  a  special  right  or  a  liability  and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further  lays down that  all  questions about the said  right  and  liability  shall  be  determined  by  the Tribunals  so  constituted,  and  whether  remedies normally  associated with  actions  in  civil  courts  are prescribed by the said statute or not.

       x x x

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.”  

(emphasis added)

6.1 Thus,  essentially,  we  must  determine  whether  the  Act

provides an adequate final remedy to what the civil court would

normally do in a suit, such that the jurisdiction of the civil court

must necessarily be inferred to have been ousted. The scheme

of the Act and Rules must be examined in this light.

7.  Section  1  of  the  Act  deals  with  the  short  title  and

commencement,  and  Section  2  deals  with  definitions.

Importantly, sub-section (4) defines “property” as any movable

or  immovable  property  or  machinery  owned  by,  or  in

possession of, or under the control of any person, including the

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entities listed under clauses (a)  to  (j)  of  the sub-section,  for

instance,  the  Central  and  State  Government,  any  local

authority, and any institution, concern, or undertaking. Sections

3,  4 and 5 lay out  offences punishable under the Act,  while

Section 6 pertains to the grant of bail.  

7.1 Section  7,  which  is  central  to  our  controversy,  merits

reproduction:

“7.  Order  to  Pay  Compensation.—(1)  When imposing a sentence of fine for an offence under this Act, the Court may when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied — (a)  in  defraying  expenses  properly  incurred  in  the prosecution; (b)  in the payment, to any person, of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence; (c) in replacing or as the case may be, restoring to the previous state, the property including any road, bridge, navigable channel, natural or artificial. (2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal. (3) An order under this section may also be made by an  Appellate  Court  or  by  the  High  Court  when exercising its powers of revision. (4)  At  the  time  of  awarding  compensation  in  any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court  shall  take  into  account  any  sum  paid  or recovered as compensation under this section. (5)  Save  as  otherwise  provided,  when  a  Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the

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person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced.”  

(emphasis added)

7.2 Evidently,  Section  7(1)  provides  that  where  the  Court

trying  any  offence  punishable  under  the  Act  imposes  a

sentence of fine after conviction, it may order such fine to be

partly  or  wholly  applied,  inter  alia,  for  the  payment  of

compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, as

mentioned  in  clause  (b).  Sub-section  (5),  at  the  same time,

provides that if a Court is imposing a sentence under the Act

comprising  only  imprisonment,  the  Court  may  order  the

accused  to  separately  pay  compensation  to  the  aggrieved

party.  

7.2.1   It is relevant to note at this stage itself that Section 8

specifies that offences under the Act cannot be tried by any

Court inferior  to that of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a

Sessions Court.

7.2.2   As per Section 7(3), an order under Section 7, which

would include orders both under sub-sections (1) and (5), may

also be made by an Appellate Court or the High Court in the

exercise of the power of revision. Most crucial, however, is sub-

section  (4),  which  specifically  provides  that  in  a  subsequent

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civil  suit  relating  to  the  same  matter,  if  the  civil  court  is

awarding compensation, it shall take into account any sum paid

or recovered as compensation under Section 7 of the Act.

7.3 Moving  on,  Section  9  provides  that  notwithstanding

anything  contained  in  the  Act,  where  an  offence  punishable

under  this  Act  has  been  committed  during  any  procession,

assembly,  meeting,  agitation,  demonstration  or  any  other

activity organised by a political party or communal, language or

ethnic group, the Court shall presume that the offence has also

been committed by such party or group, which shall be liable to

pay compensation for damage or loss caused to any property,

in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  the  rules

made thereunder.

7.4 Section  10(1)  pertains  to  claims  for  compensation  for

damage and loss, which can be made by the person affected by

the  damage  or  loss,  or  by  an  officer  empowered  by  any

authority  specified in  clauses (a)  to  (j)  of  Section 2(4).  Sub-

section  (2)  provides  that  every  application  for  claiming

compensation shall be in such format as may be prescribed.

7.5 Section 11(1) provides that every claim for compensation

for damage or loss caused to property shall  be made to the

authority as may be prescribed. Sub-section (2) provides the

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factors  to  be  considered  by  the  prescribed  authority  while

determining the quantum of compensation, and sub-section (3)

provides  that  such  authority  shall  have  to  follow  prescribed

procedure while deciding the application. Sub-section (4) gives

the prescribed authority the powers of a civil court as provided

in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the CPC”) for the

purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance

of  witnesses,  discovery  and  production  of  documents  and

material  objects,  and  for  such  other  purposes  as  may  be

prescribed.

7.6 Section  12  of  the  Act  provides  that  the  prescribed

authority  under  Section  11  may,  after  determining  the

compensation to be awarded, issue a certificate for the amount

to  the  Collector,  who  shall  recover  the  same  in  the  same

manner as an arrear of land revenue. Section 12-A deals with

the  manner  of  appeal  against  an  order  under  Section  11,

providing that  an appeal  may be made to such authority  as

may be prescribed.  Sub-section (2)  specifically  provides that

the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall

not  be  called  into  question  in  any  Court  of  law.  Section  13

confers power on the State Government to make rules under

the Act.

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7.7 Section 14 is the savings provision. Since much revolves

around this provision as well, we reproduce it below:

“14. Saving.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for  the  time  being  in  force  and  nothing  contained herein shall exempt any person from any proceeding by  way  of  investigation  or  otherwise  which  might, apart from this Act, be instituted against him.”

7.8  Section 15, the last provision of the Act, repeals the Tamil

Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Act,

1982.

8. The Rules have been framed by the State Government in

the exercise of powers under Section 13 of the Act. Rule 3 lays

down  who  may  claim  compensation  for  damage  or  loss  to

property owned by, or in the possession or under the control of,

an authority specified in clauses (a) to (j) of Section 2(4), and in

what manner. Importantly, Rule 4 sets out the Commissioner

for Revenue Administration, or any authority authorised by him,

as competent to decide compensation claims made under Rule

3.  Sub-rule  (2)  provides  that  the  decision  of  the  competent

authority as to the quantum of compensation for  damage or

loss  caused  to  public  property  shall  be  final  and  not  be

questioned in any Court of law. Sub-rule (3) lays down certain

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additional  factors  to  be  considered  while  determining

compensation for damage or loss caused to public property.

8.1   Rules 5 to 10 deal with various aspects of the procedure of

inquiry,  including rectification of defects,  filing of the written

statement,  notice  to  parties,  issue  of  summons,  and  the

appearance of legal practitioners if required. Rule 11 gives the

power  to  the  inquiring  authority  to  inspect  the  damaged

property,  while  Rule  12  allows  the  production  of  damaged

movable  property  before  the  authority.  Rule  13  deals  with

travel expenses of the inquiring authority. Rule 14 provides for

the  summary  examination  of  any  person  required.  Rule  15

states  that  the  inquiring  authority  has  to  get  recorded  a

memorandum  of  the  substance  of  the  evidence  of  each

witness. Rule 16 provides that the inquiring authority may take

assistance from persons having special knowledge with respect

to any matter relevant to the inquiry. Rules 17 to 19 require the

inquiring authority to frame a record of points to be decided,

maintain a brief diary of the proceedings of the inquiry,  and

record his findings concisely on each point and record reasons

for such findings. Rule 20, pertaining to the application of the

CPC, was omitted by G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Home (Court IV), dated

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24.10.1994. Rule 21,  the last rule,  deals with the manner of

recovery of compensation.

9. Additionally, it is important to note that the Act, which was

enacted in 1992,  initially only pertained to damage and loss

caused to public property. The Act was amended vide the Tamil

Nadu  Public  Property  (Prevention  of  Damage  and  Loss)  Act,

1994,  which  was  published  in  the  Tamil  Nadu  Government

Gazette Extraordinary on 09.08.1994, to provide compensation

in respect of property other than public property as well. The

Rules  framed under  the Act  came into  force  on 09.04.1994,

that  is  to  say,  prior  to  the  amendment  of  the  Act.  Though

certain  amendments  were  subsequently  made  to  the  Rules,

vide G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Home (Court IV) dated 24.10.1994, it

appears  that  the  State  Government  has  committed  an

oversight in amending the Rules, and has failed to provide any

procedure for  the claiming and assessment of damages with

respect to property other than public property. For instance, as

already  discussed,  Rule  3,  which  prescribes  the  authority  to

claim compensation,  continues to deal  only with applications

for  compensation  with  respect  to  public  property.  Similarly,

Rule  4(1),  which  prescribes  the  authority  before  whom

compensation is to be claimed, does not clarify as to before

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whom an application should be made to claim damages for loss

caused to private property. At the same time, Rule 4(2) states

that  the  assessment  of  compensation  for  damage  or  loss

caused to public property shall be final, without any mention of

the fate of damages with respect to private property. So also,

Rule  4(3)  takes care of  the assessment  of  compensation for

damage or loss caused to public property, and does not deal

with  how  damages  are  to  be  assessed  in  case  of  private

property.  A  bare  reading  of  the  Rules  in  their  entirety  thus

makes it  clear that the State Government has committed an

oversight in amending the Rules appropriately to bring them in

consonance with the amended enactment, and to facilitate the

appropriate enforcement of the same.  

10. However,  even  if  we  assume  that  the  Rules  broadly

provide a procedure to claim compensation for damage or loss

to  public  as  well  as  private  property,  we  find  force  in  the

contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the

scheme of the Act does not envisage ouster of jurisdiction of

the civil court.  

11.  As mentioned supra, reading the Rules expansively,  not

literally,  it  is  evident  that  the  Act,  along  with  the  Rules,

provides for the award of compensation in two ways. Firstly, it

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may  be  awarded  at  the  end  of  the  trial  for  any  offence

punishable under the Act, or may be ordered to be paid out of

the fine imposed upon the accused. This is similar to the power

of the criminal court to award compensation under Section 357

of the Cr.P.C. Secondly, compensation may be awarded upon

an application as envisaged under Section 10, after a summary

inquiry as envisaged under the Rules. This is somewhat similar

to  the  summary  procedure  envisaged  under  the  Consumer

Protection  Act,  1986  (in  short  “the  1986  Act”),  for  claiming

compensation thereunder. This would indicate that the Act and

Rules provide a specific remedy to claim compensation for loss

and  damage  to  property.  It  was  on  this  basis  that  learned

Counsel  for  the  Respondents  submitted  that  the  civil  court

could not be said to have concurrent jurisdiction to decide a

suit for damages.  

12. Such an argument, however, deserves to be rejected. We

first turn our attention to the aspect of award or provision of

compensation by the criminal court under Section 7 after trial

for any offence under the Act. It is evident that the provision

clearly  recognises  the  possibility  of  a  civil  suit  instituted

subsequent to the criminal proceedings under the Act, relating

to the same matter, where if the Court trying the civil suit is

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awarding compensation, it is required to take into account any

sum paid or recovered as compensation under Section 7 of the

Act. It does not stand to reason that the Act would permit the

subsequent filing of a civil suit while excluding the concurrent

jurisdiction of the civil court.  

13. Moreover,  even  the  summary  remedy  of  claiming

compensation envisaged under Section 10 of the Act, read with

the Rules, does not preclude the filing of a suit for damages.

Section 14 of the Act is important in this regard, which clearly

provides that the Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of,

any other law in force for the time being. It further mandates

that nothing contained in the Act shall exempt any person from

any  proceeding  by  way  of  investigation  or  otherwise  which

might be instituted against him apart from under the Act. “Law”

in  force  would  include  the  common  law,  under  which  the

tortious remedy of  damages may be claimed,  which remedy

can only be pursued in a civil court. Thus, it is evident that the

Act,  by way of Section 14,  clearly recognises the concurrent

jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for damages.

14. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to Section 3 of

the 1986 Act, similar to Section 14 of the Act, which provides

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that  the 1986 Act  is  in  addition to and not  in  derogation of

other laws in force:

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

14.1    This provision has been considered on a multitude of

occasions  by  this  Court  to  affirm that  the  remedy  available

before consumer fora may only be one of several concurrent

remedies available to an aggrieved person. For instance, even

recently,  this  Court  in  Pioneer Urban  Land  and

Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 43/2019,

decided on 09.08.2019) observed that remedies to flat allottees

under various statutes such as the 1986 Act, the Real Estate

(Regulation and Development) Act,  2016,  and the Insolvency

and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 are concurrent. However, for our

purposes,  we  may  limit  ourselves  to  examine  the  effect  of

Section 3 of the 1986 Act on the jurisdiction of the civil court.

The  following  discussion  in  State  of  Karnataka  v.

Vishwabharathi  House Building Coop.  Society,  (2003)  2

SCC 412, serves us adequately, where this Court explained that

the  1986  Act  does  not  supplant  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil

court:

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“46. By reason of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, it is evident that remedies provided thereunder are not in derogation of those provided under other laws.  The said  Act  supplements  and not  supplants the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory authorities.

  x x  x 53. …  Furthermore, primarily the jurisdiction of the forums/Commissions  is  to  grant  damages.  In  the event, a complainant feels that he will have a better and effective remedy in a civil court as he may have to  seek  for  an  order  of  injunction,  he  indisputably may file a suit in an appropriate civil  court or may take recourse to some other remedies as provided for in other statutes.”

(emphasis added)

14.2    We may also refer to the following observations made by

this  Court  in  its  earlier  decision  in  Indian  Medical

Association v. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651, where, while

concluding that  consumer  fora  were competent  to  deal  with

complaints regarding deficiency in service by way of medical

negligence, it was observed as follows:

“37. … In  complaints  involving  complicated  issues requiring  recording  of  evidence  of  experts,  the complainant can be asked to approach the civil court for  appropriate  relief.  Section  3  of  the  Act  which prescribes that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, preserves the right of the consumer to approach the civil court for necessary relief…”  

(emphasis added)

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14.3    There is no doubt in our minds that a similar proposition

holds the field even with respect to the Act at hand. Section 14

of the Act,  being in addition to and not in derogation of the

provisions of other laws in force, permits an aggrieved person

to approach the civil court for relief if he so desires, instead of

availing of the remedy envisaged under Section 10 of the Act.

Clearly, a claim for compensation under the Act is only in the

nature of an additional remedy which may be pursued in place

of filing a civil suit for the same relief.

15. Moreover, it is clear that since a claim for compensation

under Section 10 may only be determined by way of summary

proceedings, it does not stand as a complete substitute to the

remedies that may be pursued in a civil court and determined

through a full-fledged trial, even though certain powers of the

civil  court  are  conferred  upon  the  prescribed  authority

determining a claim for compensation under the Act.  

16. Upon an evaluation of the entire scheme of the Act and

Rules, and looking to the tests laid down by Dhulabhai (supra),

we are thus of the considered opinion that the Act does not

stand in place of and preclude a claim for damages under the

common law as may fall for determination before a civil court in

a civil suit. In this view of the matter, we find ourselves drawn

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to  the  irresistible  conclusion  that  the  Act  does  not  oust  the

jurisdiction of the civil court either expressly or by necessary

implication, and that the High Court has erred in allowing the

appeal filed by the Respondents herein by holding that the suit

filed by the Appellant was not maintainable.

17. As mentioned supra, the Trial Court, upon holding that the

suit is maintainable, proceeded to decree the suit on merits.

The appeal before the High Court, filed under Section 96 of the

CPC, was decided only on the preliminary point pertaining to

the maintainability of the suit.  In view of our finding that the

suit is maintainable, the matter has to be remitted to the High

Court for hearing the first appeal on merits.

18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and consequently, the

judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted

to the High Court for deciding the first appeal being A.S. (MD)

No. 143 of 2018 on merits.  

..........................................J.               (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

..........................................J.                          (Ajay Rastogi)

New Delhi; October 17, 2019.