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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7921  OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition [C] No.2991/2011)  

Londhe Prakash Bhagwan … Appellant

Vs.

Dattatraya Eknath Mane & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated July 1, 2010 passed by  

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the High Court remanded  

the matter to the School Tribunal directing it to register the appeal and hear  

the same in accordance with law. The High Court felt that if an appeal is  

preferred against an order of supersession before the School Tribunal under  

Section  9(1)(b)  of  the  Maharashtra  Employees  of  Private  Schools

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(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the MEPS  

Act’),  the  provisions  of  limitation  do  not  apply  to  such  appeals  and  

accordingly remanded the matter before the School Tribunal.

3. The appellant  being aggrieved by the said  order  has  preferred this  

appeal.

4. The facts of the case are as follows :  

4.1. On  August  16,  1996  the  appellant  was  appointed  as  the  

Headmaster  of  Shri  Chatrapati  Shivaji  Vidhyalaya  run by Jijamata  

Shikshan Prasarak Mandal. Then respondent No.1 was acting as the  

in-charge  Headmaster  of  the  said  School.  The  appointment  of  the  

appellant was approved in a meeting held on August 14, 1996 and the  

respondent No.1 presided over the said meeting. On August 21,1996  

such  appointment  of  the  appellant  was  duly  approved  by  the  

Education Officer, after following due procedure. It appears from the  

facts that on July 11, 2007, respondent No.1, after a delay of 9 years  

and 11 months, filed an application for condonation of delay before  

the School Tribunal (being Misc.  Appeal No. 78/2006) challenging  

the appointment of the appellant. By an order dated 14th March, 2007,  

the  said  application  was  dismissed  by  the  School  Tribunal.  It  is  

recorded in the said order that respondent No.1 claiming himself to be  

the senior most teacher in the School, having been appointed as an  

Assistant Teacher in the year 1991 and the Management has denied  

his claim to the said post of Headmaster.

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4.2. The  School  Tribunal,  after  hearing  the  parties,  found  that  

respondent No.1 herein on August 9, 1995 voluntarily resigned from  

the  post  of  the  In-charge  Headmaster  of  the  said  School.  Such  

resignation was duly accepted by the Management. It also noticed that  

the  Management  thereafter  applied  before  the  Deputy  Director  of  

Education  and  sought  permission  to  appoint  a  Headmaster  after  

publication of an advertisement in accordance with the MEPS Rules.  

Such permission was granted to the Management. After following the  

due  procedure,  the  post  of  Headmaster  was  filled  up  by  the  

Management on August 14, 1996.  

4.3. The School Tribunal duly considered the matter on merits and  

noticed that respondent No.1 himself presided over the meeting of the  

Managing Committee and approved the appointment of  the present  

appellant as Headmaster of the said School. Admittedly, the appellant  

was working since then and the said fact was known to the respondent  

No.1. Admittedly, he did not apply before the appropriate authority  

for  appropriate  remedy,  save  and  except  he  filed  representations  

addressed to R/M. In these circumstances, the School Tribunal refused  

to condone the delay and dismissed the application.  

5. Being aggrieved, a writ petition was filed by respondent No.1 before  

the  High  Court  and  the  High  Court  remanded  the  matter  to  the  School  

Tribunal, holding that the provisions of limitation do not apply to appeals  

filed under Section 9(1)(b) of the said Act. It is to be noted that respondent  

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No. 1 filed writ petition before the High Court and on August 2, 2007, the  

High Court was pleased to dismiss the same, observing that the Presiding  

Officer was right in rejecting the application for condonation of delay of  

about 10 years in preferring the application. Subsequently, it further appears  

that in 2009, respondent No.1 filed a review petition before the High Court  

when the High Court was pleased to recall the order dated August 2, 2007  

and restored the same on the file and thereafter on July 1, 2010, it allowed  

the writ petition.

6. In these circumstances,  the only question that arises is,  whether an  

application can be filed by an aggrieved party even long after 10 years. It is  

necessary for us to quote Section 9 of the said Act for our consideration,  

which is set out hereunder :

“9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private   school.

(1)Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any  law  or   contract for the time being in force, [any employee in   a private school,-

 (a)Who is  dismissed or removed or whose  services   

are  otherwise  terminated  or  who  is  reduced  in   rank, by the order passed by the Management; or

(b)Who  is  superseded  by  the  Management  while   making an appointment to any post by promotion,   and who is aggrieved, shall have a right to appeal   and  may  appeal  against  any  such  order  or   

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supersession  to  the  Tribunal  constituted  under   section 8:]

    Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal   in any case where the matter has already been decided   by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before   such Court, on the appointed date or where the order of   dismissal,  removal, otherwise termination of service or   reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any   time before the 1st July, 1976.

(2)Such appeal  shall  be  made by the  employee  to  the   Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt   by him of the order of dismissal,  removal otherwise   termination  of  service  or  reduction  in  rank,  as  the   case may be.    

Provided that,  where  such order  was made before the   appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty   days from the said date.

(3)Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section   (2), the Tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it   after the expiry of the said period of thirty or sixty   days,  as  the  case  may be,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  the   appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the   appeal within that period.

(4)Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of [Five   hundred]  rupees,  which  shall  not  be  refunded  and   shall  be  credited  to  the  Consolidated  Fund  of  the   State.”  

7. We have noticed from the language of the said Section that the right  

of appeal is given to an employee of a private school who is aggrieved by an  

order  of  the  Management  in  respect  of  dismissal,  removal,  termination,  

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reduction in rank or supersession. In all these cases, the aggrieved person  

shall have a right to approach the Tribunal. Now, the sole question which  

falls for our consideration is : when an aggrieved person can apply before  

the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal  

before the appropriate forum. We have duly considered the said question.  

Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an  

application  before  the  court  in  that  case,  can  an  aggrieved  person  come  

before the court at his sweet will at any point of time ? The answer must be  

in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply  

before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court  

within  a  reasonable  time.  This  Court  on  a  number  of  occasions,  while  

dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation  

has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In  

our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but  

an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting  

any cogent reason therefor. The court has no power to condone the same in  

such case. (See: Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory [2012 (8) SCC 524],  

State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [2011 (3) SCC 436] and K.R. Mudgal   

v. R.P. Singh [1986 (4) SCC 531]. In these cases, it has been held that the  

application  should  be  rejected  on  the  ground  of  inordinate  delay.  

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Furthermore, it is to be noted that appointment of the appellant was within  

the knowledge of respondent No.1 from day one but he did not take any  

steps for such a long time.

8. In these  circumstances,  we find it  is  difficult  for  us to  uphold the  

decision of the High Court. We are sure that the said question of inordinate  

delay missed out from the mind of the court at the time of sending back the  

matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the  

High Court, allow the appeal and affirm the order of the Tribunal.  

         ..……………………J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

New Delhi; ………………………..J. September 10, 2013. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

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