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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6392 OF 2003

Laxman Lal (Dead) Through LRs. and Anr.               ……  Appellants

   Vs.

State of Rajasthan and Ors.          ……  Respondents

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, J.  

 The compulsory acquisition of the land admeasuring 4 bigha  

and 2 biswa comprised in Khasra no. 1013 at Dungarpur (Rajasthan) is the  

subject  matter  of  this  appeal   by  special  leave.  The  appellants  were  

unsuccessful in challenging the acquisition of the above land in the High  

Court.  They failed before the  Single Judge as well as the Division Bench.  

2. The two questions that arise for consideration are :

(i)  Whether preliminary notification under Section 4 of the  

Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, “1953  

Act”) issued on 01.05.1980 has lapsed since declaration  

under Section 6 of that Act was made on 19.03.1987  

after the expiry of two years from the commencement of  

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the  Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment  and  

Validation)  Act,  1981  (for  short,  “1981  Amendment  

Act”).  

(ii) Whether  invocation  of  power  of  urgency  and  

dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A after 7 years  

of issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4 of  

the 1953 Act are legally sustainable?

3. The  above  two  questions  arise  from  these  facts:  on  

01.05.1980, the state government issued a preliminary notification under  

Section 4  that the subject land was needed or likely to be needed for a  

public purpose, namely, construction of bus stand.   The state government  

required  and  authorised  Land  Acquisition  Officer  (SDO),  Dungarpur  to  

enter upon,  do survey and all other acts necessary to ascertain whether  

land was suitable for such public purpose and enquire into and ascertain  

the particulars of the persons interested in such land.  

4. On 19.03.1987, a notification was issued under Section 6 of  

the 1953 Act.  By that notification the state government also invoked its  

powers conferred under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the 1953  

Act and dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A.  

5. An  important  event  occurred  between  01.05.1980  and  

19.03.1987. The State Legislature following the Ordinance promulgated by  

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the  Governor  amended  the  1953  Act  by  the  1981  Amendment  Act.  

Effective from 27.06.1981, by the 1981 Amendment Act, Section 6 of 1953  

Act was amended and the following proviso in Section 6 was inserted:

“Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land  covered by a notice under section 4, sub-section 5, given  after the commencement of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition  (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981, shall be made after  the  expiry  of  three years  from the  date  of  giving  of  such  notice:”

6. Section 5 of the 1981 Amendment Act provides for validation  

of  certain  acquisitions.  Sub-sections  1(b)  and  (2)  thereof,  which  are  

relevant for the present controversy, read as follows :

“S. 5. Validation of certain acquisitions.—  

(1)  (a)  xxx xxx xxx

(b)   any acquisition in  pursuance of  any notice given  under sub-section (5) of section 4 of the principal Act before  the  commencement  of  this  Act  may  be  made  after  such  commencement and no such acquisition and no action taken  or thing done (including any order made, agreement entered  into  or  notice  given),  whether  before  or  after  such  commencement, in connection with such acquisition shall be  deemed to be invalid merely on the grounds referred to in  clause (a) or any of them.  

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in  clause (b)  of  sub-section  (1)  no  declaration  under  section  6  of  the  principal  Act  in  respect  of  any  land  for  the  acquisition  of  which  notice  under  sub-section  (5)  of  section  4  of  the  principal Act has been given before the commencement of  this Act, shall be made after the expiry of two yeas from the  commencement of the said Act.”

7. The above acquisition was challenged in three writ petitions  

before the High Court. One of these writ petitions was filed by Laxman Lal  

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and Manohar Lal. Both these petitioners are dead and now represented by  

their legal representatives who are appellants herein. The challenge to the  

acquisition  was  laid  on  diverse  grounds  but  none  of  the  grounds  

persuaded the Single Judge and all the three writ petitions were dismissed  

by a common order dated 11.05.1999.

8. The order of the Single Judge was challenged in intra-court  

appeal  by  the  writ  petitioners.  Before  the  Division  Bench,  the  following  

three points were raised in support of the appeal:-

I) Proceedings  could  not  be  continued  because  notification under  Section 6 of  the Act  was issued after a  lapse of about 7 years. This was in view of the provisions of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  5  of  the  Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981. The said  provisions provided a limitation of two years from the date of  commencement  of  the  Validation  Act  for  issuing  the  declaration  under  Section  6.  Since  the  declaration  was  issued much beyond this period of limitation the same was  liable to be quashed. It was further contended that Section  17(4)  notification  could  not  be  used  to  validate  the  proceedings. II) Notice under Section 17(4) was void ab initio because  the respondents failed to tender payment of 80 percent of  compensation  as  envisaged  under  sub-section  (3)(a)  of  Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. III) The action of the respondents is highly arbitrary. By  issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act in the year  1980 the appellants were being pegged down for purposes  of  payment  of  compensation  although  effectively  the  acquisition was being made in the year 1987.   

9. Dealing with the first point, the Division Bench held as under:

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  that  a  declaration  under  Section 6 in respect of the land can be made at any time  after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In  view of this specific statutory provision which is admittedly  applicable, it cannot be said that a declaration under Section  6 could not have been issued after a lapse of 7 years or  

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more.  Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  fairly  conceded  that  Section  17  is  a  Code  in  itself.  It  contains  complete  procedure  for  acquisition  made  under  the  said  provision.  Section  17  is  a  provision  to  be  resorted  to  in  cases  of  urgency.  Notification  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  already  stood issued with respect to the land in question as far back  as the year 1980. The Government felt the urgency for the  acquisition  and,  therefore,  Section  17(4)  notification,  read  with  Section  6,  was  issued  on  19.03.1987.  We  find  no  illegality in the procedure following in the facts of the case.    

10. It  is  not  necessary  to  deal  with  the  second  ground urged  

before  the  Division  Bench  as  it  has  not  been  pressed  before  us.  As  

regards the third ground, the Division Bench held  as under:

“Lastly, the learned counsel raised an argument suggesting  arbitrariness  on  the  part  of  the  respondents.  As  already  noted,  Section  17  permits  the  Government  to  invoke  its  provisions at any time, therefore, there is no statutory bar so  far  as  the  action  is  concerned.  If  the  action  of  the  respondents  results  in  some  hardship  to  the  landowners  normally, the provision regarding payment of interest takes  care of the hardship. The power of compulsory acquisition of  land is in the nature of a power of eminent domain which the  State is entitled to exercise keeping in view the larger public  interest as against individual interest.”

11.          We shall deal with the second question first. Two basic facts  

are not in dispute, namely, one, preliminary notification under Section 4  

showing intention to acquire the subject land for a public purpose, namely,  

construction  of  bus  stand  was  issued  by  the  state  government  on  

01.05.1980 and two, the declaration under Section 6 of the 1953 Act was  

made  on  19.03.1987  and  by  means  of  that  very  notification  the  state  

government exercised its power of urgency under Section 17(1) read with  

Section 17(4)  and dispensed with enquiry  under  Section 5A.  Thus,  the  5

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power of urgency was invoked for the first time by the state government  

after seven years of issuance of the preliminary notification under Section  

4.

12. Section 4 of the 1953 Act is identical to Section 4 of the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “1894 Act”). It provides that whenever the  

state government considers it necessary or expedient to acquire land in  

any locality, needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose, it shall, by  

an order published in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of  

Section 45, require any officer subordinate to it and generally or specially  

authorised in this behalf,  to enter upon or into any land in such locality  

accompanied by his servants and workmen for the purpose stated therein.  

Sub-section (5) of Section 4 empowers the Collector to issue notice to the  

persons  interested  of  the  proposed  acquisition  and also  issue a  public  

notice  to  that  effect  at  convenient  places  on  or  near  about  the  land  

proposed to be acquired.

13. Section  5A  enables  the  person  interested  in  any  land  in  

respect of which notice has been issued under Section 4 (5) to object to  

acquisition of that land.

14. Section 6 is also similar to Section 6 of the 1894 Act. Inter alia,  

it provides that when the state government is satisfied after considering the  

report, if any, made under Section 5-A that any particular land is needed  

for  a  public  purpose,  a  declaration  shall  be  made  to  that  effect.  Such  

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declaration  is  conclusive  evidence that  the  land is  needed for  a  public  

purpose  and  after  making  such  declaration  the  state  government  may  

acquire  the  land in  the  manner  provided  in  sub-section  (4)  thereof.  As  

noticed above, Section 6 came to be amended by the 1981 Amendment  

Act  and,  inter  alia,  limitation  of  three  years  for  issuance  of  notification  

under  Section  6  was  fixed  from  the  date  of  issuance  of  notice  under  

Section 4(5). As regards the notice issued under Section 4(5) prior to the  

1981 Amendment Act, limitation of two years from coming into force of the  

1981 Amendment Act was fixed.   

15. Section 17 of the 1953 Act gives special powers to the state  

government in the cases of urgency and emergency. To the extent it  is  

relevant, Section 17 reads as under:

“S. 17.   Special  powers in case of urgency.—In cases of  urgency,  whenever  the  State  Government  so  directs  the  Collector though no such award has been made may, on the  expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice  mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of  any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a  company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the  State Government free from all encumbrances. xxx xxx xxx 2. xxx xxx xxx 3. xxx xxx xxx 4. In the case of any land to which in the opinion of the  State Government the provisions of sub-sections (1) or sub- section (2) are applicable the State Government may direct  that the provisions of section 5-A shall  not apply and, if  it  does so direct a declaration may be made under section 6 in  respect of the land at any time after the publication of the  order under sub-section (1) of section 4. 5. xxx xxx xxx 6. xxx xxx xxx 7. xxx xxx xxx”   

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16. The statutory provisions of compulsory acquisition contained  

in the 1953 Act are not materially different from the 1894 Act. This Court  

has explained the doctrine of eminent domain in series of cases. Eminent  

domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate the private  

property within the territorial sovereignty to public uses or purposes. It is an  

attribute of sovereignty and essential  to the sovereign government.  The  

power of eminent domain, being inherent in the government, is exercisable  

in  the  public  interest,  general  welfare  and  for  public  purpose.  The  

sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of  

the state, including private property without its owner’s consent provided  

that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good.

17. Article  300-A  of  the  Constitution  mandates  that  no  person  

shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Though right to  

property is no longer a fundamental right but the constitutional protection  

continues in as much as without the authority of law, a person cannot be  

deprived of his property.  Accordingly, if the state intends to appropriate  

the  private  property  without  the  owners’  consent  by  acting  under  the  

statutory provisions for compulsory acquisition, the procedure authorised  

by law has to  be mandatorily  and compulsorily  followed.  The power  of  

urgency which takes away the right to file objections can only be exercised  

by the state government  for  such public purpose of  real  urgency which  

cannot brook delay of few weeks or few months.  This Court  as early as in  8

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1964  said that the right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial  

right when a person’s property is being threatened with acquisition; such  

right cannot be taken away as if by a side wind (Nandeshwar Prasad &  

Ors.  v. U.P. Govt. & Ors.1).

18. In Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India2, this Court explained  

the importance of Section 5-A in the following terms:

“7.  Section  5-A  embodies  a  very  just  and  wholesome  principle that a person whose property is being or is intended  to  be  acquired  should  have  a  proper  and  reasonable  opportunity  of  persuading  the  authorities  concerned  that  acquisition of the property belonging to that person should  not be made. We may refer to the observation of this court in  Nandeshwar  Prasad v.  The State  of  U.P.  [AIR  1964  SC  1217] that the right to file objections under Section 5-A is a  substantial  right  when  a  person's  property  is  being  threatened with acquisition and that right  cannot be taken  away as if  by a side wind. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A  makes it obligatory on the Collector to give an objector an  opportunity of being heard. After hearing all objections and  making  further  inquiry  he  is  to  make  a  report  to  the  appropriate Government containing his recommendation on  the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government  on the objections is then final. The declaration under Section  6  has  to  be  made  after  the  appropriate  Government  is  satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by  the  Collector  under  Section  5-A(2).  The  legislature  has,  therefore,  made  complete  provisions  for  the  persons  interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition  and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of  urgency  that  special  powers  have  been  conferred  on  the  appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of  Section 5-A: [See Section 17(4) of the Acquisition Act.]”

1  AIR 1964 SC 1217 2  (1973) 2 SCC 337

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19. In  Hindustan  Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd. v.  Darius  Shapur   

Chenai & Ors.3,  it was reiterated by this Court that Section 5-A confers a  

valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired.

20. We do not think it is necessary to multiply the authorities. In a  

comparatively  recent  judgment,  this  Court  speaking  through  one  of  us  

(R.M. Lodha, J.) in  Anand Singh and Another v.  State of Uttar Pradesh  

and  Others4 explained  the  importance  of  Section  5-A  in  the  following  

words:

“41.……That Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right  to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this  Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5-A confers  an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought  to be acquired. 42.  When  the  Government  proceeds  for  compulsory  acquisition  of  a  particular  property  for  public  purpose,  the  only  right  that  the  owner  or  the  person  interested  in  the  property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed  time under Section 5-A of the Act and persuade the State  authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by  setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land  for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be  caused  to  him  by  such  expropriation,  availability  of  alternative land for achieving public purpose, etc. Moreover,  the right conferred on the owner or person interested to file  objections  to  the  proposed  acquisition  is  not  only  an  important and valuable right but also makes the provision for  compulsory  acquisition  just  and  in  conformity  with  the  fundamental principles of natural justice.”

21. This Court has  dealt with the scope, extent and ambit of the  

power of the state government under Section 17(1) and (4) of the 1894 Act  

from time to time. Narayan Govind Gavate & Ors.  v. State of Maharashtra   

3  (2005) 7 SCC 627 4  (2010) 11 SCC 242

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& Ors.5, Deepak Pahwa & Ors.  v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.6, State of   

U.P.  v.  Smt. Pista Dev & Ors.7, State of U.P. & Anr.  v. Keshav Prasad   

Singh8,  Chameli  Singh  &  Ors.   v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Anr.   9,  Meerut   

Development Authority & Ors.  v. Satbir Singh & Ors.10,  Om Prakash &  

Anr.   v. State of U.P. & Ors.11, Union of India & Ors.  v. Mukesh Hans12,   

Union  of  India  &  Ors.   v.  Krishan  Lal  Arneja  &  Ors.13,  Mahadevappa  

Lachappa Kinagi & Ors.  v. State of Karnataka & Ors.14, Babu Ram & Anr.   

v. State of Haryana & Anr.15 and Tika Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P.16 have  

been referred to  in Anand Singh4  and the  legal position in paragraphs 43  

to 48 of the Report (pgs. 265-266) is culled out  as follows :

“43. The exceptional and extraordinary power of doing away  with  an  enquiry  under  Section  5-A  in  a  case  where  possession  of  the  land  is  required  urgently  or  in  an  unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17 of the Act.  Such power is not a routine power and save circumstances  warranting  immediate  possession  it  should  not  be  lightly  invoked.  The  guideline  is  inbuilt  in  Section  17  itself  for  exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry  under  Section  5-A.  Exceptional  the  power,  the  more  circumspect  the Government must  be in  its  exercise.  The  Government  obviously,  therefore,  has  to  apply  its  mind  before it  dispenses with enquiry under Section 5-A on the  aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that justifies  elimination of summary enquiry under Section 5-A. 44. A repetition of the statutory phrase in the notification that  the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in  the  notification  is  urgently  needed  and  the  provision  contained in Section 5-A shall not apply, though may initially  raise  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  Government  that  

5  (1977) 1 SCC 133 6  (1984) 4 SCC 308 7  (1986) 4 SCC 251 8  (1995) 5 SCC 587 9  (1996) 2 SCC 549 10  (1996) 11 SCC462 11  (1998) 6 SCC 1 12  (2004) 8 SCC 14 13  (2004) 8 SCC 453 14  (2008) 12 SCC 418 15  (2009) 10 SCC 115 16  (2009) 10 SCC 689

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prerequisite conditions for exercise of such power have been  satisfied,  but  such  presumption  may  be  displaced  by  the  circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with  the purpose for which the power has been exercised. Upon  challenge being made to the use of power under Section 17,  the Government must produce appropriate material  before  the Court  that  the opinion for  dispensing with  the enquiry  under Section 5-A has been formed by the Government after  due application of mind on the material placed before it. 45.  It  is  true  that  power  conferred  upon  the  Government  under Section 17 is administrative and its opinion is entitled  to due weight,  but in a case where the opinion is formed  regarding the urgency based on considerations not germane  to  the  purpose,  the  judicial  review  of  such  administrative  decision may become necessary. 46. As to in what circumstances the power of emergency can  be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but circumstances  necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) are  not  stated  in  the  provision  itself.  Generally  speaking,  the  development  of  an  area  (for  residential  purposes)  or  a  planned  development  of  city,  takes  many  years  if  not  decades and,  therefore,  there is no reason why summary  enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A  may not be held  and objections of landowners/persons interested may not be  considered.  In  many  cases,  on  general  assumption  likely  delay in completion of enquiry under Section 5-A is set up as  a reason for invocation of extraordinary power in dispensing  with the enquiry little realising that an important and valuable  right of the person interested in the land is being taken away  and  with  some  effort  enquiry  could  always  be  completed  expeditiously. 47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to  eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving and cases  of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on  the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates  dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. We have already  noticed a few decisions of this Court. There is a conflict of  view in the two decisions of this Court viz.  Narayan Govind  Gavate [(1977) 1 SCC 133] and  Pista Devi [(1986) 4 SCC  251]. In  Om Prakash [(1998) 6 SCC 1] this Court held that  the  decision  in  Pista  Devi  [(1986)  4  SCC  251] must  be  confined  to  the  fact  situation  in  those  days  when  it  was  rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down  a  proposition  contrary  to  the  decision  in  Narayan  Govind  Gavate [(1977) 1 SCC 133]. We agree. 48. As regards the issue whether pre-notification and post- notification  delay  would  render  the  invocation  of  urgency  

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power void, again the case law is not consistent. The view of  this Court has differed on this aspect due to different fact  situation prevailing in those cases. In our opinion such delay  will  have material bearing on the question of invocation of  urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material  has been placed by the appropriate Government before the  Court  justifying  that  urgency  was  of  such  nature  that  necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A.”  

22. Anand Singh4  has been referred to in later cases, one of such  

decisions is  Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through LRs & Ors.. v.  State of Uttar   

Pradesh and Others17 wherein this Court in paragraph 77 (v) to (ix) of the  

Report stated  as follows:

“77(v)   Section  17(1)  read  with  Section  17(4)  confers  extraordinary  power  upon  the  State  to  acquire  private  property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A.  These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of  acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or  months.  Therefore,  before  excluding  the  application  of  Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied  that  time  of  few  weeks  or  months  likely  to  be  taken  in  conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all  probability,  frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be  acquired.  (vi)  The  satisfaction  of  the  Government  on  the  issue  of  urgency  is  subjective  but  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can be  challenged  on  the  ground  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  private  property  is  sought  to  be  acquired  is  not  a  public  purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to  mala fides or  that the authorities concerned did  not  apply  their mind to the relevant factors and the records. (vii) The exercise of power by the Government under Section  17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5-A  of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land  can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his  objection.  The  use  of  word  “may”  in  sub-section  (4)  of  Section  17  makes  it  clear  that  it  merely  enables  the  Government  to  direct  that  the  provisions  of  Section  5-A  would not apply to the cases covered under sub-section (1)  

17  (2011) 5 SCC 553 13

Page 14

or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4)  is  not  a  necessary  concomitant  of  the  exercise  of  power  under Section 17(1). (viii)  The  acquisition  of  land  for  residential,  commercial,  industrial  or  institutional  purposes  can  be  treated  as  an  acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section  4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by  the  Government  under  Sections  17(1)  and/or  17(4).  The  court  can  take  judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  planning,  execution  and  implementation  of  the  schemes  relating  to  development  of  residential,  commercial,  industrial  or  institutional  areas  usually  take  few  years.  Therefore,  the  private  property  cannot  be  acquired  for  such  purpose  by  invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In  any  case,  exclusion  of  the  rule  of  audi  alteram  partem  embodied in Sections 5-A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in  such matters. (ix) If land is acquired for the benefit of private persons, the  court should view the invoking of Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4)  with  suspicion  and carefully  scrutinise  the  relevant  record  before adjudicating upon the legality of such acquisition.”

23. In   light   of   the  above  legal  position  which  is  equally  

applicable to Section 17(1) and (4) of the 1953 Act, we may turn to the fact  

situation of the present matter.  Section 4(5) notice under the 1953 Act was  

issued by the state government  in  1980.   For  almost  seven years,  no  

steps  were  taken in  taking  the acquisition  proceedings  pursuant  to  the  

Section 4(5) notice to the logical conclusion. Even inquiry under Section  

5-A was not commenced, much less completed.  Abruptly on  19.03.1987,  

without  following  the   procedure   contemplated   in   Section   5-A,  

the  declaration  under  Section  6  was  made  and   in   that  

notification the state government  stated that it  has invoked its power of  

urgency under Section 17(1) and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A  

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in  exercise  of  its  power  under  Section  17(4).   Can  it   be   said  that  

an inquiry under  Section 5-A  could  not  have  been completed in all  

these  years?    We  think  that  it  could  have  been  done   easily   and  

conveniently in  few  months leave  aside  few  years.  There were  not  

large  number of owners or  persons interested in respect of the subject  

land.   Section 5-A, which gives a very limited right to an owner/person  

interested, is not an empty formality. The substantial right  under  Section  

5-A is the only  right given to an owner/person interested to object to the  

acquisition proceedings.  Such right ought not to be taken away by the  

State Government  sans real urgency.  The  strong arm of the government  

is  not  meant  to  be  used  nor  it  should   be  used  against  a  citizen  in  

appropriating the property against his consent without giving him right to  

file  objections  as   incorporated  under  Section  5-A   on  any  ostensible  

ground.   The  dispensation  of  enquiry  under  Section  17(4)  has  to  be  

founded on considerations germane to the purpose and not in a routine  

manner.  Unless the circumstances warrant immediate possession, there  

cannot be any justification in dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A.  

As has been stated by this Court in  Anand Singh4, elimination of enquiry  

under  Section 5-A must  only  be  in deserving  and in the  cases of  real  

urgency.  Being  an  exceptional  power,  the  government  must  be  

circumspect in exercising  power of urgency.   

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24. In  Anand  Singh4,  dealing  with  the  issue  whether  the  pre-

notification  and  post-notification  delay  would  render  the  invocation  of  

urgency power void, this Court said that such delay would have material  

bearing on the question  of  invocation  of  urgency  power,  more  so,  in  a  

situation  where  no  material  has  been  placed  by  the  appropriate  

government before the Court  justifying that urgency was of such nature  

that necessitated elimination of inquiry under Section 5-A.

25. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos.  

1 to 3 before this Court, in respect of invocation of power of urgency under  

Section 17(1) and dispensation of inquiry under Section 17(4), it is stated  

as follows:

“…….. Section 17 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act  which  is  a  code  containing  complete  procedure  for  acquisition  made  under  the  said  provision  in  case of  urgency.  In  the  present  petition,  urgency  of  the  acquisition has been shown by the respondent. For the  purpose of public interest, as a bus stand was to be put  up, hence the nature of urgency is quite apparent.         The government issued notification under Section  6 read with 17(4) of the Act on 19.03.1987 under the  compulsory need of the land ……..”.

26. The  counter  affidavit  filed  by  the  respondent  no.  4,  i.e.,  

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation is not relevant as Section 17  

confers power of urgency only on the state government alone  and it is the  

state government that has to justify that the urgency was so imminent that  

dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A was necessary.

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27. The explanation by the state government unsupported by any  

material indicates that the state government feels that  power  conferred on  

it under Section 17(1) and (4)  is unbridled and uncontrolled.  The state  

government seems to have some misconception that in the absence of any  

time limit prescribed in Section 17(1) and (4) for exercise of such power  

after issuance of notice under Section 4 of the 1953 Act,  it can invoke the  

power  of  urgency  whenever  it  wants.  We  are  afraid  the  whole  

understanding of  Section 17 by the state government is fallacious. This  

Court  has time and again  said with regard to  Section 17(1)  read with  

Section 17 (4) of the 1894 Act that the provisions contained therein confer  

extraordinary  power  upon  the  state  to  appropriate  the  private  property  

without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A and, therefore, these  

provisions can be invoked only when the  purpose of acquisition cannot  

brook the delay of  even  few weeks or  months.   This  principle  equally  

applies to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and (4) of the 1953  

Act.   The  state  government,  therefore,  has  to  apply  its  mind  before  it  

invokes its power of urgency and dispensation of inquiry under Section  5-

A  that the compliance of the mandate of Section 5-A may lead to precious  

loss of time which may defeat the purpose for which land  is sought to be  

acquired.  Any construction of building (institutional, industrial, residential,  

commercial  etc.) takes some time and, therefore,  acquisition of land for  

such  purpose  can  always  brook  delay  of  few  months.   Ordinarily,  

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invocation  of  power  of  urgency  by  the  state  government  for  such  

acquisition  may not be legally sustainable.   

28. In this case, as noted above, the preliminary notification under  

Section  4  was  issued  on  01.5.1980.  After  lapse  of  about  7  years  on  

19.03.1987,  one  fine  morning  the  state  government  issued  declaration  

under Section 6 without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A and in  

that declaration it was stated that it has invoked its powers conferred under  

Section 17(1) read with Section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act and dispensed with  

the provisions of Section 5-A. Had the state government intended to hold  

and complete the inquiry under Section 5-A, it could have been done  in  

few months. However, no steps for commencement of the inquiry under  

Section 5-A were even taken by the state government.  We  find that a  

very  valuable right conferred on the land owner/person interested under  

Section  5-A  has  been   taken  away  without  any  justification.  It  is  so  

because the bus stand construction  would have taken some time.  The  

exercise of the power by the state government under section 17(1) read  

with  Section  17(4)  of  the  1953  Act  and  dispensation  of  inquiry  under  

Section 5-A can not  be legally sustained and  has to be declared as such.  

29. Now,  coming  to  the  first  question,  it  will  be  seen  that  

preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued on 01.05.1980. At the  

time  of  issuance  of  the  preliminary  notification,  the  1953  Act  did  not  

prescribe  any  time  limit  for  issuance  of  declaration  under  Section  6.  

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However,   with  effect  from  27.06.1981  by  the  1981  Amendment  Act,  

Section 6 was amended and a proviso was inserted that no declaration in  

respect of any land covered by notice under Section 4, sub-section (5),  

given after the commencement of the 1981 Amendment Act shall be made  

after the expiry of three years from the date of giving of such notice. This  

proviso  is   obviously  applicable  to  the  acquisition  proceedings  initiated  

after coming into force of the 1981 Amendment Act and has no application  

to the present fact situation.   As regards the acquisition proceedings which  

had  already  commenced  by  issuance  of  preliminary  notification  before  

coming into force of the 1981 Amendment Act, Section 5(1)(b) of the 1981  

Amendment  Act,  inter  alia,  provides  that  acquisition  pursuant  to  such  

preliminary  notification   may  be  completed  after  commencement  of  the  

1981 Amendment Act and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing  

done including any order made, agreement entered into or notice given,  

whether  before  or  after  such  commencement,  in  connection  with  such  

acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the grounds referred to  

in clause (a) or any one of them. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the 1981  

Amendment  Act,  however,  provides  that  notwithstanding  anything  

contained in clause (b) of sub-section (1),  no declaration under Section 6  

of the 1953 Act in respect of any land for the acquisition of which notice  

under  sub-section  (5)  of  Section  4  has  been  given  before  the  

commencement of the 1981 Amendment Act shall be made after the expiry  

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of two years from the commencement of the 1981 Amendment Act. Sub-

section  (2)  of  Section 5 of  the 1981 Amendment  Act  begins  with  non  

obstante clause.  Section 5(2) of the 1981 Amendment Act thus mandates  

that no declaration under Section 6 in respect of the notice issued under  

Section 4(5)  before the commencement of the 1981 Amendment Act shall  

be made after expiry of two years from the commencement of the said Act.  

The provision leaves no manner of doubt that two years’ time prescribed  

for  making  declaration  under  Section 6 in  respect  of  the notice  issued  

under Section 4(5) prior to the commencement of the 1981 Amendment  

Act is mandatory and permits no departure. This is clear from the words  

“no declaration” and “shall be made” used in Section 5(2). The intention of  

the legislature admits of no ambiguity and it is clear that in respect of the  

notice issued under Section 4(5) before the commencement of the 1981  

Amendment  Act,   it  is  obligatory  on  the  state  government  to  make  

declaration on or before the expiry of two years from the commencement  

of the 1981 Amendment Act. The provision is imperative in nature and has  

to be followed as it  lays down the maximum time limit within which the  

declaration under Section 6  of the 1953 Act can be made in respect of the  

notice under Section 4(5) issued before the commencement of the 1981  

Amendment Act.

30. On behalf of the respondents, two decisions of the Rajasthan  

High Court, one,  Indrapuri Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v.  State of   

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Rajasthan and others18 and the other,   Chain Singh and etc., v.  State of   

Rajasthan and others19 were cited. We are afraid insofar as Indrapuri Grah  

Nirman  Sahakari  Samiti  Ltd.18  is  concerned,  it  has  no  application  

whatsoever.  As  regards  Chain  Singh19,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  

Rajasthan  High  Court  was  concerned  with  the  provisions  of  the  Land  

Acquisition  (Rajasthan  Amendment)  Act,  1987  amending  the  1894  Act.  

The provisions under  consideration  before the Rajasthan High Court  in  

Chain Singh19 were materially different and, therefore, that decision is of no  

help to the respondents.  

31. Learned counsel for the respondents also cited a decision of  

this Court in Pesara Pushapmala Reddy v. G. Veera Swamy and Others20.   

In Pesara  Pushpamala  Reddy20,  this  Court  was  concerned  with  the  

questions whether it was mandatory for the special tribunal or the special  

court  to  call  for  a  report  of  the  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  before  taking  

cognizance  of  a  case  under  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, “Land Grabbing Act”) and whether it was  

mandatory  for  the  special  tribunal  or  the  special  court  to  publish  a  

notification in the gazette notifying the fact of cognizance of a case under  

the Act. This Court considered the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act. In  

our view, Pesara Pushpamala Reddy20 is not even remotely relevant for the  

present case and has no application at all. 18  2002 (3) WLN 122  19  AIR 1991 Rajasthan 17 20  (2011) 4 SCC 306

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32. Having regard to clear and unambiguous mandate of Section  

5(2) of the 1981 Amendment Act that no declaration under Section 6 of the  

1953 Act in respect of any land for the acquisition of which notice under  

Section  4(5)  has  been  given  before  the  commencement  of  the  1981  

Amendment  Act  shall  be  made  after  the  expiry  of  two  years  from the  

commencement of the 1981 Amendment Act, it has to be held and we hold  

that  preliminary  notification   dated  01.05.1980,  which  was  followed  by  

notice  under  Section  4(5)  before  the  commencement  of  the  1981  

Amendment Act, has lapsed and does not survive since declaration under  

Section 6 has been made much beyond the time limit prescribed in law.

33. Civil appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned orders are  

set aside. It is declared that preliminary notification dated 01.05.1980 has  

lapsed and the declaration made on 19.03.1987 is legally unsustainable.  If  

possession of the subject  land has been taken from the appellants,  the  

same shall be restored to them without any delay.  No orders as to costs.  

             …………………….J.                         (R.M. Lodha)

                       .……………………...J.          (J. Chelameswar)

NEW DELHI MARCH 1, 2013.

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