REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.68 OF 2008

Lalita Kumari   …Petitioner

Versus

Government of U.P. & Others …Respondents

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1410 OF 2011

Samshudheen …Appellant

Versus

State, Represented by Dy. Superintendent of Police Tamil Nadu …Respondent

WITH  

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO.5200 OF 2009

Baldev Singh Cheema …Petitioner  

Versus

State of Punjab & Others …Respondents

WITH

SLP (CRIMINAL) NO.5986 OF 2010

Surjit Singh & Another …Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab & Others …Respondents

AND

CONTEMPT PETITION NO.         ARISING OUT OF D.26722 of 2008

IN

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.68 OF 2008

Daljit Singh Grewal …Petitioner

Versus

Ramesh Inder Singh …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. We propose  to deal  with the abovementioned writ  

petition, the criminal appeals and the contempt petition  

by this judgment.  The question of law involved in these  

cases  is  identical,  therefore,  all  these  cases  are  being  

dealt  with  by  a  common judgment.   In  order  to  avoid  

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repetition,  only  the  facts  of  the  writ  petition  of  Lalita  

Kumari’s case are recapitulated.

2. The petition has been filed before this Court under  

Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the nature of  

habeas  corpus  to  produce  Lalita  Kumari,  the  minor  

daughter of Bhola Kamat.

3. On 5.5.2008, Lalita Kumari, aged about six years,  

went out of her house at 9 p.m. When she did not return  

for half an hour and Bhola Kamat was not successful in  

tracing her, he filed a missing report at the police station  

Loni, Ghaziabad, U.P.

4. On 11.5.2008,  respondent  no.5 met Bhola  Kamat  

and informed him that his daughter has been kidnapped  

and kept under unlawful confinement by the respondent  

nos.6  to  13.   The  respondent-police  did  not  take  any  

action on his complaint.  Aggrieved by the inaction of the  

local  police,  Bhola  Kamat  made  a  representation  on  

3.6.2008  to  the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Police,  

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Ghaziabad.  On the directions of the Superintendent of  

Police,  Ghaziabad,  the  police  station  Loni,  Ghaziabad  

registered  a  First  Information  Report  (F.I.R.)  No.484  

dated 6.6.2008 under Sections 363/366/506/120B IPC  

against the private respondents.

5. Even after registration of the FIR against the private  

respondents, the police did not take any action to trace  

Lalita  Kumari.  According  to  the  allegation  of  Bhola  

Kamat,  he  was  asked  to  pay  money  for  initiating  

investigation  and  to  arrest  the  accused  persons.  

Ultimately, the petitioner filed this petition under Article  

32 of the Constitution before this Court.

6. This  Court  on 14.7.2008 passed a comprehensive  

order expressing its grave anguish on non-registration of  

the FIR even in a case of cognizable offence.  The Court  

also issued notices to all Chief Secretaries of the States  

and Administrators of the Union Territories.  In response  

to  the  directions  of  the  Court,  various  States  and  the  

Union Territories have filed comprehensive affidavits.   

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7. The  short,  but  extremely  important  issue  which  

arises in this petition is whether under Section 154 of the  

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  a  police  officer  is  

bound to register  an FIR when a cognizable  offence is  

made out or he has some latitude of  conducting some  

kind of preliminary enquiry before registering the FIR.

8. Mr.  S.B.  Upadhyay,  learned  senior  advocate  

appearing  for  the  petitioner  has  tried  to  explain  the  

scheme  of  Section  154  Cr.P.C.  with  the  help  of  other  

provisions  of  the  Act.  According  to  him,  whenever  

information regarding cognizable offence is brought to the  

notice of the SHO, he has no option but to register the  

First Information Report.

9. This  Court  also  issued  notice  to  the  learned  

Attorney  General  for  India  to  assist  the  Court  in  this  

matter of general public importance.  Mr. Harish P Raval,  

the learned Additional Solicitor General appeared before  

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the  Court  and  made  comprehensive  submissions.   He  

also filed written submissions which were settled by him  

and re-settled by the learned  Attorney General for India.

10. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that  

the issue which has been referred to this Court has been  

decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case  

of Aleque Padamsee and Others v. Union of India and  

Others (2007) 6 SCC 171.  In this case, this Court while  

referring to the judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumari  

v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Others (2006) 2 SCC 677 in  

paragraph 2 of the judgment has observed as under:-

“Whenever cognizable offence is disclosed  the police officials are bound to register  the  same  and  in  case  it  is  not  done,  directions  to  register  the  same  can  be  given.”

11. The State of Gujarat, the respondent in the above  

case,  on  the  facts  thereof,  contended  that  on  a  bare  

reading of a complaint lodged, it appears that no offence  

was  made  and  that  whenever  a  complaint  is  lodged,  

automatically and in a routine manner an FIR is not to  

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be registered.  This  Court  after  considering Chapter  XII  

and  more  particularly  Sections  154  and  156  held  

(paragraphs 6 and 7) that “whenever any information is  

received by the police about the alleged commission of  

offence  which  is  a  cognizable  one,  there  is  a  duty  to  

register  the  FIR.”   There  could  be  no  dispute  on  that  

score as observed by this Court.  The issue referred to in  

the reference has already been answered by the Bench of  

three Judges.  The judgment in  Aleque Padamsee and  

Others (supra) is not referred in the reference order.  It is  

therefore prayed that the present reference be answered  

accordingly.

12. It  was submitted  on behalf  of  the  Union of  India  

that  Section  154  (1)  provides  that  every  information  

relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given  

orally, to an officer incharge of a police station shall be  

reduced in writing by him or under his directions.  The  

provision is mandatory.  The use of the word “shall” by  

the  legislation is  indicative  of  the  statutory  intent.   In  

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case such information is given in writing or is reduced in  

writing on being given orally, it is required to be signed  

by the persons giving it.  It is further provided that the  

substance  of commission of a cognizable offence as given  

in writing or reduced to writing “shall”  be entered in a  

book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State  

Government may prescribe in this behalf.   Sub-section  

(2) provides that a copy of such information as recorded  

in sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith free of cost to  

the informant.

13. In light of the provisions contained in Section 154  

(1)  and the law laid by this  Court  on the subject,  the  

following submissions were placed by the Union of India  

for consideration of this Court.

a) The  statutory  intention  is  manifest  on  a  bare  

reading  of  provisions  of  Section  154(1)  to  the  

effect  that  when an officer  incharge  of  a  police  

station  to  whom  information  relating  to  

commission  of  cognizable  offence  has  been  

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disclosed, he has no discretion save and except to  

reduce the said information in writing by him or  

under his direction.

b) Section 154(1) does not have ambiguity and is in  

clear terms.

c) The use of expression “shall” clearly manifest the  

mandatory statutory intention.

d) In construing a statutory provision, the first and  

the  foremost  rule  of  construction  is  the  literal  

construction.   It  is  submitted  that  all  that  the  

Court has to see at the very outset is what does  

that  provision  say.   If  the  provision  is  

unambiguous  and  if  from  that  provision,  the  

legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call  

into it the other rules on construction of statutes.  

[Para 22 of  Hiralal Rattanlal etc.etc. v.  State  

of U.P. and Another etc.etc. 1973(1) SCC 216].  

This  judgment  is  referred to  and  followed  in  a  

recent decision of this Court in  B. Premanand  

and Others v. Mohan Koikal and Others (2011)  

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4 SCC 266 paras 8 and 9.  It is submitted that  

the  language  employed  in  Section  154  is  the  

determinative  factor  of  the  legislative  intent.  

There is neither any defect nor any omission in  

words  used  by  the  legislature.   The  legislative  

intent is clear.  The language of Section 154(1),  

therefore, admits of no other construction.

e) The use of expression “shall” is indicative of the  

intention  of  the  legislature  which  has  used  a  

language of compulsive force.  There is nothing  

indicative  of  the  contrary  in  the  context  

indicating a permissive interpretation of Section  

154.  It is submitted that the said Section ought  

to be construed as preemptory.  The words are  

precise  and  unambiguous  (Govindlal  

Chhaganlal  Patel v.  Agricultural  Produce  

Market Committee, Godhra and Others 1975  

(2) SCC 482).  It is submitted that it is settled law  

that  judgments  of  the  courts  are  not  to  be  

construed  as  statutes  [para  11  of  three-Judge  

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Bench decision of this court in the case of  M/s  

Amar  Nath  Om  Prakash  and  others  etc.  v.  

State of Punjab and Others (1985) 1 SCC 345].  

The abovesaid decision is followed by a judgment  

of  this  Court  in the  case  of  Hameed Joharan  

(dead)  and others  v.  Abdul  Salam (dead)  by  

Lrs. and Others (2001) 7 SCC 573.

f) The provision of  Section 154(1)  read in light  of  

statutory scheme do not admit of conferring any  

discretion on the officer  in charge of  the police  

station  of  embarking  upon  an  preliminary  

enquiry  prior  to  registration  of  an  FIR.  A  

preliminary enquiry is  a term which is  alien to  

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which talks  

of (i) investigation (ii) inquiry and (iii) trial.  These  

terms  are  definite  connotations  having  been  

defined under Section 2 of the Act.

g) The concept of preliminary enquiry as contained  

in  Chapter  IX  of  the  CBI  (Crime)  Manual,  first  

published  in  1991  and  thereafter  updated  on  

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15.7.2005 cannot  be  relied  upon to  import  the  

concept of holding of preliminary enquiry in the  

scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

h) The  interpretation  of  Section  154  cannot  be  

depended upon a Manual regulating the conduct  

of officers of an organization, i.e., CBI.

i) A reference to para 9.1. of the said Manual would  

show  that  preliminary  enquiry  is  contemplated  

only when a complaint is received or information  

is  available  which  may  after  verification  as  

enjoined  in  the  said  Manual  indicates  serious  

misconduct on the part of the public servant but  

is not adequate to justify registration of a regular  

case  under  provisions  of  Section  154  Cr.P.C.  

Such preliminary inquiry as referred to in para  

9.1 of  the CBI Manual  as also to be registered  

after  obtaining  approval  of  the  competent  

authority.  It is submitted that these provisions  

cannot be imported into the statutory scheme of  

Section 154 so as to provide any discretion to a  

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police officer in the matter of registration of an  

FIR.

j) The  purpose  of  registration  of  an  FIR  are  

manifold –that is to say

i) To  reduce  the  substance  of  information  

disclosing  commission  of  a  cognizable  

offence, if given orally, into writing

ii) if  given in writing to have it signed by the  

complainant

iii) to maintain record of receipt of information  

as  regards  commission  of  cognizable  

offences

iv) to  initiate  investigation  on  receipt  of  

information  as  regards  commission  of  

cognizable offence

v) to inform Magistrate forthwith of the factum  

of the information received.

14. Reference  has  also  been  made  to  the  celebrated  

judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v.  

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Khwaza Nazim Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 in which it is  

held that for the receipt  and recording of an information,  

report  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the  setting  in  

motion of a criminal investigation.  It is further held, that  

no  doubt,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  criminal  

prosecution are undertaken as a result of the information  

received  and  recorded  in  this  way.   (As  provided  in  

Sections 154 to 156 of the earlier Code).   It  is further  

held  that  there  is  no  reason  why  the  police,  if  in  

possession through their own knowledge or by means of  

credible  though  informal  intelligence   which  genuinely  

leads  them to  the  belief  that  a  cognizable  offence  has  

been  committed,  should  not  of  their  own  motion  

undertake an investigation into the truth of the matters  

alleged.  It is further held that Section 157 of the Code  

when directing that a police officer, who has a reason to  

suspect from information or  otherwise,  that an offence  

which he is empowered to investigate under Section 156  

has been committed, he shall proceed to investigate the  

facts and circumstances of the case.  It is further held in  

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the said judgment that, in truth the provisions as to an  

information report (commonly called a First Information  

Report)  are enacted for  other  reasons.   Its  object  is  to  

obtain  early  information  of  alleged criminal  activity,  to  

record the circumstances before there is time for them to  

be forgotten or embellished, and it has to be remembered  

that  the  report  can  be  put  in  evidence  when  the  

informant  is  examined,  if  it  is  desired  to  do so.   It  is  

further  held  in  the  said  judgment  that  there  is  a  

statutory  right  on part  of  the  police  to  investigate  the  

circumstances  of  an  alleged  cognizable  crime  without  

requiring any authority from the judicial authorities.

15. On behalf of the Union of India reference was made  

to the judgment of this Court delivered in The State of  

Uttar Pradesh v.  Bhagwant Kishore Joshi AIR 1964  

SC 221 wherein it has been held vide para 8 that Section  

154 of  the  Code prescribed the mode of  recording  the  

information  received  orally  or  in  writing  by  an  officer  

incharge of a police station in respect of commission of a  

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cognizable offence.  Section 156 thereof authorizes such  

an officer to investigate any cognizable offence prescribed  

therein.  Though, ordinarily investigation is undertaken  

on information received by a police officer, the receipt of  

information is not a condition precedent for investigation.

16. It  is  further  held  that  Section  157 prescribes the  

procedure in the matter of such an investigation which  

can be initiated either on information or otherwise.  It is  

also held that it is clear from the said provision that an  

officer in charge of a police station can start investigation  

either  on information or otherwise.   The judges in the  

said judgment referred to a decision of this Court in the  

case of H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of  

Delhi 1955 SCR (1) 1150 at pp.1157-58 that the graphic  

description  of  the  stages  is  only  a  restatement  of  the  

principle  that  a  vague  information  or  an  irresponsible  

rumour would not by itself constitute information within  

the meaning of Section 154 of the Code or the basis of an  

investigation under Section 157 thereof.  The said case  

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was in respect of an offence alleged under Prevention of  

Corruption Act, 1947.  The said case was under the old  

Code  which  did  not  define  the  term  ‘investigation’  

(paragraph  18  of  the  concurring  judgment  of  Justice  

Mudholkar  at  page  226).   It  is  also  observed that  the  

main  object  of   investigation  mean to  bring  home  the  

offence to the offender.  The essential part of the duty of  

an investigating officer in this connection is, apart from  

arresting the offender, to collect all material necessary for  

establishing the accusation “against” the offender.

17. The  following  observations  in  the  concurring  

judgment  of  Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi (supra)  were  

found in paragraph 18 :

“In the absence of any prohibition in the  Code, express or implied, I am of opinion  that it is open to a Police Officer to make  preliminary  enquiries  before  registering  an  offence  and  making  a  full  scale  investigation into  it.  No doubt,  s.  5A of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  was  enacted  for  preventing  harassment  to  a  Government servant and with this object  in  view  investigation,  except  with  the  

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previous  permission  of  a  Magistrate,  is  not  permitted  to  be  made  by  an officer  below  the  rank  of  a  Deputy  Superintendent of Police. Where however,  a Police Officer makes some preliminary  enquiries,  does  not  arrest  or  even  question  an  accused  or  question  any  witnesses  but  merely  makes  a  few  discreet  enquiries  or  looks  at  some  documents without making any notes, it  is difficult to visualise how any possible  harassment  or  even  embarrassment  would result therefrom to the suspect or  the accused person.”

18. In case of H.N. Rishbud (supra), in the case under  

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it is observed as  

under:-

“Investigation   usually   starts   on  information relating to the commission of  an offence given to an officer in charge of  a  police  station  and  recorded  under  section  154  of  the  Code.   If  from  information so received or  otherwise, the  officer in charge of the police station has  reason  to suspect the  commission  of an  offence, he  or some  other subordinate  officer deputed by him, has to proceed  to  the  spot  to  investigate  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  and   if  necessary to take  measures for  the  discovery  and arrest of  the  offender.”

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It is further held :-

“Thus  investigation   primarily consists  in  the  ascertainment  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of    the   case.  By  definition,   it   includes   "all  the  proceedings   under  the  Code  for  the  collection  of   evidence  conducted  by  a  police officer".

It is further held in the said judgment that :

“Thus,  under   the  Code  investigation  consists  generally  of  the  following  steps:(1)  Proceeding  to  the  spot,  (2)  Ascertainment  of  the   facts  and  circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery  and  arrest  of the suspected offender, (4)  Collection  of  evidence   relating  to   the  commission  of  the  offence  which  may  consist  of  (a) the  examination of various  persons (including the  accused) and  the  reduction of their statements into writing,  if  the officer  thinks  fit,  (b)  the  search  of  places  of  seizure   of  things  considered necessary for the investigation  and to  be produced at the trial, and (5)  Formation of  the  opinion as to  whether  on the material collected there is a case  to place the accused before a Magistrate  for  trial  and  if  so  taking  the  necessary  steps  for  the  same  by  the  filing  of   a  charge-sheet under section 173.”

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19. It was further submitted that this Court in the case  

of Damodar v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2004(12)  

SCC 336 referred to the observations of the judgment of  

this Court rendered in case of Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v.  

State of Gujarat 1994 (2) SCC 685 and observed that  

the  question  as  to  at  what  stage  the  investigation  

commence  has to  be  considered and examined  on the  

facts  of  each  case  especially  when  the  information  of  

alleged cognizable offence has been given on telephone.  

The  said  case  deals  with  information  received  on  

telephone by an unknown person.  In paragraph 10 it is  

observed  thus  “in  order  to  constitute  the  FIR,  the  

information  must  reveal  commission  of  act  which  is  a  

cognizable offence.”

20. It is further observed in paragraph 11 in the case  

of Damodar (supra) that in the context of the facts of the  

said  case,  that  any  telephonic  information  about  

commission of a cognizable offence, if any, irrespective of  

the  nature  and  details  of  such  information  cannot  be  

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treated as an FIR.  It is further held that if the telephonic  

message  is  cryptic  in  nature  and  the  officer  incharge  

proceeds to the place of occurrence on the basis of that  

information to find out the details of the nature of the  

offence,  if  any,  then  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  

information  which  had  been  received  by  him  on  

telephone shall be deemed to be an FIR.   

21. It is also observed that the object and purpose of  

giving such telephonic message is not to lodge an FIR,  

but  to  make  the  officer  incharge  of  the  police  station  

reach the place of occurrence.  It is further held that if  

the information given on telephone is not cryptic and on  

the basis of that information the officer incharge is prima  

facie satisfied about commission of a cognizable offence  

and he proceeds from the police station after recording  

such information, to investigate such offence, then any  

statement  made  by  any  person  in  respect  of  the  said  

offence including the participants shall be deemed to be  

statement made by a person to the police officer in the  

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course  of  investigation  covered  by  Section  162  of  the  

Code.

22. This Court in the case of  Binay Kumar Singh v.  

The State  of  Bihar 1997(1)  SCC  283  observed  as  

under:-

“…..It  is  evidently  a  cryptic  information  and is hardly sufficient for discerning the  commission  of  any  cognizable  offence  therefrom. Under Section 154 of the Code  the information must unmistakably relate  to the commission of a cognizable offence  and it shall be reduced to writing (if given  orally) and shall be signed by its maker.  The  next  requirement  is  that  the  substance  thereof  shall  be  entered in  a  book kept  in  the  police  station in  such  form  as  the  State  Government  has  prescribed. First information report (FIR)  has  to  be  prepared  and  it  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  magistrate  who  is  empowered  to  take  cognizance  of  such  offence upon such report.  The officer in  charge of a police station is not obliged to  prepare FIR on any nebulous information  received  from  somebody  who  does  not  disclose  any authentic  knowledge  about  commission of the cognizable offence. It is  open  to  the  officer-in-charge  to  collect  more  information  containing  details  about the occurrence, if available, so that  he  can  consider  whether  a  cognizable  offence  has  been  committed  warranting  investigation thereto.”

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23. It is submitted that in the said judgment what fell  

for  consideration  of  the  Court  was  the  conviction  and  

sentence  in  respect  of  the  offence  under  Sections  

302/149 of the IPC in respect of a murder which took  

place in a Bihar village wherein lives of 13 people were  

lost and 17 other were badly injured along with burning  

alive of large number of mute cattle and many dwelling  

houses.   It  is also submitted that the interpretation of  

Section  154  was  not  directly  in  issue  in  the  said  

judgment.

24. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the  

case  of  Madhu  Bala v.  Suresh  Kumar  and  Others  

reported as 1997 (8) SCC 476 in the context of Sections  

156(3)  173(2),  154  and  190(1)  (a)  and  (b)  and  more  

particularly  upon the  following  paragraphs  of  the  said  

judgment.  The same read as under:-

“Coming first to the relevant provisions of  the Code, Section 2(d) defines “complaint”  to mean any allegation made orally or in  writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his  taking action under the Code, that some  person, whether known or unknown has  

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committed  an  offence,  but  does  not  include a police report. Under Section 2(c)  “cognizable offence” means an offence for  which,  and  “cognizable  case”  means  a  case  in  which  a  police  officer  may  in  accordance  with  the  First  Schedule  (of  the Code) or under any other law for the  time  being  in  force,  arrest  without  a  warrant.  Under  Section  2(r)  “police  report”  means  a  report  forwarded  by  a  police officer to a Magistrate under sub- section  (2)  of  Section  173  of  the  Code.  Chapter  XII  of  the  Code  comprising  Sections  154  to  176  relates  to  information to the police and their powers  to investigate. Section 154 provides, inter  alia, that the officer in charge of a police  station  shall  reduce  into  writing  every  information relating to the commission of  a  cognizable  offence given to  him orally  and  every  such  information  if  given  in  writing  shall  be  signed  by  the  person  giving it and the substance thereof shall  be entered in a book to be kept by such  officer  in  such  form  as  the  State  Government may prescribe in this behalf.  Section 156 of  the Code with which we  are primarily concerned in these appeals  reads as under:

“(1) Any officer in charge of a police station  may,  without  the  order  of  a  Magistrate,  investigate  any  cognizable  case  which  a  court having jurisdiction over the local area  within the limits of such station would have  power  to  inquire  into  or  try  under  the  provisions of Chapter XIII.

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(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any  such  case  shall  at  any  stage  be  called  in  question on the ground that the case was  one which such officer was not empowered  under this section to investigate.

(3)  Any  Magistrate  empowered  under  Section  190  may  order  such  an  investigation as above mentioned.”

On  completion  of  investigation  undertaken  under  Section  156(1)  the  officer  in charge of  the  police  station  is  required  under  Section  173(2) to forward to a Magistrate empowered to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  on  a  police  report, a report in the form prescribed by the  State  Government  containing  all  the  particulars mentioned therein. Chapter XIV of  the Code lays down the conditions requisite for  initiation  of  proceedings  by  the  Magistrate.  Under sub-section (1) of Section 190 appearing  in  that  Chapter  any  Magistrate  of  the  First  Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class  specially  empowered  may  take  cognizance  of  any offence (a) upon receiving a “complaint” of  facts which constitutes such offence; (b) upon  a  “police  report”  of  such  facts;  or  (c)  upon  information  received  from  any  person  other  than  a  police  officer,  or  upon  his  own  knowledge  that  such  offence  has  been  committed.  Chapter  XV  prescribes  the  procedure the Magistrate has to initially follow  if  it  takes  cognizance  of  an  offence  on  a  complaint under Section 190(1)(a).

25. Learned counsel for the Union of India relied on the  

following passage from Madhu Bala (supra) :-

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“From  a  combined  reading  of  the  above  provisions it is abundantly clear that when a  written  complaint  disclosing  a  cognizable  offence is  made before  a Magistrate,  he  may  take cognizance upon the same under Section  190(1)(a)  of  the  Code  and proceed  with  the  same  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Chapter XV. The other option available to the  Magistrate  in  such  a  case  is  to  send  the  complaint  to  the  appropriate  police  station  under  Section  156(3)  for  investigation.  Once  such a direction is given under sub-section (3)  of  Section  156  the  police  is  required  to  investigate  into  that  complaint  under  sub- section  (1)  thereof  and  on  completion  of  investigation  to  submit  a  “police  report”  in  accordance  with  Section  173(2)  on  which  a  Magistrate may take cognizance under Section  190(1)(b)  — but not under 190(1)(a).  Since a  complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a  “police  report”  in  view  of  the  definition  of  “complaint”  referred  to  earlier  and  since  the  investigation  of  a  “cognizable  case”  by  the  police under Section 156(1) has to culminate  in a “police report” the “complaint” — as soon  as  an  order  under  Section  156(3)  is  passed  thereon — transforms itself to a report given in  writing within the meaning of Section 154 of  the  Code,  which  is  known  as  the  first  information  report  (FIR).  As  under  Section  156(1),  the  police  can  only  investigate  a  cognizable “case”, it has to formally register a  case on that report.”

26. Mr. Raval also relied on the following passage from  

Madhu Bala’ s case:-

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“From  the  foregoing  discussion  it  is  evident  that  whenever  a  Magistrate  directs  an  investigation on a “complaint” the police has to  register  a  cognizable  case  on  that  complaint  treating the same as the FIR and comply with  the  requirements  of  the  above  Rules.  It,  therefore, passes our comprehension as to how  the direction of a Magistrate asking the police  to  “register  a  case”  makes  an  order  of  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  legally  unsustainable.  Indeed,  even  if  a  Magistrate  does  not  pass  a  direction to  register  a case,  still in view of the provisions of Section 156(1)  of  the  Code  which  empowers  the  police  to  investigate  into  a  cognizable  “case”  and  the  Rules  framed  under  the  Indian  Police  Act,  1861 it (the police) is duty-bound to formally  register  a  case  and then investigate  into  the  same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, do  not  in  any  way  stand  in  the  way  of  a  Magistrate to direct the police to register a case  at the police station and then investigate into  the  same.  In  our opinion when an order  for  investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code  is to be made the proper direction to the police  would  be  “to  register  a  case  at  the  police  station  treating  the  complaint  as  the  first  information  report  and  investigate  into  the  same”.

27. This  Court  in  the  case  of  Hallu  and  others v.  

State  of  Madhya  Pradesh 1974  (4)  SCC  300  in  the  

context  of  Section  154  of  the  Code  held  (para  7)  that  

Section 154 of the Code does not require that the Report  

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must be given by a person who has personal knowledge  

of the incident reported.  It is further held that the said  

Section  speaks  of  an  information  relating  to  the  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  given  to  an  officer  

incharge of a police station.

28. Mr. Raval placed reliance on para 8 of the judgment  

of this Court in the case of  Rajinder Singh Katoch v.  

Chandigarh Administration and others 2007 (10) SCC  

69, wherein this Court observed as under:-

“8.Although  the  officer  in  charge  of  a  police station is legally bound to register  a  first  information  report  in  terms  of  Section  154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  if  the  allegations  made  by  them give rise to an offence which can be  investigated  without  obtaining  any  permission  from  the  Magistrate  concerned,  the  same by  itself,  however,  does  not  take  away  the  right  of  the  competent officer to make a preliminary  enquiry, in a given case, in order to find  out  as  to  whether  the  first  information  sought to be lodged had any substance or  not.  In  this  case,  the  authorities  had  made  investigations  into  the  matter.  In  fact, the Superintendent of Police himself  has, pursuant to the directions issued by  the  High  Court,  investigated  into  the  matter  and  visited  the  spot  in  order  to  

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find out the truth in the complaint of the  petitioner  from  the  neighbours.  It  was  found  that  the  complaint  made  by  the  appellant  was  false  and  the  same  had  been filed with an ulterior motive to take  illegal possession of the first floor of the  house.”

29. While  referring  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Ramesh Kumari (supra) in para 11 of the judgment in  

Rajinder Singh’s case, it is observed as under:-

“11. We are not oblivious to the decision  of this Court in Ramesh Kumari v. State  (NCT of Delhi) wherein such a statutory  duty has been found in the police officer.  But,  as  indicated  hereinbefore,  in  an  appropriate case, the police officers also  have  a  duty  to  make  a  preliminary  enquiry so as to find out as to whether  allegations  made  had  any  substance  or  not.”

30. It is further submitted that the above observations  

run concurrently to the settled principles of law and more  

particularly the three judge Bench decision of this Court  

in Aleque Padamsee and Others (supra).

31. In  the  context  of  the  statutory  provisions,  the  

learned counsel for the Union of India drew the attention  

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of this Court to the decision of this Court in the case of  

Superintendent of Police, CBI and Others v.  Tapan  

Kumar Singh AIR 2003 SC 4140, paragraph 20 at page  

4145 as under:-

“It is well settled that a First Information  Report  is  not  an  encyclopedia,  which  must  disclose  all  facts  and  details  relating  to  the  offence  reported.  An  informant may lodge a report  about the  commission of an offence though he may  not know the name of the victim or his  assailant.   He  may not  even know how  the  occurrence  took  place.   A  first  informant need not necessarily be an eye  witness  so  as  to  be  able  to  disclose  in  great  details  all  aspects  of  the  offence  committed.  What is of significance is that  the  information given must  disclose  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  and  the information so lodged must provide a  basis for the police officer to suspect the  commission of  a  cognizable  offence.   At  this stage it is enough if the police officer  on  the  basis  of  the  information  given  suspects the commission of a cognizable  offence,  and  not  that  he  must  be  convinced  or  satisfied  that  a  cognizable  offence  has  been  committed.  If  he  has  reasons  to  suspect,  on  the  basis  of  information  received,  that  a  cognizable  offence may have been committed, he is  bound  to  record  the  information  and  conduct an investigation.  At this stage it  is  also  not  necessary  for  him to  satisfy  himself  about  the  truthfulness  of  the  

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information.   It is only after a complete  investigation  that  he  may  be  able  to  report on the truthfulness or otherwise of  the  information.   Similarly,  even  if  the  information  does  not  furnish  all  the  details, he must find out those details in  the course of investigation and collect all  the necessary evidence.  The information  given  disclosing  the  commission  of  a  cognizable offence only sets in motion the  investigative  machinery,  with  a  view  to  collect  all  necessary  evidence,  and  thereafter  to  take  action  in  accordance  with law.   The true test  is  whether  the  information furnished provides a reason  to suspect the commission of an offence,  which  the  concerned  police  officer  is  empowered  under  Section  156  of  the  Code to investigate.  If it does, he has no  option but to record the information and  proceed  to  investigate  the  case  either  himself  or  depute  any  other  competent  officer to conduct the investigation. The  question as to whether the report is true,  whether it discloses full details regarding  the  manner  of  occurrence,  whether  the  accused is named, and whether there is  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  allegations are all matters which are alien  to  the  consideration  of  the  question  whether  the  report  discloses  the  commission of a cognizable offence.  Even  if  the  information  does  not  give  full  details  regarding  these  matters,  the  investigating officer is not absolved of his  duty to investigate the case and discover  the true facts, if he can.”

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32. This Court  in its decision in the case of  Ramesh  

Kumari (supra) has observed as under in paragraphs 3,  

4 and 5 :-

“3. Mr Vikas Singh, the learned Additional  Solicitor General, at the outset, invites our  attention to the counter-affidavit filed by the  respondent  and  submits  that  pursuant  to  the aforesaid observation of the High Court  the  complaint/representation  has  been  subsequently  examined  by  the  respondent  and  found  that  no  genuine  case  was  established.  We are  not  convinced  by  this  submission  because  the  sole  grievance  of  the  appellant  is  that  no  case  has  been  registered  in  terms  of  the  mandatory  provisions of Section 154(1) of the Criminal  Procedure Code. Genuineness or otherwise  of  the  information  can only  be  considered  after registration of  the case. Genuineness  or  credibility  of  the  information  is  not  a  condition  precedent  for  registration  of  a  case. We are also clearly of the view that the  High Court  erred in law in dismissing the  petition  solely  on  the  ground  that  the  contempt  petition  was  pending  and  the  appellant  had  an  alternative  remedy.  The  ground of alternative remedy nor pending of  the  contempt  petition  would  be  no  substitute in law not to register a case when  a citizen makes a complaint of a cognizable  offence against a police officer.

4. That a police officer mandatorily registers  a  case  on  a  complaint  of  a  cognizable  offence by the citizen under Section 154 of  the Code is no more res integra. The point of  

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law has been set  at  rest  by this  Court  in  State  of  Haryana v.  Bhajan  Lal. This  Court after examining the whole gamut and  intricacies  of  the  mandatory  nature  of  Section 154 of the Code has arrived at the  finding in paras 31 and 32 of the judgment  as under: (SCC pp. 354-55)

31. At the stage of registration of a crime or  a  case  on  the  basis  of  the  information  disclosing  a  cognizable  offence  in  compliance  with  the  mandate  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code,  the  police  officer  concerned cannot embark upon an enquiry  as to whether the information,  laid by the  informant  is  reliable  and  genuine  or  otherwise and refuse to register a case on  the  ground  that  the  information  is  not  reliable or credible. On the other hand, the  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  is  statutorily  obliged  to  register  a  case  and  then to proceed with the investigation if he  has reason to suspect the commission of an  offence  which  he  is  empowered  under  Section  156  of  the  Code  to  investigate,  subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we  have  proposed  to  make  a  detailed  discussion  about  the  power  of  a  police  officer  in  the  field  of  investigation  of  a  cognizable  offence  within  the  ambit  of  Sections  156  and  157 of  the  Code  in  the  ensuing  part  of  this  judgment,  we  do  not  propose  to  deal  with  those  sections  in  extenso in the present context.) In case, an  officer in charge of a police station refuses  to  exercise  the  jurisdiction  vested  in  him  and to register a case on the information of  a  cognizable  offence  reported  and  thereby  violates the statutory duty cast upon him,  

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the  person  aggrieved  by  such  refusal  can  send  the  substance  of  the  information  in  writing and by post to the Superintendent of  Police  concerned  who  if  satisfied  that  the  information  forwarded  to  him  discloses  a  cognizable offence, should either investigate  the case himself or direct an investigation to  be made by any police officer subordinate to  him in the manner provided by sub-section  (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the  Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom  has  carefully  and  cautiously  used  the  expression  ‘information’  without  qualifying  the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the  Code wherein the  expressions,  ‘reasonable  complaint’  and  ‘credible  information’  are  used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the  word ‘information’  in Section 154(1) unlike  in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may  be  for  the  reason  that  the  police  officer  should not refuse to record an information  relating to the commission of  a cognizable  offence and to register a case thereon on the  ground  that  he  is  not  satisfied  with  the  reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,  ‘reasonableness’  or  ‘credibility’  of  the  said  information is not a condition precedent for  registration of a case. A comparison of the  present Section 154 with those of the earlier  Codes will indicate that the legislature had  purposely thought it fit to employ only the  word  ‘information’  without  qualifying  the  said  word.  Section  139  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861)  passed by  the  Legislative  Council  of  India  read  that  ‘every  complaint  or  information’  

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preferred to an officer in charge of a police  station  should  be  reduced  into  writing  which provision was subsequently modified  by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10  of  1872)  which  thereafter  read  that  ‘every  complaint’ preferred to an officer in charge  of  a  police  station  shall  be  reduced  in  writing.  The  word  ‘complaint’  which  occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and  1872 was deleted and in that place the word  ‘information’ was used in the Codes of 1882  and  1898  which  word  is  now  used  in  Sections  154,  155,  157  and  190(c)  of  the  present  Code  of  1973 (Act  2 of  1974).  An  overall  reading  of  all  the  Codes  makes  it  clear that the condition which is  sine qua  non for recording a first information report  is  that  there  must  be  an information  and  that information must disclose a cognizable  offence.”

33. Finally,  this  Court  in  Ramesh Kumari (supra)  in  

para 33 said :-  

“33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that  if any information disclosing a cognizable  offence is laid before an officer in charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code, the said police officer has no other  option  except  to  enter  the  substance  thereof in the prescribed form, that is to  say,  to  register  a  case  on  the  basis  of  such information.”

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34. The views expressed by this Court in paras 31, 32  

and 33 as quoted above leave no manner of doubt that  

the provision of Section 154 of  the Code is mandatory  

and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the  

case  on  the  basis  of  such  an  information  disclosing  

cognizable offence.

35. In the case of  Ramesh Kumari (supra), this Court  

has held that the views expressed by this Court in the  

case of  State of Haryana and Others v.  Bhajan Lal  

and Others  1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335  leave no matter of  

doubt that the provisions of Section 154 of the Code is  

mandatory and the officer  concerned is  duty bound to  

register  the  case  on  the  basis  of  such  information  

disclosing a cognizable offence.

36. Mr. Raval while concluding his arguments reiterated  

that  Section  154  of  the  Code  it  is  mandatory  for  the  

officer concerned to register the case on the basis of such  

information including cognizable  offence.   According to  

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Union of India, the police officer has no discretion in the  

matter and this is according to the legislative intention  

behind  enacting  Section  154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure.

37. Mr.  Ratnakar  Das,  learned  senior  advocate  

appearing for  the State of  U.P.  adopted the arguments  

addressed by Mr. Raval on behalf of the Union of India  

and submitted that the word ‘shall’ appearing in Section  

154 mandates the police to enter the information about  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  in  a  book in  such  

form commonly known as “First Information Report’.  At  

that stage, the police cannot go into the question about  

the  truth  or  otherwise  of  the  information  and make  a  

roving enquiry.   

38. It  was  also  submitted  by  Mr.  Das  that  the  word  

‘information’ is not qualified by credible information.  It  

has  to  be  recorded  with  utmost  dispatch  and  if  its  

recording  is  dependent  upon  any  type  of  preliminary  

enquiry,  then  there  would  be  a  great  temptation  to  

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incorporate the details and circumstances advantageous  

to the prosecution which may be lacking in the earlier  

information.  Similarly, if the police is given the power to  

hold a preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR it  

may benefit the wrongdoer because by afflux of time, the  

evidence would be obliterated or destroyed and thereby  

justice would be denied to the victim of crime.   

39. Mr. Das gave an example that in a bride burning  

case,  when  a  person  makes  a  complaint  that  the  

husband and the in-laws of  his daughter  have doused  

her with kerosene and set her ablaze and arrangements  

were being made to cremate the dead body, in that case,  

if the police instead of taking immediate steps to register  

an FIR proceeds to the spot to seize the dead body and  

the burnt clothes etc. on the plea that he is required to  

make  preliminary  enquiry  to  ascertain  the  truth,  then  

during the interregnum, no evidence would be available  

to bring the offenders to book.  It needs to mention that  

power  is  conferred  upon the  police  under  the  Code to  

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make seizure in course of investigation and not during  

the enquiry.  So, the police being in connivance with the  

accused may permit them to cremate the dead body in  

order to cause disappearance of the evidence.   

40. It is further submitted by Mr. Das that now-a-days  

custodial  violence is  on the rise.   Horror of  Bhagalpur  

blinding case and the Maya Tyagi case in Uttar Pradesh  

are still in the minds of the people.  It is complained that  

the police do not take action against their own brethren  

who  commit  crimes.   Most  of  the  times  the  Court  

intervenes and it is only then that the person wronged  

gets justice.  In such cases if the police is given handle to  

hold  a preliminary enquiry the offender will get a scope  

to fabricate evidence and ultimately the police will deny  

registration of an FIR on the ground that the preliminary  

enquiry  does  not  reveal  any  such offence  having  been  

committed at all.

41. It was submitted on behalf of the Union of India and  

the State of U.P. that in the Code the Legislature never  

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intended to incorporate any provision for conducting any  

‘preliminary  enquiry’  before  registering  an  FIR  when  a  

report  regarding  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  is  

made.   The  specific  question  on  this  issue  was  never  

raised or agitated earlier before this Court at any point of  

time  whether as a general rule the police should hold a  

preliminary enquiry before  registering an FIR and take  

further steps in the investigation.  Only in two cases in  

respect of the offence under Prevention of Corruption Act  

which was to be investigated by the Central Bureau of  

Investigation (CBI) this Court taking note of the peculiar  

facts  and  circumstances  of  those  cases,  made  an  

observation  that  where  public  servant  is  charged  with  

acts  of  dishonesty  amounting  to  serious  misdemeanor,  

registering an FIR should be preceded by some suitable  

preliminary enquiry.  In another case in which dispute  

regarding  property  between  the  brothers  was  involved,  

this  Court  in  the  peculiar  facts  of  that  case  made  an  

observation that though the officer in charge of a police  

station  is  legally  bound to  register  a  First  Information  

4

Report  in  terms  of  Section  154  of  the  Code,  if  the  

allegations  give  rise  to  an  offence  which  can  be  

investigated  without  obtaining  permission  from  the  

Magistrate,  the same however,  does not take away the  

right  of  the  competent  officer  to  make  a  preliminary  

enquiry in a given case in order to find whether the FIR  

sought to be lodged has any substance or not.   

42. According to him, the grievance of the appellant in  

the  said  case  was  that  his  report  which  revealed  

commission of a cognizable case was not treated as an  

FIR by the concerned police.  It was not the issue nor was  

any argument advanced as to whether registering of an  

FIR as provided under Section 154 of the Code should be  

preceded by some sort of preliminary enquiry or not.  In  

such view of  the  matter,  the observation of  this Court  

that  it  does  not  take  away the  right  of  the  competent  

officer to make a preliminary enquiry in a given case is  

nothing but a passing observation.

4

43. According  to  Mr.  Das,  the  provision  of  law about  

registration  of  an  FIR  is  very  clear  and  whenever  

information relating to cognizable offence is received by  

the police, in that event the police had no option but to  

register the FIR.

44. Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  Senior  counsel  

appearing for the State of Maharashtra on the other hand  

has taken a different view as taken by the Union of India  

and  submitted  that  before  registering  an  FIR  under  

Section  154  Cr.P.C.  it  is  open  to  the  SHO  to  hold  a  

preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there is prime  

facie case of commission of cognizable offence or not.  

45. Mr.  Naphade  has  comprehensively  explained  the  

statutory  scheme of  Section  154  Cr.P.C..  According  to  

him, Sections 41, 57 154(3) 156(1) and 156(3), 157, 167,  

190 and 202 are an integral part of the statutory scheme  

relating  to  investigation  of  crimes.  These  provisions  

clearly  contemplate  that  the  police  officer  can exercise  

4

powers  under  the  aforesaid  provisions  provided  he  is  

prima-facie satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to  

believe that the accused is guilty of commission of the  

cognizable offence.

46. Section 154 of  Cr.P.C.  forms a part  of  a chain of  

statutory  provisions  relating  to  investigation,  and  

therefore, it must follow that the provisions of Sections  

41, 157, 167 etc. have a bearing on the interpretation of  

Section  154  of  Cr.P.C.   The  said  judgments  have  

interpreted Section 154 of  Cr.P.C. purely on the literal  

interpretation  test  and  while  doing  so,  the  other  

important tests of statutory interpretation, like a statute  

must be read as a whole and no provision of a statute  

should be considered and interpreted de-hors the other  

provisions, the rule of purposive construction etc. are lost  

sight of.  He referred to the following cases -  Tarachand  

and Another v.  State of Haryana 1971 (2) SCC 579,  

Sandeep Rammilan Shukla v.  State of Maharashtra  

and Others  2009 (1) Mh.L.J. 97, Sakiri Vasu v. State  

4

of Uttar Pradesh and Others 2008 (2)  SCC 409, Nasar  

Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1957 SCR 657, Union of  

India  and Another  v.  W.N.  Chadha  1993  (Suppl.)  4  

SCC 260, State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak 1963 (2)  

SCR 52.

47. Mr.Naphade  submitted  that  in  the  case  of  

allegations relating to medical negligence on the part of  

doctors,  this  Court  has  clearly  held  that  no  medical  

professional should be prosecuted merely on the basis of  

the allegations in the complaint.  There should be an in-

depth enquiry into the allegations relating to negligence  

and  this  necessarily  postulates  a  preliminary  enquiry  

before  registering  an  FIR  or  before  entering  on  

investigation.  He reported to  State of M.P. v.  Santosh  

Kumar - 2006 (6) SCC 1 and Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Govt.  

of NCT of Delhi and Another 2004(6) SCC 422.

48. He also submitted that the same principle can also  

be made applicable to the people of different categories.  

4

The  literal  interpretation  of  Section  would  mean  the  

registration  of  an  FIR  to  a  mechanical  act.  The  

registration of an FIR results into serious consequences  

for the person named as accused therein.  It immediately  

results in loss of reputation, impairment of his liberty,  

mental anguish, stigma, etc.  It is reasonable to assume  

that the legislature could not have contemplated that a  

mere mechanical act on the part of SHO should give rise  

to such consequences.

49. He submitted that the registration of an FIR under  

Section 154 of Cr.P.C. is an administrative act of a police  

officer.   In the case of  Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur  

and Others  v. State of Punjab 1955 (2) SCR 225, this  

Court has explained what is administrative function and  

has said that ordinarily the executive power connotes the  

residue  of  Government  functions  that  remain  after  

legislative/judicial  functions  are  taken  away.   Every  

administrative act must be based on application of mind,  

scrutiny and verification of the facts.  No administrative  

4

act  can  ever  be  a  mechanical  one.   This  is  the  

requirement of rule of law.  Reference was made to paras  

12 and 13 of  State (Anti-Corruption Branch), Govt. of  

NCT  of  Delhi  and  Another v.  Dr.  R.C.  Anand  and  

Another 2004 (4) SCC 615.

50. According  to  Mr.  Naphade,  these  judgments  have  

not considered the impact of Article 21 on Section 154 of  

Cr.P.C.  After  and  beginning  with  Maneka  Gandhi  v.  

Union of  India and Another 1978 (1)  SCC 248,  this  

Court has applied Article 21 to several provisions relating  

to  criminal  law.  This  Court  has  also  said  that  the  

expression  “law”  contained  in  Article  21  necessarily  

postulates  law  which  is  reasonable  and  not  merely  a  

statutory provision irrespective of its reasonableness or  

otherwise.  In the light of Article 21, provisions of Section  

154 of Cr.P.C. must be read down to mean that before  

registering an FIR, the Station House Officer must have a  

prima-facie  satisfaction  that  there  is  commission  of  

cognizable  offence  as  registration  of  an  FIR  leads  to  

4

serious consequences for the person named as accused  

and  for  this  purpose,  the  requirement  of  preliminary  

enquiry can be spelt out in Section 154 and can be said  

to  be  implicit  within  the  provisions  of  Section  154  of  

Cr.P.C. Reliance was placed on Maneka Gandhi (supra)  

and  S.M.D.  Kiran  Pasha v.  Government  of  Andhra  

Pradesh and Others  1990 (1) SCC 328.

51. The fact that Sections 154 (3), 156(3), 190, 202 etc.  

clearly  provide  for  remedies  to  a  person  aggrieved  by  

refusal on the part of the SHO to register an FIR, clearly  

show  that  the  statute  contemplates  that  in  certain  

circumstances the SHO can decline to register an FIR.  

52. To require SHO to register an FIR irrespective of his  

opinion  that  the  allegations  are  absurd  or  highly  

improbable,  motivated  etc.  would  cause  a  serious  

prejudice  to  the  person  named  as  accused  in  the  

complaint and this would violate his rights under Article  

21.  This  Court  has  recognized  the  concept  of  pre-

violation  protection  implicit  in  Article  21.   The  said  

4

judgments  while  relying  upon the  literal  interpretation  

test  have  not  considered  the  rule  of  statutory  

interpretation  that  in  certain  situations  the  expression  

“shall”  does  not  convey  mandatory  character  of  the  

provisions.  For example, proviso to Section 202 (2) has  

been  held  using  the  expression  “shall”  not  to  be  

mandatory but directory.  After all, Section 154 of Cr.P.C.  

is  a  part  of  the  procedural  law  and  in  respect  of  

procedural  law,  the  expression  “shall”  may  not  always  

necessarily  convey that the provision is mandatory.  Mr.  

Naphade placed reliance on the following cases -  P.T.  

Rajan v.  T.P.M.  Sahir and Others 2003(8)  SCC 498,  

Shivjee Singh v.  Nagendra Tiwary and Others  2010  

(7) SCC 578 and Sarbananda Sonowal (II) etc. v. Union  

of India   2007 (1) SCC 174.  The said judgments have  

also not considered the rule of purposive interpretation  

and also that the statute must be considered as a whole  

and no provision can be interpreted in isolation.

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53. The non-registration  of  an FIR does not  result  in  

crime going unnoticed or unpunished. The registration of  

an FIR is only for the purpose of making the information  

about the cognizable offence available to the police and to  

the judicial  authorities  at earliest  possible  opportunity.  

The delay in lodging an FIR does not necessarily result in  

acquittal  of  the  accused.   The  delay  can  always  be  

explained.   

54. Mr.  Naphade  also  submitted  that  this  Court  has  

also held that registration of an FIR is not a condition  

precedent for initiating investigation into the commission  

of  a  cognizable  offence.   Section  154  Cr.P.C.  clearly  

imposed  a  duty  on  the  police  officer.  When  an  

information is received, the officer in charge of the police  

station is expected to reach the place of occurrence as  

early  as possible.   It  is  not  necessary  for  him to  take  

steps only on the basis of an FIR.  It is the duty of the  

State  to  protect  the  life  of  an  injured  as  also  an  

endeavour on the part of the responsible police officer to  

reach the  place of  occurrence in his  implicit  duty and  

4

responsibility.   This  has  been  held  in  the  case  of  

Animireddy Venkata Ramana and Others v.  Public  

Prosecutor,  High Court of Andhra Pradesh 2008 (5)  

SCC 368.

55. Mr. Naphade further submitted that ordinarily the  

SHO should record an FIR upon receiving a complaint  

disclosing the ingredients of a cognizable offence, but in  

certain  situations  he  should  have  the  discretion  of  

holding  a  preliminary  enquiry  and  thereafter  if  he  is  

satisfied, register an FIR.   

56. The provisions contained in Section 154 Cr.P.C. of  

1973 were also there in the 1898 Cr.P.C. and even the  

earlier one of 1877.  The interpretation that was placed  

by  the  High  Courts  and  the  Privy  Council  on  these  

provisions  prior  to  Maneka  Gandhi (supra)  rested  

principally on the words used in the Section de-hors the  

other provisions of the Act and also de-hors the impact of  

Article  21  of  the  Constitution  on  the  criminal  

5

jurisprudence.  In other words, the courts have followed  

the test of literal interpretation without considering the  

impact of Article 21.  

57. It is a trite proposition that a person who is named  

in an FIR as an accused,  suffers social  stigma.   If  an  

innocent person is falsely implicated, he not only suffers  

from loss of reputation but also mental tension and his  

personal  liberty  is  seriously  impaired.   After  Maneka  

Gandhi’s  case,  the  proposition  that  the  law  which  

deprives  a  person  of  his  personal  liberty  must  be  

reasonable,  both  from  the  stand  point  of  substantive  

aspect  as  well  as  procedural  aspect  is  now  firmly  

established in our constitutional law.  This warrants a  

fresh look at Section 154 of Cr.P.C.  Section 154 Cr.P.C.  

must be read in conformity with the mandate of Article  

21. If it is so interpreted, the only conclusion is that if a  

Police  Officer  has  doubts  about  the  veracity  of  the  

complaint,  he  can  hold  preliminary  enquiry  before  

deciding to record or not to record an FIR.   

5

58. It  is  the  mandate  of  Article  21  which  requires  a  

Police  Officer  to  protect  a  citizen  from  baseless  

allegations.   This,  however,  does not mean that  before  

registering an FIR the police officer must fully investigate  

the  case.  A  delicate  balance  has  to  be  maintained  

between  the  interest  of  the  society  and  protecting  the  

liberty of an individual.  Therefore, what should be the  

precise  parameters  of  a  preliminary  enquiry  cannot  be  

laid down in abstract.  The matter must be left open to  

the discretion of the police officer.   

59. A  proposition  that  the  moment  the  complaint  

discloses ingredients a cognizable offence is lodged, the  

police officer must register an FIR without any scrutiny  

whatsoever, is an extreme proposition and is contrary to  

the mandate of Article 21.  Similarly, the extreme point of  

view is that the police officer must investigate the case  

substantially  before  registering  an  FIR  is  also  an  

argument of the other extreme.  Both must be rejected  

and a middle path must be chosen.

5

60. Mr.Naphade  mentioned  about  Maneka  Gandhi’s  

case and observed that the attempt of the Court should  

be to expand the reach and ambit  of  the  fundamental  

rights,  rather  than  to  attenuate  their  meaning  and  

contents  by  a  process  of  judicial  construction.   The  

immediate  impact  of  registration  of  an  FIR  on  an  

innocent  person  is  loss  of  reputation,  impairment  of  

personal  liberty  resulting  in  mental  anguish  and,  

therefore, the act of the police officer in registering an FIR  

must be informed by reason and it can be so only when  

there is a prima facie case against the named accused.   

61. According to Mr. Naphade, the provisions of Article  

14  which  are  an  anti-thesis  of  arbitrariness  and  the  

provisions of Articles 19 and 21 which offer even a pre-

violation protection require the police officer to see that  

an innocent person is not exposed to baseless allegations  

and,  therefore,  in  appropriate  cases  he  can  hold  

preliminary  enquiry.   In  Maneka  Gandhi’s  case this  

Court has specifically  laid down that in  R.C. Cooper’s  

5

case it has been held that all fundamental rights must  

be read together and that Articles 14, 19 and 21 overlap  

in  their  content  and  scope  and  that  the  expression  

‘personal liberty’ is of the widest amplitude and covers a  

variety of rights which go to constitute personal liberty of  

a citizen.  (Reliance was particularly placed on paras 5,6  

and 7 on pages 278-284).

62. Mr.  Naphade  further  argued  that  this  Court  has  

held  that in order to give concrete shape to a right under  

Article 21, this Court can issue necessary directions in  

the matter.  If directions as regards arrest can be given,  

there is no reason why guidelines cannot be framed by  

this Court as regards registration or non-registration of  

an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.

63. Mr. Naphade also submitted that the importance of  

the  need  of  the  police  officer’s  discretion  of  holding  a  

preliminary inquiry is well illustrated by the judgment of  

this  Court  in  the  case  of  Uma  Shankar  Sitani v.  

5

Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. 1996 (11) SCC  

714.   In  that  case  the  complaint  was  lodged  by  one  

Sarvjeet Chauhan against one Uma Shankar relating to  

alleged  cognizable  offence.  Uma Shankar  was  arrested  

and upon investigation it was found that the complainant  

was a fictitious person.  Somebody else had filed the false  

complaint.   The  residential  address  of  the  fictitious  

complainant  was  also  fictitious.   In  the  whole  process  

Uma Shankar went  through serious mental  turmoil  as  

not only the allegation was found to be false, but he was  

arrested by the police and had to undergo humiliation  

and loss of reputation.  Such incidents can happen and  

must have happened in scores of cases as filing of false  

cases due to personal, political, business rivalry, break-

down of matrimonial relationship etc. are rampant.   

64. Mr. Naphade submitted that Section 498-A of I.P.C.  

which was meant to be a measure of protection, turned  

out to be an instrument of oppression.  Judicial notice of  

this has been taken by this Court in the case of  Preeti  

5

Gupta  and  Another v.  State  of  Jharkhand  and  

Another (2010) 7 SCC 667.  In the said case, this Court  

has  referred  to  rapid  increase  in  filing  of  complaints  

which  are  not  bona  fide  and  are  filed  with  oblique  

motives.  Such false complaints lead to insurmountable  

harassment, agony and pain to the accused.  This Court  

has observed that the allegations of the complainant in  

such  cases  should  be  scrutinized  with  great  care  and  

circumspection. Is it, therefore, not advisable that before  

registering an FIR, a preliminary inquiry at least to verify  

the  identity  of  the  complainant  and  his  residential  

address should be carried out.  This case illustrates how  

on a false complaint, a person’s right to life and liberty  

under Article 21 of the Constitution can be put to serious  

jeopardy.

65. This Court in its judgment in Francis C. Mullin v.  

Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi 1981 (1) SCC  

608 [paras 4 and 5) has held that Article 21 requires that  

no one shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty  

5

except  by  procedure  established  by  law  and  this  

procedure  must  be  reasonable,  fair  and  just.   If  the  

procedure is not reasonable, fair and just, the Court will  

immediately spring into action and run to the rescue of  

the  citizen.   From  this  it  can  be  easily  deduced  that  

where the police officer has a reasonable doubt about the  

veracity of the complaint and the motives that prompt the  

complainant  to  make  the  complaint,  he  can  hold  a  

preliminary inquiry.  Holding of preliminary inquiry is the  

mandate of Article 21 in such cases. If the police officer  

mechanically  registers  the  complaint  involving  serious  

allegations,  even though he has  doubts  in  the  matter,  

Article  21  would  be  violated.   Therefore,  Section  154  

must  be  read  in  the  light  of  Article  21  and  so  read  

preliminary inquiry is implicit in Section 154.  In paras 7  

and  8  of  the  said  judgment,  this  Court  has  made  an  

unequivocal  declaration  of  the  law that  any act  which  

damages or injures or interferes with use of any limb or  

faculty  of  a  person,  either  permanently  or  even  

temporarily, would be within the ambit of Article 21.   

5

66. Not only this, every act which offends against and  

imperils human dignity, would constitute deprivation pro  

tanto of  this  right  to  live  and  it  would  have  to  be  in  

accordance with the reasonable, just and fair procedure  

established  by  law  which  stands  the  test  of  other  

fundamental rights.  A baseless allegation is a violation of  

human  dignity  and  despite  the  police  officer  having  

doubts about the allegation, he being required to register  

an FIR, would be a clear infringement of Article 21.

67. Mr.  Naphade  further  submitted  that  it  is  settled  

principle of law that no single provision of a statute can  

be read and interpreted in isolation.  The statute must be  

read as a whole.  In the present case, the provisions of  

Sections 41,57, 156, 157, 159, 167, 190, 200 and 202 of  

Cr.P.C.  must  be  read  together.  These  provisions  

constitute the statutory scheme relating to investigation  

of offences and, therefore, no single provision can be read  

in  isolation.   Both,  Sections  41  and  154  deal  with  

cognizable  offence.   Section 41 empowers the police  to  

5

arrest any person without warrant from the Magistrate if  

such person is  concerned in  any cognizable  offence or  

against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or  

credible  information  has  been  received  or  reasonable  

suspicion exits of such person having been so concerned  

with the cognizable offence.  Section 41 also specifically  

refers to a cognizable complaint about commission of a  

cognizable offence.   

68. The scheme of the Act is that after the police officer  

records  an  FIR  under  Section  154  Cr.P.C.,  he  has  to  

proceed  to  investigate  under  Section  156  Cr.P.C.  and  

while investigating the police officer has power to arrest.  

What is required to be noted is that for the purpose of  

arresting  the  accused,  the  police  officer  must  have  a  

reasonable ground to believe that the accused is involved  

in the commission of a cognizable offence.  If Sections 41  

and  154  are  so  read  together,  it  is  clear  that  before  

registering an FIR under  Section 154 the police  officer  

must form an opinion that there is a prima facie  case  

5

against the accused.  If he does not form such an opinion  

and still proceeds to record an FIR, he would be guilty of  

an  arbitrary  action.   Every  public  authority  exercising  

any powers under any statute is under an obligation to  

exercise  that  power  in  a  reasonable  manner.   This  

principle is well settled and it forms an integral part of  

the legal system in this country.

69. Mr.  Naphade  submitted  that  the  provisions  of  

Section 154(3) enable any complainant whose complaint  

is not registered as an FIR by the SHO to approach the  

higher  police  officer  for  the  purpose  of  getting  his  

complaint  registered as  an FIR  and in  such  case,  the  

higher police officer has all  the powers of recording an  

FIR and directing  investigation into  the  matter.   Apart  

from this power under Section 36 any police officer senior  

in rank to an officer in charge of the police station can  

exercise the same powers as may be exercised by such  

officer  in  charge  of  the  police  station.   Provisions  of  

Section 154 (3) and Section 36 are  clear indication that  

6

in an appropriate case a police officer can either decline  

to  register  the  FIR  or  defer  its  registration.   The  

provisions of Section 154(3) and Section 36 is a sufficient  

safeguard against an arbitrary refusal on the part of a  

police  officer  to register  the FIR.   The very fact  that a  

provision has been made in the statute for approaching  

the  higher  police  officer,  is  an  indication  of  legislative  

intent  that  in  appropriate  cases,  a  police  officer  may  

decline to register an FIR and/or defer its registration.

70. In addition to the remedy available to the aggrieved  

person of approaching higher police officer, he can also  

move  the  concerned  Magistrate  either  under  Section  

156(3) for making a complaint under Section 190.  If a  

complaint  is  lodged,  the  Magistrate  can  examine  the  

complainant and issue process against the accused and  

try  the  case  himself  and  in  case  triable  by  Sessions  

Court, then he will  commit the case to Sessions under  

Section 209.   

6

71. The Magistrate can also on receipt of a complaint,  

hold an enquiry or direct  the police  to investigate.   In  

addition to the above, the Magistrate also has a power to  

direct  investigation  under  Section  159  Cr.P.C.   In  the  

case of  Mona Panwar v.  High Court of Judicature of  

Allahabad (2011) 3 SCC 496 in paras 17 and 18 on page  

503 this Court has, inter alia, held that if the complaint  

relating to a cognizable  officer  is  not registered by the  

police, then the complainant can go the Magistrate and  

then the Magistrate has the option of either passing an  

order under Section 156(3) or proceeding under Section  

200/202 of the Code.   

72. It was also submitted by Mr. Naphade that an order  

under Section 156(3) of the Code is in the nature of a  

preemptory  reminder  or  intimation  to  the  police  to  

exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section  

156(1).   Such  an  investigation  embraces  the  entire  

continuous process which begins with the collection of  

evidence  under  Section  156  and  ends  with  the  vital  

6

report  either  under  Section  169  or  submission  of  a  

charge-sheet  under  Section  173  of  the  Code.   A  

Magistrate  can  under  Section  190  of  the  Code  before  

taking cognizance,  direct  investigation by the police by  

order under Section 156(3) of the Code.

73. Mr. Naphade also submitted that the very fact that  

the Legislature has provided adequate remedies against  

refusal  to  register  an  FIR  and  hold  investigation  in  

cognizable offences is indicative of legislative intent that  

the police officer is not bound to record an FIR merely  

because  the  ingredients  of  cognizable  offences  are  

disclosed  in  the  complaint  if  he  has  doubt  about  the  

veracity of the complaint.

74. In further support of the proposition that a police  

officer is not bound to register an FIR on mere disclosure  

of  existence  of  ingredients  of  cognizable  offence,  it  is  

submitted that the statute does not contemplate that for  

the  purpose  of  investigation,  recording  of  an  FIR  is  a  

condition precedent.  Section 156 empowers the police to  

6

do so.  Similarly, Section 157 clearly lays down that if  

from  information  received  or  otherwise  an  officer  in  

charge  of  the  police  station has reason to suspect  the  

commission  of  an  offence,  he  can  investigate  into  the  

same.  In Section 157(1) the expression “from information  

received” obviously refers to complaint under Section 154  

Cr.P.C.  registered  as  an  FIR.  The  word  “otherwise”  in  

Section 157 Cr.P.C. clearly indicates that recording of an  

FIR  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  initiation  of  

investigation. The very fact that the police have a power  

of investigation independent of registration of an FIR is a  

clear pointer to the legislative intent that a police officer  

is not bound to register an FIR in each and every case.   

75. Mr. Naphade relied on the case of  Apren Joseph  

alias  current  Kunjukunju  and  Others   v.  State  of  

Kerala 1973 (3) SCC 114 wherein in para 11 this Court  

has  held  that  recording  of  an  FIR  is  not  a  condition  

precedent for setting in motion criminal investigation.  In  

doing  so,  this  Court  has  approved  the  observation  of  

6

Privy  Council  made  in  the  case  of  Khwaja  Nazim  

Ahmad (supra).

76. Mere recording of an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.  

is  of  no  consequence  unless  the  alleged  offence  is  

investigated into.  For the purpose of investigation after  

registration  of  the  FIR,  the  police  officer  must  have  

reason  to  suspect  commission  of  an  offence.   Despite  

registration of the FIR, the police officer may not have a  

reasonable ground to suspect that an offence has been  

committed and in that situation he may decline to carry  

out investigation and may come to the conclusion that  

there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  carrying  out  

investigation.   If  under  the  proviso  (b)  to  Section  157  

Cr.P.C.  the  police  officer  has  such  discretion  of  not  

investigating, then it stands to reason that registration of  

an FIR should not result into an empty formality.   

77. The registration of an FIR should be effective and it  

can  be  effective  only  if  further  investigation  is  to  be  

6

carried out and further investigation can be carried out  

only if the police officer has reasonable ground to suspect  

that the offence is committed.  If, therefore, there is no  

reasonable  ground  to  suspect  the  commission  of  

cognizable offence, the police officer will  not investigate  

and if  that is a situation, then on the same footing he  

may decline to register the FIR.  This is clearly implicit in  

the provisions of Section 154(1).  It is, submitted that if  

the  provisions  of  Section  154  are  read  with  Sections  

41,57,156,157,159,167,190,200  and  202  Cr.P.C.,  the  

only  possible  conclusion  is  that  a  police  officer  is  not  

bound to register each and every case.

78. Mr.  Naphade  placed  reliance  on  State  of  

Maharashtra  and  Others v.  Sarangdharsingh  

Shivdassingh Chavan and Another (2011) 1 SCC 577  

wherein  in  paragraphs  29  and  30,  this  Court  has  

observed as follows:-

“29. The legal position is well settled that  on  information  being  lodged  with  the  police  and  if  the  said  information  discloses the commission of a cognizable  

6

offence, the police shall record the same  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  contained  under  Section  154  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code.  The  police  officer's power to investigate in case of a  cognizable  offence  without  order  of  the  Magistrate is statutorily recognised under  Section 156 of the Code. Thus the police  officer in charge of a police station, on the  basis  of  information  received  or  otherwise,  can  start  investigation  if  he  has reasons to suspect the commission of  any cognizable offence.

30. This is subject to provisos (a) and (b)  to  Section 157 of  the  Code which leave  discretion with the police officer in charge  of  police  station  to  consider  if  the  information is not of a serious nature, he  may  depute  a  subordinate  officer  to  investigate and if it appears to the officer- in-charge  that  there  does  not  exist  sufficient  ground,  he  shall  not  investigate. This legal framework is a very  vital component of the rule of law in order  to  ensure  prompt  investigation  in  cognizable cases and to maintain law and  order.”

79. He  submitted  that  if  the  police  officer  is  of  the  

opinion that the complaint is not credible and yet he is  

required to register the FIR, then he would be justified in  

not investigating the case.  In such a case the FIR would  

become a useless lumber and a dead letter.  The police  

6

officer  would  then  submit  a  closure  report  to  the  

Magistrate. The Magistrate then would issue notice to the  

complainant and hear him.  If the Magistrate is of the  

opinion that there is a case, then he may direct police to  

investigate.   

80. Mr. Napahde submitted that the aforesaid analysis  

of various provisions of Criminal Procedure Code clearly  

bring out that the statutory provisions clearly maintain a  

balance between the rights of a complainant and of the  

Society to have a wrongdoer being brought to book and  

the rights of the accused against baseless allegations.

81. The provisions have also to be read in the light of  

the  principle  of  malicious  prosecution  and  the  

fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and  

21.   Every  citizen  has  a  right  not  to  be  subjected  to  

malicious prosecution and every police officer has an in-

built duty under Section 154 to ensure that an innocent  

person is  not  falsely  implicated  in a criminal  case.   If  

6

despite the fact that the police officer is not prima facie  

satisfied as regards commission of a cognizable offence,  

and  proceeds  to  register  an  FIR  and  carry  out  

investigation and thereby putting the liberty of a citizen  

in  jeopardy,  he  would  expose  himself  to  the  charge  of  

malicious  prosecution  and  against  the  charge  of  

malicious prosecution the doctrine of sovereign immunity  

will not protect him.  There is no law protecting a police  

officer who takes part in the malicious prosecution.

82. Mr. Naphade also submitted that the word “shall”  

used in the statute does not always mean absence of any  

discretion in the matter.

83. The  word  “shall”  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  

provision being imperative or mandatory.

84. The use of word “shall” raises a presumption that  

the  particular  provision  is  imperative.   But,  this  

presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  other  considerations  

such as,  object  and scope of  the enactment and other  

6

consequences flowing from such construction.  There are  

numerous cases where the word “shall”  has,  therefore,  

been construed as merely directory.   

85. In the case of Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and Others  

v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 SC 1480, Hidayatullah,  

J. has held that the word “shall” is ordinarily mandatory,  

but it is sometimes not so interpreted if  the context of  

intention otherwise demands.

86. Further,  Subba  Rao,  J.  in  the  case  of  State  of  

Uttar Pradesh and Others  v. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR  

1961 SC 751, has observed that when the statute uses  

the  word  “shall”  prima  facie  it  is  mandatory,  but  the  

Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature  

carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute.

87. In the case of  State of  Madhya Pradesh v.  M/s  

Azad Bharat Finance Co. and Another AIR 1967 SC  

276  it  has  been  held  that  the  word  “shall”  does  not  

always  mean  that  the  provision  is  obligatory  or  

7

mandatory.   It depends upon the context in which the  

word “shall” occur and the other circumstances.

88. In the case of  Shivjee Singh (supra)  it  has been  

held that the use of word “shall” in proviso to Section 202  

(2)  of  Cr.P.C.  prima  facie  is  indicative  of  mandatory  

character of the provision contained therein.  But, a close  

and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions  

show that the same is not mandatory.  Further, it has  

been observed that by its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a  

compendium of law relating to criminal procedure.  The  

provisions  contained  therein  are  required  to  be  

interpreted  keeping in  view the  well  recognized rule  of  

construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for  

doing  substantial  justice.   If  violation  of  procedural  

provisions does not result in denial of a fair hearing or  

causes prejudice to the party, the same has to be treated  

as directly notwithstanding the use of the word “shall”.

7

89. In P.T. Rajan (supra), this Court has discussed the  

principles  as  to  whether  a  statute  is  mandatory  or  

directory.  The Court has observed that a statute as is  

well known must be read in the text and context thereof.  

Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be  

dependent on the use of the word “shall” or “may”.  Such  

a question must be posed and answered having regard to  

the purpose and object it seeks to achieve.  It has further  

been  held  that  a  provision  in  a  statute  which  is  

procedural in nature although employs the word “shall”  

may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice  

is caused.  The analysis of various provisions of Cr.P.C.  

clearly shows that no prejudice is caused if police officer  

does not register an FIR.  The complainant has effective  

remedies under Sections 154(3), 156, 190 Cr.P.C. etc.

90. Mr. Naphade, the learned senior counsel submitted  

that it is impossible to put the provisions of Section 154  

Cr.P.C. in any straight jacket formula.  However, some  

guidelines can be framed as regards registration or non-

7

registration  of  an  FIR.  According  to  him,  some  such  

guidelines are as follows:-

1. Normally in the ordinary course a police officer  

should record an FIR, if the complaint discloses a  

cognizable offence. However, in exceptional cases  

where  the  police  officer  has  reason  to  suspect  

that  the  complaint  is  motivated  on  account  of  

personal  or  political  rivalry,  he  may  defer  

recording  of  the  FIR,  and take  a  decision after  

preliminary enquiry.

2. In  case  of  complaints  which  are  a  result  of  

vendetta  like  complaints  under  Section  498A  

Cr.P.C. (IPC), the police officer should be slow in  

recording an FIR and he should record an FIR  

only if he finds a prima facie case.

3. The police officer may also defer recording of an  

FIR  if  he  feels  that  the  complainant  is  acting  

under a mistaken belief.

7

4. The police  officer  may also  defer  registering  an  

FIR  if  he  finds  that  the  facts  stated  in  the  

complaint are complex and complicated, as would  

be in  respect  of  some offences having financial  

contents  like  criminal  breach of  trust,  cheating  

etc.

91.  The  aforesaid  are  only  illustrations  and  not  

exhaustive  of  all  conditions  which  may  warrant  

deferment of an FIR.

92. The second aspect of the matter is what test should  

the police officer take in case he is of the opinion that  

registration of an FIR should be deferred. He suggested  

the following measures :-   

1. The police officer must record the complaint in the  

Station/General Diary.  This will ensure that there  

is no scope for manipulation and if subsequently he  

decides  to  register  an  FIR,  the  entry  in  

Station/General Diary should be considered as the  

FIR.

7

2. He  should  immediately  report  the  matter  to  the  

superior police officer and convey him his reasons  

or  apprehensions  and  take  his  permission  for  

deferring  the  registration.   A  brief  note  of  this  

should be recorded in the station diary.

3. The police officer should disclose to the complainant  

that he is deferring registration of the FIR and call  

upon  him  to  comply  with  such  requisitions  the  

police officer feels necessary to satisfy himself about  

the  prima  facie  credibility  of  the  complaint.   The  

police officer should record this in the station diary.  

All this is necessary to avoid any charge as regard  

to the delay in recording the FIR.  It is a settled law  

that  a  mere  delay  in  registering  an  FIR  is  not  

harmful if there are adequate reasons to explain the  

delay in filing an FIR.

93. According  to  him,  in  the  light  of  the  above  

discussion  in  respect  of  the  impact  of  Article  21  on  

statutory provisions, it must be held that Section 154 of  

Cr.P.C. must be interpreted in the light of Article 21.  The  

7

requirement of Article 21 is that the procedure should be  

just and fair.  If, therefore, the police officer himself has  

doubts in the matter, it is imperative that he should have  

the  discretion  of  holding  a  preliminary  inquiry  in  the  

matter.  If he is debarred from holding such a preliminary  

inquiry, the procedure would then suffer from the vice of  

arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

94. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of  Tamil  

Nadu adopted the arguments submitted by Mr. Naphade,  

the  learned  senior  counsel  for  Maharashtra  and  

submitted that ordinarily a police officer has to register  

an FIR when a cognizable  offence is  made out,  but  in  

exceptional  cases  he  must  have  some  discretion  or  

latitude of conducting some kind of preliminary inquiry  

before recording of the FIR.

95. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  drawn  our  

attention  to  two  sets  of  cases  decided  by  this  Court  

expressing totally divergent judicial opinions.  We deem it  

7

appropriate  to briefly  summarise  them in the following  

paragraphs.

96. This Court in the case of  Bhajan Lal and Others  

(supra),  Ramesh  Kumari (supra),  Parkash  Singh  

Badal  and Another v.  State  of  Punjab  and Others  

(2007)  1  SCC  1  and  Aleque  Padamsee  and  Others  

(supra)  held that if  a complaint alleging commission of  

cognizable offence is received in the Police Station, then  

the S.H.O. has no option but to register an F.I.R. under  

Section 154 Cr.P.C..  

97. On the other  hand, this Court in following cases,  

namely, Rajinder Singh Katoch  (supra), P. Sirajuddin  

etc. v.  State  of  Madras  etc.  1970  (1)  SCC  595,  

Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi (supra),  Sevi  and Another  

etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another 1981 (Suppl.)  

SCC 43 have taken contrary view and held that before  

registering  the  FIR under  Section  154 of  Cr.P.C.,  it  is  

open  to  the  SHO  to  hold  a  preliminary  enquiry  to  

7

ascertain  whether  there  is  a  prima  facie  case  of  

commission of cognizable offence or not.

98. We deem it appropriate to give a brief  ratio of these  

cases.

99. In  Bhajan  Lal  (supra), this  Court  observed  as  

under:-

“It  is,  therefore,  manifestly  clear  that  if  any  information  disclosing  a  cognizable  offence is laid before an officer in charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code, the said police officer has no other  option  except  to  enter  the  substance  thereof in the prescribed form, that is to  say,  to  register  a  case  on  the  basis  of  such information.”

100. In  Ramesh  Kumari  (supra),  this  Court  

observed that the provision of Section 154 of the Code is  

mandatory  and the  officer  concerned is  duty-bound to  

register  the  case  on  the  basis  of  such  an  information  

disclosing cognizable offence.

7

101. In  Parkash Singh Badal  (supra), this Court  

observed as under:-

“It  is,  therefore,  manifestly  clear  that  if  any  information  disclosing  a  cognizable  offence is laid before an officer in charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code, the said police officer has no other  option  except  to  enter  the  substance  thereof in the prescribed form, that is to  say,  to  register  a  case  on  the  basis  of  such information.”

102. In Aleque  Padamsee  (supra), this  Court  

observed as under :-

“The correct position in law, therefore, is  that the police officials ought to register  the FIR whenever facts brought to their  notice  show that  cognizable  offence has  been made out.”

103. There is another set of cases where this Court  

has taken contrary view.

104. In Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra), this Court  

observed as under:-

“We are not oblivious to the decision of  this Court in  Ramesh Kumari v.  State  (NCT of Delhi) wherein such a statutory  duty has been found in the police officer.  But,  as  indicated  hereinbefore,  in  an  

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appropriate case, the police officers also  have  a  duty  to  make  a  preliminary  enquiry so as to find out as to whether  allegations  made  had  any  substance  or  not.”

105. In  Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi  (supra),  

Mudholkar, J. in his concurring judgment has observed  

as under:-

“I  am  of  opinion  that  it  is  open  to   a  Police  Officer  to  make  preliminary  enquiries   before  registering  an  offence  and making a full scale investigation into  it.”

106. In P.  Sirajuddin  etc. (supra),  this  Court  

quoted the observations of the High Court as under:-

“(a) “substantial information and evidence  had  been  gathered  before  the  so-called  first information report was registered”.”

107. In  Sevi  and  Another  (supra),  this  Court  

observed as under:-

“If  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the  information  given  by  PW  10  that  any  cognizable  offence  had  been  committed  he was quite right in making an entry in  the general  diary and proceeding to the  village  to  verify  the  information  without  registering any FIR.”

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108. It is quite evident from the ratio laid down in  

the aforementioned cases that different Benches of this  

Court have taken divergent views in different cases.  In  

this case also after this Court’s notice, the Union of India,  

the States and the Union Territories have also taken or  

expressed  divergent  views  about  the  interpretation  of  

Section 154 Cr.P.C.

109. We have carefully analysed various judgments  

delivered by this Court in the last several decades.  We  

clearly discern divergent judicial  opinions of this Court  

on the main issue whether under Section 154 Cr.P.C., a  

police  officer  is  bound  to  register  an  FIR  when  a  

cognizable offence is made out or he (police officer) has  

an option, discretion or latitude of conducting some kind  

of preliminary enquiry before registering the FIR.

110. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  Union  of  

India  and  different  States  have  expressed  totally  

divergent views even before this Court.   This Court also  

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carved  out  a  special  category  in  the  case  of  medical  

doctors in the aforementioned cases of Santosh Kumar  

(supra) and Dr. Suresh Gupta (supra) where preliminary  

enquiry had been postulated before registering an FIR.

111.  Some  counsel  also  submitted  that  the  CBI  

Manual also envisages some kind of preliminary enquiry  

before registering the FIR.  The issue which has arisen for  

consideration  in  these  cases  is  of  great  public  

importance.

112. In  view  of  the  divergent  opinions  in  a  large  

number of  cases decided by this Court,  it  has become  

extremely important to have a clear enunciation of law  

and adjudication by a larger Bench of this Court for the  

benefit  of  all  concerned –  the  courts,  the  investigating  

agencies and the citizens.   

113. Consequently,  we  request  Hon’ble  the  Chief  

Justice to refer these matters to a Constitution Bench of  

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at  least  five  Judges  of  this  Court  for  an  authoritative  

judgment.

..………........................J.      (Dalveer Bhandari)

..……….......................J.              (T.S. Thakur)

..………........................J.      (Dipak Misra)

New Delhi; February 27, 2012

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