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       REPORTABLE     

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 68 OF 2008

Lalita Kumari           .... Petitioner (s)

Versus

Govt. of U.P. & Ors.                                    ....  Respondent(s)

          WITH

S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5986 of 2006

S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5200 of 2009       

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  1410 OF 2011

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  1267 OF 2007

AND

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. D26722 OF 2008  IN

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 68 OF 2008

J U D G M E N T

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P.Sathasivam, CJI.

1) The important issue which arises for consideration in  

the referred matter is whether “a police officer is bound to  

register  a  First  Information  Report  (FIR)  upon  receiving  

any  information  relating  to  commission  of  a  cognizable  

offence  under  Section  154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) or the police officer  

has the power to conduct a “preliminary inquiry” in order  

to test the veracity of such information before registering  

the same?”

2) The  present  writ  petition,  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution, has been filed by one Lalita Kumari (minor)  

through her father, viz., Shri Bhola Kamat for the issuance  

of a writ of  Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature  

against the respondents herein for  the protection of his  

minor daughter who has been kidnapped.  The grievance  

in the said writ petition is that on 11.05.2008, a written  

report was submitted by the petitioner before the officer  

in-charge of the police station concerned who did not take  

any  action  on  the  same.   Thereafter,  when  the  

Superintendent  of  Police  was  moved,  an  FIR  was  

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registered.  According to the petitioner, even thereafter,  

steps were not taken either for apprehending the accused  

or for the recovery of the minor girl child.   

3) A two-Judge Bench of this Court in, Lalita Kumari vs.  

Government of  Uttar  Pradesh & Ors. (2008)  7  SCC  

164, after noticing the disparity in registration of FIRs by  

police officers on case to case basis across the country,  

issued notice to the Union of India, the Chief Secretaries of  

all the States and Union Territories and Director Generals  

of Police/Commissioners of Police to the effect that if steps  

are not taken for registration of FIRs immediately and the  

copies thereof are not handed over to the complainants,  

they  may  move  the  Magistrates  concerned  by  filing  

complaint  petitions  for  appropriate  direction(s)  to  the  

police  to  register  the  case  immediately  and  for  

apprehending  the  accused  persons,  failing  which,  

contempt  proceedings  must  be  initiated  against  such  

delinquent police officers if no sufficient cause is shown.   

4) Pursuant to  the above directions,  when the matter  

was heard by the very same Bench in Lalita Kumari vs.  

Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 14 SCC  

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337,  Mr.  S.B.  Upadhyay,  learned senior  counsel  for  the  

petitioner,  projected  his  claim  that  upon  receipt  of  

information by a police officer in-charge of a police station  

disclosing a cognizable offence, it is imperative for him to  

register a case under Section 154 of the Code and placed  

reliance upon two-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in  

State of Haryana vs.  Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC  

335, Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2006) 2  

SCC 677 and Parkash Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab  

(2007) 1 SCC 1.  On the other hand, Mr. Shekhar Naphade,  

learned  senior  counsel  for  the  State  of  Maharashtra  

submitted that an officer in-charge of a police station is  

not  obliged  under  law,  upon  receipt  of  information  

disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, to register  

a case rather the discretion lies with him, in appropriate  

cases, to hold some sort of preliminary inquiry in relation  

to the veracity or otherwise of the accusations made in  

the  report.   In  support  of  his  submission,  he  placed  

reliance upon two-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in  

P. Sirajuddin vs.  State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 595,  

Sevi vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu 1981  Supp  SCC  43,  

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Shashikant vs.  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation  

(2007)  1  SCC  630,  and  Rajinder  Singh  Katoch vs.  

Chandigarh Admn.  (2007) 10 SCC 69.   In view of the  

conflicting decisions of this Court on the issue, the said  

bench, vide order dated 16.09.2008, referred the same to  

a larger bench.  

5) Ensuing  compliance  to  the  above  direction,  the  

matter pertaining to Lalita Kumari was heard by a Bench  

of  three-Judges  in  Lalita  Kumari vs.  Government  of  

Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors. (2012)  4  SCC  1  wherein,  this  

Court, after hearing various counsel representing Union of  

India, States and Union Territories and also after adverting  

to  all  the  conflicting  decisions  extensively,  referred  the  

matter to a Constitution Bench while concluding as under:-

“97. We  have  carefully  analysed  various  judgments  delivered  by  this  Court  in  the  last  several  decades.  We  clearly discern divergent judicial opinions of this Court on  the main issue: whether under Section 154 CrPC, a police  officer  is  bound  to  register  an  FIR  when  a  cognizable  offence is made out or he (police officer)  has an option,  discretion  or  latitude  of  conducting  some  kind  of  preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR.

98. The learned counsel appearing for the Union of India  and different States have expressed totally divergent views  even before this Court. This Court also carved out a special  category  in  the  case  of  medical  doctors  in  the  aforementioned cases of Santosh Kumar and Suresh Gupta  where  preliminary  inquiry  had  been  postulated  before  

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registering an FIR. Some counsel also submitted that the  CBI Manual also envisages some kind of preliminary inquiry  before registering the FIR.

99. The issue which has arisen for consideration in these  cases  is  of  great  public  importance.  In  view  of  the  divergent opinions in a large number of cases decided by  this Court,  it  has become extremely important to have a  clear enunciation of law and adjudication by a larger Bench  of this Court for the benefit of all concerned—the courts,  the investigating agencies and the citizens.

100. Consequently,  we  request  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice to refer these matters to a Constitution Bench of at  least  five  Judges  of  this  Court  for  an  authoritative  judgment.”

6) Therefore, the only question before this Constitution  

Bench relates to the interpretation of Section 154 of the  

Code and incidentally to consider Sections 156 and 157  

also.

7) Heard Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel for  

the petitioner, Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Additional  

Solicitor  General  for  the  Union  of  India,  Mr.  Sidharth  

Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General for the State of  

Chhattisgarh,  Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  Mr.  R.K.  Dash,  Ms.  

Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel for the State  

of  Maharashtra,  U.P.  and  M.P.  respectively,  Mr.  G.  

Sivabalamurugan,  learned  counsel  for  the  accused,  Dr.  

Ashok Dhamija,  learned counsel  for  the CBI,  Mr.  Kalyan  

Bandopodhya, learned senior counsel for the State of West  

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Bengal, Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned AAG for the State of  

Rajasthan and Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat.    

8) In order to answer the main issue posed before this  

Bench, it  is useful to refer the following Sections of the  

Code:-

“154. Information in cognizable cases.— (1) Every  information relating to the commission of a cognizable  offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police  station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his  direction, and be read over to the informant; and every  such information, whether given in writing or reduced to  writing  as  aforesaid,  shall  be  signed  by  the  person  giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a  book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State  Government may prescribe in this behalf.

(2) A  copy  of  the  information  as  recorded  under  sub-  section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the  informant.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  to  record  the  information referred to in subsection (1) may send the  substance of such information, in writing and by post, to  the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied  that  such  information  discloses  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  shall  either  investigate  the  case  himself  or  direct  an investigation  to be made by any  police  officer  subordinate  to  him,  in  the  manner  provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the  powers of  an officer in charge of the police station in  relation to that offence.

156.  Police  officer's  power  to  investigate  cognizable case. (1) Any officer in charge of a police  station  may,  without  the  order  of  a  Magistrate,  investigate any cognizable case which a Court  having  jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such  station would have power to inquire into or try under the  provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case  

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shall at any stage be called in question on the ground  that  the  case  was  one  which  such  officer  was  not  empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may  order such an investigation as above- mentioned.

157.  Procedure  for  investigation: (1)  If,  from  information received or otherwise, an officer in charge  of a police station has reason to suspect the commission  of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156  to investigate,  he shall  forthwith send a report  of  the  same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of  such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in  person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers  not  being  below  such  rank  as  the  State  Government  may,  by  general  or  special  order,  prescribe  in  this  behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  and,  if  necessary,  to  take  measures  for  the  discovery  and  arrest  of  the  offender:

Provided that-

(a) when information as to the commission of any such  offence is given against any person by name and the  case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a  police station need not proceed in person or depute a  subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;

(b)  if  it  appears  to  the  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on  an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.

Provided further that in relation to an offence of rape,  the  recording  of  statement  of  the  victim  shall  be  conducted at the residence of the victim or in the place  of  her  choice  and  as  far  as  practicable  by  a  woman  police officer in the presence of her parents or guardian  or near relatives or social worker of the locality.

(2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b)  of the proviso to sub- section (1), the officer in charge of  the police station shall state in his report his reasons for  not fully complying with the requirements of that sub- section, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the  said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the  informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed  by  the  State  Government,  the  fact  that  he  will  not  investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.”

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Contentions:

9) At the foremost, Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior  

counsel,  while  explaining  the  conditions  mentioned  in  

Section 154 submitted that Section 154(1) is mandatory  

as the use of the word ‘shall’ is indicative of the statutory  

intent of the legislature.  He also contended that there is  

no discretion left to the police officer except to register an  

FIR.  In support of the above proposition, he relied on the  

following  decisions,  viz.,  B.  Premanand  and  Ors. vs.  

Mohan  Koikal  and  Others (2011)  4  SCC  266,  M/s  

Hiralal Rattanlal Etc. Etc. vs.  State of U.P. and Anr.  

Etc. Etc. (1973) 1 SCC 216 and  Govindlal Chhaganlal  

Patel vs.  Agricultural  Produce  Market  Committee,  

Godhra and Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 482.

10) Mr. Upadhyay, by further drawing our attention to the  

language used in Section 154(1) of the Code, contended  

that it merely mentions ‘information’ without prefixing the  

words ‘reasonable’ or ‘credible’.  In order to substantiate  

this  claim,  he  relied  on  the  following  decisions,  viz.,  

Bhajan  Lal  (supra),  Ganesh  Bhavan  Patel  and  

Another vs.  State of Maharashtra (1978) 4 SCC 371,  

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Aleque Padamsee and Others vs. Union of India and  

Others (2007)  6  SCC  171,  Ramesh  Kumari  (supra),  

Ram  Lal  Narang vs.  State  (Delhi  Administration)  

(1979) 2 SCC 322 and Lallan Chaudhary and Others vs.  

State  of  Bihar  and  Another (2006)  12  SCC  229.  

Besides, he also brought to light various adverse impacts  

of  allowing  police  officers  to  hold  preliminary  inquiry  

before registering an FIR.

11) Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned Additional Solicitor  

General appearing on behalf of Union of India submitted  

that in all the cases where information is received under  

Section 154 of the Code, it is mandatory for the police to  

forthwith enter the same into the register maintained for  

the said purpose, if the same relates to commission of a  

cognizable offence. According to learned ASG, the police  

authorities have no discretion or authority, whatsoever, to  

ascertain the veracity of such information before deciding  

to register it.   He also pointed out that a police officer,  

who proceeds to the spot under Sections 156 and 157 of  

the Code, on the basis of either a cryptic information or  

source information, or a rumour etc., has to immediately,  

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on gathering information relating to the commission of a  

cognizable  offence,  send  a  report  (ruqqa)  to  the  police  

station so that the same can be registered as FIR.  He also  

highlighted  the  scheme  of  the  Code  relating  to  the  

registration of FIR, arrest, various protections provided to  

the accused and the power of police to close investigation.  

In support of his claim, he relied on various decisions of  

this  Court  viz.,  Bhajan  Lal (supra),  Ramesh  Kumari  

(supra) and  Aleque  Padamsee  (supra).   He  also  

deliberated upon the distinguishable judgments in conflict  

with  the  mandatory  proposition,  viz.,  State  of  Uttar  

Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (1964) 3 SCR 71,  

P.  Sirajuddin  (supra),  Sevi (supra),  Shashikant  

(supra),  Rajinder  Singh  Katoch (supra),  Jacob  

Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1.  He  

concluded his arguments by saying that if any information  

disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in-

charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of  

Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no  

other option except to enter the substance thereof in the  

prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the  

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basis of  such information.  Further,  he emphasized upon  

various safeguards provided under the Code against filing  

a false case.

12) Dr.  Ashok Dhamija,  learned  counsel  for  the  CBI,  

submitted that the use of the word “shall” under Section  

154(1)  of  the  Code  clearly  mandates  that  if  the  

information  given  to  a  police  officer  relates  to  the  

commission of a cognizable offence, then it is mandatory  

for  him  to  register  the  offence.   According  to  learned  

counsel,  in  such  circumstances,  there  is  no  option  or  

discretion given to the police.  He further contended that  

the  word  “shall”  clearly  implies  a  mandate  and  is  

unmistakably indicative of the statutory intent.  What is  

necessary, according to him, is only that the information  

given  to  the  police  must  disclose  commission  of  a  

cognizable offence.  He also contended that Section 154 of  

the Code uses the word “information” simpliciter and does  

not use the qualified words such as “credible information”  

or  “reasonable  complaint”.   Thus,  the  intention  of  the  

Parliament  is  unequivocally  clear  from  the  language  

employed that a mere information relating to commission  

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of a cognizable offence is sufficient to register an FIR.  He  

also  relied  on  Bhajan  Lal (supra),  Ramesh  Kumari  

(supra),  Aleque  Padamsee  (supra),  Lallan  

Chaudhary (supra), Superintendent of Police, CBI vs.  

Tapan  Kumar  Singh (2003)  6  SCC  175,  M/s  Hiralal  

Rattanlal  (supra),  B.  Premanand  (supra),  Khub  

Chand vs.  State of Rajasthan AIR  1967 SC 1074,  P.  

Sirajuddin  (supra),  Rajinder  Singh Katoch (supra),  

Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi  (supra),  State  of  West  

Bengal vs.  Committee for Protection of Democratic  

Rights, West Bengal (2010) 3 SCC 571.  He also pointed  

out various safeguards provided in the Code against filing  

a false case.  In the end, he concluded by reiterating that  

the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of  

the  Code,  if  the  information  discloses  commission  of  a  

cognizable  offence  and  no  preliminary  inquiry  is  

permissible in such a situation.  Further, he also clarified  

that the preliminary inquiry conducted by the CBI, under  

certain  situations,  as  provided  under  the  CBI  Crime  

Manual, stands on a different footing due to the special  

provisions  relating  to  the  CBI  contained  in  the  Delhi  

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Special  Police  Establishment  Act,  1946,  which  is  saved  

under Sections 4(2) and 5 of the Code.   

13) Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned senior counsel  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  West  Bengal,  

submitted  that  whenever  any  information  relating  to  

commission of a cognizable offence is received, it is the  

duty of the officer in-charge of a police station to record  

the same and a copy of such information, shall be given  

forthwith,  free  of  cost,  to  the  informant  under  Section  

154(2) of the Code.  According to him, a police officer has  

no  other  alternative  but  to  record  the  information  in  

relation to a cognizable offence in the first instance.  He  

also highlighted various subsequent steps to be followed  

by the police officer pursuant to the registration of an FIR.  

With regard to the scope of Section 154 of the Code, he  

relied on  H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs.  State of  

Delhi AIR  1955  SC  196,  Bhajan  Lal (supra),  S.N.  

Sharma vs.  Bipen  Kumar  Tiwari (1970)  1  SCC  653,  

Union of India vs.  Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC  

195,  Sheikh Hasib alias Tabarak vs.  State of Bihar  

(1972) 4 SCC 773,  Shashikant (supra),  Ashok Kumar  

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Todi vs.  Kishwar Jahan and Others (2011) 3 SCC 758,  

Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others vs.  State of  

T.N.  and  Others  (2002)  3  SCC  533,  P.  Sirajuddin  

(supra),  Rajinder  Singh Katoch (supra),  Bhagwant  

Kishore  Joshi  (supra) and  Mannalal  Khatic vs.  The  

State AIR 1967 Cal 478.  

14) Dr.  Manish  Singhvi,  learned  Additional  Advocate  

General for the State of Rajasthan, submitted that Section  

154(1) of the Code mandates compulsory registration of  

FIR.  He also highlighted various safeguards inbuilt in the  

Code for lodging of false FIRs.  He also pointed out that  

the  only  exception  relates  to  cases  arising  under  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act as, in those cases, sanction is  

necessary  before  taking  cognizance  by  the  Magistrates  

and  the  public  servants  are  accorded  some  kind  of  

protection  so  that  vexatious  cases  cannot  be  filed  to  

harass them.

15) Mr. G. Sivabalamurugan,  learned counsel for the  

appellant  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  1410  of  2011,  after  

tracing the earlier history, viz., the relevant provisions in  

the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861, 1872, 1882 and  

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1898 stressed as to why the compulsory registration of FIR  

is mandatory.  He also highlighted the recommendations  

of the Report of the 41st Law Commission and insertion of  

Section 13 of  the Criminal  Law (Amendment)  Act,  2013  

with effect from 03.02.2013.

16) Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the State of Uttar Pradesh, though initially commenced his  

arguments  by  asserting  that  in  order  to  check  

unnecessary  harassment  to  innocent  persons  at  the  

behest of unscrupulous complainants, it is desirable that a  

preliminary  inquiry  into  the  allegations  should  precede  

with  the  registration  of  FIR  but  subsequently  after  

considering  the  salient  features  of  the  Code,  various  

provisions  like  Sections  2(4)  (h),  156(1),  202(1),  164,  

various  provisions  from  the  U.P.  Police  Regulations,  

learned  senior  counsel  contended  that  in  no  case  

recording of FIR should be deferred till verification of its  

truth  or  otherwise  in  case  of  information  relating  to  a  

cognizable offence.  In addition to the same, he also relied  

on  various  pronouncements  of  this  Court,  such  as,  

Mohindro vs.  State  of  Punjab (2001)  9  SCC  581,  

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Ramesh Kumari (supra), Bhajan Lal (supra), Parkash  

Singh  Badal  (supra),  Munna  Lal vs.  State  of  

Himachal  Pradesh 1992  Crl.  L.J.  1558,  Giridhari  Lal  

Kanak vs.  State  and  others 2002  Crl.  L.J.  2113  and  

Katteri Moideen Kutty Haji vs.  State of Kerala 2002  

(2)  Crimes  143.   Finally,  he  concluded  that  when  the  

statutory  provisions,  as  envisaged in  Chapter  XII  of  the  

Code, are clear and unambiguous, it would not be legally  

permissible  to  allow  the  police  to  make  a  preliminary  

inquiry into the allegations before registering an FIR under  

Section 154 of the Code.

17) Mr.  Sidharth  Luthra,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General  appearing  for  the  State  of  Chhattisgarh,  

commenced his arguments by emphasizing the scope of  

reference before the Constitution Bench.   Subsequently,  

he elaborated on various judgments which held that an  

investigating  officer,  on  receiving  information  of  

commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of  

the Code, has power to conduct preliminary inquiry before  

registration  of  FIR,  viz.,  Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi  

(supra),  P.  Sirajuddin  (supra),  Sevi (supra) and  

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Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra).  Concurrently,  he also  

brought to our notice the following decisions, viz., Bhajan  

Lal (supra),  Ramesh Kumari (supra),  Parkash Singh  

Badal (supra), and Aleque Padamsee (supra),  which  

held that a police officer is duty bound to register an FIR,  

upon  receipt  of  information  disclosing  commission  of  a  

cognizable offence and the power of preliminary inquiry  

does not exist under the mandate of Section 154.  Learned  

ASG has put forth a comparative analysis of Section 154 of  

the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 and of 1973. He  

also  highlighted  that  every  activity  which  occurs  in  a  

police  station  [Section  2(s)]  is  entered  in  a  diary  

maintained at the police station which may be called as  

the  General  Diary,  Station  Diary  or  Daily  Diary.   He  

underlined the relevance of General Diary by referring to  

various judicial  decisions such as  Tapan Kumar Singh  

(supra),  Re:  Subbaratnam  &  Ors. AIR  1949  Madras  

663.  He further pointed out that, presently,  throughout  

the  country,  in  matrimonial,  commercial,  medical  

negligence  and  corruption  related  offences,  there  exist  

provisions for conducting an inquiry or preliminary inquiry  

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by  the  police,  without/before  registering  an  FIR  under  

Section 154 of the Code.  He also brought to our notice  

various  police  rules  prevailing  in  the  States  of  Punjab,  

Rajasthan, U.P.,  Madhya Pradesh, Kolkata, Bombay, etc.,  

for  conducting  an  inquiry  before  registering  an  FIR.  

Besides, he also attempted to draw an inference from the  

Crime Manual of the CBI to highlight  that a preliminary  

inquiry  before  registering  a  case  is  permissible  and  

legitimate  in  the  eyes  of  law.  Adverting  to  the  above  

contentions,  he  concluded  by  pleading  that  preliminary  

inquiry  before  registration  of  an  FIR  should  be  held  

permissible.  Further,  he  emphasized  that  the  power  to  

carry out an inquiry or preliminary inquiry by the police,  

which precedes the registration of FIR will  eliminate the  

misuse of the process, as the registration of FIR serves as  

an  impediment  against  a  person  for  various  important  

activities  like  applying  for  a  job  or  a  passport,  etc.  

Learned  ASG  further  requested  this  Court  to  frame  

guidelines  for   certain  category  of  cases  in  which  

preliminary inquiry should be made.

18) Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  senior  counsel  

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appearing  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  Maharashtra,  

submitted that ordinarily the Station House Officer (SHO)  

should record an FIR upon receiving a complaint disclosing  

the  ingredients  of  a  cognizable  offence,  but  in  certain  

situations,  in  case  of  doubt  about  the  correctness  or  

credibility  of  the  information,  he  should  have  the  

discretion of holding a preliminary inquiry and thereafter,  

if  he  is  satisfied  that  there  is  a  prima  facie case  for  

investigation,  register  the  FIR.   A  mandatory  duty  of  

registering FIR should not be cast upon him.  According to  

him,  this  interpretation  would  harmonize  two  extreme  

positions,  viz.,  the  proposition  that  the  moment  the  

complaint disclosing ingredients of a cognizable offence is  

lodged, the police officer must register an FIR without any  

scrutiny  whatsoever  is  an  extreme  proposition  and  is  

contrary to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of  

India, similarly, the other extreme point of view is that the  

police  officer  must  investigate  the  case  substantially  

before registering an FIR.  Accordingly, he pointed out that  

both must be rejected and a middle path must be chosen.  

He also submitted the following judgments, viz.,  Bhajan  

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Lal (supra),  Ramesh Kumari (supra),  Parkash Singh  

Badal (supra), and Aleque Padamsee (supra) wherein  

it has been held that if a complaint alleging commission of  

a cognizable offence is received in the police station, then  

the SHO has no other option but to register an FIR under  

Section  154  of  the  Code.  According  to  learned  senior  

counsel,  these  verdicts  require  reconsideration  as  they  

have interpreted Section 154 de hors the other provisions  

of  the  Code  and  have  failed  to  consider  the  impact  of  

Article 21 on Section 154 of the Code.  

19) Alongside,  he  pointed  out  the  following  decisions,  

viz.,  Rajinder  Singh  Katoch (supra),  P.  Sirajuddin  

(supra),  Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi  (supra) and  Sevi  

(supra), which hold that before registering an FIR under  

Section 154 of the Code, it is open to the police officer to  

hold a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there is a  

prima facie case of commission of a cognizable offence or  

not.  According to learned senior counsel, Section 154 of  

the  Code  forms  part  of  a  chain  of  statutory  provisions  

relating  to  investigation  and,  therefore,  the  scheme  of  

provisions of Sections 41, 157, 167, 169, etc., must have a  

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bearing on the interpretation of Section 154.  In addition,  

he emphasized that giving a literal  interpretation would  

reduce  the  registration  of  FIR  to  a  mechanical  act.  

Parallelly,  he  underscored  the  impact  of  Article  21  on  

Section 154 of the Code by referring to Maneka Gandhi  

vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, wherein this Court  

has  applied  Article  21  to  several  provisions  relating  to  

criminal  law.   This  Court  has  also  stated  that  the  

expression  “law”  contained  in  Article  21  necessarily  

postulates  law  which  is  reasonable  and  not  merely  

statutory provisions irrespective of its reasonableness or  

otherwise.   Learned  senior  counsel  pleaded  that  in  the  

light of Article 21, provisions of Section 154 of the Code  

must be read down to mean that before registering an FIR,  

the police officer must be satisfied that there is a  prima  

facie case  for  investigation.   He  also  emphasized  that  

Section 154 contains implied power of the police officer to  

hold preliminary inquiry if  he  bona fide possess serious  

doubts  about  the credibility  of  the information given to  

him.   By  pointing  out  Criminal  Law  (Amendment)  Act,  

2013, particularly, Section 166A, Mr. Naphade contended  

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that as far as other cognizable offences (apart from those  

mentioned in Section 166A) are concerned, police has a  

discretion  to  hold  preliminary  inquiry  if  there  is  some  

doubt about the correctness of the information.   

20) In case of allegations relating to medical negligence  

on the part of the doctors, it is pointed out by drawing our  

attention  to  some  of  the  decisions  of  this  Court  viz.,  

Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), Jacob Mathew (supra)  

etc.,  that  no medical  professional  should  be prosecuted  

merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint.  By  

pointing out various decisions, Mr.  Naphade emphasized  

that in appropriate cases, it would be proper for a police  

officer, on receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence,  

to  satisfy  himself  that  at  least  prima  facie allegations  

levelled against the accused in the complaint are credible.  

He also contended that no single provision of a statute can  

be read and interpreted in isolation, but the statute must  

be  read  as  a  whole.   Accordingly,  he  prayed  that  the  

provisions of  Sections 41,  57,  156,  157,  159,  167,  190,  

200 and 202 of the Code must be read together.  He also  

pointed out that Section 154(3) of the Code enables any  

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complainant whose complaint is not registered as an FIR  

by the officer in-charge of the police station to approach  

the  higher  police  officer  for  the  purpose  of  getting  his  

complaint  registered as an FIR and in  such a case,  the  

higher police officer has all the powers of recording an FIR  

and directing investigation into the matter.  In addition to  

the  remedy  available  to  an  aggrieved  person  of  

approaching higher police officer, he can also move the  

concerned  Magistrate  by  making  a  complaint  under  

Section 190 thereof.  He further emphasized that the fact  

that  the  legislature  has  provided  adequate  remedies  

against refusal to register FIR and to hold investigation in  

cognizable offences, is indicative of legislative intent that  

the  police  officer  is  not  bound  to  record  FIR  merely  

because  the  ingredients  of  a  cognizable  offence  are  

disclosed  in  the  complaint,  if  he  has  doubts  about  the  

veracity of the complaint.  He also pointed out that the  

word “shall”  used in the statute does not always mean  

absence  of  any  discretion  in  the  matter.   For  the  said  

proposition,  he  also  highlighted  that  this  Court  has  

preferred the rule of purposive interpretation to the rule of  

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literal  interpretation  for  which  he  relied  on  Chairman  

Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of   

Mines and Another vs. Ramjee (1977) 2 SCC 256, Lalit  

Mohan Pandey vs.  Pooran Singh (2004)  6  SCC 626,  

Prativa Bose vs.  Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikat (1964)  

4 SCR 69.  He further pointed out that it is impossible to  

put  the  provisions  of  Section  154  of  the  Code  in  a  

straightjacket  formula.   He  also  prayed  for  framing  of  

some guidelines as regards registration or non-registration  

of  FIR.   Finally,  he pointed out  that  the requirement  of  

Article 21 is that the procedure should be fair  and just.  

According to him, if the police officer has doubts in the  

matter, it is imperative that he should have the discretion  

of  holding a preliminary inquiry in  the matter.   If  he is  

debarred  from  holding  such  a  preliminary  inquiry,  the  

procedure would then suffer from the vice of arbitrariness  

and unreasonableness. Thus, he concluded his arguments  

by  pleading  that  Section  154  of  the  Code  must  be  

interpreted in the light of Article 21.   

21) Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija,  learned senior counsel  

appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh submitted that  

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a plain reading of Section 154 and other provisions of the  

Code  shows  that  it  may  not  be  mandatory  but  is  

absolutely obligatory on the part of the police officer to  

register  an  FIR  prior  to  taking  any  steps  or  conducting  

investigation  into  a  cognizable  offence.   She  further  

pointed out that after receiving the first information of an  

offence  and  prior  to  the  registration  of  the  said  report  

(whether  oral  or  written)  in  the  First  Information  Book  

maintained  at  the  police  station  under  various  State  

Government regulations, only some preliminary inquiry or  

investigative  steps  are  permissible  under  the  statutory  

framework of the Code to the extent as is justifiable and is  

within the window of statutory discretion granted strictly  

for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been a  

commission  or  not  of  a  cognizable  offence.   Hence,  an  

investigation,  culminating  into  a  Final  Report  under  

Section 173 of the Code, cannot be called into question  

and  be  quashed  due  to  the  reason  that  a  part  of  the  

inquiry,  investigation or steps taken during investigation  

are  conducted  after  receiving  the  first  information  but  

prior to registering the same unless it  is found that the  

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said  investigation  is  unfair,  illegal,  mala  fide and  has  

resulted in grave prejudice to the right of the accused to  

fair  investigation.   In  support  of  the above contentions,  

she traced the earlier provisions of the Code and current  

statutory framework, viz., Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,  

2013  with  reference  to  various  decisions  of  this  Court.  

She concluded that  Section  154 of  the  Code leaves  no  

area of doubt that where a cognizable offence is disclosed,  

there is no discretion on the part of the police to record or  

not to record the said information, however, it may differ  

from case to case.

22) The  issues  before  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  

Court arise out of two main conflicting areas of concern,  

viz.,

(i) Whether the immediate non-registration of FIR leads  

to scope for manipulation by the police which affects  

the  right  of  the  victim/complainant  to  have  a  

complaint immediately investigated upon allegations  

being made; and  

(ii) Whether  in  cases  where  the  complaint/information  

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does  not  clearly  disclose  the  commission  of  a  

cognizable  offence  but  the  FIR  is  compulsorily  

registered  then  does  it  infringe  the  rights  of  an  

accused.

Discussion:

23) The FIR is a pertinent document in the criminal law  

procedure  of  our  country  and  its  main  object  from the  

point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in  

motion  and from the  point  of  view of  the  investigating  

authorities  is  to  obtain  information  about  the  alleged  

criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps to  

trace and to bring to book the guilty.  

24) Historical experience has thrown up cases from both  

the sides where the grievance of the victim/informant of  

non-registration  of  valid  FIRs  as  well  as  that  of  the  

accused of being unnecessarily harassed and investigated  

upon false charges have been found to be correct.  

25) An example of the first category of cases is found in  

State  of  Maharashtra vs.  Sarangdharsingh  

Shivdassingh Chavan & Anr. (2011) 1 SCC 577 wherein  

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a  writ  petition  was  filed  challenging  the  order  of  the  

Collector  in  the  District  of  Buldhana  directing  not  to  

register  any  crime  against  Mr.  Gokulchand  Sananda,  

without obtaining clearance from the District Anti-Money  

Lending Committee and the District Government Pleader.  

From the record, it was revealed that out of 74 cases, only  

in seven cases,  charge sheets were filed alleging illegal  

moneylending.   This  Court  found that  upon instructions  

given by the Chief Minister to the District Collector, there  

was no registration of FIR of the poor farmers.  In these  

circumstances, this Court held the said instructions to be  

ultra vires and quashed the same.  It is argued that cases  

like above exhibit the mandatory character of Section 154,  

and if it is held otherwise, it shall lead to grave injustice.

26) In  Aleque Padamsee (supra),  while  dealing  with  

the issue whether it is within the powers of courts to issue  

a writ directing the police to register a First Information  

Report in a case where it  was alleged that the accused  

had made speeches likely to disturb communal harmony,  

this Court held that “the police officials ought to register  

the FIR whenever facts brought to their notice show that a  

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cognizable offence has been made out.  In case the police  

officials fail to do so, the modalities to be adopted are as  

set out in Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code.”  

As such, the Code itself provides several checks for refusal  

on the part of the police authorities under Section 154 of  

the Code.

27) However, on the other hand, there are a number of  

cases  which exhibit  that  there  are  instances  where the  

power  of  the  police  to  register  an  FIR  and  initiate  an  

investigation  thereto  are  misused  where  a  cognizable  

offence  is  not  made  out  from  the  contents  of  the  

complaint.  A significant case in this context is the case of  

Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667  

wherein this Court has expressed its anxiety over misuse  

of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short  

‘the IPC’) with respect to which a large number of frivolous  

reports were lodged.  This Court expressed its desire that  

the legislature must take into consideration the informed  

public  opinion  and  the  pragmatic  realities  to  make  

necessary changes in law.

28) The abovesaid judgment resulted in the 243rd Report  

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of the Law Commission of India submitted on 30th August,  

2012.  The Law Commission, in its Report, concluded that  

though the offence under Section 498-A could be made  

compoundable,  however,  the  extent  of  misuse  was  not  

established by empirical data, and, thus, could not be a  

ground to denude the provision of its efficacy.  The Law  

Commission also observed that the law on the question  

whether the registration of FIR could be postponed for a  

reasonable time is in a state of uncertainty and can be  

crystallized  only  upon  this  Court  putting  at  rest  the  

present controversy.   

29) In  order  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion  in  the  light  of  

divergent views on the point and also to answer the above  

contentions, it is pertinent to have a look at the historical  

background of the Section and corresponding provisions  

that  existed in  the previous enactments of  the Code of  

Criminal Procedure.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861

“139.  Every  complaint  or  information  preferred  to  an  officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced into  writing and the substance thereof shall be entered in a  diary to be kept by such officer, in such form as shall be  prescribed by the local government.”

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872

“112. Every complaint preferred to an officer in charge  of  a police station,  shall  be reduced into writing,  and  shall be signed, sealed or marked by the person making  it; and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book  to be kept by such officer in the form prescribed by the  local government.”

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882

“154. Every information relating to the commission of a  cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in charge  of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him, or  under his direction, and be read over to the informant;  and every such information, whether given in writing or  reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the  person  giving  it,  and  the  substance  thereof  shall  be  entered  in  a  book  to  be  kept  by  such  form  as  the  government may prescribe in this behalf.”   

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

“154. Every information relating to the commission of a  cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in charge  of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or  under his direction, and be read over to the informant;  and every such information, whether given in writing or  reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the  person  giving  it,  and  the  substance  thereof  shall  be  entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form  as the Government may prescribe in this behalf.”

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

“154.  Information  in  cognizable  cases:  1)  Every  information relating to the commission of a cognizable  offence, it given orally to an officer in charge of a police  station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his  direction, and be read over to the informant; and every  such information, whether given in writing or reduced to  writing  as  aforesaid,  shall  be  signed  by  the  person  giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a  

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book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State  Government may prescribe in this behalf.

[Provided that if the information is given by the woman  against  whom an offence under Sections  326A,  326B,  354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C,  376D, 376E or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  or  attempted,  then  such information shall be recorded by a woman police  officer or any woman officer:-  

Provided further that:-

(a)  in  the  event  that  the  person  against  whom  an  offence under Sections 354,  354A, 354B,  354C, 354D,  376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376E or Section 509 of  the Indian Penal code is alleged to have been committed  or attempted is temporarily or permanently mentally or  physically  disabled  then  such  information  shall  be  recorded  by  a  police  officer,  at  the  residence  of  the  person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient  place  of  such  person’s  choice,  in  the  presence  of  an  interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be;

(b) the  recording  of  such  information  shall  be  videographed;

(c) the police officer  shall  get the statement of  the  person recorded by a Judicial  Magistrate under clause  (a)  of  sub-Section  (5A)  of  Section  164  as  soon  as  possible.]

(Inserted  by  Section  13  of  ‘The  Criminal  Law  (Amendment) Act, 2013 w.e.f. 03.02.2013)

(2) A  copy  of  the  information  as  recorded  under  sub-  section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the  informant.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  to  record  the  information referred to in subsection (1) may send the  substance of such information, in writing and by post, to  the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied  that  such  information  discloses  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  shall  either  investigate  the  case  himself  or  direct  an investigation  to be made by any  police  officer  subordinate  to  him,  in  the  manner  provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the  powers of  an officer in charge of the police station in  

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relation to that offence.

A perusal of the above said provisions manifests the  

legislative intent in both old codes and the new code for  

compulsory  registration  of  FIR  in  a  case  of  cognizable  

offence without conducting any Preliminary Inquiry.

30) The  precursor  to  the  present  Code  of  1973  is  the  

Code of 1898 wherein substantial changes were made in  

the  powers  and  procedure  of  the  police  to  investigate.  

The starting point of the powers of police was changed  

from the power of the officer in-charge of a police station  

to investigate into a cognizable offence without the order  

of a Magistrate, to the reduction of the first information  

regarding  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  whether  

received orally or in writing, into writing and into the book  

separately  prescribed  by  the  Provincial  government  for  

recording such first information.   

31) As such, a significant change that took place by way  

of the 1898 Code was with respect to the placement of  

Section 154,  i.e.,  the provision imposing requirement of  

recording the first information regarding commission of a  

cognizable  offence  in  the  special  book  prior  to  Section  

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156, i.e.,  the provision empowering the police officer to  

investigate a cognizable offence.  As such, the objective of  

such  placement  of  provisions  was  clear  which  was  to  

ensure that the recording of the first information should be  

the starting point of any investigation by the police.  In the  

interest of expediency of investigation since there was no  

safeguard of obtaining permission from the Magistrate to  

commence  an  investigation,  the  said  procedure  of  

recording first  information in their  books along with the  

signature/seal  of  the  informant,  would  act  as  an  

“extremely  valuable  safeguard”  against  the  excessive,  

mala fide and illegal exercise of investigative powers by  

the police.   

32) Provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Code deal  

with  information  to  the  police  and  their  powers  to  

investigate.  The said Chapter sets out the procedure to  

be  followed  during  investigation.   The  objective  to  be  

achieved by the procedure prescribed in the said Chapter  

is to set the criminal law in motion and to provide for all  

procedural  safeguards  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  

investigation is fair and is not  mala fide and there is no  

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scope of tampering with the evidence collected during the  

investigation.   

33) In  addition,  Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  senior  

counsel  contended that insertion of Section 166A in IPC  

indicates that registration of FIR is not compulsory for all  

offences other than what is specified in the said Section.  

By Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, Section 166A was  

inserted in Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-

“Section 166A—Whoever, being a public servant.—

(a) knowingly  disobeys any direction of  the law which  prohibits him from requiring the attendance at any place  of any person for the purpose of investigation into an  offence or any other matter, or

(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person,  any other direction of the law regulating the manner in  which he shall conduct such investigation, or

(c) fails  to record any information given to him under  sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  in  relation  to  cognizable  offence  punishable under Section 326A, Section 326B,  Section  354, Section 354B, Section 370, Section 370A, Section  376, Section 376A, Section 376B, Section 376C, Section  376D, Section 376E, Section 509 shall be punished with  rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less  than six months but which may extend to two years and  shall also be liable to fine.”    

Section 166A(c) lays down that if a public servant (Police  

Officer) fails to record any information given to him under  

Section  154(1)  of  the  Code  in  relation  to  cognizable  

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offences  punishable  under  Sections  326A,  326B,  354,  

354B, 370, 370A, 376, 376A 376B, 376C, 376D, 376E or  

Section  509,  he  shall  be  punished  with  rigorous  

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six  

months but may extend to two years and shall  also be  

liable to fine. Thus, it is the stand of learned counsel that  

this provision clearly indicates that registration of FIR is  

imperative  and  police  officer  has  no  discretion  in  the  

matter in respect of offences specified in the said section.  

Therefore, according to him, the legislature accepts that  

as far as other cognizable offences are concerned, police  

has  discretion  to  hold  a  preliminary  inquiry  if  there  is  

doubt about the correctness of the information.

34) Although,  the  argument  is  as  persuasive  as  it  

appears, yet, we doubt whether such a presumption can  

be  drawn  in  contravention  to  the  unambiguous  words  

employed in the said provision. Hence, insertion of Section  

166A in the IPC vide Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013,  

must be read in consonance with the provision and not  

contrary to it.  The insertion of Section 166A was in the  

light of recent unfortunate occurrence of offences against  

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women.  The intention of the legislature in putting forth  

this  amendment  was  to  tighten  the  already  existing  

provisions  to  provide  enhanced  safeguards  to  women.  

Therefore,  the  legislature,  after  noticing  the  increasing  

crimes  against  women  in  our  country,  thought  it  

appropriate to expressly punish the police officers for their  

failure to register FIRs in these cases. No other meaning  

than this can be assigned to for the insertion of the same.

35) With this background, let us discuss the submissions  

in the light of various decisions both in favour and against  

the referred issue.

Interpretation of Section 154:

36) It may be mentioned in this connection that the first  

and  foremost  principle  of  interpretation  of  a  statute  in  

every  system  of  interpretation  is  the  literal  rule  of  

interpretation. All that we have to see at the very outset is  

what does the provision say?  As a result, the language  

employed in Section 154 is the determinative factor of the  

legislative intent.  A plain reading of Section 154(1) of the  

Code  provides  that  any  information  relating  to  the  

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commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an  

officer-in-charge of a police station shall be reduced into  

writing  by  him  or  under  his  direction.  There  is  no  

ambiguity in the language of Section 154(1) of the Code.

37) At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the following  

observations  of  this  Court  in  M/s  Hiralal  Rattanlal  

(supra) which are as under:

“22...In construing a statutory provision, the first and  the  foremost  rule  of  construction  is  the  literary  construction. All that we have to see at the very outset  is  what  does  that  provision  say?  If  the  provision  is  unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative  intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules  of  construction  of  statutes.  The  other  rules  of  construction  of  statutes  are called into aid only  when  the legislative intention is not clear…”

The  above  decision  was  followed  by  this  Court  in  B.  

Premanand (supra) and  after  referring  the  abovesaid  

observations  in  the case of  Hiralal  Rattanlal  (supra),  

this Court observed as under:

“9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the  first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute  in  every system of  interpretation  is  the literal  rule  of  interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the  mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be  resorted  to  when  the  plain  words  of  a  statute  are  ambiguous or  lead to  no intelligible  results  or  if  read  literally  would  nullify  the  very  object  of  the  statute.  Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and  unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles  of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish  

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Match AB v. SEBI (2004) 11 SCC 641.

The language of Section 154(1), therefore, admits of  

no other construction but the literal construction.  

38) The  legislative  intent  of  Section  154  is  vividly  

elaborated in Bhajan Lal (supra) which is as under:-

“30. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1)  is that every information relating to the commission of a  "cognizable offence" (as defined Under Section 2(c) of  the  Code)  if  given  orally  (in  which  case  it  is  to  be  reduced into writing) or in writing to "an officer incharge  of a police station" (within the meaning of Section 2(o)  of  the  Code)  and  signed  by  the  informant  should  be  entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form  as the State Government may prescribe which form is  commonly  called  as  "First  Information  Report"  and  which act of entering the information in the said form is  known as registration of a crime or a case.

31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case  on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable  offence  in  compliance  with  the  mandate  of  Section  154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot  embark upon an inquiry as to whether the information,  laid  by  the  informant  is  reliable  and  genuine  or  otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground  that the information is not reliable or credible. On the  other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is  statutorily  obliged  to  register  a  case  and  then  to  proceed  with  the  investigation  if  he  has  reason  to  suspect  the  commission  of  an  offence  which  he  is  empowered  under  Section  156  of  the  Code  to  investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As  we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about  the power of a police officer in the field of investigation  of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156  and  157  of  the  Code  in  the  ensuing  part  of  this  judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections  in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in  charge  of  a  police  station  refuses  to  exercise  the  jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the  

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information  of  a  cognizable  offence  reported  and  thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the  person  aggrieved  by  such  refusal  can  send  the  substance of the information in writing and by post to  the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied  that  the  information  forwarded  to  him  discloses  a  cognizable  offence,  should  either  investigate the case  himself  or  direct  an investigation  to be made by any  police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided  by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code,  the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and  cautiously  used  the  expression  “information”  without  qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the  Code wherein the expressions, “reasonable complaint”  and “credible information” are used. Evidently, the non- qualification of the word “information” in Section 154(1)  unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for  the reason that the police officer should not refuse to  record an information relating to the commission of  a  cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the  ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,  ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is  not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A  comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the  earlier  Codes  will  indicate  that  the  legislature  had  purposely  thought  it  fit  to  employ  only  the  word  “information” without qualifying the said word. Section  139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of  1861)  passed by the Legislative Council  of  India  read  that  ‘every  complaint  or  information’  preferred  to  an  officer in charge of a police station should be reduced  into writing which provision was subsequently modified  by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872)  which thereafter read that ‘every complaint’  preferred  to  an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  shall  be  reduced in writing. The word ‘complaint’ which occurred  in previous two Codes of  1861 and 1872 was deleted  and in that place the word ‘information’ was used in the  Codes  of  1882  and  1898  which  word  is  now used  in  Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code  of 1973 (Act 2 of  1974).  An overall  reading of  all  the  Codes makes it  clear  that the condition which is  sine  qua non for recording a first information report is that  there  must  be  information  and  that  information  must  disclose a cognizable offence.

33. It  is,  therefore,  manifestly  clear  that  if  any  

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information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before  an officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code,  the  said  police officer has no other option except to enter the  substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say,  to register a case on the basis of such information.

39) Consequently, the condition that is  sine qua non for  

recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is  that  

there  must  be  information  and  that  information  must  

disclose  a  cognizable  offence.   If  any  information  

disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in  

charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of  

Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option  

except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed  

form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such  

information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is  

mandatory  and  the  concerned  officer  is  duty  bound  to  

register the case on the basis of information disclosing a  

cognizable  offence.  Thus,  the  plain  words  of  Section  

154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning.

‘Shall’

40) The use of the word “shall” in Section 154(1) of the  

Code  clearly  shows  the  legislative  intent  that  it  is  

mandatory to register an FIR if the information given to  

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the  police  discloses  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  

offence.  

41) In  Khub  Chand (supra), this  Court  observed  as  

under:

“7…The  term “shall”  in  its  ordinary  significance  is  mandatory  and  the  court  shall  ordinarily  give  that  interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation  leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or  be at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be  collected from other parts of the Act. The construction of  the  said  expression  depends  on  the  provisions  of  a  particular  Act,  the  setting  in  which  the  expression  appears, the object for which the direction is given, the  consequences that would flow from the infringement of  the direction and such other considerations...”  

42) It is relevant to mention that the object of using the  

word “shall” in the context of Section 154(1) of the Code is  

to  ensure  that  all  information  relating  to  all  cognizable  

offences  is  promptly  registered  by  the  police  and  

investigated in accordance with the provisions of law.

43) Investigation  of  offences  and  prosecution  of  

offenders  are  the  duties  of  the  State.   For  “cognizable  

offences”, a duty has been cast upon the police to register  

FIR  and  to  conduct  investigation  except  as  otherwise  

permitted specifically under Section 157 of the Code.  If a  

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discretion, option or latitude is allowed to the police in the  

matter  of  registration  of  FIRs,  it  can  have  serious  

consequences on the public order situation and can also  

adversely  affect  the  rights  of  the  victims  including  

violating their fundamental right to equality.  

44) Therefore,  the  context  in  which  the  word  “shall”  

appears  in  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code,  the  object  for  

which it  has been used and the consequences that  will  

follow from the infringement of the direction to register  

FIRs, all these factors clearly show that the word “shall”  

used  in  Section  154(1)  needs  to  be  given  its  ordinary  

meaning  of  being  of  “mandatory”  character.  The  

provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light  

of the statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring any  

discretion on the officer in-charge of the police station for  

embarking  upon  a  preliminary  inquiry  prior  to  the  

registration of an FIR. It is settled position of law that if the  

provision  is  unambiguous  and  the  legislative  intent  is  

clear,  the court  need not  call  into  it  any other  rules of  

construction.

45) In  view  of  the  above,  the  use  of  the  word  ‘shall’  

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coupled with the Scheme of the Act lead to the conclusion  

that the legislators intended that if an information relating  

to  commission of  a  cognizable  offence is  given,  then it  

would mandatorily be registered by the officer in-charge of  

the police station.  Reading ‘shall’ as ‘may’, as contended  

by  some counsel,  would  be  against  the  Scheme of  the  

Code.   Section  154  of  the  Code  should  be  strictly  

construed and the word ‘shall’ should be given its natural  

meaning.  The golden rule of interpretation can be given a  

go-by only in cases where the language of the section is  

ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.

46) In view of the above, we are satisfied that Section  

154(1) of the Code does not have any ambiguity in this  

regard and is in clear terms.  It is relevant to mention that  

Section 39 of the Code casts a statutory duty on every  

person  to  inform about  commission  of  certain  offences  

which includes offences covered by Sections 121 to 126,  

302,  64-A,  382,  392  etc.,  of  the  IPC.   It  would  be  

incongruous to suggest that though it is the duty of every  

citizen to inform about commission of an offence, but it is  

not obligatory on the officer-incharge of a Police Station to  

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register the report.  The word ‘shall’ occurring in Section  

39 of the Code has to be given the same meaning as the  

word ‘shall’ occurring in Section 154(1) of the Code.   

‘Book’/‘Diary’

47) It  is  contented  by  learned  ASG  appearing  for  the  

State  of  Chhattisgarh  that  the  recording  of  first  

information under Section 154 in the ‘book’ is subsequent  

to the entry in the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary,  

which is maintained in police station. Therefore, according  

to  learned ASG, first  information is  a document at the  

earliest  in  the  general  diary,  then  if  any  preliminary  

inquiry is needed the police officer may conduct the same  

and thereafter the information will be registered as FIR.

48) This  interpretation  is  wholly  unfounded.  The  First  

Information  Report  is  in  fact  the  “information”  that  is  

received  first  in  point  of  time,  which  is  either  given  in  

writing or is reduced to writing.  It is not the “substance”  

of it, which is to be entered in the diary prescribed by the  

State Government.  The term ‘General Diary’ (also called  

as  ‘Station  Diary’  or  ‘Daily  Diary’  in  some  States)  is  

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maintained not under Section 154 of the Code but under  

the provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 in the  

States  to  which  it  applies,  or  under  the  respective  

provisions  of  the  Police  Act(s)  applicable  to  a  State  or  

under the Police Manual of a State, as the case may be.  

Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 is reproduced below:-

“44. Police-officers to keep diary.—It shall be  the  duty  of  every  officer  in  charge  of  a  police- station  to keep a general  diary in  such form as  shall,  from  time  to  time,  be  prescribed  by  the  State  Government  and  to  record  therein  all  complaints and charged preferred,  the names of  all  persons  arrested,  the  names  of  the  complainants, the offences charged against them,  the  weapons  or  property  that  shall  have  been  taken from their possession or otherwise, and the  names  of  the  witnesses  who  shall  have  been  examined.  The Magistrate of the district shall be  at liberty to call for any inspect such diary.”

49) It  is  pertinent  to  note  that  during  the  year  1861,  

when the aforesaid Police Act, 1861 was passed, the Code  

of Criminal Procedure, 1861 was also passed.  Section 139  

of that Code dealt with registration of FIR and this Section  

is also referred to the word “diary”, as can be seen from  

the language of this Section, as reproduced below:-

“139.  Every  complaint  or  information  preferred  to  an  officer  in  charge of  a Police Station,  shall  be reduced  into writing, and the substance thereof shall be entered  in a  diary to be kept by such officer, in such form as  shall be prescribed by the local government.”   

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Thus, Police Act, 1861 and the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1861, both of which were passed in the same year, used  

the same word “diary”.

50) However, in the year 1872, a new Code came to be  

passed which was called the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1872.   Section 112 of  the Code dealt  with the issue of  

registration of FIR and is reproduced below:-

“112. Every complaint preferred to an officer in charge  of  a  Police  station  shall  be  reduced  into  writing,  and  shall be signed, sealed, or marked by the person making  it; and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book  to be kept by such officer in the form prescribed by the  Local Government.”

51) It  is,  thus,  clear  that  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure,  1872,  a  departure  was  made  and  the  word  

‘book’  was  used  in  place  of  ‘diary’.   The  word  ‘book’  

clearly referred to FIR book to be maintained under the  

Code for registration of FIRs.

52)   The question that whether the FIR is to be recorded  

in the FIR Book or in General Diary, is no more res integra.  

This issue has already been decided authoritatively by this  

Court.

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53) In  Madhu Bala  vs.  Suresh Kumar (1997)  8  SCC  

476, this Court has held that FIR must be registered in the  

FIR  Register  which  shall  be  a  book  consisting  of  200  

pages.  It is true that the substance of the information is  

also to be mentioned in the Daily diary (or the general  

diary).  But, the basic requirement is to register the FIR in  

the FIR Book or Register.  Even in  Bhajan Lal (supra),  

this Court held that FIR has to be entered in a book in a  

form  which  is  commonly  called  the  First  Information  

Report.  

54) It is thus clear that registration of FIR is to be done in  

a  book  called  FIR  book  or  FIR  Register.   Of  course,  in  

addition, the gist of the FIR or the substance of the FIR  

may  also  be  mentioned  simultaneously  in  the  General  

Diary as mandated in the respective Police Act or Rules, as  

the case may be, under the relevant State provisions.  

55) The  General  Diary  is  a  record  of  all  important  

transactions/events  taking  place  in  a  police  station,  

including  departure  and  arrival  of  police  staff,  handing  

over or taking over of charge, arrest of a person, details of  

law and order duties, visit of senior officers etc. It is in this  

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context that gist or substance of each FIR being registered  

in the police station is also mentioned in the General Diary  

since  registration  of  FIR  also  happens  to  be  a  very  

important event in the police station.  Since General Diary  

is a record that is maintained chronologically on day-to-

day basis (on each day, starting with new number 1), the  

General  Diary  entry  reference  is  also  mentioned  

simultaneously  in  the  FIR  Book,  while  FIR  number  is  

mentioned in the General Diary entry since both of these  

are prepared simultaneously.

56) It is relevant to point out that FIR Book is maintained  

with its  number given on an annual  basis.   This means  

that  each FIR has a  unique annual  number  given to  it.  

This  is  on  similar  lines  as  the  Case  Numbers  given  in  

courts.  Due to this reason, it is possible to keep a strict  

control  and  track  over  the  registration  of  FIRs  by  the  

supervisory  police  officers  and  by  the  courts,  wherever  

necessary.   Copy  of  each  FIR  is  sent  to  the  superior  

officers and to the concerned Judicial Magistrate.

57) On the other  hand,  General  Diary  contains  a huge  

number of other details of the proceedings of each day.  

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Copy of General Diary is not sent to the Judicial Magistrate  

having jurisdiction over the police station, though its copy  

is sent to a superior police officer.  Thus, it is not possible  

to keep strict control of each and every FIR recorded in  

the General  Diary by superior  police officers  and/or  the  

court  in  view  of  enormous  amount  of  other  details  

mentioned therein and the numbers changing every day.

58) The signature of the complainant is obtained in the  

FIR Book as and when the complaint is given to the police  

station.  On the other hand, there is no such requirement  

of obtaining signature of the complainant in the general  

diary.   Moreover,  at  times,  the  complaint  given  may  

consist of  large number of pages, in which case it is only  

the gist of the complaint which is to be recorded in the  

General Diary and not the full complaint.  This does not fit  

in with the suggestion that what is recorded in General  

Diary  should  be  considered  to  be  the  

fulfillment/compliance of the requirement of Section 154  

of  registration  of  FIR.   In  fact,  the  usual  practice  is  to  

record the complete complaint in the FIR book (or annex it  

with  the  FIR  form)  but  record  only  about  one  or  two  

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paragraphs (gist of the information) in the General Diary.

59) In view of the above, it is useful to point out that the  

Code was enacted under Entry 2 of the Concurrent List of  

the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  which  is  

reproduced below:-

“2. Criminal procedure, including all matters included in  the Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement  of this Constitution.”

On the other hand, Police Act, 1861 (or other similar Acts  

in respective States) were enacted under Entry 2 of the  

State  List  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution,  

which is reproduced below:-  

“2. Police (including railway and village police) subject  to the provisions of Entry 2A of List I.”

60) Now, at this juncture, it is pertinent to refer Article  

254(1) of the Constitution, which lays down the provisions  

relating to inconsistencies between the laws made by the  

Parliament and the State Legislatures.   Article 254(1) is  

reproduced as under:-

“254.  Inconsistency  between  laws  made  by  Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of  States

(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a  State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by  Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or  

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to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of  the  matters  enumerated  in  the  Concurrent  List,  then,  subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by  Parliament,  whether  passed  before  or  after  the  law  made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case  may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made  by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the  repugnancy, be void.”

Thus it is clear from the mandate of Article 254(1) of the  

Constitution that if there is any inconsistency between the  

provisions  of  the  Code  and  the  Police  Act,  1861,  the  

provisions of the Code will  prevail  and the provisions of  

the  Police  Act  would  be  void  to  the  extent  of  the  

repugnancy.

61) If at all, there is any inconsistency in the provisions of  

Section 154 of the Code and Section 44 of the Police Act,  

1861, with regard to the fact as to whether the FIR is to be  

registered  in  the FIR  book or  in  the  General  Diary,  the  

provisions of Section 154 of the Code will prevail and the  

provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 (or similar  

provisions  of  the respective corresponding Police Act  or  

Rules  in  other  respective  States)  shall  be  void  to  the  

extent of the repugnancy.  Thus, FIR is to be recorded in  

the FIR Book, as mandated under Section 154 of the Code,  

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and it is not correct to state that information will be first  

recorded in the General Diary and only after preliminary  

inquiry, if required, the information will  be registered as  

FIR.  

62) However,  this  Court  in  Tapan  Kumar  Singh  

(supra),  held  that  a  GD entry  may be treated as  First  

information in an appropriate case, where it discloses the  

commission of a cognizable offence. It was held as under:  

“15. It is the correctness of this finding which is assailed  before  us  by  the  appellants.  They  contend  that  the  information recorded in the GD entry does disclose the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence.  They  submitted  that even if their contention, that after recording the GD  entry  only  a  preliminary  inquiry  was  made,  is  not  accepted, they are still entitled to sustain the legality of  the investigation on the basis that the GD entry may be  treated as a first information report,  since it  disclosed  the commission of a cognizable offence.

16. The  parties  before  us  did  not  dispute  the  legal  position  that  a  GD  entry  may  be  treated  as  a  first  information  report  in  an  appropriate  case,  where  it  discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If the  contention of the appellants is upheld, the order of the  High Court must be set aside because if there was in law  a first information report disclosing the commission of a  cognizable  offence,  the  police  had  the  power  and  jurisdiction  to  investigate,  and  in  the  process  of  investigation  to  conduct  search  and  seizure.  It  is,  therefore,  not  necessary  for  us  to  consider  the  authorities cited at the Bar on the question of validity of  the  preliminary  inquiry  and the  validity  of  the search  and seizure.

Xxx xxxx  

19. The High Court fell into an error in thinking that the  

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information received by the police could not be treated  as  a  first  information  report  since  the  allegation  was  vague inasmuch as it  was not  stated from whom the  sum of rupees one lakh was demanded and accepted.  Nor was it stated that such demand or acceptance was  made as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do  any official act, or for showing or forbearing to show in  exercise of  his  official  function,  favour or  disfavour to  any person or for rendering, attempting to render any  service or disservice to any person. Thus there was no  basis for a police officer to suspect the commission of an  offence which he was empowered under Section 156 of  the Code to investigate.”

63) It is thus unequivocally clear that registration of FIR is  

mandatory and also that it  is to be recorded in the FIR  

Book by giving a unique annual  number to each FIR to  

enable strict tracking of each and every registered FIR by  

the superior police officers as well as by the competent  

court to which copies of each FIR are required to be sent.  

‘Information’

64) The legislature has consciously used the expression  

“information” in Section 154(1) of the Code as against the  

expression  used  in  Section  41(1)(a)  and  (g)  where  the  

expression used for arresting a person without warrant is  

“reasonable  complaint”  or  “credible  information”.  The  

expression  under  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code  is  not  

qualified by the prefix “reasonable” or “credible”.  The non  

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qualification of the word “information” in Section 154(1)  

unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code is for the  

reason that the police officer should not refuse to record  

any information relating to the commission of a cognizable  

offence on the ground that  he is  not  satisfied with  the  

reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other  

words,  reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  said  

information  is  not  a  condition  precedent  for  the  

registration of a case.  

65) The above view has been expressed by this Court in  

Bhajan Lal (supra) which is as under:-

“32. ... in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature  in  its  collective  wisdom  has  carefully  and  cautiously  used the expression “information” without qualifying the  same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein  the expressions, “reasonable complaint” and  “credible  information” are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of  the  word  “information”  in  Section  154(1)  unlike  in  Section  41(1)(a)  and (g)  of  the  Code may be for  the  reason that the police officer should not refuse to record  an  information  relating  to  the  commission  of  a  cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the  ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,  ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is  not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A  comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the  earlier  Codes  will  indicate  that  the  legislature  had  purposely  thought  it  fit  to  employ  only  the  word  “information” without qualifying the said word.”  

66) In Parkash Singh Badal (supra), this Court held as  

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under:-

“65. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1) is  that  every  information  relating  to  the  commission  of  a  “cognizable offence” [as defined under Section 2(c) of the  Code] if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into  writing)  or  in writing to “an officer in charge of  a police  station” [within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code]  and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to  be  kept  by  such  officer  in  such  form  as  the  State  Government may prescribe which form is commonly called  as “first information report” and which act of entering the  information in the said form is known as registration of a  crime or a case.

66. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on  the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence  in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the  Code, the police officer concerned cannot embark upon an  inquiry as to whether the information laid by the informant  is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a  case on the ground that the information is not reliable or  credible.  On  the  other  hand,  the  officer  in  charge  of  a  police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and  then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to  suspect  the  commission  of  an  offence  which  he  is  empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate,  subject to the proviso to Section 157 thereof. In case an  officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the  jurisdiction  vested in  him and to  register  a  case  on the  information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby  violates  the  statutory  duty  cast  upon  him,  the  person  aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the  information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of  Police  concerned  who  if  satisfied  that  the  information  forwarded  to  him discloses  a  cognizable  offence,  should  either  investigate  the  case  himself  or  direct  an  investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate  to him in the manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section  154 of the Code.

67. It  has  to  be  noted  that  in  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully  and cautiously used the expression “information” without  qualifying the same as in Sections 41(1)(a)  or (g)  of the  Code wherein the expressions “reasonable complaint” and  “credible  information”  are  used.  Evidently,  the  non- qualification  of  the  word  “information”  in  Section  154(1)  

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unlike in Sections 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for  the  reason  that  the  police  officer  should  not  refuse  to  record  an  information  relating  to  the  commission  of  a  cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the  ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or  credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,  “reasonableness” or “credibility” of the said information is  not  a  condition  precedent  for  registration  of  a  case.  A  comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the  earlier  Codes  will  indicate  that  the  legislature  had  purposely  thought  it  fit  to  employ  only  the  word  “information” without qualifying the said word. Section 139  of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861)  passed by the Legislative Council of India read that “every  complaint or information” preferred to an officer in charge  of  a  police  station  should  be reduced into  writing  which  provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the  Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that  “every  complaint”  preferred to  an officer  in  charge of  a  police  station  shall  be  reduced  in  writing.  The  word  “complaint” which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861  and  1872  was  deleted  and  in  that  place  the  word  “information”  was  used  in  the  Codes  of  1882  and  1898  which  word  is  now used  in  Sections  154,  155,  157  and  190(c)  of  the  Code.  An overall  reading  of  all  the  Codes  makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for  recording a first information report is that there must be an  information  and  that  information  must  disclose  a  cognizable offence.

68. It  is,  therefore,  manifestly  clear  that  if  any  information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police  officer has no other option except to enter the substance  thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a  case on the basis of such information.”

67) In  Ramesh  Kumari (supra),  this  Court  held  as  

under:-

4. That a police officer mandatorily registers a case on a  complaint  of  a  cognizable  offence  by  the  citizen  under  Section 154 of the Code is no more res integra. The point of  law has been set at rest by this Court in State of Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal.  This  Court  after  examining the whole  gamut  and intricacies of the mandatory nature of Section 154 of  

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the Code has arrived at the finding in paras 31 and 32 of  the judgment as under:  

“31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case  on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable  offence  in  compliance  with  the  mandate  of  Section  154(1) of the Code, the police officer concerned cannot  embark upon an inquiry as to whether the information,  laid  by  the  informant  is  reliable  and  genuine  or  otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground  that the information is not reliable or credible. On the  other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is  statutorily  obliged  to  register  a  case  and  then  to  proceed  with  the  investigation  if  he  has  reason  to  suspect  the  commission  of  an  offence  which  he  is  empowered  under  Section  156  of  the  Code  to  investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As  we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about  the power of a police officer in the field of investigation  of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156  and  157  of  the  Code  in  the  ensuing  part  of  this  judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections  in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in  charge  of  a  police  station  refuses  to  exercise  the  jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the  information  of  a  cognizable  offence  reported  and  thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the  person  aggrieved  by  such  refusal  can  send  the  substance of the information in writing and by post to  the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied  that  the  information  forwarded  to  him  discloses  a  cognizable  offence,  should  either  investigate the case  himself  or  direct  an investigation  to be made by any  police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided  by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the  legislature  in  its  collective  wisdom  has  carefully  and  cautiously  used  the  expression  ‘information’  without  qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the  Code  wherein  the  expressions,  ‘reasonable  complaint’  and ‘credible information’ are used. Evidently, the non- qualification of the word ‘information’ in Section 154(1)  unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for  the reason that the police officer should not refuse to  record an information relating to the commission of  a  cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the  ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  information.  In  other  words,  ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is  

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not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A  comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the  earlier  Codes  will  indicate  that  the  legislature  had  purposely  thought  it  fit  to  employ  only  the  word  ‘information’  without  qualifying the said word.  Section  139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of  1861)  passed by the Legislative Council  of  India  read  that  ‘every  complaint  or  information’  preferred  to  an  officer in charge of a police station should be reduced  into writing which provision was subsequently modified  by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872)  which thereafter read that ‘every complaint’  preferred  to  an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  shall  be  reduced in writing. The word ‘complaint’ which occurred  in previous two Codes of  1861 and 1872 was deleted  and in that place the word ‘information’ was used in the  Codes  of  1882  and  1898  which  word  is  now used  in  Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code  of 1973 (Act 2 of  1974).  An overall  reading of  all  the  Codes makes it  clear  that the condition which is  sine  qua non for recording a first information report is that  there  must  be  information  and  that  information  must  disclose a cognizable offence.”

(emphasis  in  original)

Finally, this Court in para 33 said:  

“33.  It  is,  therefore,  manifestly  clear  that  if  any  information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before  an officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  satisfying  the  requirements  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Code,  the  said  police officer has no other option except to enter the  substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say,  to register a case on the basis of such information.”

5. The views expressed by this Court in paras 31, 32  and 33 as quoted above leave no manner of doubt that the  provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the  officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the  basis of such information disclosing cognizable offence.”

68) In Ram Lal Narang (supra), this Court held as  

under:-

“14. Under  the  CrPC,  1898,  whenever  an  officer  in  charge of the police station received information relating to  

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the commission of a cognizable offence, he was required to  enter the substance thereof in a book kept by him, for that  purpose, in the prescribed form (Section 154 CrPC). Section  156  of  the  CrPC  invested  the  Police  with  the  power  to  investigate into cognizable offences without the order of a  Court.  If,  from the information received or otherwise, the  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  suspected  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  he  was  required  to  send  forthwith  a  report  of  the  same  to  a  Magistrate  empowered  to  take  cognizance  of  such  offence  upon  a  police report and then to proceed in person or depute one  of  his  subordinate  officers  to  proceed  to  the  spot,  to  investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and to  take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender  (Section  157  CrPC).  He  was  required  to  complete  the  investigation without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it  was completed, to forward to a Magistrate empowered to  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  upon  a  police  report,  a  report in the prescribed form, setting forth the names of  the parties, the nature of the information and the names of  the  persons  who  appeared  to  be  acquainted  with  the  circumstances of the case [Section 173(1) CrPC]. He was  also  required  to  state  whether  the  accused  had  been  forwarded in custody or had been released on bail.  Upon  receipt of the report submitted under Section 173(1) CrPC  by the officer in charge of the police station, the Magistrate  empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon a police  report  might  take  cognizance  of  the  offence  [Section  190(1)(b)  CrPC].  Thereafter,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence,  there  was  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding,  the  Magistrate  was  required  to  issue  the  necessary  process  to  secure  the  attendance of the accused (Section 204 CrPC). The scheme  of  the  Code  thus  was  that  the  FIR  was  followed  by  investigation, the investigation led to the submission of a  report to the Magistrate, the Magistrate took cognizance of  the offence on receipt of the police report and, finally, the  Magistrate  taking  cognizance  issued  process  to  the  accused.

15. The police thus had the statutory right and duty to  “register” every information relating to the commission of a  cognizable offence. The police also had the statutory right  and duty to investigate the facts and circumstances of the  case where the commission of  a cognizable offence was  suspected and to submit the report of such investigation to  the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the  offence upon a  police  report.  These statutory  rights  and  duties of the police were not circumscribed by any power of  

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superintendence or interference in the Magistrate; nor was  any sanction required from a Magistrate to empower the  Police to investigate into a cognizable offence. This position  in  law  was  well-established.  In  King  Emperor v.  Khwaja  Nazir Ahmad the Privy Council observed as follows:

“Just  as  it  is  essential  that  everyone  accused of  a  crime should have free access to a Court of justice, so  that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the  offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost  importance that the judiciary should not interfere with  the police in matters which are within their province and  into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry.  In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on  the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of  an  alleged  cognizable  crime  without  requiring  any  authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as  Their  Lordships  think,  be  an  unfortunate  result  if  it  should be held possible to interfere with those statutory  rules by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the  Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are  complementary,  not  overlapping,  and the combination  of individual liberty with a due observance of law and  order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise  its own function, always of course, subject to the right of  the  Courts  to  intervene  in  an  appropriate  case  when  moved  under  Section  491  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code to give directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus.  In  such  a  case  as  the  present,  however,  the  Court’s  functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and  not until  then ...  In the present case, the police have  under Sections 154 and 156 of the Criminal Procedure  Code,  a  statutory  right  to  investigate  a  cognizable  offence without requiring the sanction of the Court ....”

Ordinarily, the right and duty of the police would end with  the submission of a report under Section 173(1) CrPC upon  receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take or not  to take cognizance of the offence. There was no provision  in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to be followed  by the police, where, after the submission of a report under  Section  173(1)  CrPC and  after  the  Magistrate  had taken  cognizance of the offence, fresh facts came to light which  required  further  investigation.  There  was,  of  course,  no  express  provision  prohibiting  the  police  from  launching  upon an investigation into the fresh facts coming to light  after the submission of the report under Section 173(1) or  after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence.  As we shall presently point out, it was generally thought by  many  High  Courts,  though  doubted  by  a  few,  that  the  

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police  were not  barred from further  investigation  by the  circumstance  that  a  report  under  Section  173(1)  had  already  been  submitted  and  a  Magistrate  had  already  taken cognizance of the offence. The Law Commission in its  41st report recognized the position and recommended that  the right of the police to make further investigation should  be statutorily affirmed. The Law Commission said:

“14.23. A report under Section 173 is normally the  end  of  the  investigation.  Sometimes,  however,  the  police officer after submitting the report under Section  173  comes  upon  evidence  bearing  on  the  guilt  or  innocence of the accused. We should have thought that  the police officer can collect that evidence and send it to  the  Magistrate  concerned.  It  appears,  however,  that  Courts have sometimes taken the narrow view that once  a  final  report  under  Section  173  has  been  sent,  the  police cannot touch the case again and cannot re-open  the investigation.  This  view places a hindrance in the  way  of  the  investigating  agency,  which  can  be  very  unfair to the prosecution and, for that matter, even to  the accused. It should be made clear in Section 173 that  the competent police officer can examine such evidence  and send a report to the Magistrate. Copies concerning  the fresh material must of  course be furnished to the  accused.”

Accordingly,  in the CrPC,  1973,  a new provision,  Section  173(8), was introduced and it says:

“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude  further  investigation  in  respect  of  an  offence  after  a  report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the  Magistrate  and,  where  upon  such  investigation,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police  station  obtains  further  evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the  Magistrate  a  further  report  or  reports  regarding  such  evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of  sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in  relation  to  such  report  or  reports  as  they  apply  in  relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).”  

69) In  Lallan Chaudhary (supra),  this Court held  

as under:  

“8. Section 154 of the Code thus casts a statutory duty  upon the police officer to register the case, as disclosed in  

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the complaint, and then to proceed with the investigation.  The mandate of Section 154 is manifestly clear that if any  information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an  officer in charge of a police station, such police officer has  no other option except to register the case on the basis of  such information.

9. In  Ramesh Kumari v.  State (NCT of Delhi) this Court  has held that the provision of Section 154 is mandatory.  Hence,  the  police  officer  concerned  is  duty-bound  to  register  the  case  on  receiving  information  disclosing  cognizable  offence.  Genuineness  or  credibility  of  the  information is not a condition precedent for registration of  a case. That can only be considered after registration of the  case.

10. The mandate of Section 154 of the Code is that at  the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of  the information disclosing a cognizable offence, the police  officer  concerned  cannot  embark  upon  an  inquiry  as  to  whether the information,  laid by the informant is reliable  and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on  the ground that the information is not relevant or credible.  In  other  words,  reliability,  genuineness  and credibility  of  the  information  are  not  the  conditions  precedent  for  registering a case under Section 154 of the Code.”

A perusal of the above-referred judgments clarify that the  

reasonableness or creditability of the information is not a  

condition precedent for the registration of a case.

Preliminary Inquiry

70) Mr.  Naphade  relied  on  the  following  decisions  in  

support of his arguments that if  the police officer has a  

doubt  about  the  veracity  of  the  accusation,  he  has  to  

conduct preliminary inquiry, viz., E.P. Royappa vs. State  

of  Tamil  Nadu (1974)  4  SCC  3,  Maneka  Gandhi  

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(supra),  S.M.D.  Kiran  Pasha vs.  Government  of  

Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 328, D.K. Basu vs. State  

of  W.B. (1997)  1  SCC  416,  Uma Shankar  Sitani vs.  

Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC  

714,  Preeti Gupta (supra),  Francis Coralie Mullin vs.  

Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC  

608, Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union  

of  India  (1999)  6  SCC  667,  District  Registrar  and  

Collector, Hyderabad vs.  Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC  

496 and Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State  

of Maharashtra (2005) 5 SCC 294.   

71) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  State  further  

vehemently contended that in appropriate cases, it would  

be proper for a police officer, on receipt of a complaint of  

a cognizable offence,  to satisfy himself  that  prima facie  

the  allegations  levelled  against  the  accused  in  the  

complaint are credible.  In this regard, Mr. Naphade cited  

the  following  decisions,  viz.  Tapan  Kumar  Singh  

(supra), Bhagwant  Kishore  Joshi  (supra),  P.  

Sirajuddin (supra), Sevi (supra), Shashikant (supra),  

Rajinder  Singh  Katoch  (supra), Vineet  Narain  vs.  

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Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226, Elumalai vs. State of  

Tamil Nadu 1983 LW (CRL) 121,  A. Lakshmanarao vs.  

Judicial  Magistrate,  Parvatipuram AIR 1971 SC 186,  

State of Uttar Pradesh vs.  Ram Sagar Yadav & Ors.  

(1985)  1  SCC  552,  Mona  Panwar vs.  High  Court  of  

Judicature  of  Allahabad (2011)  3  SCC  496,  Apren  

Joseph vs.  State  of  Kerala (1973)  3  SCC  114,  King  

Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 and  

Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan (supra).

72) He further pointed out that the provisions have to be  

read in the light of the principle of  malicious prosecution  

and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,  

19 and 21. It is the stand of learned senior counsel that  

every citizen has a right not to be subjected to malicious  

prosecution and every police officer has an in-built duty  

under Section 154 to ensure that an innocent person is not  

falsely implicated in a criminal case.  If despite the fact  

that  the  police  officer  is  not  prima  facie satisfied,  as  

regards commission of a cognizable offence and proceeds  

to register an FIR and carries out an investigation, it would  

result  in  putting  the  liberty  of  a  citizen  in  jeopardy.  

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Therefore, learned senior counsel vehemently pleaded for  

a preliminary inquiry before registration of FIR.

73) In terms of the language used in Section 154 of the  

Code,  the  police  is  duty  bound  to  proceed  to  conduct  

investigation  into  a  cognizable  offence  even  without  

receiving information (i.e. FIR) about commission of such  

an offence,  if  the officer  in charge of the police station  

otherwise  suspects  the  commission  of  such  an  offence.  

The  legislative  intent  is  therefore  quite  clear,  i.e.,  to  

ensure  that  every  cognizable  offence  is  promptly  

investigated in accordance with law.  This being the legal  

position,  there  is  no  reason  that  there  should  be  any  

discretion or option left with the police to register or not to  

register  an  FIR  when  information  is  given  about  the  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence.   Every  cognizable  

offence must be investigated promptly in accordance with  

law and all information provided under Section 154 of the  

Code about the commission of a cognizable offence must  

be registered as an FIR so as to initiate an offence.  The  

requirement of Section 154 of the Code is only that the  

report  must  disclose  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  

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offence  and  that  is  sufficient  to  set  the  investigating  

machinery into action.

74) The insertion of  sub-section (3)  of  Section 154,  by  

way  of  an  amendment,  reveals  the  intention  of  the  

legislature to ensure that no information of commission of  

a cognizable offence must be ignored or not acted upon  

which would result in unjustified protection of the alleged  

offender/accused.

75) The  maxim  expression  unius  est  exclusion  alterius  

(expression  of  one  thing  is  the  exclusion  of  another)  

applies in the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code,  

where the mandate of recording the information in writing  

excludes the possibility of not recording an information of  

commission of a cognizable crime in the special register.

76) Therefore,  conducting  an  investigation  into  an  

offence after registration of FIR under Section 154 of the  

Code is the “procedure established by law” and, thus, is in  

conformity  with  Article  21  of  the  Constitution.  

Accordingly, the right of the accused under Article 21 of  

the Constitution is protected if the FIR is registered first  

and  then  the  investigation  is  conducted  in  accordance  

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with the provisions of law.

77) The  term inquiry  as  per  Section  2(g)  of  the  Code  

reads as under:

‘2(g) –  “inquiry” means  every  inquiry,  other  than a  trial,  conducted  under  this  Code  by  a  Magistrate  or  Court.”

Hence, it is clear that inquiry under the Code is relatable  

to a judicial act and not to the steps taken by the Police  

which are either investigation after the stage of Section  

154 of  the Code or  termed as ‘Preliminary Inquiry’  and  

which are prior to the registration of FIR, even though, no  

entry in  the General  Diary/Station Diary/Daily  Diary  has  

been made.  

78) Though there is  reference to the term ‘preliminary  

inquiry’ and ‘inquiry’ under Sections 159 and Sections 202  

and 340 of the Code, that is a judicial exercise undertaken  

by the Court and not by the Police and is not relevant for  

the purpose of the present reference.  

79) Besides, learned senior counsel relied on the special  

procedures prescribed under the CBI manual to be read  

into Section 154. It is true that the concept of “preliminary  

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inquiry” is contained in Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of  

the CBI. However, this Crime Manual is not a statute and  

has  not  been  enacted  by  the  legislature.  It  is  a  set  of  

administrative orders issued for internal guidance of the  

CBI officers. It cannot supersede the Code. Moreover, in  

the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Code  

itself, the provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be  

relied upon to import the concept of holding of preliminary  

inquiry in the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  

At this juncture, it is also pertinent to submit that the CBI  

is  constituted  under  a  Special  Act,  namely,  the  Delhi  

Special  Police Establishment  Act,  1946 and it  derive its  

power to investigate from this Act.

80) It may be submitted that Sections 4(2) and 5 of the  

Code permit special procedures to be followed for special  

Acts. Section 4 of the Code lays down as under:

“Section  4. Trial  of  offences  under  the  Indian  Penal  Code and other laws. (1) All offences under the Indian Penal  Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried,  and  otherwise  dealt  with  according  to  the  provisions  hereinafter contained.

(2)  All  offences  under  any  other  law  shall  be  investigated,  inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the  same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time  being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating,  inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”

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It is thus clear that for offences under laws other than IPC,  

different provisions can be laid down under a special Act  

to regulate the investigation, inquiry,  trial  etc.,  of those  

offences. Section 4(2) of the Code protects such special  

provisions.

81) Moreover, Section 5 of the Code lays down as under:

“Section 5. Saving - Nothing contained in this Code shall, in  the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any  special or local law for the time being in force, or any special  jurisdiction  or  power  conferred,  or  any  special  form  of  procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in  force.”

Thus, special provisions contained in the DSPE Act relating  

to the powers of the CBI are protected also by Section 5 of  

the Code.

82) In view of the above specific provisions in the Code,  

the  powers  of  the  CBI  under  the  DSPE  Act,  cannot  be  

equated with the powers of the regular State Police under  

the Code.

Significance  and  Compelling  reasons  for  registration of FIR at the earliest

83) The object sought to be achieved by registering the  

earliest information as FIR is inter alia two fold: one, that  

the  criminal  process  is  set  into  motion  and  is  well  

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documented  from the  very  start;  and  second,  that  the  

earliest information received in relation to the commission  

of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot be  

any embellishment etc., later.

84) Principles of democracy and liberty demand a regular  

and efficient check on police powers.  One way of keeping  

check on authorities with such powers is by documenting  

every  action  of  theirs.   Accordingly,  under  the  Code,  

actions of the police etc., are provided to be written and  

documented.  For example, in case of arrest under Section  

41(1)(b) of the Code, arrest memo along with the grounds  

has to be in writing mandatorily; under Section 55 of the  

Code, if an officer is deputed to make an arrest, then the  

superior officer has to write down and record the offence  

etc., for which the person is to be arrested; under Section  

91 of the Code, a written order has to be passed by the  

concerned officer to seek documents; under Section 160  

of  the  Code,  a  written  notice  has  to  be  issued  to  the  

witness so that he can be called for recording of his/her  

statement, seizure memo/panchnama has to be drawn for  

every article seized etc.

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85) The  police  is  required  to  maintain  several  records  

including Case Diary as provided under Section 172 of the  

Code, General Diary as provided under Section 44 of the  

Police  Act  etc.,  which  helps  in  documenting  every  

information collected, spot visited and all  the actions of  

the  police  officers  so  that  their  activities  can  be  

documented.   Moreover,  every  information  received  

relating to commission of  a  non-cognizable offence also  

has to be registered under Section 155 of the Code.

86) The underpinnings of compulsory registration of FIR  

is not only to ensure transparency in the criminal justice  

delivery  system  but  also  to  ensure  ‘judicial  oversight’.  

Section 157(1)  deploys  the word ‘forthwith’.   Thus,  any  

information  received  under  Section  154(1)  or  otherwise  

has to be duly informed in the form of  a report  to  the  

Magistrate.  Thus, the commission of a cognizable offence  

is not only brought to the knowledge of the investigating  

agency but also to the subordinate judiciary.

87) The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs.  The duly  

signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the informant to the  

concerned officer at the police station.  The second kind of  

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FIR could be which is registered by the police itself on any  

information received or other than by way of an informant  

[Section 157(1)] and even this information has to be duly  

recorded and the copy should be sent to the Magistrate  

forthwith.   

88) The  registration  of  FIR  either  on  the  basis  of  the  

information  furnished  by  the  informant  under  Section  

154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of  

the Code is obligatory.  The obligation to register FIR has  

inherent advantages:

a)     It is the first step to ‘access to justice’ for a victim.

b) It  upholds  the  ‘Rule  of  Law’  inasmuch  as  the  

ordinary person brings forth the commission of a  

cognizable crime in the knowledge of the State.

c) It also facilitates swift investigation and sometimes  

even prevention of  the crime.   In  both cases,  it  

only effectuates the regime of law.   

d) It leads to less manipulation in criminal cases and  

lessens incidents of ‘ante-dates’ FIR or deliberately  

delayed FIR.

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89) In  Thulia Kali vs.  State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 3  

SCC 393, this Court held as under:-

“12…First information report in a criminal case is an  extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the  purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at  the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly  be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused.  The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report  to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to  obtain early information regarding the circumstances in  which  the  crime  was  committed,  the  names  of  the  actual culprits and the part played by them as well as  the  names  of  eyewitnesses  present  at  the  scene  of  occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report  quite often results in embellishment which is a creature  of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only  gets  bereft  of  the  advantage  of  spontaneity,  danger  creeps  in  of  the  introduction  of  coloured  version,  exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of  deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential  that  the  delay  in  the  lodging  of  the  first  information  report should be satisfactorily explained...”

90) In  Tapan  Kumar  Singh  (supra),  it  was  held  as  

under:-

“20. It is well settled that a first information report is  not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and  details  relating  to  the  offence  reported.  An  informant  may lodge a report about the commission of an offence  though he may not know the name of the victim or his  assailant.  He may not even know how the occurrence  took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an  eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all  aspects  of  the  offence  committed.  What  is  of  significance is that the information given must disclose  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  and  the  information  so  lodged  must  provide  a  basis  for  the  police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable  offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on  the  basis  of  the  information  given  suspects  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  and  not  that  he  must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence  

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has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on  the  basis  of  information  received,  that  a  cognizable  offence  may  have  been  committed,  he  is  bound  to  record the information and conduct an investigation. At  this  stage  it  is  also  not  necessary  for  him  to  satisfy  himself about the truthfulness of the information.  It  is  only after a complete investigation that he may be able  to  report  on  the  truthfulness  or  otherwise  of  the  information. Similarly, even if the information does not  furnish all the details he must find out those details in  the course of investigation and collect all the necessary  evidence.  The  information  given  disclosing  the  commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion  the investigative machinery,  with a view to collect  all  necessary  evidence,  and  thereafter  to  take  action  in  accordance  with  law.  The  true  test  is  whether  the  information furnished provides a reason to suspect the  commission  of  an  offence,  which  the  police  officer  concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code  to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record  the  information  and  proceed  to  investigate  the  case  either himself or depute any other competent officer to  conduct the investigation.  The question as to whether  the  report  is  true,  whether  it  discloses  full  details  regarding  the  manner  of  occurrence,  whether  the  accused  is  named,  and  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the  allegations  are  all  matters  which  are  alien  to  the  consideration  of  the  question  whether  the  report  discloses  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence.  Even  if  the  information  does  not  give  full  details  regarding  these  matters,  the  investigating  officer  is  not  absolved  of  his  duty  to  investigate the case and discover the true facts, if  he  can.”

91) In Madhu Bala (supra), this Court held:  

“6. Coming first to the relevant provisions of the Code,  Section  2(d)  defines  “complaint”  to  mean any allegation  made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his  taking action under the Code, that some person, whether  known or unknown has committed an offence, but does not  include  a  police  report.  Under  Section  2(c)  “cognizable  offence”  means  an  offence  for  which,  and  “cognizable  case”  means  a  case  in  which  a  police  officer  may  in  accordance with the First Schedule (of the Code) or under  any other law for the time being in force, arrest without a  warrant. Under Section 2(r) “police report” means a report  

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forwarded by a police officer  to a Magistrate under sub- section (2) of Section 173 of the Code. Chapter XII of the  Code comprising Sections 154 to 176 relates to information  to the police and their powers to investigate. Section 154  provides,  inter alia,  that the officer in charge of a police  station shall reduce into writing every information relating  to  the commission of  a  cognizable  offence given to  him  orally and every such information if given in writing shall  be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof  shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such  form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.  Section  156  of  the  Code  with  which  we  are  primarily  concerned in these appeals reads as under:….

9. The mode and manner of registration of such cases  are laid down in the Rules framed by the different State  Governments under the Indian Police Act, 1861. As in the  instant case we are concerned with Punjab Police Rules,  1934 (which are applicable to Punjab, Haryana, Himachal  Pradesh and Delhi) framed under the said Act we may now  refer  to  the  relevant  provisions  of  those  Rules.  Chapter  XXIV of the said Rules lays down the procedure an officer in  charge  of  a  police  station  has  to  follow  on  receipt  of  information  of  commission  of  crime.  Under  Rule  24.1  appearing  in  the  Chapter  every  information  covered  by  Section  154  of  the  Code  must  be  entered  in  the  First  Information Report Register and the substance thereof in  the daily diary. Rule 24.5 says that the First Information  Report  Register  shall  be a  printed book  in  Form 24.5(1)  consisting  of  200  pages  and  shall  be  completely  filled  before a new one is commenced. It  further requires that  the cases shall bear an annual serial number in each police  station for each calendar year. The other requirements of  the  said  Rules  need  not  be  detailed  as  they  have  no  relevance to the point at issue.

10. From  the  foregoing  discussion  it  is  evident  that  whenever  a  Magistrate  directs  an  investigation  on  a  “complaint” the police has to register a cognizable case on  that complaint  treating the same as the FIR and comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  above  Rules.  It,  therefore,  passes  our  comprehension  as  to  how the  direction  of  a  Magistrate asking the police to “register a case” makes an  order  of  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  legally  unsustainable. Indeed, even if a Magistrate does not pass a  direction to register a case, still in view of the provisions of  Section 156(1) of the Code which empowers the police to  investigate into a cognizable “case” and the Rules framed  under the Indian Police  Act,  1861 it  (the police)  is  duty- bound to formally register a case and then investigate into  

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the same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, do not in  any way stand in  the  way of  a  Magistrate  to  direct  the  police  to  register  a  case  at  the  police  station  and  then  investigate into the same. In our opinion when an order for  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  of  the  Code  is  to  be  made  the  proper  direction  to  the  police  would  be  “to  register a case at the police station treating the complaint  as  the  first  information  report  and  investigate  into  the  same”.

92) According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons,  

protection of the interests of the poor is clearly one of the  

main  objects  of  the  Code.   Making  registration  of  

information relating to commission of a cognizable offence  

mandatory would help the society, especially, the poor in  

rural and remote areas of the country.

93) The  Committee  on  Reforms  of  Criminal  Justice  

System headed by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath also noticed  

the plight faced by several people due to non-registration  

of  FIRs  and  recommended  that  action  should  be  taken  

against  police  officers  who  refuse  to  register  such  

information.  The Committee observed:-

“7.19.1  According  to  the  Section  154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  the  office  incharge  of  a  police  station is mandated to register every information oral or  written  relating  to  the  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence.  Non-registration of cases is a serious complaint  against the police.  The National Police Commission in  its 4th report lamented that the police “evade registering  cases  for  taking  up  investigation  where  specific  complaints are lodged at the police stations”.  It referred  to a study conducted by the Indian Institute of  Public  

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Opinion,  New Delhi  regarding  “Image of  the  Police  in  India” which observed that over 50% of the respondents  mention  non-registration  of  complaints  as  a  common  practice in police stations.

7.19.2 The Committee recommends that all complaints  should be registered promptly, failing which appropriate  action should be taken.  This would necessitate change  in the mind – set of the political executive and that of  senior officers.

7.19.4   There  are  two  more  aspects  relating  to  registration.  The first is minimization of offences by the  police  by way of  not  invoking  appropriate  sections  of  law.   We  disapprove  of  this  tendency.   Appropriate  sections  of  law  should  be  invoked  in  each  case  unmindfull  of  the  gravity  of  offences  involved.   The  second  issue  is  relating  to  the  registration  of  written  complaints.  There is an increasing tendency amongst  the police station officers to advise the informants, who  come  to  give  oral  complaints,  to  bring  written  complaints.   This  is  wrong.   Registration  is  delayed  resulting  in  valuable  loss  of  time  in  launching  the  investigation  and apprehension of  criminals.   Besides,  the  complainant  gets  an  opportunity  to  consult  his  friends, relatives and sometimes even lawyers and often  tends to exaggerate the crime and implicate innocent  persons.  This eventually has adverse effect at the trial.  The information should be reduced in writing by the SH,  if given orally, without any loss of time so that the first  version of the alleged crime comes on record.

7.20.11 It has come to the notice of the Committee that  even in cognizable cases quite often the Police officers  do  not  entertain  the  complaint  and  send  the  complainant  away  saying  that  the  offence  is  not  cognizable.   Sometimes the police twist facts to bring  the case within the cognizable category even though it  is non-cognizable, due to political or other pressures or  corruption.  This menace can be stopped by making it  obligatory  on  the  police  officer  to  register  every  complaint received by him.  Breach of this duty should  become an offence punishable in law to prevent misuse  of the power by the police officer.”

94) It  means that the number of FIRs not registered is  

approximately equivalent to the number of FIRs actually  

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registered.  Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show  

that about 60 lakh cognizable offences were registered in  

India during the year 2012, the burking of crime may itself  

be in the range of about 60 lakh every year.  Thus, it is  

seen that such a large number of FIRs are not registered  

every year, which is a clear violation of the rights of the  

victims of such a large number of crimes.   

95) Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in  

the short run; and also has a very negative impact on the  

rule  of  law  in  the  long  run  since  people  stop  having  

respect for rule of law.  Thus, non-registration of such a  

large number of FIRs leads to a definite lawlessness in the  

society.

96) Therefore,  reading  Section  154  in  any  other  form  

would not only be detrimental to the Scheme of the Code  

but also to the society as a whole. It is thus seen that this  

Court has repeatedly held in various decided cases that  

registration of FIR is mandatory if the information given to  

the police under Section 154 of  the Code discloses the  

commission of a cognizable offence.  

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Is there a likelihood of misuse of the provision?

97) Another,  stimulating argument  raised in  support  of  

preliminary inquiry is that mandatory registration of FIRs  

will  lead  to  arbitrary  arrest,  which  will  directly  be  in  

contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution.  

98) While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of the  

accused immediately  on registration of  FIR is  not  at  all  

mandatory.  In fact,  registration of FIR and arrest of an  

accused person are two entirely different concepts under  

the  law,  and  there  are  several  safeguards  available  

against arrest.  Moreover, it is also pertinent to mention  

that  an  accused  person  also  has  a  right  to  apply  for  

“anticipatory bail” under the provisions of Section 438 of  

the Code if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied.  

Thus, in appropriate cases, he can avoid the arrest under  

that provision by obtaining an order from the Court.

99) It is also relevant to note that in Joginder Kumar vs.  

State of U.P. & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 260, this Court has  

held that  arrest  cannot be made by police in  a routine  

manner.  Some important observations are reproduced as  

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under:-

“20…No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a  mere  allegation  of  commission  of  an  offence  made  against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer  in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights  of  a  citizen  and  perhaps  in  his  own  interest  that  no  arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction  reached after some investigation as to the genuineness  and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief  both as to the person’s complicity and even so as to the  need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a  serious  matter.  The  recommendations  of  the  Police  Commission  merely  reflect  the  constitutional  concomitants  of  the  fundamental  right  to  personal  liberty  and  freedom.  A  person  is  not  liable  to  arrest  merely  on  the  suspicion  of  complicity  in  an  offence.  There  must  be  some  reasonable  justification  in  the  opinion  of  the  officer  effecting  the  arrest  that  such  arrest  is  necessary  and  justified.  Except  in  heinous  offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer  issues notice to person to attend the Station House and  not to leave the Station without permission would do.”

100) The registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code  

and arrest of an accused person under Section 41 are two  

entirely different things.  It is not correct to say that just  

because  FIR  is  registered,  the  accused  person  can  be  

arrested  immediately.   It  is  the  imaginary  fear  that  

“merely because FIR has been registered, it would require  

arrest of the accused and thereby leading to loss of his  

reputation” and it should not be allowed by this Court to  

hold  that  registration  of  FIR  is  not  mandatory  to  avoid  

such inconvenience to some persons.  The remedy lies in  

strictly  enforcing  the  safeguards  available  against  

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arbitrary arrests made by the police and not in allowing  

the police to avoid mandatory registration of FIR when the  

information discloses commission of a cognizable offence.

101) This can also be seen from the fact that Section 151  

of the Code allows a police officer to arrest a person, even  

before the commission of a cognizable offence, in order to  

prevent the commission of  that  offence,  if  it  cannot be  

prevented otherwise.  Such preventive arrests can be valid  

for 24 hours.  However, a Maharashtra State amendment  

to Section 151 allows the custody of a person in that State  

even for up to a period of 30 days (with the order of the  

Judicial  Magistrate)  even before  a  cognizable  offence is  

committed  in  order  to  prevent  commission  of  such  

offence.  Thus, the arrest of a person and registration of  

FIR are not directly and/or irreversibly linked and they are  

entirely  different  concepts  operating  under  entirely  

different parameters.  On the other hand, if a police officer  

misuses his power of arrest, he can be tried and punished  

under Section 166.

102) Besides, the Code gives power to the police to close  

a  matter  both  before  and  after  investigation.   A  police  

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officer can foreclose an FIR before an investigation under  

Section 157 of the Code, if it appears to him that there is  

no sufficient ground to investigate the same.  The Section  

itself  states  that  a  police  officer  can  start  investigation  

when he has a ‘reason to suspect the commission of an   

offence’.   Therefore,  the  requirements  of  launching  an  

investigation under  Section 157 of  the Code are higher  

than the requirement under Section 154 of the Code.  The  

police officer  can  also,  in  a  given  case,  investigate  the  

matter and then file a final report under Section 173 of the  

Code seeking closure of the matter.  Therefore, the police  

is not liable to launch an investigation in every FIR which  

is mandatorily registered on receiving information relating  

to commission of a cognizable offence.

103) Likewise,  giving  power  to  the  police  to  close  an  

investigation,  Section  157  of  the  Code  also  acts  like  a  

check on the police to make sure that it is dispensing its  

function  of  investigating  cognizable  offences.   This  has  

been recorded in the 41st Report of the Law Commission of  

India on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as follows :

“14.1…….If the offence does not appear to be serious  

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and  if  the  station-house  officer  thinks  there  is  no  sufficient ground for starting an investigation, he need  not investigate but, here again, he has to send a report  to  the  Magistrate  who  can  direct  the  police  to  investigate,  or  if  the  Magistrate  thinks  fit,  hold  an  inquiry himself.”

“14.2.  A noticeable feature of  the scheme as outlined  above is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all  stages  of  the  police  investigation,  but  he  is  not  authorized to interfere with the actual investigation or to  direct  the  police  how  that  investigation  is  to  be  conducted.”

Therefore, the Scheme of the Code not only ensures that  

the time of the police should not be wasted on false and  

frivolous information but also that the police should not  

intentionally refrain from doing their duty of investigating  

cognizable  offences.  As  a  result,  the  apprehension  of  

misuse of the provision of mandatory registration of FIR is  

unfounded and speculative in nature.  

104) It is the stand of Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel  

for the State of Maharashtra that when an innocent person  

is  falsely  implicated,  he  not  only  suffers  from  loss  of  

reputation but also from mental tension and his personal  

liberty  is  seriously  impaired.  He  relied  on  the  Maneka  

Gandhi (supra), which held the proposition that the law  

which deprives a person of his personal liberty must be  

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reasonable both from the stand point  of  substantive as  

well as procedural aspect is now firmly established in our  

Constitutional law. Therefore, he pleaded for a fresh look  

at Section 154 of the Code, which interprets Section 154  

of the Code in conformity with the mandate of Article 21.

105)  It  is  true  that  a  delicate  balance  has  to  be  

maintained  between  the  interest  of  the  society  and  

protecting  the  liberty  of  an  individual.  As  already  

discussed above, there are already sufficient safeguards  

provided in the Code which duly protect the liberty of an  

individual in case of registration of false FIR. At the same  

time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in mind the interest  

of  the victim and the society.  Therefore,  we are of  the  

cogent  view  that  mandatory  registration  of  FIRs  under  

Section 154 of the Code will  not be in contravention of  

Article  21  of  the  Constitution  as  purported  by  various  

counsel.

Exceptions:

106) Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section  

154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of  

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FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offence, yet, there may be  

instances  where  preliminary  inquiry  may  be  required  

owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with  

the passage of time. One such instance is in the case of  

allegations relating to medical negligence on the part of  

doctors.  It  will  be unfair  and inequitable to prosecute a  

medical professional only on the basis of the allegations in  

the complaint.

107) In the context of medical negligence cases, in Jacob  

Mathew (supra), it was held by this Court as under:     

“51. We may not be understood as holding that doctors  can  never  be  prosecuted  for  an  offence  of  which  rashness  or  negligence  is  an  essential  ingredient.  All  that we are doing is to emphasise the need for care and  caution in the interest of society; for, the service which  the  medical  profession  renders  to  human  beings  is  probably the noblest of all, and hence there is a need for  protecting doctors from frivolous or unjust prosecutions.  Many a complainant prefer recourse to criminal process  as a tool  for  pressurising the medical  professional  for  extracting  uncalled  for  or  unjust  compensation.  Such  malicious proceedings have to be guarded against.

52. Statutory  rules  or  executive  instructions  incorporating certain guidelines need to be framed and  issued  by  the  Government  of  India  and/or  the  State  Governments in consultation with the Medical Council of  India. So long as it is not done, we propose to lay down  certain guidelines for the future which should govern the  prosecution  of  doctors  for  offences  of  which  criminal  rashness  or  criminal  negligence  is  an  ingredient.  A  private  complaint  may  not  be  entertained  unless  the  complainant has produced  prima facie evidence before  the  court  in  the  form  of  a  credible  opinion  given  by  

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another  competent  doctor  to  support  the  charge  of  rashness  or  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  accused  doctor.  The  investigating  officer  should,  before  proceeding  against  the  doctor  accused  of  rash  or  negligent  act  or  omission,  obtain an independent  and  competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in  government service, qualified in that branch of medical  practice  who  can  normally  be  expected  to  give  an  impartial and unbiased opinion applying the Bolam9 test  to  the  facts  collected  in  the  investigation.  A  doctor  accused of rashness or negligence, may not be arrested  in a routine manner (simply because a charge has been  levelled against him). Unless his arrest is necessary for  furthering the investigation or for collecting evidence or  unless the investigating officer  feels satisfied that the  doctor  proceeded  against  would  not  make  himself  available  to  face  the  prosecution  unless  arrested,  the  arrest may be withheld.”

108) In the context of offences relating to corruption, this  

Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) expressed the need for a  

preliminary  inquiry  before  proceeding  against  public  

servants.  

109) Similarly,  in  Tapan  Kumar  Singh  (supra),  this  

Court  has  validated  a  preliminary  inquiry  prior  to  

registering an FIR only on the ground that at the time the  

first information is received, the same does not disclose a  

cognizable offence.

110) Therefore,  in  view  of  various  counter  claims  

regarding  registration  or  non-registration,  what  is  

necessary is only that the information given to the police  

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must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.  In  

such  a  situation,  registration  of  an  FIR  is  mandatory.  

However,  if  no  cognizable  offence  is  made  out  in  the  

information  given,  then the  FIR  need  not  be  registered  

immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of  

preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose  

of  ascertaining  as  to  whether  a  cognizable  offence  has  

been  committed.   But,  if  the  information  given  clearly  

mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is  

no  other  option  but  to  register  an  FIR  forthwith.  Other  

considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration  

of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given,  

whether  the  information  is  genuine,  whether  the  

information is credible etc.  These are the issues that have  

to be verified during the investigation of the FIR.  At the  

stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely  

whether  the  information  given  ex  facie discloses  the  

commission of a cognizable offence.  If, after investigation,  

the information given is found to be false, there is always  

an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false  

FIR.   

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Conclusion/Directions:

111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154  

of  the  Code,  if  the  information  discloses  

commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  and  no  

preliminary  inquiry  is  permissible  in  such  a  

situation.

(ii) If  the  information  received  does  not  disclose  a  

cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for  

an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted  

only  to  ascertain  whether  cognizable  offence  is  

disclosed or not.

(iii)  If  the  inquiry  discloses  the  commission  of  a  

cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered.  In  

cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the  

complaint,  a  copy  of  the  entry  of  such  closure  

must be supplied to the first informant forthwith  

and  not  later  than  one  week.   It  must  disclose  

reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not  

proceeding further.

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(iv) The  police  officer  cannot  avoid  his  duty  of  

registering  offence  if  cognizable  offence  is  

disclosed.  Action  must  be  taken  against  erring  

officers who do not register the FIR if information  

received by him discloses a cognizable offence.  

(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the  

veracity or otherwise of the information received  

but  only  to  ascertain  whether  the  information  

reveals any cognizable offence.  

(vi) As  to  what  type and in  which  cases preliminary  

inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts  

and circumstances of each case.  The category of  

cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made  

are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in  

initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over  

3 months delay in reporting the matter without  

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satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.

The  aforesaid  are  only  illustrations  and  not  

exhaustive  of  all  conditions  which  may  warrant  

preliminary inquiry.

(vii) While  ensuring  and  protecting  the  rights  of  the  

accused  and  the  complainant,  a  preliminary  

inquiry  should  be  made  time  bound  and  in  any  

case it should not exceed 7 days.  The fact of such  

delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the  

General Diary entry.

(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is  

the record of all  information received in a police  

station,  we direct that all  information relating to  

cognizable  offences,  whether  resulting  in  

registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be  

mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said  

Diary  and the  decision  to  conduct  a  preliminary  

inquiry  must  also  be  reflected,  as  mentioned  

above.

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112) With  the  above  directions,  we  dispose  of  the  

reference  made  to  us.   List  all  the  matters  before  the  

appropriate Bench for disposal on merits.

………………………………CJI.                  (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….……………………J.                     (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)                                

     ………….………………………J.                  (RANJANA PRAKASH  

DESAI)                                   

……….………………………J.                     (RANJAN GOGOI)    

                                       ………….……………………J.      

              (S.A. BOBDE)                                   

NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 12, 2013.

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