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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 677 OF 2010

KUNA @ SANJAYA BEHERA ….APPELLANT

versus

THE STATE OF ODISHA ….RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T  

AMITAVA ROY, J.

The  appellant,  successively  convicted   by  both  the

courts below  along with one Pravati Behera under Section 302 of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860  (for Short, hereinafter to be referred

to as “IPC/Code”)  along with Section 34 of the Code is in appeal

seeking  remedial intervention.   

2. Whereas  the Trial Court  by the judgment and order

dated 26.1.2001, as stated hereinbefore,  convicted the appellant

and the co-accused Pravati Behera, the High Court by the verdict

impugned,  though has affirmed the conviction of both, had left

the co-accused at liberty to move an application for premature

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release from the jail and for appropriate orders under Sections

433  and  433-A  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for

short, hereinafter to  be referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).  Noticeably,  the

appellant and co-accused had been charged along with Section

302 IPC for  the  offence  under  Section 203  as  well  but  were

acquitted  thereof   by  the  Trial  Court.  Though  an  appeal  was

preferred by the State against such acquittal,  the High Court has

affirmed their  exoneration as well.

3. We have heard Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior

counsel  for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  Shibashish  Misra  for  the

respondent.  

4. The  prosecution   case   unfolds   with  a  written

information lodged by Premananda Behra (PW12) with the police

on 20.2.2000,  whereby  the  unnatural  death   of   his  brother

Santosh Behera by hanging  from the roof of a shed adjacent to

his  (deceased)  house,  was  reported.    In  the  course  of  the

investigation,   following  the  registration  of  said  information,

Niranjan Behera (PW1) disclosed to Daitari Behera (PW5) that the

appellant  along with the co-accused Pravati Behera had  in the

intervening night of 19/20.2.2000 murdered  the deceased in his

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house and  thereafter  had suspended his dead body from the

roof  of   the  nearby shed.  PW1 claimed to  have  witnessed the

incident  of  murder.    Following  this  information,   the

investigation  took   a  different  turn.    The  appellant  and  the

co-accused were arrested and eventually, charge-sheet was laid

against them.

5. Notably, on 26.2.2000, Gunahari Behera   (PW6) and

Makhan  Behera  (PW8)   also  came  to  the  police  station  and

reported   that   PW1  had  disclosed  to  them  as  well  to  have

witnessed the appellant and the co-accused committing murder

of  Santosh  Behera  (deceased)  in  his  house  and  thereafter,

hanging the dead body from the roof of the nearby shed.   The

investigating  officer   in  the  process  of  investigation,  amongst

others caused the inquest of the dead body to be made, prepared

a spot map Ex. P-11,  effected seizure, amongst others inter alia

of a rope and  also got the post-mortem of the dead body done

before submitting the charge-sheet as  mentioned hereinabove.

The  formal  FIR   was  registered  on  26.2.2000  under  Sections

302/203 read with Section 34 IPC.

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6. At the trial,  the accused persons were charged under

Sections 302/203/34 IPC.  They having denied the allegations,

were made to stand trial.  The prosecution examined as many as

16 witnesses,  and after  recording the statements  of the accused

persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and on a consideration of the

materials on record, the Trial Court  convicted the appellant and

co-accused under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 of the

Code and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and

to pay fine of Rs. 100/-,  in default to suffer R.I. for 30 days.    

7. In recording the conviction, the Trial Court laid utmost

emphasis  on the testimony of PW1, who apart from narrating the

incident  of  murder,  also  deposed  about  the  extra-marital

relationship  between  the  accused  persons,  though  they  were

related as  nephew and aunt.  Reliance was also placed on the

evidence  of  Musimani   Behera  (PW3),   the  mother  of   the

deceased,  who,    perceived  to  have  hinted  at  well  to  this

unacceptable  liaison.  The  Trial Court noted the   opinion  of Dr.

Rupabhanu  Mishra  (PW11),  who  conducted  the  post-mortem

examination  that   the  cause  of  death  of  Santosh  Behera  was

asphyxia as a result of  constriction of the neck and not due to

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hanging  by  rope.   The  Trial  Court,  however   discarded  the

prosecution  case   of   illicit  relationship  between  the  accused

persons and  the motive of murder stemming therefrom.    It was

however  of  the  view  that  lack  of  motive  notwithstanding,  the

testimony of PW1, PW5, PW6 and PW8 taken together proved the

charge against the accused persons and, therefore,  returned the

finding of guilt against them, qua the offences for which they had

been charged.  

8. Both the appellant and co-accused preferred separate

appeals before the High Court and as hereinbefore stated, by the

decision assailed, their conviction under Section 302/34 IPC and

the sentence  awarded thereupon was affirmed. The High Court,

in determining so, sustained  the prosecution’s plea of motive of

murder   founded  on  extra-marital  relationship  between  the

accused  persons  and  arrived  at  the  conclusion   drawing

sustenance from the evidence of PW1  as well as PW3, the mother

of the deceased, who testified to have rebuked both of them  for

their  deplorable  conduct. The High Court, as well  believed  the

version  of the incident, as narrated by PW1 and  disclosed  to

PW5, PW6 and  PW8 albeit  after a lapse of three days. The High

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Court  accepted  the  explanation  of  PW1 for  the  delay  in  such

disclosure  that  the  appellant  had  threatened  him  with  dire

consequences, if he did so.  

9. Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the

appellant has emphatically urged  that as the testimony of PW1,

the sole  eye witness,  as claimed by the prosecution,  is  wholly

unbelievable,  the conviction of the appellant is palpably illegal

and is liable to set-aside.  Apart from contending that  the FIR

filed   after  six  days  of  the  incident  was  inexplicably  delayed

rendering  the  prosecution  case  unworthy  of  any  credit,  the

learned senior  counsel   maintained that  the  High Court   has

grossly erred in accepting  that  the  motive  behind the murder

was  the  illicit  relationship  between  the  accused  persons,

necessitating the elimination of the deceased.  The learned senior

counsel  was  particularly  critical  of  the  unnatural  conduct  of

PW1, who    incomprehensibly remained indifferent and silent

though  his  uncle  was  murdered  in  his  view   and  that   the

incident, according to him,  ranged for about an hour. Further,

his  unexplained  silence   about  the  gruesome  murder  by  the

accused persons for about three days also rendered him  wholly

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untrustworthy, he urged.  Mr. Krishnan argued as well that not

only PW1 at the relevant time was admittedly  in an intoxicated

state, his presence at the place of occurrence was not free from

doubt. The learned senior counsel underlined that it being in the

evidence  that  there were several houses of the close relatives  of

the deceased and PW1  in the locality,  the claim of PW1 to be a

silent eye witness to the incident, is wholly unbelievable.   The

learned senior counsel insisted as well  that  in absence of any

material on record that  the area was sufficiently lighted,  it was

wholly unacceptable that PW1 could see the incident from his

house at a distance   of 15 cubits.  In the attendant facts and

circumstances, Mr. Venugopal maintained that  the conviction of

the  appellant  on  the  testimony  of  a  solitary  witness,  whose

version  was  laden  with  inconsistencies,  absurdities,   and

improbabilities, is patently illegal and cannot, in any view of the

matter, be sustained in law.   He discarded the evidence of  PW5,

PW6  and  PW8,  relied  upon  by  the  two  courts  below,  on  the

ground that their testimonies were wholly inconsequential being

in the nature of “hearsay”, they having derived the knowledge of

the  incident  from  PW1,  as  reported  to  them  by  him.   Mr.

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Venugopal  has urged that if the version of PW1 is  disbelieved,

as it ought to be, in view of the  inherent  incongruities,  the

other materials on record do not unerringly evince the complicity

of the accused persons in the offence and thus, the appellant  is

liable  to  be  acquitted.   He  argued  as  well  that  the  injuries

enumerated  in  the  inquest  report  and  the  medical

evidence/post-mortem  report,   also  are  inconsistent  and

contradictory   in  description,  thus  rendering  the  prosecution

version  highly  improbable.    The  learned  counsel  emphasised

that the evidence on record by no means convincingly establish

the  illicit relationship between the accused persons and that the

High Court did fall in error  in accepting the same.  The following

decisions were cited in endorsement of  the arguments advanced.

1. Anil Phukhan vs. State of Assam1   

2. Ramji  Surya  Padvi  and  Another  vs.   State  of

Maharashtra2  

3    Chuhar Singh vs. State of Haryana3  

1 (1993) 3 SCC 282 2 (1983) 3 SCC 629 3 (1976) 1 SCC 879

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4. State of A.P. vs. Patnam Anandam4  

5. Mahamadkhan Nathekhan vs. State of Gujarat5  

6. Budha Satya Venkata S.  Rao and Others vs.  State of

A.P.6   

7. Niranjan Panja vs. State of West Bengal7   

8. Nagraj  vs.  State  represented  by  Inspector  of  Police,

Salem Town, Tamil Nadu8   

10. In  refutation,  the  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-state has asserted that the evidence of the  sole eye

witness  PW1  is  coherent,  consistent  and  cogent  and  is  fully

complemented by medical evidence  and thus  the prosecution

having  been  able  to  prove  the  charge  beyond  all  reasonable

doubt,   the conviction and sentence  of  the appellant and his

co-accused does not merit interference.     Having regard to the

vivid narration of the incident in minute details, as provided by

PW1,  the  courts below were perfectly justified in relying on his

sole testimony, he urged.   As the medical evidence,  mentioning

4 (2005) 9 SCC 237 5 (2014) 14 SCC 589 6 1994 Supp(3) SCC 639 7 (2010) 6 SCC 525 8 (2015) 4 SCC 739

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the cause of  death,   is  wholly  corroborative   of  the version of

PW1, there is no scope to doubt the culpability of the accused

persons, he argued.  The learned counsel dismissed  the demur

of  the  defence   that  the  evidence  of  PW1  was  vitiated  by

contradictions, embellishments and inconsistencies.   According

to Mr. Misra, the  statement  on oath of  PW1 is amply supported

by  that of  Kumari Nomita Behera (PW2),  the daughter of  the

deceased and PW12, who,  in the next morning,  did detect  the

dead body of the deceased in a hanging posture  from the roof of

the adjacent shed, as deposed by PW1.   As the  testimony of

PW1  together with that of   PW3, the mother of  the deceased

persuasively  prove  the  illicit  relationship  between the  accused

persons, the High Court was justified in accepting the same to be

the  motive  for  the  offence,  in  the  attendant  facts  and

circumstances of the case, he insisted.  The learned counsel for

the respondent urged  that as PW1 had been threatened with

death by the appellant,  if he dared to disclose  the commission of

offence,  the delay on the part of the witness (PW1) to confide

about the same  in PW5, PW6 and PW8 after three days and the

filing  of  the  FIR   after  six  days  per  se,   is  not  fatal  for  the

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prosecution.  The decision of this Court  in  Gulam Sarbar vs.

State of Bihar9  was cited   to reinforce  the contention that

when  ocular  evidence   is  in  conformity   with  the  medical

evidence,  conviction based thereon  is legal and valid.   

11. To appropriately appreciate the  competing assertions,

it is expedient to evaluate  the evidence having a direct bearing

on  the  offence   allegedly  committed  for  the  offence   involved.

PW1, who is the cousin brother of the appellant and incidentally

the nephew of the co-accused Pravati Behera, deposed on oath

that  there  was  a  lingering  love  affair  between  the   accused

persons from before the occurrence and that  he had seen them

in a  compromising  position  in  the  house  of  the  deceased,  six

months'  prior  to  the  incident.   The  witness  stated  that   he

informed about this to the mother of the deceased, who rebuked

the accused persons. He stated that in the night of occurrence at

9.30 p.m., he had gone  to witness a video show in the village,

where the children of Parvati  Behra, the co-accused were also

present.  According  to  him,  in  the  course  of  the  show,  the

appellant asked him to accompany him for liquor  and though

9 (2014) 3 SCC 401

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the witness initially resisted, he eventually  left the video show

with the appellant.  He stated further that  they then went to the

house of Baisakhu Behera, where the appellant purchased liquor

and consumed the same and forced the witness as well to drink.

The  witness  stated  that    they  then  proceeded  towards  their

respective homes and when they were nearing  their houses, the

appellant  concealed  himself  in  a  lane  near  the  house  of  the

witness. PW1 stated  that at that time, he saw the deceased and

Pravati Behera coming out of their house to ease themselves.  On

their way back to the house, Pravati Behera  entered first and

when the deceased was about to enter, the appellant struck him

twice from the back, as a result of which, he (deceased) fell down.

According to the witness, the appellant sat on the chest of the

deceased and pressed his neck by his hands and Pravati Behera

covered his  mouth  with her hands, as a result of  which the

deceased soon became suffocated and died. The witness stated

that  thereafter  the  accused  persons  brought  a  rope,  tied  it

around the neck of the deceased  and suspended the dead body

from the roof of the  adjacent shed.  Thereafter,  the appellant

locked Pravati Behera in the house from outside and threatened

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to kill him, if  he disclosed the offence to anyone, whereafter the

witness  returned  home.  PW1  stated  that  it  was  three  days

thereafter that he narrated the incident to PW5, PW6 and PW8.

12. In cross-examination,  the witness  in substance stated

that  his  house,  that of  the deceased,  PW12 and other relatives

were located nearby and that the courtyard in between his house

and  that  of  the  deceased   measured  about  15  cubits  .  The

witness  conceded  that  there  were  about  150  to  200  houses

adjacent to his house, situated at a distance of 20 to 25 cubits.

He  further  stated  that   at  that  point  of  time,  he  was  little

intoxicated,  and   he  was  then   inside  his  compound.  PW1

deposed as well  that  though the occurrence took place for about

an  hour,  he  did  not  raise  any  alarm asking  for   help.    He

admitted that on the next day, though about 5000 people had

gathered, he did not disclose the incident either to them or to the

police.  He however sought to explain his conduct by stating  that

he did not do so as he had been threatened by the appellant but

after three days, he gathered courage and informed PW5, PW6

and PW8 of the incident.

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13  PW3, the mother of the deceased  deposed that she had

rebuked the accused persons on several occasions on noticing

“secret talks' between them. The testimony of PW5 and  PW6   in

essence   is  that  on  20.2.2000,   PW1  disclosed  to  them  the

incident and the fact that he had witnessed the same.   PW8

stated that about 5/6 days after  the incident,  when he asked

PW1 about  the  same,   he  disclosed  to  him stating  that   the

appellant  and Pravati Behera had committed murder of Santosh

Behera.  To all these three witnesses, as stated by them, PW1

disclosed in sequence the facts, as narrated by him on oath.  

14. Dr.  Rupabhanu  Mishra  (PW11),  who  performed  the

post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased had

apart from mentioning the external injuries by way of abrasions

etc. opined  that  death was due to asphyxia by pressing of neck

and  was not due to hanging by rope.  PW12,  as  already alluded

to hereinabove, stated on oath that on 20.2.2000, he had gone to

the house of  the deceased to hand over the keys of his Sweet

Meat Shop, where the deceased was employed, but was told by

his wife from inside the house that he (deceased) had gone out by

locking the door from outside. The witness stated that  it was

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then 5/5.30 a.m. and when he returned  with his torch light, he

detected the dead body of Santosh Behera hanging from the roof

of adjacent shed by a rope. He then  requested PW5 to write a

report   which he thereafter lodged with the police.  S.I. Narendra

Kumar  Sarangi  (PW16)  is  the  Investigating  Officer,  who

enumerated the steps taken by him during the investigation and

proved  amongst others Ex P-11, the spot map.   

15. The  accused  persons   in  response  to  the  questions,

laying  the  incriminating  evidence  against  them  denied  the

correctness thereof and stood by their plea of innocence.      

16. Before recording  the final conclusions on the basis of

the evidence on record,  beneficial it would be to briefly note the

legal propositions  enunciated in the authorities cited at the Bar.  

17. That   conviction  can be  based  on a   testimony  of  a

single eye witness if he or she passes the test of reliability and

that it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of evidence

that  is  important,  have  been propounded consistently  in  Anil

Phukhan1,  Ramji  Surya2,   Patnam Anandam4 and  Gulam

Sarbar9 with  the  apparent  emphasis  that  evidence  must  be

weighed and not counted, decisive test being whether it  has a

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ring of truth and it is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise.

18. That in a case where the charge is sought to be proved

only on circumstantial evidence,  motive plays an important part

in order to tilt  the scale was, amongst others  underscored in

Mohmadkhan Nathekhan5

19. With reference to Section 3 of the Evidence Act,  which

defines  “proved”,  “disproved”  and  “not  proved”,  this  Court  in

Lokeman  Shah  and  another  vs.   State  of  West  Bengal10

recalled  its  observations  in  M. Narsinga  Rao vs.  State of

A.P., 2001 Crl.L.J. 515 as hereinbelow:

“A  fact  is  said  to  be  proved  when,  after considering  the  matters  before  it,  the  court either  believes  it  to  exist  or  considers  its existence  so  probable  that  a  prudent  man ought under the circumstances of a particular case,  to  act  upon  the  supposition  that  it exists,  (vide  Section  3  of  the  Evidence  Act). What is required  is materials on which the court  can  reasonably  act  for  reaching  the supposition that a certain fact exists.  Proof of the  fact  depends  upon  the  degree  of probability of its having existed.  The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a  prudent  man  acting  on  any  important matter concerning him.”

20.     Prior thereto, in Vijayee Singh and others vs. State of 10 AIR 2001 SC 1760

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U.P.11, this Court dwelling on the same theme, had  recorded the

following exposition:

“28.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  concept  of ‘reasonable doubt’ is vague in nature and the standard  of  ‘burden  of  proof’  contemplated under  Section  105  should  be  somewhat specific,  therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile both.  But  the  general  principles  of  criminal jurisprudence,  namely,  that  the  prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of  a  reasonable  doubt,  are  to  be  borne  in mind.  The  ‘reasonable  doubt’  is  one  which occurs  to  a  prudent  and  reasonable  man. Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved” lays  down  the  standard  of  proof,  namely, about  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the circumstances  from  the  point  of  view  of  a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of  a fact,  in other words, “believe it to exist” and secondly  in  which  though  he  may  not  feel absolutely  certain  of  a  fact,  he  thinks  it  so extremely probable that a prudent man would under  the  circumstances  act  on  the assumption  of  its  existence.  The  Act  while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to  measure  proof  at  the  same  time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances  or  condition  of  probability  or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to

11 (1990) 3 SCC 190

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be disproved when the court believes that  it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and now we come to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved i.e.  neither  proved  nor  disproved.  It  is  this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal  recognition  in  the  field  of  criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction  and  it  is  also  different  from  a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of  the  entire  material  on record by ‘a prudent man’.”

21. The  quintessence  of  the  enunciation  is   that   the

expression “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”, lays down the

standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence

of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man, so

much  so  that  while  adopting  the  said  requirement,   as  an

appropriate concrete standard to measure “proof”, full effect has

to be given to the circumstances or conditions of probability or

improbability.   It has been expounded that it is this degree of

certainty,   existence  of  which   should  be  arrived  at  from the

attendant circumstances, before a fact can be said to be proved.  

22. It is on the touchstone  of this legal exposition  that the

evidence in the case in hand, has to be appreciated. Admittedly,

PW1 is the solitary eye witness to the incident.  He is related both

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to  the  deceased  and  the  accused-appellant.   Whereas  the

deceased is his uncle, the appellant is his cousin brother.   He

claims to have accompanied the appellant from the video show

till  the  place  of  occurrence.   At  the  relevant  time,  he  was

admittedly  intoxicated.  The  incident,  as  per  the  prosecution

version,  occurred between 1 a.m. to 2 a.m. in the  intervening

night of 19/20.2.2000 in the house  of the deceased which was

located  about 15 cubits from the compound where the house of

PW1 was situated . The spot map Ex. P-11  prepared by the I.O.

(PW16) noticeably does not mention about any source of light in

the locality. It does not even indicate  as to whether  the area was

lighted at the time of incident so as to  make  the viewing of the

incident possible by PW1 from the place, where he was located.

It is intriguing  that though PW1 claimed that the  duration of the

the incident was about one hour and that the appellant first did

assault  the deceased from behind twice on which he (deceased)

fell down, whereafter he (appellant) sat on his chest and throttled

him and that co-accused Pravati Behera  covered the mouth of

deceased to facilitate his suffocation to death, he did not utter a

sound or make a shriek   or raise any alarm either to  prevent the

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occurrence or to muster assistance from the inhabitants in the

locality. This is more so as he admitted that there were about 150

to 200 inhabitants, lodging nearby apart from the fact that the

houses  of his relatives as well of the deceased were almost in the

same campus. His plea that  he did not disclose the incident to

others  immediately as he had been threatened by the appellant

does  not  explain  or  justify  in  any  manner  whatsoever  his

inexplicable silence or indifference during the time of commission

of occurrence. In the overall scenario, the plea of the defence that

the evidence  of PW1 is highly improbable, absurd and doubtful,

cannot be lightly brush aside  more particularly in view of  the

test of essentiality of the degree of certainty, necessary  to accept

that  the facts narrated by this witness as proved.  To recall, the

incident  at  the  first  place  had  been  registered   as  a  case  of

unnatural  death  and  was  after  six  days  of  the  occurrence

converted into one under Sections 302/203/34 IPC against the

appellant and the co-accused on the disclosures made by PW1,

PW5, PW6 and PW8.  Apart from the fact that testimony of PW5,

PW6 and PW8 can by no means be construed to be substantive

in nature,  these  witnesses  having derived the  knowledge  from

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PW1,  we are inclined to accept the analysis of the materials on

record on the aspect of motive as made by the Trial Court.

23. The  testimony  of  PW1  with  regard  to  the  illicit

relationship  between the accused persons, his revelation to the

mother of the deceased that he and the co-accused were seen in

a compromising position in their house with the door open and

the  reprimand of the mother (PW3) for the “secret talks” between

them (accused persons) lack in persuasion to conclude   that the

prosecution  had  been  able  to  prove  such  relationship   and

therefore,  the  motive   for  the  murder  by  them.   The  medical

evidence to the effect that death had occurred by asphyxia as a

result of constriction of the neck and not due to hanging by rope,

though conforms to the manner of execution of  the offence, as

narrated by  PW1,   in  view of  inherent    improbabilities   and

incongruities in his evidence, we do not consider it safe  to base

the  conviction  of  the  appellant   and the  co-accused thereon.

Dehors   testimony  of  PW1,  and  the  motive  as  alleged  by  the

prosecution,  there is no other tangible and clinching material on

record in support of  the charge against the appellant  and the

co-accused.  The inference of motive by the High Court drawn

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from the evidence of PW1 and PW3,  in the  overall perspective as

discussed hereinabove, is apparently flawed.       

24. On a totality of  the consideration of all  relevant facts

and circumstances, we are of the unhesitant  opinion  that the

evidence of PW1, as a witness of incident of murder, as projected

by  him  is  wholly  unacceptable  being   fraught  with

improbabilities, doubts and oddities inconceivable  with normal

human conduct or behaviour and, thus cannot be acted upon  as

the basis of conviction.  The testimonies of PW3, PW5, PW6, PW8

and PW11,  even if  taken on their  face value,  fall  short  of  the

requirement of proof of the charge beyond all reasonable doubt.

The appellant and the co-accused are thus entitled to the benefit

of doubt in the singular  facts and circumstances of the case.

The  contrary  view  taken  by  the  courts  below   is  against  the

weight  of  the  evidence  on  record  and   the  exposition  of  law

attested  by  the  decisions  cited  at  the  Bar  and   traversed  as

hereinabove.

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25. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. As a

consequence, the  appellant  is acquitted and is ordered to be set

at liberty if not required in connection with any other case.  

….....................................J. [N.V. RAMANA ]

…....................................J. [AMITAVA ROY ]

NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 17, 2017.