14 December 2012
Supreme Court
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KUMAR ETC.ETC. Vs KARNATAKA INDUSL.COOP.BANK LTD.

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002049-002066 / 2012
Diary number: 17249 / 2011
Advocates: SHANKAR DIVATE Vs


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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA             CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION         CRIMINAL  APPEAL  No.2049-2066  of  2012

       (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5206-5223 of 2011)

Kumar Etc. Etc.      ...Appellant  Versus

Karnataka Industrial Coop. Bank Ltd. & Anr    …Respondents  

 J  U  D  G  M  E  N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Leave granted in each of the Special Leave Petitions.

2. The appellants who have been acquitted of the charges  

under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian  

Penal  code  have  filed  the  instant  appeals  challenging  the  

conviction  ordered  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  in  the

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exercise of its Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397 read  

with  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.   The  

appellant  in  each  of  the  appeals  has  been  sentenced  to  

undergo R.I. for three months for the offence punishable under  

Section 406 IPC and R.I for six months for the offence under  

Section 420 IPC. While both the sentences of imprisonment  

are to run concurrently, each of the appellants has also been  

sentenced to pay fine or undergo the default sentence that  

has been imposed.   

3. The facts lie within a short compass and may be briefly  

enumerated herein under.    

The  respondent  No.  1  in  each  of  these  appeals  i.e.  

Karnataka Industrial Corporation Bank Ltd., Hubli (hereinafter  

shall  be  referred  to  ‘the  complainant  Bank’)  had  filed  18  

different complaints in the Court of Judicial  Magistrate, First  

Class, Hubli alleging that between 12.07.2003 and 31.03.2004  

loans were taken by each of the  appellants  by mortgaging  

gold  ornaments.  According  to  the  complainant  Bank,  on  

10.06.2004,  a  news  item  had  appeared  in  the  local  

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newspapers that the appraiser of Maratha Cooperative Bank  

had given false appraisal  reports on the basis of which the  

said bank had granted loans against fake gold ornaments.  As  

the  said  person  was also  the  appraiser  of  the  complainant  

Bank the gold ornaments pledged with the complainant bank  

by  the  accused  were  verified  through  another  appraiser  

(PW.4)  who  certified  the  gold  ornaments  pledged  by  the  

accused to be fake. Accordingly, the complaints in question  

were filed alleging commission of offences under Section 406,  

420 read with Section 34 of the IPC by each of the accused  

persons who had taken loans from the complainant Bank by  

pledging fake gold ornaments. The complaints were referred,  

by the learned Magistrate, to the police for investigation and  

on completion of such investigation charge sheets were filed  

in the Court against each of the accused. Thereafter charges  

were  framed  to  which  the  accused  pleaded  not  guilty  and  

claimed to be tried. All the complaint cases were taken up for  

trial  together  and  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution  was  

recorded in the complaint case registered and numbered as  

CC. No. 1235 of 2005. In the course of the trial six witnesses  

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were  examined  by  the  prosecution  and  several  documents  

were  also  exhibited.  Thereafter,  the  learned  trial  court  by  

order dated 29.2.2008 acquitted each of the accused of the  

charges levelled against them.  It may also be noticed that  

during  the  pendency  of  the  trial,  the  appraiser,  who  was  

impleaded as the second accused had died.  Aggrieved by the  

said acquittal, the complaint Bank instituted separate Revision  

applications before the High Court of Karnataka.   The High  

Court by its common order dated 16/11/2010 and 22/3/2011  

allowed  each  of  the  Revision  Applications  filed  by  the  

complainant Bank and convicted and sentenced the accused  

as aforesaid. Aggrieved the present appeals have been filed.

4. We have heard Mr. Shankar Divate, learned counsel for  

the appellant and Mr. N.D.B. Raju and Mr. V.N. Raghupathy,  

learned counsels for the respondents.    

5. The revisional jurisdiction of a High Court is conferred  

by the provisions of Section 397 read with Section 401 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure. While Section 397 empowers the  

High court to call for the record of any proceeding before any  

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inferior criminal court within its jurisdiction to satisfy itself as  

to  the  correctness,  legality  or  propriety   of  any  finding,  

sentence or order and such power extends to suspension of  

execution of any sentence or order and also to release the  

accused  on  bail,  under  Section  401  (3)  Cr.P.C.  there  is  an  

express bar in the High Courts to convert a finding of acquittal  

into one of conviction.  While the revisional power under the  

Code would undoubtedly vest in the High Court the jurisdiction  

to set aside an order of acquittal the same would not extend  

to permit the conviction of the accused. The High Court may,  

however, order a retrial or a rehearing of the case, as may be,  

if so justified. [vide Sheetala Prasad & Ors. v. Sri Kant &  

Anr.1 and Johar & Ors. v. Mangal Prasad & Anr.2]. In view  

of the above we do not see how the orders of the High Court  

dated 16/11/2010 and 22/3/2011  converting the acquittal of  

the accused appellants to one of conviction and the sentences  

imposed on each of them can be sustained in law.   

6. There is another aspect of the case which cannot be left  

unaddressed.  The  Revision  Applications  filed  by  the  1     2010(2) SCC 190 2     2008 (3) SCC 423

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complainant  Bank  before  the  High  Court  were  inordinately  

delayed, i.e., some by 290 days and the others by 785 days.  

We  have  read  and  considered  the  application  filed  by  the  

complainant Bank under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963  

seeking  condonation  of  the  delay  that  had  occurred  in  

instituting the Revision Applications. The entire application is  

in a single paragraph containing a bald statement  that  the  

result of the case (perhaps the order of the trial court) was not  

intimated to the bank and it is only after getting the requisite  

information  and  certified  copies  of  the  judgment  that  the  

Revision  application  could  be  filed.   The  High  Court  had  

condoned the delay on the ground that  mere  technicalities  

should not come in the way of rendering justice.  While there  

can be no dispute with the above proposition, we do not see  

how the same could have had any application to the present  

case.    It  was  the  duty  of  the  High  Court  to  consider  the  

reasons assigned for  the  delay and thereafter  come to the  

conclusion whether,  on the grounds shown, sufficient  cause  

within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been  

made out.  We have already taken note of the contents of the  

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condonation application filed on behalf of the bank and it is  

our considered view that on the basis of the statements made  

therein no satisfaction could have been reasonably reached  

that the complainant Bank was prevented by sufficient cause  

from filing the Revision Applications in time.   

7. We have also been addressed by the learned counsels  

for the parties at some length on the merits of the matter. To  

make  the  discussion  complete  we  may  briefly  note  the  

reasons that had weighed with the learned trial court to acquit  

the accused in  the present  cases.  We have considered the  

evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses, particularly,  

Madan  Athani     (PW-1),  A.N.  Ramakrishna  (PW-2),  Irappa  

Abbigeri  (PW-3)  and  Pandurang  (PW-4).  Significantly,  PW-1  

had deposed that a register is maintained with respect to the  

gold articles pledged with the Bank showing the weight, the  

nature of the article, quality of the gold, name of the design  

etc.  for  purposes  of  identification  of  the  articles  pledged.  

However,  no  such  register  was   brought  on  record  by  the  

prosecution.  At the same time, PW-2 who was the Manager of  

the bank at the time of the filing of the complaint had stated  

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that he had not called the borrowers/accused to identify the  

gold articles when the same were found to be fake nor had he  

informed the  accused  that  the  gold  ornaments  pledged  by  

them were fake.  That a register showing the particulars and  

description of the gold ornaments pledged to the bank was  

maintained  had  also  been  admitted  by  PW-3.  PW-1  in  his  

cross-examination  had  admitted  that  each  gold  article  

pledged with the  bank will  have a  chit  containing the loan  

account  number,  signature  of  the  borrower  and  the  bank  

officials  but  in  respect  of  the  gold articles  exhibited  in  the  

court no such chits were found to be affixed.  It also transpires  

that PW-1 who was the Bank Manager at the time of the loan  

transaction  had  handed  over  the  articles  to  the  new  

incumbent (PW-2) and furthermore that the gold ornaments  

pledged were kept in a locker and were subjected to regular  

inspection by the bank officials.  PW-4 who had submitted the  

second appraisal report to the effect that the gold ornaments  

sent to him were fake had deposed that the said fact i.e. gold  

ornaments were fake could be made out on an examination by  

the naked eye.  If the prosecution evidence itself had revealed  

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the aforesaid facts it is difficult to see as to how the conclusion  

of the learned trial  court that the prosecution had failed to  

prove that the gold ornaments  exhibited  in the case are the  

very  same  articles  pledged  by  the  accused  is  in  any  way  

erroneous or untenable in law so as to disentitle the accused  

to be acquitted.

8. For all the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the  

judgment  and  order  dated  16/11/2010  and  22/3/2011  

passed by the High Court in each of the Criminal Revisions  

before it cannot be sustained in law. We therefore, allow the  

appeals and set aside the common judgment and order dated  

16/11/2010 and 22/3/2011  passed by the High Court in the  

Criminal Revision Petitions filed by the respondent Bank.

…………………………….J.           [ P. SATHASIVAM ]

………………………………J.     [ RANJAN  GOGOI ]

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New Delhi, December 14, 2012

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