REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8950 OF 2011

KRISHNA PRASAD VERMA (D) THR. LRS.          APPELLANT(S)

                               VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.                       RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Deepak Gupta, J. (oral)

In  a  country,  which  follows  the  Rule  of  Law,

independence of the judiciary is sacrosanct.  There can

be no Rule of Law, there can be no democracy unless there

is  a  strong,  fearless  and  independent  judiciary.  This

independence and fearlessness is not only expected at the

level of the Superior Courts but also from the District

judiciary.

2. Most  litigants  only  come  in  contact  with  the

District judiciary.  They cannot afford to come to the

High Court or the Supreme Court. For them the last word

is the word of the Magistrate or at best the Sessions

Judge. Therefore, it is equally important, if not more

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important, that the judiciary at the District Level and

at the Taluka level is absolutely honest, fearless and

free from any pressure and is able to decide cases only

on the basis of the facts on file, uninfluenced by any

pressure from any quarters whatsoever.  

3. Article  235  of  the  Constitution  of  India  vests

control of the subordinate Courts upon the High Courts.

The  High  Courts  exercise  disciplinary  powers  over  the

subordinate Courts. In a series of judgments, this Court

has held that the High Courts are also the protectors and

guardians  of  the  judges  falling  within  their

administrative control. Time and time again, this Court

has laid down the criteria on which actions should be

taken against judicial officers. Repeatedly, this Court

has cautioned the High Courts that action should not be

taken against judicial officers only because wrong orders

are passed. To err is human and not one of us, who has

held judicial office, can claim that we have never passed

a wrong order.  

4. No  doubt,  there  has  to  be  zero  tolerance  for

corruption and if there are allegations of corruption,

misconduct  or  of  acts  unbecoming  a  judicial  officer,

these  must  be  dealt  with  strictly.  However,  if  wrong

orders are passed that should not lead to disciplinary

action unless there is evidence that the wrong orders

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have been passed for extraneous reasons and not because

of the reasons on the file.  

5. We  do  not  want  to  refer  to  too  many  judgments

because  this  position  has  been  laid  down  in  a  large

number of cases but it would be pertinent to refer to the

observations of this Court in Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. High

Court of Punjab & Haryana and another  1, wherein this Court

held as follows:

"14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising  that  control  it  is  under  a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on  trifling  matters  relating  to  judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and  independent  manner.  An  independent  and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary  will  not  be  able  to  administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers  by  ignoring  ill-conceived  or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. Having regard to facts and circumstances of the instant case we have no  doubt  in  our  mind  that  the  resolution passed  by  the  Bar  Association  against  the appellant  was  wholly  unjustified  and  the complaints made by Shri Mehlawat and others were  motivated  which  did  not  deserve  any credit. Even the vigilance Judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that the

1 (1988) 3 SCC 370

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appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All that was said  against  him  was  that  he  had  acted improperly in granting adjournments."

6. Thereafter, following the dicta laid down in  Union

of India & Ors. Vs. A.N. Saxena  2 and Union of India & Ors.

Vs.  K.K. Dhawan  3, this Court in  P.C. Joshi Vs.  State of

U.P. & Ors.  4 held as follows:

"7.  In  the  present  case,  though  elaborate enquiry  has  been  conducted  by  the  enquiry officer, there is hardly any material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial  side  to  arrive  at  a  different conclusion. That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry  officer  has  not  found  any  other material,  which  would  reflect  on  his reputation  or  integrity  or  good  faith  or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case and A.N. Saxena case that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not  warrant  initiation  of  disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the  High  Court  has  chosen  to  initiate

2 (1992) 3 SCC 124 3(1993) 2 SCC 56 4(2001) 6 SCC 491

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disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case."

7. In Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court of Allahabad

&  Anr.  5,  a  three-judge  Bench  of  this  Court,  after

considering the entire law on the subject, including the

authorities  referred  to  above,  clearly  disapproved  the

practice of initiating disciplinary proceedings against

the officers of the district judiciary merely because the

judgment/orders passed by them are wrong. It was held

thus:-

"12.  This  Court  on  several  occasions  has disapproved  the  practice  of  initiation  of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate  and  revisional  courts  have  been established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing the appeal  may  modify  or  set  aside  erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based on judicial orders, The  High  Court  must  take  extra  care  and caution."

xxx xxx xxx

"17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot  be  the  basis  for  initiating disciplinary  proceeding.  Of  course,  if  the judicial  officer  conducted  in  a  manner  as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or  good  faith  or  there  is  a  prima  facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed

5  (2007) 4 SCC 247

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an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of  the  Constitution  may  exercise  its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it should be kept in mind that  the  Judges  at  all  levels  have  to administer  justice  without  fear  or  favour. Fearlessness  and  maintenance  of  judicial independence  are  very  essential  for  an efficacious  judicial  system.  Making  adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers and  subjecting  them  to  severe  disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at the grassroot level."

8. No  doubt,  if  any  judicial  officer  conducts

proceedings  in  a  manner  which  would  reflect  on  his

reputation or integrity or there is prima facie material

to show reckless misconduct on his part while discharging

his duties, the High Court would be entitled to initiate

disciplinary cases but such material should be evident

from  the  orders  and  should  also  be  placed  on  record

during the course of disciplinary proceedings.  

9. Coming  to  the  facts  of  this  case  there  are  two

charges  against  the  appellant,  who  was  a  judicial

officer. The charges are as follows:

CHARGE-1

"You,  Sri  Krishna  Prasad  Verma  while functioning  as  Additional  Distt.  &  Sessions Judge, Chapra granted bail to M/s Bishwanath Rai,  Sheo  Nath  Rai  and  Pradeep  Rai  on 11.7.2002 in S.T. No.514 of 2001 arising out of  Chapra  (M)  Khatra  P.S.  Case  No.453/2000 registered U/s 302/34 I.P.C. notwithstanding the fact that the bail petitions of Bishwanath Rai was earlier rejected by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 27.3.2001 and 4.7.2001 passed

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in  Cr.  Misc.  No.34144/2000  and  15626/2001 respectively, that of Sheo Nath Rai vide order 13.2.2001 and 26.11.2001 passed in Cr. Misc. No.3387/2001  and  Cr.  Misc.  No.30563/2001 respectively  and  that  of  Pradeep  Rai  vide order  dated  28.2.2001  passed  in  Cr.Misc. No.3599/2001.

The aforesaid act on your part is indicative of  some  extraneous  consideration  which tantamounts  to  gross  judicial  impropriety, judicial  indiscipline,  lack  of  integrity, gross misconduct and an act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.

CHARGE-2

You,  Sri  Krishna  Prasad  Verma  while functioning  as  Additional  District  and Sessions  Judge,  Chapra  with  an  intent  to acquit  Raju  Mistry,  the  main  accused  in N.D.P.S.  Case  No.15/2000  arising  out  of Revealganj P.S. Case No.137/2000 (G.R. No.1569 of 2000) registered under sections 22, 23 and 24  of  the  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 closed the proceeding in great  haste  resulting  in  acquittal  of  Raju Mistry,  who  was  charged  of  driving  a  Jeep bearing No.W.B.C.4049 carrying 90 Kg. Charas, without  exhausting  all  coercive  methods  to record  the  statement  of  the  Investigating Oficer of the case as there is no proof on the record to show that the non-bailable warrant issued against the said Investigating Officer was ever served on him.  

The aforesaid act of yours is indicative of some  extraneous  considerations  which tantamounts  to  gross  judicial  impropriety, judicial  indiscipline,  lack  of  integrity, gross misconduct and an act of unbecoming of a Judicial Officer."    

10. As far as the first charge is concerned, a major

fact, which was not considered by the enquiry officer,

the disciplinary authority as well as the High Court was

that the Additional Public Prosecutor, who had appeared

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on behalf of the State had not opposed the prayer of the

accused for grant of bail. In case, the public prosecutor

does not oppose the bail, then normally any Judge would

grant bail.  

11. The main ground to hold the appellant guilty of the

first charge is that the appellant did not take notice of

the orders of the High Court whereby the High Court had

rejected the bail application of one of the accused vide

order dated 26.11.2001. It would be pertinent to mention

that the High Court itself observed that after framing of

charges, if the non-official witnesses are not examined,

the prayer for bail could be removed, but after moving

the Lower Court first. The officer may have been guilty

of negligence in the sense that he did not carefully go

through the case file and did not take notice of the

order of the High Court which was on his file.  This

negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct.  It would

be pertinent to mention that the enquiry officer has not

found that there was any extraneous reason for granting

bail. The enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of

appeal picking holes in the order granting bail.

12. It would be important to mention that it seems that

later it was brought to the notice of the appellant that

he had not taken note of the order of the High Court

while granting bail on 11.07.2002. Thereafter, he issued

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notice to all the three accused on 23.08.2002 i.e. within

less than two months and cancelled the bail granted to

all the three accused on 11.07.2002. If he had made the

mistake  of  not  seeing  the  whole  file,  on  that  being

brought to his notice, he corrected the mistake. After

the appellant cancelled the bail and the accused were

again arrested, they again applied for bail and this bail

application was rejected by the appellant on 18.12.2002.  

13. After  rejection  of  the  bail  application  of  the

accused, two out of three accused moved the High Court.

The High Court granted bail to one of the accused and the

bail application of the other was rejected, not on merits

but on the ground that he did not disclose the fact that

he had earlier moved the High Court for grant of bail.

This itself is clear indicator of the fact that probably

even  the  order  passed  by  the  appellant  is  not  an

incorrect one.

14. Coming  to  the  second  charge,  which  is  under  the

Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic  Substances  Act,  1985

(hereinafter referred to as the "NDPS". On 18.07.2002 the

appellant, a Special Judge, closed the evidence of the

prosecution  which  resulted  in  material  witnesses  not

being  examined  and  consequently  the  accused  was

acquitted. As far as this allegation is concerned, the

enquiry officer on the basis of the statements of two

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clerks of the Court has made lengthy observations that

the  appellant  did  not  send  any  communication  to  the

Superintendent  of  Police,  the  District  Magistrate  and

other  authorities  to  ensure  the  production  of  the

witnesses. According to the enquiry officer, this being a

serious matter, the evidence should not have been closed

and the appellant should have made efforts to approach

the senior officials to get the witnesses produced. The

Code of Criminal Procedure or the NDPS Act do not provide

for any such procedure. It is the duty of the prosecution

to  produce  the  witnesses.  Even  in  this  case,

interestingly, the Public Prosecutor had made a note on

the side of the daily order-sheet that he is unable to

produce the witnesses so the evidences may be closed. We

fail  to  understand  how  the  appellant  has  been  hanged

whereas no action has been taken or recommended against

the Public Prosecutor concerned. We are constrained to

note  that  the  enquiry  officer,  while  conducting  the

enquiry, has noted, while considering the arguments of

the delinquent official, that he had raised a plea that

he closed the evidence because the Public Prosecutor had

made  the  statement,  but  while  holding  the  appellant

guilty of misconduct no reference has been made to the

statement of the Public Prosecutor.  

15. We may also note that the case of the appellant is

that he had given 18 adjournments for production of the

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witnesses to the prosecution in the NDPS case. Such a

judicial officer is between the devil and the deep sea.

If he keeps on granting adjournments then the High Court

will take action against him on the ground that he does

not dispose of his cases efficiently and if he closes the

evidence  then  the  High  Court  will  take  action  on  the

ground that he has let the accused go scot-free. That is

not the purpose of Article 235 of the Constitution of

India.  That  is  why  we  again  repeat  that  one  of  the

responsibilities of the High Court on the administrative

side is to ensure that the independence of the District

judiciary  is  maintained  and  the  High  Court  acts  as  a

guardian and protector of the District judiciary.  

16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are

in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes

a wrong order, then no action is to be taken.  In case a

judicial officer passes orders which are against settled

legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous

influences leading to the passing of such orders then the

appropriate action which the High Court should take is to

record such material on the administrative side and place

it  on  the  service  record  of  the  judicial  officer

concerned.  These matters can be taken into consideration

while  considering  career  progression  of  the  concerned

judicial officer.  Once note of the wrong order is taken

and they form part of the service record these can be

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taken  into  consideration  to  deny  selection  grade,

promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of

wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be

to  compulsorily  retire  the  judicial  officer,  in

accordance  with  the  Rules.   We  again  reiterate  that

unless  there  are  clear-cut  allegations  of  misconduct,

extraneous  influences,  gratification  of  any  kind  etc.,

disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely

on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the

judicial  officer  or  merely  on  the  ground  that  the

judicial order is incorrect.   

17. In  view  of  the  above  discussion,  we  allow  the

appeal,  set  aside  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  and

quash  all  the  orders  passed  against  the  delinquent

officer. He is directed to be given all consequential

benefits on or before 31.12.2019. The appeal is allowed

with costs of Rs.25,000/-.

...................J.   (DEEPAK GUPTA)

...................J.    (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

New Delhi September 26, 2019

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ITEM NO.103               COURT NO.13               SECTION XVI

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).8950/2011

KRISHNA PRASAD VERMA (D) THR. LRS.                 Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.                              Respondent(s)

Date : 26-09-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE

For Appellant(s) Mr. Braj Kishore Mishra, Adv. Ms. Aparna Jha, AOR Ms. Kriti S., Adv. Mr. Abhishek Yadav, Adv.

                   For Respondent(s)

Mr. Sanjay Jain, ASG Mr. Yogesh Pachauri, Adv. Ms. Binu Tamta, Adv. Ms. Anil Katiyar, AOR

Mr. Pravin H. Parekh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Kshatrshal Raj, Adv Mr. Nikhil Ramdev, Adv. Ms. Tanya Chaudhry, Adv. Ms. Pratyusha Priyadarshi, Adv. M/S.  Parekh & Co., AOR

Mr. Gopal Singh, AOR Mr. Srikaanth S., Adv.                     

         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR) COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER

(signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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