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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.22311 of 2012

KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors.              …Petitioners  

Versus

State of Karnataka & Ors.                   …Respondents

With

SLP (C) Nos.22307-22309 of 2012

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These petitions have been filed against the judgment and order  

dated  24.10.2011,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  

Bangalore  in  Writ  Appeal  No.1421  of  2008  etc.  affirming  the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17.4.2008 passed in Writ  

Petition  No.  11502/2006,  by  which  and  whereunder  the  court  had  

quashed the  order dated 27.2.2004, passed by the Revenue Minister,  

Government of Karnataka de-notifying the suit land from acquisition.

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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these petitions are:

A. That a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land  

Acquisition  Act  1894  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘Act  1894’)  was  

issued in  respect  of  huge chunk of  land including Survey No.49/1  

admeasuring  15  Acres  on  6.8.1991  for  the  benefit   of  the  State  

Government  Houseless  Harijan  Employees  Association  (Regd.)  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘Society’).   In  respect  of  the  same land  

declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894 was issued on 15.5.1992.

B. At  the  behest  of  the  then  owners  of  the  suit  land  the  

Government  de-notified the land from acquisition  vide order  dated  

5.8.1993 issuing notification under Section 48(1) of the Act 1894.

C. Aggrieved  the  respondent  no.3-Society  challenged  the  said  

order of de-notifying the land from acquisition by filing Writ Petition  

which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The said order was  

also  affirmed  by  the  Division  Bench  dismissing  the  Writ  Appeal  

preferred by the Society. The Society approached this court by filing  

special leave petitions which were entertained and finally heard Civil  

Appeal  No. 5015/1999 etc. and this court vide judgment and order  

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dated 11.12.2000 quashed the order dated 5.8.1993 de-notifying the  

suit land from acquisition.

D. During the pendency of Civil Appeal No.5015 of 1999 etc. filed  

by the respondent-society, the present petitioners purchased the suit  

land  in  the  years  1997-1998  and  approached  the  Government  of  

Karnataka  to  de-notify  the  said  land  from  acquisition.  As  their  

application for release was not dealt  with by the Government, they  

preferred Writ  Petition Nos.19968-97 of  2002 etc.  before the High  

Court for directions to the Government to release the land.  

E. The  High  Court  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  19.2.2003  

disposed of the said writ petition, directing the Government to decide  

their application in accordance with law expeditiously.  In pursuance  

of the High Court order, the Government of Karnataka issued notice  

to  all  concerned  parties  and  against  all  the  parties  the  Hon’ble  

Revenue Minister passed an order dated 27.2.2004, directing to de-

notify the land from acquisition.   

F. The order dated 27.2.2004 was not complied with as the Deputy  

Secretary to the Government of Karnataka raised certain objections  

and made an endorsement dated 21.9.2005 that the matter had attained  

finality after being decided by this Court and possession of the land  

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had already been taken and handed over to the respondent-society on  

6.9.2002, much prior to the order passed by the Hon’ble Minister.

G. The present  petitioners filed Writ Petition No.11502 of 2006  

etc. before the High Court to quash the endorsement dated 21.9.2005  

made  by the  learned  Deputy  Secretary,  Government  of  Karnataka.  

The  writ  petition  stood  dismissed  on  17.4.2008  in  terms  of  the  

judgment of the same date in a similar case, i.e. Writ Petition No.9857  

of 2006 (M.V. Kasturi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.).  

H. Aggrieved, petitioners preferred a Writ Appeal No. 1421/2008  

which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order.

Hence, these petitions.

3. Shri Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

petitioners submitted that the courts below have committed an error in  

dismissing the case of the petitioners as the courts failed to appreciate  

the legal issues.  This Court set aside the order of de-notification dated  

5.8.1993 on a  technical  ground as  the order of  de-notification was  

passed without hearing the respondent-society for whose benefit the  

land had been acquired.  Thus, there could be no prohibition for the  

State  to  de-notifying  the  land  from  acquisition  after  hearing  the  

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concerned parties. More so, the Hon’ble Minister  had competence to  

deal with the acquisition proceedings and thus the finding recorded by  

the High Court about his competence is perverse. More so, as there  

was  no  interim order  of  this  court  in  Society’s  appeal,  petitioners  

could purchase the land.   Hence, these petitions should be accepted.

4. Per contra, Shri Rama Jois and Shri K.N. Bhat, learned senior  

counsel  for  the  respondents  have  opposed  the  petitions  contending  

that this Court has set aside the order dated 5.8.1993 de-notifying the  

land from acquisition not only on the ground of violation of principles  

of natural justice but also on merits as it had been held by this Court  

that there was no justification for de-notifying the land.  The present  

petitioners  are  purchasers  of  land  subsequent  to  notification  under  

Section 4(1) of the Act 1894, and they could not purchase the land at  

all.  In view of the fact that the appeal filed by the respondent no.3  

against  the  order  dated  5.8.1993  was  pending  before  this  Court,  

doctrine of lis pendens would apply.  Thus, the petitions are liable to  

be  dismissed.

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

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The facts are not in dispute.  At the time of purchase  of the suit  

land by the present petitioners the matter was  sub-judice before this  

Court and if the order of de-notification dated 5.8.1993 stood quashed,  

it  would  automatically  revive  the  land  acquisition  proceedings  

meaning  thereby  the  notification  under  Section  4  and  declaration  

under  Section  6  resurfaced  by  operation  of  law.   In  such  a  fact-

situation, it is not permissible for the present petitioners to argue that  

merely because there was no interim order in the appeal filed by the  

respondent no.3, petitioners had a right to purchase the land during the  

pendency of the litigation and would not be bound by the order of this  

Court quashing the de-notification of acquisition proceedings.

6. Doctrine  of  lis  pendens is  based  on  legal  maxim  ‘ut  lite   

pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new should be  

introduced).  This  doctrine  stood  embodied  in  Section  52  of  the  

Transfer of Property Act 1882.    The principle of ‘lis pendens’ is in  

accordance with the equity, good conscience or justice because they  

rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to  

bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are  

permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree  

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just  as  much  as  he  was  a  party  to  the  suit.  A  litigating  party  is  

exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency  

of the litigation. However, it must be clear that mere pendency of a  

suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property  

constituting the subject matter of the suit. The law simply postulates a  

condition that the alienation will, in no manner, affect the rights of the  

other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless  

the  property  was  alienated  with  the  permission  of  the  Court.  The  

transferee cannot deprive the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the  

decree if  he purchased the property  pendente lite. [Vide :  K. Adivi  

Naidu & Ors. vs. E. Duruvasulu Naidu & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 150;  

Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi & Ors. vs. Malatibai & Ors., (2003) 1  

SCC 722;  Raj Kumar vs.  Sardari Lal & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 601;  

and Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1332).  

7. In Rajender Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973  

SC  2537,  while  dealing  with  the  application  of  doctrine  of  lis   

pendens, this court held as under:  

“The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike   at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the   jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or   interests  in  immovable  property  is  pending  by  private   dealings  which  may  remove  the  subject  matter  of   

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litigation from the ambit of the court’s power to decide a   pending dispute or frustrate its decree.”  

(See also: T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Anr., (2010) 14  

SCC 370).  

8. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that it is  

not permissible to say that in case the petitioners had purchased the  

suit property during the pendency of the appeal filed by respondent  

no.3 before this Court, the petitioners are not bound by the final orders  

of this Court.

9. By operation of law, as this Court quashed the de-notification  

of  acquisition  proceedings,  the  proceedings  stood  revived.  In  V.  

Chandrasekaran & Anr. vs. The Administrative Officer & Ors.,  

JT 2012 (9) SC 260, this Court considered the right of  purchaser of  

land subsequent to the issuance of Section 4 notification and held that  

any one who deals with the land subsequent to a Section 4 notification  

being issued, does so, at his own peril. Section 4 notification gives a  

notice to the public at large that the land in respect to which it has  

been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points out  

that there will be "an impediment to any one to encumber the land  

acquired thereunder." The alienation thereafter does not bind the State  

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or the beneficiary under the acquisition. In fact, purchase of land after  

publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is void  

against  the State  and at  the most,  the purchaser  may be a  person-

interested  in  compensation,  since  he  steps  into  the  shoes  of  the  

erstwhile owner and may therefore, merely claim compensation. Thus,  

the  purchaser  cannot  challenge  the  acquisition  proceedings.  While  

deciding  the  said  case  this  court  placed  reliance  on  a  very  large  

number of  its  earlier  judgments including  Leela Ram v. Union of  

India & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2112; Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. v. State of  

Uttar  Pradesh  &  Anr., AIR  1996  SC  540;  Meera  Sahni  v.  

Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177; and Tika  

Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 689.

10. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that  a  

person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4  

notification  with  respect  to  it,  is  not  competent  to  challenge  the  

validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for  

the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer  

upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation on the  

basis of his vendor’s title.

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11. In order to meet the menace of sale of land after initiation of  

acquisition proceedings, various States enacted the Acts and making  

such transfers as punishable, e.g., The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on  

Transfers) Act, 1972 made the sales permissible only after grant of  

permission for transfer by the authority prescribed therein.  In absence  

of such permission if the sale is made in contravention of the statutory  

provisions it  is a punishable offence with imprisonment for  a term  

which may extend to 3 years or with fine or with both.

Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to accept any plea  

taken by the petitioners that they could purchase the suit land even  

subsequent to Section 4 notification.  

12. We do not find force in the submission made by Shri Kailash  

Vasdev, learned senior counsel  that this Court had quashed the de-

notification of acquisition proceedings only on technical ground as the  

respondent-society was not heard.

This  Court  in  State  Govt.  Houseless  Harijan  Employees  

Association v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 437 held as  

under:

“71. From all this, the ultimate position which emerges is  that  the  acquisition  in  favour  of  the  appellant  was  

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properly initiated by publication of the Notification under  Section 4(1) and by the declaration issued under Section  6. The withdrawal of the acquisition under Section 48(1)  was vitiated not only because the appellant was not heard  but  also  because  the  reason  for  withdrawal  was  wrong. The  High  Court  erred  in  dismissing  the  appellant's writ petition. The decision of the High Court  is  accordingly  set  aside.  The  impugned  Notification  under Section 48(1) is quashed and the appeal is allowed  with costs.”  (Emphasis added)

13. There is ample evidence on record to show that possession of  

the suit  land had been taken on 6.9.2002.  In such a  fact-situation,  

question of de-notifying the acquisition of land could not arise. Thus,  

the  order  dated 27.2.2004 could  not  be  passed.  There cannot  be  a  

dispute in law that upon possession being taken under Section 16 or  

17  of  the  Act  1894,  the  land  vests  in  the  State  free  from  all  

encumbrances.  Thus, in case possession of the land has been taken,  

application for release of land from acquisition is not maintainable.  

Once the land is vested in the State free from encumbrances, it cannot  

be divested.  (See:  LT. Governor of  H.P. & Anr.  v.  Sri  Avinash  

Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State  

of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517;  Mandir Shree Sitaramji alias  

Shree Sitaram Bhandar v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors., AIR  

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2005 SC 3581;  and Smt. Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune  

Municipal Transport  & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2962).

14. In view of the above, we do not think it necessary to examine  

the other issues raised in the petitions particularly, the competence of  

the Hon’ble Minister to deal with the matter.

15. The  petitions  are  devoid  of  any  merit  and  are  accordingly  

dismissed.   However,  it  is  made clear  that  the  petitioners  shall  be  

entitled to compensation as determined under the provisions of  the  

Act 1894.

.........................………………..J.                                                 (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)

                                                        .............………………………J.                    (S.A. BOBDE)

New Delhi, December 2, 2013    

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