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NON-REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. No. 8 of 2014  IN  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7424 OF 2013   

  KARNAIL KAUR & ORS.            ………APPELLANTS

Vs.

  STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.             ………RESPONDENTS

    with

I.A. No. 5 in Civil Appeal No. 7425 of 2013 I.A. No. 19 of Civil Appeal No. 7426 of 2013 I.A. No. 15 in Civil Appeal No. 7427 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7428 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7429 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7430 of 2013 I.A. No. 6 in Civil Appeal No. 7431 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7433 of 2013 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7435 of 2013

      I.A.Nos.3-4 in Civil Appeal Nos.7437-7438 of 2013

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      I.A. Nos.6-8 in Civil Appeal Nos.7439-7441 of 2013  I.A. No. 5 in Civil Appeal No. 7444 of 2013

and I.A. No.6 in Civil Appeal No. 7445 of 2013

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. The abovementioned applications are filed by the  

appellants for allowing the concerned appeals in terms  

of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and  

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and  

Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short ‘the Act of 2013’).  

The  appellant-land  owners  have  come  to  this  Court  

questioning the correctness of the common judgment and  

order dated 19.04.2011 passed by the High Court of  

Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition  

No.5512 of 2001 and batch petitions by which the High  

Court  dismissed  the  Writ  Petitions  filed  by  the  

appellants herein.

 2. As  all  the  appeals  are  identical  involving  

similar question of law, for the sake of brevity we

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will discuss the facts of the case in C.A. No. 7424 of  

2013 which are stated hereunder:

   The appellants are original residents and have  

their houses along with their land in village-Sohana,  

Tehsil Mohali in District Roop Nagar (Punjab). The  

State of Punjab has framed a special Act known as ‘The  

Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act,  

1995’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1995’)  

to construct a residential urban estate with the main  

object  to  undertake  urban  development  and  housing  

programme. On 21.02.2000, the State of Punjab through  

Secretary,  Punjab  Housing  and  Development,  the  

respondent  No.1  herein,  issued  notification  under  

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short  

‘the  L.A.  Act’)  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  a  

residential urban estate in the area of revenue estate  

of village Mauli Baidwan, SAS Nagar (Mohali). The said  

acquisition  notification  covered  a  total  extent  of  

1264.84 acres of land in four villages –Mauli Baidwan,  

Sohana,  Raipur  Khurd  and  Lakhnausr  in  Roopnagar  

district  of  Punjab  out  of  which  the  land  of  the  

appellants in the present batch of appeals constituted

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102 acres of land in small pockets of the said 1264.84  

acres. Objections were raised against the same by the  

appellants under Section 5A alleging that in the year  

1996 the Punjab State Government had framed a scheme  

called  “Farmers  Friendly  and  Land  Pooling  Exchange  

Scheme”, and as per the contents of the said Scheme,  

for every acre of land transferred by the land owners  

to Punjab Urban Development Authority (PUDA), the land  

owners will be given back approximately 1000 square  

yards  after  development  and  the  land  owners  were  

advised  not  to  sell  their  land.  Therefore,  the  

appellants  objected  to  the  said  notification  under  

Section 4 of the L.A. Act, as the same was violative  

of the principles of promissory estoppel. The said  

objections were not decided by the Land Acquisition  

Officer. Thereafter, on 02.02.2001, the notification  

under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was published.

3. The appellants filed writ petition No. 5512 of  

2001 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  

Chandigarh alleging inter alia that respondent no. 1  

has started acquiring the land without complying with

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the provisions and in utter violation of the Act of  

1995 & therefore the acquisition proceedings are bad  

in law and liable to be quashed.

   4. The  High  Court  vide  order  dated  19.04.2011  

dismissed writ petition No. 5512 of 2001 along with  

batch  matters  in  CWP  No.  4981  of  2001.  Hence,  the  

present appeal.

5. It  has  been  contended  by  the  learned  senior  

counsel for the appellants that the L.A. Act has been  

replaced by the Act of 2013, which has come into force  

w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and that Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013 provides that where an award under Section 11 of  

the L.A. Act has been made five years or more prior to  

the commencement of the Act of 2013 but the physical  

possession  of  the  land  has  not  been  taken  or  the  

compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings  

shall be deemed to have lapsed. In the present case,  

the proceedings under the L.A. Act have lapsed for  

both the above said reasons because the case of the  

appellants satisfy both the conditions as referred to  

in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The award under

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Section 11 of the L.A. Act in respect of the land in  

dispute  was  passed  on  17.05.2001.  It  is  further  

contended that not only the possession of the said  

land is still with the appellants but they have also  

not  been  paid  any  compensation.  Therefore,  the  

acquisition proceedings in respect of the land under  

challenge in the present appeal have lapsed by virtue  

of provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

6. It  has  been  further  contended  that  the  then  

Additional  Chief  Administrator-cum-Land  Acquisition  

Collector,  GMADA,  Mohali  in  his  affidavit  dated  

06.02.2008  has  admitted  that  the  possession  of  the  

land in question is with the appellants. Further, in  

the  affidavit  dated  19.07.2012  filed  on  behalf  of  

respondent no.2, it has been categorically stated that  

the appellants and other land owners are using their  

land for agricultural purposes. For the said reason,  

the  respondent-GMADA had  filed an  application dated  

09.02.2012  seeking  permission  to  complete  the  

remaining development works in Sectors 76-80 of SAS  

Nagar, Mohali. The said application was dismissed by  

this Court on 11.11.2013.

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7. Further, it is contended by the appellants that  

no details/calculation of the awarded money has been  

given to the appellants. Even if payments have been  

deposited, the same is no payment in the eyes of law  

and  the  respondent  State  has  never  offered  to  pay  

compensation  of  the  acquired  land  in  terms  of  the  

award of the appellants. No notice, whatsoever, has  

been  received  by  the  appellants  from  any  quarter  

asking  them  to  collect  the  compensation  awarded  in  

respect  of  their  acquired  land.  A  perusal  of  the  

Annexure R-10 filed by the State of Punjab along with  

their  further  affidavit  filed  before  this  Court  on  

02.07.2013  would  clearly  go  to  show  that  the  

compensation amount is lying in the Treasury. It has  

been contended that in view of the above, the case of  

the appellants is squarely covered under Section 24(2)  

of the Act of 2013. Therefore, the appellants have  

filed the applications.

8. On the other hand, it has been contended by the  

learned  Solicitor  General  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  for  the  

respondents that the issue involved in these appeals

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relates to the prayer for re-allotment of the land on  

the  premise  that  certain  other  housing  

societies/institutions  were  re-alloted  the  acquired  

land. Therefore, it is no ground for the claim of the  

appellants  to  dispose  of  the  appeal  in  terms  of  

Section  24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013  as  it  is  not  

sustainable  in  the  eyes  of  law  and  deserves  to  be  

rejected.

9. Further  it  has  been  contended  that  physical  

possession of the entire extent of the acquired land  

except 102 acres of the land involved in these appeals  

were not taken by the respondent no.2-PUDA (now GMADA)  

on 17.05.2001 because of the interim order passed by  

both the High Court and this Court. The possession of  

the land covered by the above batch of appeals could  

not be taken as stay orders passed by the High Court  

in writ petitions filed by the land owners were in  

force.

 10. It has been further contended that Section 24(2)  

of the Act of 2013 stipulates that in relation to the  

land acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A.

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Act where an award has been made five years or more  

prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  Act  of  2013  and  

either of the two contingencies is satisfied, viz; (i)  

physical possession of the land has not been taken or  

(ii) the compensation has not been paid to the owners,  

the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have  

lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition under the  

L.A. Act, it has to initiate the proceedings afresh  

under the Act of 2013. The proviso appended to Section  

24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the  

acquisition initiated under the L.A. Act an award has  

been made and compensation in respect of a majority of  

land holdings has not been deposited in the account of  

the beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified  

in  Section  4  notification  become  entitled  to  

compensation under the Act of 2013.

11. Further,  it  is  contended  that  the  acquisition  

proceedings in relation to the land involved in the  

present appeals are a part of 1264.84 acres of land  

acquired pursuant to the notification dated 21.02.2000  

and the compensation has already been paid/deposited  

in  Court  in  case  of  the  affected  land  holders  and

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physical possession of the land has been taken with  

regard to more than 90% of the acquired land except  

the land covered by the present appeals where physical  

possession of the land could not be taken as the stay  

orders passed by the High Court & this Court have been  

in force. It is further contended that, however, soon  

after  the  passing  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  

19.04.2011  the  possession  of  the  land  was  taken  

28.4.2011. Reliance was placed on the decision of this  

Court in the case of  Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New  

Delhi v. Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T., Delhi & Ors.1,  

in justification of the above legal contentions, the  

relevant paragraph of which is extracted hereunder:-  

“30.  It  would,  thus,  be  seen  from  a  cumulative  reading  of  the  aforesaid  judgments,  that  while  taking  possession  of  a  large  area  of  land  with  a  large  number of owners, it would be impossible  for the Collector or the Revenue Official  to enter each bigha or biswa and to take  possession thereof and that a pragmatic  approach has to be adopted by the Court.  It is also clear that one of the methods  of taking possession and handing it over  to  the  beneficiary  Department  is  the  recording  of  a  Panchnama  which  can  in  itself  constitute  evidence  of  the  fact  that  possession  had  been  taken  and  the  land  had  vested  absolutely  in  the  Government.”

1  (2009) 10 SCC 501

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12. Further, it is contended that this Court while  

granting special leave to appeal directed to maintain  

“status quo” with regard to possession. As is held by  

this  Court  in  a  catena  of  judgments  including  

Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  v. Lichho  Devi  and  

Ors.2,  and Bailamma  &  Ors.  v.  Poornaprajna  House  

Building  Cooperative  Society  &  Ors.3,  while  dealing  

with cases under Section 11-A of the L.A. Act which  

also speaks of ‘lapse’ of acquisition proceedings, if  

no award is made within a period of two years from the  

date of publication of the declaration, once an order  

of  stay  is  obtained  and  the  Government  and  the  

Collector are prevented from taking any further action  

pursuant to the declaration they cannot be faulted for  

the  delay.  Similarly,  the  authorities  cannot  be  

faulted for not taking physical possession of the land  

covered in the present appeals in as much as it is not  

that the authorities had on their own volition not  

taken  possession  of  the  acquired  land  of  the  

appellants.  In  fact  the  authorities  who  had  taken  

2  (1997) 7 SCC 430 3  (2006) 2 SCC 416

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physical  possession  of  more  than  90%  of  the  total  

extent  of  acquired  land  covered  by  the  acquisition  

proceedings  were  prevented  from  taking  physical  

possession of the land in question in view of the stay  

orders  passed  in  writ  petitions  moved  by  the  

landowners  themselves  in  spite  of  the  filing  of  

application by the authorities seeking permission to  

complete the development works on the land in issue  

which was adversely affected in view of the pending  

lis. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 will not be  

applicable in such a situation. Any interpretation to  

the  contrary  would  lead  to  absurdity  and  anomalous  

results and unjust and unwarranted enrichment of the  

landholders  who  are  in  physical  possession  of  the  

acquired land in view of the stay orders passed in the  

writ  petitions  filed  by  them  which  prevented  the  

authorities  from  taking  physical  possession  of  the  

acquired land when the L.A. Act was in force. Further,  

reliance was placed on New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.  

Nusli Neville Wadia & Anr.4 and Ashok Lanka & Anr. v.  

Rishi Dixit & Ors.5 that legislature is known to avoid  

4  (2008) 3 SCC 279 5  (2005) 5 SCC 598

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anomaly or absurdity.

13. It  is  further  contended  that  the  settled  

principle of law based upon the legal maxim ‘Actus  

Curiae  Neminem  Gravabit’ that  has  also  been  given  

statutory flavour in terms of Section 144 of the Civil  

Procedure Code (Restitution) must be read into Section  

24(2) of the Act of 2013 in conjunction with Section 6  

of the General Clauses Act and Section 11(A) of the  

L.A. Act.  

14. The  learned  Attorney  General  has  further  

submitted  that  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Sree  

Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil  

Nadu6 is per incuriam in as much as the above crucial  

legal  aspects  have  not  been  considered  therein.  

Further, he has placed reliance upon the case of Nand  

Kishore Gupta & Ors. v.  State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.7  

this Court held thus:-  

“46.The  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf of the appellants could not deny  the  fact  that  the  total  number  of  petitioners  concerned  in  these  acquisition  proceedings,  coming  up  before  the  High  Court,  was  extremely  

6  2014(10)SCALE388 7  (2010) 10 SCC 282

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insignificant as compared to those who  had  accepted  the  compensation.  Of  course, that by itself may not be the  only  reason  to  hold  against  the  appellants  (the  petitioners),  however,  that fact will have to be kept in mind  while  deciding  the  issues  which  cover  the  whole  acquisition  process,  which  acquisition  is  for  the  purpose  of  development of 25 million sq m of land.  The  High  Court  has  also  noticed  this  aspect.  We  have  mentioned  this  aspect  only with a limited objective of showing  that  the  criticism  against  the  whole  scheme  which  would  invalidate  the  acquisition  would  be  difficult  to  be  accepted, particularly in this case, in  view of the fact that majority of the  landowners have parted with possession,  taken  the  compensation  and  thus,  the  whole  scheme  has  progressed  to  a  substantial level, wherefrom it will be  extremely difficult now to turn back to  square one.”

With reference to the above decision, he has further  

contended  that  in  the  above  circumstances,  Section  

24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be applicable to the  

fact situation in the present appeals and the above  

applications deserve to be dismissed in the interest  

of justice and also public interest.

 15. We  have  carefully  gone  through  the  legal  

submissions  made  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on  

behalf  of  the  appellants  with  respect  to  the

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application filed under Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013 and the objections raised by the respondents to  

the  same.  In  our  considered  view,  respondent  No.2  

GMADA has admitted that the possession of the land in  

question (i.e. about 102 acres) is with the appellants  

and the appellants have not received the compensation  

for the said land being acquired by GMADA. Therefore,  

the case of Nand Kishore Gupta  referred to supra is  

not applicable to the present case on hand. In fact,  

the present case is squarely covered by the law laid  

down in the matter of  Pune Municipal Corporation and  

Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors.8, Union of  India & Ors. v. Shiv Raj & Ors.9, Bimla Devi & Ors. v.  

State of Haryana & Ors.10, Bharat Kumar  v. State of  

Haryana  &  Anr.11 and Sree  Balaji  Nagar  Residential  

Association (supra).

16. The above said provisions of Section 24 (2) of  

the Act of 2013 quoted above has been interpreted by  

the three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of  

8  (2014) 3 SCC 183 9  (2014) 6 SCC 564 10  (2014) 6 SCC 583 11  (2014) 6 SCC 586

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Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the relevant paras  

20 and 21 from the case are extracted hereunder:-

“20……it  is  clear  that  the  award  pertaining to the subject land has been  made  by  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer more than five years prior to the  commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also  admitted  position  that  compensation  so  awarded  has  neither  been  paid  to  the  landowners/persons  interested  nor  deposited in the court. The deposit of  compensation  amount  in  the  Government  treasury  is of  no avail  and cannot  be  held  to  be  equivalent  to  compensation  paid  to  the  landowners/persons  interested.  We  have,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  holding  that  the  subject  land  acquisition  proceedings  shall  be  deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2)  of the 2013 Act.

21. The  argument  on  behalf  of  the  Corporation  that  the  subject  land  acquisition  proceedings  have  been  concluded in all respects under the 1894  Act and that they are not affected at all  in  view of  Section 114(2)  of the  2013  Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to  be rejected. Section 114(1) of the 2013  Act repeals the 1894 Act. Sub-section (2)  of Section 114, however, makes Section 6  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  applicable with regard to the effect of  repeal  but  this  is  subject  to  the  provisions in the 2013 Act. Under Section  24(2)  land  acquisition  proceedings  initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal  fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where  award has been made five years or more  prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act  and possession of the land is not taken

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or compensation has not been paid. The  legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes  into  operation  as  soon  as  conditions  stated  therein  are  satisfied.  The  applicability of Section 6 of the General  Clauses  Act  being  subject  to  Section  24(2),  there  is  no  merit  in  the  contention of the Corporation.

17.  Further,  this  Court  vide  its  order  dated  

05.09.2011 requested the State Government to consider  

the submissions of the appellants regarding the re-

allotment of the acquired land without admitting any  

right in the appellants and place the issue before the  

State Government for its consideration. Therefore, the  

learned  Solicitor  General  contends  that  this  Court  

found reasonable ground for its interference in the  

matter  and  granted  leave  for  the  same  to  be  re-

examined and reconsidered. The above contention is not  

tenable in law particularly having regard to the fact  

that after the above said date leave was granted by  

this Court by allowing the Special Leave Petition that  

means  this  Court  has  to  consider  the  case  of  the  

appellants on merits. However, this does not deprive  

the right of the appellants to apply for relief under  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as they have acquired

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a valid statutory right. The learned Solicitor General  

has   also  placed  reliance  upon  the  case  of  A.R.  

Antulay  v. R.S. Nayak & Anr12, in support of his legal  

submission that in the said case the majority view of  

this  Court  have  succinctly  laid  down  that  the  

elementary rule of justice is that no party should  

suffer by mistake/action of the Court. What the court  

does  ought  not  prejudice  a  litigant  and  therefore,  

respondents herein shall not be made to suffer or be  

deprived of their right by the reliance being placed  

by the land owners upon Section 24 (2) of the Act of  

2013 due to the interim orders of the High Court and  

this  Court  as  they  have  been  in  possession  of  the  

acquired land.  The above contentions of the learned  

Solicitor General cannot be accepted by us as the said  

principle of law laid down by this Court in the above  

referred case has no application to the fact situation  

on hand in view of the clear statement of law laid  

down by this Court in the above referred cases after  

interpreting the provisions of the Act of 2013 and  

therefore, the reliance placed upon the said decision  

is misplaced. 12  (1988) 2 SCC 602

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18. In Sree  Balaji  Nagar  Residential  Association  

(supra), it was opined that after adverting to the  

decisions of the Privy Council and this Court,  that  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any  

period during which the land acquisition proceedings  

might  have  remained  stayed  on  account  of  stay  or  

injunction or “status quo” order regarding possession  

of the land granted by any court. It was conclusively  

held that the Legislature has consciously omitted to  

extend the period of five years indicated in Section  

24(2) of the Act of 2013, even if the proceedings had  

been  delayed  on  account  of  an  order  of  stay  or  

injunction  granted  by  a  court  of  law  or  for  any  

reason.  

19. Further,  so far  as the  judgment cited  by the  

respondents in Civil Appeal No.331 of 2014, we are of  

the view that the same has no application on the facts  

of the present case because the appellants in that  

matter  are  nowhere  connected  or  concerned  with  the  

appellants in the present batch of cases as contended  

by  the  appellants.  In  that  matter,  the  aggrieved

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persons  have  not  challenged  the  acquisition  

proceedings rather they accepted that acquisition but  

filed references for enhancement of compensation. The  

appellants therein have accepted the compensation in  

the year 2001 itself after the passing of the award  

and their possession have been taken in the year 2001  

itself by the authorities concerned. Whereas in the  

present batch of appeals the appellants are still in  

possession and they have not accepted any compensation  

for  their  acquired  land.  Secondly,  the  impugned  

judgment in the present appeals is two years after  

passing of the impugned order in C.A. No.331 of 2014.  

Therefore, the impugned judgment of C.A. No. 331 of  

2014 is totally different from the impugned judgment  

in the present batch of matters and are in no way  

connected to each other.  

20. After referring to the aforesaid decisions with  

reference to the facts and circumstances of the case  

on hand, we are of the view that physical possession  

of the land belonging to the appellants have neither  

been taken by the respondents nor compensation paid to  

them even though the award was passed on  06.08.2007,

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and more than five years have lapsed prior to date on  

which the Act of 2013 came into force. Therefore, the  

conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013 are satisfied in this case for allowing the plea  

of  the  appellants  that  the  land  acquisition  

proceedings  are  deemed  to  have  lapsed  in  terms  of  

Section  24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013.  The  said  legal  

principle laid down by this Court in the case of Pune  

Municipal  Corporation  and  other  cases  referred  to  

supra  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  Section  

24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013,  with  all  fours  are  

applicable to the fact situation in respect of the  

land covered in these appeals for granting the relief  

as prayed by the appellants in the applications.

21. We have noticed the Gazette of India published  

by the Ministry of Law and Justice in respect of the  

“Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  (Amendment)  Ordinance,  2014”,  in  which  a  second  proviso to Section 24(2) has been inserted which reads  

as follows:-

“Provided further that in computing the

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period referred to in this sub-section,  any period or periods during which the  proceedings for acquisition of the land  were held up on account of any stay or  injunction  issued  by  any  stay  or  injunction  issued  by  any  court  or  the  period  specified  in  the  award  of  a  Tribunal  for  taking  possession  or  such  period  where  possession  has  been  taken  but the compensation lying deposited in a  court or in any account maintained for  this purpose shall be excluded.”

The above said amendment has come into force w.e.f.  

01.01.2015. With due regard to the same, we are of the  

view that the amendment would not be applicable to the  

case on hand for the reason that these appeals were  

pending  much  prior  to  the  ordinance  and  also  the  

applications under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013  

were filed prior to the amendment to Section 24(2) by  

Ordinance and the same were heard and reserved for  

orders on 28.10.2014 and therefore the Ordinance in so  

far as insertion of proviso to the above Section by  

way of an amendment is  prospective. Further, keeping  

in mind the principles laid down by this Court in the  

case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and  

Ors.13, wherein it was held thus:

13  AIR 1957 SC 540

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“23…(iv)The  right  of  appeal  is  a  vested  right  and  such  a  right  to  enter  the  superior court accrues to the litigant and  exists  as on  and from  the date  the lis  commences and although it may be actually  exercised  when  the  adverse  judgment  is  pronounced such right is to be governed by  the  law  prevailing  at  the  date  of  the  institution of the suit or proceeding and  not by the law that prevails at the date  of  its  decision  or  at  the  date  of  the  filing of the appeal.

(v)  This  vested  right  of  appeal  can  be  taken away only by a subsequent enactment,  if  it  so  provides  expressly  or  by  necessary intendment and not otherwise.

25.In  construing  the  articles  of  the  Constitution we must bear in mind certain  cardinal  rules  of  construction.  It  has  been  said  in  Hough  v.  Windus [1884]  12  Q.B.D.  224,  that  "statutes  should  be  interpreted, if possible, so as to respect  vested  right."  The  golden  rule  of  construction  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  anything in the enactment to show that it  is  to  have  retrospective  operation,  it  cannot be so constructed as to have the  effect of altering the law applicable to a  claim in litigation at the time when the  Act was passed [Leeds and County Bank Ltd.  v.  Walker (1883)  11  Q.B.D.  84;  Moon  v.  Durden (1848) 2 Ex. 22; 76 R.R. 479. The  following  observation  of  Rankin  C.J.  in  Sadar  Ali  v.  Dalimuddin  (supra)  at  page  520 is also apposite and helpful : "Unless  the  contrary  can  be  shown  the  provision  which  takes  away  the  jurisdiction  is  itself  subject  to  the  implied  saving  of  the litigant's right."  In Janardan Reddy  v.     The State   [1950  ]1SCR940 Kania C.J. in   

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nature. (iii)  Every  litigant  has  a  vested  right in substantive law but no such  right exists in procedural law. (iv) a procedural statute should not  generally  speaking  be  applied  retrospective where the result would  be  to  create  new  disabilities  or  obligations or to impose new duties  in respect of  of  transactions already  accomplished. (v) a statute which not only changes  the procedure but also creates new  rights  and  liabilities  shall  be  construed  to  be  prospective  in  operation unless otherwise provided,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication.’

27.  In K.S.  Paripoornan vs. State  of  Kerala & others  AIR1995SC1012, this Court  while considering the effect of amendment  in  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  in  pending  proceedings held thus:

"...  In  the  instant  case  we  are  concerned with the application of the  provisions of sub-section 1(1-A) of  S. 23 as introduced by the Amending  Act of acquisition proceedings which  were  pending  on  the  date  of  commencement of the Amending act. In  relation  pending  proceedings,  the  approach of the courts in England is  that the same are unaffected by the  changers in the law so far as they  relate to the determination of the  substantive rights and in the absence  of a clear indication of a contrary  intention in an amending enactment,  the substantive rights of the parties  to an action fall to the determined

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by the law as it existed when the  action was commenced and this is so  whether the law is change before the  hearing  of  the  case  at  the  first  instance  or  while  an  appeal  is  pending  (See  Halsbury's  Laws  of  England,  4th  Edn.,  Vol.  44,  para  922).’

28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal  position  that  emerges  is  that  when  a  repeal of an enactment is followed by a  fresh  legislation  such  legislation  does  not effect the substantive rights of the  parties  on  the  date  of  suit  or  adjudication  of  suit  unless  such  a  legislation is retrospective and a court  of appeal cannot take into consideration a  new law brought into existence after the  judgment appealed from has been rendered  because the rights of the parties in an  appeal  are  determined  under  the  law  in  force on the date of suit. However, the  position in law would be different in the  matters which relate to procedural law but  so  far  as  substantive  rights  of  parties  are  concerned  they  remain  unaffected  by  the  amendment  in  the  enactment.  We  are,  therefore, of the view that where a repeal  of provisions of an enactment is followed  by  fresh  legislation  by  an  amending  Act  such  legislation  is  prospective  in  operation and does not effect substantive  or  vested  rights  of  the  parties  unless  made retrospective either expressly or by  necessary  intendment.  We  are  further  of  the  view  that  there  is  a  presumption  against the retrospective operation of a  statue and further a statute is not to be  construed t have a greater retrospective  operation  than  its  language  renders  necessary,  but  an  amending  act  which  affects  the  procedure  is  presumed  to  be  retrospective,  unless  amending  act  provides otherwise. …….”

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(emphasis laid by this Court)

22. In view of the  aforesaid findings and reasons  

recorded by us, the acquisition proceedings in respect  

of the appellants’ land have lapsed.

    The aforesaid applications are allowed in the  

above  said  terms  and  consequently,  the  appeals  

referred to above are also allowed by quashing the  

land acquisition proceedings notification in so far as  

the land of the appellants are concerned. No costs.

   I.A. No. 6 in C.A. No.7424 of 2013 for impleadment  

is dismissed with liberty to approach the appropriate  

forum in accordance with law.

     I.A. Nos. 9 and 10 in C.A. No. 7424 of 2013 for  

intervention  and  direction  are  dismissed  as  not  

maintainable.

                         ……………………………………………………………J.                           [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

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   ……………………………………………………………J.        [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, January 22, 2015