REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5406-5445 OF 2005

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board & Anr.   .. Appellants

VERSUS

M/S Prakash Dal Mill & Ors.                 ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. The instant appeals are preferred against the final  

order and judgment of the High Court of Karnataka  

at Bangalore in W.A. Nos. 2183 to 2221 of 2000 &  

W.A.      No.  1492 of  2000 dated 18th February,  

2003 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court  

allowed  the  writ  appeal  by  setting  aside  the  

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judgment of the High Court in W.P. Nos. 23578 to  

23617 of 1999 dated 7th July, 1999.  

2. We may now briefly notice the relevant facts which  

are  necessary  for  the  adjudication  of  the  present  

case. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development  

Board  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘appellant  No.1)  

had formed an industrial layout at Tarihal village in  

the  year  1983,  pursuant  to  which,  it  invited  

interested  purchasers  to  make  applications  for  

allotment of industrial sites. Pursuant to the same,  

the respondents herein, applied for the allotment of  

sites. It is a matter of record that the respondents  

had applied  for  the  allotment  of  sites  at  different  

points of time. Consequently, the appellant issued  

letters of intent,  indicating that it  had resolved to  

allot all respondents the sites shown in their cause  

titles  at  Tarihal  Industrial  Estate.  The  said  letter  

also indicated the tentative price at which the land  

was sought to be allotted.  

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3. In response to the offer made by the appellant No.1,  

the respondents being desirous of purchasing their  

respective  plots  indicated  their  willingness for  the  

abovementioned  site.  Accordingly,  they  affirmed  

their interest to purchase the same. Thereafter, the  

letters  of  allotment  were  issued  in  favour  of  the  

respondents incorporating the terms and conditions  

of  allotment.   Subsequent  thereto,  lease-cum-sale  

agreements  were  executed  in  favour  of  the  

respondents on their complying with conditions of  

allotment.

4. One of the conditions mentioned in the lease-cum-

sale agreement reads thus:-

“7(b) As  soon  as  it  may  be  convenient  the  Lessor  will  fix  the  price  of  the  demised  premises at which it will be sold to the Lessee  and  communicate  it  to  the  Lessee  and  the  decision  of  the  Lessor  in  this  regard  will  be  final and binding on the Lessee.  The Lessee  shall  pay  the  balance  of  the  value  of  the  property,  if  any after  adjusting  the  premium  and  the  total  amount  of  rent  paid  by  the  Lessee, and earnest money deposit within one  month  from  the  date  of  receipt  of  communication  signed  by  the  Executive  

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Member of the Board.  On the other hand, if  any  sum  is  determined  as  payable  by  the  Lessor to the Lessee after  the adjustment as  aforesaid, such sum shall be refunded to the  Lessee before the date of execution of the sale  deed.”  

5. The lease-cum-sale agreement, entered into between  

the  Board  and  the  respondents,  contained  

covenants  that  the  respondents  shall  pay  99% of  

the allotment price immediately and remaining 1%  

in 10 equal yearly installments plus lease premium  

alongwith  the  interest  at  12.5%.  The  respondents  

claim to have complied with all the stipulations and  

the  conditions  incorporated  in  the  lease-cum-sale  

agreements.  It seems that the appellants even after  

a lapse of 11 long years did not execute the regular  

sale  deeds  in  favour  of  the  respondents.  On  the  

contrary,  the  appellants  after  a  gap  of  6  months  

from the date of expiry of the lease period, issued  

letters  to  the  respondents,  raising  therein  the  

demands  with  regard  to  the  final  allotment  price  

and  also  directed  the  respondents  to  pay  the  

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balance of final allotment price within a stipulated  

period. The appellants vide its Board meeting dated  

18th September, 1997 resolved to fix the final price  

of the land as follows:

Allotment  made  at  the  basic tentative  rates as  per acre (in Rs.)

Basic  final  prices  fixed per acre (in Rs.)

1. 40,000/- 1.08 lakhs 2. 60,000/- 1.27 lakhs 3. 1.00 lakh to 1.25 lakhs 2.01 lakhs 4. 1.50 lakhs to 1.60 lakhs 2.61 lakhs

6. On  receipt  of  the  aforesaid  demand,  respondents  

filed their objections individually putting forth their  

grievances  and  declined  to  pay  the  increased  

amount.  It  was contended by  them that  the  final  

allotment price was unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust  

and contrary to what was legitimately expected and  

assured  by  the  appellant,  i.e.,  only  marginal  

increase,  based  on  the  cost  of  land  acquisition.  

Pursuant to the objections filed individually by the  

respondents,  the  appellant  invited  them  to  

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Bangalore  for  a  discussion.  According  to  the  

respondents, during the course of discussions, they  

had  sought  for  the  detailed  break  up,  based  on  

which the enhanced claim was made.  The board  

had furnished them a statement showing the basis  

for  enhancement  of  the  price.  In  the  break–ups  

statement,  as  provided  by  the  appellant,  it  was  

shown that Rs.34.17 lakhs were indicated to be the  

cost of future development. The respondents having  

expressed  their  inability  to  pay  the  hiked  prices,  

once again brought to the notice of the appellants  

that  the  proposed  enhancement  was  unjust  and  

arbitrary.  Thereafter,  the  appellant  No.1,  on  

consideration  of  the  objections  raised  by  the  

respondents  reduced  the  final  allotment  price  

marginally  and  issued  demand  notices  to  the  

respondents as follows:

Basic  final  prices  fixed  in the  meeting held on  18.9.1997

Reduction in the final  prices  approved  (Rs. in lakhs)

1. 1.08 lakhs 0.95 lakhs 2. 1.27 lakhs 1.10 lakhs 3. 2.01 lakhs 1.80 lakhs

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4. 2.61 lakhs 2.40 lakhs

7. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents filed a writ  

petition W.P. No. 23578–23617 of 1999 before the  

High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore and prayed  

for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the  

letters enhancing the price and for a direction to the  

appellant to execute the sale deeds on the basis of  

the  price  indicated  in  the  lease  deed.  The  High  

Court  in  its  judgment  dated  7th July,  1999  

dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench of  

the High Court in writ appeal vide its final order and  

judgment dated             18th February, 2003 allowed  

the same and quashed the enhanced demands as  

proposed  by  the  appellant.  Hence  the  instant  

appeals by special leave before us.  

8. We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  parties.  

Ms. Kiran Suri,  learned counsel  appearing for the  

appellants submits that the High Court committed a  

grave  error  in  holding  that  Clause  7(b)  of  the  

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lease-cum-sale agreement doesn’t  confer power on  

the appellants to revise or alter the tentative price.  

She submits that the appellant No.1 is an industrial  

board established for the purpose of establishment  

of  industrial  areas.  Section  13  of  the  Karnataka  

Industrial  Areas  Development  Board  stipulates  

functions of the Board which includes establishing,  

maintaining,  developing  and  managing  industrial  

estates  within  industrial  areas.  Thus,  power  of  

fixation  of  price  of  the  land  vested  with  the  

appellant.

9. She further submits that enhanced price was fixed  

after  taking  into  consideration,  the  cost  of  

acquisition, the development expenditure, statutory  

charges and interest. The price fixed at the time of  

the  allotment  was  only  tentative  since  the  

appellants could not foresee the quantum of  land  

acquisition  compensation  that  would  be  fixed  in  

future.   The  price  so  fixed  was  uniform  to  all  

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allottees. She further submits that the High Court  

was not right in holding that the allottees of the site  

in  one  industrial  area  cannot  be  regarded  as  

persons  belonging  to  same  class.  The  final  price  

fixed was much less than the actual market price  

and hence the High Court erred in holding that it  

was  arbitrary,  unjust  and  unfair.   The  appellant  

No.1  was  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  to  

develop the industrial area as a whole and it had  

nothing to do with any class of allottees. She also  

submitted that the present matter was not one of  

escalation of price but the fixation of the final price.  

10. Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  the  final  

price  fixation  is  in  accordance  with  the  allotment  

letters  issued  to  the  respondents.  As  per  the  

allotment letter, the tentative price of the land had  

been  fixed  at  Rs.40,500/-  per  acre  in  Tarihal  

Industrial  Area.   The  allottees  were  to  exercise  

option with regard to the mode of payment of the  

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purchase price.  The letter clearly indicated that the  

price was only tentative.  The final price was fixed  

taking  into  account  the  cost  of  acquisition,  

development  expenditure,  statutory  charges  and  

interest.   On the basis of the above criteria, the cost  

of land per allotable acre worked out approximately  

to 2.61 lakhs per acre.  Therefore, the break-ups of  

the same was as follows:-  

Rs.  in  Lakhs

a) Cost of acquisition 0.20 b) Development expenditure:

Already incurred (as on 31.12.96) Future development (as estimated  on 31.12.96)

0.88 0.98

c) Statutory Charges: 0.23 d) Interest 0.32

2.61

Therefore, keeping the above cost per acre as the basis,  

the  appellant  Board,  at  its  Board  Meeting  dated  

18th September, 1997 resolved to fix the final price of the  

lands as follows:-

Allotment  made  at  the  basic tentative  rates as  per acre (in Rs.)

Basic  final  prices  fixed per acre (in Rs.)

1. 40,000/- 1.08 lakhs

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2. 60,000/- 1.27 lakhs 3. 1.00 lakh to 1.25 lakhs 2.01 lakhs 4. 1.50 lakhs to 1.60 lakhs 2.61 lakhs

11. According  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  aforesaid  

exercise  carried  out  by  the  Board  would  clearly  

indicate  that  the  decision  has  been  taken  upon  

consideration  of  all  the  relevant  parameters  for  

determination of  the final  price.   Learned counsel  

further  submitted  that  the  respondents  have  

wrongly claimed that they had been allotted plots in  

fully  developed  area.   The  development  work had  

just  begun in 1982.   These allotments have been  

made at a heavily subsidized rate.  The final price  

has been fixed to put all allottees at par, irrespective  

of the date,  area/phase/segment of the allotment.  

The development costs had been worked out as a  

whole  and  the  allottees  had  not  been  segregated  

into  separate  groups.   The  respondents  having  

voluntarily  entered  into  lease  agreement  can  not  

now  be  permitted  to  question  the  power  of  the  

Board to fix the final price.  She relied on  Premji  

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Bhai  Parmar  &  Ors. Vs.  Delhi  Development  

Authority & Ors.  1   and Centre for Public Interest  

Litigation & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.  2  .   

12. The  learned  counsel  further  submits  that  it  is  a  

settled  proposition  of  law  that  price  fixation  is  

beyond the scope of judicial review in writ petitions.  

The High Court, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction  

in  allowing  the  writ  appeal  in  favour  of  the  

respondents.  She  relied  on  the  judgment  of  this  

Court  in  the  case  of  Meerut  Development  

Authority Vs. Association  of  Management  

Studies.3 She then brought to our notice that if the  

impugned judgment prevails then it would cause a  

loss of Rs.1,66,000/- for allotment of every acre.

13. On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Basava  Prabhu  S.  Patil,  

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondents  submitted  that  the  allotment  letters  

1 (1980) 2 SCC 129 2 (2000) 8 SCC 606 3  (2009) 6 SCC  171

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have been issued by the appellant Board in exercise  

of  its  powers  under  Section  41  of  the  Karnataka  

Industrial Area Development Act, 1966.  Section 41  

empowers the Board to make regulations consistent  

with the Act and the Rules made there under,  to  

carry out the purposes of this Act.      Sub-section  

41(2) provides that the Board can make regulations  

with regard to “(b) the terms and conditions under  

which the Board may dispose of land”.  In exercise  

of  this  power,  the  Board  has  framed  Karnataka  

Industrial  Area  Development  Board  Regulations,  

1969.  Under Regulation 7, the Board has to notify  

the availability of land for which applications may  

be made by the intending purchaser.   The notice  

has to specify the manner of disposal, the last date  

for  submission  of  application  and  such  other  

particulars as the Board may consider necessary in  

each  case  by  giving  wide  publicity  through  

newspapers,  having  circulation  in  and  outside  

Karnataka State.  Upon receipt of the applications,  

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the  allotment  letter  has  to  be  issued  in  terms  of  

Regulation  10.   According  to  the  learned  senior  

counsel,  the  exercise  of  power  with  regard  to  the  

fixation of price by the Board has to be within four  

corners of the aforesaid statutory provisions.   He  

further  pointed  out  that  the  lease  agreement  

between the applicants/lessee and the Board has to  

be executed in terms of Form IV contained in the  

third  schedule.   The  Form  is  issued  in  terms  of  

Regulation 10(c).  The form being statutory, it was  

necessary  to  strictly  comply  with  the  aforesaid  

provisions.  However,  in the contracts  entered into  

between  the  appellant  Board  and  the  allottees,  

Clauses 7(a) and 7(b) have been introduced without  

amending  the  applicable  Regulations  or  Form IV.  

Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel,  

the  final  price  fixation  is  without  any  statutory  

basis.   Learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted  

that in calculating the final price, the respondents  

have not only included the cost of land acquisition  

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which  is  not  disputed,  but  also  included  future  

development  costs  and  interest  on  investments.  

According to the learned counsel, the Board had no  

power  to  levy  such  amounts  either  under  the  

contract or under the regulations.  Learned senior  

counsel submitted that the difference between the  

so  called  tentative  price  and  the  final  price  is  

excessive and unquestionable.  The increase in price  

can not be said to be marginal as the allottees are  

now required to pay double the amount which was  

initially  indicated.   Under  Clause  7  of  the  

Regulations, the appellants were required to fix the  

final price as soon as possible.  In the present case,  

the  price  has  been  finalized  after  a  period  of  13  

years.  

14. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the  

respondents were not entitled to such an arbitrary  

increase in price. This itself shows that the decision  

making  process  was  totally  flawed.   The  

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respondents  had  taken  into  consideration  factors  

which were not permissible under the Statute or the  

Regulations.  Thus, the decision has been rendered  

arbitrarily.  This is evident from the fact that a sum  

of  Rs.237.14  lakhs  is  sought  to  be  calculated for  

future  development.   Learned  senior  counsel  

submitted that the Division Bench, considering the  

entire  issue  has  recorded  the  correct  conclusions  

and, therefore, does not call for any interference.  

15. We have considered the submissions made by the  

learned counsel. It is true that under Clause 7(b),  

the Board reserved to itself the right to fix the final  

price of the demised premises as soon as it may be  

convenient to it and communicate the same to the  

concerned  lessee.   Upon  communication  of  the  

price, the lessee is required to pay the balance of  

the value of the site.  Determination of the price by  

the Board is binding on the lessee.  In our opinion,  

the aforesaid clause would not permit the Board to  

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arbitrarily or irrationally fix the final price of the site  

without  any  rational  basis.   The  power  of  price  

fixation under Clause 7 being statutory in nature  

would  have  to  be  exercised,  in  accordance  with  

statutory provisions; it can not be permitted to be  

exercised arbitrarily.  Undoubtedly, as observed by  

this  Court  in  the  case  of  Premji  Bhai  Parmar  

(supra),  Courts  would  not  reopen  the  concluded  

contracts.   Ms.  Suri  had  placed  reliance  on  the  

observations made by this Court in Paragraph 10 of  

the judgment, which are  as follows:-

“Pricing  policy  is  an  executive  policy.  If  the  Authority  was  set  up  for  making  available  dwelling units at reasonable price to persons  belonging to different income groups it would  not be precluded from devising its own price  formula  for  different  income groups.  If  in  so  doing  it  uniformly  collects  something  more  than  cost  price  from  those  with  cushion  to  benefit those who are less fortunate it cannot  be accused of discrimination. In this country  where weaker and poorer sections are unable  to  enjoy  the  basic  necessities,  namely,  food,  shelter and clothing, a body like the Authority  undertaking  a  comprehensive  policy  of  providing shelter to those who cannot afford to  have the same in the competitive albeit harsh  market of demand and supply nor can afford it  on their own meagre emoluments or income, a  little more from those who can afford for the  benefit of those who need succour, can by no  stretch of imagination attract Article 14. People  in  the  MIG  can  be  charged  more  than  the  

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actual  cost  price  so  as  to  give  benefit  to  allottees of flats in LIG, Janata and CPS. And  yet record shows that those better off got flats  comparatively  cheaper  to  such  flats  in  open  market.  It  is  a  well  recognised  policy  underlying tax law that the State has a wide  discretion in selecting the persons or objects it  will  tax  and that  the  statute  is  not  open  to  attack  on  the  ground  that  it  taxes  some  persons or objects and not others.  It  is  only  when within  the range of its selection the  law  operates  unequally,  and  this  cannot  be  justified on the basis of a valid classification,  that  there would be a  violation of  Article  14  (see East India Tobacco Co. v. State of A.P.).  Can it be said that classification income-wise- cum-scheme-wise  is  unreasonable?  The  answer is a firm no. Even the petitioners could  not point out unequal treatment in same class.  However,  a  feeble attempt was made to urge  that  allottees  of  flats  in  MIG  scheme  at  Munirka which project  came up at  or  about  the  same  time  were  not  subjected  to  surcharge. This will be presently examined but  aside from that, contention is that why within  a  particular  period,  namely,  November,  1976  to  January,  1977  the  policy  of  levying  surcharge  was  resorted  to  and  that  in  MIG  schemes  pertaining  to  period  prior  to  November,  1976  and  later  April,  1977  no  surcharge was levied. If a certain pricing policy  was  adopted  for  a  certain  period  and  was  uniformly applied to projects coming up during  that period, it cannot be the foundation for a  submission why such policy was not adopted  earlier or abandoned later.”

16. In  our  opinion,  these  observations  would  not  be  

applicable in the facts of this case.  The appellants  

are required to fix  the  price  within the  stipulated  

parameters contained in the Statute and the Board  

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Regulations.     Ms.  Suri  has  also  relied  on  a  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Indore  

Development  Authority Vs.  Sadhana  Agarwal  

(Smt.) & Ors.  4   in support of the submissions that  

since  the  allotment  letters  indicated  only  the  

tentative price, the respondents could not demand  

that they be allowed the sites at the original price.  

In that case, this  Court observed as follows:-        

“Although this  Court  has from time to  time,  taking the special facts and circumstances of  cases  in  question,  has  upheld  the  excess  charged  by  the  development  authorities  over  the cost initially announced as estimated cost,  but  it  should  not  be  understood  that  this  Court  has  held  that  such  development  authorities have absolute right to hike the cost  of flats, initially announced as approximate or  estimated cost for such flats. It is well known  that  persons  belonging  to  middle  and  lower  income  groups,  before  registering  themselves  for  such  flats,  have  to  take  their  financial  capacity into consideration and in some cases  it  results  in  great  hardship  when  the  development  authorities  announce  an  estimated or approximate cost and deliver the  same at twice or thrice of the said amount. The  final  cost  should  be  proportionate  to  the  approximate  or  estimated  cost  mentioned  in  the offers or agreements. With the high rate of  inflation,  escalation  of  the  prices  of  construction materials and labour charges, if  the scheme is not ready within the time-frame,  then it  is  not possible  to deliver  the  flats  or  houses in question at the cost so announced.  

4 (1995) 3 SCC 1

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It will be advisable that before offering the flats  to  the  public  such  development  authorities  should fix the estimated cost of the flats taking  into  consideration  the  escalation  of  the  cost  during  the  period  the  scheme  is  to  be  completed.  In the  instant  case the estimated  cost  for  the  LIG  flat  was  given  out  at  Rs 45,000.  But  by  the  impugned  communication,  the  appellant  informed  the  respondents  that  the  actual  cost  of  the  flat  shall be Rs 1,16,000 i.e. the escalation is more  than 100%.  The  High  Court  was justified  in  saying  that  in  such  circumstances,  the  Authority owed a duty to explain and to satisfy  the  Court,  the  reasons  for  such  high  escalation.  We  may  add  that  this  does  not  mean that  the  High Court  in such disputes,  while  exercising  the  writ  jurisdiction,  has  to  examine every detail  of the construction with  reference to the cost incurred. The High Court  has to be satisfied on the materials on record  that  the  Authority  has  not  acted  in  an  arbitrary or erratic manner.”

17. These  observations  make  it  clear  that  the  High  

Court  has  the  jurisdiction  to  satisfy  itself  on  the  

material on record that the authority has not acted  

in an arbitrary or erratic manner.  In our opinion,  

the High Court, in the present case, has not acted  

beyond such jurisdiction.  Ms. Suri then relied on  

the  case  of  Kanpur  Development  Authority Vs.  

Sheela Devi (Smt.) & Ors.  5     In the aforesaid case,  

this  Court  reiterated  the  jurisdiction  of  the  High  

5 (2003) 12 SCC 497

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Court to satisfy itself, that there was material on the  

record  to  justify  the  escalation  of  cost  of  a  

house/flat.   The  Court  can  take  notice  as  to  

whether the delay was caused by the allottee or the  

authority itself.  In our opinion, the judgment of the  

High  Court  is  within  the  parameters  of  the  

jurisdiction vested in it under       Article 226 of the  

Constitution of India.     

18. The  Board  being  a  State  within  the  meaning  of  

Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to  

act  fairly,  reasonably  and  not  arbitrarily  or  

whimsically.  The guarantee of equality before law  

or  equal  protection  of  the  law,  under  Article  14  

embraces within its realm exercise of discretionary  

powers by the State.  The High Court examined the  

entire issue on the touchstone of Article 14 of the  

Constitution of India.  It has been observed that the  

fixation of price done by the Board has violated the  

Article 14 of the Constitution of India.  It is correctly  

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observed that though Clause 7(b) permits the Board  

to  fix  the  final  price  of  the  demised  premises,  it  

cannot be said that where the Board arbitrarily or  

irrationally fixes the final price of the site without  

any basis, such fixation of the price could bind the  

lessee. In such circumstances, the Court will have  

the  jurisdiction  to  annul  the  decision,  upon  

declaring the same to be void and non-est.  A bare  

perusal of Clause 7(b) would show that it does not  

lay  down  any  fixed  components  of  final  price.  

Clause 7(b) also does not speak about the power of  

the Board to revise or alter the tentative price fixed  

at  the  time  of  allotment.   The  High  Court  has  

correctly observed that Clause 7(b) does not contain  

any guidelines which would ensure that the Board  

does not act arbitrarily  in fixing the final price of  

demised premises. Since the validity of the aforesaid  

Clause  was  not  challenged,  the  High  Court  has  

rightly  refrained  from  expressing  any  opinion  

thereon.

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19. Even  though  the  Clause  gives  the  Board  an  

undefined power to fix the final price, it would have  

to be exercised in accordance with the principle of  

rationality and reasonableness. The Board can and  

is entitled to take into account the final cost of the  

demised premises in the event of it incurring extra  

expenditure after the allotment of the site. But in  

the  garb  of  exercising  the  power  to  fix  the  final  

price, it can not be permitted to saddle the earlier  

allottees with the liability of sharing the burden of  

expenditure by the Board in developing some other  

sites subsequent to the allotment of the site to the  

respondents.   The  respondents  have  placed  on  

record sufficient material  to show that acquisition  

and development of land in the industrial area has  

been in phases. Some areas and segments are fully  

developed  and  others  are  in  different  stages  of  

development. Sites and plots have been allotted at  

different  times  and  locations.  Thus,  it  cannot  be  

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said  that  all  the  allottees  form one  class.  Earlier  

allottees  having  sites  in  fully  developed  segments  

cannot  be  intermingled  with  the  subsequent  

allottees in areas which may be wholly undeveloped.  

Such action is clearly violation of       Article 14. We  

are also of the opinion that the Board can not be  

permitted to exercise its powers of fixing the final  

price under Clause 7(b) at any indefinite time in the  

future  after  the  allotment  is  made.   This  would  

render the word “as soon as” in Clause 7(b) wholly  

redundant.  As noticed earlier, in the present case,  

the Board has sought to fix the final price after a  

gap of 13 years. Such a course is not permissible in  

view  of  the  expression  “as  soon  as”  contained  in  

Clause 7(b).

20. In our opinion, the High Court correctly concluded  

that  the  fixation  of  final  price  by  the  Board  is  

without authority of law.   It violates Article 14 of  

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the  Constitution  of  India  being  arbitrary  and  

unreasonable exercise of discretionary powers.   

21. In  view  of  the  above,  we  find  no  merit  in  these  

appeals.  The appeals are accordingly dismissed.   

……………………………..J.                                                [B.Sudershan Reddy]

……………………………..J.   [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi April 06, 2011.

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