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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   8410   OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.19532 of 2011)

Kamaljit Singh …Appellant

Vs.

Sarabjit Singh …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of an order dated 9th July, 2010  

passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at  

Chandigarh whereby Civil Revision Petition No.580 of 2005  

filed by the appellant has been dismissed and order dated 5th  

November, 2004 passed by the Rent Controller, Phagwara,  

dismissing a petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab  

Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 upheld.  

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3. The suit premises comprise a shop in a building bearing  

No.XVI/258/1 situate at Banga Road, Phagwara.  It was let  

out to the respondent-tenant by the appellant who was born  

and brought up in India but having spent over 30 years in  

U.K.  has returned in  the year  2000 with the intention to  

settle  down  and  establish  a  hotel  at  Phagwara  his  home  

town.  An eviction petition under Section 13-B of the East  

Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949 was filed by the  

appellant on the ground that as a Non Resident Indian in  

need of the shop for his own use, he was entitled to have  

the same vacated from the respondent-tenant.

4. The eviction petition was contested by the respondent  

on several grounds including the ground that the appellant  

was not a NRI and that the eviction petition was barred by  

the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. It was also contended  

by the respondent-tenant that although he was a tenant in  

occupation of  the premises under the appellant,  the sale-

deeds relied upon by the respondent did not relate to the  

land underlying the shop in question.  5. By  an  order  dated  5th November,  2004,  the  Rent  

Controller  dismissed  the  eviction  petition  filed  by  the  

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appellant holding that the appellant had failed to prove his  

ownership over the demised premises for a period of five  

years  before  the  filing  of  the  eviction  petition.  The  Rent  

Controller  held  that  the  deposition  of  the  witnesses  

appearing on behalf  of  the appellant  did not  satisfactorily  

prove that the building comprising the shops one of which  

happened to be the suit shop was constructed on the land  

purchased by the appellant in terms of the two sale-deeds  

set  up by him.  The Rent  Controller  was of  the view that  

although the sale-deeds in question had been proved by the  

appellant,  he had failed to co-relate the same to the suit  

shop or other shops over which he claimed ownership. The  

Rent Controller, therefore, dismissed the eviction petition no  

matter  the appellant's  case that  he was an NRI and had  

returned home to set up his own business was accepted.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the  

Rent Controller, the appellant filed revision petition No.580  

of  2005 before the High Court of  Punjab and Haryana at  

Chandigarh. An application for permission to lead additional  

evidence filed by the appellant in the said revision petition to  

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establish that the sale-deeds proved by the appellant at the  

trial,  indeed  related  to  the  land  comprising  the  shop  in  

dispute was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated  

9th July,  2010 and so also the revision petition.  The High  

Court concurred with  the view that the appellant had failed  

to prove that he was the owner of the suit shop for more  

than five years prior to the filing of the petition, a condition  

essential for invoking the provisions of Section 13-B of the  

Act. The High Court also held that the additional evidence  

sought to be adduced was very much within the knowledge  

of the appellant and could have been adduced by him if only  

he was diligent in doing so.  Additional evidence, could not,  

observed the High Court, be allowed to fill up the lacunae in  

the appellants’ case.

7. Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Land Restriction  

Act, 1949 reads as under:  “13-B. Right to recover immediate possession   of  residential  building  or  scheduled  and/or  non-residential  building  to  accrue  to  Non- resident Indian – (1) Where an owner is a Non- Resident  Indian  and  returns  to  India  and  the  residential  building  or  scheduled  building  and/or   non-residential building, as the case may be, let out   by him or her, is required for his or her use, or for   the  use  of  any  one  ordinarily  living  with  and   dependent on him or her, he or she, may apply to   

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the  Controller  for  immediate  possession  of  such  building or buildings, as the case may be:

Provided  that  a  right  to  apply  in  respect  of   such a building under this section, shall be available   only after  a  period of  five years from the date of   becoming the owner of such a building and shall be   available only once during the life time of such an   owner.

(2) Where the owner referred to in sub-section (1),   has  let  out  more  than  one  residential  building  or   scheduled building and/or non-residential building, it   shall be open to him or her to make an application   under  that  sub-section  in  respect  of  only  one   residential building or one scheduled building and/or   one non-residential building, each chosen by him or   her;

(3) Where  an  owner  recovers  possession  of  a   building  under  this  section,  he  or  she  shall  not   transfer it through sale or any other means or let it   out before the expiry of a period of five years from  the date of taking possession of the said building,   failing which, the evicted tenant may apply to the   Controller  for  an  order  directing  that  he  shall  be   restored the possession of the said building and the   Controller shall make an order accordingly.”  

8. A careful  reading  of  the  above would show that  the  

same entitles a Non-Resident Indian who returns to India to  

demand  eviction  of  any  residential  or  non-residential  

building, as the case may be, let out by him or her, if the  

same is required by such non-resident Indian for his or her  

use or for the use of any one ordinarily living and dependant  

on him or her. In terms of the proviso, however, the right to  

seek eviction of the tenant is available only after a period of  

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five  years  from  the  date  of  such  Non-Resident  Indian  

becoming owner of any such building. It is further subject to  

the condition that any such right shall be available to a Non-

Resident Indian owner of the premises only once during his  

life time.

9. In  terms of  sub-section  (2)  the  Non-Resident  Indian  

owner  of  the  demised  premises  is  entitled  to  apply  for  

eviction from only one residential or one scheduled building  

or one non-residential building chosen by him or her. Sub-

section (3) postulates that if the owner recovers possession  

of the building under Section 13-B but transfers it through  

sale or any other means or lets the same out before the  

expiry  of  a  period  of  five  years  from the  date  of  taking  

possession  of  the  said  building,  the  evicted  tenant  may  

apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be  

restored  the  possession  of  the  said  building  and  the  

Controller  shall  make  an  order  accordingly.  There  is,  

therefore, no gainsaying that Section 13-B is a code by itself  

for the special category of cases where the landlord happens  

to be a non-resident Indian who returns to India and needs  

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the demised premises for his or her own use or for the use  

of  anyone ordinarily  living with and dependant on him or  

her. The only limitation on the exercise of the right vested  

under  Section  13-B  (supra)  is  that  the  NRI  owner  must  

apply for eviction of the tenant only after a period of five  

years  from  the  date  he  becomes  the  owner  of  such  a  

building and that any such right shall be exercisable by him  

only once during his life time and in respect of one of the  

several buildings that he may be owning. The short question  

that arises in the above backdrop is whether the appellant  

had satisfied the above conditions in the case at hand.

10. In  support  of  his  claim  of  ownership  over  the  suit  

premises, the appellant places reliance upon two sale-deeds  

one dated 10th April,  1985 and the other dated 19th April,  

1985. These sale-deeds have been satisfactorily proved and  

accepted at the trial before the Rent Controller. The findings  

recorded by the Rent Controller to that effect are clear and  

specific.  What is according to the Rent Controller and the  

High  Court,  not  established  is  that  the  sale-deeds  relied  

upon  by  the  appellant  relate  to  the  land  underlying  the  

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shops. That view is not, in our opinion, sound. The reasons  

are not far to seek.  The appellant has, in para 1 of the  

amended eviction petition, made a specific averment to the  

effect that the appellant is the owner of the building bearing  

No.XVI/258/1, situate at Banga Road, Phagwara, comprising  

15  shops  and  open  courtyard,  as  described  in  the  plan  

attached with the eviction petition. In reply, the respondent-

tenant has denied the ownership of the appellant over the  

shop in dispute. It is also denied that there are 15 shops in  

the  building  in  dispute.  It  is,  however,  admitted  by  the  

respondent that 6 out of the several shops that comprise the  

building,  are  in  the  possession  of  the  appellant-landlord  

while the remaining are in possession of the tenants each  

one of  them having  a  separate  provision  for  ingress  and  

egress.  More  importantly,  the  appellant  has  in  para  2  

asserted that the respondent is a tenant in shop no.4 under  

the  appellant  since  the  same was demised  in  1989 on  a  

monthly  rent of  Rs.400/-.  The respondent in reply  to the  

said averment admits that he is in occupation of the shop in  

dispute but denies that his possession relates back to the  

year 1989. The respondent’s case is that he is in possession  

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of the suit shop since the year 1992 only.  Para 2 of the  

reply to the eviction petition reads:

“2. That para no.2 of the application is correct only   to the extent that the respondent is in possession of   the shop in dispute.  The rest of the para is wrong   and incorrect.   The respondent is  in possession of   the shop in dispute since 1992 not from 1989, the   answering  respondents  is  not  the  subletee  of  the   shop in dispute.  The respondent took the shop in   dispute  on  rent  and  since  the  day  of  creation  of   tenancy  the  respondent  works  in  the  shop  in   dispute.”

11. It is evident from the above that the respondent does  

not  dispute  either  the  jural  relationship  of  landlord  and  

tenant  between  the  parties  or  the  rate  of  rent  settled  

between them. All that the respondent has asserted is that  

he has been in possession of the shop since the year 1992  

and not since 1989 as asserted by the appellant. It is also  

not the case of the respondent that he is the owner of the  

suit  shop  or  that  he  had  taken  the  same  on  rent  from  

anyone other than the appellant. Such being the position,  

the question is whether the respondent can dispute the title  

of the appellant over the shop assuming that he was let in  

possession by the appellant in the year 1992 as asserted by  

him and not in the year 1989. Our answer is in the negative.  

We say so because once the respondent admits that he has  

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been let in possession as a tenant by the appellant in the  

year 1992 i.e. more than 10 years before the filing of the  

eviction Petition, the requirement of appellant being owner  

of the property for more than five years within the meaning  

of  Section  13-B  (supra)  would  stand  satisfied.  The  

respondent would then be estopped from denying the title of  

the appellant during the continuance of the benefit that he is  

drawing  under  the  transaction,  between  him  and  the  

appellant.  It is trite that the doctrine of estoppel is steeped  

in the principles of equity and good conscience. Equity will  

not allow a person to say one thing at one time and the  

opposite  of  it  another  time.   It  would  estop  him  from  

denying  his  previous  assertion,  act,  conduct  or  

representation  to  say  something  contrary  to  what  was  

implied  in  the  transaction  under  which  he  obtained  the  

benefit  of  being  let  in  possession  of  the  property  to  be  

enjoyed by him as a tenant.  

12. Lord Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and  

17th Century English Jurist explains estoppel thus:  

“Cometh of the French Word ‘estoupe’, from where   the  English  word  stopped;  and  it  is  called  an   

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estoppels or conclusion, because a man’s own act or   acceptance stoppeth or closet up his mouth to allege  or plead the truth.” [Co. Litt. 352a]

13. Law  Lexicon (Second  Edition,  Page  656)  defines  

estoppel in the following words:

“An Estoppel  is  an admission,  or  something which   the law treats as an equivalent to an admission, of   so high and conclusive a nature that any one who is   affected by it is not permitted to contradict it.” [11th  

Edn p. 744 in the note to the Dutchess of Kingston’s   case]

“An admission or determination under circumstances   of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact   so admitted to be questioned by the parties or their   privies.”

“The preclusion of a person from asserting a fact, by   previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own  part, or on the part of those under whom he claims.”

14. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edn., page 629) describes  

Estoppel as :

“A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or   right  that  contradicts  what  one  has  said  or  done   before or what has been legally established as true.”

    15. Section  116 of  the  Evidence  Act  deals  with  estoppel  

against tenants and of licensees or persons in possession.  

Estoppel under this provision falls in the category of estoppel  

by contract and is relatively a recent development.  The rule  

embodied  in  Section  116  simply  prevents  the  tenant  in  

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occupation  of  the  premises  from denying  the  title  of  the  

landlord who let him into possession, just as it applies to a  

mortgagor or a mortgagee, vendor or a vendee, bailer or a  

bailee and licensor or a licensee. The rationale underlying  

the doctrine of estoppel against the tenant’s denial of title of  

his landlord was stated by Jessel. M.R. in Re: Stringer’s  

Estate, LR Ch 9 as under:

“Where a man having no title obtains possession of   land under a demise by a man in possession who  assumes  to  give  him a  title  as  tenant,  he  cannot   deny his landlord’s title. This is perfectly intelligible   doctrine.   He took possession under  a  contract  to   pay rent  so long as he held possession under  the   landlord, and to give it up at the end of the term to   the landlord, and having taken it in that way he is   not  allowed  to  say  that  the  man  whose  title  he  admits and under whose title he took possession has   not a title. That is a well-established doctrine. That is   estoppel by contract.”                      

16. There is considerable authority for the proposition both  

in India as well as in U.K. that a tenant in possession of the  

property cannot deny the title  of  the landlord.   But if  he  

wishes to do so he must first surrender the possession of the  

property back to him.  He cannot, while enjoying the benefit  

conferred upon him by the benefactor, question latter’s title  

to  the  property.  Section 116  clearly  lends  itself  to  that  

interpretation when it says:

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“116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person   in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or   person claiming through such tenant,  shall,  during   the  continuance  of  the  tenancy,  be  permitted  to   deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at  the   beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable   property;  and  no  person  who  came  upon  any   immovable property by the licence of the person in   possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that   such person had a title  to such possession at  the  time when such licence was given.”

17. A three-Judge of this Court in  Sri Ram Pasricha v.  

Jagannath  and Ors.  (1976)  4  SCC  184 reiterated  the  

principle that a tenant in a suit for possession was estopped  

from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116  

of the Evidence Act.  The title of the landlord, declared this  

Court, even otherwise irrelevant in a suit for eviction of the  

tenant. The only exception to the rule of estoppel as stated  

in Section 116 (supra) may be where the tenant is validly  

attorned to the paramount title  holder  of  the property or  

where that the plaintiff-landlord had, during the intervening  

period, lost his title to the property.  We are not, however,  

dealing with a case where the respondent-tenant claims that  

the property is vested in anyone else who could be described  

as the paramount title holder or there was any extinction of  

the title of the appellant on any count whatsoever since the  

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induction of the respondent as a tenant into the premises.  

We need not, therefore, be detained by any one of those  

considerations.  What is important is that so long as a jural  

relationship exists between the respondent-tenant and the  

appellant  and  so  long  as  he  has  not  surrendered  the  

possession  of  the  premises  in  his  occupation,  he  cannot  

question  the  title  of  the  appellant  to  the  property.  The  

inevitable  inference  flowing  from  the  above  proposition  

would be that (viz-a-viz the respondent) the appellant was  

and continues to be the owner of the premises in question  

since the year 1992 when the respondent was inducted as a  

tenant.  Reckoned  from  the  year  1992  the  appellant  has  

established his ownership of the premises for a period of five  

years  before  the  filing  of  the  eviction  petition  thereby  

entitling him to invoke the provisions of Section 13-B of the  

East Punjab Urban Land Restriction Act, 1949.

18. We must before parting remind ourselves that Section  

13-B is a beneficial provision intended to provide a speedy  

remedy to NRIs who return to their native places and need  

property let out by them for their own requirement or the  

requirement of those who are living with and economically  

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dependent upon them.  Their position cannot, therefore, be  

worse off  than what it  would have been if  they were not  

Non-Resident  Indians.  If  ordinarily  a  landlord  cannot  be  

asked to prove his title before getting his tenant evicted on  

any one of the grounds stipulated for such eviction, we see  

no reason why he should be asked to do so only because he  

happens to be a Non-Resident Indian. The general principles  

of Evidence Act including the doctrine of estoppel enshrined  

in Section 116 are applicable even to the tenants occupying  

properties of the Non-Resident Indians referred to in the Act.

19. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Courts  

below fell  in  manifest  error  in  holding that  the appellant-

landlord was obliged to prove his title to the property, no  

matter  the  tenant  clearly  admits  the  existence  of  jural  

relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  him and  the  

appellant.  We have, in the circumstances no hesitation in  

reversing  the  view  taken  by  the  Courts  below  and  in  

decreeing the eviction petition.

20. We  accordingly  allow  this  appeal,  set  aside  the  

judgment and order passed by the Courts below and direct  

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eviction of the respondent from the suit premises. Since the  

respondent has been in possession of the suit property for a  

considerable  length of  time,  we are inclined to grant him  

reasonable  time to  do so.  We accordingly  direct  that  the  

respondent shall have time till  31st March, 2015 to vacate  

the  premises  in  question  and  handover  the  peaceful  

possession  of  the  same  to  the  appellant  subject  to  the  

following conditions:

    (1) The respondent files  an undertaking in this  Court on  

usual terms within four weeks.

(2) The respondent deposits  arrears of  rent, if  any, with  

the Rent Controller within six weeks from today.

(3) The  respondent  pays/deposits  with  Rent  Controller  

compensation for use and occupation of the premises  

@Rs.2000/-  per  month  w.e.f.  1st September,  2014  

onwards till the date of vacation. (4) In the event of the failure of the respondent to comply  

with  any  one  of  the  above  conditions,  the  order  of  

eviction shall become executable, forthwith.

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 ……………………………..…….…..…J.      (T.S. THAKUR)

     …………………………..……………..J.       (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi,  September 2, 2014

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