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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 558 OF 2012

Kalpana Mehta and Others Petitioner(s)

  Versus

Union of India and Others Respondent(s)

W I T H

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 921 OF 2013

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Though the present writ petitions were preferred in the

years 2012 and 2013 and the debate had centered around on

many  an  aspect  relating  to  action  taken  by  the  Drugs

Controller General of India and the Indian Council of Medical

Research (ICMR) pertaining to approval of a vaccine, namely,

Human  Papilloma  Virus  (HPV)  manufactured  by  the

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respondent No. 7, M/s. GlaxoSmithKline Asia Pvt. Ltd. and

the respondent No.8, MSD Pharmaceuticals Private Limited,

respectively for preventing cervical cancer in women and the

experimentation of the vaccine was done as an immunization

by the Governments of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh (before

bifurcation, the State of Andhra Pradesh, eventually the State

of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  the  State  of  Telangana)  with  the

charity  provided  by  the  respondent  No.6,  namely,  PATH

International.   The  issue  also  arose  with  regard  to  the

untimely  death  of  certain  persons  and  grant  of

compensation. Certain orders were passed by this Court from

time to time.   

2. A stage came in the life span of this litigation, which is

still  in continuation, when the Court  vide order dated 12th

August, 2014, had posed the following questions:-

“i) Whether  before  the  drug was  accepted to  be used  as  a  vaccine  in  India,  the  Drugs  Controller General  of  India  and  the  ICMR had  followed  the procedure for said introduction?

ii) What  is  the  action  taken  after  the Parliamentary  Committee  had  submitted  the 72nd report on 30.08.2013?

iii) What  are  the  reasons  for  choosing  certain places in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh?

iv) What has actually caused the deaths and other

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ailments  who  had  been  administered  the  said vaccine?

v) Assuming this vaccine has been administered, regard being had to the nature of the vaccine, being not an ordinary one, what steps have been taken for monitoring the same by the competent authorities of  the  Union  of  India,  who  are  concerned  with health  of  the  nation  as  well  as  the  State Governments who have an equal role in this regard?

vi) The girls who were administered the vaccine, whether proper consent has been taken from their parents/guardians, as we have been apprised at the Bar that the young girls had not reached the age of majority?

vii) What  protocol  is  required  to  be observed/followed,  assuming  this  kind  of vaccination is required to be carried out?”

3. In  the  said  order,  the  Court  had  also  directed  as

follows:-

“At  this  juncture,  we  are  obligated  to  state  the Union of India, who is required to assist this Court in  proper  perspective,  shall  direct  its  competent authority  to  produce the  file  by  which the  Drugs Controller  General  of  India  had  approved  the vaccine for introduction in India.  Mr. Suri, learned senior counsel for the Union of India will produce the said file.  Additionally, the relevant documents shall also be provided to the concerned counsel for the petitioners.”

4. In the course of proceedings, affidavits were filed by the

Union of India and the State of Gujarat.  Learned counsel for

the petitioners, Mr. Colin Gonsalves in Writ Petition (C) No.

558 of 2012 and Mr. Anand Grover in Writ Petition (C)  No.

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921 of 2013 had drawn the attention of this Court to the 81st

Report  dated  22nd December,  2014  of  the  Parliamentary

Standing Committee.   Be it  noted,  when the  report  of  the

Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  was  produced,  the

question arose with regard to the “concept  of  consent”  for

administration of vaccine and the resultant illness suffered

by  the  victims  and  such  other  issues  and  the  Court  had

issued certain directions for filing of affidavits pertaining to

steps that have been taken by the concerned Governments

keeping in view the various instructions given from time to

time  including  what  has  been  stated  in  the  report  of  the

Parliamentary Standing Committee.

5. It is worthy to note here that certain affidavits were filed

about the safety measures being undertaken with regard to

the consent and the method of trial and the improvements

made thereon.  In essence, the stand of the Union of India

and the States was that the vaccine was necessary and steps

have been taken to avoid any kind of hazards.  That apart,

the  factual  allegations  made  by  the  petitioners  were  also

controverted.

6. On 18th November,  2015,  an issue was raised by the

learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 8,

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MSD Pharmaceuticals  Private  Limited  and  by  the  learned

Additional  Solicitor  General  whether  this  Court  while

exercising  the  power  of  judicial  review  or  its  expansive

jurisdiction under Article 32 dealing with the public interest

litigation,  can  advert  to  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary

Standing Committee and on that basis issue directions.  After

the said issue was posed, the learned counsel for the parties

sought time to file written notes of submissions and argue

the matter.  Regard being had to importance of the matter,

assistance  of  the  learned  Attorney  General  for  India  was

sought.

7. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India

has filed a written note of submission contending, inter alia,

that the reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee are

at best external aids of construction in order to determine the

surrounding  circumstances  or  the  historical  facts  for  the

purpose of  discerning the mischief  sought to be remedied,

but  not  for  any other  purpose.  He has referred to  certain

authorities  which  we  shall  refer  to  in  the  course  of  our

deliberation.   We may clarify that though Mr. Rohatgi has

filed the written note  of  submissions,  today we have  been

assisted by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General, Mr.

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A.K. Panda and Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel

and Mrs. Rekha Pandey, learned counsel on behalf of Union

of India.

8. Mr. Grover and Mr. Gonsalves, learned senior counsel

appearing  for  the  petitioners,  who  intend  to  reply  on  the

report of  the Parliamentary Standing Committee submitted

that  looking  at  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee by this Court in a writ petition preferred under

Article 32 of the Constitution is only to be apprised about

facts  to arrive  at  a conclusion for  the purpose of  issue of

necessitous directions and there cannot be absolute rule that

it  cannot  be  looked  at.   According  to  them,  there  is  no

impediment to rely on the said report as the reports of the

Parliamentary Standing Committee  are  put on the  website

and in such a situation, the Court can always take aid of the

report  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  the

legislative intendment of a legislation, but also for taking the

facts  into  consideration  to  issue  any  prerogative  writ.

Learned senior counsel would contend that as long as the

reference to report does not violate the freedom of speech of

the  members  of  the  Committee  or  there  is  no  attempt  to

impugn the report or criticize the same, reliance on the same

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should not be prohibited.  It is urged by Mr. Gonsalves that

the role of the Parliament in the modern democracy has gone

beyond the traditional concept and the perception is to have

a transparent society and when there is access to the report,

there is no warrant not to utilize the same in a proceeding

before the Court.

9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of India

would in reply submit that the arguments advanced by the

learned counsel for the petitioners are to be tested on the

constitutional  parameters  and  various  Articles  of  the

Constitution  are  to  be  read  in  proper  perspective.  It  is

asserted  by  him  that  the  constitutional  scheme  does  not

favour the interpretation which is sought to be placed by the

learned counsel for the petitioners.  According to the learned

counsel for Union of India, the report of the Parliamentary

Standing Committees are meant to guide the functioning of

the departments and work as a precursor to the debate in

Parliament but not meant to be used in court as it does not

countenance any contest in a court of law.  

10. To appreciate the controversy, we may usefully refer to

the  Rules  of  Procedure  and  Conduct  of  Business  of  Lok

Sabha Rules  (for  short,  'the  Rules').   Rule  2  of  the  Rules

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defines  the  “Parliamentary  Committee”.   For  the  sake  of

completeness, we reproduce the same:-

““Parliamentary  Committee”  means  a  Committee which  is  appointed  or  elected  by  the  House  or nominated by the Speaker and which works under the direction of the Speaker and presents its report to the House or to the Speaker and the Secretariat for which is provided by the Lok Sabha Secretariat.”

11. Chapter  26  of  the  Rules  deals  with  Parliamentary

Committees  and  the  matters  regarding  appointment,

quorum, decisions of the committee, etc.  There are two kinds

of Parliamentary Committees: (i) Standing Committees, and

(ii)  Adhoc  Committees.    The  Standing  Committees  are

categorized  by  their  nature  of  functions.  The  Standing

Committees of the Lok Sabha are as follows:-

“a) Financial Committees;

b) Subject Committees or Departmentally related standing committees of the two houses;

c) Houses Committee i.e. the Committees relating to the day to day business of the House;

d) Enquiry Committee;

e) Scrutiny Committees;

f) Service Committees;

vi) A  list  of  Standing Committees  of  Lok  Sabha along  with  its  membership  is  reproduced  as under:

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Name of Committee Number of Members

Business Advisory Committee 15

Committee of Privileges 15

Committee  on  Absence  of Members from the Sittings of the House  Committee  on Empowerment of Women

15

Committee on Estimates 30

Committee on Government  Assurances

15

Committee on Papers Laid on the Table  

15

Committee on Petitions 15

Committee  on  Private  Members Bills and Resolutions

15

Committee on Public Accounts 22

Committee on Public  Undertakings

22

Committee on Subordinate  Legislation

15

Committee  on  the  Welfare  of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

30

House Committee 12

Joint Committee on Offices of  Profit  

15

Joint Committee on Salaries and Allowances  of  Members  of Parliament

15

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Library Committee 9

Rules Committee 15

vi) Apart  from  the  above,  there  are  various departmentally  related  Standing  Committees under various ministries.”

12. From  the  aforesaid,  it  is  quite  clear  that  there  are

various departmentally  related Standing Committees under

various Ministries.  It is apt to note here that in the case at

hand, Rule 270 of the Rules which deals with the functions

of the Parliamentary Committee meant for Committees Rajya

Sabha is relevant.  It reads as follows:-

“270. Functions  

Each of the Standing Committees shall have the following functions, namely:—  

(a) to  consider  the  Demands  for  Grants  of  the related  Ministries/  Departments  and  report thereon. The report shall not suggest anything of the nature of cut motions;  

(b) to  examine  Bills,  pertaining  to  the  related Ministries/  Departments,  referred  to  the Committee by the Chairman or the Speaker, as the case may be, and report thereon;  

(c) to  consider  the  annual  reports  of  the Ministries/Departments  and  report  thereon; and

(d) to  consider  national  basic  long  term  policy documents  presented  to  the  Houses,  if referred to the Committee by the Chairman or the Speaker, as the case may be, and report

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thereon:  Provided  that  the  Standing Committees  shall  not  consider  matters  of day-to-day  administration  of  the  related Ministries/Departments.”

13. Rule 271 provides for applicability of provisions relating

to  functions.   Rule  274  deals  with  the  report  of  the

Committee.  The said Rule reads as follows:-

“274. Report of the Committee  

(1) The report of the Standing Committee shall be based on broad consensus.

(2) Any member of the Committee may record a minute of dissent on the report of the Committee.

(3) The report of the Committee, together with the minutes of dissent, if any, shall be presented to the Houses.”

14. Rule 274(3) is extremely significant, for it provides that

the report of the Committee together with the Minutes of the

dissent, if any, is to be presented to the House.  Rule 277

stipulates that the report is to have persuasive value.  The

said Rule is as follows:-

“277.  Reports  to  have  persuasive  value.—  The report  of  a  Standing  Committee  shall  have persuasive value and shall be treated as considered advice given by the Committee.”

15. Relying on the said Rule,  it  is  argued by the learned

counsel  for  the petitioners that  the report  of  the Standing

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Committee has a persuasive value and hence, it can be taken

note of  for the purpose of  fact finding by this Court.   The

learned  counsel  for  the  Union  of  India,  on  the  contrary,

would contend that  as  per  the  scheme of  the  Rules,  it  is

meant to have persuasive value and considered as an advice

given by the Standing Committee to the Parliament.

16. It is submitted on behalf of the Union of India that the

Rules 277 – 279 deal with submission of the Report of the

Committee and provide that  if  no time frame is given,  the

same  would  be  submitted  within  a  month  from  the

appointment  of  the  Committee  and  the  reports  shall  be

presented  to  the  House  by  the  Chairperson.  It  is  further

urged that the reports submitted by the different Committees

are examined/debated by the House and only thereafter they

are adopted. Our attention has been drawn to Rule 277 and

Rule  278 made for  Lok Sabha which provide for  Scope of

Advice  regarding  reports  submitted  by  Select/Joint

Committees.  In essence,  the purpose of  reliance is,  it  is  a

matter of concern to the debates in the Parliament.

17. At this juncture, we may look at the origin and working

of the Parliamentary Committee.  The Committee system in

India,  as  has  been  stated  in  “The  Committee  System  in

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India : Effectiveness in Enforcing Executive Accountability”,

Hanoi Session, March 2015, is as follows:-

“The origin of the Committee system in India can be traced back to the Constitutional Reforms of 1919. The  Standing  Orders  of  the  Central  Legislative Assembly  provided  for  a  Committee  on  Petitions relating to Bills, Select Committee on Amendments of Standing Orders, and Select Committee on Bills. There was also  a  provision for  a  Public  Accounts Committee and a Joint Committee on a Bill. Apart from  Committees  of  the  Legislative  Assembly, members of both Houses of the Central Legislature also served on the  Standing Advisory  Committees attached to various Departments of the Government of India. All these committees were purely advisory in character and functioned under the control of the Government  with  the  Minister-incharge  of  the Department  acting  as  the  Chairman  of  the Committee.  

After  the  Constitution  came  into  force,  the position of the Central Legislative Assembly changed altogether  and  the  committee  system  underwent transformation.  Not  only  did  the  number  of committees  increase,  but  their  functions  and powers were also enlarged.  

By their nature, Parliamentary Committees are of  two  kinds:  Standing  Committees  and  Ad  hoc Committees.  Standing  Committees  are  permanent and regular committees which are constituted from time to time in pursuance of  the provisions of  an Act  of  Parliament  or  Rules  of  Procedure  and Conduct  of  Business  in  Lok  Sabha.  The  work  of these  Committees  is  of  continuous  nature.  The Financial  Committees,  Departmentally  Related Standing  Committees  (DRSCs)  and  some  other Committees  come under  the  category  of  Standing Committees. Ad hoc Committees are appointed for a specific purpose and they cease to exist when they finish  the  task  assigned  to  them  and  submit  a

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report.  The  principal  Ad  hoc  Committees  are  the Select  and  Joint  Committees  on  Bills.  Railway Convention  Committee,  Joint  Committee  on  Food Management  in  Parliament  House  Complex,  etc. also  come  under  the  category  of  ad  hoc Committees.”

18. In the said document in respect of Standing Committees

of Parliament, it has been observed:-

“Standing  Committees  are  those  which  are periodically elected by the House or nominated by the  Speaker,  Lok  Sabha,  or  the  Chairman,  Rajya Sabha,  singly  or  jointly  and  are  permanent  in nature.  In  terms  of  their  functions,  Standing Committees may be classified into  two categories. One category of Committees like the Departmentally Related  Standing  Committees  (DRSCs),  Financial Committees  etc.,  scrutinize  the  functioning  of  the Government  as  per  their  respective  mandate.  The other  category  of  Committees  like  the  Rules Committee, House Committee, Joint Committee on Salaries  and  Allowances,  etc.  deal  with  matters relating to the Houses and members.”

19. We have referred to the same as a holistic reading of the

said  document  conveys  that  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee makes the executive accountable to it on certain

issues.  As  is  indicated  hereinbefore,  Mr.  Grover  and  Mr.

Gonsalves, learned senior appearing for the writ petitioners,

would contend that the executive being accountable to the

Parliamentary  Standing  Committee,  the  report  of  the

Committee which is in the public domain and hence, that

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can be relied upon by them to buttress a fact situation and in

any way, establish it. Learned counsel for the Union of India

and the contesting respondents,  per contra, would urge that

the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  report  cannot  be

tendered as a piece of evidence to prove a fact and once it is

referred to, it invites a contest and criticism.    

20. We  may  fruitfully  state  that  the  procedure  of  the

Committee is neither inquisitorial nor adjudicative. It has its

own  character.  The  procedure  is  sui  generis.  In  the

Westminister system, Parliament also deals with the matter

of accountability of the executive and standing Committees of

Parliament, on many an occasion, examine the propriety and

wisdom of the conduct of the executive. The reports of the

Committees  are  for  the  assistance  of  Parliament.  The

procedure for drawing up such reports, is entirely a matter

for the Committee and it  has authority to receive evidence

from witnesses – but it is for their own assistance.  No person

has  a  right  to  be  heard  by  the  Committee  even  if  the

Committee  is  examining  a  matter  which may result  in  an

adverse  comment  on  the  conduct  of  such  person.  The

principles of natural justice are not applicable.

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21. It is apt to note here that Mr. Grover and Mr. Gonsalves

have placed reliance on the authority of  Raja Ram Pal v.

Hon'ble  Speaker,  Lok  Sabha  and  others1,  wherein  in

paragraph 431(a), it has been said:-

“(a) Parliament is a coordinate organ and its views do deserve defence even while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny.”

22. Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  have  also  placed

reliance  on  a  two-Judge  Bench  decision  in  Krishan  Lal

Gera v. State of Haryana and others2.  In the said case,

the  report  submitted  by  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee  on  Human  Resources  Development  has  been

referred to.  They have also cited certain English authorities

which  relate  to  reliance  upon  the  report  in  trials  without

impugning the same.

23. At this stage, we may gainfully refer to the authorities

cited  by  the  learned  counsel  for  Union  of  India  and  the

contesting respondents.  In A.K. Roy v. Union of India and

others3 , it has been held thus:-

“But  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  intervene  in  a matter of this nature by issuing a mandamus to the Central  Government  obligating  it  to  bring  the

1 (2007) 3 SCC 184 2  (2011) 10 SCC 529 3  (1982) 1 SCC 271

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provisions of Section 3 into force.  The Parliament having left to the unfettered judgment of the Central Government  the  question as  regards  the  time  for bringing the provisions of the 44th Amendment into force,  it  is  not  for  the  court  to  compel  the government  to  do  that  which,  according  to  the mandate of the Parliament, lies in its discretion to do  when it  considers  it  opportune  to  do  it.   The executive is responsible to the Parliament and if the Parliament  considers  that  the  executive  has betrayed its trust by not bringing any provision of the  Amendment  into  force,  it  can  censure  the executive.  It  would  be  quite  anomalous  that  the inaction of the executive should have the approval of  the  Parliament  and  yet  we  should  show  our disapproval  of  it  by  issuing  a  mandamus.   The court's power of judicial review in such cases has to be  capable  of  being  exercised  both  positively  and negatively, if needed it has that power: positively, by issuing a mandamus calling upon the government to act and negatively by inhibiting it from acting.  If it  were  permissible  to  the  court  to  compel  the government  by  a  mandamus  to  bring  a constitutional amendment into force on the ground that the government has failed to do what it ought to have done, it would be equally permissible to the court  to  prevent  the  government  from  acting,  on some such ground as that, the time was not yet ripe for  issuing  the  notification  for  bringing  the Amendment into force.”

24. The aforesaid passage shows that the Court does not

have the power to direct the Parliament to bring an Act into

force. Drawing an analogy, it is canvassed that as the Court

cannot  issue  a  writ  to  implement  the  report  of  the

Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  or  rely  on  it  for  the

purpose of issuance of a writ.

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25. Ms. Manisha Singh, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent  No.6,  PATH  International,  contended  that  the

report of  the Parliamentary Standing Committee cannot be

assailed as has been held in  M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree

Krishna Sinha and Others4.  In this regard, she has drawn

our attention to paragraph 431(o) of  Raja Ram Pal  (supra)

which states thus:-

“The truth or correctness of the material will not be questioned  by  the  court  nor  will  it  go  into  the adequacy of the material  or substitute its opinion for that of the legislature.”

26. Reliance has been placed on the aforesaid conclusion to

lay thrust  on the  point  that  there cannot  be a combat or

dispute  over  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee in a court of law and, therefore, the respondents

are  debarred  from  contesting  the  same  and  that  is  the

singular ground not to place reliance upon the same.

27. In  Sarojini  Ramaswami  vs.  Union  of  India  and

others5, the Court observed that a finding of guilt recorded

by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the charges is

not  conclusive and final  and the Parliament  can still  hold

that  charges levelled  against  the  person concerned do not

4  AIR 1960 SC 1186 5  (1992) 4 SCC 506

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amount  to  misbehavior  and  may  decide  not  to  adopt  the

motion.   Though the  decision  was  rendered  in  a  different

context, it has been taken aid of to bolster the proposition

that  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee

does not attain finality, inasmuch as it is subject to debate in

the  Parliament and subject  to further  action taken by the

Parliament.

28. Inspiration has also been drawn from the authority in

Arun  Kumar  Agrawal  vs.  Union  of  India  and  others6,

wherein it has been stated in the context of the report of the

Comptroller  and  Auditor  General  of  India  (CAG)  that  the

report of the CAG is always subject to Parliamentary debates

and it is possible that the Parliamentary Accounts Committee

can  accept  the  Ministry's  objection  to  the  CAG  report  or

reject the report of the CAG.  What has been stated is that

CAG though indisputably  is  an independent  constitutional

functionary,  yet  it  is  for  the  Parliament  to  decide  whether

after  receiving  the  report,  i.e.  the  Parliamentary  Accounts

Committee to make its comments on the CAG's report.  The

emphasis  is  on  the  areas  of  demarcation  of  power  of  the

Parliament and its supremacy within its sphere.

6  (2013) 7 SCC 1

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29. On behalf of the Union of India, two decisions, namely,

R  v.  Murphy7 and  Office  of  Government  Commerce  v.

Information Commissioner8 have been referred to highlight

that  there  has  been  exclusion  of  discussion  of  the

Parliamentary report.  

30. At  this  juncture,  we  may  note  with  profit,  how  this

Court  has  taken  aid  of  the  debates  of  the  Constituent

Assembly,  Parliamentary  notes,  speeches  given  in  the

Parliament  and  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee.  In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India9, Jeevan

Reddy,  J.,  speaking  for  the  majority,  held  that  debates  in

Constituent  Assembly  can  be  relied  upon  as  an  aid  to

interpretation of a constitutional provision and for the said

purpose  the  learned  Judge  relied  upon  the  decisions  in

Madhu  Limaye,  In  re10,  Union  of  India  v.  Harbhajan

Sinhg  Dhillon11 and  several  opinions  in  Kesavananda

Bharati  Sripadagalvaru  v.  State  of  Kerala  and

another12.

7  (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 8   [2008] EWHC 737 (Adnin) 9   1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 10  (1969) 1 SCC 292 11  (!971) 2 SCC 779 12  (1973) 4 SCC 225

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31. In  Manoj Narula v. Union of India13, the majority of

the Constitution Bench relied on the Constituent Assembly

debates  while  dealing  with  the  concept  of  constitutional

trust.

32. As the Constituent Assembly debates are referred to for

interpretation of a constitutional provision and especially to

understand  the  context,  similarly  judicial  notice  of

parliamentary  proceedings  can  be  taken  note  of  for  the

purpose of appreciating the intention of the legislature.

33. In  Jyoti  Harshad  Mehta  and  others  v.  Custodian

and  others14,  it  has  been  held  that  reports  of  the  Joint

Parliamentary Committee are admissible only for the purpose

of tracing the legal history of the legislation.  

34. In  this  regard,  we  may  also  usefully  state  that  the

speeches of  Ministers in the Parliament are  referred to on

certain occasions for limited purposes.  A Constitution Bench

in State of W.B. v. Union of India15 has held:-

“It is however well-settled that the Statement of Ob- jects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when intro- duced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive pro- visions of the statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the back-

13  (2014) 9 SCC 1 14  (2009) 10 SCC 564

15   AIR 1963 SC 1241

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ground and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we cannot use this state- ment as an aid to the construction of the enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to ac- quire the proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect the State Governments’ rights as owners of minerals. A statute, as passed by Parlia- ment, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.”

35. In  K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam

and  another16  the  Court  while  referring  to  the  budget

speech of the Minister ruled:-  

“Now it is true that the speeches made by the Mem- bers  of  the  Legislature  on the  floor  of  the  House when a Bill for enacting a statutory provision is be- ing debated are inadmissible for the purpose of in- terpreting  the  statutory  provision  but  the  speech made by the Mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be re- ferred to for  the purpose of  ascertaining the mis- chief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. This is in accord with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in western countries but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, every- thing which is logically relevant should be admissi- ble. In fact there are at least three decisions of this Court,  one  in  Loka  Shikshana  Trust v.  CIT17,  the other in  Indian Chamber of  Commerce v.  Commis- sioner of  Income Tax18 and the third in  Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v.  Surat Art Silk Cloth

16   AIR 1981 SC 1922 17   AIR 1976 SC 10 18  AIR 1976 SC 348

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Manufacturers’ Association19 where the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing the exclu- sionary clause in Section 2, clause (15) of the Act was relied upon by the Court for the purpose of as- certaining what was the reason for introducing that clause.”

36. Similar  references  have  also  been  made  in  Ramesh

Yeshwant  Prabhoo  v.  Prabhakar  Kashinath  Kunte20.

That apart, Parliamentary debates have also been referred to

appreciate  the  context  relating  to  the  construction  of  a

statute in Novartis AG v. Union of India21, State of M.P. v.

Dadabhoy’s  New  Chirimiri  Ponri  Hill  Colliery  Co.  (P)

Ltd.22, Union of India v. Steel Stock Holders’ Syndicate23,

K.P. Varghese (supra) and  Surana Steels (P) Ltd. v. CIT24.

37. We have referred to these authorities to highlight that

the said speeches have been referred to or not referred to for

the  purposes indicated therein and when the meaning of a

statute is not clear or ambiguous, the circumstances that led

to passing of the legislation can be look into to ascertain the

intention of the legislature.  

38. Thus observed, the reference to Constituent Assembly

debates,  reports  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee

19  AIR 1980 SC 387 20  (1996) 1 SCC 130  

21  (2013) 6 SCC 1 22  (1972) 1 SCC 298 23  (1976) 3 SCC 108 24  (1999) 4 SCC 306

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and the speeches made in the Parliament or for that matter,

debates held in Parliament are only meant for understanding

the Constitution or the legislation, as the case may be.  It is

quite  different  than  to  place  reliance  upon  Parliamentary

Standing Committee report as a piece of evidence to establish

a  fact.  We have  been commended to  the  authority  by the

learned counsel appearing for the Union of India reported in

R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and others ex parte

Anderson Strathclyde plc25:-

“In my judgment there is no distinction between us- ing a report in Hansard for the purpose of support- ing a cause of action arising out of something which occurred outside the House, and using a report for the purpose of supporting a ground for relief in pro- ceedings for judicial review in respect of something which occurred outside  the  House.  In  both cases the court would have to do more than take note of the fact that a certain statement was made in the House on a certain date.  It would have to consider the statement or statements with a view to deter- mining  what  was  the  true  meaning of  them,  and what were the proper inferences to be drawn from them.  This, in my judgment, would be contrary to art 9 of the Bill of Rights.  It would be doing what Blackstone said was not to be done, namely to ex- amine, discuss and adjudge on a matter which was being considered in Parliament. Moreover, it would be an invasion by the  court  of  the  right  of  every member of Parliament to free speech in the House with  the  possible  adverse  effects  referred  to  by Browne J.”

25  [1983] 2 All ER 233

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39. In  this  regard,  a  reference  to  a  three-Judge  Bench

decision in State Bank of India through General Manager

v. National Housing Bank and others26 would be apposite.

The  Court  was  dealing  with  an  appeal  preferred  under

Section 10 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to

Transactions in Securities) Act 27 of 1992.  In the said case,

this  Court  noticed  that  the  learned  Judge  of  the  Special

Court had extensively relied upon the Second Interim of the

Janakiraman Committee27  on the ground that the same was

filed by the first defendant. The Court in that context held:-  

“50. It is well settled by a long line of judicial au- thority that the findings of even a statutory commis- sion appointed under the Commissions of  Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in  Ram Krishna Dalmia v.  Justice S.R. Tendolkar28 and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings  civil  or  criminal.  The  leading  judicial pronouncements  on that  question were succinctly analysed by this  Court  in  T.T.  Antony v.  State  of Kerala29, SCC paras 29-34. Para 34 of the judgment inter alia reads:

“34. … In our view, the courts, civil or crimi- nal, are not bound by the report or findings of the Commission of Inquiry as they have to ar- rive  at  their  own  decision  on  the  evidence placed before them in accordance with law.”

26  (2013) 16 SCC 538 27  Committee set up by RBI on 30.04.1992 which submitted six reports and the  Final Report was on

    07.05.1993 28  AIR 1958 SC 538 29  (2001) 6 SCC 181

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51. Therefore, courts are not bound by the conclu- sions and findings rendered by such commissions. The statements made before such commission can- not be used as evidence before any civil or criminal court. It should logically follow that even the conclu- sions  based  on  such  statements  can  also  not  be used  as  evidence  in  any  court.  The Janakiraman Committee is not even a statutory body authorised to collect evidence in the legal sense. It is a body set up by the Governor of Reserve Bank of India obvi- ously in exercise of its administrative functions,

“…  the Governor, RBI set up a committee on 30-4-1992 to investigate into the possible ir- regularities in funds management by commer- cial  banks  and  financial  institutions,  and in particular, in relation to their dealings in gov- ernment  securities,  public  sector  bonds  and similar  instruments.  The  Committee  was  re- quired  to  investigate  various  aspects  of  the transactions  of  SBI  and  other  commercial banks as well as financial institutions in this regard.”30   

And again:-

“53. The report of such a committee in our view can at best be the opinion of the Committee based on its own examination of the records of the various banks (including the plaintiff and the first defendant) and the statements recorded (by the Committee) of the various persons examined by the Committee. In our considered  view  the  report  of  the  Janakiraman Committee  is  not  evidence  within  the  meaning of Evidence Act which the Special Court is bound to follow.”   

40. We have referred to the said authority as this Court has

thought it appropriate to state following the precedents that

30   See the Janakiraman Committee’s first interim report, May 1992, p. 1.

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the  report  of  a  statutory committee cannot  be  received as

evidence of facts stated in the report.  

41. Having dwelled upon this aspect, we may refer to certain

relevant Articles of the Constitution.  Article 105 deals with

with powers, privileges, etc. of the Houses of Parliament and

of the members and committees thereof.  To have a complete

picture, the said Article is reproduced in entirety:-

“105.  Powers,  privileges,  etc.,  of  the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof.– (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament.

(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or  any  vote  given  by  him  in  Parliament  or  any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in  respect  of  the  publication  by  or  under  the authority  of  either  House  of  Parliament  of  any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

(3) In  other  respects,  the  powers,  privileges  and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to  time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, 1[shall be those  of  that  House  and  of  its  members  and committees  immediately  before  the  coming  into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of  this Constitution  have  the  right  to  speak  in,  and otherwise  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings  of,  a

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House  of  Parliament  or  any committee  thereof  as they apply in relation to members of Parliament.”

42. What is necessary to understand from Article 105(2) is

that no member of the Parliament can be made liable for any

proceeding in any court because of what he has stated in a

committee.  The  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  is  a

committee constituted under the Rules and what a member

speaks over  there  is  absolutely  within  the  domain of  that

committee.  Freedom of speech of a member of a Committee

is only guided subject to provisions of the Constitution and

the Rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of

Parliament.   It  is  also  seemly  to  note  that  Article  105(4)

categorically lays the postulate that clauses 1, 2 and 3 shall

apply to any committee of the Parliament.   

43. Article 118 deals with rules of procedure.  Clause 1 of

the said Article stipulates that each House of Parliament may

make rules for  regulating,  subject  to the provisions of  the

Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business.

Thus, the said Article empowers the Parliament to regulate

its procedure apart from what has been stated directly in the

Constitution.  

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44. Article  121  provides  restriction  on  discussion  in

Parliament.  The same is extracted below:-

“121. Restriction  on  discussion  in Parliament.– (1) No discussion shall take place in Parliament with respect to the conduct of any Judge of  the  Supreme Court  or  of  a  High  Court  in  the discharge  of  his  duties  except  upon a  motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge as hereinafter provided.”

45. The aforesaid Article makes it vivid that the Parliament

shall not discuss as regards the conduct of any Judge of the

Supreme Court or of  a High Court in the discharge of  his

duties,  except  upon  a  motion  been  presented  before  the

President  of  India  praying  for  removal  of  the  Judge  as

provided in the  Constitution.   Thus,  the discussion of  the

Parliament is restricted by a constitutional provision.  

46. Article  122 stipulates a restraint  on courts to inquire

into proceedings of  the Parliament.   The said Article being

absolutely significant is reproduced below:-

“122. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament.– (1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.

(2) No officer  or  member of  Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to  the  jurisdiction  of  any  court  in  respect  of  the

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exercise by him of those powers.”

47. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid Articles is that

while  exercising  the  power  of  judicial  review  or  to  place

reliance  on  the  report  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing

Committee, the doctrine of restraint has to be applied by this

Court as required under the Constitution.  What is argued by

the  learned counsel  for  the  petitioners  is  that  there  is  no

question of  any kind of  judicial  review from this  Court  or

attributing anything on the conduct of any of the members of

the Committee, but to look at the report for understanding

the controversy before us.  The submission “looking at the

report,”  as  we  perceive,  is  nothing  but  placing  reliance

thereupon.  The  view  of  a  member  of  the  Parliament  or  a

member  of  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  who

enjoys  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  within  the

constitutional  parameters  and  the  rules  or  regulations

framed  by  the  Parliament  inside  the  Parliament  or  the

Committee is not to be adverted to by the court in a lis.  

48. In  this  regard,  it  is  appropriate  to  refer  to  the

observations made by the House of Lords in Hamilton v. Al

Fayed31:-

31   [2001] 1 A.C. 395

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“The Court of Appeal held, first, that apart from any question of parliamentary privilege the principle in Hunter’s case [1982] AC 529 had no application: a parliamentary decision was not analogous to a deci- sion of  the  court.  Next,  the  Court  of  Appeal  held that the proceedings before the PCS, his report and its acceptance by the CSP were all “parliamentary proceedings” and therefore any attempt to investi- gate  or  challenge  any  of  the  procedures  adopted constituted a breach of parliamentary privilege: they constituted a “questioning” of parliamentary proce- dures. They therefore held that the judge had been in  error  and  had  himself  breached  parliamentary procedure by criticizing the procedures adopted by the PCS.  The conclusion of the Court of Appeal on these two points met the concerns of the Solicitor General.  The Court of Appeal were clearly correct on  these  points  and  they  were  not  further  chal- lenged on appeal to your Lordship’s House….

Presumably because of the way the case was pre- sented to them, the Court of Appeal never consid- ered the relevant question (viz whether there should be a fair trial stay) raised by question 2 of the sum- mons. The only way in which Mr Al Fayed could jus- tify his defamatory statements was by detailed chal- lenge  to  Mr  Hamilton’s  conduct  in  Parliament, which challenge would be precluded by parliamen- tary privilege. That being so it  would in my judg- ment have been impossible for Mr Al Fayed to have had a fair  trial  in this action if  he had been pre- cluded from challenging the evidence produced to the  parliamentary  committees  on  behalf  of  Mr. Hamilton. Had it not been for section 13, the court should, in my judgment, have stayed the libel action brought by Mr. Hamilton by making an order under paragraph 2 of the summons. However, section 13 does apply to this case and provides a complete an- swer to it.”

49. We will be failing in our duty if we do not note another

submission of the learned Solicitor General that for issuance

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of a writ of mandamus, it is primary to establish that one has

a right and, in the case at hand, an effort has been made to

rely  on  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee's  report  to

create a right which is legally not permissible.

50. The controversy has to be seen from the perspective of

judicial  review.  The basic principle of  judicial  review is to

ascertain the propriety of the decision making process on the

parameters of reasonableness and propriety of the executive

decisions.   We  are  not  discussing  about  the  parameters

pertaining  to  the  challenge  of  amendments  to  the

Constitution or the constitutionality of  a statute.   When a

writ of mandamus is sought on the foundation of a factual

score, the Court is required to address the facts asserted and

the  averments  made  and  what  has  been  stated  in

oppugnation.  Once the Court is asked to look at the report,

the same can be challenged by the otherside, for it cannot be

accepted without affording an opportunity of being heard to

the respondents.  The invitation to contest a Parliamentary

Standing Committee report is  likely to disturb the delicate

balance  that  the  Constitution  provides  between  the

constitutional institutions.  If the Court allows contest and

adjudicates on the report, it may run counter to the spirit of

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privilege of Parliament which the Constitution protects.  

51. As advised at  present,  we are  prima facie  of  the view

that the Parliamentary Standing Committee report may not

be tendered as a document to augment the stance on the

factual  score  that  a  particular  activity  is  unacceptable  or

erroneous.   However,  regard  being  had  to  the  substantial

question of law relating to interpretation of the Constitution

involved, we think it appropriate that the issue be referred to

the  Constitution  Bench  under  Article  145(3)  of  the

Constitution.   We  frame  the  following  questions  for  the

purpose of reference to the Constitution Bench:-

(i) Whether  in  a  litigation filed  before  this  Court

either  under  Article  32  or  Article  136  of  the

Constitution of India, the Court can refer to and

place  reliance  upon  the  report  of  the

Parliamentary Standing Committee?  

(ii) Whether such a Report can be looked at for the

purpose  of  reference  and,  if  so,  can  there  be

restrictions for the purpose of reference regard

being  had  to  the  concept  of  parliamentary

privilege and the delicate balance between the

constitutional institutions that Articles 105, 121

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and 122 of the Constitution conceive?

52. Let  the  papers  be  placed  before  Hon'ble  the  Chief

Justice of India for constitution of appropriate Bench.

..................................J.  [Dipak Misra]

..................................J. [Rohinton Fali Nariman]

New Delhi April 05, 2017.