K.Vijaya Lakshmi Vs Govt.Of A.P.Tr.Sec.Home

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1389 OF 2013 (@ out of SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 23312/2009)

Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi … Appellant

Versus

Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Represented by its Secretary Home (Courts C1) Department and another … Respondents

J U D G E M E N T

H.L. Gokhale J.

Leave Granted.

2. This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and

order dated 19.3.2009 rendered by a Division Bench of

Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 26147 of 2008.

By that order the said writ petition of the appellant disputing

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her non-appointment to the post of a Civil Judge in Andhra

Pradesh, has come to be dismissed.

Facts leading to this appeal

3. The appellant herein is an advocate practicing in

the courts at Markapur, District Prakasam in the State of

Andhra Pradesh. The Andhra Pradesh High Court (Respondent

No.2 herein) had invited applications for the appointments to

105 posts of (Junior) Civil Judges (including 84 posts by direct

recruitment) by its Notification No.1/2007-RC dated

14.5.2007. A written examination was conducted for that

purpose on 28.10.2007, and those who qualified therein, were

called for an interview. After the interviews, some 81

candidates from amongst the direct recruits (and 17 by

transfer) were selected by a committee of Hon’ble Judges of

the High Court, and this selection was approved by the Full

Court on the administrative side. The appellant was one of

those who were selected, and her name figured at S.No.26 in

the list of selected candidates from the general category.

4. However, it so transpired that whereas the other

selected candidates were issued appointment letters, the

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appellant was not. She, therefore, applied on 3.11.2008

under the provisions of The Right to Information Act, 2005, to

find out the reason of her non-appointment. She received a

letter dated 11.11.2008 from the respondent No.1 which gave

the following reason therefor:

“I am directed to invite your attention to the reference 2nd cited, and to inform you that, adverse remarks were reported in the verification report, that your husband Sri Srinivasa Chowdary, who is practicing as an Advocate in the Courts at Markapur is having close links with CPI (Maoist) Party which is a prohibited organization.”

5. The appellant was shocked to learn the above

reason for her non-appointment. Although nothing was stated

against her in that letter, according to her what was stated

against her husband was also false. She, therefore, filed a Writ

Petition bearing No. 26147 of 2008 in the High Court of

Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, and prayed that a writ of

mandamus be issued to declare that the non-inclusion of her

name in the list of Junior Civil Judges issued on 23.10.2008

was illegal, arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India (Constitution for short), and consequently

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a direction be issued to the respondents to forthwith issue an

order of appointment to her.

6. The respondents contested the matter by filing their

affidavits in reply. This time the Respondent No 1 alleged that

the appellant too had close links with the CPI (Maoist) party.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit of respondent No. 1 stated

as follows:-

“It is further submitted that the Superintendent of Police, has reported that in re-verification of character and antecedents of Karanam Vijaya Lakshmi D/o K. Balaguravaiah, Mangali Manyam, Markapur, Prakasam District who is selected as Junior Civil Judge shows that the confidential intrinsic intelligence collected recently with regard to the movements of CPI (Maoist), it came to light that Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi (Sl. No.26 in the selected list) D/o K. Balaguravaiah r/o Mangali Manyam, Markapur who is selected for the post of Junior Civil Judge and her husband Srinivasa Chowdary s/o Sambasiva Rao who is practicing as an advocate in the Courts at Markapur are having close links with CPI (Maoist) Party, which is a prohibited organization and also in touch with UG cadre of the CPI (Maoist) Party.

Further it is submitted that the CPI (Maoist) is a prohibited Organization by the Government and as the candidate Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi Sl. No.26 in the selected list D/o K. Balaguravaiah r/o Mangali Manyam, Markapur and her husband Srinivasa Chowdary S/o Sambasiva Rao who is practicing as an Advocate in the Courts at Markapur are having close links with CPI (Maoist) Party, which is a prohibited organization and also in touch with UG cadre of the CPI (Maoist) Party the Government feel that she should not be offered the appointment to the post of Junior Civil Judge.”

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7. The appellant filed a rejoinder on 8.2.2009, and

denied all the allegations as being false and incorrect.

8. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the

Respondent No. 2, by the Registrar General of the High Court.

In Para 4 of this affidavit it was stated that the appellant was

provisionally selected by the High Court for the appointment

to the post of a Civil Judge, along with other candidates. A

provisional list of 98 selected candidates was sent to the first

respondent Government of Andhra Pradesh to issue orders

approving the select list, after duly following the formalities

like verification of antecedents. The first respondent, vide its

G.O.Ms. 164 Home (Cts. C1) Dept. dated 23.10.2008, did

thereafter issue the order approving the Selection of 94

candidates. However, as far as the appellant is concerned, the

affidavit stated that the first respondent vide its memo dated

8.5.2008, had requested the Superintendent of Police,

Prakasam District, to get verified the character and

antecedents of the appellant and other candidates.

Thereafter, the affidavit stated:-

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“…The 1st Respondent through the letter dated 25.10.2008 informed the High Court that the candidature of the petitioner could not be considered as it was reported in her antecedents verification report that she had links with prohibited organization.

It is respectfully submitted that this Respondent has no role to play in the matter since the 1st Respondent is the appointing authority in respect of Civil Judge (Junior Division). Hence no relief can be claimed against this respondent.”

Thus, as can be seen, the High Court Administration was

informed through a letter that the appellant had links with a

prohibited organisation, but the affidavit does not state that

the High Court was informed as to which was that

organization, or as to how the appellant had links with that

organization. The High Court has also not stated whether it

made any inquiry with the Respondent No. 1 as to which was

that organization, and in what manner the appellant was

connected with it. Besides, as can be seen from the affidavit,

the Government at its own level had taken the decision in this

matter that the candidature of the appellant could not be

considered due to the adverse report, and conveyed it to the

High Court. This decision was accepted by the High Court, as

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it is, by merely stating that it had no role to play since the

Respondent No 1 was the appointing authority.

9. When the Writ Petition came up before a Division

Bench of the High Court, the Division Bench by its order dated

18.9.2008 called upon the respondents to produce the

material in support of the report which had been submitted by

the Superintendent of Police, Prakasam District. The report

and the supporting material was tendered to the Division

Bench, and after going through the same the Bench held in

para 19 of its judgment that ‘the allegations appearing from

the antecedent verification report show links/associations with

the banned organization’. The Division Bench relied upon

judgment of this court in K. Ashok Reddy Vs. Govt. of

India reported in 1994 (2) SCC 303 to state that judicial

review is not available in matters where the State was

exercising the prerogative power, and applied it in the present

case since the appointment of the candidate concerned was

to be made to a sensitive post of a judge. The Division Bench

also referred to and relied upon the judgment of this Court in

Union of India Vs. Kali Dass Batish reported in 2006 (1)

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SCC 779 to the effect that when the appointing authority has

not found it fit to appoint the concerned candidate to a judicial

post, the court is not expected to interfere in that decision.

The Division Bench therefore dismissed the writ petition by its

impugned judgment and order.

10. Being aggrieved by this decision, the appellant has

filed the present appeal. When the matter reached before this

Court, the respondents were called upon to produce the

report which was relied upon before the High Court. After a

number of adjournments, the report was ultimately produced

alongwith an affidavit of one M.V. Sudha Syamala, Special

Officer (I/C). A document titled ‘Report over the activities

of CPI (Maoist) activists and their sympathizers’ dated

15.9.2008 by Inspector of Police, District Special Branch,

Ongole was annexed with that affidavit. Para 5 of this report

made certain adverse remarks against the appellant. This

para 5 reads as follows:-

“5. Kasukurthi Vijayalakshmi, Advocate, Markapur CPI (Maoist) frontal organization member and sympathizer of CPI (Maoist):- She is wife of Srinivasarao @ Srinivasa Chowdary. She is a sympathizer of CPI (Maoist) party. She is a

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member of Chaitanya Mahila Samakhya (CMS), a frontal organization of CPI (Maoist). She along with other members Nagireddy Bhulakshmi @ Rana and Cherukuri Vasanthi, Ongole town is trying to intensify the activities of CMS in Prakasam district, especially in Markapuram area.”

One more affidavit was filed on behalf of the first respondent,

viz, that of one Shri Kolli Raghuram Reddy who produced

along therewith some of the documents of the police

department, known as ‘A.P. Police Vachakam’. He, however,

accepted in para 5 of this affidavit that:-

“There is no particular documentary proof that the Chaitanya Mahila Samakhya is a frontal organization to the CPI (Maoist) except the above publication in A.P. Police Vachakam part III.”

11. The appellant filed a reply affidavit and denied the

allegations. She stated that she was not a member of CPI

(Maoist), nor did she have any connection with the banned

organization or with any of its leaders. She disputed that any

such organization, by name CMS existed, and in any case, she

was not a member of any such organization. She submitted

that her husband must have appeared in some bail

applications of persons associated with this party, but she has

never appeared in any such case. She further stated that her

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husband was a member of a panel of advocates who had

defended political prisoners, against whom the district police

had foisted false cases, and those cases had ended in

acquittals. She disputed the bona-fides of the police

department in making the adverse report, and relied upon the

resolutions passed by various bar associations expressing that

her husband was being made to suffer for opposing the police

in matters of political arrests. We may note at this stage that

the Respondent No. 2 has not filed any counter in this appeal.

Submissions of the rival parties

12. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellant submitted that the respondents have changed their

stand from time to time. Initially, all that was stated was that

the husband of the appellant was having close links with CPI

(Maoist) party, which is a prohibited organization.

Subsequently, it was alleged that the appellant was also

having connection with the same party, and lastly it was said

that she was a member of CMS, which was named to be a

Maoist Frontal Organization. The learned Counsel called upon

the respondents to produce any document to show that CMS

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was in any way a Frontal Organization of CPI (Maoist), but no

such material has been produced before us.

13. Reliance was placed by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, on the

judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.

Ramashanker Raghuvanshi reported in AIR 1983 SC 374.

That was a case concerning the respondent who was a

teacher. He was absorbed in a Govt. school on 28.2.1972 but

his service was terminated on 5.11.1974, on the basis of an

adverse report of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The High

court of Madhya Pradesh quashed that termination order, for

being in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. This Court

(per O. Chinappa Reddy, J.) while upholding the judgment of

the High Court, elaborated the concepts of freedom of speech,

expression and association enshrined in the constitution. It

referred to some of the leading American judgments on this

very issue. The Court noted that the political party ‘Jansangh’

or RSS, with which the respondent was supposed to be

associated, was not a banned organization, nor was there any

report that the respondent was involved in any violent

activity. The Court observed that it is a different matter

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altogether if a police report is sought on the question of the

involvement of the candidate in any criminal or subversive

activity, in order to find out his suitability for public

employment. But otherwise, it observed in para 3:-

“……Politics is no crime’. Does it mean that only True Believers in the political faith of the party in power for the time being are entitled to public employment?...... Most students and most young men are exhorted by national leaders to take part in political activities and if they do get involved in some form of agitation or the other, is it to be to their ever-lasting discredit? Some times they get involved because they feel strongly and badly about injustice, because they are possessed of integrity and because they are fired by idealism. They get involved because they are pushed into the forefront by elderly leaders who lead and occasionally mislead them. Should all these young men be debarred from public employment? Is Government service such a heaven that only angels should seek entry into it?”

This Court therefore in terms held that any such view to deny

employment to an individual because of his political affinities

would be offending Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and

16 of the Constitution.

14. In paragraph 7 of its judgment the Court referred to

the observations of Douglas, J. in Lerner Vs. Casey which are

to the following effect:-

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“7. In Lerner v. Casey, (1958) 357 US 468 Douglas, J. said: “We deal here only with a matter of belief. We

have no evidence in either case that the employee in question ever committed a crime, ever moved in treasonable opposition against this country. The only mark against them — if it can be called such — is a refusal to answer questions concerning Communist Party membership. This is said to give rise to doubts concerning the competence of the teacher in the Beilan case and doubts as to the trustworthiness and reliability of the subway conductor in the Lerner case....

There are areas where government may not probe . . . But government has no business penalizing a citizen merely for his beliefs or associations. It is government action that we have here. It is government action that the Fourteenth and First Amendments protect against . . . Many join associations, societies, and fraternities with less than full endorsement of all their aims.”

Thereafter, in para 9 this Court once again quoted Douglas, J’s

statement in Speiser Vs. Randall (1958) 357 US 513 to

the following effect:-

“9……..Advocacy which is in no way brigaded with action should always be protected by the First Amendment. That protection should extend even to the ideas we despise…….”

Ultimately this Court dismissed that petition. What it observed

in paragraph 10 thereof, is equally relevant for our purpose.

This para reads as follows:-

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“10. We are not for a moment suggesting, that even after entry into Government service, a person may engage himself in political activities. All that we say is that he cannot be turned back at the very threshold on the ground of his past political activities. Once he becomes a Government servant, he becomes subject to the various rules regulating his conduct and his activities must naturally be subject to all rules made in conformity with the Constitution.”

15. Mr. Venkataramni, learned senior counsel appearing

for the respondents, on the other hand, drew our attention to

the judgment of a bench of three judges of this Court in

Union of India Vs. Kali Dass Batish (supra), which was

relied upon by the Division Bench. That was a case where the

first respondent was a candidate for the post of a judicial

member in the Central Administrative Tribunal. The selection

committee, under the chairmanship of a judge of this Court,

had selected him for consideration. When his antecedents

were verified by the Intelligence Bureau, a noting was made

by the Director (AT), Ministry of Personnel, on 25.10.2001, to

the following effect:-

“……..(i) In legal circles, he is considered to be an advocate of average caliber. (ii) It is learnt that though he was allotted to the Court of Justice R.L. Khurana, the learned Judge was not happy with his presentation of cases and asked the

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Advocate General to shift him to some other court, which was done. (iii) He was a contender for the Shimla AC seat on BJP ticket in 1982 and 1985. When he did not get the ticket, he worked against the party and was expelled from the party in 1985. He was subsequently re-inducted by the party in 1989…..”

The Director, however, gave him the benefit of doubt, since

his name had been recommended by a selection committee

headed by a Judge of Supreme Court. The Joint Secretary,

Ministry of Personnel also made a similar note. The Secretary,

Ministry of Personnel, however, made a note that he need not

be appointed, since his performance was poor. The Minister

of State made a note that the departmental recommendations

be sent to the Chief Justice of India (C.J.I.). When the proposal

was subsequently submitted with the confidential

memorandum to the C.J.I., he concurred with the

memorandum submitted by the Secretary, Ministry of

Personnel, and the name of the first respondent was dropped.

16. It is on this background that first respondent Kali

Dass Batish (supra) approached the Himachal Pradesh High

Court, which directed that his case be reconsidered afresh.

When that judgment was challenged, this Court noted the

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above referred facts, and held that when the appropriate

decision-making procedure had been followed, and the C.J.I.

had accepted the opinion of the Ministry to drop the

candidature of the first respondent, there was no reason for

the High Court to interfere with that decision. Provisions of

the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 required a consultation

with the C.J.I. under Section 6(3) thereof. That, having been

done, and the first respondent having not been found suitable,

there was no case for reconsideration. Mr. Venkataramni tried

to emphasize that the involvement in political activities was

the factor which went against the respondent no.1 in that

case, and so it is for the appellant herein. However, as we

can see from that judgment, the political connection was not

the relevant factor which went against Kali Dass Batish.

Principally, it is the fact that the he was reported to be a

mediocre advocate which led to the rejection of his

candidature.

17. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents

that the name of a candidate may appear in the merit list but

he has no indefeasible right to an appointment. Reliance was

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placed on the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court

in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India reported in 1991

(3) SCC 47. We must however, note that while laying down

the above proposition, this Court has also stated that this

proposition does not mean that the State has the license for

acting in an arbitrary manner. The relevant paragraph 7 of

this judgment reads as follows:-

“7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted……….”

Consideration of the rival submissions:

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Duties of an advocate in the context of Article 22(1) of

the Constitution, and the provisions of the Advocates

Act, 1961:

18. We have noted the submissions of the rival parties

on the issue of denial of appointment on the basis of a police

report. The appellant has denied any association with CPI

(Maoist) party or CMS. She has, however, stated that maybe

her husband had appeared as an advocate for some persons

associated with the CPI (Maoist) Party in their bail

applications. Initially, as stated in the first respondent’s letter

dated 11.11.2008, the basis of the adverse police report

against the appellant was that her husband is having close

links with the CPI (Maoist) party, which is a prohibited

organization. Mr. Ranjit Kumar submitted that the appellant

can’t be made to suffer because of her husband appearing for

some litigant, and secondly he asked: ‘in any case can her

husband be criticized for appearing to seek any bail order for

a person on the ground that, the person belongs to CPI

(Maoist) party?’ As an advocate, he was only discharging his

duties for the litigants who had sought his assistance.

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19. We quite see the merit of this submission. Those

who are participating in politics, and are opposed to those in

power, have often to suffer the wrath of the rulers. It may

occasionally result in unjustifiable arrests or detentions. The

merit of a democracy lies in recognizing the right of every

arrested or detained person to be defended by a legal

practicenor of his choice. Article 22(1) of our Constitution

specifically lays down the following as a Fundamental Right:-

“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases- (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.”

(emphasis supplied)

All such accused do have the right to be defended lawfully

until they are proved guilty, and the advocates have the

corresponding duty to represent them, in accordance with

law. Taking any contrary view in the facts of the present case

will result into making the appellant suffer for the role of her

husband who is discharging his duty as an advocate in

furtherance of this Fundamental Right of the arrested persons.

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We cannot ignore that during the freedom struggle, and even

after independence, many leading lawyers have put in

significant legal service for the political and civil right

activists, arrested or detained. In the post independence era

we may refer, in this behalf, to the valuable contribution of

Late Sarvashri M.K. Nambiar, (Justice) V.M. Tarkunde, and K.G.

Kannabiran (from Andhra Pradesh itself) to name only a few of

the eminent lawyers, who discharged this duty by

representing such arrested or detained persons even when

they belonged to banned organizations.

20. We may, at this stage, note that the Bar Council of

India, which is a regulating body of the advocates, has framed

rules under Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Chapter-II

of Part-VI thereof, lays down the Standards of Professional

Conduct and Etiquette. Section-I, consisting of rules 1 to 10

thereof, lays down the duties of the advocates to the court,

whereas Section-II lays down the duties to the client. Rules

11 and 15 of this Section are relevant for us. These two rules

read as follows:-

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“11. An advocate is bound to accept any brief in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authorities in or before which he proposes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case. Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.

…….

15. It shall be the duty of an advocate fearlessly to uphold the interests of his clients by all fair and honourable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other. He shall defend a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, bearing in mind that his loyalty is to the law which requires that no man should be convicted without adequate evidence.”

In A.S. Mohammed Rafi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported

in 2011 (1) SCC 688, this Court was concerned with the

resolution passed by a Bar Association not to defend accused

policemen in criminal cases. This Court in terms held that

such resolutions violate the right of an accused to be

defended, which right is specifically recognised under Article

22(1) of the Constitution as a Fundamental Right, and such

resolutions are null and void.

Requirements for the appointment of a judicial officer,

under Article 234 of Constitution and Judicial Service

Rules:

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21. In this appeal, we are concerned with the question

as to whether the first respondent (the Govt. of Andhra

Pradesh) and the second respondent (the High Court) have

proceeded correctly in the matter of appointment of the

appellant. In this behalf we must refer to Article 234 of the

Constitution, which is the governing article when it comes to

the recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the

judicial service. This article reads as follows:-

“234. Recruitment of persons other than district judges to the judicial service – Appointment of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.”

22. In the instant case, appointments to the posts of

Civil Judges are governed by the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial

Service Rules, 2007 framed under Articles 233, 234, 235, 237

proviso to Article 309 and proviso to Article 320(3) of the

Constitution. Rule 4 (1) of these rules declares that the

Governor of the State shall be the Appointing Authority for the

categories of District Judges and Civil Judges. Rule 4 (2) (d)

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lays down that the appointments to the category of civil

Judges shall be by direct recruitment from among the eligible

advocates on the basis of written and viva-voce test, as

prescribed by the High Court. Accordingly, in the present

case an advertisement was issued, and written and oral tests

were conducted. The appellant appeared for the same and

was declared successful in both the tests. Thereafter her

name figured in the select list. It was at this stage that the

investigation was carried out by the Intelligence Bureau,

which gave an adverse report about her. We do not find from

the affidavit of the Registrar General, filed during the hearing

of the Writ Petition, that all relevant papers of the police

investigation were submitted to the High Court on the

administrative side. Now, the question arises viz. as to

whether it was proper for the respondent No. 1 to decide on

its own that the candidature of the appellant could not be

considered on the bias of that report? The police report dated

15.9.2008 was produced before the Division Bench only when

the respondent No. 1 was called upon to produce the material

relied upon against the appellant. And if the report was

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adverse, was it not expected of the respondent no.1 to

forward all those relevant papers to the High Court on

administrative side for its consideration? This is what was

done in the case of Kali Dass Batish (supra) wherein an

adverse report was received after the inclusion of the name of

the respondent no.1 in the select list, and the report was

forwarded to the C.J.I. In the present case it has not been

placed on record that all such papers were forwarded to the

High Court on the administrative side to facilitate its decision.

On the other hand the Government itself had taken the

decision that appellant’s candidature could not be considered

in view of the adverse reports. It can not therefore be said

that there has been a meaningful consultation with the High

Court before arriving at the decision not to appoint the

appellant. Article 234 specifically requires that these

appointments are to be made after consultation with the State

Public Service Commission and the High Court exercising

jurisdiction in the concerned state. The High Court may

accept the adverse report or it may not. Ultimately, inasmuch

as the selection is for the appointment to a judicial post, the

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Governor will have to be guided by the opinion of the High

Court. In the present case as is seen from the affidavit of the

Registrar-General in reply to the Writ Petition, in view of the

letter from the Home Department, the High Court has thrown

up its hands, and has not sought any more information from

the first respondent. It is the duty of the Government under

Article 234 to forward such reports to the High court, and then

it is for the High Court to form its opinion which will lead to

the consequential decision either to appoint or not to appoint

the candidate concerned. Such procedure is necessary to

have a meaningful consultation as contemplated under this

Article. Any other approach will mean that whatever is stated

by the police will be final, without the same being considered

by the High Court on the administrative side.

23. In Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported

in AIR 1974 SC 2192, a Constitution bench of this Court was

concerned with a matter where the Punjab and Haryana High

Court had handed over the work of conducting an enquiry

against a judicial officer to the Vigilance Department of the

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Punjab Government. This Court called it as an act of ‘self-

abnegation’. Para 78 of this judgment reads as follows:-

“78. The High Court for reasons which are not stated requested the Government to depute the Director of Vigilance to hold an enquiry. It is indeed strange that the High Court which had control over the subordinate judiciary asked the Government to hold an enquiry through the Vigilance Department. The members of the subordinate judiciary are not only under the control of the High Court but are also under the care and custody of the High Court. The High Court failed to discharge the duty of preserving its control. The request by the High Court to have the enquiry through the Director of Vigilance was an act of self abnegation. The contention of the State that the High Court wanted the Government to be satisfied makes matters worse The Governor will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of Article 235. The High Court should have conducted the enquiry preferably through District Judges. The members of the subordinate judiciary look up to the High Court not only for discipline but also for dignity. The High Court acted in total disregard of Articles 235 by asking the Government to enquire through the Director of Vigilance.”

24. In State of Bihar Vs. Bal Mukund Sah reported

in AIR 2000 SC 1296, a Constitution bench of this Court was

concerned with the issue as to whether it was permissible to

lay down the recruitment procedure for the district and

subordinate judiciary by framing rules under Article 309

without having a consultation with the High Court, in the teeth

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of Articles 233 to 235. This Court examined the scheme of

the relevant articles of the Constitution and the rules framed

by Government of Bihar, in this behalf. Paragraph 20 of this

judgment is relevant for our purpose, and it reads as follows:-

“20. Part VI of the Constitution dealing with the States, separately deals with the executive in Chapter II, the State Legislature under Chapter III and thereafter Chapter IV dealing with the Legislative Powers of the Governor and then follows Chapter V dealing with the High Courts in the States and Chapter VI dealing with the Subordinate Courts. It is in Chapter VI dealing with the Subordinate Courts that we find the provision made for appointment of District Judges under Article 233, recruitment of persons other than the District Judges to the Judicial Services under Article 234 and also Control of the High Court over the Subordinate Courts as laid down by Article 235. Article 236 deals with the topic of 'Interpretation' and amongst others, defines by sub- article (b) the expression "judicial service" to mean "a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District Judge." It becomes, therefore, obvious that, the framers of the Constitution separately dealt with 'Judicial Services' of the State and made exclusive provisions regarding recruitment to the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts inferior to the posts of the District Judge. Thus these provisions found entirely in a different part of the Constitution stand on their own and quite independent of Part XIV dealing with Services in general under the 'State'. Therefore, Article 309, which, on its express terms, is made subject to other provisions of the Constitution, does get circumscribed to the extent to which from its general field of operation is carved out a separate and exclusive field for operation by the relevant provisions of Articles dealing with Subordinate

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Judiciary as found in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution to which we will make further reference at an appropriate stage in the later part of this judgment.”

25. These judgments clearly lay down the principles

which guide the interpretation and role of Articles 233 to 235

of the Constitution to safeguard the independence of the

subordinate judiciary. Article 234 requires a meaningful

consultation with the High Court in the matter of recruitment

to judicial service. In view of the mandate of Article 234, High

Court has to take a decision on the suitability of a candidate

on the administrative side, and it cannot simply go by the

police reports, though such reports will, of course, form a

relevant part of its consideration. As held in paragraph 3 of

Ramashankar Raghuvanshi (supra) to deny a public

employment to a candidate solely on the basis of the police

report regarding the political affinity of the candidate would

be offending the Fundamental Rights under Article 14 and 16

of the Constitution, unless such affinities are considered likely

to effect the integrity and efficiency of the candidate, or (we

may add) unless there is clear material indicating the

involvement of the candidate in the subversive or violent

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activities of a banned organization. In the present case there

is no material on record to show that the appellant has

engaged in any subversive or violent activities. The appellant

has denied her alleged association with CPI (Maoist) party or

CMS. Respondent No. 1 has accepted that there is no

documentary proof that CMS is a frontal organization of CPI

(Maoist). And as far as her connection CPI (Maoist) is

concerned, there is no material except the report of police,

the bonafides of which are very much disputed by the

appellant. Besides, since the report was neither submitted to

nor sought by the High Court, there has not been any

consideration thereof by the High Court Administration. Thus,

there has not been any meaningful consultation with the High

Court on the material that was available with the Government.

The High Court administration has thus failed in discharging

its responsibility under Article 234 of the Constitution.

26. The Division Bench has relied upon the observations

of this Court in K. Ashok Reddy (supra) to bring in the

principle of prerogative power to rule out judicial review. In

that matter the petitioner had sought a declaration

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concerning the judges of the High Courts that they are not

liable to be transferred. One of his submissions was that there

is absence of judicial review in the matter of such transfers,

and the same is bad in law. As noted in the impugned

judgment, in K. Ashok Reddy (supra), this Court did refer to

the observations of Lord Roskill in Council of Civil Service

Union v. Minister for the Civil Service reported in 1984

(3) All ER 935 that many situations of exercise of

prerogative power are not susceptible to judicial review,

because of the very nature of the subject matter such as

making of treaties, defence of realm, and dissolution of

Parliament to mention a few. Having stated that, as far as the

transfer of judges is concerned, this court in terms held that

there was no complete exclusion of judicial review, instead

only the area of justiciability was reduced by the judgment in

Supreme Court A.O.R Association Vs. Union of India

reported in (1993) 4 SCC 441. The reliance on the

observations from K. Ashok Reddy (supra) was therefore

totally misplaced. Besides, the appointment to the post of a

Civil Judge is covered under Article 234 and the State Judicial

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Service Rules, and if there is any breach or departure

therefrom, a judicial review of such a decision can certainly

lie. The High Court, therefore, clearly erred in holding that

judicial review of the decision concerning the appointment of

a Civil Judge was not permissible since that post was a

sensitive one.

Hence, the conclusion:

27. Here we are concerned with a question as to

whether the appellant could be turned back at the very

threshold, on the ground of her alleged political activities.

She has denied that she is in any way connected with CPI

(Maoist) or CMS. There is no material on record to show that

this CMS is a banned organization or that the appellant is its

member. It is also not placed on record in which manner she

had participated in any of their activities, and through which

programme she tried to intensify the activities of CMS in

Markapuram area, as claimed in paragraph 5 of the report

quoted above. While accepting that her husband may have

appeared for some of the activists of CPI (Maoist) to seek bail,

the appellant has alleged that the police are trying to frame

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her due to her husband appearing to oppose the police in

criminal matters. Prima facie, on the basis of the material on

record, it is difficult to infer that the appellant had

links/associations with a banned organization. The finding of

the Division Bench in that behalf rendered in para 19 of the

impugned judgment can not therefore be sustained.

28. We may as well note at this stage, that on selection,

the Civil Judges remain on probation for a period of two years,

and the District Judges and the High Court have ample

opportunity to watch their performance. Their probation can

be extended if necessary, and if found unsuitable or in

engaging in activities not behoving the office, the candidates

can be discharged. The relevant rules of the Andhra Pradesh

State Judicial Service being Rule Nos. 9, 10 and 11 read as

follows:-

“9. Probation and officiation: a) Every person who is appointed to the

category of District Judges by direct recruitment from the date on which he joins duty shall be on probation for a period of two years.

b) Every person who is appointed to the category of District Judges otherwise than on direct recruitment shall be on officiation for a period of two years.

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c) Every person who is appointed to the category of Civil Judges shall be on probation for a period of two years.

d) The period of probation or officiation, may be extended by the High Court by such period, not exceeding the period of probation or officiation, as the case may be, as specified in clauses (a) to (c) herein above.

10. Confirmation/Regularisation: A person who has been declared to have satisfactorily completed his period of probation or officiation as the case may be shall be confirmed as a full member of the service in the category of post to which he had been appointed or promoted, as against the substantive vacancy which may exist or arise.

11. Discharge of unsuitable probationers: If at the end of the period of probation or the period of extended probation, the Appointing authority on the recommendation of the High Court, considers that the probationer is not suitable to the post to which he has been appointed, may by order discharge him from service after giving him one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu thereof.”

29. In view of this constitutional and legal framework,

we are clearly of the view that the High Court has erred firstly

on the administrative side in discharging its responsibility

under Article 234 of the Constitution, and then on the Judicial

side in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant, by

drawing an erroneous conclusion from the judgment in the

case of Kali Dass Batish (supra). Having stated so, the

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Court can not grant the mandamus sought by the appellant to

issue an appointment order in her favour. As held by this

Court in para 17 of Harpal Singh Chauhan Vs. State of

U.P. reported in 1993 (3) SCC 552, the court can examine

whether there was any infirmity in the decision making

process. The final decision with respect to the selection is

however to be left with the appropriate authority. In the

present matter the Division Bench ought to have directed the

State Govt. to place all the police papers before the High

Court on the administrative side, to enable it to take

appropriate decision, after due consideration thereof.

30. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order

dated 19.3.2009 rendered by the Division Bench of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court is hereby set-aside. The first

respondent State Government is directed to place the police

report (produced before the Division Bench) for the

consideration of the High Court on the administrative side.

The first respondent should do so within two weeks from the

receipt of a copy of this judgment. The selection committee of

the High Court shall, within four weeks thereafter consider all

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relevant material including this police report, and the

explanation given by the appellant, and take the appropriate

decision with respect to the appointment of the appellant, and

forward the same to the respondent no 1. The first respondent

shall issue the consequent order within two weeks from the

receipt of the communication from the High Court. This appeal

and the Writ Petition No. 26147 of 2008 filed by the appellant

in the High Court will stand disposed off with this order. In the

facts of this case, we refrain from passing any order as to the

cost.

………………………………… ..J.

[ A.K. Patnaik ]

…………………………………. .J. [ H.L. Gokhale ]

New Delhi Dated : February 18th, 2013

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