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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURIDISCTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 412 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5236/2014)

K.V.S. RAM       .. Appellant       

Versus

BANGALORE METROPOLITAN     ..Respondent TRANSPORT CORPN.

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.   

Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special  leave arises out of the judgment  

dated 3.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka,  in and by  

which,  the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-

workman thereby, confirming the  termination of the appellant.

3. Brief  facts  which  led to  the filing  of  this  appeal  are  as  

under:-  The appellant was appointed on the post of  Driver in the  

Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation on 3.9.1985 and was  

working on the same post since then.  The appellant was served  

with article of charge dated 3.9.1990 alleging that he had secured

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appointment by producing a false transfer certificate.  An enquiry  

was  initiated  on  15.7.1992  and  the  appellant  submitted  his  

explanation to the aforesaid charges.  The Enquiry Officer submitted  

his  report  on  13.3.2002  holding  the  appellant  guilty  for  his  

misconduct.   After  affording opportunity to the appellant to show  

cause against the proposed punishment, the disciplinary authority  

passed  the  order  imposing  punishment  of  dismissal  from service  

vide order dated 1.10.2004.

4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant raised  

an industrial dispute bearing I.D.No.39/2005 before the III Additional  

Labour  Court,  Bangalore.   The  Labour  Court  vide  award  dated  

14.2.2007 directed the management of the corporation to reinstate  

the  appellant  in  his  original  post  with  continuity  of  service  but  

without  backwages.   The  Labour  Court  modified  the  punishment  

directing  withholding  of  four  annual  increments  with  cumulative  

effect.  In the Labour Court, appellant has produced notarized copies  

of orders passed by the respondent-Corporation in respect of other  

workmen,  who  have  committed  similar  misconduct  but  were  

awarded lesser punishments.  Referring to Exs. W.5 to W.11 which  

are the notarized copies of the orders passed in respect of other  

workmen  who  have  committed  similar  misconduct,  Labour  Court  

held  that  those  workmen  were  reinstated  in  service  with  minor

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punishment of withholding of few annual increments, whereas the  

appellant was imposed grave punishment of dismissal from service  

and thus was discriminated.  Referring to another judgment of the  

High Court in W.P.No.17316/2005 (L/K) dated 8.8.2005, Labour Court  

observed that when similarly situated workmen were imposed lesser  

punishment and the appellant cannot be discriminated by imposing  

punishment  of  dismissal  from  service  and  the  Labour  Court  in  

exercise  of  its  discretion  under  Section  11A  set  aside  the  

punishment imposed on the appellant and directed reinstatement of  

the appellant without backwages.   

5. Being  aggrieved,  respondent-corporation  filed  a  writ  

petition before the High Court.  Vide order dated 31.1.2008,  learned  

Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that  

the punishment of dismissal from service was proportionate to the  

proved misconduct against the appellant.  Aggrieved by the same,  

the appellant-workman preferred appeal before the Division Bench  

challenging  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the  said  order.   The  

Division Bench dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant on the  

ground that the charges levelled against the appellant are serious in  

nature and that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed  

by the disciplinary authority was just and proper. In this appeal, the  

appellant assails the correctness of the above judgment.

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6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High  

Court erroneously held that the long delay of twelve years in holding  

the enquiry is not fatal to the case, although it is clearly evident that  

no reasonable explanation is forthcoming for the inordinate delay of  

twelve years in concluding the disciplinary proceedings.    It  was  

further submitted that in the similar cases of other workmen who  

produced  bogus  certificate,  they  were  reinstated  in  the  service  

withholding of few increments with cumulative effect and while so,  

the  appellant  alone  cannot  be  discriminated  by  imposing  harsh  

punishment of dismissal from service.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation  

contended that  the finding of  guilt  was based on appreciation of  

evidence on record and having regard to the gravity of the charges,  

the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the punishment  

imposed by the disciplinary authority and the learned Single Judge  

as well as the Division Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the  

award passed by the Court.        

8. We  have  carefully  considered  the  rival  contentions  and  

perused the impugned judgment and other materials on record.

9. The appellant joined the services of the corporation in the  

year  1985.   In  the  year  1990,  charges  were  framed against  the  

appellant alleging that he had secured appointment by producing a

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false certificate and enquiry was initiated in the year 1992 and the  

Enquiry Officer submitted his report only in the year 2002, nearly  

twelve years after  framing of  charges.   Even though the Enquiry  

Officer submitted his report on 13.3.2002, order of dismissal from  

service was  passed only  on  1.10.2004.   Enquiry  report  was  thus  

submitted after a lapse of twelve years and there was a delay of  

twelve years in conducting and completing the enquiry.  As pointed  

out by the Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for such  

inordinate delay in completing the enquiry.  The appellant continued  

in  service  from  1990  to  2004.   Having  allowed  the  appellant-

workman to  work  for  fourteen years,  by  the  time punishment  of  

dismissal from service was imposed on the appellant, the appellant  

had reached the age of forty five years.  As observed by the Labour  

Court, the appellant having crossed forty five years, he could not  

have sought for alternative employment.  Further, as seen from Exs.  

W.5 to W.11, similarly placed workmen were ordered to be reinstated  

with lesser punishment of stoppage of few increments.  While so,  

there is no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant  

should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service.

10. It is settled proposition of law that while considering the  

management’s  decision to dismiss or  terminate the services of  a  

workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the decision of the

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management only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed  

by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt  

of the workman concerned.  Considering the delay in completing the  

enquiry  and  the  age of  the  appellant  and the  fact  that  similarly  

situated  workmen  were  reinstated  with  lesser  punishment,  the  

Labour  Court  ordered  reinstatement,  in  exercise  of  its  discretion  

under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.   

11. In the Writ Petition, while setting aside the award of the  

Labour  Court,  learned  Single  Judge  placed  reliance  upon  the  

judgment of this Court passed in the case of  Punjab Water Supply  

Sewerage Board & Anr. vs.  Ramsajivan & Anr., reported in 2007 (2)  

SCC (L&S) 668 = (2007) 9 SCC 86 and also another judgment of the  

High  Court  and  observed  that  a  person  who  practices  fraud  for  

securing employment cannot perpetuate on the ground of delay and  

the  learned  Single  Judge  faulted  the  Labour  Court  for  exercising  

discretion  under  Section  11A  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  

interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service.  In our  

considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence under  

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere  

with the order of the Tribunal, only, when there has been a patent  

perversity in the orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it or  

where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the

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basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.  In our view,  

when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view  

the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen,  

the High Court  ought not  to  have interfered with  the exercise of  

discretion by the Labour Court.    

12. In Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477,  

the Constitution Bench of  this  Court  considered the scope of  the  

High  Court’s  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  in  cases  

involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted  

with  quasi-judicial  functions  under  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1939.  

Speaking  for  the  majority  of  the  Constitution  Bench,  

Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)

“7. …A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors  of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these  are  cases  where  orders  are  passed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result  of  failure  to  exercise  jurisdiction.   A  writ  can  similarly  be  issued where in  exercise of  jurisdiction conferred on it,  the  court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it  decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard  to the party affected by the order,  or where the procedure  adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of  natural  justice.   There  is,  however,  no  doubt  that  the  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as  an  appellate  court.   This  limitation  necessarily  means  that  findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a  result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or  questioned  in  writ  proceedings.   An  error  of  law  which  is  apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,  but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be.  In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of  certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said  finding,  the  Tribunal  had  erroneously  refused  to  admit  admissible  and  material  evidence,  or  had  erroneously

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admitted  inadmissible  evidence  which  has  influenced  the  impugned finding.  Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no  evidence,  that would be regarded as an error of law which  can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.  In dealing with this  category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that  a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged  in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the  relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal  was  insufficient  or  inadequate  to  sustain  the  impugned  finding.   The adequacy or  sufficiency of  evidence led on a  point  and the  inference of  fact  to  be  drawn from the said  finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and  the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court.  It is  within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High  Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be  legitimately exercised.”       

              (Emphasis supplied)

13. In  the  case  of  Iswarlal  Mohanlal  Thakkar vs.  Paschim  

Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 434,  it was held as  

under:-      

“15. We find the judgment and award of the labour court well  reasoned and based  on facts  and  evidence on  record.  The  High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227  of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour  court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court  cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution  as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its  findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious  error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent  on  record,  can  the  High  Court  quash  the  order  of  a  lower  court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily  exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the  facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned  order  and answered  the  points  of  dispute  in  favour  of  the  appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the  same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound  and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice.

16. It is relevant to mention that in  Shalini Shyam Shetty v.  Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 with regard to the  limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under  Article 227, it was held in para 49 that: (SCC p. 348)

“49. (m) … The power of interference under [Article 227] is  to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice

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does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains  pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in  the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the  High Court.” It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 49)

“49.  (c)  High  Courts  cannot,  at  the  drop  of  a  hat,  in  exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of  the  Constitution,  interfere  with  the  orders  of  tribunals  or  courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as  a  court  of  appeal  over  the  orders  of  the  court  or  tribunal  subordinate to it.”

14. Emphasizing  that  while  exercising  jurisdiction  under  

Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts are to  

keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the  

Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder  

Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation,  (2010) 3 SCC 192,  

this Court has held as under:

“21.  Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe  that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227  of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High  Courts  are  duty-bound  to  keep  in  mind  that  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  other  similar  legislative  instruments  are  social  welfare legislations and the same are required to be  interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble  of  the  Constitution  and  the  provisions  contained  in  Part  IV  thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in  particular,  which  mandate  that  the  State  should  secure  a  social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure  equality between men and women and equitable distribution  of  material  resources  of  the  community  to  subserve  the  common  good  and  also  ensure  that  the  workers  get  their  dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:

“10. …The concept of social and economic justice  is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives  sustenance to the rule of  law and meaning and  significance to the ideal of welfare State. (State  of  Mysore  v.  Workers  of  Gold  Mines,  AIR  1958 SC 923 at page 928 para 10)”

15. Once  the  Labour  Court  has  exercised  the  discretion

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judicially,  the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is  

satisfied  that  the  award  of  the  Labour  Court  is  vitiated  by  any  

fundamental flaws.  We do not find that the award passed by the  

Labour Court suffers from any such flaws.  While interfering with the  

award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the  

parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the  

High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India  

and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

16. In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  impugned  

judgment  passed  by  the  High  Court  is  set  aside  and  the  award  

passed  by  the  Labour  Court  is  restored.  In  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

………………………….J. (V. Gopala Gowda)

.…………………………J. (R. Banumathi)

New Delhi; January 14, 2015

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ITEM NO.1C-For Judgment     COURT NO.11               SECTION XV

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  5236/2014

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03/09/2012  in WA No. 390/2008 passed by the High Court Of Karnataka At  Bangalore)

K.V.S.RAM                                          Petitioner(s)

                               VERSUS

BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT CORP              Respondent(s)

Date : 14/01/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s)                      Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)                      Mr. S. N. Bhat,Adv.

         Hon'ble  Mrs.  Justice  R.  Banumathi  pronounced  the  

judgment  of  the  Bench  comprising  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.  

Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

   (VINOD KR. JHA)      (RENU DIWAN) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)