IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6520 OF 2003 WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6521-6537 OF 2003 AND  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6538 OF 2003

K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.  … Appellants

Vs

State of Karnataka       …Respondent   

J U D G M E N T

K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

The  constitutional  validity  of  Roerich  and  

Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition & Transfer)  

Act,  1996  (in  short  the  “Acquisition  Act”),  the  

legal validity of Section 110 of the Karnataka Land  

Reforms Act, 1961 (in short “Land Reforms Act”), the  

Notification No. RD 217 LRA 93 dated 8th March, 1994  

issued by the State Government thereunder and the  

scope  and  content  of  Article  300A  of  the  

Constitution of India, are the issues that have come  

up for consideration in these civil appeals.

2. We propose to deal with the above issues in  

three  parts.   In  Part-I,  we  will  deal  with  the  

validity of Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and  

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the validity of the notification dated 8.3.1994 and  

in  Part-II,  we  will  deal  with  the  constitutional  

validity of the Acquisition Act and in Part-III, we  

will deal with the claim for enhanced compensation  

and the scope of Article 300A of the Constitution.

PREFACE

3. Dr. Svetoslav Roerich, a Russian born, was an  

internationally  acclaimed  painter,  artist  and  

recipient of many national and international awards  

including Padma Bhushan from the President of India  

in the year 1961.  Smt. Devika Rani Roerich, grand  

niece  of  Rabindranath  Tagore  had  made  valuable  

contributions and outstanding services to the Indian  

Motion Pictures and Film Industry, was known to be  

the  “First  Lady  of  the  Indian  Screen”.   She  was  

awarded Padmashri by the President of India in the  

year 1958 and was the recipient of the first Dada  

Saheb Phalke Award and the Soviet Land Nehru Award  

in the year 1989.

4.    Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika Rani Roerich had  

owned  an  Estate  called  Tatgunni  Estate  covering  

470.19 acres at B.M. Kaval Village of Kengeri Hobli  

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and  Manvarthe  Kaval  Village  of  Uttarhalli  Hobli,  

Bangalore South Taluk, out of which 100 acres were  

granted to them by the State Government in the year  

1954  for  Linaloe  cultivation  vide  G.O.  dated  

16.3.1954 read with Decree dated 19.4.1954.  When  

the Land Reforms Act came into force, they filed  

declarations under Section 66 of the Act before the  

Land Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk-II stating that  

they had no surplus lands to surrender to the State  

since the entire area held by them had been used for  

the cultivation of Linaloe which was exempted under  

Section 107(1)(vi) of the Land Reforms Act.  The  

Land  Tribunal,  Bangalore  vide  order  dated  15.3.82  

dropped  the  proceedings  instituted  under  the  Act  

against  them  holding  that  the  land  used  for  

cultivation  of  Linaloe  did  not  attract  the  

provisions of the Land Reforms Act.   

5. Dr. Roerich, it was stated, had sold 141.25  

acres  (which  included  100  acres  granted  by  the  

Government  for  Linaloe  cultivation)  to  M/s  K.T.  

Plantations Pvt. Ltd. (the first appellant herein,  

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in short ‘the Company’) by way of a registered Sale  

Deed  dated  23.3.91  for  a  sale  consideration  of  

Rs.56,65,000/-.  It was stated that Mrs. Devika Rani  

Roerich  had  also  sold  an  extent  of  223  acres  30  

guntas  to  the  Company  on  16.2.1992  for  a  sale  

consideration  of  Rs.89,25,000/-  by  way  of  an  

unregistered  sale  deed,  a  transaction  disputed  by  

Mrs. Devika Rani. The Company, however, preferred a  

suit  OS  122/92  for  a  declaration  of  title  and  

injunction  in  respect  of  that  land  before  the  

District and Civil Judge, Bangalore which is pending  

consideration.

6. The Company sought registration of the sale  

deed  dated  16.02.92  before  the  Sub  Registrar,  

Kingeri, who refused to register the sale deed.  The  

Company then preferred an appeal before the District  

Registrar, but when the appeal was about to be taken  

up for hearing, one Mary Joyce Poonacha who claimed  

rights  over  the  property  on  the  strength  of  an  

alleged  will preferred a Writ Petition No.2267 of  

1993 before the Karnataka High Court and a learned  

Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ  

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petition.  On appeal, the Division Bench confirmed  

the  order,  against  which  she  had  approached  this  

Court vide C.A.No.3094 of 1995 and this Court  vide  

its  judgment  dated  18th April,  1995  directed  the  

District Registrar not to proceed with the matter  

till the suit is disposed of by the Civil Court.  

The judgment is reported in (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 459.

7. Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika Rani had no issue  

and  due  to  old  age  and  other  ailments  it  was  

reported  that  they  were  staying  at  Hotel  Ashok,  

Bangalore for a couple of years before their death.  

It was alleged that some of the persons who were  

associated  with  the  couple,  had  an  eye  on  their  

properties,  including  the  land  used  for  linaloe  

cultivation,  valuable  paintings,  jewellery,  

artefacts  etc.,  and  began  to  create  documents  to  

grab those properties.

8. The Chief Secretary of the State of Karnataka  

noticing the above facts and circumstances convened  

a meeting on 1.4.92 in  the presence of the Director  

of Archaeology to take effective and proper steps to  

preserve  the  paintings,  artefacts  and  other  

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valuables.  For that purpose, they met Smt. Devika  

Rani and Dr. Roerich on 03.04.92 and a letter was  

handed over to Dr. Roerich on behalf of the State  

Government  expressing  the  Government’s  willingness  

to purchase the paintings and other valuables so as  

to set up a Roerich Gallery.  The State Cabinet in  

its meeting held on 09.04.92 also discussed about  

the desirability of acquiring the landed properties  

of Roerichs and also for setting up an Art Gallery-

cum-Museum,  in  public  interest.  Following  that  

meeting, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate  

(Acquisition  and  Transfer)  Ordinance,  1992  was  

drafted, but could not be issued.

9. The  Deputy  Commissioner,  Bangalore  Rural  

District  had  reported  on  26.6.1993  that  though  

Roerichs had owned 470.19 acres of land including  

the land used for Linaloe cultivation they had filed  

declarations  only  to  the  extent  of  429.26  acres.  

Out of the extent of 470.19 acres of land owned by  

them,  they  had  raised  Linaloe  cultivation  to  the  

extent of 356.15 acres and the remaining extent of  

114.04  acres  was  agricultural  land.   As  per  the  

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ceiling provisions of the Land Reforms Act they were  

entitled  to  hold  an  extent  of  54  acres  of  

agricultural land.  As such, the excess of 60.04  

acres ought to have been surrendered by them to the  

Government.   The  view  of  the  Law  Department  was  

sought for in that respect and the Law Department on  

18.11.93  stated  that  the  earlier  order  dated  

15.03.82  of  the  Land  Tribunal,  Bangalore  be  re-

opened  and  the  action  under  Section  67(1)  be  

initiated for resumption of the excess land.  The  

Deputy Commissioner was requested to issue suitable  

instructions to the Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk  

to place the matter before the Land Tribunal, for  

review  of  the  earlier  order  dated  15.03.82  by  

invoking the provisions of Section 122A of the Land  

Reforms Act.

10. The  Deputy  Commissioner  reported  that  Dr.  

Roerich had sold an extent of 137.33 acres of land  

comprising of survey nos. 124, 126 of B.M. Kaval and  

survey No. 12 of Manavarth Kaval of Bangalore South  

Taluk on 23.3.1991 to M/s K.T. Plantations Private  

Limited and it was reported that the request for  

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mutation in respect of those lands was declined by  

the local officers and the lands stood in the name  

of late Dr. Roerich in the Record of Rights.

11. The  Commissioner  and  Secretary  to  the  

Government,  Revenue  Department  taking  note  of  the  

above mentioned facts sought the legal opinion of  

the Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs as  

to whether valuable lands held by the late Roerichs  

could be resumed by the State before lands changed  

hands,  by  withdrawing  the  exemption  given  to  the  

lands used for Linaloe cultivation.  The Department  

of  Law  and  Parliamentary  Affairs  in  their  note  

No.108:/L/11/94  dated  1.3.1994  opined  that  the  

exemption  given  under  Section  107  of  the  Land  

Reforms Act, 1961 can be withdrawn by the Government  

by issuing a notification as per Section 110 of the  

Land Reforms Act.  Consequently the Commissioner and  

Secretary  to  the  government  proposed  to  issue  a  

notification to that effect for which approval of  

the Cabinet was sought for.  The Cabinet accorded  

sanction in its meeting held on 04.03.1994 and the  

Government issued a notification dated 08.03.1994 in  

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exercise of powers conferred by Section 110 of the  

Land Reforms Act, withdrawing the exemption granted  

for the lands used for cultivation of Linaloe under  

clause (vi) of Sub-section 1 of Section 107 of the  

Act.  Notification was published in the Government  

Gazette on 11.03.1994.

12. The  Assistant  Commissioner,  Bangalore  sub-

division  later  issued  a  notice  no.LRF:CR  17:93-94  

dated 28.03.94  to the company to show cause why  

137.33  acres  of  land  be  not  forfeited  to  the  

Government,  since  it  had  purchased  the  above  

mentioned lands in violation of Section 80 and 107  

of  the  Land  Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1973.  An  

enquiry under Section 83 of the Land Reforms Act was  

ordered for violation of the provisions of the Act.  

The  Company,  aggrieved  by  the  above  mentioned  

notice, filed Writ Petition No.12806/94 before the  

High Court of Karnataka, which was allowed to be  

withdrawn giving liberty to the petitioner to take  

recourse  to  the  remedies  under  law.   Due  to  the  

status  quo order  passed,  by  this  Court  in  these  

appeals  the  proceedings  pending  before  the  Asst.  

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Commissioner,  Bangalore  following  the  show-cause  

notice dated 28.03.1994 was kept in abeyance.

13. Mary Joyce Poonacha, the appellant in Civil  

Appeal No. 6538 of 2003 had, in the meanwhile, filed  

W.P. No. 11149 of 1994 before the Karnataka High  

Court  claiming  rights  over  some  of  the  articles  

belonging to Roerichs’ couple on the strength of a  

will  dated  4.3.1994.    The  writ  petition  was  

dismissed  by  the  High  Court  holding  that  the  

articles claimed by the appellant stood vested in  

the State in view of the Acquisition Act. Against  

that  judgment,  Mary  Joyce  Poonacha  has  approached  

this Court and filed Civil Appeal No. 6538 of 2003.  

14. The  Company,  through  its  Managing  Director,  

filed Writ Petition No. 32560 of 1996 before the  

Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional  

validity of the Acquisition Act, Section 110 of the  

Land Reforms Act, the notification dated 08.03.1994  

issued  thereunder  and  also  sought  other  

consequential  reliefs.   The  writ  petition  was  

dismissed by the High Court upholding the validity  

of the Acquisition Act as well as Section 110 of the  

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Land  Reforms  Act  and  the  notification  issued  

thereunder except in relation to the inclusion of  

certain  members  in  the  Board  of  Directors  

constituted under the Acquisition Act.  Aggrieved by  

the same the Company has come up before this Court  

in Civil Appeal No.6520 of 2003.   

15. Mary  Joyce  Poonacha  and  others  had  also  

challenged  the  constitutional  validity  of  the  

Acquisition Act by filing Writ Petition Nos. 32630-

32646 of 1996 before the Karnataka High Court, which  

were also dismissed in view of the judgment in Writ  

Petition No. 32560 of 1996.  Aggrieved by the same,  

they have preferred Civil Appeal Nos. 6521-6537 of  

2003.   

16. When the Civil Appeals came up before a bench  

of this Court on 28.07.04 and this Court passed an  

order framing the following substantive questions of  

law:-

1. Whether  Section  110  of  the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act,  1961,  as  amended  by  the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  amendment  Act,  1973,  (Act  1  of  1974),  which came into effect from 01.03.1974,  read with Section 79 B of the said Act,  introduced  by  amending  Act  1  of  1974,  violates  the  basic  structure  of  the  

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Constitution,  in  so  far  as  it  confers  power  on  the  Executive  Government,  a  delegatee  of  the  Legislature,  of  withdrawal  of  exemption  of  Linaloe  plantation, without hearing and without  reasons?

2. Whether  the  Roerich  and  Devika  Rani Roerich (Acquisition and Transfer)  Act,  1996,  (the  Acquisition  Act),  is  protected  by  Article  31C  of  the  Constitution?

3. Whether the true interpretation of  Article  300A  of  the  Constitution,  the  said  Act  is  violative  of  the  said  Article  in  so  far  as  no  specific  compensation  prescribed  for  the  acquisition  of  468  acres  of  Linaloe  plantation,  and,  after  deduction  of  liabilities and payment of compensation  for the artefacts, no balance may and/or  is likely to exist for payment of such  compensation,  as  a  result  of  which,  whether the Act really is expropriatory  in nature?

4. Whether on true interpretation of  Article  300A  of  the  Constitution,  the  said Act is violative of Article 300A as  the said Article is not, by itself, a  source  of  Legislative  power,  but  such  power  of  the  State  Legislature  being  traceable only to Entry 42 of List III  of  Schedule  VII  to  the  Constitution  viz.,  “Acquisition  and  Requisition  of  Property”,  which  topic  excludes  expropriation  and  confiscation  of  property?

5. If  Article  300A  of  the  Constitution  is  construed  as  providing  for deprivation of property without any  compensation  at  all,  or  illusory  

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compensation,  and  hence  providing  for  expropriation  and  confiscation  of  property, whether the said Article would  violate the rule of law and would be an  arbitrary  and  unconscionable  violation  of Article 14 of the Constitution, thus  violating  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution?

Part-I

We will first examine the validity of Section  

110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification  

dated 08.03.94, issued thereunder.

17. Mr.  T.R.  Andhyarujina,  Senior  Advocate  

appearing  for  the  Company  submitted  that  it  had  

purchased the lands from Roerich couple when those  

lands stood exempted from the provisions of the Land  

Reforms Act by virtue of Section 107(1)(vi) of the  

Act.    Learned senior counsel submitted that the  

State Government cannot, in exercise of its powers  

under  Section  110  of  the  Act,  issue  notification  

dated 08.03.94 to withdraw the exemption granted by  

the Legislature which is essentially a legislative  

policy.    Learned senior counsel also submitted  

that Section 110 gave unfettered and unguided power  

to the Executive to take away the exemption granted  

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by the Legislature and hence that Section is void  

for  excessive  delegation  of  legislative  powers  on  

the State Government.  In support of his contention,  

reliance was placed on the judgments of this court  

In Re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the Ajmer-Merwara  

(Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 and the Part C States  

(Laws) Act, 1950 (1951) 2 SCR 747,  Rajnarain Singh  

v.  The  Chairman,  Patna  Admnistration  Committee,  

Patna&  Another,   AIR  1954  SC  569,  Vasantlal  

Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay and Ors. AIR  

1961 SC 4,  Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi  

& Another v. Union of India & Others (1960) 2 SCR  

671.   

18. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the  

State  Government  cannot  take  away  retrospectively  

the vested rights of persons to hold lands used for  

Linaloe cultivation from 01.03.1974 onwards, without  

assigning  any  reasons.    Further,  it  was  also  

submitted  that  the  exemption  under  Section  

107(1)(vi)  was  granted  with  respect  to  the  lands  

used for the cultivation of Linaloe, and not for any  

specific  individual,  and  there  is  no  bar  in  

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alienating the land to third parties.  In support of  

the  above  contention,  learned  counsel  placed  

reliance on the decisions of this Court in  Bakul  

Cashew Co. and Ors.  v.  Sales Tax Officer, Quilon  

and  Anr. (1986)  2  SCC  365,  Income  Tax  Officer,  

Alleppy v.  M.C. Ponnoose and Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 351,  

Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor and Ors.  v.  

Associated Transport Madras (P) Ltd. and Ors. (1980)  

4 SCC 597, Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd.  

v.  Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin  

and Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 112,  Hukam Chand etc.  v.  

Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (1972) 2 SCC 601.

19. Shri Andhyarujina also submitted that the show  

cause notice dated 28.03.1994 was  ex facie illegal  

and that the prohibition of transfer of land under  

Section 80 of the Act cannot act retrospectively in  

respect  of  lands  already  stood  exempted  under  

Section 107(1)(vi) of the Act.   

20. Learned  senior  counsel  also  refuted  the  

contention of the State that, under Section 107(2)  

of the Land Reforms Act, there can be only 10 units  

of land used for Linaloe cultivation exempted under  

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Section 107(1)(vii) of the Act.   Learned senior  

counsel submitted that it would be anomalous for the  

Legislature, by amending the Act, on the one hand,  

to exempt the lands for cultivation of Linaloe from  

operation of the Land Reforms Act, without any limit  

of  holding  and,  at  the  same  time,  deprive  the  

existing  cultivators  of  Linaloe,  except  to  the  

extent  of  10  units  on  1.3.74.   Learned  counsel  

submitted  that  Section  107(1)(vi)  does  not  put  a  

limit of 10 units of Linaloe lands.   

21. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the  

State Government has also not followed the procedure  

laid down in Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act  

and,  in  any  view,  the  mere  laying  of  the  

notification before the State Legislature would not  

cure the infirmity of excessive delegation. Learned  

counsel also submitted that though the Land Reforms  

Act was placed in the 9th Schedule which saves its  

provisions from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and  

31,  a  challenge  to  a  provision  of  the  Act  for  

excessive delegation of legislative power is still  

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available  and  the  Land  Reforms  Act  cannot  be  

protected by Article 31B.  Shri Andhyarujina also  

submitted that the State Govt. was led to deprive  

the appellants of their property even by-passing the  

Act when it resorted to withdrawing the exemption  

available  under  Section  107(1)(vi)  of  the  Land  

Reforms  Act,  by  issuing  its  notification  dated  

08.03.1994 by withdrawing the exemption and making  

the Company ineligible to hold the agricultural land  

under Section 79B of the Land Reforms Act which also  

provided inadequate compensation.  

22. Mr. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, senior counsel for  

the State of Karnataka submitted that the validity  

of  Section  110  of  the  Act  was  never  questioned  

before the High Court on the ground of excessive  

delegation and hence, the appellants are precluded  

from  raising  that  contention  before  this  Court.  

Learned senior counsel submitted that the validity  

of  Section  110  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  

violation  of  the  fundamental  rights  which  was  

rightly negatived by the High Court since the Land  

Reforms  Act  was  placed  in  the  IXth  Schedule.  

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Learned senior counsel also submitted that the Land  

Reforms  Amendment  Act  (Act  1  of  1974)  was  also  

placed in the IXth Schedule  and, hence immune from  

attack on the ground of violation of Articles 14 or  

19 of the Constitution and, hence, the notification  

dated 8.03.1994 issued under Section 110 of the Act  

is  also  immune  from  challenge.  Learned  senior  

counsel submitted that the constitutional validity  

of the amended Act was also upheld by this Court in  

H.S.  Srinivasa  Raghavachar and  Ors. v.  State  of  

Karnataka and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 692.   

23. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the  

appellants have no  locus standi to maintain these  

writ petitions since they have not perfected their  

title  over  the  properties  in  question.   Further,  

Mrs.  Devika  Rani  Roerich  had  also  disputed  the  

execution of the sale deed dated 16.02.92 and a suit  

disputing title is pending consideration before the  

Civil Court.  Learned senior counsel also submitted  

that the company had illegally acquired 141 acres 25  

guntas of land in excess of the ceiling prescribed  

under Section 107(2) of the Land Reforms Act and the  

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Act mandates that no person shall, which includes a  

Company also, after the date of commencement of the  

Land Reforms Act, i.e., 01.03.74, acquire land in  

any manner for cultivation of Linaloe to an extent  

which together with the land cultivated by Linaloe,  

if  any,  already  held  by  him  exceed  10  units  

notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section  

(1) of Section 107.  

24. Learned senior counsel further submitted that  

the provisions of Sections 66 to 76 also shall apply  

mutatis  mutandis,  in  respect  of  every  acquisition  

contrary to Section 107(2). Learned senior counsel  

also submitted that in any view Section 110 of the  

Land Reforms Act does not suffer from the vice of  

excessive delegation of legislative powers. Learned  

senior  counsel  submitted  that  Section  110  of  the  

Land Reforms Act is guided by the policy laid down  

by the state legislature which is discernible from  

the scheme of the Land Reforms Act, its objective,  

provisions in Chapter-VIII, history of the amendment  

substituting Section 107 (1)(vi) etc.    Learned  

counsel also submitted that exemption under Section  

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107(1)(vi) was granted to Roerichs’ for cultivation  

of  Linaloe,  while  the  Company  is  statutorily  

disentitled to hold the land and, hence, the claim  

for exemption from the provisions of Land Reforms  

Act is opposed to the policy of the Act.    Further  

nobody can claim the exemption from the provisions  

of the Land Reforms Act, as a matter of right, much  

less  a  Company  which  is  statutorily  barred  from  

holding excess agricultural land.     By withdrawing  

the exemption the State Govt. was only giving effect  

to the underlying legislative policy.    

25. Learned senior counsel submitted, but for the  

exemption granted, Roerichs’ would not have held the  

land  used  for  the  cultivation  of  Linaloe.  

Exemption was granted to Roerichs subject to Section  

110 of the Land Reforms Act and it was with that  

statutory limitation the Company had purchased the  

land.  Learned senior counsel cited the following  

judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of  

Delhi v.  Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills,  

Delhi and Another  AIR 1968 SC 1232;  Delhi Cloth &  

General  Mills  Ltd.  v.  Union  of  India  &  Others.  

20

(1983) 4 SCC 166; Premium Granites and Anr. v. State  

of Tamilnadu and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691; Registrar of  

Co-operative  Societies,  Trivandrum  and  Anr.  v.  

Kunjabmu and Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 340.

26. Learned  senior  counsel  also  submitted  that  

there  is  no  provision  for  providing  hearing  or  

recording  reasons  before  issuing  the  notification  

dated  08.03.1994,  while  exercising  powers  under  

Section 110 of the Act.   Learned senior counsel  

submitted that exercise of powers under Section 110  

of  the  Act  is  in  the  nature  of  subordinate  

legislation  and  no  opportunity  of  hearing  or  

recording of reasons are warranted. In support of  

his  contention  learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on  

the decisions of this Court in  Shri Sitaram Sugar  

Co. Ltd. and Another v.  Union of India and Others  

(1990) 3 SCC 223;  Union of India  and Another v.  

Cynamide India Ltd. and Another Etc. (1987) 2 SCC  

720; H.S.S.K. Niyami & Another v. Union of India &  

Another  (1990) 4 SCC 516;  Laxmi Khandsari and Ors.  

v.  State of U.P.  and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 600;  J. K.  

21

Industries  &  Another  v.  Union  of  India  &  Others  

(2007) 13 SCC 673.  

27. Learned  senior  counsel  also  submitted  that  

requirement  of  placing  the  notification  dated  

08.03.94  before  the  State  Assembly  is  not  a  

mandatory  requirement  once  the  State  Government  

publishes the notification in the official gazette.  

Reference was made to the judgment in  Jan Mohammad  

Noor Mohammad Bagban v.  State of Gujarat and Anr.,  

AIR 1966 SC 385.   Learned senior counsel submitted  

that in any view of the matter, as per the order of  

this  Court  dated  24.2.2011  the  State  Govt.  have  

already  taken  steps  for  placing  the  notification  

before  both  the  Houses  of  the  State  Legislature.  

Consequently, the defect, if any, of non-laying the  

notification, has been cured.

28. The  Land  Reforms  Act  was  enacted  by  the  

Karnataka State Legislature to have a uniform law  

relating to land reforms  in the State of Karnataka,  

relating  to  agrarian  relations,  conferment  of  

ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings etc.  

Chapter II of the Act deals with general provisions  

22

relating  to  tenancies,  Chapter  III  deals  with  

conferment of ownership on tenants.  Ceiling on land  

holdings is dealt with in Chapters IV and Chapter V  

deals with restrictions on holding or transfer of  

agricultural lands.  Chapter VIII of the Act deals  

with  exemptions  and  Chapter  XI  deals  with  the  

miscellaneous provisions.

29. Appellants  in  these  appeals  have  challenged  

the validity of Section 110 of the Act primarily on  

the  ground  of  excessive  delegation  of  legislative  

powers on the State Government.  To examine that  

contention  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  certain  

provisions contained in various Chapters referred to  

above,  the  scheme  of  the  Act,  its  object  and  

purpose,  legislative  policy  underlying  in  the  

provisions of the statute etc.

30. Chapter  V  of  the  Act,  as  we  have  already  

indicated, imposes certain restrictions on holding  

or transfer of agricultural lands.  Section 79B(1)  

of the Act prohibits holding of agricultural land by  

certain persons which says that with effect on and  

from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act  

23

(Act 1/74) w.e.f. 1.3.1974, no person other than a  

person cultivating land personally shall be entitled  

to hold land; and that it shall not be lawful for, a  

company inter alia to hold ‘any land’.  Further sub-

section (2) of Section 79B states that the company  

which holds lands on the date of the commencement of  

the Amendment Act and which is disentitled to hold  

lands  under  sub-section  (1),  shall  within  ninety  

days from the said date furnish to the Tahsildar  

within whose jurisdiction the greater part of such  

land  is  situated  a  declaration  containing  the  

particulars of such land and such other particulars  

as may be prescribed; and which acquires such land  

after the said date shall also furnish a similar  

declaration  within  the  prescribed  period.   Sub-

section (3) of Section 79B states that the Tahsildar  

shall,  on  receipt  of  the  declaration  under  sub-

section  (2)  and  after  such  enquiry  as  may  be  

prescribed,  send  a  statement  containing  the  

prescribed particulars relating to such land to the  

Deputy  Commissioner  who  shall,  by  notification,  

declare  that  such  land  shall  vest  in  the  State  

24

Government  free  from  all  encumbrances  and  take  

possession thereof in the prescribed manner.  Sub-

section (4) of Section 79B states that in respect of  

the land vesting in the State Government under that  

section an amount as specified in Section 72 shall  

be paid.  Explanation to Section 79B states that for  

the purpose of that section it shall be presumed  

that  a  land  is  held  by  an  institution,  trust,  

company, association or body where it is held by an  

individual on its behalf.  Section 80 bars transfer  

of any land to non-agriculturists, which says that  

no sale, gift or exchange or lease of any land or  

interest therein etc. shall be lawful in favour of a  

person who is disentitled under Section 79A or 79B  

to acquire or hold any land.   

31. The  first  appellant  being  a  company  was,  

therefore, prohibited from holding any agricultural  

land  after  the  commencement  of  the  Act.   If  the  

company  was  holding  any  land  with  Linaloe  

cultivation on the date of the commencement of the  

Act,  the  same  would  have  vested  in  the  State  

25

Government under Section 79B(3) of the Act and an  

amount as specified in Section 72 would have been  

paid.    Section  104,  however,  states  that  the  

provisions of Section 38, Section 63 other than sub-

section (9), thereof, Sections 64, 79-A, 79-B and 80  

shall  not  apply  to  plantations  and  is  not  made  

subject to the provisions of Section 110.   

32. Section 107 states that the provisions of the  

Act  would  not  apply  to  certain  lands  mentioned  

therein,  but  made  subject  to  the  provisions  of  

Section  110.   Section  107,  to  the  extent  it  is  

relevant  for  the  purpose,  is  extracted  below  for  

easy reference:

“107.    Act not to apply to certain  lands.- (1) Subject to the provisions of  Section 110, nothing in this Act, except  Section 8, shall apply to lands,-

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(vi) used  for  the  cultivation  of  linaloe;

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(2)    Notwithstanding anything in sub- section (1), no person shall, after the  date  of  commencement  of  the  Amendment  Act  acquire  in  any  manner  for  the  

26

cultivation  of  linaloe,  land  of  an  extent  which  together  with  the  land  cultivated by linaloe, if any, already  held by him exceeds ten units.

(3)      In  respect  of  every  acquisition contrary to sub-section (2),  the provisions of Section 66 to 76 shall  mutatis mutandis apply.”

Section  107,  we  have  already  indicated,  is  

made subject to Section 110, which reads as follows:

“110.  Certain  lands  to  be  not  exempt  from  certain  provisions.- The  State  Government  may,  by  notification  direct  that  any  land  referred  to  in  [Section  107 and 108] shall not be exempt from  such of the provisions of this Act from  which they have been exempted under the  said sections.”

33. The question that is canvassed before us is  

whether  Section  110  is  invalid  due  to  excessive  

delegation  of  legislative  powers  on  the  State  

Government.  Before we examine the scope and ambit  

of the above quoted provision, reference may be made  

to few of the decided cases of this Court on the  

power of delegation of legislative functions.  

34. In re:  The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (supra), this  

Court held that legislatures in India have been held  

to possess wide powers of delegation but subject to  

27

one  limitation  that  a  legislature  cannot  delegate  

essential  legislative  functions  which  consists  in  

the determination of the legislative policy and of  

formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of  

conduct.  In  Maharashtra State Board of Secondary  

and Higher Secondary Education and Anr. v. Paritosh  

Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others (1984) 4 SCC 27, this  

Court  declared  that  while  examining  whether  a  

particular piece of delegated legislation - whether  

in the form of a rule or regulation or any other  

type of statutory instrument - was in excess of the  

power  of  subordinate  legislation  conferred  on  the  

delegate, has to be determined with reference only  

to the specific provisions contained in the relevant  

statute  conferring  the  power  to  make  the  rule,  

regulation etc. and the object and purpose of the  

Act as can be gathered from the various provisions  

of the enactment.  It was held that the Court cannot  

substitute  its  own  opinion  for  that  of  the  

legislature or its delegate as to what principle or  

policy would best serve the objects and purpose of  

the  Act  or  sit  in  judgment  over  the  wisdom  and  

28

effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down  

by  the  regulation  making  body  and  declare  a  

regulation to be  ultra vires merely on the ground  

that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  the  impugned  

provisions will not help to serve the object and  

purpose of the Act.  It is exclusively within the  

province  of  the  legislature  and  its  delegate  to  

determine, as a matter of policy, how the provision  

of  the  Statute  can  best  be  implemented  and  what  

measures,  substantive  as  well  as  procedural  would  

have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations  

for the efficacious achievement of the objects and  

purposes of the Act.  It is not for the Court to  

examine  the  merits  or  demerits  of  such  a  policy  

because  its  scrutiny  has  to  be  limited  to  the  

question as to whether the impugned regulations fall  

within  the  scope  of  the  regulation-making  power  

conferred on the delegate by the Statute.

35. Law  is  settled  that  the  Court  shall  not  

invalidate a legislation on the ground of delegation  

of essential legislative functions or on the ground  

of  conferring  unguided,  uncontrolled  and  vague  

29

powers upon the delegate without taking into account  

the preamble of the Act as also other provisions of  

the statute in the event they provide good means of  

finding out the meaning of the offending statute.  

The  question  whether  any  particular  legislation  

suffered  from  excessive  delegation,  has  to  be  

determined  by  the  court  having  regard  to  the  

subject-matter,  the  scheme,  the  provisions  of  the  

statute  including  its  preamble  and  the  facts  and  

circumstances  and  the  background  on  which  the  

statute is enacted.  See Bhatnagars & Co. Ltd.  v.  

Union of India AIR 1957 SC 478; Mohmedalli and Ors.  

v. Union of India  and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 980.

36. Further,  if  the  legislative  policy  is  

formulated  by  the  legislature,  the  function  of  

supplying details may be delegated to the executive  

for giving effect to the policy.  Sometimes, the  

legislature passes an act and makes it applicable,  

in the first instance, to some areas and classes of  

persons, but empowers the government to extend the  

provisions thereof to different territories, persons  

or  commodities,  etc.    So  also  there  are  some  

30

statutes which empower the government to exempt from  

their operation certain persons, commodities, etc.  

Some statutes authorise the government to suspend or  

relax  the  provisions  contained  therein.   So  also  

some statutes confer the power on the executive to  

adopt and apply statutes existing in other states  

without modifications to a new area.   

37. In  Brij  Sunder  Kapoor v.  I  Additional  

District Judge and Ors. (1989) 1 SCC 561 this Court  

held  that  the  Parliament  decided  as  a  matter  of  

policy that the cantonment areas in a State should  

be  subject  to  the  same  legislation  relating  to  

control  of  rent  and  regulation  of  housing  

accommodation  as  in  force  in  other  areas  of  the  

State  and  this  policy  was  given  effect  to  by  

empowering  the  Central  Government  to  extend  to  a  

cantonment area in a State the tenancy legislation  

as in force as in other areas of the State including  

future amendments and that there was no abdication  

of legislative functions by Parliament.

38. Chapter VIII of the Land Reforms Act deals  

with exemption provisions.  Section 104 of the Act  

31

deals  with  plantations,  which  says,  that  the  

provisions  of  Section  38,  Section  63,  other  than  

sub-section  (9),  thereof,  Sections  64,  79-A,  79-B  

and 80 shall not apply to plantations, but the power  

to  withdraw  the  exemption  in  respect  of  the  

plantations,  has  not  been  conferred  on  the  State  

Government,  but  evidently  retained  by  the  

Legislature. Legislative policy is therefore clearly  

discernible  from  the  provision  of  the  Statute  

itself,  that,  whenever  the  Legislature  wanted  to  

confer the power to withdraw the exemption to the  

State Government it has done so, otherwise it has  

retained the power to itself.    

39. Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act empowers  

the  State  Government  to  withdraw  the  exemption  

granted to any land referred to in Sections 107 and  

108.  Section 107 itself has been made “subject to”  

Section  110  of  the  Act.   The  words  ‘subject  to’  

conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to  

another provision or other provisions to which it is  

made subject.  In Black Law  Dictionary, 5th Edn. At  

p.1278, the expression “subject to” has been defined  

32

as under:

“Liable,  subordinate,  subservient,  inferior,  obedient  to;  governed  or  effected  by;  provided  that;  provided;  answerable for.”

Since Section 107 is made subject to Section 110,  

the former section conveys the idea of yielding to  

the provision to which it is made subject that is  

Section  110  which  is  the  will  of  legislature.  

Reference may be made to the decisions of this Court  

in  Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Moudhapara,  

Raipur v. Regional Transport Authority & Another AIR  

1966  SC  1318,  Joginder  Singh  &  Others  v.  Deputy  

Custodian-General of Evacuee Property & Others  AIR  

1967 SC 145    and   Bharat Hari Singhania & Others  

v.  Commissioner  of  Wealth  Tax  (Central)  &  Others  

(1994) Supp. 3 SCC 46, Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State  

of T.N. & Another (2004) 3 SCC 1, Printers (Mysore)  

Ltd. v. M. A. Rasheed & Others (2004) 4 SCC 460,  

South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board  

of Revenue, Trivendrum & Another AIR 1964 SC 207,  

Commissioner  of  Wealth  Tax,  Andhra  Pradesh,  

Hyderabad  v.  Trustees  of  H.E.H.  Nizam’s  Family  

(Remainder Wealth Trust), Hyderabad (1977) 3 SCC 362  

33

and Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram  

(1986) 4 SCC 447.   

40. The Legislature’s apathy in granting exemption  

for  lands  used  for  cultivation  of  Linaloe  is  

discernible  from  the  language  used  in  sub-section  

(2) of Section 107, which says that no person shall  

after the commencement of the Amendment Act acquire  

in any manner for the cultivation of Linaloe, land  

of an extent which together with the land cultivated  

by Linaloe, if any, already held by him exceeds ten  

units.    Legislature,  therefore,  as  matter  of  

policy, wanted to give only a conditional exemption  

for  lands  used  for  Linaloe  cultivation  and  the  

policy  was  to  empower  the  State  Government  to  

withdraw the same especially when the law is that no  

person can claim exemption as a matter of right.  

The legislative will was to make Section 107 subject  

to Section 110 and not the will of the delegate,  

hence, overriding effect has to be given to Section  

110.   Further,  the  Land  Reforms  Act  including  

Section 110 was placed in IXth Schedule in the year  

34

1965 and, hence, immune from challenge in a court of  

law.    

41. Dr. Roerich and Mrs. Devika had got only the  

conditional  exemption  from  the  provisions  of  the  

Land  Reforms  Act  for  the  lands  used  for  Linaloe  

cultivation and, hence, they also would have lost  

ownership  and  possession  of  the  lands  once  the  

exemption had been withdrawn and the land would have  

vested in the State.   The land was purchased by the  

Company with that statutory condition from Roerichs  

and,  hence,  was  bound  by  that  condition.    We,  

therefore, reject the contention that Section 110 is  

void  due  to  excessive  delegation  of  legislative  

powers.

42. The State Government issued the notification  

dated 8.3.1994 in exercise of the powers conferred  

by Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act which was  

published  in  the  official  gazette  on  11.3.94.  

Section 2(22) of the Act defines ‘Notification’ to  

mean  a  notification  published  in  the  official  

gazette.  Section 23 of the General Clauses Act 1897  

35

also  states  that  the  publication  in  the  official  

gazette of a rule or by-law purported to have been  

made in exercise of power to make rules or by-laws  

after previous publication shall be conclusive proof  

that the rule or by-law has been duly made.   

43. This  Court  in  B.K.  Srinivasan  and  Ors. v.  

State of Karnataka and Ors.  (1987) 1 SCC 658 held  

as follows:-

“Unlike Parliamentary legislation which  is  publicly  made,  delegated  or  subordinate  legislation  is  often  made  unobtrusively  in  the  chambers  of  a  minister, a secretary to the Government  or  other  official  dignitary.   It  is,  therefore,  necessary  that  subordinate  legislation,  in  order  to  take  effect,  must be published or promulgated in some  suitable  manner,  whether  such  publication  or  promulgation  is  prescribed by the parent statute or not.  It will then take effect from the date  of such publication or promulgation.”

44. So far as this case is concerned, the State  

Government  has  already  followed  the  legal  

requirement of publication of the notification dated  

08.03.1994 which came into effect on 11.03.94.

45. Mr.  T.R.Andhyarujina,  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  the  

respondent State has not followed the procedure laid  

36

down in Section 140 of the Act and that the approval  

of the notification by the State Legislature is an  

important circumstance to be taken into account in  

determining its validity.  Learned counsel submitted  

that laying of notification under Section 140 is not  

a  mere  laying  but  is  coupled  with  a  

negative/affirmative resolution of the Legislature;  

the failure to lay the notification is an illegality  

which  cannot be cured.   

46. Following is the procedure generally followed  

when an order or notification is laid before the  

Legislature:-

1)    Laying which requires no further  procedure;

2)   Laying allied with the affirmative  procedure; and

3)    Laying  allied  with  negative  procedure.

The  object  of  requirement  of  laying  provided  in  

enabling  Acts  is  to  subject  the  subordinate  law  

making authority to the vigilance and control of the  

Legislature.  The degree of control the Legislature  

wants can be noticed on the language used in such  

laying clause.   

47. We have in this case already found that there  

37

has  not  been  any  excessive  delegation  of  

legislative powers  on the State Government and we  

may now examine whether the failure to follow the  

procedure laid down under Section 140 of the Act has  

affected  the  legal  validity  of  the  notification.  

Facts would indicate that, in the instant case, the  

notification  has  not  been  laid  before  the  

Legislature, but looking at the language of Section  

140, it has not affected the validity or the effect  

of the notification.    

For  easy  reference  Section  140  is  extracted  

hereunder:

“Section 140.  Rules and notifications  to  be  laid  before  the  State  Legislature.- Every rule made under this  Act and every notification issued under  Sections 109, 110 and 139 shall be laid  as soon as may be after it is made or  issued  before  each  House  of  the  State  Legislature while it is in session for a  total period of thirty days which may be  comprised  in  one  session  or  in  two  successive sessions, and, if, before the  expiry of the session in which it is so  laid  or  the  session  immediately  following  both  Houses  agree  in  making  any  modification  in  the  rule  or  notification or both Houses agree that  the rule or notification should not be  made,  the  rule  or  notification  shall  thereafter  have  effect  only  in  such  modified form or be of no effect, as the  

38

case may be;  so however that any such  modification  or  annulment  shall  be  without  prejudice  to  the  validity  of  anything previously done under that rule  or notification.”

(Emphasis supplied)

48. The Constitution Bench of this Court in  Jan  

Mohammad Noor’s case (supra) examined the effect of  

sub-section 5 of Section 26 which provides that the  

rules  shall  be  laid  before  each  House  of  the  

provisional  Legislature,  for  giving  effect.  

Interpreting  that  provision  the  Court  held  that  

Section  26(5) of  Bombay Act  29 of  1939 does  not  

prescribe that the Rules acquired validity only from  

the date on which they have been placed before the  

House of Legislature.  The Court held that the Rules  

are valid from the date on which they are made under  

Section 26(1).  The Court noted that the Legislature  

has prescribed that the Rules shall be placed before  

the  House  of  the  Legislature,  but  held  that  the  

failure  to  place  the  rules  before  the  House  of  

Legislature  does  not  effect  the  validity  of  the  

rules and merely because they have not been placed  

before the House of the Legislature, the provision  

39

cannot be regarded as mandatory.

49. This Court in  Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. &  

Others v. State of Haryana (1979) 2 SCC 196 examined  

the  question  relating  to  the  non-compliance  with  

sub-section  (6)  of  Section  3  of  the  Essential  

Commodities  Act,  1955  which  provides  that  every  

order made under the section shall be laid before  

both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be, after  

it is made.   The Court held that non-compliance  

with the Laying Clause did not affect the validity  

of the order and make it void.  In  Quarry Owners’  

Association v. State of Bihar & Others (2000) 8 SCC  

655, this court while examining the scope of Section  

28(3)  of  the  Mines  and  Minerals  (Regulation  and  

Development)  Act  1957,  stated  that  when  a  statue  

required the placement of a notification before the  

State Legislature it is the obligation of the state  

to place the same with the specific note before each  

House of State Legislature.  Even if it had not been  

done,  the  State  could  place  the  same  before  the  

House at the earliest and the omission to comply  

with  it  would  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  

40

notifications  and  their  coming  into  force.  

Direction was issued to the State Government to lay  

notifications at the earliest.

50. Section  140  does  not  require  the  State  

Legislature to give its approval for bringing into  

effect the notification, but a positive act by the  

Legislature has been contemplated in Section 140 to  

make the notification effective, that does not mean  

that failure to lay the notification has affected  

the legal validity, its effect or the action taken  

precedent to that notification.  We, therefore, hold  

that non-laying of the notification dated 08.03.1994  

before the State Legislature has not affected its  

validity  or  the  action  taken  precedent  to  that  

notification.   We have now,  vide our order dated  

24.02.2011, directed the State Government to place  

the notification before both the Houses of the State  

Legislature following the judgment in Quarry Owners’  

case (supra).  Therefore, the defect, if any, of not  

placing the notification has been cured.  

51. We  may  also  consider  the  effect  of  

Section 80 of the Land Reforms Act on Section 79-B.  

41

Section 80 prohibits transfer of any land to non-

agriculturalist.   Section 80(1)(iv), states that it  

shall not be lawful to sell, gift, exchange or lease  

of  any  land,  in  favour  of  a  person,  who  is  

disentitled under Section 79-B, to acquire or hold  

any land.  The expression “land” has been defined  

under Section 2(18) which is all comprehensive and  

takes in agricultural lands, that is land which is  

used or capable of being used for agriculture, but  

for the exemption granted under Section 107(1)(vi)  

lands used for the cultivation of linaloe would have  

fallen  under  Section  2(18).    But,  so  far  the  

company is concerned, the prohibition was total and  

complete since Section 79-B states that it would not  

be lawful for a company to hold “any land”, with  

effect and from the date of the commencement of the  

amending  Act.   The  Company,  therefore,  could  not  

have  held  the  land  used  for  the  cultivation  of  

Linaloe on the date of the commencement of the Act.  

Further on withdrawal of exemption vide notification  

dated 08.03.94 the Company was disentitled to hold  

the land belonging to Roerichs’ since the same would  

42

be governed by the provisions of the Land Reforms  

Act.

52. We also find no force in the contention that  

opportunity  of  hearing  is  a  pre-condition  for  

exercising powers under Section 110 of the Act.  No  

such requirement has been provided under Section 107  

or Section 110.  When the exemption was granted to  

Roerichs’ no hearing was afforded so also when the  

exemption  was  withdrawn  by  the  delegate.   It  is  

trite  law  that  exemption  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  

matter of right so also its withdrawal, especially  

when the same is done through a legislative action.  

Delegated  legislation  which  is  a  legislation  in  

character,  cannot  be  questioned  on  the  ground  of  

violation  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice,  

especially  in  the  absence  any  such  statutory  

requirement.  Legislature or its delegate is also  

not  legally  obliged  to  give  any  reasons  for  its  

action while discharging  its legislative function.  

See  –  State  of  Punjab  v.   Tehal  Singh  and  Ors.  

(2002) 2 SCC 7;  West Bengal Electricity Regulatory  

Commission  v.  CESC Ltd. etc. etc. (2002) 8 SCC  

43

715;  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  and  Anr.  v.  

Promoters and Builders Association and Anr.  (2004)  

10 SCC 796; Bihar State Electricity Board  v.  Pulak  

Enterprises and Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 641.

53. We,  therefore,  repel  the  challenge  on  the  

validity  of  Section  110  of  the  Karnataka  Land  

Reforms Act as well as the notification dt.8.3.1994  

and  we  hold  that  the  land  used  for  linaloe  

cultivation would be governed by the provisions of  

the  Land  Reforms  Act  which  is  protected  under  

Article 31B of the Constitution having been included  

in the IXth Schedule.    

PART-II

Constitutional Validity of the Acquisition Act

54. The  State  Government  after  withdrawing  the  

exemption  granted  to  the  lands  used  for  Linaloe  

cultivation, felt the necessity to take effective  

and  proper  steps  to  manage  the  estate,  its  tree  

growth,  preserve  paintings,  artefact  and  other  

valuables of Roerichs’ and their transferees and to  

establish an Art Gallery-cum-Museum.  For the said  

purpose  initially  the  State  issued  an  ordinance,  

44

namely, the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate  

(Acquisition and Transfer) Ordinance 1992, which was  

sent for the approval of the President of India.  In  

the  meanwhile  Roerich  couple  passed  away  and  the  

ordinance  was  returned  to  make  sufficient  

amendments. After necessary amendments ordinance of  

1995 was issued. However, the ordinance was returned  

by the Government of India informing that it had no  

objection  to  introduce  legislation  as  a  bill  and  

hence the same with requisite amendments was placed  

before the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative  

Council.  The  Acquisition  Act  was  then  passed  and  

subsequently  got  the  assent  of  the  President  on  

15.11.96 and was brought into force on 21.11.1996.

55. The  Act  was  questioned  by  filing  a  writ  

petition before the High Court of Karnataka on the  

ground  that  enactment  providing  for  compulsory  

acquisition of Titgunni Estate was not for public  

purpose and the compensation provided thereunder was  

illusory. During the pendency of the writ petition  

the  Act  was  amended  by  the  Amendment  Act  2001,  

w.e.f. 01.11.96 by inserting a new Section 19A to  

45

provide  clarity  for  payment  of  amount  to  the  

owners/interested persons. The challenge against the  

validity of the Act and its provisions were repelled  

by  the  High  Court  except  in  relation  to  certain  

provisions, providing for the inclusion of certain  

members in the board of directors constituted under  

the Act.   

56. Shri  Andhyarujina,  submitted  that  the  

impugned  Act  does  not  contain  any  provision  for  

protection  of  agrarian  reforms  and  hence  not  

protected by the provisions of Article 31A and hence  

not saved from challenges on the ground of violation  

of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.  Learned  

counsel  also  pointed  out  that  the  management  and  

protection of land used for linaloe cultivation and  

the preservation of artefacts, paintings etc. are  

not part of agrarian reforms. Learned senior counsel  

submitted  that  concept  of  agrarian  reforms  is  a  

dynamic  one  and  this  Court  in  various  decisions  

examined  its  meaning  and  content.   Reference  was  

made to the judgments of this Court in  State of  

Kerala v.  Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.)  

46

Co.  Limited (1993)  2  SCC  713, Kavalappara  

Kottarathil Kochuni & Others v. State of Madras &  

Others (1960) 3 SCR 887,  P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v.  

Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Another (1965)  

1 SCR 614,   Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Others v.  

State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 133.

57. Shri  Andhyarujina,  also  submitted  that  the  

impugned Act is ex-facie repugnant to the provisions  

of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and hence void under  

Article 254(1) due to want of Presidential assent on  

repugnancy. Learned Counsel elaborately referred to  

the various provisions of the impugned Act and the  

Land  Acquisition  Act  to  bring  home  his  point  on  

repugnancy between both the Legislations, the former  

being a State Legislation and the latter being a  

Central  Legislation.  Learned  Counsel  specifically  

pointed out that the procedure and the principle for  

the acquisition of land as well as determination of  

compensation, etc., under both the Acts are contrary  

to  each other  and hence  the impugned  Act can  be  

saved only if Presidential assent is obtained under  

Article 254(2) of the constitution.  Learned Counsel  

47

submitted that the Acquisition Act is in pith and  

substance  a  law  on  acquisition  and  presidential  

assent under Article 254(2), was warranted to save  

that Legislation.  

58. Shri  K.N.  Bhat,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the appellants in CA No.6521-6537 of  

2003 submitted that Article 300A is almost a replica  

of  Article  31(1),  hence,  all  the  judicial  

pronouncements  rendered  by  this  Court  on  Article  

31(1) would equally apply when we interpret Article  

300A.  Learned counsel also referred to the view  

expressed  by  Justice  Subba  Rao  in  P.  Vajravelu  

Mudaliar’s case (supra) and also referred to Subodh  

Gopal Bose v. Bejoy Kumar Addya and Others (1973) 2  

SCC 105 and few other decisions.  Learned counsel  

submitted that the concept of eminent domain has to  

be read into Article 300A, which is an over-arching  

principle.  Learned counsel also submitted that the  

concept of reasonableness, could be the touchstone  

while interpreting a statute enacted to deprive a  

person of his property under Article 300A.  Learned  

counsel also referred to the Judgment of this Court  

48

in  Kavalappara  Kottarathil  Kochuni’s case  (supra)  

and submitted that a person can be deprived of his  

property only by a valid law which can be tested in  

the light of Articles 14 and 21.   

59. Shri Dushyant R. Dave, learned senior counsel  

appearing for the appellants in CA No.6520 of 2003  

also supported the arguments of Shri Andhyarujina  

and submitted that the concept of eminent domain be  

read into Article 300A of the Constitution and the  

impugned Act is unconstitutional for not providing  

adequate compensation to the transferors.  Reference  

was  made  to  several  decisions  of  this  Court  

including the decisions in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v.  

Special Deputy Collector, Madras & Anr. (1965) 1 SCR  

614; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation)  

v.  Union  of  India  (1970)  1  SCC  248;  Deputy  

Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v.  Durga  

Nath Sharma (1968) 1 SCR 561 and Reliance Energy  

Limited  &  Anr.  v.   Maharashtra  State  Road  

Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors.  (2007) 8 SCC 1  

etc.   

49

60. Shri  Andhyarujina,  referring  to  the  letter  

dated  20.09.1996  submitted  that  the  State  of  

Karnataka  had  sought  the  assent  of  the  President  

only for the specific purpose of Clause(a) of Clause  

(1) of Article 31-A of the Constitution and not for  

any other purpose and the assent was given only in  

response  to  the  said  proposal  of  the  State  

Government  and  there  had  never  been  any  proposal  

pointing out the repugnancy between the impugned Act  

and the Land Acquisition Act and hence the impugned  

Act  is  void  of  ex-facie repugnancy  between  

provisions of the existing Land Acquisition Act 1894  

and the impugned  Act. In support of his contentions  

learned counsel placed reliance on judgments of this  

Court  in  Gram  Panchayat  of  Village  Jamalpur v.  

Malwinder Singh & Others (1985) 3 SCC 661; Kaiser-I-

Hind  Pvt.  Ltd.  &  Another v.  National  Textile  

Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others (2002)  

8 SCC 182.

61. Shri Patil, learned senior counsel appearing  

for the Respondent-State submitted that Acquisition  

Act  is  not  open  to  challenge  on  the  ground  of  

50

violation  of Article  14 or  19 since  the same  is  

protected under Article 31A and the assent of the  

President  was  obtained.  Learned  counsel  submitted  

that the impugned Act was enacted in public interest  

to provide for acquisition of Roerich’s Estate, to  

secure  its  proper  management  and  to  preserve  the  

valuable  tree  growth,  paintings,  art  objects,  

carvings  and  for  the  establishment  of  an  art  

gallery-cum-museum.  Learned  counsel  submitted  that  

general scheme of the Acquisition Act is for the  

preservation of Linaloe cultivation and other tree  

growth  hence  constitutes  a  measure  of  agrarian  

reforms and in any view Act does not violate Article  

14 or 19 of the Constitution of India.  

62. Learned  senior  counsel  also  submitted  that  

Acquisition  Act  was  never  challenged  by  the  

appellants before the High Court on the ground of  

repugnancy  or  on  the  ground  of  absence  of  

Presidential  assent  under  Article  254(2)  of  the  

Constitution. Learned counsel submitted that such a  

plea cannot be raised for the first time before this  

Court  since  the  same  raises  questions  of  facts.  

51

Reference was made to the decisions of this Court in  

Engineering Kamgar Union v.  Electro Steels Castings  

Ltd. and Another (2004) 6 SCC 36; Bhuwalka Steel  

Industries Ltd.  v.  Bombay Iron and Steel Labour  

Board and Another (2010) 2 SCC 273.  Learned counsel  

submitted that in any view assent of the President  

was  sought  for  and  obtained  which  satisfies  the  

requirements  of  Article  254(2)  as  well  as  the  

proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution.   

63. Learned counsel submitted that the Bill was  

referred  for  the  assent  of  the  President  with  a  

specific note that subject matter of the bill falls  

under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III  

of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India.  

Learned counsel submitted that the main object of  

the Acquisition Act is not being "Acquisition and  

Requisition  of   Property”  and  the  Legislation  in  

pith and substance is in respect of “land" under  

Entry 18 of List II of the Constitution and there is  

no repugnancy between State and Central Legislation  

and hence no assent of the President under Article  

254(2) was warranted.  In support of his contention  

52

learned counsel also relied on the judgments of this  

Court in  P.N. Krishnan Lal & others vs. Govt. of  

Kerala &  Another (1995)  Suppl.  (2)  SCC  187 and  

Offshore  Holdings  Pvt.  Ltd. vs.  Bangalore  

Development Authority and Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 139.

64. After  passing  the  Roerich  and  Devika  Rani  

Roerich Estate (Acquisition and Transfer) Bill 1996  

by the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council,  

on 10.09.1996, a request was put up in file No. Law  

28 LGN 92 stating that subject matter of the Bill  

would fall under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of  

List III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution  

pointing  out  that  the  State  Legislative  would  be  

competent to enact such a legislation.  Note also  

indicated that the provisions of draft bill would  

attract sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Article 31A  

of the Constitution inasmuch as rights of the land  

owners were proposed to be extinguished, and hence  

required the assent of the President in accordance  

with the proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution  

to make it free from attack and to protect it from  

being  declared  as  void  on  the  ground  of  

53

inconsistency or violation of Articles 14 and 19 of  

the  Constitution  of  India.  Further,  it  was  also  

proposed to place the Bill before the Governor as  

provided under Article 200 of the Constitution of  

India  for  consideration  of  the  President  under  

Clause 2 of Article 254 of the Constitution.  Later,  

a letter dated 20.09.1996 was addressed by the State  

of Karnataka to the Secretary to the Government of  

India, Ministry of Home Affairs requesting to obtain  

the  assent  of  the  President.   No  reference  to  

Article 254(2) was, however, made in that letter but  

the operative portion of the letter reads as follows  

:-

"The  subject  matter  of  the  Bill  falls  under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42  of List III of the 7th Schedule to the  Constitution  of  India.  Therefore,  the  State Legislature is competent to enact  the measure.

Since the provisions of the Bill would  attract sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of  Article  31A  of  the  Constitution,  the  Bill has to be reserved for the assent  of the President in accordance with the  proviso to Clause (1) thereof in order  to get the protection of that Article.  Accordingly,  the  Governor  has  reserved  the  Bill  under  Article  200  of  the  

54

Constitution  of  India  for  the  consideration of the President."

Later, the assent of the President was obtained on  

15.11.96.

65.  The plea of repugnancy can be urged only if  

both  the  legislations  fall  under  the  Concurrent  

List.   Under  Article  254  of  the  Constitution,  a  

State  law  passed  in  respect  of  a  subject  matter  

comprised  in  List  III  would  be  invalid  if  its  

provisions are repugnant to a law passed on the same  

subject by Parliament and that too only if both the  

laws  cannot  exist  together.   The  question  of  

repugnancy  under  Article  254  of  the  Constitution  

arises when the provisions of both laws are fully  

inconsistent or are absolutely irreconcilable and it  

is  impossible  without  disturbing  the  other,  or  

conflicting  results  are  produced,  when  both  the  

statutes covering the same field are applied to a  

given  set  of  facts.   Repugnancy  between  the  two  

statutes would arise if there is a direct conflict  

between the two provisions and the law made by the  

55

Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature  

occupies the same filed.  Reference may be made to  

the decisions of this Court in Deep Chand  v. State  

of U.P. & Others AIR 1959 SC 648; Prem Nath Kaul  v.  

State of   Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1959 SC 749; (1959)  

Supp.  (2)  SCR  270,  Ukha  Kolhe   v.  State  of  

Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 1531; Bar Council of Uttar  

Pradesh v. State of U.P & Another (1973) 1 SCC 261;  

T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe & Another   (1983) 1 SCC  

177;  Hoechst  Pharmaceuticals  v.  State  of  Bihar  

(1983) 4 SCC 45; Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State  

of Maharashtra & Another (1985) 1 SCC 479; and Vijay  

Kumar Sharma & Others v. State of Karnataka & Others  

(1990) 2 SCC 562.   

66. When the repugnancy between the Central and  

State  Legislations  is  pleaded  we  have  to  first  

examine whether the two legislations cover or relate  

to  the  same  subject  matter.    The  test  for  

determining the same is to find out the dominant  

intention  of  the  two  legislations  and  if  the  

dominant  intention  of  the  two  legislations  is  

different, they cover different subject matter then  

56

merely because the two legislations refer to some  

allied or cognate subjects, they do not cover the  

same field.   A provision in one legislation to give  

effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be  

on the same subject as covered by the provision of  

the other legislation, but such partial coverage of  

the same area in a different context and to achieve  

a  different  purpose  does  not  bring  about  the  

repugnancy  which  is  intended  to  be  covered  by  

Article  254(2).   In  other  words,  both  the  

legislations  must  be  substantially  on  the  same  

subject  to  attract   Article  254.   In  this  

connection, reference may be made to the decisions  

of this Court in Municipal Council Palai  v.  T. J.  

Joseph (1964) 2 SCR 87; Ch. Tika Ramji  v.  State of  

U.P. 1956 SCR 393; State of Karnataka  v.  Shri  

Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471;  M. Karunanidhi  

v. Union of India & Another (1979) 3 SCC 431; and  

Vijay Kumar Sharma& Others v. State of Karnataka &  

Others (1990) 2 SCC 562.    

67. We  are  of  the  considered  view  that  the  

Acquisition Act, in this case, as rightly contended  

57

by the State, primarily falls under Entry 18 List  

II, since the dominant intention of the legislature  

was to preserve and protect Roerichs’ Estate covered  

by the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, on the  

State  Government  withdrawing  the  exemption  in  

respect of the land used for linaloe cultivation.  

The Acquisition Act, though primarily falls under  

Entry 18 List II incidentally also deals with the  

acquisition  of  paintings,  artefacts  and  other  

valuable belongings of Roerichs’ and, hence, the Act  

partly  falls  under  Entry  42  List  III  as  well.  

Since  the  dominant  purpose  of  the  Act  was  to  

preserve and protect Roerichs’ Estate  as  part of  

agrarian  reforms,  the  inclusion  of  ancillary  

measures  would  not  throw  the  law  out  of  the  

protection of Article 31A(1)(a).    On the other  

hand, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is an act which  

fell exclusively under Entry 42 List III and enacted  

for the purpose of acquisition of land needed for  

public purposes for companies and for determining  

the amount of compensation to be made on account of  

such  acquisition,  which  is  substantially  and  

58

materially  different  from  the  impugned  Act  whose  

dominant purpose is to preserve and protect “estate”  

governed by Art.31A(a) read with Art.31A(2)(a)(iii)  

of the Constitution.

68. We  are,  therefore,  of  the  considered  view  

that no assent of the President was required under  

Article 254(2) of the Constitution to sustain the  

impugned Act, which falls under Article 31A(1)(a) of  

the  Constitution,  for  which  the  assent  of  the  

President was obtained.    The contention of the  

counsel that the Acquisition Act was invalid due to  

repugnancy is, therefore, rejected.

69. We may also state that the Constitution (17th  

Amendment)  Act,  1964   extended  the  scope  of  the  

expression “estate” in Art.31A(a) as to protect all  

legislations on agrarian reforms and the expression  

“estate” was given a wider meaning so as to bring  

within  its  scope  lands  in  respect  of  which  

provisions  are  normally  made  in  land  reforms  

enactments.  Art.31A(2)(a)(iii)  brings  in  any  land  

held or let for the purpose of agriculture or for  

purpose ancillary thereto, including waste or vacant  

59

land,  forest  land,  land  for  pasture  or  sites  of  

buildings  and  other  structure  occupied   by  the  

cultivators of land etc.   

70. In  Gwalior  Rayon  Silk  Manufacturing  

(Wvg.) Co. Ltd’s case (supra), this Court held that  

the  concept  of  agrarian  reform  is  a  complex  and  

dynamic  one  promoting  wider  interests  than  

conventional  reorganisation  of  the  land  system  or  

distribution of land, which is intended to realise  

the social function of the land and includes various  

other  proposals  of  agrarian  reforms.   To  test  

whether the law was intended for agrarian reforms,  

the court is required to look to the substance of  

the  Act  and  not  its  mere  outward  form.    In  

Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala & Another (1972)  

2 SCC 364, this Court held that any provision for  

promotion of agriculture or agricultural population  

is an agrarian reform, which term is wider than land  

reforms. In  Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami  

etc., etc. v. State of Orissa & Another (1962) 3 SCR  

250, this Court held that a law for the acquisition  

of an estate etc. does not lose the protection of  

60

Article 31A(1) merely because ancillary provisions  

are included in such law.    

71. The  Acquisition  Act  was  enacted  in  public  

interest, to preserve and protect the land used for  

the linaloe cultivation and its tree growth as part  

of agrarian reforms which is its dominant purpose.  

Proposal  to  preserve  the  paintings,  artefacts,  

carvings  and  other  valuables  and  to  establish  an  

Art-Gallery-cum-Museum are merely ancillary to the  

main purpose.  The dominant purpose of the Act is to  

protect  and  preserve  the  land  used  for  Linaloe  

cultivation, a part of agrarian reforms.  The Act  

is,  therefore,  saved  by  the  provisions  of  

Art.31A(1)(a).    

72. We,  therefore,  hold  that  Roerich’s  estate  

falls  within  the  expression  “estate”  under  clause  

(2) of Article 31A of the Constitution and the Act  

has obtained the assent of the President, hence, is  

protected from the challenge under Articles 14 and  

19 of the Constitution of India.  No arguments have  

been  raised  on  the  applicability  or  otherwise  of  

Article 31C and hence it is unnecessary to examine  

61

whether the Act is protected by Article 31C of the  

Constitution or not.

Part-III

Article 300A of the Constitution and the Acquisition  Act

73. We  will  now  examine  the  validity  of  the  

Acquisition Act on the touchstone of Article 300A of  

the Constitution and examine whether the concept of  

eminent  domain  be  read  into  Art.300A  and  in  the  

statute enacted to deprive a person of his property.  

74. Shri  Andhyarujina,  learned  senior  counsel  

submitted  that  Art.300A  and  the  statute  framed  

should satisfy the twin principles of public purpose  

and  adequate  compensation.     Learned  counsel  

submitted  that  whenever  there  is  arbitrariness  in  

State action whether it be of the legislature or of  

the executive or of an authority under Article 12,  

Article 14 springs into action and strikes down such  

State action as well as the legislative provisions,  

if it is found to be illegal or disproportionate.  

Reference was made to the judgments of this Court in  

Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni’s  case (supra),  E.P  

Royappa v.  State of Tamil Nadu & Another (1974) 4  

62

SCR 3;  Maneka Gandhi v.  Union of India & Another  

1978  (1)  SCC  248;  Ramana  Dayaram  Shetty v.  

International Airport Authority of India & Others  

(1979)  3  SCC  489;  Kasturi  Lal  Lakshmi  Reddy,  

represented  by  its  Partner  Kasturi  Lal,  Jammu  &  

Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Another. (1980)  

4 SCC 1.   Learned counsel submitted that even a tax  

law can be discriminatory and violative of Article  

14 or confiscatory and hence can be subjected to  

judicial review.  Learned counsel made reference to  

the decisions of this court in Chhotabhai Jethabhai  

Patel & Co. v. Union of India & Another (1962) Supp  

(2) SCR 1 and Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair  v.  

State of Kerala & Another AIR 1961 SC 552.   

75. Shri Andhyarujina also submitted that the Act  

does not provide for any principle or guidelines for  

the  fixation  of  the  compensation  amount  and  the  

amount fixed is illusory, compared to the value of  

the property taken away from the company in exercise  

of the powers of eminent domain.  Learned senior  

counsel submitted that the inherent powers of public  

purpose and eminent domain are embodied in Article  

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300A,  and  Entry  42  List  III,  “Acquisition  and  

Requisitioning  of  Property”  which  necessarily  

connotes that the acquisition and requisitioning of  

property  will  be  for  a  public  use  and  for  

compensation,  as  it  is  the  legislative  head  for  

eminent  domain.   Learned  senior  counsel  also  

submitted  that  the  twin  requirements  of  public  

purpose  and  compensation  though  seen  omitted  from  

Article 300A, but when a person is deprived of his  

property, those limitations are implied in Article  

300A  as  well  as  Entry  42  List  III  and  a  

Constitutional Court can always examine the validity  

of the statute on those grounds.  

76. Learned senior counsel traced the legislative  

history and various judicial pronouncements of this  

Court  in  respect  of  Articles  19(1)(f),  31(1)  and  

31(2)  and  submitted  that  those  are  useful  guides  

while  interpreting  Article  300A  and  the  impugned  

Act.  Reference was made to the judgments of this  

Court  in  State  of  Bihar v.  Maharajadhiraja  Sir  

Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors. (1952) 1 SCR  

889; State of West Bengal  v. Union of India (1964)  

64

1 SCR 371; Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability  

v. Union of India & Others  (1991) 4 SCC 699;  I.R.  

Coelho(Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2  

SCC 1;  D.C. Wadhwa & Others v.  State of Bihar &  

Others (1987) 1 SCC 378 and Glanrock Estate Private  

Limited. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 10 SCC 96.    

77. Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  the  

action  depriving  a  person  of  just  and  fair  

compensation  is  also  amenable  to  judicial  review  

under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of  

India, which is the quintessence of the rule of law,  

otherwise  the  Constitution  would  be  conferring  

arbitrary and unbridled powers on the Legislature,  

to deprive a person of his property.  Reference was  

made  to  the  provisions  of  the  Constitutions  of  

Australia and Republic of South Africa.   

78. Mr. Patil,  on the other hand, contended that,  

having  regard  to  the  express  language  of  Article  

300A, the common law limitations of eminent domain  

cannot be read into that Article especially when,  

the right to property is no more a Fundamental Right  

on deletion of Article 19(1)(f), Article 31(1) and  

65

(2).   Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  

history of Constitutional Amendments shows that the  

Legislature in its wisdom expressed its intention to  

do away with the requirement of public purpose and  

compensation.  Further, the adequacy of the amount  

fixed  by  Legislature  is  also  not  amenable  to  

judicial review.     

79. Learned senior counsel also referred to the  

decisions  of  this  Court  reported  in  Subodh  Gopal  

Bose’s  case (supra),  Dwarakadas Shrinivas (1954) 1  

SCR 674;  Sir Kameshwar Singh’s   case (supra),  P.  

Vajravelu  Mudaliar’s case  (supra)  and  State  of  

Gujarat  v.  Shantilal Mangaldas & Others (1969) 1  

SCC 509.    

80. Learned  senior  counsel  submitted  that  the  

impugned Act has provided Rs.5 crore to meet various  

priorities,  which  cannot  be  said  to  be  illusory,  

especially  when  the  Government  has  withdrawn  the  

exemption granted with respect to the land used for  

linaloe cultivation.  Further, it was pointed out  

but  for  impugned  Act  the  Roerich’s  or  the  

transferors  would  have  got  only  Rs.2  lakhs  under  

66

Section 72 of the Land Reforms Act, if they were in  

possession and ownership of the land.   

81. Learned counsel submitted, in any view, sale  

deeds  dated  23.03.1991  and  16.02.1992  would  show  

that  the  company  had  paid  only  a  total  sale  

consideration of Rs.1,46,10,000  for purchasing the  

lands from Roerichs’ but the transferees/owners and  

other claimants, if any, would get more than what  

they had paid.    Learned counsel also submitted  

that  Section  19A  also  provides  for  

principles/machinery  for  payment  of  amount  to  the  

owners/interested persons and the amount is to be  

apportioned among owners, transferees and interested  

persons having regard to value on the appointed day  

i.e.  18.11.1996.    Further  learned  counsel  also  

submitted that the company has not perfected their  

title or possession over the land and litigation is  

pending in the civil court between the company and  

the other claimants.

82. Right to life, liberty and property were once  

considered to be inalienable rights under the Indian  

Constitution,  each  one  of  these  rights  was  

67

considered to be inextricably bound to the other and  

none would exist without the other.  Of late, right  

to property parted company with the other two rights  

under the Indian Constitution and took the position  

of a statutory right.  Since ancient times, debates  

are going on as to whether the right to property is  

a “natural” right or merely a creation of ‘social  

convention’  and  ‘positive  law’  which  reflects  the  

centrality and uniqueness of this right.  Property  

rights  at  times  compared  to  right  to  life  which  

determine access to the basic means of sustenance  

and  considered  as  prerequisite  to  the  meaningful  

exercise  of  other  rights  guaranteed  under  Article  

21.   

83. Eminent  thinkers  like  Hugo  Grotius,  

Pufendorf,  John  Locke,  Rousseau  and  William  

Blackstone had  expressed  their  own  views  on  the  

right to property.   Lockean rhetoric of property as  

a  natural  and  absolute  right  but  conventional  in  

civil  society  has,  its  roots  in  Aristotle  and  

Aquinas, for Grotius and Pufendorf property was both  

natural and conventional.  Pufendrof, like Grotius,  

68

never recognised that the rights of property on its  

owners  are  absolute  but  involve  definite  social  

responsibilities, and also held the view that the  

private property was not established merely for the  

purpose “allowing a man to avoid using it in the  

service of others, and to brood in solitude over his  

hoard  or  riches.”     Like  Grotius,  Pufendorf  

recognised that those in extreme need may have a  

right  to  the  property  of  others.   For  Rousseau,  

property was a conventional civil right and not a  

natural  right  and  private  property  right  was  

subordinate  to  the  public  interest,  but  Rousseau  

insisted  that  it  would  never  be  in  the  public  

interest to violate them.  With the emergence of  

modern written constitutions in the late eighteenth  

century and thereafter, the right to property was  

enshrined as a fundamental constitutional right in  

many of the Constitutions in the world and India was  

not an exception.  Blackstone declared that so great  

is the regime of the law for private property that  

it will not authorise the land violation if it – no,  

not  even  for  the  general  good  of  the  whole  

69

community.   Writings  of  the  above  mentioned  

political  philosophers  had  also  its  influence  on  

Indian Constitution as well.

EMINENT DOMAIN

84. Hugo Grotius is credited with the invention of  

the term “eminent domain” (jus or dominium eminens)  

which implies that public rights always overlap with  

private  rights  to  property,  and  in  the  case  of  

public  utility,  public  rights  take  precedence.  

Grotius sets two conditions on the exercise of the  

power  of  eminent  domain:  the  first  requisite  is  

public  advantage  and  then  compensation  from  the  

public funds be made, if possible, to the one who  

has  lost  his  right.   Application  of  the  above  

principle  varies  from  countries  to  countries.  

Germany,  America  and  Australian  Constitutions  bar  

uncompensated  takings.   Canada’s  constitution,  

however,  does  not  contain  the  equivalent  of  the  

taking clause, and eminent domain is solely a matter  

of statute law, the same is the situation in United  

Kingdom which does not have a written constitution  

as also now in India after the 44th Constitutional  

70

Amendment.

85. Canada  does  not  have  an  equivalent  to  the  

Fifth  Amendment  taking  clause  of  the  U.S.  

Constitution  and  the  federal  or  provincial  

governments are under any constitutional obligation  

to  pay  compensation  for  expropriated  property.  

Section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights does  

state that, “The right of the individual to life,  

liberty,  security  of  a  person  and  enjoyment  of  

property and the right not to be deprived thereof  

except by due process of law.”   

86. In  Australia,  Section  51  (xxxi)  of  the  

Constitution permits the federal government to make  

laws with respect to “the acquisition of property on  

just terms from any State or persons for any purpose  

in respect of which the Parliament has powers to  

make laws.”   

87. Protocol to the European Convention on Human  

Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Article 1 provides  

that every natural or legal person is entitled to  

the peaceful enjoyment of his possession and no one  

shall  be  deprived  of  his  possessions  except  in  

71

public  interest  and  subject  to  the  conditions  

provided by law and by the several principles of  

International law.    

88. Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution says  

that the government shall not take private property  

for  public  use  without  paying  just  compensation.  

This provision referred to as the eminent domain, or  

taking clause has generated an enormous amount of  

case laws in the United States of America.

89. The  US  Supreme  Court  in  Hawaii  Housing  

Authority v.  Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984) allowed the  

use of eminent domain to transfer land from lesser  

to  lessees.   In  that  ruling  the  court  held  the  

government does not itself have the use the property  

to legitimate taking, it is a takings purpose and  

not its mechanics that must pass the muster under  

the public use clause.  The US Supreme Court later  

revisited the question on what constitute public use  

in  Kelo v. City of New London (545 US 469 (2005).  

In that case the Court held that a plan of economic  

development,  that  would  primarily  benefit  a  major  

pharmaceutical company, which incidentally benefited  

72

the  public  in  the  nature  of  increased  employment  

opportunities  and  increased  tax  benefits  was  a  

‘public use’.  The Court rejected the arguments that  

takings of this kind, the Court should require a  

‘reasonable  certainty’  that  the  respective  public  

benefits will actually accrue.    

90. Eminent domain is distinguishable alike from  

the police power, by which restriction are imposed  

on private property in the public interest, e.g. in  

connection  with  health,  sanitation,  zoning  

regulation, urban planning and so on from the power  

of taxation, by which the owner of private property  

is compelled to contribute a portion of it for the  

public  purposes  and  from  the  war-power,  involving  

the destruction of private property in the course of  

military  operations.    The  police  power  fetters  

rights of property while eminent domain takes them  

away.   Power  of  taxation  does  not  necessarily  

involve  a  taking  of  specific  property  for  public  

purposes,  though  analogous  to  eminent  domain  as  

regards the purposes to which the contribution of  

the taxpayer is to be applied.   Further, there are  

73

several  significant  differences  between  regulatory  

exercises of the police powers and eminent domain of  

deprivation  of  property.    Regulation  does  not  

acquire or appropriate the property for the State,  

which appropriation does and regulation is imposed  

severally  and  individually,  while  expropriation  

applies to an individual or a group of owners of  

properties.

91. The  question  whether  the  “element  of  

compensation” is necessarily involved in the idea of  

eminent domain arose much controversy.  According to  

one school of thought (See Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd  

Edition,  1909)  opined  that  this  question  must  be  

answered  in  the  negative,  but  another  view  (See  

Randolph Eminent Domain in the United States (Boston  

1894  [AWR]),  the  claim  for  compensation  is  an  

inherent attribute of the concept of eminent domain.  

Professor  Thayer  (cases  on  Constitutional  law  Vol  

1.953),  however,  took  a  middle  view  according  to  

which the concept of eminent domain springs from the  

necessity  of  the  state,  while  the  obligation  to  

reimburse  rests  upon  the  natural  rights  of  

74

individuals.    Right  to  claim  compensation,  some  

eminent authors expressed the view, is thus not a  

component part of the powers to deprive a person of  

his property but may arise, but it is not as if, the  

former cannot exist without the other.  Relationship  

between Public Purpose and Compensation is that of  

“substance  and  shadow”.      Above  theoretical  

aspects of the doctrine have been highlighted only  

to  show  the  reasons,  for  the  inclusion  of  the  

principle of eminent domain in the deleted Article  

31(2) and in the present Article 30(1A) and in the  

2nd proviso of Article 31A of our Constitution and  

its apparent exclusion from Article 300A.   

92. Our  Constitution  makers  were  greatly  

influenced by the Western doctrine of eminent domain  

when  they  drafted  the  Indian  Constitution  and  

incorporated the right to property as a Fundamental  

Right in Article 19(1)(f), and the element of public  

purpose and compensation in Articles 31(2).   Of  

late, it was felt that some of the principles laid  

down in the Directive Principles of State Policy,  

which had its influence in the governance of the  

75

country,  would  not  be  achieved  if  those  articles  

were  literally  interpreted  and  applied.      The  

Directive Principles of the state policy lay down  

the fundamental principles for the governance of the  

country, and through those principles, the state is  

directed to secure that the ownership and control of  

the  material  resources  of  the  community  are  so  

distributed as best to sub-serve the common good and  

that the operation of the economic system does not  

result in the concentration of wealth and means of  

production to the common detriment.   Further, it  

was also noticed that the fundamental rights are not  

absolute  but  subject  to  law  of  reasonable  

restrictions in the interest of the general public  

to  achieve  the  above  objectives  specially  to  

eliminate Zamindari system.     

93. While examining the scope of the Bihar Land  

Reforms Act, 1950 conflicting views were expressed  

by the Judges with regard to the meaning and content  

of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 as reflected in  

Sir Kameshwar Singh’s  case (supra).  Suffice it to  

say  that  the  Parliament  felt  that  the  views  

76

expressed by the judges on the scope of Articles  

19(1)(f) and 31 might come as a stumbling block in  

implementing the various welfare legislations which  

led  to  the  First  Constitutional  Amendment  1951  

introducing  Articles  31A  and  31B  in  the  

Constitution.

94. Article 31A enabled the legislature to enact  

laws  to  acquire  estates  which  also  permitted  the  

State  in  taking  over  of  property  for  a  limited  

period either in the ‘public interest’ or to ‘secure  

the proper management of the property’, amalgamate  

properties, and extinguish or modify the rights of  

managers,  managing  agents,  directors,  stockholders  

etc.   Article provides that such laws cannot be  

declared  void  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  

inconsistent with Articles 14 and 19.    Article 31B  

protected the various lands reform laws enacted by  

both the Parliament and the State Legislatures by  

stating that none of these laws, which are to be  

listed in the Ninth Schedule, can become void on the  

ground that they violated any fundamental right.  

95. This Court in a series of decisions viz. in  

77

State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee & Others AIR  

1954 SC 170 and State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal  

Bose AIR 1954 SC 92 took the view that Article 31,  

clauses (1) and (2) provided for the doctrine of  

eminent domain and under clause (2) a person must be  

deemed  to  be  deprived  of  his  property  if  he  was  

“substantially dispossessed” or his right to use and  

enjoy the property was “seriously impaired” by the  

impugned law.  The Court held that under Article  

31(1) the State could not make a law depriving a  

person of his property without complying with the  

provisions of Article 31(2).   In  Bella Banerjee’s  

case (supra), this Court held that the legislature  

has the freedom to lay down principles which govern  

the determination of the amount to be given to the  

owners of the property appropriated, but the Court  

can  always,  while  interpreting  Article  31(1)  and  

Article  31(2),  examine  whether  the  amount  of  

compensation  paid  is  just  equivalent  to  what  the  

owner had been deprived of.    

96. The Parliament, following the above judgment,  

brought  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  Act  of  1955  and  

78

amended clause (2) of Article 31 and inserted clause  

(2-A) to Article 31.  The effect of the amendment is  

that  clause  (2)  deals  with  acquisition  or  

requisition as defined in clause (2-A) and clause  

(1) covers deprivation of a person’s property by the  

state otherwise than by acquisition or requisition.  

The amendment enabled the State to deprive a person  

of his property by law.    Under amended clause (2),  

the  property  of  a  citizen  could  be  acquired  or  

requisitioned by law which provides for compensation  

for the property so acquired or requisitioned and  

either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies  

the principles on which and the manner in which the  

compensation is to be determined.  However, it was  

also provided that no such law could be called in  

question  in  any  court  on  the  ground  that  the  

compensation provided by that law was not adequate.  

97. This  Court  in  Kavalappara  Kottarathil  

Kochuni’s case (supra) held that Articles 31(1) and  

(2) are different fundamental rights and that the  

expression ‘law” in Article 31(1) shall be a valid  

law and that it cannot be a valid law, unless it  

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imposes a reasonable restriction in public interest  

within the meaning of Article 19(5) and therefore be  

justiciable.   

98. The  Constitution  was  again  amended  by  the  

Seventeenth  Amendment  Act  of  1964,  by  which  the  

State extended the scope of Article 31A and Ninth  

Schedule to protect certain agrarian reforms enacted  

by the Kerala and Madras States and Jagir, Inam,  

muafi or any other grant, janmam, ryotwari etc. were  

included within the meaning of “estate”.  It also  

added  the 2nd proviso  to clause  (1) to  protect a  

person  of  being  deprived  of  land  less  than  the  

relevant  land  ceiling  limits  held  by  him  for  

personal  cultivation,  except  on  payment  of  full  

market value thereof by way of compensation.   

99. This  Court  in  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar’s case  

(supra) examined the scope of the Land Acquisition  

(Madras Amendment) Act 1961 by which the lands were  

acquired for the purpose of building houses which  

move was challenged under Articles 31 and 14.  The  

Court  held  that  if  the  compensation  fixed  was  

illusory  or  the  principles  prescribed  were  

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irrelevant to the value of the property at or about  

the time of acquisition, it could be said that the  

Legislature  had  committed  a  fraud  on  power  and  

therefore the law was inadequate.   Speaking for the  

Bench,  Justice  Subha  Rao  stated  that  “If  the  

legislature,  through  its  ex  facie purports  to  

provide for compensation or indicates the principles  

for  ascertaining  the  same,  but  in  effect  and  

substance  takes  away  a  property  without  paying  

compensation for it, it will be exercising power it  

does not possess.  If the Legislature makes a law  

for  acquiring  a  property  by  providing  for  an  

illusory  compensation  or  by  indicating  the  

principles for ascertaining the compensation which  

do not relate to the property acquired or to the  

value of such property at or within a reasonable  

proximity  of  the  date  of  acquisition  or  the  

principles  are  so  designed  and  so  arbitrary  that  

they do not provide for compensation at all, one can  

easily hold that the legislature made the law in  

fraud of its powers.”  Justice  Subha  Rao  

reiterated  his view  in  Union of  India v.   Metal  

81

Corporation of India Ltd. & Another AIR 1967 SC 637.  

100. In  Shantilal  Mangaldas’s  case  (supra),  the  

validity  of  Bombay  Town  Planning  Act  1958  was  

challenged before this Court on the ground that the  

owner was to be given market value of land at date  

of declaration of scheme, which was not the just  

equivalent of the property acquired, the Court held  

that  after the Fourth Amendment resulting in the  

changes to Article 31(2) the question of ‘adequacy  

of  compensation’  could  not  be  entertained.  

Justice Hidayatullah stated that the stance taken in  

the previous case by Justice Subha Rao as  “obiter  

and  not  binding”.   The  validity  of  the  Banking  

Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)  

Act 1969 came up for consideration before the eleven  

judges Bench of this Court in Rustom Cowasjee Cooper  

v. Union of India  (1970) 2 SCC 298. The Act, it was  

pointed  out,  did  lay  down  principles  for  

determination  and  payment  of  compensation  to  the  

banks, which was to be paid for in form of bonds,  

securities etc., and compensation would not fulfil  

the requirement of Article 31(2).   A majority of  

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the judges accepted that view and held that both  

before  and  after  the  amendment  to  Article  31(2)  

there  was  a  right  to  compensation  and  by  giving  

illusory  compensation  the  constitutional  guarantee  

to provide compensation for an acquisition was not  

complied  with.    The  Court  held  that  the  

Constitution guarantees a right to compensation – an  

equivalent  in  money  of  the  property  compulsorily  

acquired  which  is  the  basic  guarantee  and,  

therefore,  the  law  must  provide  compensation,  and  

for  determining  compensation  relevant  principles  

must  be  specified;  if  the  principles  are  not  

relevant  the  ultimate  value  determined  is  not  

compensation.

101. The validity of Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) was  

also the subject matter of I.C. Golaknath and Others  

v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.   In that case,  

a large portion of the lands of Golak Nath family was  

declared surplus under the Punjab Security of Land  

Tenures Act 1953.    They challenged the act on the  

grounds  that  it  denied  them  their  Constitutional  

Rights to acquire and hold property and practice any  

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profession. Validity of Articles 19(1)(f) and (g),  

the 17th Amendment, the 1st Amendment and the 4th  

Amendment were also questioned.  Chief Justice Subha  

Rao  speaking  for  the  majority  said  that  the  

Parliament  could  not  take  away  or  abridge  the  

Fundamental Rights and opined that those rights form  

‘basic  structure’  of  the  Constitution  and  any  

amendment to the Constitution can be made to preserve  

them, not to annihilate.

102. The Parliament enacted the (24th Amendment) Act  

1971,  by  which  the  Parliament  restored  to  the  

amending power of the Parliament and also extended  

the  scope  of  Article  368  which  authorised  the  

Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution.

103. Parliament then brought in the 25th Amendment  

Act, 1971 by which Article 31(2) was amended by which  

private property could be acquired on payment of an  

“amount” instead of “compensation”.   A new Article  

31(C) was also inserted stating that “no law giving  

effect to the policy of the State towards acquiring  

the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c)  

of  Article  39  shall  be  deemed  to  be  void  on  the  

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ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or  

abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14,  

Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a  

declaration  that  it  is  for  giving  effect  to  such  

policy shall be called in question in any court on  

the  ground  that  it  does  not  give  effect  to  such  

policy.   

104. The constitutionality of the above amendments  

was  also  the  subject  matter  in  His  Holiness  

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala  

&  Another (1973)  4  SCC  225,  which  overruled  the  

principles laid down in Gokalnath’s case (supra) and  

held that a Constitutional amendment could not alter  

the basic structure of the Constitution, and hence  

Article 19(1)(f) was not considered to be the basic  

structure of the Constitution, as later explained in  

Indira Nehru Gandhi  v.  Raj Narain (1975) Supp. SCC  

1.

105. We are in these cases, primarily concerned with  

the scope of the Forty Fourth Amendment 1978, which  

deleted  Article  19(1)(f)  and  Article  31  from  the  

Constitution of India and introduced Article 300A,  

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and  its  impact  on  the  rights  of  persons,  who  are  

deprived of their properties.   We have extensively  

dealt with the scope of Articles 19(1)(f) and Article  

31 as interpreted in the various decisions of this  

Court  so  as  to  examine  the  scope  and  content  of  

Article 300A and the circumstances which led to its  

introduction.    The  Forty  Fourth  Amendment  Act,  

inserted in Part XII, a new chapter: “Chapter IV –  

Right to Property and inserted Article 300A, which  

reads as follows:-

“No person shall be deprived of property  save by authority of law.”   

106. Reference  to  the  Statement  of  Objects  and  

Reasons of the 44th Amendment in this connection may  

be apposite.   Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Statement  

of Objects and Reasons reads as follows:     

“3.  In  view  of  the  special  position  sought  to  be  given  to  fundamental  rights,  the  right  to  property,  which  has  been  the  occasion  for  more  than  one  Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  would  cease  to  be  a  fundamental  right  and  become  only  a  legal  right.  Necessary  amendments  for  this purpose are being made to Article  19 and Article 31 is being deleted. It  would,  however,  be  ensured  that  the  removal  of  property  from  the  list  of  fundamental rights would not affect the  

86

right  of  minorities  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their choice.  

4.  Similarly,  the  right  of  persons  holding  land  for  personal  cultivation  and within the ceiling limit to receive  compensation at the market value would  not be affected.  

5.  Property,  while  ceasing  to  be  a  fundamental  right,  would,  however,  be  given  express  recognition  as  a  legal  right,  provision  being  made  that  no  person shall be deprived of his property  save in accordance with law.”

107. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Others v. State  

of  Gujarat  &  Another (1995)  Supp.  1  SC  596,  this  

Court examined whether Section 69-A, introduced by  

the Gujarat Amendment Act 8 of 1982 in the Bombay  

Land  Revenue  Code  which  dealt  with  vesting  mines,  

minerals  and  quarries  in  lands  held  by  persons  

including  Girasdars and  Barkhalidars in  the  State  

violated Article 300A of the Constitution.  The Court  

held  that  the  ‘property’  in  Article  300A  includes  

mines, minerals and quarries and deprivation thereof  

having been made by authority of law was held to be  

valid and not violative of Article 300A.   

108. Article 300A, when examined in the light of the  

circumstances  under  which  it  was  inserted,  would  

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reveal the following changes:

1. Right to acquire, hold and dispose  of  property  has  ceased  to  be  a  fundamental  right  under  the  Constitution of India.

2. Legislature can deprive a person of  his  property  only  by  authority  of  law.

3. Right to acquire, hold and dispose  of property is not a basic feature  of  the  Constitution,  but  only  a  Constitutional right.

4. Right to Property, since no more a  fundamental right, the jurisdiction  of the Supreme Court under Article  32  cannot  be  generally  invoked,  aggrieved person has to approach the  High Court under Article 226 of the  Constitution.

109. Arguments  have  been  advanced  before  us  

stating that the concept of eminent domain and its  

key components be read into Article 300A and if a  

statute  deprives  a  person  of  his  property  

unauthorizedly, without adequate compensation, then  

the statute is liable to be challenged as violative  

of Articles 14, 19 and 21 and on the principle of  

rule of law, which is the basic structure of our  

Constitution.  Further it was also contended that  

the interpretation given by this Court on the scope  

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of Article 31(1) and (2) in various judgments be not  

ignored while examining the meaning and content of  

Article 300A.  

110. Article 300A proclaims that no person can be  

deprived of his property save by authority of law,  

meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of  

his property merely by an executive fiat, without  

any specific legal authority or without the support  

of  law  made  by  a  competent  legislature.   The  

expression ‘Property’ in Art.300A confined not to  

land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights  

and other intellectual property and embraces every  

possible interest recognised by law.  This Court in  

State  of  W.  B.  &  Others  v.  Vishnunarayan  &  

Associates (P) Ltd & Another (2002) 4 SCC 134, while  

examining the provisions of the West Bengal Great  

Eastern  Hotel  (Acquisition  of  Undertaking)  Act,  

1980, held in the context of Article 300A that the  

State or executive offices cannot interfere with the  

right  of  others  unless  they  can  point  out  the  

specific provisions of law which authorises their  

rights.  Article 300A, therefore, protects private  

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property against executive action.  But the question  

that looms large is as to what extent their rights  

will  be  protected  when  they  are  sought  to  be  

illegally  deprived  of  their  properties  on  the  

strength of a legislation.  Further, it was also  

argued  that  the  twin  requirements  of  ‘public  

purpose’ and ‘compensation’ in case of deprivation  

of property are inherent and essential elements or  

ingredients,  or  “inseparable  concomitants”  of  the  

power of eminent domain and, therefore, of entry 42,  

List III, as well and, hence, would apply when the  

validity of a statute is in question.  On the other  

hand, it was the contention of the State that since  

the  Constitution  consciously  omitted  Article  

19(1)(f), Articles 31(1) and 31(2), the intention of  

the  Parliament  was  to  do  away  the  doctrine  of  

eminent domain which highlights the principles of  

public purpose and compensation.     

111. Seervai  in  his  celebrated  book  

‘Constitutional  Law  of  India’  (Edn.  IV),  spent  a  

whole  Chapter  XIV  on  the  44th  Amendment,  while  

dealing with Article 300A.  In paragraph 15.2 (pages  

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1157-1158) the author opined that confiscation of  

property  of  innocent  people  for  the  benefit  of  

private persons is a kind of confiscation unknown to  

our law and whatever meaning the word "acquisition"  

may  have  does  not  cover  "confiscation"  for,  to  

confiscate  means  "to  appropriate  to  the  public  

treasury (by way of penalty)".  Consequently, the  

law  taking  private  property  for  a  public  purpose  

without  compensation  would  fall  outside  Entry  42  

List III and cannot be supported by another Entry in  

List III.  Requirements of a public purpose and the  

payment  of  compensation  according  to  the  learned  

author be read into Entry 42 List III.  Further the  

learned author has also opined that the repeal of  

Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) could have repercussions  

on  other  fundamental  rights  or  other  provisions  

which  are  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  basic  

structure and also stated that notwithstanding the  

repeal of Article 31(2), the word "compensation" or  

the  concept  thereof  is  still  retained  in  Article  

30(1A) and in the second  proviso to Article 31A(1)  

meaning thereby that payment of compensation is a  

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condition of legislative power in Entry 42 List III.  

112. Learned senior counsel Shri T.R. Andhyarujina,  

also referred to the opinion expressed by another  

learned author Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in his article  

"Right  to  Property  after  44th  Amendment  –  Better  

Protected than Ever Before" (reported in AIR 1980 J  

pg. 49-52).  Learned author expressed the opinion  

and  the  right  of  the  individual  to  receive  

compensation  when  his  property  is  acquired  or  

requisitioned  by  the  State,  continues  to  be  

available in the form of an implied condition of the  

power of the State to legislate on "acquisition or  

requisition  of  property"  while  all  the  exceptions  

and  limitations  set  up  against  and  around  it  in  

Article 31, 31A and 31B have disappeared.  Learned  

author  opined  that  Article  300A  will  require  

obviously, that the law must be a valid law and no  

law of acquisition or requisitioning can be valid  

unless  the  acquisition  or  requisition  is  for  a  

public purpose, unless there is provision in law for  

paying compensation, will continue to have a meaning  

given to it, by Bela Banerjee’s case (supra).

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113. Learned  author,  Shri  S.B.  Sathe,  in  his  

article "Right to Property after the 44th Amendment"  

(AIR 1980 Journal 97),  to some extent, endorsed the  

view  of  Prof.  Tripathi  and  opined  that  the  44th  

amendment has increased the scope of judicial review  

in respect of right to property.  Learned author has  

stated although Article 300A says that no one shall  

be deprived of his property save by authority of  

law,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  this  

provision  would  protect  private  property  only  

against  executive  action.   Learned  author  also  

expresses  the  wish  that  Article  21  may  provide  

viable check upon Article 300A.  

114. Durga  Das  Basu  in  his  book  "Shorter  

Constitution  of  India",  13th Edition,  dealt  with  

Article  300A  in  Chapter  IV  wherein  the  learned  

author  expressed  some  reservation  about  the  views  

expressed  by  Seervai,  as  well  as  Prof.  Tripathi  

Learned author expressed the view, that after the  

44th amendment Act there is no express provision in  

the  Constitution  outside  the  two  cases  specified  

under  Article  30(1A)  and  the  second  proviso to  

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31(1A) requiring the State to pay compensation to an  

expropriated owner.  Learned author also expressed  

the opinion that no reliance could be placed on the  

legislative  Entry  42  of  List  III  so  as  to  claim  

compensation on the touchstone of fundamental rights  

since  the  entry  in  a  legislative  list  does  not  

confer  any  legislative  power  but  only  enumerates  

fields  of  legislation.    Learned  counsel  on  the  

either  side,  apart  from  other  contentions,  

highlighted the above views expressed by the learned  

authors to urge their respective contentions.   

115. Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not  

seen incorporated in Article 300A, as we see, in  

Article  30(1A), as  well as  in the  2nd proviso  to  

Article 31A(1) though we can infer those principles  

in  Article  300A.   Provision  for  payment  of  

compensation has been specifically incorporated in  

Article  30(1A)  as  well  as  in  the  2nd proviso  to  

Article  31A(1)  for  achieving  specific  objectives.  

Constitution's  44th  Amendment  Act,  1978  while  

omitting  Article  31  brought  in  a  substantive  

provision Clause (1A) to Article 30.   Resultantly,  

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though no individual or even educational institution  

belonging  to  majority  community  shall  have  any  

fundamental  right  to  compensation  in  case  of  

compulsory acquisition of his property by the State,  

an educational institution belonging to a minority  

community shall have such fundamental right to claim  

compensation in case State enacts a law providing  

for  compulsory  acquisition  of  any  property  of  an  

educational institution established and administered  

by  a  minority  community.   Further,  the  second  

proviso to Article 31A(1) prohibits the Legislature  

from making a law which does not contain a provision  

for payment of compensation at a rate not less than  

the market value which follows that a law which does  

not contain such provision shall be invalid and the  

acquisition proceedings would be rendered void.    

116. Looking  at  the  history  of  the  various  

constitutional  amendments,  judicial  pronouncements  

and the statement of objects and reasons contained  

in  the  44th Amendment  Bill  which  led  to  the  44th  

Amendment Act we have no doubt that the intention of  

the Parliament was to do away with the fundamental  

95

right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property.  

But  the  question  is  whether  the  principles  of  

eminent  domain  are  completely  obliterated  when  a  

person is deprived of his property by the authority  

of law under Article 300A of the Constitution.    

PUBLIC PURPOSE

117. Deprivation of property within the meaning of  

Art.300A,  generally  speaking,  must  take  place  for  

public purpose or public interest.  The concept of  

eminent  domain  which  applies  when  a  person  is  

deprived of his property postulates that the purpose  

must  be  primarily  public  and  not  primarily  of  

private interest and merely incidentally beneficial  

to the public. Any law, which deprives a person of  

his private property for private interest, will be  

unlawful and unfair and undermines the rule of law  

and can be subjected to judicial review.  But the  

question  as  to  whether  the  purpose  is  primarily  

public  or  private,  has  to  be  decided  by  the  

legislature, which of course should be made known.  

The concept   of   public   purpose   has   been  

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given  fairly  expansive  meaning  which  has  to  be  

justified upon the purpose and object of statute and  

the policy of the legislation.  Public purpose is,  

therefore,  a  condition  precedent,  for  invoking  

Article 300A.

COMPENSATION

118. We have found that the requirement of public  

purpose  is  invariably  the  rule  for  depriving  a  

person  of  his  property,  violation  of  which  is  

amenable  to  judicial  review.  Let  us  now  examine  

whether the requirement of payment of compensation  

is the rule after the deletion of Article 31(2).  

Payment of compensation amount is a constitutional  

requirement under Article 30(1A) and under the 2nd  

proviso to  Article  31A(1),  unlike  Article  300A.  

After  the  44th Amendment  Act,  1978,  the  

constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a  

person  who  is  deprived  of  his  property  primarily  

depends  upon  the  terms  of  the  statute  and  the  

legislative policy. Article 300A, however, does not  

prohibit  the  payment  of  just  compensation  when  a  

97

person  is   deprived  of  his  property,  but  the  

question  is  whether  a  person  is  entitled  to  get  

compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence  

of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of  

his property.    

119. Before  answering  those  questions,  let  us  

examine whether the right to claim compensation on  

deprivation of one’s property can be traced to Entry  

42 List III.  The 7th  Constitutional Amendment Act,  

1956 deleted Entry 33 List I, Entry 36 List II and  

reworded Entry 42 List III relating to “acquisition  

and requisitioning of property”.   It was urged that  

the above words be read with the requirements of  

public  purpose  and  compensation.  Reference  was  

placed on the following judgment of this Court in  

support of that contention.  In State of Madras v.  

Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. (1959) SCR 379  

at 413), this Court considered Entry 48 List II of  

the Government of India Act, 1935, “tax on sales of  

goods”,  in  accordance  with  the  established  legal  

sense  of  the  word  “sale”,  which  had  acquired  a  

definite precise sense and held that the legislature  

98

must have intended the “sale”, should be understood  

in that sense.   But we fail to see why we trace the  

meaning of a constitutional provision when the only  

safe and correct way of construing the statute is to  

apply the plain meaning of the words. Entry 42 List  

III  has  used  the  words  “acquisition”  and  

“requisitioning”,  but  Article  300A  has  used  the  

expression “deprivation”, though the word deprived  

or deprivation takes in its fold “acquisition” and  

“requisitioning”,  the  initial  presumption  is  in  

favour of the literal meaning since the Parliament  

is taken to mean as it says.  

120. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hoechst  

Pharmaceuticals Ltd.’s case  (supra), held that the  

various  entries  in  List  III  are  not  “powers”  of  

Legislation  but  “fields”  of  Legislation.  Later,  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court in  State of West  

Bengal & Another v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. & Others  

AIR  2005  SC  1646,  held  that  Article  245  of  the  

Constitution is the fountain source of legislative  

power. It provides that subject to the provisions of  

this Constitution, the Parliament may make laws for  

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the whole or any part of the territory of India, and  

the Legislature of a State may make laws for the  

whole  or  any  part  of  the  State.  The  legislative  

field between the Parliament and the Legislature of  

any  State  is  divided  by  Article  246  of  the  

Constitution. Parliament has exclusive power to make  

laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated  

in List I in Seventh Schedule, called the Union List  

and subject to the said power of the Parliament, the  

Legislature of any State has power to make laws with  

respect to any of the matters enumerated in List  

III,  called  the  Concurrent  List.  Subject  to  the  

above, the Legislature of any State has exclusive  

power  to  make  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the  

matters  enumerated  in  List  II,  called  the  State  

List. Under Article 248, the exclusive power of the  

Parliament to make laws extends to any matter not  

enumerated in any Concurrent List or State List.  

121. We find no apparent conflict with the words  

used in Entry 42 List III so as to infer that the  

payment  of  compensation  is  inbuilt  or  inherent  

either in the words “acquisition and requisitioning”  

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under Entry 42 List III. Right to claim compensation  

is, therefore, cannot be read into the legislative  

Entry 42 List III.  Requirement of public purpose,  

for deprivation of a person of his property under  

Article  300A,  is  a  pre-condition,  but  no  

compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness  

has  to  be  justified  by  the  state  on  judicially  

justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve  

greater  social  justice,  may  call  for  lesser  

compensation and such a limitation by itself will  

not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or  

confiscatory.   In other words, the right to claim  

compensation or the obligation to pay, though not  

expressly  included  in  Article  300A,  it  can  be  

inferred in that Article and it is for the State to  

justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may  

depend  upon  the  legislative  policy,  object  and  

purpose of the statute and host of other factors.

122. Article 300A would be equally violated if the  

provisions  of  law  authorizing  deprivation  of  

property  have  not  been  complied  with.   While  

enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed  

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Article 31(1) [the “Rule of law” doctrine] and not  

Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of  

Eminent Domain].  Article 300A enables the State to  

put restrictions on the right to property by  law.  

That law has to be reasonable.  It must comply with  

other  provisions  of  the  Constitution.   The  

limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or  

excessive or what is beyond what  is required in  

public  interest.    The  limitation  or  restriction  

must  not  be  disproportionate  to  the  situation  or  

excessive.   The  legislation  providing  for  

deprivation of property under Article 300A must be  

“just, fair and reasonable” as understood in terms  

of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc.  Thus in  

each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of  

the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the  

question  whether  payment  of  nil  compensation  or  

nominal  compensation  would  make  the  impugned  law  

unjust,  unfair  or  unreasonable  in  terms  of  other  

provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.  

At  this  stage,  we  may  clarify  that  there  is  a  

difference  between  “no”  compensation  and  “nil”  

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compensation.   A  law  seeking  to  acquire  private  

property  for  public  purpose  cannot  say  that  “no  

compensation shall be paid”.  However, there could  

be a law awarding “nil” compensation in cases where  

the  State  undertakes  to  discharge  the  liabilities  

charged on the property under acquisition and onus  

is on the government to establish validity of such  

law.  In the latter case, the court in exercise of  

judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind  

the above parameters.

123. Right  to  property  no  more  remains  an  

overarching guarantee in our Constitution, then is  

it the law, that such a legislation enacted under  

the authority of law as provided in Article 300A is  

immune from challenge before a Constitutional Court  

for violation of Articles 14, 21 or the overarching  

principle of Rule of Law, a basic feature of our  

Constitution, especially when such a right is not  

specifically  incorporated  in  Article  300A,  unlike  

Article 30(1A) and the 2nd proviso to Article 31A.   

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124. Article 31A was inserted by the 1st Amendment  

Act,  1951  to  protect  the  abolition  of  Jamindari  

Abolition Laws and also the other types of social,  

welfare  and  regulatory  legislations  effecting  

private  property.    The  right  to  challenge  laws  

enacted  in  respect  of  subject  matter  enumerated  

under  Article  31A(1)(a)  to  (g)  on  the  ground  of  

violation  of  Article  14  was  also  constitutionally  

excluded.   Article  31B  read  with  Ninth  Schedule  

protects all laws even if they are violative of the  

fundamental  rights,  but  in  I.R.  Coelho’s  case  

(supra),  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  held  

that  the  laws  added  to  the  Ninth  Schedule,  by  

violating  the  constitutional  amendments  after  

24.12.1973, if challenged, will be decided on the  

touchstone of right to freedom guaranteed by Part  

III of the Constitution and with reference to the  

basic structure doctrine, which includes reference  

under  Article  21  read  with  Articles  14,  15  etc.  

Article 14 as a ground would also be available to  

challenge a law if made in contravention of Article  

30(1)(A).

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125. Article 265 states that no tax shall be levied  

or collected except by authority of law, then the  

essential  characteristics  of  tax  is  that  it  is  

imposed  under  statute  power,  without  tax  payer’s  

consent  and  the  payment  is  enforced  by  law.  A  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Kunnathat  

Thathunni  Moopil  Nair’s  case (supra)  held  that  

Sections 4, 5-A and 7 of the Travancore-Cochin Land  

Tax Act are unconstitutional as being violative of  

Article  14  and  was  held  to  be  in  violation  of  

Article 19(1)(f).   Of course, this decision was  

rendered  when  the  right  to  property  was  a  

fundamental right. Article  300A,  unlike  Articles  

31A(1)  and  31C,  has  not  made  the  legislation  

depriving  a  person  of  his  property  immune  from  

challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14  

or Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but let  

us  first  examine  whether  Article  21  as  such  is  

available to challenge a statute providing for no or  

illusory compensation and, hence, expropriatory.  

126. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ambika  

Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. & Others (1980) 3 SCC  

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719, while examining the constitutional validity of  

Article 31A, had occasion to consider the scope of  

Article  21  in  the  light  of  the  judgment  of  this  

Court in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra).  Dealing with  

the contention that deprivation of property amounts  

to violation of the right guaranteed under Article  

21 of the Constitution of India, this Court held as  

follows:

“12. Proprietary  personality  was  integral  to  personal  liberty  and  a  mayhem inflicted on a man’s property was  an amputation of his personal liberty.  Therefore,  land  reform  law,  if  unreasonable,  violates  Article  21  as  expansively construed in  Maneka Gandhi.  The dichotomy between personal liberty,  in Article 21, and proprietary status,  in Articles 31 and 19 is plain, whatever  philosophical justification or pragmatic  realisation it may possess in political  or juristic theory. Maybe, a penniless  proletarian, is unfree in his movements  and  has  nothing  to  lose  except  his  chains. But we are in another domain of  constitutional jurisprudence. Of course,  counsel’s  resort  to  Article  21  is  prompted  by  the  absence  of  mention  of  Article  21  in  Article  31-A  and  the  illusory hope of inflating Maneka Gandhi  to impart a healing touch to those whose  property  is  taken  by  feigning  loss  of  personal  liberty  when  the  State  takes  only  property,  Maneka  Gandhi is  no  universal nostrum or cure-all, when all  other arguments fail!”

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127. The question of applicability of Article 21 to  

the laws protected under Article 31C also came up  

for  consideration  before  this  Court  in  State  of  

Maharashtra & Another v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan  

& Others (1986) 2 SCC 516, wherein this Court held  

that  Article  21  essentially  deals  with  personal  

liberty and has little to do with the right to own  

property as such. Of course, the Court in that case  

was  not  concerned  with  the  question  whether  the  

deprivation of property would lead to deprivation of  

life or liberty or livelihood, but was dealing with  

a case, where land was acquired for improving living  

conditions of a large number of people. The Court  

held that the Land Ceiling Laws, laws providing for  

acquisition  of  land  for  providing  housing  

accommodation,  laws  imposing  ceiling  on  urban  

property  etc.  cannot  be  struck  down  by  invoking  

Article  21  of  the  Constitution.   This  Court  in  

Jilubhai  Nanbhai  Khachar’s  case  (supra)  took  the  

view that the principle of unfairness of procedure  

attracting  Article  21  does  not  apply  to  the  

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acquisition or deprivation of property under Article  

300A.

128.  Acquisition of property for a public purpose  

may meet with lot of contingencies, like deprivation  

of livelihood, leading to violation of Art.21, but  

that per se is not a ground to strike down a statute  

or its provisions.  But at the same time, is it the  

law that a Constitutional Court is powerless when it  

confronts  with  a  situation  where  a  person  is  

deprived  of  his  property,  by  law,  for  a  private  

purpose  with  or  without  providing  compensation?  

For  example,  a  political  party  in  power  with  a  

massive mandate enact a law to acquire the property  

of the political party in opposition not for public  

purpose,  with  or  without  compensation,  is  it  the  

law, that such a statute is immune from challenge in  

a Constitutional Court?  Can such a challenge be  

rejected on the ground that statute does not violate  

the  Fundamental  Rights  (due  to  deletion  of  

Art.19(1)(f)) and that the legislation does not lack  

legislative competence?    In such a situation, is  

non-availability of a third ground as propounded in  

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State of A.P. & Others v. Mcdowell & Co. & Others  

(1996) 3 SCC 709, is an answer?  Even in Mcdowell’s  

case (supra),  it  was  pointed  out  some  other  

constitutional  infirmity  may  be  sufficient  to  

invalidate the statute.  A three judges Bench of  

this Court in Mcdowell & Co. & Others case (supra)  

held as follows:

“43. …….The power of Parliament or for  that  matter,  the  State  Legislature  is  restricted in two ways. A law made by  Parliament  or  the  legislature  can  be  struck down by courts on two grounds and  two  grounds  alone,  viz.,  (1)  lack  of  legislative competence and (2) violation  of  any  of  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  in  Part  III  of  the  Constitution  or  of  any  other  constitutional  provision.  There  is  no  third  ground………  No  enactment  can  be  struck down by just saying that it is  arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other  constitutional infirmity has to be found  before invalidating an Act. An enactment  cannot be struck down on the ground that  court thinks it unjustified. Parliament  and the legislatures, composed as they  are  of  the  representatives  of  the  people,  are  supposed  to  know  and  be  aware  of  the  needs  of  the  people  and  what is good and bad for them. The court  cannot  sit  in  judgment  over  their  wisdom.………”

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129. A two judges Bench of this Court in Union of  

India & Another v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463,  

after referring to Mcdowell’s case (supra) stated as  

under:

“that a statute can be struck down if  the  restrictions  imposed  by  it  are  disproportionate  or  excessive  having  regard to the purpose of the statute and  that the Court can go into the question  whether there is a proper balancing of  the  fundamental  right  and  the  restriction imposed, is well settled.”  

130. Plea  of  unreasonableness,  arbitrariness,  

proportionality, etc. always raises an element of  

subjectivity on which a court cannot strike down a  

statute or a statutory provision, especially when  

the  right  to  property  is  no  more  a  fundamental  

right.  Otherwise the court will be substituting its  

wisdom  to  that  of  the  legislature,  which  is  

impermissible in our constitutional democracy.    

131. In  Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI &  

Others (2005) 2 SCC 317, the validity of Section 6-A  

of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,  

was questioned as violative of Article 14 of the  

Constitution. This Court after referring to several  

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decisions of this Court including  Mcdowell’s case  

(supra), Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Others v. State  

of Karnataka & Others (1996) 10 SCC 304, Ajay Hasia  

& Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Others (1981)  

1 SCC 722, Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Others v. Union  

of India & Others (2004) 4 SCC 311, Malpe Vishwanath  

Achraya & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Another  

(1998) 2 SCC 1 etc. felt that the question whether  

arbitrariness  and  unreasonableness  or  manifest  

arbitrariness and unreasonableness being facets of  

Article 14 of the Constitution are available or not  

as grounds to invalidate a legislation, is a matter  

requiring  examination  by  a  larger  Bench  and  

accordingly, referred the matter for consideration  

by a Larger Bench.    

132. Later, it is pertinent to note that a  five-

judges Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur v.  

Union  of  India  &  Others (2008)  6  SCC  1  while  

examining the validity of the Central Educational  

Institutions  (Reservation  in  Admission)  Act,  2006  

held as follows:    

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219. A legislation passed by Parliament  can  be  challenged  only  on  constitutionally  recognised  grounds.  Ordinarily,  grounds  of  attack  of  a  legislation  is  whether  the  legislature  has  legislative  competence  or  whether  the  legislation  is  ultra  vires the  provisions of the Constitution. If any  of  the  provisions  of  the  legislation  violates fundamental rights or any other  provisions of the Constitution, it could  certainly be a valid ground to set aside  the legislation by invoking the power of  judicial  review.  A  legislation  could  also be challenged as unreasonable if it  violates  the  principles  of  equality  adumbrated  in  our  Constitution  or  it  unreasonably  restricts  the  fundamental  rights  under  Article  19  of  the  Constitution.  A  legislation  cannot  be  challenged  simply  on  the  ground  of  unreasonableness because that by itself  does  not  constitute  a  ground.  The  validity  of  a  constitutional  amendment  and the validity of plenary legislation  have to be decided purely as questions  of constitutional law………”

Court  also  generally  expressed  the  view  that  the  

doctrines  of  “strict  scrutiny”,  “compelling  

evidence” and “suspect legislation” followed by the  

U.S.  Courts  have  no  application  to  the  Indian  

Constitutional Law.

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133. We have already found, on facts as well as on  

law, that the impugned Act has got the assent of the  

President as required under the proviso to Article  

31A(1), hence, immune from challenge on the ground  

of arbitrariness, unreasonableness under Article 14  

of the Constitution of India.

134. Statutes  are  many  which  though  deprives  a  

person  of  his  property,  have  the  protection  of  

Article  30(1A),  Article  31A,  31B,  31C  and  hence  

immune from challenge under Article 19 or Article  

14.   On deletion of Article 19(1(f) the available  

grounds  of  challenge  are  Article  14,  the  basic  

structure and the rule of law, apart from the ground  

of legislative competence.    In I.R. Coelho’s case  

(supra),  basic  structure  was  defined  in  terms  of  

fundamental rights as reflected under Articles 14,  

15, 19, 20, 21 and 32.    In that case the court  

held that statutes mentioned in the IXth Schedule  

are immune from challenge on the ground of violation  

of fundamental rights, but if such laws violate the  

basic structure, they no longer enjoy the immunity  

offered, by the IXth Schedule.    

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135. The Acquisition Act, it may be noted, has not  

been included in the IXth Schedule but since the Act  

is protected by Article 31A, it is immune from the  

challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14,  

but in a given case, if a statute violates the rule  

of law or the basic structure of the Constitution,  

is it the law that it is immune from challenge under  

Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India?   

136. Rule of law as a concept finds no place in our  

Constitution, but has been characterized as a basic  

feature  of  our  Constitution  which  cannot  be  

abrogated or destroyed even by the Parliament and in  

fact binds the Parliament.  In  Kesavanda Bharati’s  

case (supra), this Court enunciated rule of law as  

one of the most important aspects of the doctrine of  

basic  structure.  Rule  of  law  affirms  parliament’s  

supremacy  while  at  the  same  time  denying  it  

sovereignty over the Constitution.  

137. Rule of law can be traced back to Aristotle  

and has been championed by Roman jurists; medieval  

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natural  law  thinkers;  Enlightenment  philosophers  

such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Dicey  

etc.   Rule of law has also been accepted as the  

basic principle of Canadian Constitution order. Rule  

of  law  has  been  considered  to  be  as  an  implied  

limitation on Parliament’s powers to legislate. In  

Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985) 1 SCR  

721,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  described  the  

constitutional status of the rule of law as follows:

“The  Constitution Act, 1982  ... is  explicit recognition that “the rule of  law  is  a  fundamental  postulate  of  our  constitutional  structure.”  The  rule  of  law  has  always  been  understood  as  the  very basis of the English Constitution  characterising  the  political  institutions of England from the time of  the  Norman  Conquest.  It  becomes  a  postulate  of  our  own  constitutional  order  by  way  of  the  preamble  to  the  Constitution Act, 1982  and its implicit  inclusion  in  the  preamble  to  the  Constitution Act, 1867 by virtue of the  words  “with  a  Constitution  similar  in  principle  to  that  of  the  United  Kingdom.”  

Additional to the inclusion of the rule  of  law  in  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982, the  principle  is  clearly  implicit  in  the  very  nature  of  a  Constitution.  The  Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must  be understood as a purposive ordering of  

115

social relations providing a basis upon  which an actual order of positive laws  can  be  brought  into  existence.  The  founders  of  this  nation  must  have  intended, as one of the basic principles  of  nation  building,  that  Canada  be  a  society  of  legal  order  and  normative  structure: one governed by the rule of  law.  While  this  is  not  set  out  in  a  specific provision, the principle of the  rule of law is clearly a principle of  our Constitution.”

138. In  Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution  

(1981)  1  SCR  753,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  

utilized  the  principle  of  rule  of  law  to  uphold  

legislation,  rather  than  to  strike  it  down.  The  

Court  held  that  the  implied  principles  of  the  

Constitution  are  limits  on  the  sovereignty  of  

Parliament  and  the  provincial  legislatures.  The  

Court reaffirmed this conclusion later in  OPSEU v.  

Ontario  (A.G.) (1987)  2  SCR  2.  This  was  a  case  

involving  a  challenge  to  Ontario  legislation  

restricting  the  political  activities  of  civil  

servants in Ontario. Although the Court upheld the  

legislation,  Beetz.  J  described  the  implied  

limitations in the following terms:   

 “There is no doubt in my mind that  the basic structure of our Constitution,  

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as established by the  Constitution Act,  1867,  contemplates  the  existence  of  certain  political  institutions,  including  freely  elected  legislative  bodies  at  the  federal  and  provincial  levels.  In  the  words  of  Duff  C.J.  in  Reference  re  Alberta  Statutes “such  institutions derive their efficacy from  the free public discussion of affairs”  and, in those of Abbott J. in  Switzman  v.  Elbling  ...  neither  a  provincial  legislature  nor  Parliament  itself  can  “abrogate this right of discussion and  debate.” Speaking more generally, I hold  that  neither  Parliament  nor  the  provincial  legislatures  may  enact  legislation the effect of which would be  to  substantially  interfere  with  the  operation  of  this  basic  constitutional  structure.”

139. The  Canadian  Constitution  and  Courts  have,  

therefore, considered the rule of law as one of the  

“basic structural imperatives” of the Constitution.  

Courts  in  Canada  have  exclusively  rejected  the  

notion  that  only  “provisions”  of  the  Constitution  

can be used to strike down legislation and comes  

down squarely in favour of the proposition that the  

rule  of  law  binds  legislatures  as  well  as  

governments.  

140. Rule  of  law  as  a  principle  contains  no  

explicit substantive component like eminent domain  

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but  has  many  shades  and  colours.   Violation  of  

principle of natural justice may undermine rule of  

law so also at times arbitrariness, proportionality,  

unreasonableness etc., but such violations may not  

undermine rule of law so as to invalidate a statute.  

Violation must be of such a serious nature which  

undermines  the  very  basic  structure  of  our  

Constitution and our democratic principles.   But  

once the Court finds, a Statute, undermines the rule  

of  law  which  has  the  status  of  a  constitutional  

principle  like  the  basic  structure,  the  above  

grounds are also available and not vice versa.  Any  

law which, in the opinion of the Court, is not just,  

fair and reasonable, is not a ground to strike down  

a Statute because such an approach would always be  

subjective,  not  the  will  of  the  people,  because  

there is always a presumption of constitutionality  

for a statute.    

141. Rule  of  law  as  a  principle,  it  may  be  

mentioned, is not an absolute means of achieving the  

equality,  human  rights,  justice,  freedom  and  even  

democracy and it all depends upon the nature of the  

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legislation  and  the  seriousness  of  the  violation.  

Rule  of  law  as  an  overarching  principle  can  be  

applied by the constitutional courts, in rarest of  

rare  cases,  in  situations,  we  have  referred  to  

earlier  and  can  undo  laws  which  are  tyrannical,  

violate the basic structure of our Constitution, and  

our cherished norms of law and justice.  One of the  

fundamental  principles  of  a  democratic  society  

inherent in all the provisions of the Constitution  

is that any interference with the peaceful enjoyment  

of possession should be lawful.  

142. Let the message, therefore, be loud and clear,  

that rule of law exists in this country even when we  

interpret  a  statute,  which  has  the  blessings  of  

Article  300A.   Deprivation  of  property  may  also  

cause  serious  concern  in  the  area  of  foreign  

investment,  especially  in  the  context  of  

International  Law  and  international  investment  

agreements.   Whenever, a foreign investor operates  

within the territory of a host country the investor  

and its properties are subject to the legislative  

control  of  the  host  country,  along  with  the  

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international treaties or agreements.  Even, if the  

foreign investor has no fundamental right, let them  

know, that the rule of law prevails in this country.  

143. We,  therefore,  answer  the  reference  as  

follows:  

(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the  

notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no  

excessive  delegation  of  legislative  power  on  the  

State Government.

(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under  

Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State  

Legislature  is  a  curable  defect  and  it  will  not  

affect the validity of the notification or action  

taken thereunder.

(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article  

31A of the Constitution after having obtained the  

assent  of  the  President  and  hence  immune  from  

challenge  under  Article  14  or  19  of  the  

Constitution.

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(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions  

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka  

Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the  

President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the  

Constitution.     

(e) Public  purpose  is  a  pre-condition  for  

deprivation  of  a  person  from  his  property  under  

Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is  

also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is  

deprived of his property the State has to justify  

both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the  

statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of  

the legislature and other related factors.  

(f) Statute, depriving a person of his property  

is,  therefore,  amenable  to  judicial  review  on  

grounds hereinbefore discussed. 144. We  

accordingly dismiss all the appeals and direct the  

notified  authority  under  the  Acquisition  Act  to  

disburse the amount   of    compensation   fixed by  

the Act to the legitimate claimants in accordance  

with law, which will depend upon the outcome of the  

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pending litigations between the parties.   Further,  

we also order that the land acquired be utilized  

only for the purpose for which it was acquired. In  

the facts and circumstances of the case, there will  

be no order as to costs.

......................CJI         (S.H. Kapadia)

......................J.         (Mukundakam Sharma)

......................J.         (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

......................J.         (Swatanter Kumar)

......................J.   (Anil R. Dave)

New Delhi, August 09, 2011

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