K. SURESH Vs NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO.LTD
Bench: K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: C.A. No.-007603-007603 / 2012
Diary number: 136 / 2011
Advocates: Vs
AISHWARYA BHATI
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7603 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3487 of 2011)
K. Suresh ….. Appellant
Versus
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and another .… Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J
Leave granted.
2. Despite many a pronouncement in the field, it still remains
a challenging situation warranting sensitive as well as
dispassionate exercise how to determine the incalculable sum in
calculable terms of money in cases of personal injuries. In such
assessment neither sentiments nor emotions have any role. It
has been stated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associate
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Collieries Ltd.1 that it is a matter of Pounds, Shillings and
Pence. There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the
heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the
pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be in
the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the Act’) stipulates that
there should be grant of “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes a
challenge for a court of law to determine “just compensation”
which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously,
should not be a pittance.
3. In Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh and others2, a three-
Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the assessment of
damages in personal-injury-actions, reproduced the following
passage from the decision by the House of Lords in H.West &
Son, Ltd. v. Shephard3 : -
“My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded for a tort are those which ‘so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act’ [Admiralty Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The Susquehanna4]. The words ‘so far as money can
1 1942 AC 601 2 (1994) 5 SCC 5 3 (1963) 2 All ER 625 4 (1926) All ER 124 : 1926 AC 655
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compensate’ point to the impossibility of equating money with human suffering or personal deprivations. A money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent conventional.”
In the said case reference was made to a passage from Clerk
and Lindsell on Torts (16th Edn.) which is apposite to reproduce
as it relates to the awards for non-pecuniary losses: -
“In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of personal injury suffers two distinct kinds of damage which may be classed respectively as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. By pecuniary damage is meant that which is susceptible of direct translation into money terms and includes such matters as loss of earnings, actual and prospective, and out-of-pocket expenses, while non-pecuniary damage includes such immeasurable elements as pain and suffering and loss of amenity or enjoyment of life. In respect of the former, it is submitted, the court
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should and usually does seek to achieve restitutio in integrum in the sense described above, while for the latter it seeks to award ‘fair compensation’. This distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage by no means corresponds to the traditional pleading distinction between ‘special’ and ‘general’ damages, for while the former is necessarily concerned solely with pecuniary losses — notably accrued loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses — the latter comprises not only non- pecuniary losses but also prospective loss of earnings and other future pecuniary damage.”
4. In this regard, we may refer with profit the decision of this
Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others5 wherein
the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v.
Camden and Islington Area Health Authority6 were quoted
with approval. They read thus: -
“The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid that, in personal injury cases, the award of damages is assessed under four main heads: first, special damages in the shape of money actually expended; second, cost of future nursing and attendance and medical expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth, loss of future earnings.”
5. While having respect for the conventional determination
there has been evolution of a pattern and the same, from time to
time, has been kept in accord with the changes in the value of 5 (2003) 2 SCC 274 6 (1979) 1 All ER 332
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money. Therefore, in the case of Ward v. James7 it has been
expressed thus: -
“Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his ‘lost years’, you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected ‘years of survival’. You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges and juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well nigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money.”
6. While assessing the damages there is a command to exclude
considerations which are in the realm of speculation or fancy
though some guess work or some conjecture to a limited extent is
inevitable. That is what has been stated in C.K. Subramania
Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair8. Thus, some guess work, some
hypothetical considerations and some sympathy come into play
but, a significant one, the ultimate determination is to be viewed
7 (1965) 1 All ER 563 8 AIR 1970 SC 376
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with some objective standards. To elaborate, neither the tribunal
nor a court can take a flight in fancy and award an exorbitant
sum, for the concept of conventional sum, fall of money value
and reasonableness are to be kept in view. Ergo, in conceptual
eventuality “just compensation” plays a dominant role.
7. The conception of “just compensation” is fundamentally
concretized on certain well established principles and accepted
legal parameters as well as principles of equity and good
conscience. In Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National
Insurance Company Limited and another9, a two-Judge
Bench, while dealing with the facet of “just compensation”, has
stated thus: -
“It goes without saying that in matters of determination of compensation both the tribunal and the court are statutorily charged with a responsibility of fixing a “just compensation”. It is obviously true that determination of just compensation cannot be equated to a bonanza. At the same time the concept of “just compensation” obviously suggests application of fair and equitable principles and a reasonable approach on the part of the tribunals and the courts. This reasonableness on the part of the tribunal and the court must be on a large peripheral field.”
9 (2010) 10 SCC 341
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8. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi10
this Court has expressed thus: -
“The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales.”
9. In Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and others v. Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corpn. and another11, while dealing
with concept of “just compensation”, it has been ruled that the
word ‘just’, as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness
and reasonableness having large peripheral field. The largeness
is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience
which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed
as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just. The field of wider
discretion of the tribunal has to be within the said limitations. It
is required to make an award determining the amount of
compensation which in turn appears to be “just and reasonable”,
for compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in
golden scales as has been stated in “State of Haryana and
another v. Jasbir Kaur and others”12.
10 (1979) 4 SCC 365 11 AIR 1998 SC 3191 12 (2003) 7 SCC 484
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10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority,
while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in view
the sufferings of the injured person which would include his
inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal
amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and
his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have
earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of
the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it
would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any
mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the
quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the
fundamental criterion of “just compensation” should be inhered.
11. Keeping in view the aforesaid aspects we shall proceed to
state the factual score. The factual matrix as unfurled, exposits
that on 11.3.2002 about 4.00 p.m. the claimant-appellant
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the claimant) was hit from the behind
by an auto bearing registration number TN-9 C 7755 which was
driven in a rash and negligent manner and in the accident he
sustained triple fracture in spinal cord, fracture in left leg neck of
femur, fracture in right hand shoulder, deep cut and degloving
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injury over right left thigh bone and multiple injuries all over the
body.
12. After the accident the claimant was admitted in M.R.
Hospital where he availed treatment. After the treatment, the
dislocation of the bones got reduced, pedical screws were inserted
into pedicles of D11 vertebra and pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of L1 vertebra. Two screws on left thigh were fixed using
a rod each. That apart, decompression of D12 vertebra was done
and bone chips were placed in the intertransverse area on both
sides. He was hospitalized for 28 days. The victim had
numbness below the knee joint and was facing difficulty to stand
and sit comfortably. As the evidence on record would reveal he
has been constantly availing physiotherapy treatment facing
difficulty in carrying out his normal activities. A disability
certificate contained as Ex.P4 was filed before the tribunal which
showed permanent disability at 75%.
13. The tribunal, as it appears from the award, had also
assessed the permanent disability at 75% as fixed by PW-4, Dr.
Thiagarajan. It had awarded Rs.25,00,000/- under various
heads, namely, transport charges, extra nourishment, medical
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expenses, additional medical expenses, pain and sufferings
suffered by family members of the claimant, mental agony,
additional transport charges, inability of the appellant to
participate in public functions, loss of marital life, pain and
suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity.
14. Before the High Court as serious objections were raised
pertaining to percentage of disability, the claimant was referred
to the Medical Board and it was found that he had compression
fracture which had healed with persistence of pain in the back
with root involvement causing grade IV power in left lower limb
and, accordingly, the Board fixed the permanent disability at
40%. The High Court adverted to the concept of “just
compensation” and opined that the quantum of damages fixed
should be in proportionate to the injuries caused. It referred to
certain authorities and opined that Rs.2,00,000/- towards
medical expenses, Rs.5,000/- each for transport charges and
extra nourishment, Rs.2,50,000/- towards pain and suffering,
Rs.50,000/- for medical expenses and Rs.4,68,000/- towards
loss of earning capacity would be the just amount of
compensation. Thus, the total amount as determined by the
High Court came to Rs.9,78,000/-. The High Court reduced the
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interest to 7.5% from 9% as granted by the tribunal. Be it noted,
the said judgment and order dated 27.1.2010 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.
1989 of 2005 whereby the High Court has reduced the
compensation granted by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II
Small Causes Court), Chennai, on an application being moved
under Section 166 of the Act is the subject-matter of challenge
herein.
15. Mr. Vipin Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
has contended that the High Court has erroneously held that
there cannot be grant of compensation under two heads, namely,
“permanent disability” and “loss of earning power”. It is urged by
him that the tribunal had correctly appreciated the evidence on
record and fixed certain sum under various heads but the High
Court on unacceptable reasons has deleted the same. It is also
canvassed by him that the High Court without ascribing any
cogent reasons has reduced the expenses for continuous
treatment from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/- as a result of which
the amount had been substantially reduced and the concept of
“just compensation” has lost its real characteristics.
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16. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No. 1, supported the order passed by the High Court
contending, inter alia, that the analysis made by the learned
single Judge is absolutely flawless and the interference in the
quantum cannot be faulted inasmuch as the tribunal has
awarded a large sum on certain heads which are totally
impermissible in law. It is also urged by her that certain sums
had been allowed by the tribunal without any material on record
and, therefore, the High Court has correctly interfered with the
award.
17. The seminal issues that really emanate for consideration are
whether the analysis made by the High Court in not granting
compensation under certain heads and further reduing the
amount on certain scores, are justified. Regard being had to the
fundamental essence of “just compensation”, we shall presently
deal with the manner in which the High Court has dwelled upon
various heads in respect of which the tribunal had granted
certain sums towards compensation. On a perusal of the order
passed by the High Court, it is manifest that the High Court
relying on certain authorities of the said court has expressed the
view that once a particular amount has been awarded towards
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`permanent disability’, no further amount can be awarded
relating to `loss of earning capacity’. The learned counsel for the
appellant has commended us to the pronouncement of this Court
in B. Kothandapani v. Tamil Nadu State Transport
Corporation Ltd.13, wherein the High Court had placed reliance
on the Full Bench decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation
Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi14. This Court referred to the
pronouncement in Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh15,
wherein it has been stated thus: -
“With regard to ground 19 covering the question that the sum awarded for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, etc. termed as general damages should be taken to be covered by damages granted for loss of earnings is concerned that too is misplaced and without any basis. The pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life which is a resultant and permanent fact occasioned by the nature of injuries received by the claimant and the ordeal he had to undergo.”
18. In Ramesh Chandra (supra) the learned Judges proceeded
to address the issue of difficulty or incapacity to earn and how it
13 (2011) 6 SCC 420 14 (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad) 15 (1990) 3 SCC 723
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stands on a different footing than pain and suffering affecting
enjoyment of life and stated as under: -
“The inability to earn livelihood on the basis of incapacity or disability which is quite different. The incapacity or disability to earn a livelihood would have to be viewed not only in praesenti but in futuro on reasonable expectancies and taking into account deprival of earnings of a conceivable period. This head being totally different cannot in our view overlap the grant of compensation under the head of pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. One head relates to the impairment of person’s capacity to earn, the other relates to the pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life by the person himself.”
19. After referring to the said passage, the Bench proceeded to
state that it is true that compensation for loss of earning
power/capacity has to be determined based on various aspects
including permanent injury/disability, but at the same time, it
cannot be construed that that compensation cannot be granted
for permanent disability of any nature. It has been mentioned by
way of an example that in a case of a non-earning member of a
family who has been injured in an accident and sustained
permanent disability due to amputation of leg or hand, it cannot
be construed that no amount needs to be granted for permanent
disability. It cannot be disputed that apart from the fact that the
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permanent disability affects the earning capacity of the person
concerned, undoubtedly, one has to forego other personal
comforts and even for normal avocation they have to depend on
others.
20. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the view of the
High Court that no compensation can be granted towards
permanent disability once compensation is computed for the loss
of earning capacity and loss of future earnings is unsustainable.
As is perceivable, the High Court has computed the loss of
earning power at Rs.4,68,000/- instead of Rs.5,00,000/- as
determined by the tribunal and deleted sum of Rs.3,00,000/-
that was awarded by the tribunal towards permanent disability.
In our considered opinion, total deletion is absolutely unjustified
and, in fact, runs counter to the principles laid down by this
Court in Ramesh Chandra (supra) and B. Kothandapani
(supra).
21. At this juncture, we think it seemly to state that it is a case
where the victim has suffered serious injuries. As far as the
injuries are concerned, there is concurrence of opinion by the
tribunal as well as by the High Court. The High Court has only
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reduced the percentage of permanent disability on the basis of
assessment made by the Medical Board as there was a serious
cavil with regard to the said percentage. While determining
compensation payable to a victim of an accident the parameters
which are to be kept in view have been succinctly stated in R.D.
Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others16: -
“9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non- pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.”
16 (1995) 1 SCC 551
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22. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance
Company Limited and another17 a two-Judge Bench referred to
the authority in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas18 and
applied the principle of multiplier for future earnings in a case of
permanent disability. We have referred to this decision solely for
the purpose that multiplier principle has been made applicable to
an application preferred under Section 166 of the Act.
23. In this context it is useful to refer to Raj Kumar v. Ajay
Kumar and Another19, wherein a two-Judge Bench after
referring to the award of compensation in personal injury cases
reiterated the concepts of pecuniary damages (special damages)
and non-pecuniary damages (general damages). The Bench
referred to the decisions in C.K. Subramania Iyer (supra), R.D.
Hattangadi (supra) and Baker v. Willoughby20 and expressed
the view that it is obligatory on the part of the court or the
tribunal to assess the damages objectively and exclude from
consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture
17 (2010) 10 SCC 254 18 (1994) 2 SCC 176 19 (2011) 1 SCC 343 20 1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 : (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)
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with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is
inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the
physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result
of such injury. He is to be compensated for his inability to lead a
full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he
would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn
as much as he used to earn or could have earned.
24. It is worthy noting that the Bench referred to the pecuniary
damages and non-pecuniary damages and opined thus: -
“Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
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(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).”
25. After so stating the Bench proceeded to opine that
assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item
(ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement
of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award
under the head of future medical expenses—Item (iii)—depends
upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further
treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary
damages—Items (iv), (v) and (vi)—involves determination of lump
sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age,
nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant
and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. It has
been observed therein that what usually poses some difficulty is
the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of
permanent disability—Item (ii)(a). Thereafter, the Bench adverted
to the features which are necessary while assessing the loss of
future earnings on account of permanent disability. In the said
case it has been opined that permanent disability can be either
partial or total and the assessment of compensation under the
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heads of loss of future earnings would depend upon the factum
and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity.
It has been laid down that the tribunal should not mechanically
apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
economic loss or loss of earning capacity. It has been further
observed that in most of the cases, the percentage of economic
loss, i.e., the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from
a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of
permanent disability. However, in some cases on appreciation of
evidence and assessment the percentage of loss of earning
capacity as a result of the permanent disability would be
approximately the same as the percentage of permanent
disability in which case, of course, the court or tribunal would
adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. To
arrive at the said conclusion reliance was placed on Arvind
Kumar Mishra (supra) and Yadav Kumar (supra).
26. In the case at hand the High Court has determined the loss
of earning capacity on the base of multiplier method and reduced
the quantum awarded by the tribunal from Rs.5,00,000/- to
Rs.4,68,000/-. Applying the ratio in Yadav Kumar (supra) and
Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and also Raj Kumar (supra) and
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regard being had to the serious nature of injury we do not find
any error in the said method of calculation and, accordingly, we
uphold the method of computation as well as the quantum.
27. Presently to the grant of compensation on other scores. It is
noticeable that the High Court has reduced the additional
medical expenses from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. In our
considered opinion, the same is not correct as there is ample
evidence on record as regards the necessity for treatment in
future. It is demonstrable that pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of D11 vertebra; pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of L1 vertebra; and two screws on left thigh were
connected using a rod each. That may be required to be removed
or scanned from time to time depending upon other aspects.
That apart, there is persistent pain and as medically advised
physiotherapy is necessary and hence, continuous treatment has
to be availed of. Thus, the High Court was not justified in
reducing the said amount.
28. The High Court has maintained the award in respect of
transport charges, extra nourishment, medical expenses and,
accordingly, they are maintained. It has enhanced the award
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from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.2,50,000 on the head of pain and
suffering, but has deleted the amount awarded on permanent
disability from the total compensation awarded by the tribunal
by relying on the decision in Cholan Roadways Corporation
Ltd. (supra). As has been stated earlier, the said decision has
been considered in B. Kothandapani (supra) and is not
accepted, and this Court has expressed the view that grant of
compensation towards permanent disability is permissible.
Regard been had to the totality of the facts and circumstances,
we are inclined to think that compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-
should be granted towards permanent disability and
Rs.2,00,000/- towards pain and suffering. We have so held as
the injury is of serious nature and under the heading of non-
pecuniary damages compensation is awardable under the
headings of pain and suffering and damages for loss of amenities
of life on account of injury. In the case of R.D. Hattangadi
(supra) this Court has granted compensation under two heads,
namely, “pain and suffering” and “loss of amenities of life”. Quite
apart from that compensation was granted towards future
earnings. In Laxman v. Divisional Manager, Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. and another21 it has been ruled thus: - 21 2012 ACJ 191
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“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim of an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to accident, loss of earnings and victim’s inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.”
Thus, the deletion by the High Court was not justified. However,
we have restricted to the amount as stated hereinbefore.
29. The High Court has deleted the additional transport
charges. We are disposed to think that while availing treatment
the said expenses would be imperative. Hence, there was no
justification to reduce the same and, accordingly, we restore it.
30. It is perceptible that the High Court has deleted the amount
awarded under the head of pain and suffering by family members
of the claimant and the amount granted towards loss of marital
life. There is no iota of evidence with regard to loss of marital
life, hence, we do not find any error in the said deletion. As far
as grant of compensation on the score of pain and suffering
suffered by the family members of claimant is concerned, the
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same is not permissible and, accordingly, we hold that that has
been correctly deleted.
31. The High Court has deleted an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-
and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and inability
on the part of the claimant to participate in public functions
respectively. We have already determined Rs.2,00,000/- under
the heading of pain and suffering already suffered and to be
suffered and Rs.2,50,000/- under the heading of permanent
disability and hence, no different sum need be awarded under
the heading of mental agony. As far as participation in public
functions is concerned, there is no evidence in that regard and,
therefore, we are disposed to think that the finding of the High
Court on that score is totally justified and does not call for any
interference.
32. Calculated on the aforesaid base, the compensation would
be payable on the headings, namely, transport charges, extra-
nourishment, medical expenses, additional medical expenses,
additional transport charges, pain and suffering, loss of earning
capacity and permanent disability and the amount on the
aforesaid scores would be, in toto, Rs.13,48,000/-. The said
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amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of
application till the date of payment. The same shall be deposited
before the tribunal within a period of two months and the
tribunal shall disburse 50% of the amount in favour of the
claimant and the rest of the amount shall be deposited in a
nationalized bank for a period of three years. Be it clarified if the
earlier awarded sum has been deposited, the differential sum
shall be deposited within the stipulated time as mentioned
hereinabove and the disbursement shall take place accordingly.
33. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part leaving the
parties to bear their respective costs.
……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J. [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi; October 19, 2012.