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        REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2285 OF 2011

K. Sitaram & Anr. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

CFL Capital Financial Service Ltd. & Anr.      .... Respondent(s)

                  J U D G M E N T

R.K. Agrawal, J.

1) This  appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  judgment  and

order  dated  07.01.2011  passed  by  the  High  Court  of

Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1279 of

2010  whereby  learned  single  Judge  of  the  High  Court

dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein.   

2) Brief facts:

(a) The complainant-respondent Company borrowed a sum

of  Rs.  900  lakhs  comprising  Rs.  180  lakhs  through  cash

credits from the consortium of Banks (of which the State Bank

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of Travancore was the lead bank) and a sum of Rs. 720 lakhs

being working capital demand Loan.  Due to non-payment of

the loan amount, the account became Non-Performing Asset.

In order to recover the amount against the borrower, the State

Bank of Travancore filed OA No. 96 of 2003 before the Debts

Recovery Tribunal (DRT),  Mumbai.  On 22.07.2005, the DRT

passed a partial decree awarding a sum of Rs. 812.26 lakhs

with 12 per cent interest.   

(b) On 29.03.2006, the State Bank of Travancore assigned

the debts due from the complainant-Company to the Kotak

Mahindra  Bank together  with  all  the  securities  through an

Assignment  Deed.   On  11.01.2007,  the  borrower-the

respondent Company assigned to Kotak Mahindra Bank the

debt due towards it from one Ravishankar Industries Pvt. Ltd.

of more than Rs. 32 crores with an agreement that any excess

recovery  over  and  above  Rs.  90  lakhs  from  Ravishankar

Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.  would  be  shared  equally  between  the

Kotak  Mahindra  Bank and  the  complainant-Company.  It  is

pertinent  to  mention  here  that  the  fact  of  the  alleged

Assignment  Deed  came  to  the  notice  of  the

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complainant-Company  only  on  17.01.2007  when  the  Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  handed  over  a  copy  of  the  application  for

substituting themselves in place of State Bank of Travancore

to the respondent-Company.   

(c) The  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank  initiated  process  for

substituting its name in place of the assignor-State Bank of

Travancore in the recovery application and also withdraws two

criminal complaints filed by the respondent-Company against

Ravishankar Industries Pvt.  Ltd. without any information to

the  respondent-Company.   On  28.04.2007,   the  Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  moved  an  application  before  the  Recovery

Officer-I  for  appropriating  Rs.  67.5  lakhs  due  towards  the

complainant-Company, being 50 per cent of the amount of Rs.

135  lakhs  received  in  excess  of  Rs.  90  lakhs  from  the

Ravishankar  Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.,  against  the claim towards

the State Bank of Travancore.   

(d)   On  16.05.2007,  the  complainant-respondent  Company

filed a complaint  against the Kotak Mahindra Bank and its

officers  being  No.  18/SW/07  before  the  Metropolitan

Magistrate,  Bandra,  Mumbai under Sections 409, 418, read

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with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).

On 25.06.2007, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Bandra, Mumbai issued process against all the accused in the

complaint dated 16.05.2007.  The accused therein preferred

Criminal Revision Applications being Nos. 1024-1026 of 2007

before the  Court  of  Sessions for  Greater  Bombay.   Learned

Additional  Sessions Judge,  vide order dated 03/05.04.2008,

allowed the revision applications while setting aside the order

of issue of process dated 25.06.2007.

(e) A fresh complaint being No. 0800009/SW/08 was filed

by  the  complainant-the  respondent  Company  before  the

Additional  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  8th Court,

Esplanade,  Mumbai  under Sections 409, 418, 423 and 425

read with Section 120-B of the IPC against the State Bank of

Travancore,  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank  Limited  and  its  officers.

The Metropolitan Magistrate, I/C ACMM, 8th Court, Esplanade,

Mumbai, vide order dated 25.01.2008, issued process against

the  officers  of  the  State  Bank  of  Travancore  and  Kotak

Mahindra Bank Limited.  On 11.05.2008, learned Magistrate

excluded the officers of the Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited in

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view  of  an  application  filed  by  the  respondent-Company  to

withdraw the complaint against them.

(f) Being  aggrieved,  the  appellants  herein  preferred  a

Criminal Writ Petition being No. 1279 of 2010 before the High

Court. On 07.01.2011, learned single Judge of the High Court,

dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein for

setting  aside  the  order  of  issue  of  process  by  learned

Magistrate dated 25.01.2008 against the appellants.   

(g) Aggrieved by the order dated 07.01.2011, the appellants

have preferred this appeal by way of special leave.

3)  Heard  the  arguments  advanced  by  Mr.  T.R.

Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel for the appellants and

Mr. Aniruddha P.  Mayee,  learned counsel  for  the State  and

perused the records.   

Point for consideration:

4) The  only  point  for  consideration  before  this  Court  is

whether Criminal Case No. 0800009/SW/08, pending in the

Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court,

Esplanade, Mumbai, is liable to be quashed or not?

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Rival contentions:

5) Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  vehemently

contended that the appellants were not the employees of the

State  Bank  of  Travancore  when  the  alleged  Deed  of

Assignment  was  entered  into  between  the  State  Bank  of

Travancore  and  the  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank.   He  further

contended that the Deed of Assignment dated 29.03.2006 is a

valid  and equitable  assignment.   The decision in respect  of

execution  of  the  assignment  is  taken  by  the  Executive

Committee of the State Bank of Travancore and the same is

not the individual decision of the appellants herein.  Learned

senior counsel further contended that since the State Bank of

Travancore had no knowledge about the transactions between

the respondent-Company and the Kotak Mahindra Bank, the

State Bank of Travancore cannot be said to have any intention

to defraud anyone.  There is no wrongful gain to the appellants

or the State Bank of Travancore and the accusation that they

acted  in  collusion  and  connivance  with  the  officers  of  the

Kotak Mahindra Bank to commit the criminal breach of trust,

cheating  and  dishonest/fraudulent  execution  of  deeds  of

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transfer  is  baseless.   He  further  submitted  that  as  the

complainant-respondent  Company  had  withdrawn  the

complaint against the co-accused, i.e., the officers of the Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  Ltd.,  the  complaint  made  against  the

appellants herein cannot proceed and is liable to be quashed

as  the  allegations  against  them  are  also  same.   The

complainant-respondent Company cannot be allowed to blow

hot and cold in the same breath.  Learned senior counsel for

the appellants finally contended that the appellants are in no

way related to the said transaction and the complaint also has

not specifically set out any offence against them.

6) On  the  other  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  State

submitted that the appellant No. 1 herein was the Managing

Director of the State Bank of Travancore at the relevant time

and was responsible for the business and day to day affairs of

the Bank.  Similarly, appellant No. 2 herein was the Deputy

General  Manager  and Principal  Officer,  who had signed the

alleged Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006 on behalf  of  the

State Bank of Travancore. He further submitted that in such a

scenario,  the  appellants  herein,  being  the  principal

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perpetrators,  actively  connived and colluded with the Kotak

Mahindra Bank and its officers with a common intention to

deceive the respondent-Company in order to make wrongful

gains.   Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  the  active

collusion  and  conspiracy  between  both  the  Banks  hatched

together  deliberately  with  a  view  to  deceive  the

respondent-Company is also evident from the fact that in the

alleged assignment deed dated 29.03.2006, there was a clear

undertaking under Clause 2.3 that  simultaneously  with the

execution of the said deed, the State Bank of Travancore must

send a notice  addressed to the respondent-Company herein

informing it  of  the assignment of  the alleged debts and the

financial instruments to the Kotak Mahindra Bank.   

7) Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the

State  Bank  of  Travancore  was  duty  bound  to  protect  the

interest  of  the  respondent-Company  as  the  Bank  was

entrusted with certain properties of the respondent-Company.

By  entering  into  such  alleged  assignment  with  deliberate

suppression and concealment of material facts with dishonest

intention, the appellants herein, who were responsible for the

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day to day affairs of the Bank, have committed the offence of

criminal breach of trust and cheating.  Learned counsel for the

State  finally  submitted  that  the  order  dated  25.01.2008

passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate for issue of process as

well  as  the  order  dated  07.01.2011,  passed  by  the  learned

single Judge of  the High Court,  dismissing the writ petition

filed by the  appellants  herein for  setting  aside the order  of

issue of process dated 25.01.2008 against the appellants are

justified and do not call for any interference.   

Discussion:

8) The  present  appeal  has  been  filed  for  quashing  of

Criminal Case No. 0800009/SW/08 pending in the Court of

Additional  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  8th Court,

Esplanade, Mumbai and for setting aside the order dated 25th

January 2008, by which process was issued against all  the

persons accused in the complaint.  Appellant No. 1 herein was

working  as  Managing  Director  with  the  State  Bank  of

Travancore  during  the  period  11th May  2006  to  30th June

2007.  Appellant No. 2 herein worked with the Bank as the

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Deputy General Manager during the period from January 2005

to November 2006.  

9) The  respondent-Company  filed  a  complaint  alleging

offence  punishable  under  Sections  409,  418,  423  and  425

read  with  Section  120-B  of  the  IPC  against  the  appellants

herein.  The Bank had in December 1995 sanctioned loan of

Rs. 180 lakhs by way of cash credit facility and Rs. 720 lakhs

by way of working capital demand loan, totaling to Rs. 900/-

lakhs  and  the  complainant-Company  executed  various

documents  in  favour  of  the  Bank.   As  the

respondent-Company was unable to pay its dues to the Bank,

the Bank had filed recovery proceedings before the Tribunal

wherein a partial  decree for  a sum of  Rs.812.26 lakhs had

been passed.   

10) In the said proceedings, Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited

filed an application for substituting its name in place of State

Bank of Travancore claiming all the dues and charge on the

immovable  properties  mortgaged in favour of  State  Bank of

Travancore vide an Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006.  The

respondent-Company  claimed  that  no  notice  of  the  alleged

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assignment  dated  29.03.2006  had  been  given  to  it.   On

11.01.2007, the respondent–Company entered into a Deed of

Assignment with the Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited, wherein

all the dues of Ravishankar Industries Pvt. Ltd. of more than

Rs.  32  crores  were  assigned  to  the  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank.

Under the agreement, it was agreed that any amount received

over  and  above  Rs.  90  lakhs  from the  Company  would  be

shared equally between the respondent–Company and Kotak

Mahindra  Bank.   The  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank  withdrew  the

proceedings filed by the respondent–Company under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the Ravishankar

Industries  Pvt.  Ltd  and  also  settled  an  amount  of  Rs.  225

lakhs without giving any information to it as to the terms of

settlement and the mode of payment.  It is the allegation of the

complainant that if the complainant was informed about the

alleged Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006, it would not have

entered into  the  assignment  agreement  on 11.01.2007 with

the Kotak Mahindra Bank. It is alleged that the suppression of

facts and surreptitious execution of  the deed of  assignment

dated  29.03.2006  was  deliberately  done  with  a  dishonest

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intention to  induce the  complainant-Company and to  make

wrongful losses and to deceive it.   

11) Learned senior counsel for the appellants contended that

the  allegations  against  the  appellants  in  their  personal

capacity are vague.  He further contended that Appellant No. 1

herein joined the State Bank of Travancore on 11.05.2006 i.e.

subsequent  to  the Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006.   He

was,  however,  admittedly  working  with  the  Bank  on

11.01.2007, when the complainant Company entered into the

Deed  of  Assignment  with  the  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank.   As

regards Appellant No. 2 herein, though he was signatory to the

Deed of Assignment dated 29.03.2006, he submitted that he

was not in service of State Bank of Travancore on the date on

which Deed of  Assignment  dated 11.01.2007,  was executed

between the complainant-Company and the Kotak Mahindra

Bank and hence he claims to have no connection whatsoever

with the offence alleged.  He further contended that the IPC

does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability

on the  part  of  the  Chairman and General  Managers  of  the

Company  when  the  accused  is  the  Company.   When  the

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Company  is  the  offender,  vicarious  liability  of  the  directors

cannot  be  imputed  automatically,  in  the  absence  of  any

statutory provisions to this effect.  

12) In support of  his claim, learned senior counsel for the

appellant cited a decision of this Court in Maksud Saiyed vs.

State of Gujarat and Others (2008) 5 SCC 668 wherein it

was held as under:-

“13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind.  The Penal  Code does  not  contain any provision for attaching  vicarious  liability  on  the  part  of  the  Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its  entirety,  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the respondents  herein  were  personally  liable  for  any  offence. The  Bank  is  a  body  corporate.  Vicarious  liability  of  the Managing  Director  and Director  would arise  provided  any provision  exists  in  that  behalf  in  the  statute.  Statutes indisputably  must  contain  provision  fixing  such  vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.”

13) In support of his claim that the transactions between the

complainant  and the  State  Bank of  Travancore  were purely

civil in nature and criminal court has nothing to do with it,

learned senior counsel for the appellants further relied upon a

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decision of this Court in Sardar Trilok Singh and Others vs.

Satya Deo Tripathi (1979) 4 SCC 396 wherein it was held as

under:-

“5…..The question as to what were the terms of the settlement and  whether  they  were  duly  incorporated  in  the  printed agreement or not were all  questions which could be properly and adequately decided in a civil court. Obtaining signature of a person on blank sheet of papers by itself is not an offence of forgery  or  the like.  It  becomes an offence when the paper is fabricated  into  a  document  of  the  kind  which  attracts  the relevant provisions of the Penal Code making it an offence or when such a document is used as a genuine document. Even assuming  that  the  appellants  either  by themselves  or  in  the Company of some others went and seized the truck on July 30, 1973  from the  house  of  the  respondent  they  could  and did claim to have done so  in exercise  of  their  bona fide  right  of seizing the truck on the respondent’s failure to pay the third monthly installment in time. It was, therefore, a bona fide civil dispute which led to the seizure of the truck. On the face of the complaint petition itself the highly exaggerated version given by the respondent, the appellants went to his house with a mob armed  with  deadly  weapons  and  committed  the  offence  of dacoity in taking away the truck was so very unnatural and untrustworthy that it could take the matter out of the realm of civil dispute. Nobody on the side of the respondent was hurt. Even a scratch was not given to anybody.

6. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances of this  case  criminal  prosecution  deserves  to  be  quashed.  On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the appellants’ filing a petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was premature and the High Court could not have quashed it. In our opinion the point is so wholly without substance that it has been stated merely to be rejected. Since the parties during the course of the hearing in this appeal showed their inclination to settle up and end all their disputes and  quarrels  in  relation  to  the  matter  in  question  after  we indicated our view that we are going to allow the appeal and quash the  proceedings,  we have  not  thought  it  necessary  to elaborately give other reasons in support of our order”.

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14) Learned senior counsel for the appellants further relied

upon  Sunil  Bharti  Mittal vs.  Central  Bureau  of

Investigation 2015 (1) SCALE 140 wherein it was held that a

corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its

officers, directors, managing director, chairman etc.  If such a

Company  commits  an  offence  involving  mens  rea,  it  would

normally be the intent and action of that individual who would

act on behalf of the Company.  It would be more so, when the

criminal act is that of conspiracy.  However, at the same time,

it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is

no vicarious liability  unless the  statute  specifically  provides

so.   

15) As the appellants herein have challenged the legality of

the  order  of  issue  of  process,  it  would  be  worthwhile  to

recapitulate the law regarding issue of process.  The relevant

point that arises for consideration at this stage is whether the

material available is sufficient enough to constitute a  prima

facie case against the accused.   

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16) When a person files a complaint and supports it on oath,

rendering himself liable to prosecution and imprisonment if it

is  false,  he  is  entitled  to  be  believed  unless  there  is  some

apparent  reason  for  disbelieving  him;  and  he  is  entitled  to

have the persons, against whom he complains, brought before

the court and tried.  The only condition requisite for the issue

of  process  is  that  the  complainant’s  deposition  must  show

some sufficient ground for proceeding.  Unless the Magistrate

is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with

the  complaint  or  sufficient  material  to  justify  the  issue  of

process,  he  should  not  pass  the  order  of  issue  of  process.

Where the complainant,  who instituted the prosecution, has

no  personal  knowledge  of  the  allegations  made  in  the

complaint, the magistrate should satisfy himself upon proper

materials that  a case is  made out for  the issue of  process.

Though under the law, a wide discretion is given to magistrate

with  respect  to  grant  or  refusal  of  process,  however,  this

discretion should be exercised with proper care and caution.

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17) The  respondent-Company  came  to  know  about  the

Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006 only on 17.01.2007 when

the  Kotak  Mahindra  Bank  moved  an  application  for

substituting themselves in place of State Bank of Travancore

on the basis of that alleged document i.e. Assignment Deed

dated 29.03.2006.  It is also pertinent to mention here that

neither the State Bank of Travancore nor the Kotak Mahindra

Bank informed the respondent-Company regarding the alleged

Assignment Deed either before or after the alleged assignment.

It is also on record that vide agreement dated 01.10.1999, the

Kotak Mahindra Bank, which was earlier a financial services

Company,  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the

respondent-Company  to  act  as  an  advisor  and  to  provide

necessary  assistance  for  the  successful  restructuring  of  the

respondent-Company  and to  provide  follow up and support

services  to  the  complainant-Company  in  recovery  from  its

various defaulters.  

18) Under the above terms and conditions, when the Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  was  already  in  an  agreement  with  the

respondent-Company  in  order  to  safeguard  its  interest,  the

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fact  of  the  Assignment  Deed  between  the  State  Bank  of

Travancore  and  the  Kotal  Mahindra  Bank  with  regard  to

alleged rights of the State Bank of Travancore pertaining to the

immovable properties allegedly mortgaged in its favour, must

be  communicated  by  the  State  Bank  of  Travancore  to  the

respondent-Company. More so,  the fact of  such assignment

deed  must  also  be  brought  to  the  notice  by  the  Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  to  the  respondent-Company  when  it  was

responsible  to  provide  necessary  assistance  to  the

respondent-Company.  

19) In  view  of  the  above,  it  is  pertinent  to  mention  here

Clause 2.3 of the Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006, which

reads as under:

“Simultaneously  with  the  execution  of  this  Deed,  the Assignor shall send a notice addressed by the Assignor to the  clients  and other  related  persons  at  their  last  known addresses informing them of the assignments of Debts and the Financial  Instruments to the Assignee and instructing them  to  pay  all  amounts  constituting  the  Debts  to  the Assignee and a copy of the said notice shall be delivered to the Assignee.”

It is very much clear from the above that the Assignment

Deed dated 29.03.2006 specifically contains one clause which

requires that  the clients  and other related persons shall  be

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informed about the alleged Assignment. But this fact was not

brought to the notice of the respondent-Company.  Primarily,

it was the duty of the State Bank of Travancore to inform the

respondent-Company  about  the  said  assignment  and

secondly, Kotak Mahindra Bank was to inform the same to the

respondent-Company.  If the intention of the Assignor and the

assignee to the Assignment Deed dated 29.03.2006 was clear,

then why the facts of the same were not brought to the notice

of  respondent-Company  that  too  when  Clause  2.3  of  the

Assignment Deed very clearly states so.  

20) The position becomes more clear from the fact that even

after  the  alleged  assignment,  in  a  proceeding  before  the

appellate  tribunal,  none  of  the  representative  of  the  State

Bank  of  Travancore  mentioned  about  the  factum  of  such

assignment.  The respondent-Company came to know about

the  alleged  Assignment  after  a  lapse  of  9  months  i.e.  on

17.01.2007,  when  an  application  was  moved  by  the  Kotak

Mahindra  Bank  for  substituting  its  name  in  place  of  State

Bank of Travancore.  In the absence of such knowledge, on

11.01.2007, the respondent-Company entered into a deed of

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Assignment  with  the  Kotak Mahindra Bank wherein all  the

dues of a defaulter, viz., Ravishankar Industries Pvt. Ltd., of

more than Rs. 32 crores were assigned to the Kotak Mahindra

Bank. The Kotak Mahindra Bank was under an obligation to

inform the respondent-Company about the earlier Assignment

Deed which was not done.  More so, the Kotak Mahindra Bank

received  a  sum  of  Rs.  225  lakhs  in  March  2007  from

Ravishankar  Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.  but  without  giving  any

information as  to  the  terms of  settlement  and the  mode of

payment  to  the  complainant-Company,  approached  the

Recovery Officer-I for appropriating the same.  

21) With regard to the contention of learned senior counsel

for  the  appellants  herein  that  there  can  be  no  vicarious

liability  attributed  to  the  Director,  Deputy  Director  of  a

Company unless the Statute specifically creates so, no doubt,

a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its

officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc.  If such

a company commits an offence involving  mens rea,  it would

normally be the intent and action of that individual who would

act on behalf of the company that too when the criminal act is

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that of conspiracy.  Thus, an individual who has perpetrated

the commission of an offence on behalf of the company can be

made  an  accused,  along  with  the  company,  if  there  is

sufficient  evidence  of  his  active  role  coupled  with  criminal

intent.   Second  situation  in  which  an  individual  can  be

implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself

attracts  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  liability,  by  specifically

invoking such a provision.   

22) In view of the above, we are of  the considered opinion

that there was suppression of facts by both the Banks and the

State  Bank  of  Travancore  was  duty  bound  to  inform  the

respondent-Company  about  the  Assignment  dated

29.03.2006.  As regards the appellants herein, appellant No.1

herein  has  claimed  to  have  joined  the  State  Bank  of

Travancore on 11.05.2006 i.e. subsequent to the assignment

deed  dated  29.03.2006  whereas  appellant  No.2  was  the

signatory to the said deed.  

23) There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  both  the  appellants

were responsible for day to day functioning of the State Bank

of Travancore.  Furthermore, admittedly, appellant No.1 was

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in employment of the State Bank of Travancore at the time of

the  execution  of  the  deed  of  assignment  and  the  appellant

No.2  was  the  signatory  to  it.  On  a  bare  perusal  of  the

complaint,  it  creates  an  iota  of  doubt  as  to  why  the

respondent-Company was kept in dark by the State Bank of

Travancore  at  the  time  of  alleged  Assignment  Deed  dated

29.03.2006    

24) However,  from the admitted position,  it  is  evident that

the  complainant-respondent  Company  in  its  wisdom  had

withdrawn the complaint against the two persons, who were

the officers of the Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from a common

complaint made against four persons. However, we do not find

any reason as to why the remaining two persons, being the

present appellants, who were the officers of the State Bank of

Travancore at the relevant time, are being prosecuted. Hence,

the complaint against the present appellants does not survive

and in the interest of justice the same is liable to quashed and

is accordingly quashed.  

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25) In view of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds and

is allowed.  However, there shall be no order as to costs.  

………….………………………J.               (R.K. AGRAWAL)                           

.…....……..………………………………J.          (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)               

NEW DELHI; MARCH 21, 2017.  

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