K.K.SINGHAL Vs STEEL STRIPS LTD.
Bench: M.Y. EQBAL,PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002546-002546 / 2014
Diary number: 23278 / 2008
Advocates: ABHINAV MUKERJI Vs
S. K. VERMA
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2546 OF 2014 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6033 of 2008
K.K. Singhal & Ors. …Appellants
:Versus: Steel Strips Ltd. ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against an order passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No.
35963-M of 2001, whereby the High Court dismissed the
application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint filed under
Sections 417, 418 and 420 read with Section 120-B of the Indian
Penal Code and the summoning order dated 14.6.2001 passed by
the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh .
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3. The basis of the filing of the application relates to issuance
of 33 cheques by the appellants during the course of its business
aggregating to Rs.2,40,64,022.19 paise in consideration of the
payment against steel billets and rolled products supplied to them
by the complainant/respondent. On presentation, all the cheques
were dishonoured on different dates culminating in lodging of 26
complaints against the appellants for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Upon notice, the appellants filed an application under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court for
quashing the said complaints.
4. The appellants on 22.7.1998 requested the complainant that
he had material worth Rs. 1 crore for disposal in the shape of
forging of steel flanges which he would dispose of and would
make the payment of the amount to the complainant and
requested the complainant to find out a customer. At the
request of the complainant, M/s. Uma Shanker Khandelwal and
Company Limited, New Delhi agreed to purchase the material
from the appellants. The appellants agreed to pay the entire
consideration to the respondent and in turn directed the said
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company to pay the consideration directly to the complainant
against all the deliveries. The appellants further promised to
clear the balance outstanding by arranging funds from its source.
Relying upon such allurement and inducement of the appellants,
the respondent agreed to withdraw all the complaints except one.
It appears as per promise, the appellants supplied flanges to said
M/s. Uma Shanker Khandelwal and Company for an amount of
Rs.31,22,524/- only and directed that the amount be paid directly
to the respondent.
5. The appellants thereafter induced the respondent to
withdraw the 25 complaints filed under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, on the plea that the appellants would
pay the entire consideration to the respondent. The appellants
also withdrew the said application filed under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. from the High Court. However, after withdrawal of all the
complaints by the respondent, the appellants neither took any
step to pay the amount nor kept his commitment.
6. In these circumstances, after recording the preliminary
evidence, the trial court by an order dated 12.6.2001 issued
summons against the appellants as accused for commission of
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offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The
appellants filed an application for quashing of the said summons
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
7. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in
support of this appeal first contended that the Judicial Magistrate,
Chandigarh had no territorial jurisdiction since the agreement
between the parties was entered into on 24.7.1998 at Faridabad.
He further contended that the appellants having its place of
business at Faridabad, it is the Court at Faridabad, which would
have jurisdiction. His basic structure of the submission was that
the dispute is nothing but a civil dispute and thereby jurisdiction
lies at Faridabad. Secondly, he contended that since the dispute
is of civil nature, the offence of cheating cannot be attracted in
the facts of this case. According to him, there is no intention to
deceive, therefore, the essential ingredients of the offence of
cheating was not present in this case. Thirdly, he submitted that it
is based on breach of contract between the parties on the ground
that the agreement was not performed. Therefore, it attracts the
breach of contract and nothing else. Lastly, he contended that the
appellant No.3 is an old man of 85 years, being the father of
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appellant No.1 and further he had no involvement in the
functioning of the company, which would be evident from his non-
appearance at the time of agreement entered into between the
parties on 24.7.1998.
8. On the contrary, Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel
appearing for the complainant/respondent drew our attention to
the facts of the case and pointed out that right from the
beginning, the appellants had the intention to induce the
respondent to enter into a compromise despite the fact that they
approached the Board of Directors, who passed the resolution on
3.7.1998, and came to the conclusion that net worth of the
company has been eroded and has become a sick industrial
company within the meaning of Section 3(1)(O) of Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and passed a resolution
only to by-pass their liability. Furthermore, the company unit was
declared as sick on the one hand; on the other hand, they
entered into a compromise dated 24.7.1993 and assured the
complainant/respondent that they had the stock worth Rs. 1
crore. He contended that the said fact would attract Section 415
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which would show that the
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intention of the appellants is to cheat the respondent. He further
pointed out that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act against the company proceedings cannot be
stayed since Section 22 or Section 22A of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act has nothing to do with the
criminal prosecution. He further pointed out that it was not the
case of the appellants that the cheques, which were bounced,
were payable at Faridabad only. Further, all the complaints were
filed by the complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act at Chandigarh, for the reason that the head office
of the company is at Chandigarh and the compromise was also
arrived at Chandigarh. On the basis of the compromise, the
complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
were withdrawn from the Court at Chandigarh. Therefore,
according to him, the question of jurisdiction as raised by the
appellants, is of no consequence and the same will be decided by
the trial court during the trial. He further pointed out that the
motive and conduct of the appellants was mala fide and hence he
narrated that the appellants tried to deceive the complainants in
a planned way, to get rid of the criminal liability and decided to
move to BIFR under Sick Industrial Companies Act thereby
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avoiding civil liability. Each and every steps of the appellants is
nothing but calculated and with an intent to deceive the
respondent/complainant. Hence, he submitted that the High
Court correctly dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after
weighing the material placed before us, we cannot accept the
contention of Dr. Dhawan that the Court at Chandigarh had no
jurisdiction. It appears that on the question of territorial
jurisdiction, the submissions made on behalf of the
respondent/complainant have substance. In our opinion, the
agreement was entered into at Chandigarh to withdraw the
criminal proceedings, the complainant having its head office at
Chandigarh and further nowhere the appellants have made out a
case that all the cheques were payable at Faridabad. Therefore,
we do not have any hesitation to hold that the question of
jurisdiction is of no consequence, which would be decided by the
trial court. The second point, which was urged by Dr. Dhawan
that the dispute is of civil nature, cannot be allowed to stand at
this stage after taking into account the conduct of the appellants.
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10. We do not find any reason to accept the contention of
Dr. Dhawan on the ground that the intention of the appellants is
absolutely clear from their actions, which they followed to allure
the complainant to withdraw the 25 complaints filed by them
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. We do not
wish to express our views further, but we are not in a position to
accept such contention of Dr. Dhawan and further the question of
non-performance of the contract tentamounts to breach of
contract as sought to be stated by Dr. Dhawan, also cannot be
accepted in the teeth of the facts placed before us at this stage.
11. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the
orders passed by the High Court. We find no merits in the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed. The Trial Court shall decide the matter
in question without being influenced, in any manner whatsoever,
by the observations made by us.
…………………………………..J. (M.Y. Eqbal)
…………………………………..J. (Pinaki Chandra Ghose) New Delhi;
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December 09, 2014.
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