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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 197  OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.29765 of 2016)  

Smt. K.A. Annamma ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

The Secretary, Cochin Co-operative Hospital Society Ltd.   …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  final

judgment  and  order  dated  21.12.2015  passed  by

the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in W.P.(C)

No.18354 of 2010 whereby the High Court allowed

the writ petition filed by the respondent herein and

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set aside the award dated 23.09.2009 of the Labour

Court, Ernakulam in I.D.No.32 of 2006.

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved

in the appeal, which is essentially legal in nature,

mentioning of few undisputed facts would suffice.

Facts in brief  

4. The  respondent  is  the  Cooperative  Society

registered under  the  Kerala  Co-operative  Societies

Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as “the KCS Act”).

The  appellant  was  an  employee  of  the

respondent-Society.  By order dated 22.03.2005, the

respondent-Society  dismissed  the  appellant  from

service.

5. The appellant,  felt  aggrieved of her dismissal

order, filed a complaint with the State Government

against the respondent-Society under the Industrial

Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the ID

Act”).  The conciliation having failed, the appropriate

Government  made  an  industrial  reference  to  the

Labour Court, Ernakulum under Section 10 of the

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ID Act for deciding the legality and correctness of

the  appellant's  dismissal  and to  pass  appropriate

consequential orders, if any.

6. The Labour Court, by award dated 23.09.2009

answered the reference in appellant’s favour.  It was

held that the dismissal order is bad in law and was

accordingly set aside.  It was held that during the

pendency  of  the  reference,  the  appellant  has

attained the age of superannuation on 31.05.2007,

therefore, she was entitled to get all monetary and

other service benefits as are permissible in law.

7. The respondent, felt aggrieved of the award of

the  Labour  Court,  filed  Writ  Petition  (Civil)

No.18354 of 2010 in the High Court of Kerala and

questioned its legality and correctness.  

8. At this stage, it is necessary to state as to how

the  question  involved  in  the  writ  petition,  which

eventually reached to this Court was decided by the

different Benches of the Kerala High Court prior to

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respondent’s filing the writ petition and during its

pendency.

9. The  question,  which  frequently  came  up  for

consideration  before  the  different  Benches  of  the

High  Court  of  Kerala  since  1978,  was  "when  a

service dispute arises between an Employee of  any

Co-operative Society and his Employer (Co-operative

Society), whether such dispute is triable by the forum

prescribed under the ID Act or under the KCS Act or

under both the Acts as per the choice of an aggrieved

person to select the forum under any of the two Acts

for deciding such service dispute".  

10. In other words, the question was “whether a

service  dispute  arising  between  the  Cooperative

Society’s Employee and his Employer is capable of

being tried by the forum prescribed under the KCS

Act or by the machinery provided under the ID Act or

it is capable of being tried under both the Acts leaving

the aggrieved person to select one forum under any of

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the Acts of his choice out of the two for getting his/her

service dispute decided by such forum."

11. The aforesaid question was first decided by two

Full  Benches  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  K.

Balachandran vs. The Dy. Registrar, Co-operative

Societies & Ors., AIR 1978 Kerala 126 = 1978 KLT

249  and  Sherly  M.U. vs.  The  President,

Parappuram Milk Producers Co-op. Society Ltd.

& Ors., 2007(1)KLT 809 wherein it was held on the

facts  involved in both the cases that  the dispute,

which had arisen between the Co-operative Society’s

Employee and his/her Employer, was not capable of

being decided under Section 69 of the KCS Act as it

stood then.   

12. This question again came up for consideration

before a Single Judge of the High Court in Board of

Directors,  Edava Service Co-operative Bank vs.

The  Co-operative  Arbitration  Court  &  Ors.,

2008(3) KLT 780 wherein it was held that a service

dispute between a Co-operative Society’s employee

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and  his/her  employer  is  capable  of  being  tried

under  both  the  Acts  inasmuch  as  both  the  Acts

enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to try and decide such

service dispute.  

13. In other words, according to the Single Judge,

one Act does not exclude the other and, therefore,

both  the  Acts  possess  concurrent  jurisdiction  to

decide such dispute leaving the aggrieved person to

choose the forum of his/her choice under any Act

out of the two Acts.  

14. This  question  was  again  considered  by  the

Division  Bench  in  Thodupuzha  Taluk  General

Marketing  Co-operative  Society vs.  Michael

Sebastian, 2010 (1) KLT 938 wherein the Division

Bench concurred with the view of the Single Judge

taken  in  Board  of  Directors,  Edava  Service

Co-operative  Bank  (supra).  It  was  accordingly

reiterated.

15. Lastly,  this  question  was  considered  by

another  Single  Bench  in  W.P.(C)  No.30854/2007

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entitled  Chirayinkeezhu  Service  Co-operative

Bank Ltd. No.115 vs. K. Santosh & Anr.  and then

by  the  Division  Bench  in  Writ  Appeal

No.2516/2009, arising out of the said writ petition.

While hearing the writ appeal, a doubt was raised

before the Division Bench about the correctness of

the  earlier  decision  rendered  in  the  case  of

Thodupuzha  Taluk  General  Marketing

Co-operative  Society(supra)  contending  that  the

said  decision  requires  reconsideration  for  various

reasons.  

16. Acceding to this prayer, the case was referred

to the larger Bench to reconsider the law laid down

in  Thodupuzha  Taluk  General  Marketing

Co-operative Society(supra). This is how the case

was placed before  the  larger  Bench comprising of

three learned Judges.

17. While the larger Bench was hearing the case, it

was noticed that the earlier two decisions of the Full

Bench also need reconsideration because the Single

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Judge and the Division Bench, subsequent to the

decisions of  the Full  Bench, have taken a slightly

different view, which appears to be in conflict with

the two Full Bench decisions, resulting in cleavage

of  opinions  amongst  the  various  Benches  of  the

same High Court  on one  question.   It  is  for  this

reason,  there  arose  a  need  to  constitute  a  larger

Bench  comprising  of  five  Judges  to  examine  the

question afresh to settle the controversy.  

18. The Bench of three Judges then formulated as

many as  9  questions  to  enable  the  Bench of  five

Judges  to  answer  the  questions  referred  by  the

Three-Judge Bench.

19. By  order  dated  14.09.2015,  the  Five-Judge

Bench answered the questions referred in the case

of  Chirayinkeezhu  Services  Cooperative  Bank

Ltd.  vs.  Santosh, 2015(4) KLT 163(LB).  However,

there was a difference of opinion amongst the five

Judges (3:2) on the questions referred.

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20. So far as the majority view of three Judges is

concerned, it  held that the service dispute arising

between  the  Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and

the Employer (Co-operative  Society)  is  triable  only

by the forum prescribed under the KCS Act, 1969

and the jurisdiction of the ID Act is excluded and

barred to try such service dispute.  

21.  So far as the minority view of two Judges is

concerned,  it  held  that  such  service  dispute  is

triable under both the Acts, i.e., the KCS Act and

the ID Act. In other words, it held that both the Acts

possess and enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to decide

such  service  dispute  and  it  is  for  the  aggrieved

person to choose the forum of his/her choice out of

the  two  Acts  to  get  the  service  dispute  settled

subject to proving the ingredients of the definition of

"Workman",  "Industrial  Dispute"  and  the

cooperative Society to be the “Industry” as defined

under the ID Act,  if  he/she desires to invoke the

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jurisdiction  of  the  ID Act  for  deciding  the  service

dispute.

22.   Relying  upon  the  majority  view,  the  writ

petition  filed  by  the  respondent(employer)  in  the

case  at  hand  was  allowed  by  the  learned  Single

Judge, resulting in setting aside of the award of the

Labour Court, giving rise to filing of this appeal by

way  of  special  leave  before  this  Court  by  the

employee.   

23. Heard Mr.  P.V. Surendranath,  learned senior

counsel  for  the  appellant  and Mr.  Ramesh Babu,

learned counsel for the respondent.

24.  Learned counsel for the appellant (employee)

while  assailing  the  legality,  correctness  and  the

reasoning of the majority Judges (3) contended that

the  majority  view  does  not  appear  to  be  in

conformity with the law laid down by this Court in

Dharappa vs.  Bijapur  Coop.  Milk  Producers

Societies  Union Ltd. (2007)  9  SCC 109 whereas

the view taken by the minority Judges (2) appears to

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be in conformity with the law laid down in the case

of  Dharappa(supra)  and,  therefore,  the  minority

view, according to learned counsel, deserves to be

upheld by this Court.

25. Placing strong reliance on the ratio laid down

in  the  case  of  Dharappa(supra),  learned  counsel

contended that  if  the  ratio  of  Dharappa’s  case  is

applied in its correct perspective to the facts of the

case at hand, the question involved in the appeal

has  to  be  answered  in  appellant's  favour  by

upholding  the  view of  the  minority  Judges  which

rightly held that both the Acts, i.e., the KCS Act and

the  ID  Act,  possess  and  enjoy  concurrent

jurisdiction  to  decide  the  service  disputes  arising

between the Co-operative Society’s  Employee and

his/her Employer-Cooperative Society.  

26. Learned counsel urged that the award of the

Labour Court impugned in the writ petition by the

respondent,  therefore,  deserves  to  be  upheld  and

the  case  needs to  be  remanded to  the  writ  court

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(Single  Judge)  for  deciding  the  writ  petition  on

merits.

27. It  is  this  submission,  which  the  learned

counsel  elaborated  by  placing  reliance  on  the

decision of Dharappa(supra), the relevant provisions

of  the  KCS  Act,  1969  and  the  Karnataka

Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1959  (hereinafter

referred to as “Karnataka CS Act”).

28. In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  the

respondent-Society  (Employer)  contended  that  the

view taken by the majority of the Judges (3) being in

accordance  with  law,  it  does  not  call  for  any

interference.  

29. Learned counsel elaborated his submission by

referring to the ratio of  Dharappa’s  case, relevant

provisions  of  KCS  Act  and  Karnataka  CS  Act  in

support of his submission.

30. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

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find force in the submission of learned counsel for

the appellant (Employee).  

31. In  our  considered  view,  we  are  inclined  to

uphold the minority view for the reasons given infra.

32. At the outset, it is considered necessary to set

out  the  relevant  Sections  of  the  KCS  Act,  which

have bearing over the controversy:

“Section 2(i)

2(i) “dispute” means any matter touching the business,  constitution,  establishments  or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not”.  

Un-amended Section 69

“69.Disputes  to  be  referred  to  Registrar-(1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises-

(a) among members, past members and persons claiming  through  members,  past  members and deceased members; or

(b) between a member, past members or person claiming through a member, a past member or  deceased  member  and  the  society,  its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or

(c) between the society or its committee and any past  committee,  any  officer,  agent  or employee or any past officer,  past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal

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representatives  of  any  deceased  officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or

(d) between the society and any other society; or (e) between  a  society  and  the  members  of  a

society affiliated to it; or (f) between the society and a person other than

a  member  of  the  society,  who  has  been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions or  any  person  claiming  through  such  a person; or

(g) between  the  society  and  a  surety  of  a member, past member, deceased member or employee or a person other than a member, who has been granted a loan by the society whether such a society is or is not a member of the society; or

(h) between  the  society  and  a  creditor  of  the society, such dispute, shall be referred to the Registrar  for  decision,  and  no  court  shall have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  any  suit  or other proceeding in respect of such dispute.  

Explanation:- In this section and in Section 70, the term “Registrar” means the Registrar of  Co-operative  Societies  appointed  under sub-section (1) of Section 3 and includes any person on whom the powers of the Registrar under  this  Section  and  Section  70  are conferred.  

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall also be deemed to be disputes, namely:- (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand  due  to  it  from  a  member  or  the nominee, heirs or legal  representatives of  a deceased  member  whether  such  debt  or demand be admitted or not;

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(b) a  claim  by  a  surety  against  the principal  debtor  where  the  society  has recovered  from  the  surety  any  amount  in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or any officer of the society; Explanation:- A dispute arising at any stage of  an  election  commencing  from  the convening  of  the  general  body  meeting  for the election shall be deemed to be a dispute arising in connection with the election. (3) No dispute  arising  in  connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society shall be entertained by the Registrar unless it is referred to him within  one  month  from  the  date  of  the election. (4) If  any,  question  arises  whether  a dispute  referred  to  the Registrar  under  the section is a dispute as defined in clause (i) of Section  2  the  decision  thereon  of  the Registrar shall be final.”

Amended Section 69 by Amending Act 1/2000 w.e.f. 02.01.2003

“69. Disputes to be decided by Co-operative Arbitration Court and Registrar-  

(1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises-

(a) Among members, past members and persons claiming  through  members,  past  members and deceased members; or

(b) Between a member,  past member or person claiming through a member, a past member or  deceased  member  and  the  society,  its

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committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or

(c) Between  the  society  or  its  committee  and any  past  committee,  any  officer,  agent  or employee or any past officer,  past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives  of  any  deceased  officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or

(d) Between the society and any other society; or (e) Between  a  society  and  the  members  of  a

society affiliated to it; or (f) Between the society and a person, other than

a  member  of  the  society,  who  has  been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions or  any  person  claiming  through  such  a person; or

(g) Between  the  society  and  a  surety  of  a member, past member, deceased member or employee or a person, other than a member, who has been granted a loan by the society, whether such a surety is or is not a member of the society; or

(h) Between  the  society  and  a  creditor  of  the society, such dispute shall be referred to the Co-operative  Arbitration  Court  constituted under  Section  70A  in  the  case  of non-monetary disputes and to the Registrar, in  the  case  of  monetary  disputes  and  the Arbitration  Court,  or  the  Registrar,  as  the case may be, shall decide such dispute;  and no other Court or other authority shall have jurisdiction  to  entertain  any  suit  or  other proceedings in respect of such dispute.  

(2) For  the  purposes  of  sub-section  (1),  the following shall also be deemed to be disputes, namely:-

(a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due  to  it  from  a  member  or  the  nominee, heirs  or  legal  representatives of  a  deceased

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member,  whether  such  debt  or  demand  be admitted or not;

(b) a  claim  by  a  surety  against  the  principal debtor, where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or  demand  due  to  it  from  the  principal debtor,  as  a  result  of  the  default  of  the principal  debtor,  whether  such  debt  or demand is admitted or not;

(c) any  dispute  arising  in  connection  with  the election of the Board of Management or any officer of the society;

Explanation-    A dispute arising at any stage of  an  election  commencing  from  the convening  of  the  general  body  meeting  for the election, shall be deemed to be a dispute arising in connection with the election;

(d) Any  dispute  arising  in  connection  with employment of  officers  and servants of  the different  classes  of  societies  specified  in sub-section(1)  of  S.80,  including  their promotion and inter se seniority.

(3) No  dispute  arising  in  connection  with  the election of the Board of  Management or an officer of the society shall be entertained by the Co-operative Arbitration Court unless it is referred to it within one month from the date of the election.”

Unamended Section 70

70. Decision and award on disputes:-

(1) The  Registrar  may,  on  receipt  of  the reference of a dispute under Section 69:-

(a) elect to decide the dispute himself; or (b) transfer  it  for  disposal  to  any  person who  has  been  invested  by  the  Government with powers in that behalf; or (c) refer  it  for  disposal  to  an  arbitrator appointed by the Registrar.

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Provided that a transfer under clause (b) or a reference under clause (c)  shall  not be made to a person equal or superior to him in rank.

 (2) The  Registrar  may  withdraw  any  reference

transferred under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or  referred  under  clause  (c)  of  that sub-section and he may elect to decide the dispute  himself  or  transfer  it  to  any  other person under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or refer it to any other arbitrator under clause (c) of that sub-section.

(3) The Registrar or such person shall decide the dispute, or the arbitrator shall pass an award, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and  the  rules  and  the  bye-laws  and  such decision  or  award  shall,  subject  to  the provisions of S.82, be final. Pending decision or  award,  the  Registrar,  such  person  or arbitrator as the case may be, may make such interlocutory  orders  as  he  may  deem necessary in the interest of justice.  

(a) the nature of the allegations showing that the elections were vitiated.  

(b) the  existence  of  prima  facie  case  which means whether respondents have a chance of success and  

(c) whether the interest  of  justice require that an interlocutory order must be made.  

Amended  Section  70  by  Amending  Act 1/2000

70. Award on disputes:- (1) the Co-operative Arbitration Court, on receipt of reference of a dispute under sub-section (1) of Sec. 69, shall pass an award within one year in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder and such award shall, subject to the provisions of Sec. 82, be final.

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(2) The  Co-operative  Arbitration  Court may, pending award of a dispute referred to it under  Section  69,  make  such  interlocutory orders  as  it  may  deem  necessary  in  the interests of justice. (3) The  Co-operative  Arbitration  Court shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), while trying a suit  in  respect  of  the  following  matters, namely:-

(i)  the  summoning  and  enforcing  the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath;

(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence;

(iii)  the  reception  of  evidence  on affidavits;

(iv)  issuing of  any commission for the examination of any witness; and  

(v)  any  other  matter  which  may  be prescribed. (4) The  Registrar  may,  on  receipt  of  the reference of a dispute under sub-section(1) of Sec. 69-

(a) elect to decide the dispute himself; or

(b) transfer it for disposal to any person who  has  been  invested  by  the  Government with powers in that behalf; or

(c) refer it for disposal to an arbitrator appointed by the Registrar:

Provided that a transfer under clause (b) or a reference under clause (c)  shall  not be made to a person equal or superior to him in rank.  

(5)   The  Registrar  may  withdraw  any reference  transferred  under  clause  (b)  of sub-section (4) or referred under clause (c) of that sub-section and he may elect to decide the dispute himself or transfer it to any other

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person under clause (b) of sub-section (4) or refer it to any other arbitrator under clause (c) of that sub-section.  

(6)   The  Registrar  or  the  person invested  with  powers  in  this  behalf  shall, decide the dispute or the arbitrator shall pass an award in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and the bye-laws and such decision or award shall, subject to the provisions  of  Sec.  82,  be  final.  Pending decision or award, the Registrar, such person or the Arbitrator,  as the case may be, may make  such  interlocutory  orders  as  he  may deem necessary in the interests of justice.  

100. Bar of jurisdiction of courts:- No civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter for which provision is made in this Act.”          

   (Emphasis supplied)

33. Before we examine the question, it is apposite

to take note of the findings of the majority as well as

minority Judges on the question.

34.  We  find  that  both  majority  and  minority

Judges examined the questions largely in the light

of the ratio laid down by this Court in  Dharappa’s

case (supra).  Indeed, the learned counsel, in their

submissions before us, did not make any attempt to

contend  that  the  law  laid  down  in  the  case  of

Dharappa (supra)  needs  reconsideration  on  any

issue.  On the other hand, both sides proceeded to

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make  their  submissions  that,  firstly,  Dharappa’s

case has laid down the correct principle of law on

facts involved therein and secondly, what needs to

be examined is whether its ratio applies to the facts

of this case and, if so, how and to what extent.    

35. In our opinion also, it may not be necessary to

examine the issue involved in this case in the light

of  any  other  decision  except  confining  its

examination to the ratio laid down in  Dharappa’s

case because Dharappa’s  case has  discussed  all

earlier  decisions  of  this  Court  on  the  subject  in

extenso.  

36. So far as the view of majority (3) Judges, one

concurring  with  two,  is  concerned,  though  they

discussed  several  issues  in  detail  in  their

concurring opinion but in substance, in our view,

their findings on material issues are as under:

37.  First, the language of Section 69 of the KCS

Act as it originally stood is materially different from

the language used in its  counter part Sections of

22

two  earlier  repealed  Kerala  Co-operative  Societies

Acts of 1932 and 1951. This departure made in the

language employed in Section 69 of the KCS Act qua

language of earlier two repealed Acts is significant

and  has  a  material  bearing  while  answering  the

questions. (Para 17/18)  

38. Second, since the KCS Act, 1969 has received

the Assent of the President on 11.04.1969, it was

not necessary for the State to have obtained another

Assent of the President for enacting Amending Act

(1/2000) by which some provisions of the KCS Act,

1969 were amended w.e.f. 02.01.2003.

39. In other words, once the KCS Act of 1969 has

received  the  Assent  of  the  President,  it  is  not

necessary for the State to obtain another Assent of

the  President  for  passing  the  Amendment  Act

1/2000.  It  is  more  so  when  it  has  received  the

Assent of the Governor (Para 45).

40. Third,  on interpreting the relevant provisions

of  the  KCS Act,  whether  independently  or/and in

23

juxtaposition, it is clear that the KCS Act, 1969 as

originally  stood  and as  amended by  Act  (1/2000)

overrides any other law for the time being in force

including the ID Act, 1947 insofar as it deals with

the  service  disputes  arising  between  the

Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and  his/her

Employer.

41. In  other  words,  the  KCS  Act,  1969  has  an

overriding  effect  on  the  ID  Act  1947  since  its

inception  insofar  as  it  deals  with  the  service

disputes  arising  between  a  Co-operative  Society’s

Employee and his/her Employer and thus excludes

the applicability of the ID Act.  

42. Any  service  dispute  arising  between  a

Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and  his/her

Employer (Co-operative Society) is, therefore, triable

only  by  the  authorities  and  the  forum  specified

under the KCS Act 1969, whether prior to or after

the amendments made by the Amendment Act No.1

24

of  2000 and not by any authority/Court/Tribunal

under any law for the time being in force.  

43. A fortiori, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court

and  Industrial  Tribunal  under  the  ID  Act  is,

excluded  and  barred  to  decide  any  such  service

dispute.

44. Fourth, the language of Section 69 of the KCS

Act,  1969  as  it  originally  stood  including  the

amended  one  and  that  of  Section  70  of  the

Karnataka  CS Act  which  fell  for  interpretation  in

Dharappa's  case  is  not  in  pari  meteria with  each

other  and  not  being  identical,  the  ratio  of

Dharappa’s case may not apply to that extent while

interpreting Section 69 of the KCS Act.   

45. Fifth, the Amendment Act (1 of 2000), which

amended Section 69(2)(d) of the KCS Act, is only by

way of an abundant caution and it has no effect on

Section 69 of the KCS Act.

46. So  far  as  the  view of  minority  Judges  (2)  is

concerned, in substance, it held:

25

47. First,  the  question  involved  in  the  case  is

squarely  covered  by  the  ratio  laid  down  in

Dharappa’s case.  

48. Second, Section 69 of the KCS Act and Section

70 as it  originally  stood and as amended by first

Amendment Act (19 of 1976) of the Karnataka CS

Act, are identically worded and, therefore, the ratio

of  Dharappa’s  case would apply while interpreting

Section 69 of the KCS Act.

49. Third, the Assent of the President was required

for passing the Amendment Act No.1 of 2000 of the

KCS Act.  

50. Fourth, since no Assent of the President was

obtained,  the Amendment Act  (1 of  2000) did not

make any effect on the exclusion of the jurisdiction

of the forum under the ID Act.  That apart, Section

69 or Section 100 of the KCS Act also does not have

a clause akin to Section 70 of the Karnataka CS Act

as  amended  by  Amendment  Act  (2  of  2000)

providing therein a clause for express exclusion of

26

the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the Labour Court

and  the  Industrial  Tribunal  from  deciding  the

service dispute.  

51. Fifth, the jurisdiction of Section 69 under the

KCS Act before and after the amendment of the KCS

Act by Amendment Act (1 of 2000) remains intact.  

52. Sixth, the jurisdiction of both the Acts, i.e., the

KCS Act and the ID Act is concurrent.  

53. A fortiori, any service dispute arising between a

Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and  his/her

Employer  (Co-operative  Society)  is  triable  under

both the Acts and it is for the aggrieved person to

select one forum of his/her choice out of the two to

get his/her dispute settled subject to proving that

he/she is a workman, the dispute is an industrial

dispute and the Cooperative Society is an industry

as defined in the ID Act.  

54. Seventh,  notwithstanding  the  amendment

brought  about  in  Section  69  of  the  KCS  Act  by

Amendment Act (1 of 2000), the jurisdiction of the

27

Labour Court under the ID Act is not excluded and

thus not barred.

55. And lastly,  in  the  light  of  these  findings,  all

decided  cases  taking  this  view  are  held  correctly

decided  and,  therefore,  do  not  need  any

reconsideration.   

56. In our opinion, the fate of this appeal depends

upon the  question as  to  what  extent  the  ratio  of

Dharappa’s  case applies to the issues involved in

the case at hand.

57. It is, therefore, necessary to first examine the

facts and the ratio of Dharappa's case.

58. Dharappa  was  a  daily  wager  working  in  the

Karnataka Milk Federation Unit Bijapur (hereinafter

referred  to  as  “the  Federation”),  which  is  a

Co-operative Society registered under the Karnataka

CS Act.  The Federation on 01.03.1980 terminated

Dharappa's services.  

59. Dharappa  felt  aggrieved  of  his  termination,

filed  an  application  to  the  Labour  Court,  Hubli

28

under  the  ID  Act.   The  application  was  later

transferred to the Labour Court, Bijapur.  According

to  Dharappa,  his  termination  order  was  bad  and

illegal inasmuch as the Federation failed to ensure

compliance  of  mandatory  requirements  of  Section

25-F of the ID Act prior to passing his termination

order. According to Dharappa, he had continuously

worked  for  more  than  240  days  in  one  calendar

year, hence he was entitled to enjoy the protection

available  to  a  workman  under  the  ID  Act  before

terminating his services.

60. The respondent-Federation denied Dharappa's

claim.  Parties adduced their evidence. The Labour

Court,  by  award  dated  15.10.1996,  allowed

Dharappa's  application  and  set  aside  the

termination order.  The Labour Court held that the

termination order was bad because Dharappa had

worked for more than 240 days continuously in one

calendar  year  and yet  the  Federation prior  to  his

termination  did  not  pay  him  any  retrenchment

29

compensation as provided in the ID Act. The Labour

Court,  however,  awarded  50%  back  wages  to

Dharappa  because  it  was  noticed  that  he

approached the Labour Court almost after 10 years

from the date of his termination.  

61. The Federation, felt aggrieved of the award of

the  Labour  Court,  filed  a  writ  petition  in  the

Karnataka  High  Court  questioning  therein  the

legality and correctness of the award.  During the

pendency of the writ petition, the Division Bench of

the same High Court in another case (Veerashaiva

Co-op.  Bank  Ltd.  vs.  Presiding  Officer,  Labour

Court,  (2001)  3  Kar.LJ  519)  held  that  since  the

remedy  and  the  procedure  prescribed  under  the

Karnataka CS Act was comprehensive, the service

disputes  arising  between  a  Co-operative  Society’s

Employee and his  Employer  (Co-operative  Society)

has to be tried under the Karnataka CS Act and the

jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the ID Act to

decide such disputes is barred.

30

62. The  Full  Bench  of  the  same  High  Court  in

another  case  in  Karnataka  Sugar  Workers

Federation vs. State of Karnataka, (AIR 2003 Kar

HCR 1802) later approved this view of the Division

Bench.

63. Relying upon the aforesaid view of the Division

Bench and the Full Bench, the learned Single Judge

allowed the Federation's writ petition and quashed

the award of the Labour Court.  It was held that the

provisions  of  the  ID  Act  are  not  applicable  to  a

service  dispute  raised  by  an  Employee  of  a

Co-operative Society against his Employer.  A liberty

was granted to Dharappa to  take recourse  to the

appropriate remedy under the Karnataka CS Act to

challenge his termination order.  

64. Dharappa felt aggrieved and filed a writ appeal

before  the  Division  Bench.   The  Appellate  Court

placing reliance on the view of  the  Full  Bench in

Karnataka  Sugar  Workers  Federation’s case

(supra) dismissed the appeal.  It was inter alia held

31

that  the  appropriate  remedy  of  Dharappa  lies  in

invoking  Section  70  of  the  Karnataka  CS  Act  by

filing a dispute before the specified authority for its

adjudication.  It is against this decision, Dharappa

felt  aggrieved and filed appeal  by  special  leave  in

this Court.    

65.   Before  this  Court,  Dharappa  raised  two

points, out of which we are concerned only with one

point, viz., whether jurisdiction of the Labour Court

under  the  ID Act  for  deciding the  service  dispute

arising between a Co-operative Society’s Employee

and his Employer is barred by virtue of Section 70

of the Karnataka CS Act and, if so, from which date.

66. It is this question, which was examined by this

Court  extensively  in  the  light  of  the  relevant

provisions including Section 70 of the Karnataka CS

Act as it stood originally and later amended twice

coupled with a question as to what is the effect of

the grant of the Assent of the President given to the

second  amendment  of  Section  70  made  in  the

32

Karnataka CS Act by Amendment Act (2/2000) and

the previous case law on the subject.

67. It was noticed that the Karnataka CS Act was

enacted by the State of  Karnataka after obtaining

the Assent of the President on 11.08.1959.  Section

70 of the Act as it  originally stood deals with the

disputes arising between the parties named therein

and provides a forum for the adjudication of such

disputes, which also includes service disputes.  

68. Section 70 was first amended by the State of

Karnataka  by  the  Amendment  Act  (19/1976).  It

received the Assent of the Governor on 07.03.1976.

The Amending Act came into force on 21.01.1976.

By this Amending Act, two clauses, namely, clauses

(d) and (e) were added to Section 70.  

69. Section 70 was then amended second time by

the State in 1997 by Amendment Act (2 of 2000).

This Amending Act, however, received the Assent of

the  President  on  18.03.2000  and  was  thereafter

brought in force with effect from 20.06.2000.  This

33

Amending Act  specifically  provided therein for  the

first  time  "no Civil  or  Labour  or  Revenue Court or

Industrial Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain

any  suit  or  other  proceedings  in  respect  of  any

dispute specified in Section 70".  

70. The learned Judge Raveendran, J. speaking for

the two Judge Bench succinctly dealt with the issue

in question in Paras 13, 14, 16 and 17 and held as

under:

“13.  The  effect  of  the  amendments  to Section  70  of  the  KCS Act,  by  Act  2  of 2000 is that if any dispute (including any dispute  relating  to  the  terms  of employment,  working  conditions  and disciplinary  action),  arose  between  a cooperative society and its  employees or past  employees  or  heirs/legal representatives  of  a  deceased  employee, on and from 20-6-2000, such dispute had to be referred to the Registrar for decision and  no  civil  court  or  Labour  Court  or Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to  entertain  any  suit  or  proceeding  in respect of such dispute.

14. Even prior to 20-6-2000, having regard to  the  amendment  to  Section  70  of  the KCS  Act  by  Act  19  of  1976  with  effect from  20-1-1976,  any  dispute  between  a cooperative society and its  employees or past  employees  or  heirs/legal representatives  of  a  deceased  employee including a dispute regarding the terms of employment,  working  conditions  and

34

disciplinary action taken by a cooperative society,  was  deemed  to  be  a  dispute touching  the  constitution,  management, or business of a cooperative society which had  to  be  referred  to  the  Registrar  for adjudication. But prior to 20-6-2000, there was  no  express  exclusion  of  the jurisdiction  of  the  Labour  Court  and Industrial  Tribunal.  As  a  result,  if  an employee  of  a  cooperative  society answered the definition of “workman” and the  dispute  between  the  cooperative society  and  its  employee  fell  within  the definition of an “industrial dispute”, then the  employee  had  the  choice  of  two alternative  forums  —  either  to  raise  a dispute before the Registrar under Section 70 of the KCS Act or seek a reference to the  Labour  Court/Industrial  Tribunal under  Section  10(1)(c)  of  the  ID  Act  [or approach  the  Labour  Court  by  an application under Section 10(4-A) of the ID Act].

16.  Though  the  Karnataka  Cooperative Societies  Act,  1959 was  reserved for  the assent  of  the  President  and received  his assent on 11-8-1959, the Amendment Act 19  of  1976  which  added  Clause  (d)  to sub-section  (2)  of  Section  70  (whereby  a dispute between a cooperative society and its present or past employee(s) in regard to any  disciplinary  action  or  working conditions  was  deemed  to  be  a  dispute touching  the  constitution,  management, or the business of a cooperative society), was neither reserved for, nor received the assent of the President. In the absence of the assent of the President, Clause (d) of Section 70(2) could not be called in aid to contend that Section 70(1)(c)  of  the KCS Act  would  prevail  over  the  provisions  of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, even  after  the  1976  Amendment  to  the KCS Act, the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals  functioning  under  the  ID  Act

35

continued to have jurisdiction in regard to disputes  between  a  society  and  its workmen  if  the  cooperative  society answered  the  definition  of  an  “industry” and  the  dispute  was  an  “industrial dispute”.  But  when  sub-section  (1)  of Section  70  of  the  KCS  Act  was  further amended by Act 2 of 2000 by specifically excluding the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and  Industrial  Tribunals  with  the simultaneous  addition  of  the  words “notwithstanding  anything  contrary contained in the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947” in Clause (d) of Section 70(2) of the KCS Act, the said Amendment Act (Act 2 of 2000) was reserved for the assent of the President  and  received  such  assent  on 18-3-2000.  The  amended provisions  were given  effect  from  20-6-2000.  Therefore, only with effect from 20-6-2000, was the jurisdiction  of  Labour  Courts  and Industrial Tribunals excluded in regard to disputes  between  a  cooperative  society and  its  employees  (or  past  employees) relating to terms of employment, service conditions or disciplinary action. It follows therefore  that  in  the  year  1996,  the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to make an award in regard to such a dispute. The High Court could not have interfered with it  on the  ground that  Section  70 of  the KCS Act was a bar to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide the dispute.

17. The 1976 Amendment to the KCS Act did not bring about any inconsistency with the  provisions  of  the  ID  Act  nor  did  it purport  to  prevail  over  the provisions  of the ID Act. Its effect was merely to provide an  additional  or  alternative  forum  for adjudication  of  the  disputes  between cooperative  societies  and  its  employees, relating  to  employment,  working conditions  and  disciplinary  action.  The 1976  Amendment  Act,  therefore,  was valid, even in the absence of the assent of

36

the  President.  On  the  other  hand,  the 2000 Amendment specifically excluded the jurisdiction  of  Industrial  Tribunals  and Labour  Courts  under  the  ID  Act,  and intended to prevail over the provisions of the  ID  Act  in  regard  to  adjudication  of disputes.  The  said  Amendment  required the  assent  of  the  President  and  was,  in fact,  reserved  for  the  assent  of  the President and obtained his assent.  If  the 1976  Amendment  was  to  be  read  as excluding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts, then it was necessary to read the provisions of Section 70,  as  amended  by  the  1976  Act,  as prevailing  over  the  provisions  of  the  ID Act. In which event, it would have required the President’s assent, and in the absence of  such  assent,  the  amendment  to  the extent  it  purported  to  prevail  over  the Central enactment, would have been void. Therefore, the only way to read the 1976 Amendment is to read it  in a literal  and normal manner, that is, as not excluding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals and  Labour  Courts  but  as  merely conferring a concurrent jurisdiction on the Registrar  under  Section  70  of  the  KCS Act.”

71. The learned Judge then in concluding Paras 24

and 25 held as under :

“24.  The  resultant  position  can  be summarised thus: (a)  Even though Clause  (d)  was  added in Section 70(2) with effect from 20-1-1976, Section 70(1) did not exclude or take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts and Industrial  Tribunals  under  the  ID  Act  to decide  an industrial  dispute  between the society and its employees.  Consequently, even  after  insertion  of  Clause  (d)  in Section 70(2) with effect from 20-1-1976,

37

the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under  the  ID  Act,  continued  to  have jurisdiction  to  decide  disputes  between societies and their employees.

(b)  The jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals to decide the disputes between  cooperative  societies  and  their employees  was  taken  away  only  when sub-section  (1)  and  sub-section  (2)(d)  of Section 70 were amended by Act 2 of 2000 and the amendment received the assent of the  President  on  18-3-2000  and  was brought into effect on 20-6-2000.

(c) The jurisdiction to decide any dispute of the nature mentioned in Section 70(2) (d)  of  the  KCS  Act,  if  it  answered  the definition  of  industrial  dispute,  vested thus:

(i)  exclusively  with  Labour  Courts  and Industrial Tribunals till 20-1-1976; (ii)  concurrently  with  Labour Courts/Industrial  Tribunals  under  the  ID Act and with Registrar under Section 70 of the  KCS  Act  between  20-1-1976  and 20-6-2000; and

(iii)  exclusively  with  the  Registrar  under Section 70 of the KCS Act with effect from 20-6-2000.

25.  We therefore  hold  that  the  award  of the  Labour  Court  was  not  without jurisdiction.  We,  however,  make  it  clear that this decision shall not be applied to reopen  matters  decided  relying  on Veerashaiva  Coop.  Bank1  and  Karnataka Sugar  Workers  Federation2  which  have attained finality.”

38

72. In  our  considered  opinion,  the  ratio  of

Dharappa’s  case  is  that  firstly,  Section 70 of  the

Karnataka  CS  Act  as  it  originally  stood  and

amended by first Amendment Act 19 of 1976 adding

therein  two  clauses  (d)  and  (e)  to  Section  70,

whether  one  reads  it  independently  or/and  in

juxtaposition with other Sections would find that it

did not  provide for  express ouster or  exclusion of

the  jurisdiction  of  the  Labour  Court/Industrial

Tribunal under the ID Act.  

73. In other words, it did not create any express

bar for the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal from

deciding  the  service  disputes  arising  between  a

Cooperative  Society’s  Employee  and  his/her

Employer (Co-operative Society).

74. Second,  any  Co-operative  Society’s  Employee

satisfying  the  definition  of  the  expression

"Workman",  “Industrial  Dispute"  and  the

Co-operative Society to be an “Industry” as defined

under the ID Act has the choice to select one forum

39

out of the two forums for filing a case in relation to

his service dispute, i.e., either to file a case under

the  Karnataka  CS  Act  or  to  seek  an  industrial

reference under Section 10 of the ID Act or to file an

application under Section 10(4-A) of the ID Act.(Para

14).

75. Third,  both  the  Acts,  namely,  Karnataka  CS

Act  and  the  ID  Act  possessed  and  enjoyed

concurrent  jurisdiction over  such service  disputes

till 20.06.2000.  

76.  Fourth,  consequent  upon  the  second

amendment  made  by  the  State  of  Karnataka  in

Section  70  by  Amendment  Act  2/2000,  which

received the Assent of the President on 18.03.2000

and was brought into force on 20.06.2000, the State

legislature,  for  the  first  time,  provided an express

provision for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court  or  Labour  Court  or  Industrial  Tribunal  to

decide  any  service  dispute  arising  between  a

40

Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and  his/her

Employer (Co-operative Society).  

77. The  effect  of  introducing  such  amended

provision was that the provisions of the ID Act were

held no longer applicable for deciding such service

disputes. In other words, jurisdiction of the ID Act

then  stood  excluded  from  deciding  such  service

disputes from 20.06.2000 onwards.  A fortiori, only

the  authorities  specified  under  the  Karnataka  CS

Act were held competent and possessed jurisdiction

to try such disputes from 20.06.2000 onwards.

78. Fifth, by way of rule of caution, the question of

such  nature  should  be  decided  by  the  Courts

primarily keeping in view the language employed in

the concerned State Act.

79. Sixth,  Article  254  of  the  Constitution  is

attracted when there is a repugnancy between any

provision(s) of the State Act such as Karnataka CS

Act and the provision(s) of any existing law enacted

41

by  the  Parliament  on  the  subject  falling  in

concurrent list such as the ID Act.  

80. The inconsistency should be so irreconcilable

that it must come in direct head on collusion with

any provision of the Central Act in the field thereby

creating  a  situation  that  obeying  one  Act  would

result in disobeying the other.  

81. Seventh, if such a situation arises in any case,

the State law (Karnataka CS Act) which is reserved

for  President's  Assent  and  on  receiving  the

President's Assent, will prevail over the Central law

(ID Act) in that State by virtue of Article 254 (2) of

the Constitution.  

82.  Now coming to the facts of the case at hand,

when we examine the question in the light of  the

ratio  of  Dharappa’s  case,  culled  out  above,  on

comparison, we find substantial similarity between

the  language  of  Section  69  of  the  KCS Act  as  it

originally  stood  and  later  amended  by  the

Amendment Act 1 of 2000 with that of the language

42

employed in Section 70 of the Karnataka CS Act as

it originally stood along with amended one by first

Amendment Act 19/ 1976.

83. In other words, we notice that the phraseology

and  language  of  both  unamended  and  amended

Section  69  of  KCS  Act  and  Section  70  of  the

Karnataka CS Act as amended by first amendment

by Act 1/2000 are in pari materia with each other.  

84. First, the KCS Act and the Karnataka CS Act

have received the Assent of the President at the time

of their respective enactment.

85. Second, the KCS Act-Amendment Act 1/2000

received  the  Assent  of  the  Governor  so  also

Amendment  Act  19/76  of  Karnataka  CS  Act

received the Assent of the Governor.  

86. Third, Section 69 and Section 70 start with a

non-obstante clause, viz., "Notwithstanding anything

contained in any law for the time being in force, if a

dispute arises ……………."

43

87. Fourth,  Section 69 and Section 70 end with

the  words  "such  dispute  shall  be  referred  to  the

Registrar  and  no  court  shall  have  jurisdiction  to

entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of

such dispute".  

88.  Fifth, (the KCS Act and the Karnataka CS Act)

had no provision expressly providing for ouster of

the jurisdiction of Civil Court, Labour Court and the

Industrial  Tribunal  from deciding service  disputes

alike the one introduced by Karnataka State for the

first time in Section 70 by the Amendment Act of 2

of 2000 with effect from 20.06.2000 with the Assent

of the President.

89. This,  in  our  view,  indicates  that  till

20.06.2000, there was similarity between the KCS

Act and Karnataka CS Act. However, after Section

70  was  amended  by  Act  No.2/2000  w.e.f.

20.06.2000  providing  therein  a  specific  clause

expressly  excluding  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil,

Labour and Revenue Court and Industrial Tribunal

44

to decide the service disputes, the scheme of the two

Acts no longer remained similar.

90. Similarly,  we  find  that  the  identical  wording

occurring in the beginning and the end of Section

69 and Section 70 was interpreted in  Dharappa’s

case  wherein  it  was  held  that  such  provisions

cannot  be  construed  as  providing  an  express

exclusion  of  the  jurisdiction  of  other  Courts

including  that  of  the  Labour  Court  and  the

Industrial Tribunal under the ID Act. On the other

hand,  it  was  held  that  the  Karnataka  CS  Act

possesses  concurrent  jurisdiction  for  deciding  the

services disputes upto 20.06.2000. (see para 14/16

of Dharappa)

91. This interpretation of Dharappa’s case, in our

view, would squarely apply to the provisions of the

KCS Act if Section 69 is also suitably amended by

the State of Kerala by making Section 69 at par with

amended Section 70 of Karnataka CS Act.  As on

date, it is not so.

45

92. Though  the  KCS  Act  was  amended  by

Amendment Act 1 of 2000 (w.e.f. 02.01.2003) but it

did  not  bring  about  any  kind  of  inconsistency  or

repugnancy in the KCS Act qua any provision of the

ID Act, 1947.  Had  the  KCS  Act  including  the

amending  one  by  Act  1/2000  brought  about  any

kind  of  inconsistency  or  repugnancy  between  the

provisions of the KCS Act and the ID Act such as

the one brought about by the second Amendment

Act  (2/2000)  in  Section  70  of  Karnataka  CS  Act

w.e.f.  20.06.2000  qua the  ID  Act  and  had  such

amended  provisions  of  the  KCS  Act  received  the

Assent of the President, the provisions of the KCS

Act too would have prevailed over the ID Act in the

State by virtue of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution.

93.  Such is not the case here because though the

KCS Act received the Assent of the President at the

time of its enactment so also the Karnataka CS Act

received, this Court while interpreting Section 70 as

amended by Act No.19/1976 of the Karnataka CS

46

Act  with the  Assent of  the  Governor,  has  held in

Dharappa’s case that Section 70 did not create any

inconsistency  or/and  repugnancy  with  any

provisions of the ID Act and possessed concurrent

jurisdiction over such service dispute.  This ratio of

Dharappa’s  case would apply to Section 69 of the

KCS Act because we have held that Section 69 is in

pari materia with Section 70 of the Karnataka CS

Act.

94. That apart, the amending KCS Act (1 of 2000)

having received the Assent of the Governor did not

bring about any inconsistency or repugnancy with

the provisions of the ID Act.  In any event, in the

absence  of  the  Assent  of  the  President  to  the

amending  KCS  Act  1/2000,  even  if  any

inconsistency  or  repugnancy  exists  between  the

provisions of the KCS Act and the ID Act, it is the ID

Act which will prevail over the KCS Act by virtue of

Article  254  (1)  of  the  Constitution  but  not

vice-a-versa.

47

95. The  law  in  relation  to  Article  254  of  the

Constitution and how it  is applied in a particular

case is fairly well settled by the series of decisions of

this Court. This Article is attracted in cases where

the law is enacted by the Parliament and the State

Legislature on the same subject, which falls in List

III - Concurrent list.

96. In such a situation arising in any case, if any

inconsistency  or/and  repugnancy  is  noticed

between the provisions of the Central and the State

Act,  which  has  resulted  in  their  direct  head  on

collusion with each other which made it impossible

to  reconcile  both  the  provisions  to  remain  in

operation inasmuch as if  one provision is obeyed,

the other would be disobeyed, the State Act, if it has

received the Assent of the President will prevail over

the Central Act in the concerned State by virtue of

Article 254 (2) of the Constitution.  

97. A fortiori, in such a situation, if the State Act

has received the  Assent of  the Governor  then the

48

Central  Act  would  prevail  over  the  State  Act  by

virtue of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution.   

98. It is this principle, which was applied by this

Court in the case of Dharappa while comparing the

provisions of the Karnataka CS Act including its two

amendments with that of the provisions of  the ID

Act.   

99. This  takes  us  to  examine  another  question.

The  majority  Judges,  as  we  find,  proceeded  to

examine  the  questions  by  attempting  to  compare

the language employed in the relevant Sections of

the two repealed KCS Acts of 1932 and 1951 with

that of the language of Section 69 of the KCS Act

1969 and noticing some departure in the language

employed in Section 69, came to a conclusion that

the language of Section 69 is comprehensive enough

to  exclude  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Labour  Court

under the ID Act.   The majority Judges also took

note  of  some  more  Sections  of  the  KCS Act  and

noticing  some  dis-similarity  in  the  scheme  of  the

49

KCS Act and Karnataka CS Act held that Section 69

of the KCS Act overrides the provisions of the ID Act

since inception. We find ourselves unable to agree

with the approach of the majority.

100.  In our view, when this Court in  Dharappa’s

case has interpreted the language of Section 70 of

the Karnataka CS Act, the questions involved herein

should  have  been  examined  by  comparing  the

language  employed  in  Section  69  of  the  KCS Act

with  the  language  employed  in  Section  70  of  the

Karnataka CS Act rather than to compare with the

repealed provisions.  

101. In  other  words,  once  on  comparing  the

language of  Section 69 and that  of  Section 70 as

amended by the first amendment, a conclusion is

reached that both Sections are akin to each other

till  20.06.2000,  a  fortiori,  the  law  laid  down  in

Dharappa’s case insofar as it interprets Section 70

as it originally stood and amended by Amendment

Act 19/1976 would apply to Section 69 of the KCS

50

Act. On the other hand, the ratio will not apply after

20.06.2000  because  from  that  date,  there  was  a

change  in  the  language  of  Section  70  which

provided  a  clause  to  exclude  the  Jurisdiction  of

other Courts in express terms by Amendment Act of

2/2000.  

102. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of

the  considered  opinion  that  the  view  of  majority

Judges cannot be upheld whereas the view of the

minority  Judges  deserves  to  be  upheld  and  is

accordingly upheld.

103. We accordingly hold that the KCS Act and the

ID  Act  both  possess  and  enjoy  the  concurrent

jurisdiction  to  decide  any  service  dispute  arising

between  the  Co-operative  Society’s  Employee  and

his/her Employer (Co-operative Society).  

104. We  also  hold  that  it  is  the  choice  of  the

Employee concerned to choose any one forum out of

the two forums available to him/her under the two

Acts (the KCS Act and the I.D. Act) to get his/her

51

service  dispute  decided.  It  is,  however,  subject  to

satisfying the test laid down under the ID Act that

the employee concerned is a “workman”, the dispute

raised by him/her is an “industrial dispute” and the

Co-operative Society (Employer) is an “Industry” as

defined under the ID Act.  

105. In the light of the aforesaid finding, all those

cases,  which  have  taken  contrary  view,  stand

overruled.

106. As a result of our conclusion, in our view, the

Labour Court in this case was competent to decide

the  service  dispute  raised  by  the  Employee

(appellant  herein)  under  the  ID  Act.  The  case  is

accordingly  remanded to  the  writ  Court  to  decide

the  respondent’s  writ  petition  for  examining  the

legality and correctness of the award of the Labour

Court on merits in accordance with law.

107. In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal

succeeds  and  is,  accordingly,  allowed.  The

impugned judgment is set aside.   

52

              ………...................................J.

[R.K. AGRAWAL]

                              ...……..................................J.          [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; January 12, 2018