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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFERRED CASE(C) NO.25/2015

JUST SOCIETY     ...PETITIONER VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA     ...RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J. 1. The petitioner seeks a declaration to the effect that certain provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas  Act,  2013  (hereinafter  for  short  ‘the Act’)  namely,  Sections  3(2)(a)  and  4(1)(d),  4(1) (e),  4(2),  the  second  proviso  to  Section  4(3), Section 10, the proviso to Section 14(3), Section 16, Section 37(2) and Section 63 are ultra vires Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution of India. The  challenge  in  the  aforesaid  transferred  case (No.25 of 2015) is primarily founded on the ground

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that  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  or  his  nominee Judge of the Supreme Court, under Section 4(1)(d) of  the  Act,  is  a  mere  Member  of  the  Selection Committee and the opinion rendered either by the Chief Justice of India or his nominee judge has no primacy in the matter of selection of Chairperson and  Members  of  the  Lokpal.   The  aforesaid contention is sought to be fortified on the basis that four former judges of this Court had exercised their  option  to  be  considered  for  the  post  of Chairperson  and  in  such  a  situation  it  is  the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India or his nominee Judge alone who would be best situated to decide on the suitability of any such former judge of this Court who has/may have opted to be considered for appointment.  It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner, that there are no norms/criterion laid down for appointment of an 'eminent jurist' under Section 4(1)(e) of the Act thereby rendering the aforesaid  provision  of  the  Act  legally  and constitutionally fragile.

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2. We fail to see how any of the aforesaid contentions  can  establish  any  infirmity  or fragility of the provisions of the Act in the light of any of the constitutional provisions so as to render  the  relevant  sections  of  the  Act  ultra vires.

3. The fact that primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice or his nominee is accorded by certain statutes  by  use  of  the  expression  “in consultation”, which expression has been understood by  judicial  opinion  to  confer  primacy  to  the opinion of the Chief Justice, the absence thereof in the Act, by itself, will not render Section 4(1) (d) thereof ultra vires the basic structure of the Constitution. If the Legislature in its wisdom had thought  it  proper  not  to  accord  primacy  to  the opinion  of  the  Chief  Justice  or  his  nominee  and accord equal status to the opinion rendered by the Chief Justice or his nominee and treat such opinion

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at par with the opinion rendered by other members of the Selection Committee, we do not see how such legislative wisdom can be questioned on the ground of constitutional infirmity. It is not the mandate of the Constitution that in all matters concerning the  appointment  to  various  Offices  in  different bodies, primacy must be accorded to the opinion of the  Chief  Justice  or  his  nominee.  Whether  such primacy  should  be  accorded  or  not  is  for  the legislature  to  decide  and  if  the  legislative opinion engrafted in the present Act is in contrast to what is provided for in other Statute(s), such legislative  intention,  by  itself,  cannot  be understood to be constitutionally impermissible.

4. Insofar as the appointment of an eminent jurist  is  concerned,  we  do  not  consider  it necessary  to  delve  into  the  issue  except  to  say that the decision being left to a high power body consisting  of  high  Constitutional  functionaries enumerated  in  Section  4(1)(a)  to  4(1)(d)  of  the

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Act, no ex-facie illegality can be discerned in the provisions contained in Section 4(1)(e) of the Act. Even if the Act is to lay down norms, it would be difficult  to  understand  the  same  to  be  all comprehensive,  satisfying  all  concerned.  No declaration  of  infirmity  of  the  provisions contained in Section 4(1)(e) of the Act can be made on the basis of the grounds urged.

5. Consequently and in the light of the above, we find no merit in this Transferred Case. The writ petition  filed  by  the  petitioner-Society  is dismissed accordingly.

....................,J. (RANJAN GOGOI)

....................,J. (NAVIN SINHA)

NEW DELHI APRIL 27, 2017