Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2321 OF 2009

RAJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT            

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T  

R.F.Nariman, J.

1. The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of  

the two great social evils practiced against the women of this  

country for centuries.  In the facts presented before us, a young  

woman consumes pesticide having been driven to  do so by  

repeated demands being made on her for money by the family  

into  which  she  is  supposed  to  merge  her  identity.  Sati  and  

dowry deaths have plagued this nation for centuries.  Sati – the  

practice of sending a widow to her husband’s funeral pyre to  

burn in it  - was first outlawed under British Rule in 1829 and  

1

Page 2

1830 under the Governor Generalship of Lord William Bentinck  

in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies.  General Sir  

Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces  

in India between 1859 and 1861, is supposed to have said to  

the Hindu Priests who complained to him about the prohibition  

of Sati  that “the burning of widows is your custom but in my  

country, when a man burns a woman alive, we hang them and  

confiscate  all  their  property.   Let  us  both,  therefore,  act  in  

accordance with our national customs.”

2. It took free India many years before the Commission of  

Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 was passed by Parliament setting  

down various offences relating to the commission of Sati and  

the  trial  of  such  offences  by  special  courts.  In  this  appeal,  

however,  we  are  confronted  with  the  other  major  problem,  

namely, dowry deaths.  Parliament responded much earlier so  

far  as the prohibition of  dowry is  concerned by enacting the  

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 under which minimum sentences  

were prescribed as penalty for the giving or taking of dowry.  

The specific menace  of dowry deaths, however, was tackled by  

the introduction of a new provision in 1986 - Section 304B in  

2

Page 3

the Penal  Code together  with another  new provision Section  

113B of the Evidence Act.  These two Sections read as follows:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a  woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or  occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  that  soon before her  death  she was subjected to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  her  husband  or  any  relative of her husband for,  or  in connection with,  any demand for dowry, such death shall be called  “dowry death”,  and such husband or relative shall  be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of  this sub-section,  “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section  2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2)  Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall  be  punished with imprisonment for a term which shall  not be less than seven years but which may extend  to imprisonment for life.”

“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When  the question is whether a person has committed the  dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon  before her death such woman had been subjected  by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in  connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had  caused  the  dowry death.

Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in  Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

3

Page 4

3. Coming back to the facts of the present appeal, a young  

woman, namely, Salwinder Kaur was married to the appellant  

Rajinder Singh sometime in the year 1990.  On 31st August,  

1993,  within  four  years  of  the  marriage,  Salwinder  Kaur  

consumed  Aluminium Phosphide,  which  is  a  pesticide,  as  a  

result of which her young life was snuffed out.  On the same  

day, an FIR was lodged against the husband, his older brother  

and the older brother’s wife. The trial court after examining the  

evidence  of  the  prosecution  and  the  defence,  acquitted  the  

appellant’s  older  brother  and  his  wife  but  convicted  the  

appellant under Section 304B and sentenced him to undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for seven years, which is the minimum  

sentence that can be pronounced on a finding of guilt under the  

said Section.  This was done after examining in particular the  

evidence of PW.2 – Karnail Singh, the father of the deceased  

woman, PW-3 – Gulzar Singh, his elder brother and PW-4 –  

Balwinder Singh, Sarpanch of the village.  The High Court of  

Punjab and Haryana confirmed the conviction and the sentence  

vide the impugned judgment.

4

Page 5

4. For the purpose of this appeal it is sufficient to set out the  

dead woman’s father’s evidence which has been accepted by  

the two courts below.  

“I  have  three  daughters  and  two  sons,  Paramjit  Kaur,  Manjit  Kaur  and  Salwinder  Kaur  are  my  daughters.   Salwinder  Kaur  my  daughter  was  married to Rajinder Singh r/o Bathwala.  She was  married  to  Rajinder  Singh  four  years  prior  to  her  death.  After one year of the marriage, my daughter  came  to  me  and  told  that  her  husband  Rajinder  Singh,  the  brother-in-law  Davinder  Singh  and  Gurmit  Kaur,  present  in  court,  are  demanding  money for constructing a house.  She also informed  me that they were quarrelling with her for the said  demand of money.  At the time of marriage of my  daughter, I had given sufficient dowry according to  my status.  I told my daughter that at that moment I  am not in possession of money.  However, I gave  she-buffalo to my daughter for taking the same to  her in-laws’ house and asked her to pull on with the  parents-in-law.   After  7/8  months,  when  my  daughter was again ill-treated by the accused, she  came  to  me  and  again  demanded  money.   The  accused,  present  in  court,  were  demanding  and  compelling my daughter to back with a promise that  I would visit her shortly and on the following day, I  alongwith  my  brother  Gulzar  Singh,  the  then  Sarpanch  Balwinder  Singh  and  Ex-Sarpanch  Hazura Singh went to the house of the accused in  village Bathawals.  On arrival at the house of the  accused, the accused, present in court, along with  father-in-law of my daughter were present at their  house.  Harjinder Singh, my son-in-law along with  Gurmit Kaur and Davinder Singh were also present.  I  requested  all  of  them  not  to  quarrel  with  my  daughter on account of demand of money.  I also  

5

Page 6

assured the accused that I would pay them the said  amount  at  the  time  of  harvesting  the  crop.   The  accused insisted about the demand of money.  My  daughter Salwinder Kaur visited my house 15 days  prior to her death.  I again pacified my daughter that  I  would definitely pay the amount after  harvesting  the crop.   Salwinder  Kaur  was not  happy for  not  getting the money from me.  She was maltreated by  the  accused.  After  the  death  of  Salwinder  Kaur,  member panchayat Harbhajan Singh of V. Bathwala  and  Davinder  Singh  accused  came  to  my  house  and  informed  that  my  daughter  has  died  after  consuming some poisonous substance and I  was  asked to accompany them for cremating the dead  body.”

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.  Counsel  

for the appellant relied upon the cross-examination of Karnail  

Singh which is set out hereinbelow:-

“I  do  not  know  if  Devinder  Singh  had  separate  portion.  My daughter had come to me for the first  time 5/6 months after her marriage, but she did not  make any complaint to me regarding the conduct of  the accused persons.  She complained to me only  after about a year and she had told me that they  wanted to build a joint house and asked her to bring  money for that purpose.  I however did not give any  money to her for this purpose.  No written complaint  was ever made to the panchayat.   I  never talked  about  it  to  Balwinder  Singh.   It  is  incorrect  to  suggest that no demand of money was ever made  from my daughter or that I have deposed falsely.”

6

Page 7

6. Based  on  this,  learned  counsel  argued  that  the  link  

required between the demand made being connected with the  

marriage was snapped as also the fact that since initially, the  

complaints  were  made  at  long  intervals,  no  offence  under  

Section 304B could be said to be made out.  Counsel for the  

State  of  Punjab  reiterated  the  findings  of  both  courts  and  

argued in support of the judgment of the High Court.  

 7. The  primary  ingredient  to  attract  the  offence  under  

Section 304B is that the death of a woman must be a “dowry  

death”.   “Dowry”  is  defined  by  Section  2  of  the  Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads as follows:

“2.  Definition  of  “dowry”.—In  this  Act,  “dowry”  means any property  or  valuable security  given or  agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to  the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by  any other person, to either party to the marriage or  to any other person,

at  or  before  [or  any  time after  the  marriage]  [in  connection with the marriage of the said parties, but  does  not  include]  dower  or mahr in  the  case  of  persons  to  whom  the  Muslim  Personal  Law  (Shariat) applies.

7

Page 8

Explanation I.— [***]

Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security”  has  the  same  meaning  as  in  Section  30  of  the  Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

8. A perusal of this Section shows that this definition can be  

broken into six distinct parts.

1) Dowry must  first  consist  of  any property  or  valuable  

security - the word “any” is a word of width and would,  

therefore,  include  within  it  property  and  valuable  

security of any kind whatsoever.  

2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed  

to  be  given.   The  actual  giving  of  such  property  or  

security is, therefore, not necessary.  

3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be  

given either directly or indirectly.  

4) Such giving or agreeing to give  can again be not only  

by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the  

parents of either party or by any other person to either  

party to the marriage or to any other person.  It will be  

noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the  

Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of  

giving or receiving dowry is concerned.

8

Page 9

5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time.  It  

can be at,  before, or at any time after the marriage.  

Thus,  it  can  be  many  years  after  a  marriage  is  

solemnised.  

6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the  

marriage of the parties.  Obviously, the expression “in  

connection with” would in the context of the social evil  

sought  to  be  tackled  by  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  

mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.   

9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B  have  

been stated and restated in many judgments.  There are four  

such ingredients and they are said to be:

(a) death of a woman must have been caused by  any burns or bodily injury or her death must have  occurred  otherwise  than  under  normal  circumstances;

(b)  such  death  must  have  occurred  within  seven  years of her marriage;

(c)  soon  before  her  death,  she  must  have  been  subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or any relative of her husband; and

(d)  such  cruelty  or  harassment  must  be  in  connection with the demand for dowry.  

10. This has been the law stated in the following judgments:

9

Page 10

Ashok Kumar  v.  State of  Haryana,  (2010)  12 SCC 350 at  

pages  360-361;  Bachni  Devi  &  Anr. v.  State  of  Haryana,  

(2011) 4 SCC 427 at 431,  Pathan Hussain Basha v. State of  

A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 594 at 599, Kulwant Singh & Ors. v. State  

of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at 184-185,  Surinder Singh v.  

State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 at 137, Raminder Singh  

v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582 at 583, Suresh Singh  

v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 at 361,  Sher Singh  

v. State of Haryana, 2015 1 SCALE 250 at 262.  

11. This Court has spoken sometimes with divergent voices  

both on what would fall within “dowry” as defined and what is  

meant  by  the  expression  “soon  before  her  death”.   In  

Appasaheb v.  State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721, this  

Court construed the definition of dowry strictly, as it forms part  

of Section 304B which is part of a penal statute.  The court held  

that a demand for money for defraying the expenses of manure  

made to a young wife who in turn made the same demand to  

her father would be outside the definition of dowry.  This Court  

said:

10

Page 11

“A demand for money on account of some financial  stringency  or  for  meeting  some  urgent  domestic  expenses  or  for  purchasing  manure  cannot  be  termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is  normally understood. The evidence adduced by the  prosecution  does  not,  therefore,  show  that  any  demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the  Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants  as what was allegedly asked for was some money  for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing  manure.” (at page 727)

12. This  judgment  was  distinguished  in  at  least  four  other  

judgments (see:  Bachni  Devi v.  State of  Haryana (2011)  4  

SCC 427 at pages 432 to 434; Kulwant Singh & Ors. v. State  

of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 at page 185; Surinder Singh v.  

State of Haryana (2014) 4 SCC 129 at pages 139 to 141 and  

Raminder Singh v.  State of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582 at  

page  586.   The  judgment  was,  however,  followed  in  Vipin  

Jaiswal v.  State of Andhra Pradesh,  (2013) 3 SCC 684 at  

pages 687-688.  

13. In order to arrive at the true construction of the definition  

of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the offence under  

Section 304B, we first need to determine how a statute of this  

kind needs to be interpreted.  It is obvious that Section 304B is  

11

Page 12

a stringent provision, meant to combat a social evil of alarming  

proportions.  Can it  be argued that it  is a penal statute and,  

should,  therefore,  in  case  of  ambiguity  in  its  language,  be  

construed strictly?

14. The answer is to be found in two path-breaking judgments  

of this Court.  In  M. Narayanan Nambiar v.  State of Kerala,  

1963 Supp. (2) SCR 724, a Constitution Bench of this Court  

was  asked  to  construe  Section  5(1)(d)  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption  Act,  1947.   In  construing  the  said  Act,  a  penal  

statute, Subba Rao,J. stated:

“The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as  it was expedient to make more effective provisions  for  the  prevention  of  bribery  and  Corruption.  The  long title as well as the preamble indicate that the  Act was passed to put down the said social evil i.e.  bribery and corruption by public servant. Bribery is  form of corruption. The fact that in addition to the  word "Bribery" the word "corruption" is used shows  that  the  legislation  was  intended  to  combat  also  other evil in addition to bribery. The existing law i.e.  Penal Code was found insufficient  to eradicate or  even  to  control  the  growing  evil  of  bribery  and  corruption  corroding  the  public  service  of  our  country. The provisions broadly include the existing  offences under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian  Penal Code committed by public servants and enact  a  new  rule  of  presumptive  evidence  against  the  accused.  The  Act  also  creates  a  new offence  of  criminal  misconduct  by  public  servants  though  to  

12

Page 13

some extent it overlaps on the pre-existing offences  and enacts a rebuttable presumption contrary to the  well known principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. It  also  aims  to  protect  honest  public  servants  from  harassment  by  prescribing  that  the  investigation  against them could be made only by police officials  of particular status and by making the sanction of  the Government or other appropriate officer a pre- condition  for  their  prosecution.  As  it  is  a  socially  useful  measure  conceived  in  public  interest,  it  should be liberally construed so as to bring about  the desired object, i.e. to prevent corruption among  public  servants and to prevent  harassment  of  the  honest among them.

A decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke  v. Elliott, cited by the Learned Counsel as an aid for  construction  neatly  states  the  principle  and  therefore  may  be  extracted:  Lord  Justice  James  speaking for the Board observes at page 191:

“No-doubt  all  penal  Statutes  are  to  be  construed strictly, that is to say, the Court  must  see  that  the  thing  charged  as  an  offence is within the plain meaning of the  words used, and must not strain the words  on any notion that there has been a slip,  that there has been a casus omissus, that  the thing is  so clearly  within the mischief  that  it  must  have  been  intended  to  be  included if thought of. On the other hand,  the person charged has a right to say that  the  thing  charged  although  within  the  words,  is  not  within  the  spirit  of  the  enactment. But where the thing is brought  within the words and within the spirit, there  a penal enactment is to be construed like  any other instrument, according to the fair  commonsense  meaning  of  the  language  used, and the Court is not to find or make  any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a  

13

Page 14

penal  statute,  where  such  doubt  or  ambiguity  would  clearly  not  be  found  or  made in the same language in any other  instrument.”

    In our view this passage, if  we may say so,  restates the rule of construction of a penal provision  from a correct perspective.”

15. In Standard  Chartered  Bank  v.  Directorate  of  

Enforcement,  (2005)  4  SCC  530 at  page  547,  another  

Constitution Bench, 40 odd years later, was faced with whether  

a corporate body could be prosecuted for offences for which the  

sentence of imprisonment is mandatory. By a majority of 3:2,  

the question was answered in the affirmative.  Balakrishnan,J.  

held:

“23. The counsel  for  the appellant  contended that  the penal  provision  in  the statute  is  to  be strictly  construed.  Reference  was  made  to Tolaram  Relumal v. State of Bombay   [(1955) 1 SCR 158 :  1954 Cri LJ 1333] , SCR at p. 164 and Girdhari Lal   Gupta v. D.H.  Mehta [(1971)  3  SCC  189  :  1971  SCC (Cri) 279] . It is true that all penal statutes are  to be strictly construed in the sense that the court  must see that  the thing charged as an offence is  within  the  plain  meaning  of  the  words  used  and  must not strain the words on any notion that there  has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the  mischief  that  it  must  have  been  intended  to  be  included and would have been included if thought  of. All penal provisions like all other statutes are to  

14

Page 15

be fairly construed according to the legislative intent  as expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative  intent to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence  committed  by  them  is  clear  and  explicit  and  the  statute  never  intended  to  exonerate  them  from  being prosecuted. It  is  sheer violence to common  sense  that  the  legislature  intended  to  punish  the  corporate bodies for  minor  and silly  offences and  extended  immunity  of  prosecution  to  major  and  grave economic crimes.

24. The distinction between a strict construction and  a more free one has disappeared in modern times  and  now  mostly  the  question  is  “what  is  true  construction of the statute?” A passage in Craies on  Statute Law, 7th Edn. reads to the following effect:

“The distinction between a strict and a liberal  construction  has  almost  disappeared  with  regard to all  classes of  statutes,  so that  all  statutes,  whether  penal  or  not,  are  now  construed by substantially the same rules. ‘All  modern  Acts  are  framed  with  regard  to  equitable  as  well  as  legal  principles.’  ‘A  hundred years ago,’ said the court in Lyons'   case [Lyons v. Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38 : 169  ER  1158]  ,  ‘statutes  were  required  to  be  perfectly precise and resort was not had to a  reasonable  construction  of  the  Act,  and  thereby  criminals  were  often  allowed  to  escape.  This  is  not  the  present  mode  of  construing  Acts  of  Parliament.  They  are  construed  now  with  reference  to  the  true  meaning and real intention of the legislature.”

At  p.  532  of  the  same  book,  observations  of  Sedgwick are quoted as under:

“The  more  correct  version  of  the  doctrine  appears to be that statutes of this class are to  be  fairly  construed  and  faithfully  applied  

15

Page 16

according  to  the  intent  of  the  legislature,  without  unwarrantable  severity  on  the  one  hand or  unjustifiable  lenity  on  the  other,  in  cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy.”

16. Concurring with Balakrishnan,J., Dharmadhikari,J. added:

“36. The  rule  of  interpretation  requiring  strict  construction of  penal  statutes does not  warrant  a  narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so  as  to  leave  loopholes  for  the  offender  to  escape  (see Murlidhar  Meghraj  Loya v. State  of   Maharashtra   [(1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri)  493] ). A penal statute has to also be so construed  as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and  to  advance  a  remedy  in  the  light  of  the  rule  in Heydon's  case [(1584)  3  Co  Rep  7a  :  76  ER  637]  .  A  common-sense  approach  for  solving  a  question  of  applicability  of  a  penal  statute  is  not  ruled  out  by  the  rule  of  strict  construction.  (See State of A.P. v. Bathu Prakasa Rao [(1976) 3  SCC  301  :  1976  SCC  (Cri)  395]  and  also G.P.  Singh on Principles of Statutory Interpretation,  9th  Edn., 2004, Chapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to  756.)”

17. And Arun  Kumar,J.,  concurring  with  both  the  aforesaid  

Judges, followed two earlier decisions of this Court as follows:-

“49. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in a  judgment  in Balram  Kumawat  v.  Union  of   India [(2003)  7 SCC 628]  to  which I  was a party,  observed  in  the  context  of  principles  of  statutory  interpretation: (SCC p. 635, para 23)

16

Page 17

“23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal  statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and  lexical  construction  may  not  always  be  given effect to. The law would have to be  interpreted  having  regard  to  the  subject- matter of the offence and the object of the  law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the  law is not to allow the offender to sneak out  of  the  meshes  of  law.  Criminal  jurisprudence does not say so.”

50. In M.V.  Javali v. Mahajan  Borewell  &  Co. [(1997) 8 SCC 72 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1239] this  Court was considering a similar situation as in the  present case. Under Section 278-B of the Income  Tax  Act  a  company  can  be  prosecuted  and  punished for offence committed under Section 276- B;  sentence  of  imprisonment  is  required  to  be  imposed under  the provision of  the statute and a  company  being  a  juristic  person  cannot  be  subjected  to  it.  It  was  held  that  the  apparent  anomalous  situation  can  be  resolved  only  by  a  proper  interpretation  of  the  section.  The  Court  observed: (SCC p. 78, para 8)

“8.  Keeping in view the recommendations of  the Law Commission and the above principles  of  interpretation  of  statutes  we  are  of  the  opinion that the only harmonious construction  that can be given to Section 276-B is that the  mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine  is  to  be imposed where it  can  be imposed,  namely on persons coming under categories  (ii)  and  (iii)  above,  but  where  it  cannot  be  imposed, namely on a company, fine will  be  the only punishment.”

17

Page 18

18. In keeping with these principles, in K. Prema S. Rao and  

another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others,  (2003) 1 SCC  

217, this Court said:

“The legislature has by amending the Penal Code  and the Evidence Act made penal law more strident  for  dealing  with  and  punishing  offences  against  married women.”   

19. In  Reema Aggarwal  v. Anupam,  (2004) 3 SCC 199, in  

construing the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act,  in the  

context  of  Section 498A, this Court  applied the mischief  rule  

made immortal by Heydon’s case and followed Lord Denning’s  

judgment in  Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v.  Asher, where the  

learned Law Lord held:

“He must  set  to  work  on the constructive  task of  finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do  this not only from the language of the statute, but  also from a consideration of  the social  conditions  which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was  passed to remedy,  and then he must supplement  the written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the  intention of the legislature.” (at page 213)

The  Court  gave  an  expansive  meaning  to  the  word  

`husband’  occurring in  Section 498A to include persons who  

18

Page 19

entered into a relationship with a woman even by feigning to be  

a husband.  The Court held:  

“….It  would  be  appropriate  to  construe  the  expression 'husband' to cover a person who enters  into  marital  relationship  and  under  the  colour  of  such  proclaimed  or  feigned  status  of  husband  subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce  her  in  any  manner  or  for  any  of  the  purposes  enumerated  in  the  relevant  provisions  Sections  304B/498A,  whatever  be  the  legitimacy  of  the  marriage itself  for  the limited purpose of  Sections  498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known  and  recognized  as  purposive  construction  has  to  come into play in a case of this nature. The absence  of  a  definition  of  'husband'  to  specifically  include  such  persons  who  contract  marriages  ostensibly  and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported  exercise of his role and status as 'husband' is no  ground to exclude them from the purview of Section  304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very  object and aim of the legislations introducing those  provisions.” (at page 210)

20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be  

given a fair, pragmatic, and  common sense interpretation so as  

to fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel  

that  the  judgment  in  Appasaheb’s  case  followed  by  the  

judgment of Kulwant Singh do not state the law correctly.  We,  

therefore,  declare  that  any  money  or  property  or  valuable  

security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section  

19

Page 20

2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after  

the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a  

married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in  

relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly  

and unequivocally point otherwise.  Coming now to the other  

important ingredient of Section 304B – what exactly is meant by  

“soon before her death”?

21. This Court in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014)  

4 SCC 129, had this to say:

“17. Thus,  the  words  “soon  before”  appear  in  Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in  Section  304-B  IPC.  For  the  presumptions  contemplated  under  these  sections  to  spring  into  action,  it  is  necessary to show that  the cruelty or  harassment was caused soon before the death. The  interpretation  of  the  words  “soon  before”  is,  therefore,  important.  The  question  is  how  “soon  before”? This would obviously depend on the facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  cruelty  or  harassment differs from case to case. It relates to  the mindset of people which varies from person to  person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical.  Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be  verbal  or  emotional  like  insulting  or  ridiculing  or  humiliating  a  woman.  It  can  be  giving  threats  of  injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be  depriving  her  of  economic  resources  or  essential  amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her  movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the  outside  world.  The  list  is  illustrative  and  not  

20

Page 21

exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating  or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.  Every  such  instance  of  cruelty  and  related  harassment has a different impact on the mind of a  woman.  Some instances  may  be  so  grave  as  to  have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances  which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her  memory for a long time. Therefore, “soon before” is  a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot  have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from  case  to  case.  This  must  be  kept  in  mind  while  examining each case of dowry death.

18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment  of this Court in Kans Raj v.  State of Punjab [(2000)  5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court  considered  the  term  “soon  before”.  The  relevant  observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para  15)

“15.  …  ‘Soon  before’  is  a  relative  term  which is required to be considered under  specific circumstances of each case and no  straitjacket  formula  can  be  laid  down  by  fixing  any  time-limit.  This  expression  is  pregnant  with  the  idea  of  proximity  test.  The term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous  with  the  term ‘immediately  before’  and is  opposite of the expression ‘soon after’  as  used  and  understood  in  Section  114,  Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These  words would imply that the interval should  not be too long between the time of making  the  statement  and  the  death.  It  contemplates  the  reasonable  time  which,  as  earlier  noticed,  has  to  be  understood  and  determined  under  the  peculiar  circumstances of each case. In relation to  dowry deaths, the circumstances showing  the existence of  cruelty  or  harassment to  the  deceased  are  not  restricted  to  a  

21

Page 22

particular instance but normally refer  to a  course of  conduct.  Such conduct may be  spread over a period of time. If the cruelty  or  harassment  or  demand  for  dowry  is  shown  to  have  persisted,  it  shall  be  deemed to  be  ‘soon before  death’  if  any  other intervening circumstance showing the  non-existence  of  such  treatment  is  not  brought  on  record,  before  such  alleged  treatment  and  the  date  of  death.  It  does  not, however, mean that such time can be  stretched to any period. Proximate and live  link between the effect of cruelty based on  dowry  demand  and  the  consequential  death  is  required  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty  or  harassment  based upon such demand  and the  date  of  death  should  not  be too  remote  in  time  which,  under  the  circumstances,  be  treated  as  having  become stale enough.”

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand  of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such  demand and the date of death. The test of proximity  will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It  depends on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case  and  calls  for  a  pragmatic  and  sensitive  approach of the court within the confines of law.”

22. In  another  recent  judgment  in  Sher  Singh v.  State  of  

Haryana, 2015 (1) SCALE 250, this Court said:

“We are aware that the word ‘soon’ finds place in  Section 304B; but  we would prefer to interpret its  use not in terms of days or months or years, but as  necessarily  indicating  that  the  demand  for  dowry  

22

Page 23

should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but  should be the continuing cause for the death under  Section 304B or the suicide under Section 306 of  the IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants  are  established  or  shown  or  proved  by  the  prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility,  the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by  an assumption of  guilt  of  the accused,  thereupon  transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and  requiring  him  to  produce  evidence  dislodging  his  guilt, beyond reasonable doubt.” (at page 262)

23. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions.  

Days or months are not  what is to be seen.  What must be  

borne  in  mind  is  that  the  word  “soon”  does  not  mean  

“immediate”.  A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind  

the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section  

304B  would  make  it  clear  that  the  expression  is  a  relative  

expression.  Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is  

necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but  

should be the continuing cause for  the death of  the married  

woman under Section 304B.  

24. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of  

this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641  

in which the law was stated thus:

23

Page 24

“The expression “soon before” is a relative term as  held  by  this  Court,  which  is  required  to  be  considered  under  the  specific  circumstances  of  each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid  down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said  that  the term “soon before”  is  synonyms with the  term “immediately before”. The determination of the  period which can come within term “soon before” is  left to be determined by courts depending upon the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.”  (at  page  646)

25. We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the  

law.   “Soon  before”  is  not  synonymous  with  “immediately  

before”.  

26. The facts of this appeal are glaring. Demands for money  

were  made  shortly  after  one  year  of  the  marriage.   A  she-

buffalo  was given by the father  to  the daughter  as  a  peace  

offering.  The peace offering had no effect.  The daughter was  

ill-treated. She went back to her father and demanded money  

again.  The father,  then,  went  along with his  brother  and the  

Sarpanch of the village to the matrimonial home with a request  

that the daughter be not ill-treated on account of the demand  

for money.  The father also assured the said persons that their  

money demand would be fulfilled and that they would have to  

24

Page 25

wait till the crops of his field are harvested.   Fifteen days before  

her death, Salwinder Kaur again visited her parents’ house on  

being  maltreated  by  her  new  family.  Then  came  death  by  

poisoning.   The cross-examination of  the father of  Salwinder  

Kaur has, in no manner, shaken his evidence.  On the facts,  

therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts  

below are upheld. The appeal is dismissed.  

    ………..…..……………………...J.     (T.S. Thakur)

   ….…..…..………………………...J.     (R.F. Nariman)

   ….…..…..………………………...J.     (Prafulla C. Pant)

New Delhi, February 26, 2015.  

25