15 March 2013
Supreme Court
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JITENDRA RAGHUVANSHI Vs BABITA RAGHUVANSHI

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000447-000447 / 2013
Diary number: 26821 / 2012
Advocates: ABHISHEK CHAUDHARY Vs C. D. SINGH


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       REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 447         OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6462 of 2012)

Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors.               .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr.                            .... Respondent(s)

     

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The important question that  falls  for determination in  

the  instant  appeal  is  about  the  ambit  and  scope  of  the  

inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 of the  

Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973  (in short “the Code”) in  

quashing of the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable  

offences relating to matrimonial disputes.  

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3) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and  

order dated 04.07.2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya  

Pradesh,  Bench  at  Indore  in  M.CR.C.  No.  2877  of  2012,  

whereby the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the  

appellants herein under Section 482 of the Code for quashing  

of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4166 of 2011 pending in  

the Court of Judicial Magistrate Class I, Indore.

4)   Brief facts:

a) The marriage of Jitendra Raghuvanshi (Appellant No. 1  

herein)  and  Babita  Raghuvanshi,  respondent-wife,  was  

solemnized  on  22.02.2002  as  per  Hindu  rites  and  rituals.  

After  the  marriage,  the  parties  were  residing  together  as  

husband and wife at District Baitul, M.P.  On 05.03.2003, an  

FIR being No. 172 of 2003 was registered at P.S. Sarni, Dist.  

Baitul for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406  

read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short  

‘the  IPC’)  at  the  instance  of  Babita  Raghuvanshi  –  

respondent-wife owing to the harassment and torture meted  

out to her in the matrimonial home by her husband and his  

relatives.  A Criminal Case being No. 4166 of 2011 was also  

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registered  against  the  appellants  herein  for  the  offences  

punishable  under  Sections  498A  and  406  of  the  IPC  and  

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.  

b) During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, in the  

year 2012, with the help and intervention of family members,  

friends and well-wishers, the parties amicably settled their  

differences by way of mutual  settlement.   Pursuant to the  

same, on 03.04.2012, a compromise/settlement application  

was filed for dropping of the criminal proceedings in Criminal  

Case  No.  4166  of  2011  and  FIR  No.  172  of  2003  dated  

05.03.2003 before the trial Court.  Respondent-wife also filed  

an  affidavit  stating  that  she  did  not  wish  to  pursue  the  

criminal  proceedings against  the  appellants.   However,  by  

order dated 03.04.2012, learned trial Judge rejected the said  

application.  

c) Being  aggrieved  by  the  order  dated  03.04.2012,  on  

09.04.2012, the appellants herein filed an application being  

M.CR.C. No. 2877 of 2012 before the High Court invoking its  

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash the  

criminal  proceedings  launched  against  them.   The  High  

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Court, by impugned order dated 04.07.2012, dismissed the  

application  filed  by the  appellants  herein  stating  that  the  

court  has  no  power  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings  in  

respect of offences under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC since  

both are non-compoundable.   

d) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants have filed  

the present appeal by way of special leave.    

5) Heard  Ms.  Preetika  Dwivedi,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants  and  Mr.  S.K.  Dubey,  learned  senior  counsel  for  

Respondent  No.  2  and  Mr.  Rahul,  learned  counsel  for  

Respondent No.1.

6) The scope and ambit of power under Section 482 of the  

Code has been examined by this Court in a catena of earlier  

decisions.   In  the  present  case,  we  are  concerned  about  

interference by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under  

Section 482 in relation to matrimonial disputes.   

7) It is not in dispute that matrimonial disputes have been  

on considerable increase in recent times resulting in filing of  

complaints  under  Sections  498A  and  406  of  IPC  not  only  

against  the  husband  but  also  against  the  relatives  of  the  

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husband.  The question is when such matters are resolved  

either by the wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or  

by mutual  settlement  of other  pending disputes  for  which  

both the sides approached the High Court and jointly prayed  

for  quashing  of  the  criminal  proceedings  or  the  FIR  or  

complaint by the wife under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC,  

whether the prayer can be declined on the sole ground that  

since the offences are non-compoundable under Section 320  

of the Code,  it would be impermissible for the Court to quash  

the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.  

8) It is not in dispute that in the case on hand subsequent  

to the filing of the criminal complaint under Sections 498A  

and 406 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition  

Act, 1961, with the help and intervention of family members,  

friends  and  well-wishers,  the  parties  concerned  have  

amicably  settled  their  differences  and  executed  a  

compromise/settlement.   Pursuant  thereto,  the  appellants  

filed  the  said  compromise  before  the  trial  Court  with  a  

request to place the same on record and to drop the criminal  

proceedings against the appellants herein.  It is also not in  

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dispute that in addition to the mutual settlement arrived at  

by  the  parties,  respondent-wife  has  also  filed  an  affidavit  

stating  that  she  did  not  wish  to  pursue  the  criminal  

proceedings against the appellants and fully supported the  

contents of the settlement deed.  It is the grievance of the  

appellants that not only the trial Court rejected such prayer  

of the parties but also the High Court failed to exercise its  

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code only on the ground  

that  the  criminal  proceedings  relate  to  the  offences  

punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of IPC which are  

non-compoundable in nature.   

9) Learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  by  drawing  our  

attention  to  the  decision of  this  Court  in  B.S.  Joshi  and  

Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC  

675, submitted that in an identical circumstance, this Court  

held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers  

under  Section  482  can  quash  criminal  proceedings  in  

matrimonial  disputes  where  the  dispute  is  entirely  private  

and the parties are willing to settle their disputes amicably.  

It is not in dispute that the facts in  B.S. Joshi (supra)  are  

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identical and the nature of the offence and the question of  

law involved are almost similar  to the one in hand.  After  

considering  the  law  laid  down  in  State  of  Haryana vs.  

Bhajan  Lal,  1992  Supp  (1)  SCC  335  and  explaining  the  

decisions  rendered  in  Madhu  Limaye vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, Surendra Nath Mohanty  

& Anr.  vs.  State of Orissa, (1999) 5 SCC 238 and  Pepsi  

Foods Ltd.  & Anr.   vs.  Special  Judicial  Magistrate &  

Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court held:  

“8.  … …. We are, therefore,  of  the view that if  for  the  purpose of  securing the ends of  justice,  quashing of  FIR  becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the  exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different  matter  depending  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each case whether to exercise or not such a power.”

Considering matrimonial matters, this Court also held:   

“12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are  evident.  It  becomes the  duty  of  the  court  to  encourage  genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.”

10) As stated earlier, it is not in dispute that after filing of a  

complaint  in  respect  of  the  offences  punishable  under  

Sections  498A and  406  of  IPC,  the  parties,  in  the  instant  

case,  arrived at  a  mutual  settlement  and the complainant  

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also  has  sworn  an  affidavit  supporting  the  stand  of  the  

appellants.  That was the position before the trial Court as  

well as before the High Court in a petition filed under Section  

482 of the Code.  A perusal of the impugned order of the  

High  Court  shows  that  because  the  mutual  settlement  

arrived at between the parties relate to non-compoundable  

offence,  the  court  proceeded  on  a  wrong  premise  that  it  

cannot  be  compounded  and  dismissed  the  petition  filed  

under Section 482.  A perusal of the petition before the High  

Court shows that the application filed by the appellants was  

not for compounding of non-compoundable offences but for  

the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings.   

11) The inherent powers of the High Court under Section  

482 of  the  Code are  wide and unfettered.   In  B.S. Joshi  

(supra), this Court has upheld the powers of the High Court  

under  Section  482  to  quash  criminal  proceedings  where  

dispute is of a private nature and a compromise is entered  

into  between  the  parties  who  are  willing  to  settle  their  

differences amicably.  We are satisfied that the said decision  

is directly applicable to the case on hand and the High Court  

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ought  to  have  quashed  the  criminal  proceedings  by  

accepting the settlement arrived at.   

12) In our view, it  is the duty of the courts to encourage  

genuine  settlements  of  matrimonial  disputes,  particularly,  

when the  same are  on considerable  increase.  Even  if  the  

offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial  

disputes  and  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  parties  have  

settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold  

that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320  

of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of  

quashing  of  FIR,  complaint  or  the  subsequent  criminal  

proceedings.   

13) There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in  

recent  times.  The  institution  of  marriage  occupies  an  

important place and it has an important role to play in the  

society.   Therefore,  every  effort  should  be  made  in  the  

interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle  

down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over  

their  defaults  and  terminate  their  disputes  amicably  by  

mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law,  

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in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters,  

the  courts  should  be  less  hesitant  in  exercising  its  

extraordinary jurisdiction.  It is trite to state that the power  

under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with  

circumspection  only  when  the  court  is  convinced,  on  the  

basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to  

continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or  

that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to  

be quashed.  We also make it  clear  that  exercise of such  

power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of  

each case and it has to be exercised in appropriate cases in  

order to do real and substantial justice for the administration  

of which alone the courts exist.  It is the duty of the courts to  

encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes and  

Section 482 of the Code enables the High Court and Article  

142  of  the  Constitution  enables  this  Court  to  pass  such  

orders.   

14) In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the  

High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash the  

criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in appropriate cases  

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in order to meet the ends of justice and Section 320 of the  

Code does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court  

under Section 482 of the Code.  Under these circumstances,  

we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated  

04.07.2012 passed in M.CR.C. No. 2877 of 2012 and quash  

the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4166 of 2011 pending  

on the file of Judicial Magistrate Class-I, Indore.  

15) The appeal is allowed.  

          

………….…………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

       ………….…………………………J.                   (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)   

………….…………………………J.                  (KURIAN JOSEPH)

NEW DELHI; MARCH 15, 2013.

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