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                                        (Non-Reportable)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1850 OF 2010

Jatinder Kumar     ………Appellant

Vs.

State of Haryana     ……….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

The  appellant  has  been  found  to  be  guilty  by  the  High  Court  of

Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, which finding affirms the judgment of

the  Trial  Court  convicting  him  for  commission  of  offences  under  the

provisions of Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

The offences were related to suicidal death of his wife, Meenakshi. The

High Court,  however,  set  aside his conviction under Section 306 of  the

Code  by  the  Trial  Court.  The  appellant  was  charged  for  subjecting  his

deceased  wife  Meenakshi  to  cruelty  or  harassment  in  connection  with

demand  for  dowry  coupled  with  cruelty  during  the  subsistence  of  her

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marriage during her stay in her matrimonial home at Mullana in the Ambala

district,  Haryana.  Charge  was  also  framed  against  him  for  abetting

Meenakshi’s  suicide.  She  had  committed  suicide  in  the  night  of  20 th

September 1991. Her marriage with the appellant was solemnised on 7 th

March 1991. On 20th September 1991, the deceased victim had come to her

parental  home to attend “pagree ceremony” of  a  relative and ultimately

returned to her matrimonial home along with the appellant on that very

evening. The mother and two brothers of the appellant were also implicated

with the same charges and convicted by the Trial Court. The High Court,

however, acquitted them.

2. The father of the deceased, Som Prakash (PW-1) received a message

on that very night from another relative of his, Parveen Kumar (PW-4) that

his daughter, Meenakshi had been taken to the Civil Hospital, Ambala. She

was found dead in the said hospital. The cause of death was consumption of

aluminium phosphide. In early morning of 21st September 1991(2.30 A.M.),

father of the deceased (PW-1) lodged the First Information Report. On the

basis  of  statement  of  P.W.1  recorded  by  the  SHO/SI  of  Police  Station

Mullana,  Kewal  Krishan  (P.W.7),  said  First  Information  Report  was

registered. The P.W.1 implicated, along with the appellant, his mother, two

brothers Atul Mittal and Anil Kumar of subjecting the victim to various

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types  of  torture  for  not  bringing  sufficient  dowry.  In  his  statement,  as

recorded,  he  said  that  before  marriage,  Anil  Kumar,  along  with  the

appellant,  made  the demand of  Rs.  1,00,000/-  for  purchasing a  Maruti

vehicle.  He has also stated in his deposition that he spent a sum of Rs.

2,50,000/-  in  marriage  ceremony  of  his  daughter.  He  also  stated  in  his

deposition  that  taunting  of  her  daughter  had  continued  for  bringing

insufficient dowry. Moreover, on certain occasions of bereavement in the

family, PW-1 stated in his examination-in-chief, that Meenakshi was not

allowed to visit  her parental  home and on other occasions,  his relations

were  not  allowed  to  meet  her  in  the  matrimonial  home  either.  Further

demand of dowry was made,  according to him, to help the appellant in

respect of his clinic, in response to which PW-1 gave Rs.20,000/- to his

daughter  for  her  well-being.  The  statement  forming  the  basis  of  F.I.R.

broadly corresponds to the deposition of PW-1 and there has been no major

contradiction or discrepancy between the version of the P.W.1 concerning

the  antecedents  and  circumstances  of  Meenakshi’s  death  in  the  F.I.R.

statement and P.W.1’s witness statement.

3. Charges were framed under Sections 306, 406, 304-B and 498-A of

the Code before the Trial Court against all the persons arraigned as accused

in the F.I.R., following charge-sheet submitted by the police on completion

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of  investigation.  Altogether  seven  witnesses  were  examined  by  the

prosecution,  of  which  four  were  witnesses  of  fact.   All  of  these  four,

however, were near or distant relatives of the deceased. The father of the

deceased deposed as  PW-1 whereas her  paternal  uncle,  Bharat  Bhushan

was  examined  and  he  deposed  as  PW-2.  We  have  already  referred  to

Parveen Kumar, who appears to be a relative of the deceased and also the

mediator in the marriage. He was examined as PW-4 and one Rajat Kumar,

maternal cousin of the deceased, deposed as PW-5. There were two police

witnesses, Jeet Ram (PW-3) and Kewal Krishan, the Investigating Officer

who deposed as PW-7. PW-6 was Dr. Tarsem Kumar Monga, the Medical

Officer of Civil Hospital,  Ambala Cantonment who had conducted post-

mortem of the deceased along with two other doctors, P.S. Ahuja and Mrs.

Rozy  Aneja.  The  PW-6  confirmed  death  of  Meenakshi  on  account  of

aluminium phosphide poisoning.  

4. So far as the judgment of conviction of the Trial Court is concerned,

not much came out from the depositions of the two police witnesses, except

that PW-7 stated that dowry articles were produced before him by Bimla

Wanti, mother of the appellant. The Trial Court, primarily relying on the

depositions of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 convicted all the four persons finding

them guilty of offences under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498A of the 1860

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Code and awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10

years to each one of them under section 304-B and four years rigorous

imprisonment under Section 306 of the Code. No separate sentence was

awarded  under  Section  498-A because  of  sentence  having  been  passed

against the accused for major offence under Section 304-B of the Code.

Fine of Rs.1,000/- was imposed on each one of them on both counts with

direction of six months additional rigorous imprisonment in the event of

failure  to  pay  the  fine.   As  we  have  already  narrated,  the  High  Court

however acquitted the mother and two brothers of the appellant and set

aside the judgment of their conviction and order of sentence. Conviction of

the  appellant  under  Section  306  of  the  1860  Code  was  set  aside  but

conviction  and  sentence  on  other  counts  were  sustained.  This  is  the

judgment  which  is  under  appeal  before  us,  instituted  by  the  appellant-

convict.

5. Main  case  of  the  appellant,  argued  by  Mr.  Harin  Raval,  Senior

Counsel has been that there was no evidence of any torture for demand of

dowry against the appellant. On the other hand, our attention was drawn to

a  part  of  the  deposition  of  Bharat  Bhushan  (PW-2).  He  stated  in  his

deposition  that  Meenakshi  had  told  them  (possibly  implying  his  other

family  members)  that  she  had  been  taunted  by  all  the  accused  persons

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excluding the husband. But the same witness also stated in his deposition:-

“Thereafter,  Meenakshi  came  to  her  parental house  for  the  purpose  of  taking  her  examination.  She again told  her  parents  and me that  Dr.  Jitender  Mittal accused  and  other  accused  had  demanded  a  sum  of Rs.50,000/- for extension of clinic. My involvement in my niece was little more than usual because my wife’s brother had proposed that alliance and I was also married at  Mullana.  I  persuaded Meenakshi’s  father  to  pay up that  amount  if  that  could  ensure  her  happiness  at  the matrimonial house. Som Parkash PW handed over a sum of  Rs.20,000/-  to  Meenakshi  when  she  left  for  the matrimonial  house  after  taking  her  examinations.  She had earlier told that the accused used to harass her and had told her to return only if she could bring a sum of Rs.50,000/-.”

6. Mr. Raval relied on decision of this Court in the case of Appasaheb &

Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721, in this judgment it was

observed:

“11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word  “dowry”  any  property  or  valuable  security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or  indirectly  at  or  before  or  any  time  after  the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said  parties.  Therefore,  the  giving  or  taking  of property  or  valuable  security  must  have  some connection with  the marriage  of  the  parties  and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is  essential.  Being  a  penal  provision  it  has  to  be strictly  construed.  Dowry  is  a  fairly  well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is

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passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant  with  that  trade,  business  or  transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that  particular  meaning.(See  Union  of  India  v. Garware  Nylons  Ltd.  (1996)  10  SCC  413  and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 2 SCC 664.) A demand for money on account of  some financial  stringency  or  for  meeting  some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for  meeting domestic  expenses and for  purchasing manure.  Since  an  essential  ingredient  of  Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained.”

7. But  the  view of  the  Court  reflected  in  that  judgment  that  seeking

financial assistance would not per se constitute demand for dowry has been

rejected by a later judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the

case  of Rajinder  Singh  vs.  State  of  Punjab  (2015)  6  SCC 477. Upon

considering the case of Appasaheb (supra) and certain other authorities, it

was held in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra):-

“20.  Given  that  the  statute  with  which  we  are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common- sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment

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in Appasaheb case followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare  that  any  money  or  property  or  valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in  Section  2  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  at  or before  or  at  any  time  after  the  marriage  which  is reasonably  connected  to  the  death  of  a  married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless,  the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

8. It was also held in the  Rajinder Singh (supra) that the expression

“soon”  is  not  to  be  construed  as  synonymous  with  “immediate”.  The

observation of the three-Judge Bench on this point is:-

“23. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that  the  word  “soon”  does  not  mean  “immediate”.  A fair  and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil  that has led to the enactment of section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case.  All  that  is  necessary is  that  the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under section 304B.”

9. So  far  as  present  appeal  is  concerned,  the  depositions  of  the

prosecution witnesses about torture and demand for dowry made by the

appellant have been believed by the Trial Court as also the High Court.

Barring the stray remark by P.W.2,  both P.W.1 and P.W.2 have narrated

facts which would constitute demand for dowry as also inflicting cruelty

and torture upon the deceased victim. Such consistent stand of these two

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witnesses cannot be said to have been overshadowed by the above-referred

stray statement of P.W.2 which is not in tune with rest of his deposition.  As

regards the appellant, it is a finding on fact upon proper appreciation of

evidence. We do not find any major contradiction in the statements made

by P.W.1 and P.W.2 on demand for  dowry and subjecting the deceased

victim  to  cruelty.  They  stuck  by  their  statements  in  cross-examination.

From their depositions, a link can be established between such acts of the

appellant and death of the deceased victim. Once these factors are proved,

presumption  rests  on  the  accused  under  Section  113-B  of  the  Indian

Evidence Act, 1872. The appellant in his statement made in response to his

examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

attributed suicide of the victim to depression on account of several of her

relatives’ deaths within a short spell of time. Though the factum of several

deaths in her family has been established, there is no corroboration of such

a  depressive  state  of  mind  of  the  deceased.  The  other  defence  of  the

appellant is that she was a modern urban lady and could not adjust to the

life  style  of  Mullana,  a  small  town  where  her  matrimonial  home  was

situated. But both the Trial Court and the High Court rejected this defence.

We find no reason to reappreciate evidence on this aspect. Father of the

deceased, as also P.W.2 have proved the demand for dowry. This version

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has  run  consistently  from  the  statement  forming  the  basis  of  F.I.R.  to

deposition stage and we do not think the Trial Court and High Court had

come to such conclusion in a perverse manner.

10. It is also argument of the appellant that since on the basis of same set

of evidences, the co-accused persons were acquitted, the appellant only for

the reason of being husband of the deceased could not be subjected to a

different standard or yardstick in the guilt finding process. The High Court

has given the following reasoning for letting off the co-accused persons:-

“23. The next question, that arises for consideration is, as to which of the accused, could be said to have tortured Meenakshi, continuously, in connection with the demand of dowry, aforesaid leading to her death. It  has  come in the evidence,  that  Anil  Kumar,  and Atul Mittal, brothers of Jatinder Kumar, were living separately, from him. They had their separate mess, and business. It has come in the evidence, that Bimla Wanti, mother of Jatinder Kumar, was residing with her son Atul Mittal, who was unmarried, at that time. Under these circumstances,  the only beneficiary,  of the  cash  amount,  for  the  purchase  of  car,  or  for extension of clinic, in the shape of dowry, could be said to be to the Jatinder Kumar, accused husband of deceased Meenakshi. A married brother, Atul Mittal, unmarried  brother,  and  Bimla  Wanti,  mother  of Jatinder  Kumar,  were  not  be  benefitted,  either  on account of the demand of car, in the shape of dowry, or, on account of demand of cash, for the extension of clinic. It is matter of common knowledge that, when the  bride  dies,  in  the  house  of  her  in-laws,  under unnatural circumstances, then no love is lost between the parents of the deceased, and members of her in-

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laws family.  In such a  situation,  the parents  of  the deceased  are  out  and  out,  to  rope  in,  as  many members of the in-laws family of the bride-groom, as they  could  possibly  do.  The  evidence  of  Som Prakash,  complainant,  Bharat  Bhushan,  paternal uncle of the deceased, and Parveen Kumar, mediator, that the accused, other than Jatinder Kumar, used to torture Meenakshi, in connection with the demand of dowry,  as  a  result  whereof,  she died,  could not  be said to be reliable. The basis of omni-bus allegations, against  Bimla Wanti,  Atul  Mittal,  and Anil  Kumar, that  they  subjected  Meenakshi  to  cruelty,  in connection with the demand of dowry continuously, until  her  death,  they  could  not  be  convicted.  It appears  that,  Anil  Kumar,  Bimla  Wanti,  and  Atul Mittal,  were  falsely implicated,  in  the  instant  case, with a view to exaggerate the number of the accused. Only  Jatinder  Kumar,  committed  the  offences, punishable under Sections 304 -B and 498-A of the Indian  Penal  Code.  Out  of  abundant  caution,  Anil Kumar,  Bimla Wanti,  and Atul  Mittal,  accused,  are required to be given the benefit of doubt, and, thus, are  entitled  to  acquittal.  The  findings  of  the  trial court, only to the extent aforesaid are affirmed.”

11. We are not testing the legality of acquittal of the co-accused persons

in this appeal. On the basis of the evidence on record, we are satisfied that

the judgment and order of conviction and sentence was rightly confirmed

by the High Court so far as the appellant is concerned. The factors which

the  High  Court  found  for  convicting  the  appellant,  in  our  opinion,

establishes  guilt  of  the  appellant  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  We  find  no

reason to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal. The appeal is

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dismissed.  We  are  apprised  that  appellant,  at  present,  is  on  bail.  The

appellant’s bail bond stands cancelled. Let the appellant surrender before

the  Trial  Court  within  four  weeks  from  date  and  undergo  rest  of  the

sentence.

……………………………….J. (Deepak Gupta)

New Delhi. Dated:   December 17, 2019

………………………………….J.         (Aniruddha Bose)