REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  692 OF 2016

Jagjeet Singh Lyallpuri (dead) Through       .… Appellant(s) Lrs. & Ors.      

Versus

M/s Unitop Apartments & Builders         …. Respondent(s) Ltd.

J U D G M E N T

A.S. Bopanna,J.

1.   The  appellants are  before this  Court assailing the

order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO No. 5704 of 2012

(O&M). Through the said order, the High Court has

remanded the matter to the sole Arbitrator Mr. Justice

Kuldip  Singh, retired Judge,  Supreme Court  of India  for

                                                                                                                     Page 1 of 27

providing opportunity of leading evidence to both the

parties  and  also grant  opportunity to cross­examine the

witnesses and thereafter decide each and every claim and

counter claim separately on merits.   The said order is

passed in an appeal filed by the respondent herein under

Section 37 of the  Arbitration and Conciliation  Act,  1996

(‘Act 1996’ for short).  The appellant herein who was the

respondent in the said appeal is therefore before this Court

claiming to be aggrieved by the said order.

2. The brief facts leading to the present situation is that

the appellants herein are joint owners of the land

measuring 14 Kanals and 3 Marlas (8560 Sq. yards) situate

at village Sunet, Tehsil and District Ludhiana, State of

Punjab.   The respondent company through its

representatives claiming to be well­versed with construction

and development of properties approached the appellants

for joint venture in constructing a residential­cum­

commercial complex on the subject land.   Accordingly, an

agreement dated 14.12.1996 was entered into and among

other terms agreed therein, the respondent had undertaken

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to complete the construction of the building consisting of at

least six floors within three years from the date of obtaining

the sanctioned plan from the Ludhiana Municipal

Corporation.  The project was required to be funded by the

respondent and a sum of Rs. 45,00,000/­ (Rupees Forty­

Five Lakhs only) was to be deposited with the appellant as

a guarantee for completion of the project.  In that view, the

appellants were expected to retain the same if the building

is not completed within the period of three years.  The sale

proceeds from the constructed building was to be shared in

the ratio of 48:52 % between the appellants and the

respondent.   

3. Pursuant to such agreement the respondent secured

the sanction of the building plan from the Municipal

Corporation on 04.07.1997.  The period of three years was

to be computed from that point as per the agreement.

Hence the construction ought to have been completed by

03.07.2000.  According to the  appellant, the respondent

though commenced the construction during August, 1997,

the activity was undertaken until 31.03.1999 and the

                                                                                                                     Page 3 of 27

project was abandoned by them thereafter.   Since the

construction was not completed by 03.07.2000 and no

further progress  was  made  despite the  appellant  having

waited beyond the said period, the appellants got issued a

legal notice dated 01.11.2001 and terminated the

agreement dated 14.12.1996.   The respondent though

issued reply dated 28.11.2001 did not proceed further to

make progress in the construction.   

4. The appellants further claim that in such

circumstance the appellant and the respondent entered

into a compromise and a cancellation agreement dated

26.10.2004 was executed due to which an amount of Rs.

40,00,000/­  (Rupees Forty  Lakhs only) from the amount

which was received as security deposit was returned.

Notwithstanding the same, since there was change of guard

in the composition of the management, the respondent filed

an application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 seeking to

restrain the appellants from damaging or demolishing the

construction which had been raised by the  respondents.

Immediately thereafter a notice dated 23.11.2004 was

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issued by the respondent invoking the arbitration clause for

referring the matter to arbitration.  The Arbitration Case

No. 124 of 2006 under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 filed by

the respondent was allowed on 03.07.2009 and Mr. Justice

Kuldip Singh, retired Judge, Supreme Court of India was

appointed as the sole arbitrator to resolve the dispute

between the parties.

5. In that view the parties appeared before the learned

Arbitrator and filed their respective claim, counter­claim

and objection thereto.  The evidence by way of affidavit and

the documents of respective parties was also filed, where

after the learned Arbitrator on hearing the learned counsel

for the parties passed the award dated 13.01.2010 through

which  both the  claim as  well  as the counter claim was

dismissed.  The respondent herein claiming to be aggrieved

by the same filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act,

1996 in the Court of the Additional District Judge,

Ludhiana which was registered in Arbitration Case No. 3

dated 29.01.2010.   The learned Additional District Judge

through the order dated 13.09.2012 affirmed the award by

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dismissing the petition.   It is in that view the respondent

herein filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996

before the High Court.  The  learned Single  Judge of the

High Court has arrived at the conclusion that the parties

have not been granted appropriate opportunity by the

learned arbitrator to tender evidence by examining witness

and to cross­examine the witnesses, whose affidavits were

filed.  It is further held by the High Court that the learned

Arbitrator  has  not considered the  aspect relating to the

extent to which the construction was put up and the

amount that was expended by the respondent herein and

no determination, in that regard has been made.  The said

observation was made after holding, though the time was

not the essence of the contract but yet the long delay would

not be justified.  It was held, even in that circumstance the

other aspects required consideration.   In that background

the matter was remanded to the learned Arbitrator for fresh

consideration.   

6. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the

appellant while assailing such conclusion by the High

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Court  has taken us  through  the  appeal  papers  and has

referred to the agreement dated 14.12.1996 and the

clauses governing the parties.  It is contended that when a

dispute is referred to the learned Arbitrator, Section 19 of

the Act,  1996 provides that the Arbitrator can determine

the rules of procedure.  In that regard it is pointed out that

in the hearing held on 28.11.2009 the learned Arbitrator

has in the course of the proceedings finalised the procedure

and recorded the same in the order.  It is pointed out that

the respondent was represented by a senior advocate in the

arbitration proceedings wherein it has been agreed that the

parties would rely upon the affidavits and documents that

were filed and the procedure of cross­examination could be

dispensed.   In that background the learned arbitrator has

referred to the materials on record in the background of the

claim put forth and the affidavits filed in support thereof

while arriving at the conclusion.   Hence, he contends that

the procedural lapse as attempted to be made out at this

stage is not justified.   

                                                                                                                     Page 7 of 27

7. It is further contended by Mr. Shyam Divan that in a

proceedings where the consideration ought to be limited to

the extent provided under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and

when the learned Additional District Judge has in that light

examined and confirmed the award, the consideration

ought  not to  have  been  expanded by the learned  Single

Judge in a proceedings under Section 37 of the Act, 1996

wherein also the scope is limited.  On the factual aspect it

is contended that despite the terms agreed in the

agreement dated 14.12.1996, no progress was made in the

construction even until the point when the proceedings

were initiated before the learned Arbitrator after it was

abandoned in March 1999. In that circumstance when the

learned Arbitrator has taken into consideration these

aspects and arrived at the conclusion, the learned single

judge could not have interfered with the award.   The

learned senior counsel in that regard has taken us through

the award to point out that a detailed consideration has

been made by the learned Arbitrator on all aspects

including the  fact that the cancellation of the agreement

was agreed between the parties.   On the contention urged                                                                                                                       Page 8 of 27

relating to the construction incurring an amount of

Rs.1,22,00,000/­ (Rupees One Crore Twenty­Two Lakhs

only) said to  have  been  made  by the respondent  also  a

consideration has been made.   In that circumstance when

the contention was adverted to and a view was taken by the

learned Arbitrator based on a finding of fact, the learned

Single Judge was not justified in commenting that the said

aspect had not been adverted to by the learned Arbitrator.

It is therefore contended that the award is liable to be

sustained and the order passed by the learned Single Judge

be set aside.

8. Mr.  Shibo  Shankar  Misra, learned  counsel for the

respondent in his attempt to sustain the order passed by

the learned Single Judge contends that the respondent had

raised twelve claims before the learned Arbitrator and each

claim should have been decided separately.   It is his case

that the learned Arbitrator has proceeded to reject the

claim only on the conclusion that time is the essence of the

contract.  Though the terms as contained in the agreement

dated 14.12.1996 is not disputed, the learned counsel

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contends that the delay caused resulting in non­completion

of the project is solely attributable to the appellant.   The

appellants had not parted with the title documents relating

to the land in question due to which the respondent was

not in a position to raise the funds from the bank by

creating  mortgage.  Apart from  the security  amount the

respondent has suffered loss to the extent of Rs.

1,22,00,000/­ (Rupees One Crore Twenty­Two Lakhs only)

being the cost of construction which was put up.   Specific

claim was raised under different heads before the learned

Arbitrator. Despite such contentions and claims being put

forth the learned Arbitrator has not considered the same.

In that regard it is contended that clause 11 of the

agreement which provides relating to the expenditure

incurred has not been properly appreciated.   The learned

counsel contended that the learned Additional District

Judge in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, 1996

has also not adverted to these aspects of the matter.

However, the learned  Single Judge taking  note of these

aspects and also keeping in view the decision in the case of

Oil and  Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. SAW Pipes                                                                                                                       Page 10 of 27

Limited  2003 (5) SCC 705 has arrived at the conclusion

that an award of the present nature cannot be sustained

and has accordingly remanded the matter to the  learned

Arbitrator to provide opportunity to the parties and take a

fresh decision.   It is contended that in such circumstance

when both parties would have an opportunity, the

appellant herein cannot make out any grievance.   He

therefore contends that the above appeal be dismissed.

9. In the light of the contentions  put forth  we  have

perused the appeal papers and made reference to the

material  on record.   With regard to the agreement dated

14.12.1996 and the clauses contained therein to regulate

the parties there is no serious dispute between the parties.

The very fact that a contention  has  been raised  by the

respondent seeking to attribute the delay and the  non­

completion of the  project to the  appellant  by  contending

that the non­furnishing of the title documents had

prevented the respondent from raising loan would by itself

indicate that no progress was made except putting up the

initial construction and the project was not completed

                                                                                                                     Page 11 of 27

within the period of three years or thereafter, though the

building plan was sanctioned on 04.07.1997.  In that light

the appellant  had  issued a notice  dated 01.11.2001 and

terminated the agreement, which had resulted in a dispute

between the parties.   In that background the matter was

placed before the learned Arbitrator who had been

appointed in  a  proceeding  under  Section  11  of the  Act,

1996.   A perusal of the award dated 30.01.2010 available

at Annexure P­12 to the appeal papers would indicate that

a detailed consideration has been made by the learned

Arbitrator on all aspects of the matter.  In that background

when the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was

filed before the learned Additional District Judge, the

learned Additional District Judge in fact has also adverted

to all aspects of the matter and since no ground for

interference as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act,

1996 was made out, the learned Additional District Judge

through his order dated 13.09.2012 has upheld the award.

10. In that backdrop when the learned Arbitrator and the

learned Additional District Judge have arrived at a

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concurrent opinion, it is necessary for us to take note as to

whether the learned Single Judge in an appeal filed under

Section 37 of the Act, 1996 could have adverted into the

merits of the contention beyond the scope available under

Section 34 (2) of the Act, 1996 so as to set aside the award

and remand the matter.   In that regard whether the

contentions which were put forth to assail the award by

picking holes in the procedure adopted by the learned

Arbitrator is to be accepted or not also requires

examination, keeping in view the scope of Section 34 (2) of

the Act, 1996 and determine as to whether such ground is

made out.

11. Since the learned Single Judge has presently

accepted the contention raised on behalf of the respondent

herein that the procedure followed by the learned Arbitrator

is contrary to law and has prejudiced the respondent herein

since the witnesses were not cross­examined, this aspect of

the  matter is required to  be  noticed  at the outset.   As

rightly pointed out by the  learned senior counsel  for  the

appellant, the rules of procedure to be followed by an

                                                                                                                     Page 13 of 27

Arbitral Tribunal is flexible and can be agreed upon by the

parties as provided under Section 19 of the Act, 1996

which reads as hereunder;

19.  Determination of rules of procedure  – (1) The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

(2) Subject to this Part, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings.

(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub­section (2), the arbitral tribunal  may, subject to this  Part, conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate.

(4) The power of the arbitral tribunal under sub­section (3) includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.

12. Further,  keeping in view that the  contention  put

forth before the High Court by the respondent herein to

assail the award was in the manner as noticed above with

regard to the  appropriate procedure  not  being followed

and there being denial of opportunity and in that view the

respondent not being able to put forth the case

appropriately  before the learned Arbitrator, the effect  of

the same is required to be examined.  When a challenge is

raised on that ground, in our opinion it would at best fall

under Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) which reads as follows;

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“34.  Application for setting aside arbitral award – (1) Recourse to a  Court  against  an  arbitral  award  may be  made  only  by  an application for setting aside such award in accordance  with sub­section (2) and sub­section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—

    (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—   

         (i) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

         (ii) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(iii)  the party making the application  was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or  was otherwise unable to present his case; or”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)

Therefore,  in order to consider whether the challenge is

sustainable on the ground available in law, at the outset it

is necessary to examine whether the procedural lapse if

any is committed by the learned Arbitrator in unilaterally

denying the opportunity to the parties so as to make the

award  invalid  and  to  set  aside the  same exercising the

power under Section 34 or in an appeal under Section 37

of the Act, 1996.  In this regard as noticed, Section 19 of

the Act,  1996 provides that the Arbitral  Tribunal  is  not

bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian

Evidence Act.  Further, it provides that the parties are free

to agree on the procedure to be followed by the Arbitral

Tribunal.   In this back drop it is noticed that in the case

on hand, in the proceedings dated 28.11.2009 (Annexure

                                                                                                                     Page 15 of 27

P­15) before the  learned Arbitrator, the procedure to be

followed has been discussed and recorded, which reads as

hereunder;

“The parties and their learned counsel have been heard. Whatever further pleadings, documents and list of witnesses were to be filed by the parties in terms of the proceedings dated 10.10.2009, have been done.  The evidence of the claimant as well as of the respondents was to be recorded today.  Mr. Ram Lal, whom the respondents want to  cross­examine, is  present  before the  Arbitrator. The learned counsel for the parties have, however, agreed and consented before me they do not wish to cross­ examine any of the witnesses whose affidavits have been filed by the parties concerned.   In view of the consent of the learned counsel of the parties and parties themselves who are present, I close the evidence.  The parties will rely on the affidavits already filed and the documents and other pleadings already placed on the record.”

(emphasis supplied)

That apart by the very proceedings dated 28.11.2009 the

points on which arguments would be addressed were also

treated as the issues for consideration and has been

formulated and recorded in the order sheet.   

13. From a perusal of the proceedings dated 28.11.2009

it would be clear that both contentions raised by the

learned counsel for the respondent herein and which were

accepted by the learned Single Judge to ultimately remand

the matter, would not be justified.  Firstly, in the presence

of the parties and their learned counsel it has been

                                                                                                                     Page 16 of 27

recorded that they do not wish to cross­examine any of the

witnesses whose affidavits have been filed by the parties

concerned and one of the witness who was present was

discharged without being cross examined and no

grievance was made either by the parties or their learned

counsel who were present.  It is in that view the evidence

was taken  as closed  on  28.11.2009  and the issues for

consideration was settled for arguments on the same day.

In that circumstance having consented to the said

procedure, it would not be open for the respondent herein

to approbate and reprobate so as to raise a different

contention at this point.   Having accepted the said

procedure the respondent  is estopped from raising such

contention before the learned Single Judge that the

arbitrator misconducted himself by not permitting the

parties to cross­examine the  witness  and  also that the

learned Arbitrator being more than 70 years of age and

suffering from knee problem has pressurized the

respondent to speed up the matter and the evidence was

closed.   It is rather intriguing  for  us  to note  that  such

contention has not only been permitted to be raised, but                                                                                                                       Page 17 of 27

also accepted by the learned Single Judge to remand the

matter, which is wholly unjustified.

14. We are of such opinion for the reason that the

procedure  to  be  followed  in arbitration proceedings  was

settled by a separate order dated 28.11.2009 during the

course  of the  proceedings  before the learned Arbitrator.

Thereafter the award was passed only on 13.01.2010.

Though the respondent was represented by their learned

counsel and the order dated 28.11.2009 was passed while

recording the proceedings of that day, neither any

application had been filed before the learned Arbitrator to

recall the  said  order  and provide  opportunity to tender

evidence or cross examine, nor was a challenge raised by

initiating any other proceedings, before the award was

passed.   It is only subsequent to the award being passed

such contention is being raised as an afterthought, which

in such event cannot be accepted.   That apart, the

agreement being entered into on 14.12.1996 and the work

not having progressed subsequent to March,1999 was not

seriously  in dispute and  in that circumstance based on

                                                                                                                     Page 18 of 27

the  affidavit, the admitted  documents  have  been taken

note by the learned Arbitrator due to which the non­cross­

examination in any event has not prejudiced the

respondent herein.  One aspect  of the matter  no doubt

was with regard to the claim that was put forth by the

appellant herein that a cancellation agreement dated

26.10.2004 was entered into and the security deposit of

Rs. 40 Lakhs and the advance of Rs. 23 Lakhs has been

re­paid to Mr. S. Surinder Singh which was disputed by

the respondent.   On that aspect the learned Arbitrator in

any  event  has concluded that the said  payment if any

cannot be considered as a payment made to the

respondent company but has been received by Mr.

Surinder Singh who had made gain unto himself. In such

event since the respondent has not filed the affidavit of Mr.

Surinder Singh disputing the same, it is an inter­se matter

to claim from Mr. Surinder Singh and therefore, the non­

cross­examination on that aspect also has not resulted in

any prejudice.   Be that as it may, as already taken note,

the procedure to be  followed in the arbitral  proceedings

                                                                                                                     Page 19 of 27

has been agreed to by the parties.   Hence the respondent

cannot be heard to complain as and when it suits them.

15.  Further, since through the very order dated

28.11.2009 the issues for consideration on which the

arguments would be addressed was settled and the matter

was proceeded on that understanding without raising any

objection, the grievance put forth by the respondent and

accepted  by the learned  Single Judge that the learned

Arbitrator has not answered each of the claims separately

in the award, cannot also be accepted.   A perusal of the

award would indicate that the learned Arbitrator has

adverted to all  aspects  in a sequential  manner and has

recorded his conclusion in answer to the contentions that

were put forth.   

16.  One other  aspect  which has been recorded by the

learned Single Judge as the reason for which the matter

requires reconsideration by the learned Arbitrator is that

the claim put forth by the respondent that the sum of Rs.

1,22,00,000/­ spent by them has not been considered by

the learned Arbitrator.   In that regard the learned Single

                                                                                                                     Page 20 of 27

Judge has held that though the respondent herein would

not be entitled to continue the project due to lapse of time

the learned Arbitrator has not considered the right of the

parties relating to the extent of the cost incurred for the

existing construction and the manner in which it is to be

dealt with.  On this aspect, a perusal of the award passed

by the learned Arbitrator would indicate that after having

arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has

committed the breach, the learned Arbitrator has also

adverted to the said contention relating to the cost

incurred for the extent of construction made, as claimed

and has rejected the same.   The consideration as made is

as hereunder;

“I  may examine,  at this  stage the  claimant’s  contention  that construction worth about Rs. 1 crore 20 lacs has been done on the project.   The claimant has primarily relied on the balance sheet of the Company for the relevant year in support of this argument.  The balance sheet is Annexure­K at page 118­126 of the statement of Claim.  In the schedule forming part of  the accounts for the  year ending  31st  March, 1999, the  balance sheet  shows an expenditure of  about 1 crore 20  lacs on the project in process.   This includes Rs. 44 lacs as advance given to the respondents (land owners) as guarantee money. Expenditure incurred has been shown under various headings such as advertisement and publicity, salary, entertainment, iron and steel, cement, GC sheets, stand, bricks, marble, crusher, electrical, GI pipes, gate, professional charges, telephone expenses, electricity expenses, labour and construction charges. An amount of Rs. 56,58,530/­ has been shown under the heading purchase.   It is not indicted so as to what was purchased.   All the items required for the construction of the

                                                                                                                     Page 21 of 27

project have been shown separately but it is not clear on what purchase/purchase this amount was spent.   No explanation is forthcoming  from the claimant  in this respect.  Mr.  Mahajan while controverting the argument of Mr. Lekhi has stated that Local  Commissioner’s report  Annexure­W makes it  clear that the amount which may have been spent on the construction was much less.  Be that as it may there is no expert evidence on the record to show as to how much money was spent on the construction.   The claimant company did receive some money as advance against flats and offices to be constructed.   It is in the evidence that Rs. 23 lacs was received by the Company in this respect.  The balance sheet as on 31st March, 1999 at page 121 shows that the Company received Rs. 19,79,488/­ as advance against flats  and offices.   In the absence of reliable evidence on the record, it is not possible to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the claimant.”

17. In  that  circumstance when  the learned Arbitrator

has noticed the contention and recorded a finding of fact it

cannot  be  accepted  that the learned  Arbitrator  has  not

adverted to the same so as to require reconsideration.  To

be fair to the learned Arbitrator, it has in fact been noticed

by the learned Arbitrator relating to the change of

Directors  and  shareholders  of the company in  2007 as

against the  shareholders  who existed as  on 30.09.2005

and  also that the erstwhile  Directors/shareholders  who

had personal knowledge have not been examined by filing

their affidavits and even though an application dated

12.09.2009 for summoning them as witnesses was filed,

the same was not pressed and the evidence was closed on

                                                                                                                     Page 22 of 27

28.11.2009 with the consent of the parties.   The learned

Arbitrator  has in fact recorded  that  none of them have

come forward to render assistance in the proceedings.  In

such circumstance when the respondent herein, who were

themselves the claimants before the learned Arbitrator

have not conducted the matter in an appropriate manner

by securing affidavit evidence of the erstwhile directors /

shareholders, they cannot at this stage turn around and

contend that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted

himself.  In any event the challenge to the award does not

fall under any of the clauses of Section 34 of Act, 1996. In

such circumstance the reliance placed by the learned

Single Judge on a decision in the case of ONGC (supra) is

highly misplaced.   Therefore, the order dated 31.07.2015

passed by the learned Single  Judges is  not  sustainable

and the same is liable to be set aside.

18. During the course of hearing we had also made an

endeavour to see that the parties amicably settle the

matter by enabling the respondent herein to receive some

amount towards the expended portion, also by not

                                                                                                                     Page 23 of 27

ignoring the loss suffered by the appellants due to delay.

From the photographs produced before us we have noticed

that except raising some columns, there is no major

construction that is put up.   In so far as the expense as

claimed by the  respondent,  as indicated by the learned

Arbitrator as extracted above, there is no conclusive

evidence to that effect.  Though such columns are raised,

admittedly construction activity has not taken place

beyond March, 1999 and already two decades have

elapsed.  In view of the breach and the respondent herein

failing in the present lis there would be no absolute right

in  their favour since  the  inevitable loss suffered by  the

appellants by not being able to enjoy the property for the

last more than two decades also cannot be lost sight.  The

appellant herein who is the owner of the property will have

to enter into a fresh contract and the need and manner of

development   may not be the same at this point and in

such event the appellant herein also would be put to some

loss to  undertake the  demolition  process themselves  or

there would be reduction that would be made by the

alternate developers who would undertake the project.                                                                                                                       Page 24 of 27

Further, the actual quantum in any event cannot be

determined and also when a breach has been committed

through the predecessor directors / shareholders of the

respondent company  and  when the  present  directors  /

shareholders have entered the scene in the midst of the

breach they would have to bear the loss, if  any, to that

extent.   Therefore,  without reference to the  actual loss

suffered by the parties, while putting an end to the

litigation between the parties, in the peculiar circumstance

and in the interest of justice, notwithstanding the fact that

we have held the order of the learned Single as not

sustainable, in exercise of our power under Article 142 of

the Constitution of India the appellant is directed to pay

the sum of Rs. 45,00,000/­ (Rupees Forty­Five Lakhs only)

to the  respondent  whereupon  they  would be  entitled to

assume  possession of the subject land and  proceed to

enjoy the same in accordance with law.   

19. In the result the appeal is disposed of with the

following order:

                                                                                                                     Page 25 of 27

(i)  The order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana in FAO No. 5704 of 2012

(O&M) is set aside.   Consequently, the award dated

13.01.2010 passed by the learned Arbitrator is restored.

(ii) The appellant is directed to pay the sum of Rs.

45,00,000/­ (Rupees Forty­Five Lakhs only) in full quit of

all claims, to the respondent within three months.

(iii) Immediately on payment of the said amount the

appellant  shall  be entitled to resume possession  of the

subject land in the status as it exists and enjoy the same

in accordance with law.

(iv) Parties to bear their own costs.

….……………………….J.                                           (R. BANUMATHI)

       ….……………………….J.                                           (A.S. BOPANNA)

….……………………….J.

                                                                                                                     Page 26 of 27

                                             (HRISHIKESH ROY) New Delhi, December 03, 2019

                                                                                                                     Page 27 of 27