IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 539­540 OF 2008

JAGDISHRAJ KHATTA               … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                  … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

N.V. RAMANA, J.    

1. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated

09.01.2008 and 27.02.2008, passed by  the Division Bench of the

High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.

356 of 1993, whereby the appeal preferred by the State of Himachal

Pradesh was allowed, and the judgment and order dated 03.04.1993

passed by the  Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra,  Dharamshala,

Himachal Pradesh, acquitting the appellant­accused for offences

under  Sections  498A and  306 of the IPC,  and Section 30  of the

Indian Arms Act, was set aside.  

2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the appellant, who

NON­REPORTABLE

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was posted as the Forest  Range  Officer at Jawalamukhi, at the

relevant time,  was residing  with the  deceased (his  wife) and two

minor children. On 07.01.1990, at about 10 a.m., within seven years

of the deceased’s marriage with the appellant, the deceased used the

appellant’s gun to kill  herself.  On receiving  information about her

death, the deceased’s  mother,  cousin,  brother in  law and  father’s

neighbor went to Jawalamukhi, and the inquest report was prepared

in their presence. After the funeral ceremonies were completed, on

08.01.1990 at around 11 p.m., the deceased’s cousin lodged a report

against the appellant herein, alleging that the appellant drove the

deceased to commit suicide as he continuously subjected the

deceased to cruelty, harassment, physical violence and even

mistreated her and insulted her in the presence of her parents and

relatives. Subsequently, on 13.01.1990, the father of the deceased

produced a letter allegedly written to him by the deceased, which he

received  on  10.01.1990.  The  contents  of the letter supported the

allegations made against the appellant in the FIR, regarding cruelty

and harassment towards the deceased.  

3. The appellant was charged under Sections 498A and 306 of the

IPC and Section 30 of the Indian Arms Act. The Trial Court, after

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considering the material against the appellant, acquitted him of all

the charges. On appeal by the State, the High Court reversed the

findings of the Trial Court and convicted the appellant for the

offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC and sentenced him

to three years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000, in

default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for a further period of six months, for the offence under Section 306,

IPC, and one­year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, in

default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for a further period of three months, for the offence under Section

498A, IPC, with both sentences to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the

judgment and order of the High Court, the appellant has preferred

the present appeals before us.

4. The counsel for the appellant strongly urged that the  High

Court erred in relying on a letter which was allegedly sent by the

deceased to her relatives in overturning the well­reasoned judgment

of the Trial Court. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the letter

was surrounded by suspicious circumstances which were not

considered by the High Court, such as the fact that there was a delay

in handing over the letter to the police, which delay was not

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explained, and that the family of the deceased had never received

any other letter from the deceased, who had a phone connection and

often  used to be visited by her family. Additionally, the counsel

submitted that the High Court did not consider that the notebook,

which was used as a handwriting sample of the deceased for

comparison purposes, was not proved to belong to the deceased. As

such, the learned counsel for the appellant supported the findings of

the  Trial  Court  and prayed  that the  High Court’s findings  be  set

aside, and the appellant be acquitted.

5. On  the  other  hand, the learned  counsel for the respondent­

State supported the findings of the High Court and submitted that

the same do not merit any interference by this Court.

6. Heard the submissions of the learned counsels of both parties.

7. On perusing the judgment of the High Court, we find that it

has reversed the findings of the Trial Court by mainly relying on the

following evidences: (1) the testimonies of the relatives of the

deceased that the  appellant  acted in  a  cruel  manner  against the

deceased in front of her relatives, and  (2) the letter allegedly written

by the deceased around the time of her death to her parents.  

8. With respect  to the  former,  we are unable to  agree with  the

reasoning  of the  High  Court in relying  on the testimonies  of the 4

relatives of the deceased. As highlighted by the Trial Court, not only

were the allegations in the FIR extremely general in nature, but also

the same were never raised by the family of the deceased when they

were present at the time of preparation of the inquest report or to the

investigating officer. In fact, the allegation of cruelty meted out by the

appellant against the deceased appears for the first time at the time

of filing the FIR, after a delay of nearly one and a half days. Further,

the prosecution did not even examine any neighbor of the appellant

and the deceased to substantiate the allegation that the appellant ill­

treated the deceased. In fact, and as the High Court also recorded, it

appears from the evidence on record that the appellant treated the

deceased with love and affection and provided for all her needs. In

these circumstances, a reliance on the general oral testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses,  without any supporting evidence,  would be

misplaced. Further, as the  High  Court itself indicated somewhat

contradictorily, reliance on the instances testified to by the witnesses

would not be appropriate as the said incidents had taken place much

before the  deceased’s  death and could  not  be treated as  conduct

which drove the deceased to commit suicide.  

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9. This brings us to the second part of the High Court’s reasoning

in convicting the appellant, relating to the letter allegedly sent by the

deceased to  her  parents  one  day  before  her  death.  We are  again

unable to accept the findings of the High Court on this point. We

agree with the submission of the counsel for the appellant that the

letter has not been proved to have been written by the deceased and

is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. While the handwriting

expert testified that the writing in the letter is the same as that of

certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who

owned or wrote in the aforesaid notebook. In fact, the only persons

who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of

the  deceased were her father  and cousin.  However,  how either  of

them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The

father of the deceased was her teacher nearly 15 years prior to the

incident,  and the  deceased  had  admittedly  not  written  any  other

letter to her father after her marriage. Similarly, the cousin of the

deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his

possession.  

10. Most importantly, the letter  was received by the deceased’s

father  on 10.01.1990 but  was  handed over to the  police  only  on

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13.01.1990, casting serious doubt on the authenticity of the letter.

The fact that the deceased had never written any other letter to her

family  after  her  marriage  but  had  rather  been  in touch with  her

relatives through the telephone, further strengthens the case of the

appellant.

11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, as

well as the material placed before us, we hold that the prosecution

was not able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable

doubt. Additionally, we are of the opinion that this was not a fit case

for the High Court to interfere with the well­reasoned judgment and

order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, particularly when there

existed no grave  infirmity in  the findings of the Trial  Court. [See

Bannareddy and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.,  (2018) 5

SCC 790]. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeals are allowed,

and the  impugned  judgment and order of the High Court are  set

aside.  The judgment  and  order  of the  Trial  Court, acquitting the

appellant herein, is therefore affirmed.  

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12. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.     

..............................................J.                                                                       (N.V. RAMANA)

..............................................J.  (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

NEW DELHI; APRIL 26, 2019.

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