JAGDISH Vs THE STATE OF HARYANA
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001864-001864 / 2009
Diary number: 29884 / 2008
Advocates: RAM NARESH YADAV Vs
MONIKA GUSAIN
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s).1864 OF 2009
JAGDISH AND ANOTHER ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The two appellants have been convicted under Sections
302, 149 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred
to as ‘IPC’). Originally there were 13 accused. Only six were
charge-sheeted. Two of them were tried by the juvenile court.
Seven were summoned under Section 319. The Trial Court
convicted three persons. One of them, Ishwar has been
acquitted by the High Court.
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2. Sri S.R. Singh, learned senior counsel, on behalf of the
appellants submits that once the other accused have been
acquitted, the two appellants alone cannot be convicted with the
aid of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court
erred in convicting with the aid of Section 34 in absence of a
charge framed under that Section. There is no evidence of any
common intention, displaying a prior meeting of minds to
commit the assault. PW-1 and PW-8 were not eye witnesses.
They reached after the occurrence. Their claim to be eye
witnesses is highly improbable from their own evidence. An
alternative submission was made that in any event at best it was
a case for conviction under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. Reliance
was placed on Dalip Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC
364::1954 SCR 145, and Sakharam Nangare vs. State of
Maharashtra, 2012 (9) SCC 249.
3. Learned counsel for the State submitted that PW-1 and
PW-8, the eye-witnesses to the occurrence had stated that
Appellant no.2 made the fatal assault on the head of the
deceased with a lathi while appellant no.1 also assaulted the
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deceased. The parties resided in the same locality and there is
evidence of a street light. Relying on Khem Karan and others
vs. State of U.P. and another, 1974 (4) SCC 603, it was
submitted that because PW-1 was the sister of the deceased, the
credibility of her evidence as an eye-witness to the occurrence
cannot be doubted to grant acquittal in the nature of materials
available on the records.
4. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the
parties and perused the materials on record. The parties resided
in the same locality and were known to each other. Animosity
existed between them because the son of the second appellant
had written love letters to the daughter of PW-1. Earlier an
altercation had taken place between the parties on 20.05.1995
leading to a police case being lodged against both sides. There
was another incident on 12.06.1995 for which the appellants and
the deceased were proceeded with under Sections 107, 151,
Cr.P.C. The deceased had been released on bail and was
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returning from the house of PW-1 on 16.06.1995 at about 9.00
P.M. when the assault is stated to have taken place.
5. PW-8 and PW-1 are husband and wife holding arms licence
in their individual names. They are stated to have been
accompanied to the place of occurrence by Kamla the sister of
PW-8 and one Pali Ram who was also an arms licensee.
Surprisingly, the latter two have been given up by the
prosecution and have not been examined. All four are stated to
have moved away from the place of assault out of fear, as
claimed. If three of them were possessed of weapons there has
to be an explanation why they did not act in self defence when
the assault is alleged by lathis, gandasi and guns. It is also
difficult to accept that her husband PW-8 and Palli continued to
hide in fear while PW-1 accompanied by her sister-in-law alone
shortly returned to the place of occurrence to check on the
deceased. An additional fact which is not only improbable but
highly unnatural according to normal societal rural customs and
mores is that PW-1 accompanied by her sister-in-law alone went
to the police station at 3.00 A.M, a kilometer away, to lodge the
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F.I.R. while her husband and Pali Ram who was staying with
them remained at home.
6. In the F.I.R. PW-1 made generalized allegations of assault
by all the 13 accused who are stated to have surrounded the
deceased. But her court statement was more specific with
regard to the nature of assault made by each of the accused. A
total of 11 injuries were found on the person of the deceased.
The first injury was bone deep in the right parieto occipital
region with damage to brain and pieces of bone in the wound.
There was injury on the neck, lacerated wound over the right
shoulder, lacerated wound over the dorsum of both ring and
little fingers causing fracture, lacerated wound over the right
wrist joint over the middle of forearm, on the left side of the
chest wall, over the iliac crest, over the left scapular region with
a linear incision due to sharp weapon, over left deltoid region
and lacerated wound over the right knee left ankle and left
forearm. The two appellants were armed with lathis by which an
incised wound could not have been caused. In any event, the
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number of injuries on the deceased leaves us satisfied that it
was the result of a mob assault and not an assault by the two
appellants alone.
7. The High Court has committed an error of record by
considering PW-8 to be an eye witness without any discussion
when his presence at the time of occurrence has been
disbelieved by the Trial Court. With regard to PW-1, the Trial
Court has itself observed that her deposition “does not contain
the entire truth and it makes the court to sit up and to find out
the kernel out of the chaff”. This observation assumes
significance in view of the acquittal of the remaining accused by
the Trial Court itself, excluding the juveniles.
8. The question that arises to our mind is that in the mob
assault by 13 persons who had surrounded the deceased at
night, PW-1 was the sole eye-witness. Even if a light was
burning some of them undoubtedly must have had their back to
PW-1 making identification improbable if not impossible. The
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witness has been severely doubted both by the trail court and
the High Court to grant acquittal to the other accused. Can the
evidence of a solitary doubtful eye witness be sufficient for
conviction? We may have a word of caution here. Conviction on
basis of a solitary eye witness is undoubtedly sustainable if there
is reliable evidence cogent and convincing in nature along with
surrounding circumstances. The evidence of a solitary witness
will therefore call for heightened scrutiny. But in the nature of
materials available against the appellants on the sole testimony
of PW-1 which is common to all the accused in so far as assault
is concerned, we do not consider it safe to accept her statement
as a gospel truth in the facts and circumstances of the present
case. If PW-1 could have gone to the police station alone with
her sister-in-law at an unearthly hour, there had to be an
explanation why it was delayed by six hours. Given the harsh
realities of our times we find it virtually impossible that two
women folk went to a police station at that hour of the night
unaccompanied by any male. These become crucial in the
background of the pre-existing enmity between the parties
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leading to earlier police cases between them also. The possibility
of false implication therefore cannot be ruled out completely in
the facts of the case.
9. The High Court concluded that the appellants alone were
the assailants of the deceased. Ishwar is also stated to have
assaulted with a lathi capable of causing lacerated wounds. We
find it difficult to hold that the appellants were any differently
situated than Ishwar. The susceptibility of eleven injuries,
including incised wounds, by two accused is considered highly
improbable.
10. Therefore, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of
the case, the relationship between PW-1 and the deceased, the
existence of previous animosity, we do not consider it safe and
cannot rule out false implication to uphold the conviction of the
appellants on the evidence of a doubtful solitary witness, as
observed in State of Rajasthan vs. Bhola Singh and Anr.,
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AIR 1994 SC 542, (Crl. Appeal No. 65 of 1980 decided on
25.08.1993):
“4. From the above-stated facts, it can be seen that the case is rested entirely on the solitary evidence of P.W.1. The High Court has pointed out several infirmities in the evidence of P.W.1. It is well-settled that if the case is rested entirely on the sole evidence of eye-witness, such testimony should be wholly reliable. In this case, occurrence admittedly took place in the darkness….”
11. In Lallu Manjhi and another vs. State of Jharkhand,
(2003) 2 SCC 401, it was observed that if ten persons were
stated to have dealt with blows with their respective weapons on
the body of the deceased, and that if each one of them
assaulted then there would have been minimum of ten injuries
on the person of the deceased. In the present case, as noticed
there are 11 injuries on the person of the deceased. Giving the
benefit of doubt granting acquittal, it was observed as follows:
“13….. The version of the incident given by the sole eyewitness who is also an interested witness on account of his relationship with the deceased and being inimically disposed against
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the accused persons is highly exaggerated and not fully corroborated by medical evidence. The version of the incident as given in the Court is substantially in departure from the earlier version as contained and available in the first information report. We cannot, therefore, place reliance on the sole testimony of Mannu (PW 9) for the purpose of recording the conviction of all the accused persons.”
12. We therefore find the order of the High Court to be
unsustainable and accordingly set it aside. The appellants are
acquitted. They are directed to be released forthwith if they are
not required in any other case.
13. The appeal is allowed.
.……………………….J. (Ashok Bhushan)
………………………..J. (Navin Sinha)
New Delhi, AUGUST 06, 2019.
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