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                                  REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11474 OF 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 13982 of 2007)

International Amusement Limited ………APPELLANT

Vs.

India Trade Promotion  Organisation & Anr.             ………RESPONDENTS

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11475 OF 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 13983 of 2007)

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.  

2. These appeals are directed by the appellant  

against the common impugned judgment and order  

dated  16.07.2007 passed  in writ  petition (c)  

No. 2015 of 2001 and C.M. (M) No.553/2007 by  

the High Court of Delhi, urging various facts  

and legal grounds and raising  two substantial

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questions of law which read thus:-   

a) Whether  the  arbitration  

proceedings  can  be  continued  

between  the  International  

Amusement  Limited  and  the  India  

Trade Promotion Organisation?

b)  Whether  the  Estate  Officer  

appointed  as  Arbitrator  is  the  

correct forum?  

Necessary brief facts are stated hereunder  

with a view to find out whether the questions  

of law framed in these appeals would arise for  

our consideration.  

3. The  appellant  herein  was  running  an  

amusement  park  in  Pragati  Maidan,  New  Delhi  

since the year 1984, which was well known as  

“Appu  Ghar”.  The  land  for  the  purpose  was  

initially  allotted to  the appellant  by India  

Trade  Promotion  Organisation  (for  short  ‘the  

ITPO) on licence basis as the lease between the  

Central  Government  and  the  ITPO  was  still  

pending and as such permanent allotment of the  

land  could  not  be  made  in  favour  of  the

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appellant. Only as an administrative measure,  

the  license  agreements  were  entered  into  

between  the  appellant  and  the  ITPO.  The  

appellant  claimed  that  it  was  the  permanent  

allottee of the land for running the amusement  

park on the similar lines as were allotted in  

favour  of  the  Statutory  

Corporations/Instrumentalities of the State and  

Central  Government.  It  was  only  on  the  

assurance of the Land & Development Office (for  

short  “the  L&DO”),  Ministry  of  Urban  

Development  and ITPO  that the  appellant made  

huge amount of investment for establishing and  

running “Appu Ghar”. The last agreement entered  

into between the parties was on 6.11.1995. In  

the said agreement, arbitration clauses 27 and  

28   were  incorporated,  which  are  extracted  

hereunder :-

“27.  The  licensed  premises  are  public  premises  as  defined  in  the Public Premises (Eviction of  Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act,  1971  and  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Estate  Officer, Pragati Maidan. 28.    In case of any dispute  arising out of or in connection

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with this agreement the disputes  shall  be  referred  to  the  sole  arbitration  of  the  Chairman,  India  Trade  Promotion  Organisation  or  his  nominee  whose  decision/award  shall  be  final, conclusive and binding on  the  parties.  Application  for  reference  to  arbitration  shall  be made by either party within  two  months  of  arising  of  the  dispute.”

4. The case of the appellant is that it being  

a  permanent  allottee  of  the  land  at  Pragati  

Maidan,  it  had  made  huge  investments  for  

opening  Water  Park,  in  order  to  provide  

additional amusement facilities to the public  

at large. The ITPO being aware of the permanent  

status of the appellant in respect of the land  

as well as the factum of huge investments made  

by it upon the same towards establishing the  

Water Park, called upon the appellant to vacate  

the premises vide letter dated 02.09.1999. The  

appellant has raised various disputes, claims  

and counter claims against the ITPO.

5. Immediately after the notice was received  

by  the  appellant,  it  submitted  a  detailed

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representation to ITPO with a request to renew  

the lease of the land for further period. Being  

unsuccessful,  the  appellant  commenced  

proceedings  under  the  Arbitration  and  

Conciliation  Act,  1996  (for  short  “the  

Arbitration  Act”)  invoking  its  right  under  

clause 28 of the agreement referred to supra.  

The  arbitration  notice  dated  11.11.1999  was  

issued to the ITPO invoking the provisions of  

clause  28 of  the aforesaid  licence agreement  

and filed an application under Section 8 of the  

Arbitration Act before the Estate Officer for  

referring  the  matter  for  arbitration.  On  

18.11.1999 ITPO issued notice of eviction under  

Section 4A of the Public Premises (Eviction of  

Unauthorized  Occupants)  Act,  1971  (for  short  

“the P.P. Act”) to the appellant to evict from  

the  land of  its unauthorised  occupation. The  

application  for  arbitration  filed  by  the  

appellant  was rejected  by the  Estate Officer  

vide his order dated 28.3.2000 on the ground  

that  the  Estate  Officer  exercises  his  

jurisdiction as provided under the provisions

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of the P.P. Act. It was further stated that it  

is  an  admitted  case  that  the  premises  in  

Pragati Maidan for running Appu Ghar was given  

to the appellant on licence basis and on expiry  

of the licence period the appellant becomes an  

unauthorised  occupant as defined under Section  

2(g)  of  the  P.P.  Act  and  therefore,  it  was  

required to vacate the premises and hand over  

the same to ITPO, hence, the appellant cannot  

take  up  the  plea  that  it  was  a  permanent  

allottee of the premises involved in this case  

and that there was no dispute at all between  

the parties, which could be agitated as raised  

by the appellant.  

6. Being  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  Estate  

Officer, the appellant filed W.P. (C) No.1425  

of 2000 before the Delhi High Court questioning  

the  correctness  of  the  order  passed  by  him.  

Thereafter, on 08.05.2000, the appellant filed  

an  application  being  A.A.  No.111/2000  under  

Section 11(6) and petition OMP No.63/2000 under  

Section  9  of  the  Arbitration  Act  before  the  

Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. The learned

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single Judge, who is the nominee of the learned  

Chief Justice, vide his order dated 23.01.2001  

allowed  the  application  by  appointing  an  

arbitrator  for  deciding  the  disputes  between  

the parties through the process of arbitration.  

7. Aggrieved by the said order, the ITPO filed  

Writ Petition (C) No.2015 of 2001 before the  

Division Bench of Delhi High Court, challenging  

the correctness of the order of appointment of  

the  arbitrator  by  the  High  Court.  On  

12.04.2001,  the  High  Court  stayed  the  

arbitration proceeding which has been in force  

till the disposal of the writ petition.  

8. During the pendency of the above matter,  

some part of “Appu Ghar” land was required by  

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation for construction  

of  Pragati  Maidan  Metro  Station  which  was  

handed  over  by  the  appellant  to  the  ITPO.  

Thereafter, the land of Appu Ghar was resumed  

by the L&DO and the same was allotted to the  

Supreme Court Registry for its expansion plan.  

9. The High Court vide its common order dated  

16.7.2007 allowed Writ Petition (C)No. 2015 of

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2001 filed by the ITPO holding that the matters  

enumerated under Section 15 of the P.P. Act  

cannot  be  referred  to  arbitration  for  

adjudication  for  arbitrator.  The  application  

C.M. (M) No. 553 of 2007 filed by the appellant  

was also dismissed. Hence, these appeals.  

10. It is contended by Mrs. Pratibha M. Singh,  

the learned senior counsel for the appellant  

that the legal position prevailing with respect  

to Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, was that  

any  directions  qua-jurisdiction  ought  to  be  

raised  before  the  Arbitrator  and  the  same  

cannot be adjudicated under Section 11 of the  

Arbitration Act by the Judge who is a designate  

of the Chief Justice under Sections 11(6) and  

11(7)  of the Arbitration Act as per the law  

laid down by this Court in its judgments in  

Konkan Railway Corporation. Ltd. and Ors.  v.  

Mehul  Construction  Co.1  and Konkan  Railway  

Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. v. Rani Construction Pvt.  

Ltd.2

11. Further reliance was placed by the learned  

1  (2000) 7 SCC 201 2  (2002) 2 SCC 388

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senior  counsel  upon  the  Constitution  Bench  

decision of this Court in SBP & Co.  v. Patel  

Engineering  Limited  and  Anr.3,  wherein  this  

Court  has  succinctly  held  that  power  under  

Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act is not an  

administrative  power  of  either  the  Chief  

Justice of the High Court or his designate but  

a judicial power. The said position of law was  

re-affirmed and re-emphasized by this Court in  

Maharshi Dayanand University and Anr. v. Anand  

Coop. L/C Society Ltd. and Anr.4 and again in  

the  case  of S.N.  Prasad,  Hitek  Industries  

(Bihar) Ltd.  v. Monnet Finance Ltd. and Ors.5  

in support of the above said proposition of  

law. Further reliance was placed by the learned  

senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  appellant  on  

another judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh  

Tourism  Development  Corpn.  Ltd.  and  Anr.  v.  

Pampa Hotels Ltd.6

12. It  is  further  contended  by  the  learned  

senior counsel that under Section 15 of the  

3  (2005) 8 SCC 618 4  (2007) 5 SCC 295 5  (2011) 1 SCC 320

6  (2010) 5 SCC 425

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P.P. Act, the bar of jurisdiction applies only  

to a Court and placed reliance on the judgments  

in the cases of Kamal Pushp Enterprises v. D.R.  

Construction  Company7, Firm  Ashok  Traders  &  

Anr.   v.   Gurumukh Das Saluja & Ors.  8 and Ashoka  

Marketing Ltd. & Anr. v. Punjab National Bank &  

Ors.9

13. Without  prejudice  to  the  above  legal  

contentions,  the  learned  senior  counsel  also  

contended that though in general, licences may  

be governed by the P.P. Act, in the case on  

hand,  the  agreement  and  the  nature  of  

relationship between the parties was not that  

of a licensee and licensor, as it is evident  

from the various documents produced on record  

by the appellant. There are several documents  

spanning from 1980s to 1997 which reflect that  

the Government’s intention was always to raise  

the  appellant  as  permanent  allottee  of  the  

land.  However,  for  various  reasons  and  

subsequent events, the permanent allotment of  

7  (2000) 6 SCC 659 8  (2004) 3 SCC 155 9  (1990) 4 SCC 406

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land was not made despite the huge investments  

made by the appellant and the appellant was  

forced to vacate the premises. It was under  

these  circumstances,  the  Government  was  

conscious  of  the  different  nature  of  the  

relationship  of  parties  and  the  arbitration  

clause  was  incorporated  in  the  license  

agreement.

14. On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Ravi  Sikri,  the  

learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  

the ITPO and Mrs. M. Diwan, learned counsel on  

behalf of Union of India rebutted the above  

said  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant contending that arbitration clause 28  

in  the  agreement  does  not  deal  with  the  

arbitration  under  the  provisions  of  the  

Arbitration  Act.  The  learned  senior  counsel  

contended that the Division Bench of Delhi High  

Court after examining the provisions of Section  

5  and  in  the  light  of  Section  2(3)  of  the  

Arbitration  Act,  held  that  Section  2(3)  

protects the existing laws, both common law as  

well  as  statutory  law,  under  which  some

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disputes  cannot  be  made  subject  matter  of  

arbitration.  Further,  it  is  urged  that  the  

Division Bench of the High Court has rightly  

held that Section 15 read with Sections 5 and 7  

of the P.P. Act, confers exclusive jurisdiction  

on the Estate Officer appointed under Section 3  

of the P.P. Act, to deal with the application  

that is filed by the ITPO to evict unauthorised  

occupants from the public premises and pay the  

damages as provided under Sections 5 and 7 of  

the P.P. Act respectively. Further, Section 15  

of the P.P. Act bars and prohibits any court  

from entertaining any suit or proceeding for  

eviction  from  the  premises  etc.  as  provided  

under clauses (a) to (e) of Section 15 and that  

the general power of the Court under Section 9  

of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  to  

entertain  suit  or  proceedings  is  therefore  

ousted if a dispute raised by the appellant  

falls in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 15 of  

the P.P. Act. It was further contended that the  

Division Bench of the High Court rightly held  

that the provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the

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P.P. Act empower the Estate Officer appointed  

under Section 3 of the P.P. Act  to deal with  

applications  that  will  be  filed  by  the  

respondent-ITPO  for  eviction  of  unauthorised  

occupation and for payment of rent and damages  

in respect of the public premises against the  

unauthorised occupants. Sections 5 and 7 of the  

P.P. Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon  

the Estate Officer and makes it very clear that  

he alone has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to  

decide such applications of the ITPO in respect  

of the dispute regarding public premises. The  

said  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  the  Estate  

Officer by the statute cannot be taken away by  

a contract between the parties by incorporating  

arbitration  clause  in  the  agreement  or  made  

subject matter of any dispute in relation to  

the public premises which will be in occupation  

of  the  licensee  for  reference  before  an  

arbitrator to arbitrate the same. It cannot be  

waiver of statutory provisions of the P.P. Act.  

The contract between the parties must be within  

the legal framework and parties cannot contract

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out of the statute. Further, it was contended  

that  the  Estate  Officer  having  exclusive  

jurisdiction is not arbitrable and parties by a  

contract cannot agree to refer the matters in  

respect  of  which  jurisdiction  has  been  

conferred upon the Estate Officer. Therefore,  

the arbitrability of claims of the appellant  

covered under Sections 5 and 7 of the P.P. Act,  

is excluded. To arrive at the said conclusion,  

the Division Bench of the High Court rightly  

placed  reliance  upon  the  Constitution  Bench  

judgment of this Court in the case of  Ashoka  

Marketing  Ltd.  (supra),  wherein  the  legal  

question that arose was as to whether the Rent  

Control Act,1995, which is also a Special Act  

will override the provisions of the P.P. Act.  

After interpreting the relevant provisions of  

the Act, the Constitution Bench of this Court  

in the above case has held that the P.P. Act,  

is a special statute relating to eviction of  

unauthorised occupants from public premises and  

therefore, the same will prevail over the Rent  

Control Act. In the said case it was held that

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the 1971 enactment did away with the option of  

the  parties  and  conferred  exclusive  

jurisdiction on the Estate Officer in relation  

to  the  public  premises.  The  power  and  

jurisdiction  of  a  civil  court  to  adjudicate  

matters enumerated under Section 15 of P.P. Act  

was withdrawn.

15. Further,  reliance  was  placed  by  the  

learned senior counsel for the respondents upon  

the judgment of this Court in Haryana Telecom  

Limited  v. Sterlite  Industries  (India)  

Limited10,  wherein, this Court has referred to  

the provisions of the Companies Act and held  

that power to wind up a company is conferred on  

the Company Court. The said power cannot be  

subject matter of arbitration.  

16. In  view  of  the  above  rival  legal  

contentions urged on behalf of the parties, to  

answer the aforesaid substantial questions of  

law,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  examine  

arbitration clause 28 of the license agreement  

dated 06.11.1995 entered between the parties,  

10  (1999) 5 SCC 688

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which has been extracted in the earlier portion  

of this judgment.  

This Court must accept the contention of  

the learned senior counsel on behalf of the  

ITPO  that  the  said  clause  in  the  licence  

agreement  is  not  an  arbitration  agreement  

between the parties for the reasons discussed  

below.  

17. The  three  Judge  Bench  decision  of  this  

Court (of which two of us were members) in P.  

Dasaratharama Reddy Complex  v. Government of  

Karnataka & Anr.11,  while examining a similar  

clause  of  an  arbitration  agreement,  after  

careful  consideration   and  interpretation  of  

the clause, has held that in all the matters of  

dispute arising out of the agreement regarding  

quality  of  materials  and  work,  etc.,  the  

decision  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  

Nagarika  Yogbakashema  Mathu  Gruha  Nirmana  

Sahakara Sangha, shall be final and binding on  

the part of the Contractor. Further, the case  

of  Mysore  Construction  Company  v. Karnataka  

11  (2014) 2 SCC 201

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Power Corporation Ltd. & Ors.12 was discussed in  

P. Dasaratharama Reddy  (supra) by this Court,  

at para 14, wherein, the Designated Judge has  

referred  to  the  passage  from  Russell,  on  

Arbitration (19th Edition,  page  59)  and  the  

other judgments of this Court in K.K. Modi v.  

K.N.  Modi  and  Ors.,  Chief  Conservator  of  

Forests, Rewa v. Ratan Singh Hans13, Rukmanibai  

Gupta  v. The  Collector,  Jabalpur14,  State  of  

Uttar  Pradesh  v.  Tipper  Chand15,  State  of  

Orissa  v. Damodar Das16, Bharat Bhushan Bansal  

v. Uttar Pradesh Small Industries Corporation  

Ltd., Kanpur17 and observed that the decisions  

in the abovementioned cases make it clear by  

laying down the conditions, when an agreement  

or a clause in the agreement can be construed  

as  an  arbitration  agreement  between  the  

parties.

18. Further,  at  paragraph  16  of P.  

Dasaratharama  Reddy  (supra),  the  distinction  

12   ILR 2000 KAR 4953

13  AIR 1967 SC 166 14   (1980) 4 SCC 556

15  (1980) 2 SCC 341 16  (1996) 2 SCC 216 17  (1992) 2 SCC 166

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between  an  expert  determination  and  

arbitration between the parties has been spelt  

out as per Russell, on Arbitration (21st Edn.)  

in the following words:-  

“16……Many  cases  have  been  fought  over  whether  a  contract’s  chosen  form  of  dispute  resolution  is  expert  determination  or  arbitration.  This  is  a  matter  of  construction of the contract, which  involves an objective enquiry into  the  intentions  of  the  parties.  First, there are the express words  of the disputes clause. If specific  words  such  as  ‘arbitrator’,  ‘Arbitral  Tribunal’,  ‘arbitration’  or  the  formula  ‘as  an  expert  and  not as an arbitrator’ are used to  describe  the  manner  in  which  the  dispute  resolver  is  to  act,  they  are  likely  to  be  persuasive  although  not  always  conclusive….  Where there is no express wording,  the  court  will  refer  to  certain  guidelines.  Of  these,  the  most  important used to be, whether there  was an ‘issue’ between the parties  such as the value of an asset on  which  they  had  not  taken  defined  positions,  in  which  case  the  procedure  was  held  to  be  expert  determination;  or  a  ‘formulated  dispute’ between the parties where  defined  positions  had  been  taken,  in  which  case  the  procedure  was  held  to  be  an  arbitration.  This  imprecise  concept  is  still  being  relied  on.  It  is  unsatisfactory  because  some  parties  to  contract  deliberately  choose  expert  determination  for  dispute

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resolution.  The  next  guideline  is  the  judicial  function  of  an  Arbitral Tribunal as opposed to the  expertise  of  the  expert….  An  Arbitral  Tribunal  arrives  at  its  decision  on  the  evidence  and  submissions of the parties and must  apply  the  law  or  if  the  parties  agree,  on  other  consideration;  an  expert,  unless  it  is  agreed  otherwise, makes his own enquiries,  applies  his  own  expertise  and  decides  on  his  own  expert  opinion….”

19. It  was  further  held  that  a  clause  

substantially similar to the clauses referred  

to  in  P.  Dasaratharama  Reddy (supra)  was  

interpreted by the three Judge Bench of this  

Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Tipper  

Chand  (supra) wherein paras 2 and 3 of the  

said judgment contain the reasons for holding  

that  the  clause  in  the  agreement  cannot  be  

construed as an arbitration clause.

20.  At  para  18  in P.  Dasaratharama  Reddy  

(supra), the case of  State of Maharashtra  v.  

Ranjeet  Construction18 has  been  discussed  

wherein  a  two  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  

interpreted clause 30 of the agreement entered  

18  AIR 1986 Bom 76

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into  between  the  parties,  which  is  almost  

identical to the clauses under consideration,  

relying upon the judgment in the Tipper Chand  

(supra),  and  held  that  clause  30  cannot  be  

relied  upon  by  the  parties  for  seeking  

reference  of  any  dispute  to  an  Arbitrator  

arising out of the contract.

21. At para 17 in the  P. Dasaratharama Reddy  

Complex  case  (supra),  the  case  of  State  of  

Orissa  v. Damodar Das  (supra) has also been  

examined,  wherein  the  three  Judge  Bench  of  

this  Court  interpreted  clause  21  of  the  

contract entered into between the parties. In  

the said case, this Court referred to clause  

25 of the agreement, relied upon the judgment  

in  State of U.P. v.  Tipper Chand (supra) and  

held  that  the  said  clause  cannot  be  

interpreted for resolution of the dispute by  

an Arbitrator, the case fell for consideration  

of this Court in the case of  State of Uttar  

Pradesh  v. Tipper  Chand  (supra)  which  was  

relied upon in the said case is extracted at

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para  20  of  the P.  Dasaratharama  Reddy  case  

(supra) as under:-

“20……(10)……  A  reading  of  the  above clause in the contract as a  conjoint whole, would give us an  indication  that  during  the  progress of the work or after the  completion  or  the  sooner  determination  thereof  of  the  contract,  the  Public  Health  Engineer  has  been  empowered  to  decide all questions relating to  the  meaning  of  the  specifications,  drawings,  instructions  hereinbefore  mentioned and as to the quality  of workmanship or material used  on the work or as to any other  question, claim, right, matter or  thing  whatsoever  in  any  way  arising out of, or relating to,  the  contract  drawings,  specifications,  estimates,  instructions,  orders  or  those  conditions  or  otherwise  concerning  the  works  or  the  execution or failure to execute  the  same  has  been  entrusted  to  the  Public  Health  Engineer  and  his decision shall be final. In  other words, he is nominated only  to decide the questions arising  in the quality of the work or any  other  matters  enumerated  hereinbefore  and  his  decision  shall  be  final  and  bind  the  contractor.  A  clause  in  the  contract cannot be split into two  parts so as to consider one part  to  give  rise  to  difference  or  dispute and another part relating  to  execution  of  work,  its  workmanship, etc. It is settled

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now that a clause in the contract  must be read as a whole. If the  construction  suggested  by  the  respondent is given effect then  the decision of the Public Health  Engineer would become final and  it is not even necessary to have  it made rule of the court under  the Arbitration Act. It would be  hazardous  to  the  claim  of  a  contractor  to  give  such  instruction and give power to the  Public  Health  Engineer  to  make  any dispute final and binding on  the contractor. A careful reading  of  the  clause  in  the  contract  would give us an indication that  the  Public  Health  Engineer  is  empowered  to  decide  all  the  questions  enumerated  therein  other  than  any  disputes  or  differences  that  have  arisen  between  the  contractor  and  the  Government.  But  for  Clause  25,  there  is  no  other  contract  to  refer any dispute or difference  to  an  arbitrator  named  or  otherwise.”  

22. Further, at paragraph 21 of the case of P.  

Dasaratharama Reddy  (supra) the case of  K.K.  

Modi v. K.N.  Modi  (supra) fell  for  

consideration, wherein this Court interpreted  

clause  9  of  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  

that  was  signed  by  the  two  groups  of  Modi  

family.  The  relevant  portion  from  the  said  

judgment  with  regard  to  interpretation  of

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Clause  9  of  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  

between the parties is extracted below:-

“9. Implementation will be done  in  consultation  with  the  financial institutions. For all  disputes,  clarifications,  etc.  in respect of implementation of  this  agreement,  the  same  shall  be  referred  to  the  Chairman,  IFCI  or  his  nominees  whose  decisions  will  be  final  and  binding on both the groups.”

23. Further, in the decision of P. Dasaratharama  

Reddy  at  para  30  referred  to  the  case  of  

Mallikarjun  v. Gulbarga  University19 wherein  it  

was held that the decision of the Superintending  

Engineer of Gulbarga Circle was final, conclusive  

and binding on all parties to the contract upon  

all  questions  relating  to  the  meaning  of  the  

specifications,  designs  etc.  whether  arising  

during  the  progress  of  the  work  or  after  the  

completion  or  abandonment  thereof  in  case  of  

dispute arising between the contractor and the  

Gulbarga University. The case of Punjab State v.  

Dina Nath20 was also referred supporting the same  

view  in  the  case  of  P.  Dasaratharama  Reddy  

19  (2004) 1 SCC 372  

20  (2007) 5 SCC 28

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(supra).  

24. In view of the aforesaid decisions and the  

law laid down by this Court in catena of cases  

referred  to supra  which are  reiterated in  the  

case of P. Dasaratharama Reddy (supra) we are of  

the  view  that  the  clause  28  in  the  agreement  

which is referred to in the case on hand is not  

an arbitration clause. Therefore, the appointment  

of  an  Arbitrator  by  the  nominee  of  the  Chief  

Justice  has  been  rightly  set  aside  in  the  

impugned judgment by the Division Bench of the  

Delhi High Court. The law laid down by this Court  

in  the  above  referred  judgments,  after  

interpretation of relevant arbitration clauses in  

the  agreement  in  those  cases,  are  aptly  

applicable to the fact situation on hand and we  

answer the questions of law framed by this Court  

against the appellant and in favour of the ITPO  

and Union of India.  

      The other proceedings involved in this  

case, if any, pending under the provisions of the  

P.P.  Act  before  the  Estate  Officer,  the  same  

shall be continued by him.

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    Accordingly,  the  civil  appeals  are  

dismissed as there is no merit for consideration  

to  interfere  with  the  impugned  judgment  and  

order. No costs.

                     ……………………………………………………………J.                        [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

 ……………………………………………………………J.  [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi,   December 17, 2014

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ITEM NO.1A-For JUDGMENT      COURT NO.11               SECTION XIV

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No. …...../2014 arising from SLP (C) No(s).  13982/2007

INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENT LIMITED                    Petitioner(s)                                 VERSUS INDIA TRADE PROMOTION ORGANIZATION & ANR           Respondent(s)

WITH C.A. No. …...../2014 arising from SLP(C) No. 13983/2007   Date : 17/12/2014 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.       For Petitioner(s)    Mr. Abhinav Mukerji,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)  Mr. A.K. Pandey, Adv.

Mr. K.V. Upadhyay, Adv.

                    Ms. Madhu Sikri,Adv.

Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv.   Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Adv.

                    M/s Saharya & Co.

                    M/s. S. Narain & Co.

                    Ms. Sushma Suri,Adv.                      

       Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment  

of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.  

Nagappan.

Leave granted.

The  appeals  are  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed  

reportable judgment.

     (VINOD KR.JHA)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)