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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2009 OF 2013 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.4895 OF 2012)

Indra Sarma … Appellant  

Versus

V.K.V. Sarma … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

Leave granted.

2. Live-in  or  marriage  like  relationship  is  neither  a  

crime  nor  a  sin  though  socially  unacceptable  in  this  

country.   The decision to marry or not to marry or to  

have a heterosexual relationship is intensely personal.   

3. We are, in this case, concerned with the question  

whether  a  “live-in  relationship”  would  amount  to  a  

“relationship in the nature of marriage” falling within the

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definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f)  

of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,  

2005 (for short “the DV Act”) and the disruption of such  

a relationship by failure to maintain a women involved in  

such  a  relationship  amounts  to  “domestic  violence”  

within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.    

FACTS:

4. Appellant and respondent were working together in  

a private company.    The Respondent, who was working  

as  a Personal  Officer  of  the Company,  was a married  

person having two children and the appellant, aged 33  

years,  was  unmarried.    Constant  contacts  between  

them  developed  intimacy  and  in  the  year  1992,  

appellant  left  the  job  from  the  above-mentioned  

Company  and  started  living  with  the  respondent  in  a  

shared  household.   Appellant’s  family  members,  

including her father, brother and sister, and also the wife  

of the respondent, opposed that live-in-relationship.  She  

has also maintained the stand that the respondent,  in  

fact, started a business in her name and that they were

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earning  from  that  business.   After  some  time,  the  

respondent  shifted  the  business  to  his  residence  and  

continued the business with the help of his son, thereby  

depriving her right of working and earning.  Appellant  

has also stated that  both of  them lived together  in  a  

shared  household  and,  due  to  their  relationship,  

appellant became pregnant on three occasions, though  

all  resulted  in  abortion.   Respondent,  it  was  alleged,  

used  to  force  the  appellant  to  take  contraceptive  

methods to avoid pregnancy.  Further, it was also stated  

that the respondent took a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-  from  

the appellant stating that he would buy a land in her  

name,  but  the same was not  done.   Respondent also  

took money from the appellant to start a beauty parlour  

for his wife.  Appellant also alleged that, during the year  

2006, respondent took a loan of Rs.2,50,000/- from her  

and had not returned.  Further, it was also stated that  

the respondent, all  along, was harassing the appellant  

by not exposing her as his wife publicly, or permitting to  

suffix  his  name  after  the  name  of  the  appellant.  

Appellant also alleged that the respondent never used to

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take her anywhere, either to the houses of relatives or  

friends or  functions.    Appellant  also  alleged that  the  

respondent never used to accompany her to the hospital  

or  make joint  Bank account,  execute  documents,  etc.  

Respondent’s  family  constantly  opposed  their  live-in  

relationship  and  ultimately  forced  him  to  leave  the  

company of the appellant and it was alleged that he left  

the company of the appellant without maintaining her.   

5. Appellant then preferred Criminal Misc. No. 692 of  

2007  under  Section  12  of  the  DV  Act  before  the  III  

Additional  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Bangalore,  

seeking the following reliefs:

1) Pass a Protection Order under Section 18 of the DV  Act  prohibiting  the  respondent  from  committing  any act of domestic violence against the appellant  and  her  relatives,  and  further  prohibiting  the  respondent  from  alienating  the  assets  both  moveable  and  immoveable  properties  owned  by  the respondent;

2) Pass a residence order under Section 19 of the DV  Act  and  direct  the  respondent  to  provide  for  an  independent  residence  as  being  provided  by  the  respondent or in the alternative a joint residence

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along  with  the  respondent  where  he  is  residing  presently and for  the maintenance of Rs.25,000/-  per month regularly as being provided earlier or in  the alternative to pay the permanent maintenance  charges at  the rate of  Rs.25,000/-  per  month for  the rest of the life;

3) Pass a monetary order under Section 20 of the DV  Act  directing  the  respondent  to  pay  a  sum  of  Rs.75,000/-  towards  the  operation,  pre  and  post  operative  medication,  tests  etc  and  follow  up  treatments;

4) Pass a compensation order under Section 22 of the  DV Act to a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- towards damages  for misusing the funds of the sister of the appellant,  mental torture and emotional feelings; and

5) Pass an ex-parte interim order under Section 23 of  the  DV  Act  directing  the  respondent  to  pay  Rs.75,000/- towards the medical expenses and pay  the maintenance charges @ Rs.25,000/- per month  as being paid by the respondent earlier.

6. Respondent  filed  detailed  objections  to  the  

application stating that it was on sympathetical grounds  

that he gave shelter  to her in a separate house after  

noticing the fact that she was abandoned by her parents  

and relatives, especially after the demise of her father.

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She had also few litigations against  her  sister  for  her  

father’s  property  and  she  had  approached  the  

respondent for moral as well as monetary support since  

they  were  working  together  in  a  Company.   The  

respondent has admitted that he had cohabited with the  

appellant since 1993.  The fact that he was married and  

had  two  children  was  known  to  the  appellant.  

Pregnancy of the appellant was terminated with her as  

well  as  her  brother’s  consent  since  she  was  not  

maintaining  good  health.   The  respondent  had  also  

spent large amounts for her medical treatment and the  

allegation that he had taken money from the appellant  

was  denied.   During  the  month  of  April,  2007,  the  

respondent had sent a cheque for Rs.2,50,000/- towards  

her medical expenses, drawn in the name of her sister  

which was encashed.  Further, it was stated, it was for  

getting further amounts and to tarnish the image of the  

respondent, the application was preferred under the DV  

Act. Before the learned Magistrate, appellant examined  

herself  as  P.W.1  and  gave  evidence  according  to  the  

averments made in the petition.  Respondent examined

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himself as R.W.1.  Child Development Project Officer was  

examined as R.W.2.  The learned Magistrate found proof  

that  the parties had lived together  for  a  considerable  

period  of  time,  for  about  18  years,  and  then  the  

respondent  left  the company of  the appellant  without  

maintaining her.  Learned Magistrate took the view that  

the plea of “domestic violence” had been established,  

due to the non-maintenance of the appellant and passed  

the order dated 21.7.2009 directing the respondent to  

pay  an  amount  of  Rs.18,000/-  per  month  towards  

maintenance from the date of the petition.   

7. Respondent,  aggrieved  by  the  said  order  of  the  

learned Magistrate, filed an appeal before the Sessions  

Court under Section 29 of the DV Act.   The Appellate  

Court,  after  having  noticed  that  the  respondent  had  

admitted  the  relationship  with  appellant  for  over  a  

period of 14 years, took the view that, due to their live-

in  relationship  for  a  considerable  long  period,  non-

maintenance of the appellant would amount to domestic  

violence within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.

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The appellate Court also concluded that the appellant  

has  no  source  of  income  and  that  the  respondent  is  

legally obliged to maintain her and confirmed the order  

passed by the learned Magistrate.     

8. The  respondent  took  up  the  matter  in  appeal  

before the High Court.  It was contended before the High  

Court that the appellant was aware of the fact that the  

respondent was a married person having two children,  

yet  she  developed  a  relationship,  in  spite  of  the  

opposition raised by the wife of the respondent and also  

by the appellant’s parents. Reliance was also placed on  

the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  D.  Velusamy  v.  D.  

Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469 and submitted that  

the tests laid down in  Velusamy case (supra) had not  

been  satisfied.    The  High  Court  held  that  the  

relationship between the parties would not fall within the  

ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” and the  

tests laid down in Velusamy case (supra) have not been  

satisfied.    Consequently,  the  High  Court  allowed  the  

appeal  and set  aside  the  order  passed by  the  Courts

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below.  Aggrieved by the same, this appeal  has been  

preferred.

9. Shri Anish Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing  

for  the  appellant,  submitted  that  the  relationship  

between the parties continued from 1992 to 2006 and  

since  then,  the  respondent  started  avoiding  the  

appellant  without  maintaining  her.    Learned  counsel  

submitted  that  the  relationship  between  them  

constituted  a  “relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage”  

within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which  

takes  in  every  relationship  by  a  man  with  a  woman,  

sharing household, irrespective of the fact whether the  

respondent is a married person or not.  Learned counsel  

also  submitted that  the tests  laid  down in  Velusamy  

case (supra) have also been satisfied.

10. Ms.  Jyotika  Kalra,  learned  amicus curiae,  took us  

elaborately through the provisions of the DV Act as well  

as  the  objects  and  reasons  for  enacting  such  a  

legislation.  Learned amicus curiae submitted that the  

Act  is  intended  to  provide  for  protection  of  rights  of

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women who are victims of violence of any type occurring  

in  the  family.   Learned  amicus  curiae  also  submitted  

that the various provisions of the DV Act are intended to  

achieve the constitutional principles laid down in Article  

15(3), reinforced vide Article 39  of the Constitution of  

India. Learned amicus curiae also made reference to the  

Malimath Committee report and submitted that a man  

who marries a second wife, during the subsistence of the  

first wife, should not escape his liability to maintain his  

second wife,  even under Section 125 CrPC.   Learned  

amicus curiae also referred to a recent judgment of this  

Court  in  Deoki  Panjhiyara  v.  Shashi  Bhushan  

Narayan  Azad  and  Another (2013)  2  SCC  137  in  

support of her contention.

11. Mr.  Nikhil  Majithia,  learned counsel  appearing for  

the respondent, made extensive research on the subject  

and made available valuable materials.  Learned counsel  

referred  to  several  judgments  of  the  Constitutional  

Courts of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,  

etc.  and  also  referred  to  parallel  legislations  on  the

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subject  in  other  countries.  Learned counsel  submitted  

that the principle laid down in  Velusamy  case (supra)  

has been correctly applied by the High Court and,  on  

facts,  appellant  could  not  establish  that  their  

relationship is a “relationship in the nature of marriage”  

so as to fall within Section 2(f) of the DV Act.  Learned  

counsel  also  submitted  that  the  parties  were  not  

qualified to enter into a legal marriage and the appellant  

knew  that  the  respondent  was  a  married  person.  

Further, the appellant was not a victim of any fraudulent  

or bigamous marriage and it was a live-in relationship  

for mutual benefits,  consequently,  the High Court was  

right in holding that there has not been any domestic  

violence,  within the scope of  Section 3 of the DV Act  

entitling the appellant to claim maintenance.

12. We have to examine whether the non maintenance  

of the appellant in a broken live-in-relationship, which is  

stated  to  be  a   relationship  not  in  the  nature  of  a  

marriage, will amount to “domestic violence” within the  

definition  of  Section  3  of  the  DV  Act,  enabling  the

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appellant  to  seek one or  more  reliefs  provided under  

Section 12 of the DV Act.

13. Before examining the various issues raised in this  

appeal,  which  have  far  reaching  consequences  with  

regard to the rights and liabilities of parties indulging in  

live-in  relationship,  let  us  examine  the  relevant  

provisions  of  the  DV  Act  and  the  impact  of  those  

provisions on such relationships.

D.V. ACT

14. The  D.V.   Act  has  been  enacted  to  provide  a  

remedy in Civil Law for protection of women from being  

victims of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence  

of domestic violence in the society.   The DV Act has  

been enacted also to provide an effective protection of  

the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution,  

who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within  

the family.    

15. “Domestic Violence” is undoubtedly a human rights  

issue,  which  was  not  properly  taken  care  of  in  this

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country even though the Vienna Accord 1994 and the  

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) had  

acknowledged that domestic violence was undoubtedly  

a human rights issue.  UN Committee on Convention on  

Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  Against  

Women  in  its  general  recommendations  had  also  

exhorted the member countries to take steps to protect  

women  against  violence  of  any  kind,  especially  that  

occurring  within  the  family,  a  phenomenon  widely  

prevalent  in  India.   Presently,  when  a  woman  is  

subjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives, it is an  

offence punishable under Section 498A IPC.   The Civil  

Law, it was noticed, did not address this phenomenon in  

its  entirety.   Consequently,  the Parliament,  to  provide  

more effective protection of rights of women guaranteed  

under the Constitution under Articles 14, 15 and 21, who  

are  victims  of  violence  of  any  kind  occurring  in  the  

family, enacted the DV Act.     

16. Chapter  IV  is  the  heart  and  soul  of  the  DV Act,  

which provides various reliefs to a woman who has or

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has been in domestic relationship with any adult male  

person and seeks one or more reliefs provided under the  

Act.   The Magistrate, while entertaining an application  

from an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the DV  

Act, can grant the following reliefs:

(1) Payment  of  compensation  or  damages  without  prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit  for compensation or damages for injuries caused by  the acts of domestic violence committed by the adult  male member, with a prayer for set off against the  amount payable under a decree obtained in Court;

(2) The Magistrate, under Section 18 of the DV Act,  can  pass  a  “protection  order”  in  favour  of  the  aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from:

(a)committing any act of domestic violence;

(b)aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of  domestic violence;

(c) entering  the  place  of  employment  of  the  aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a  child, its school or any other place frequented by  the aggrieved person;

(d)attempting  to  communicate  in  any  form,  whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including  personal,  oral  or  written  or  electronic  or  telephonic contact;

(e)alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or  bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both

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the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and  the  respondent  or  singly  by  the  respondent,  including her stridhan or any other property held  either jointly by the parties or separately by them  without the leave of the Magistrate;

(f) causing  violence  to  the  dependants,  other  relatives or any person who give the aggrieved  person assistance from domestic violence;

(g)committing  any  other  act  as  specified  in  the  protection order.

(3) The Magistrate, while disposing of an application  under  Section  12(1)  of  the  DV  Act,  can  pass  a  “residence order” under Section 19 of the DV Act, in  the following manner:

“19. Residence orders.-  (1) While disposing  of  an  application  under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  12,  the  Magistrate  may,  on  being  satisfied  that  domestic  violence  has  taken  place, pass a residence order-

(a) restraining  the  respondent  from  dispossessing  or  in  any  other  manner  disturbing  the  possession  of  the  aggrieved  person  from  the  shared  household,  whether  or  not  the  respondent  has  a  legal  or  equitable  interest in the shared household;

(b) directing the respondent to remove  himself from the shared household;

(c) restraining the respondent or any of his  relatives  from  entering  any  portion  of  the  shared  household  in  which  the  aggrieved person resides;

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(d) restraining  the  respondent  from  alienating  or  disposing  off  the  shared  household or encumbering the same;

(e) restraining  the  respondent  from  renouncing  his  rights  in  the  shared  household except with the leave of the  Magistrate; or

(f) directing the respondent to secure same  level of alternate accommodation for the  aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in  the shared household or to pay rent for  the  same,  if  the  circumstances  so  require:  

Provided  that  no  order  under  clause  (b)  shall  be  passed against  any  person who is  a  woman.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx”

(4) An  aggrieved  person,  while  filing  an  application  under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, is also entitled,  under Section 20 of the DV Act, to get “monetary  reliefs”  to  meet  the expenses incurred and losses  suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of  the  aggrieved person  as  a  result  of  the  domestic  violence  and  such  relief  may  include,  but  is  not  limited to,- “20. Monetary reliefs.-   (1) While disposing  of  an  application  under  sub-  section  (1)  of  section  12,  the  Magistrate  may  direct  the  respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the  expenses incurred and losses  suffered by the  aggrieved  person  and  any  child  of  the

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aggrieved person as  a result  of  the domestic  violence and such relief  may include,  but not  limited to,-

(a) the loss of earnings;

(b) the medical expenses;

(c)  the  loss  caused  due  to  the  destruction,  damage or removal  of  any property from the  control of the aggrieved person; and

(d) the maintenance for  the aggrieved person  as  well  as  her  children,  if  any,  including  an  order  under  or  in  addition  to  an  order  of  maintenance under section 125 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973 (2 of 1974 ) or  any  other law for the time being in force.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx”

The  monetary  reliefs  granted  under  the  above  mentioned  section  shall  be  adequate,  fair,  reasonable  and  consistent  with  the  standard  of  living to which an aggrieved person is accustomed  and  the  Magistrate  has  the  power  to  order  an  appropriate  lump  sum  payment  or  monthly  payments of maintenance.

(5) The Magistrate, under Section 21 of the DV Act, has  the power to grant temporary custody of any child or  children  to  the  aggrieved  person  or  the  person  making an application on her behalf and specify, if

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necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child  or children by the respondent.

(6) The  Magistrate,  in  addition  to  other  reliefs,  under  Section 22 of the DV Act, can pass an order directing  the respondent to pay compensation and damages  for  the  injuries,  including  mental  torture  and  emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic  violence committed by the respondent.

17. Section 26 of the DV Act provides that any relief  

available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also  

be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court,  

family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved  

person  and  the  respondent  whether  such  proceeding  

was initiated before or after the commencement of this  

Act.  Further, any relief referred to above may be sought  

for in addition to and along with any other reliefs that  

the  aggrieved  person  may  seek  in  such  suit  or  legal  

proceeding before a civil  or criminal court.  Further, if  

any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in  

any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act,  

she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant  

of such relief.

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18. Section  3  of  the  DV  Act  deals  with  “domestic  

violence” and reads as under:

“3.  Definition  of  domestic  violence.- For  the  purposes  of  this  Act,  any  act,  omission  or  commission  or  conduct  of  the  respondent  shall  constitute domestic violence in case it-

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health,  safety,  life,  limb  or  well-being,  whether  mental or physical, of the aggrieved person  or  tends  to  do  so  and  includes  causing  physical  abuse,  sexual  abuse,  verbal  and  emotional abuse and economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the  aggrieved person with a view to coerce her  or any other person related to her to meet  any  unlawful  demand  for  any  dowry  or  other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved  person or any person related to her by any  conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause  (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether  physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.  

Explanation I.- For the purposes of this section,-

(i)  "physical abuse" means any act or conduct  which  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  cause  bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb,  or  health  or  impair  the  health  or  development of the aggrieved person and  includes assault, criminal intimidation and  criminal force;

(ii)  "sexual  abuse" includes any conduct  of  a  sexual  nature  that  abuses,  humiliates,  degrades or otherwise violates the dignity  of woman;

(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes-

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(a) insults,  ridicule,  humiliation,  name  calling and insults or ridicule specially  with regard to not having a child or a  male child; and

(b) repeated  threats  to  cause  physical  pain  to  any  person  in  whom  the  aggrieved person is interested.

(iv) "economic abuse" includes- (a) deprivation of all  or any economic or  

financial  resources  to  which  the  aggrieved person is entitled under any  law or custom whether payable under  an  order  of  a  court  or  otherwise  or  which  the  aggrieved  person  requires  out  of  necessity  including,  but  not  limited to, household necessities for the  aggrieved  person  and  her  children,  if  any,  stridhan,  property,  jointly  or  separately  owned  by  the  aggrieved  person,  payment  of  rental  related  to  the  shared  household  and  maintenance;

(b) disposal  of  household  effects,  any  alienation  of  assets  whether  movable  or  immovable,  valuables,  shares,  securities, bonds and the like or other  property in which the aggrieved person  has an interest or is entitled to use by  virtue  of  the  domestic  relationship  or  which may be reasonably required by  the aggrieved person or her children or  her  stridhan or  any  other  property  jointly  or  separately  held  by  the  aggrieved person; and

(c) prohibition  or  restriction  to  continued  access to resources or facilities which  the aggrieved person is entitled to use  or  enjoy  by  virtue  of  the  domestic  relationship  including  access  to  the  shared household.

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Explanation II.- For the purpose of determining  whether  any  act,  omission,  commission  or  conduct  of  the  respondent  constitutes"  domestic  violence"  under  this  section,  the  overall  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  shall be taken into consideration.”

19. In order to examine as to whether there has been  

any act,  omission,  or  commission or  conduct  so as to  

constitute domestic violence, it is necessary to examine  

some of the definition clauses under Section 2 of the DV  

Act.  Section 2(a) of the DV Act defines the expression  

“aggrieved person” as follows:

“2(a).  “Aggrieved  person”  means  any  woman  who  is,  or  has  been,  in  a  domestic  relationship  with  the  respondent  and  who  alleges to have been subjected to any act of  domestic violence by the respondent.”

Section  2(f)  defines  the  expression  “domestic  

relationship” as follows:

“2(f).  “Domestic  relationship”  means  a  relationship between two persons who live or  have, at any point of time, lived together in a  shared  household,  when  they  are  related  by  consanguinity,  marriage,  or  through  a  relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption  or are family members living together as a joint  family.”

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Section  2(q)  defines  the  expression  “respondent”  as  

follows:

“2(q). “Respondent” means any adult male  person  who  is,  or  has  been,  in  a  domestic  relationship  with  the  aggrieved  person  and  against whom the aggrieved person has sought  any relief under this Act:

Provided that an aggrieved wife or female  living  in  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  a  marriage may also  file  a  complaint  against  a  relative of the husband or the male partner.”

Section 2(s) defines the expression “shared household”  

and reads as follows:

“2(s).  “shared  household”  means  a  household where the person aggrieved lives or  at  any  stage  has  lived  in  a  domestic  relationship  either  singly  or  along  with  the  respondent  and  includes  such  a  household  whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the  aggrieved  person  and  the  respondent,  or  owned or tenanted by either of them in respect  of  which  either  the  aggrieved  person  or  the  respondent or  both jointly or  singly have any  right, title, interest or equity and includes such  a  household  which  may  belong  to  the  joint  family  of  which the respondent is  a  member,  irrespective of whether the respondent or the  aggrieved person has any right, title or interest  in the shared household.”

20. We  are,  in  this  case,  concerned  with  a  “live-in  

relationship” which, according to the aggrieved person,  

is a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and it is that

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relationship which has been disrupted in the sense that  

the respondent failed to maintain the aggrieved person,  

which, according to the appellant, amounts to “domestic  

violence”.   The respondent maintained the stand that  

the   relationship  between  the  appellant  and  the  

respondent  was  not  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage  but  a  live-in-relationship  simplicitor  and  the  

alleged  act,  omission,  commission  or  conduct  of  the  

respondent would not constitute “domestic violence” so  

as to claim any protection orders under Section 18, 19 or  

20 of the DV Act.  

21.  We have to first  examine whether the appellant  

was  involved  in  a  domestic  relationship  with  the  

respondent.   Section  2(f)  refers  to  five  categories  of  

relationship,  such  as,  related  by  consanguinity,  

marriage,  relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage,  

adoption,  family  members  living  together  as  a  joint  

family, of which we are, in this case,  concerned with an  

alleged relationship in the nature of marriage.

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22. Before  we  examine  whether  the  respondent  has  

committed any act of domestic violence, we have to first  

examine whether the relationship between them was a  

“relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage”  within  the  

definition of Section 3 read with Section 2(f) of the DV  

Act.   Before  examining  the  term  “relationship  in  the  

nature of marriage”, we have to first examine what is  

“marriage”, as understood in law.

MARRIAGE AND MARITAL RELATIONSHIP:

23. Marriage is often described as one of the basic civil  

rights of man/woman, which is voluntarily undertaken by  

the  parties  in  public  in  a  formal  way,  and  once  

concluded, recognizes the parties as husband and wife.  

Three  elements  of  common  law  marriage  are  (1)  

agreement to be married (2) living together as husband  

and  wife,  (3)  holding  out  to  the  public  that  they  are  

married.   Sharing a common household and duty to live  

together  form  part  of  the  ‘Consortium  Omnis  Vitae”  

which obliges spouses to live together, afford each other  

reasonable marital privileges and rights and be honest

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and faithful to each other.  One of the most important  

invariable  consequences  of  marriage  is  the  reciprocal  

support  and  the  responsibility  of  maintenance  of  the  

common household, jointly and severally.  Marriage as  

an  institution  has  great  legal  significance and various  

obligations and duties flow out of marital relationship, as  

per  law,  in  the  matter  of  inheritance  of  property,  

successionship,  etc.  Marriage,  therefore,  involves legal  

requirements of formality,  publicity,  exclusivity and all  

the legal consequences flow out of that relationship.    

24. Marriages in  India take place either  following the  

personal Law of the Religion to which a party is belonged  

or following the provisions of the Special Marriage Act.  

Marriage,  as  per  the  Common  Law,  constitutes  a  

contract  between  a  man  and  a  woman,  in  which  the  

parties  undertake  to  live  together  and  support  each  

other.    Marriage, as a concept,  is also nationally and  

internationally  recognized.    O’Regan,  J.,  in  Dawood  

and  Another  v.  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  and  

Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) noted as follows:

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“Marriage  and  the  family  are  social  institutions  of  vital  importance.  Entering  into  and sustaining a marriage is a matter of intense  private  significance  to  the  parties  to  that  marriage  for  they  make  a  promise  to  one  another to establish and maintain an intimate  relationship for the rest of their lives which they  acknowledge  obliges  them  to  support  one  another, to live together and to be faithful to  one  another.   Such  relationships  are  of  profound  significance  to  the  individuals  concerned.  But  such  relationships  have  more  than  personal  significance  at  least  in  part  because human beings are social beings whose  humanity  is  expressed  through  their  relationships  with  others.    Entering  into  marriage  therefore  is  to  enter  into  a  relationship that has public significance as well.  

The institutions of marriage and the family  are important social institutions that provide for  the  security,  support  and  companionship  of  members of our society and bear an important  role in the rearing of children. The celebration  of  a  marriage  gives  rise  to  moral  and  legal  obligations,  particularly  the  reciprocal  duty  of  support  placed  upon  spouses  and  their  joint  responsibility  for  supporting  and  raising  children  born  of  the  marriage.  These  legal  obligations  perform  an  important  social  function.  This  importance  is  symbolically  acknowledged in part by the fact that marriage  is  celebrated  generally  in  a  public  ceremony,  often before family and close friends....”

25. South  African  Constitutional  Court  in  various  

judgments recognized the above mentioned principle.  In

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Satchwell  v.  President  of  the Republic  of  South  

Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC),  Du Toit and  

Another  v.  Minister  of  Welfare  and  Population  

Development  and  Others  (Lesbian  and  Gay  

Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198  

(CC), the Constitutional Court of South Africa recognized  

the right “free to marry and to raise family”.   Section  

15(3)(a)(i)  of  the  Constitution  of  South  Africa,  in  

substance  makes  provision  for  the  recognition  of  

“marriages concluded under the tradition, or a system of  

religious,  personal or family law.”  Section 9(3) of the  

Constitution of South Africa reads as follows:

“The  State  may  not  unfairly  discriminate  directly or indirectly against anyone on one or  more  grounds,  including  race,  gender,  sex,  pregnancy,  marital  status,  ethnic  or  social  origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,  religion,  conscience,  belief,  culture,  language  and birth.”

26. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and  

Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) provides that:

“1. The family is the natural and fundamental group  unit  of  society and is  entitled to protection by  society and the State.

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2. The right  of  men and women of  marriageable  age  to  marry  and  to  found  a  family  shall  be  recognized.

3. No marriage shall  be entered into  without  the  free and full consent of the intending spouses.

4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take  appropriate  steps  to  ensure  equality  of  rights  and responsibilities  of spouses as to marriage,  during marriage and at  its  dissolution.   In  the  case of dissolution, provision shall be made for  the necessary protection of any children.”

27. Article  16 of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  

Rights, 1948 provides that:

“1. Men  and  women  of  full  age,  without  any  limitation  due  to  race,  nationality  or  religion,  have the right to marry and to found a family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage,  during marriage and at it dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free  and full consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group  unit  of  society and is  entitled to protection by  society and the State.”

28. Parties in the present case are Hindus by religion  

and are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act,    1955.

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The  expression  “marriage”,  as  stated,  is  not  defined  

under the Hindu Marriage Act, but the “conditions for a  

Hindu marriage” are dealt with in Section 5 of the Hindu  

Marriage Act and which reads as under:

“5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage - A  marriage may be solemnized between any two  hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled,  namely:- (i)    neither party has a spouse living at the  

time of the marriage (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither  party-

(a) is  incapable  of  giving  a  valid  consent  to  it  in  consequence  of  unsoundness of mind; or

(b) though  capable  of  giving  a  valid  consent,  has  been  suffering  from  mental disorder of such a kind or to  such  an  extent  as  to  be  unfit  for  marriage  and  the  procreation  of  children; or

(c) has  been  subject  to  recurrent  attacks of insanity;

(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of  twenty- one years and the bride the age of  eighteen years at the time of the marriage;  

(iv)  the parties are not  within the degrees of  prohibited relationship unless the custom or  usage governing each of them permits of a  marriage between the two;

(v)   the parties are not sapindas of each other,  unless the custom or usage governing each

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of them permits of a marriage between the  two.”

29. Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the  

“Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage” and reads as follows:

“7. Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage. -

(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in  accordance with the customary rites and  ceremonies of either party thereto.

(2) Where  such  rites  and  ceremonies  include the saptapadi (that is, the taking  of  seven steps by the  bridegroom and  the bride jointly before the sacred fire),  the  marriage  becomes  complete  and  binding when the seventh step is taken.”

30. Entering into a marriage, therefore, either through  

the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special  Marriage Act or  

any  other  Personal  Law,  applicable  to  the  parties,  is  

entering into a relationship of “public significance”, since  

marriage  being  a  social  institution,  many  rights  and  

liabilities flow out of that legal relationship.  The concept  

of  marriage as  a “civil  right”  has  been recognised by  

various courts all over the world, for example,  Skinner  

v.  Oklahoma  316 US 535 (1942),  Perez v.  Lippold  

198 P.2d 17, 20.1 (1948), Loving v. Virginia 388 US 1  

(1967).  

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31. We have referred to, in extenso, about the concept  

of “marriage and marital relationship”  to indicate that  

the  law  has  distinguished  between  married  and  

unmarried  people,  which  cannot  be  said  to  be  unfair  

when we look at the rights and obligations which flow  

out of the legally wedded marriage.  A married couple  

has to discharge legally various rights and obligations,  

unlike the case of persons having live-in relationship or,  

marriage-like relationship or defacto relationship.   

32. Married  couples  who  choose  to  marry  are  fully  

cognizant  of  the  legal  obligation  which  arises  by  the  

operation of law on solemnization of the marriage and  

the rights and duties they owe to their children and the  

family as a whole, unlike the case of persons entering  

into  live-in  relationship.    This  Court  in  Pinakin  

Mahipatray  Rawal  v.  State  of  Gujarat  (2013)  2  

SCALE  198  held  that  marital  relationship  means  the  

legally  protected  marital  interest  of  one  spouse  to  

another which include marital obligation to another like  

companionship,  living  under  the  same  roof,  sexual

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relation and the exclusive enjoyment of them, to have  

children,  their  up-bringing,  services  in  the  home,  

support, affection, love, liking and so on.     

RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE:

33. Modern  Indian  society  through  the  DV  Act  

recognizes  in  reality,  various  other  forms  of  familial  

relations, shedding the idea that such relationship can  

only  be  through  some  acceptable  modes  hitherto  

understood. Section 2(f), as already indicated, deals with  

a relationship between two persons (of the opposite sex)  

who live or have lived together in a shared household  

when they are related by:

(a)  Consanguinity (b) Marriage (c) Through  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage (d) Adoption (e) Family  members  living  together  as  joint  

family.

34. The definition clause mentions only five categories  

of  relationships  which  exhausts  itself  since  the

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expression “means”, has been used.  When a definition  

clause  is  defined  to  “mean”  such  and  such,  the  

definition  is  prima  facie restrictive  and  exhaustive.  

Section 2(f) has not used the expression “include” so as  

to make the definition exhaustive.  It is in that context  

we  have  to  examine  the  meaning  of  the  expression  

“relationship in the nature of marriage”.

35. We  have  already  dealt  with  what  is  “marriage”,  

“marital relationship” and “marital obligations”.   Let us  

now examine the meaning and scope of the expression  

“relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage”  which  falls  

within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.  Our  

concern in this case is of the third enumerated category  

that  is  “relationship  in  the nature of  marriage”  which  

means  a  relationship  which  has  some  inherent  or  

essential  characteristics  of  a  marriage  though  not  a  

marriage legally recognized, and, hence, a comparison  

of both will have to be resorted, to determine whether  

the  relationship  in  a  given  case  constitutes  the  

characteristics of a regular marriage.

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36. Distinction between the relationship in the nature  

of  marriage  and  marital  relationship  has  to  be  noted  

first.     Relationship  of  marriage  continues,  

notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  are  differences  of  

opinions, marital unrest etc., even if they are not sharing  

a shared household, being based on law.   But live-in-

relationship  is  purely  an  arrangement  between  the  

parties unlike, a legal marriage.  Once a party to a live-

in-relationship determines that he/she does not wish to  

live in such a relationship, that relationship comes to an  

end.  Further, in a relationship in the nature of marriage,  

the party asserting the existence of the relationship, at  

any stage or at any point of time, must positively prove  

the existence of  the identifying characteristics  of  that  

relationship,  since  the  legislature  has  used  the  

expression “in the nature of”.   

37. Reference  to  certain  situations,  in  which  the  

relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in  

Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section  

2(q)  of  the  DV Act,  would  or  would  not  amount  to  a

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relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage,  would  be  

apposite.  Following are some of the categories of cases  

which are only illustrative:

(a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried    adult  woman  and  an  unmarried  adult  male:  Relationship  between an  unmarried  adult  woman  and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any  point of time lived together in a shared household,  will fall  under the definition of Section 2(f) of the  DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence,  the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and  the  aggrieved  person  can  always  seek  reliefs  provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act.

(b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried    woman and a married adult male:  Situations may  arise when an unmarried adult women knowingly   enters  into  a  relationship  with  a  married  adult  male.  The question is whether such a relationship  is a relationship “in the nature of marriage” so as  to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV  Act.

(c) Domestic  relationship  between  a  married    adult  woman  and  an  unmarried  adult  male:  Situations may also arise where an adult married  woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with  an unmarried adult male, the question is whether

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such a relationship would fall within the expression  relationship “in the nature of marriage”.

(d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried    woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with  a  married  adult  male:    An  unmarried  woman  unknowingly  enters  into  a  relationship  with  a  married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall  within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act  and such a relationship may be a relationship in the  “nature  of  marriage”,  so  far  as  the  aggrieved  person is concerned.

(e) Domestic  relationship  between  same  sex    partners (Gay and Lesbians):  DV  Act  does  not  recognize such a relationship and that relationship  cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of  marriage  under  the  Act.   Legislatures  in  some  countries,  like  the  Interpretation  Act,  1984  (Western  Australia),  the  Interpretation  Act,  1999  (New Zealand),  the  Domestic  Violence  Act,  1998  (South Africa),  the Domestic  Violence,  Crime and  Victims  Act,  2004  (U.K.),  have  recognized  the  relationship  between  the  same  sex  couples  and  have brought these relationships into the definition  of Domestic relationship.   

38. Section  2(f)  of  the  DV  Act  though  uses  the  

expression  “two  persons”,  the  expression  “aggrieved

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person”  under  Section  2(a)  takes  in  only  “woman”,  

hence,  the Act  does  not  recognize  the  relationship  of  

same sex (gay or lesbian) and, hence, any act, omission,  

commission or conduct of any of the parties, would not  

lead to domestic violence, entitling any relief under the  

DV Act.

39. We  should,  therefore,  while  determining  whether  

any  act,  omission,  commission  or  conduct  of  the  

respondent  constitutes  “domestic  violence”,  have  a  

common  sense/balanced  approach,  after  weighing  up  

the  various  factors  which  exist  in  a  particular  

relationship and then reach a conclusion as to whether a  

particular relationship is a relationship in the “nature of  

marriage”.  Many a times, it is the common intention of  

the  parties  to  that  relationship  as  to  what  their  

relationship  is  to  be,  and  to  involve  and  as  to  their  

respective  roles  and  responsibilities,  that  primarily  

governs that relationship.  Intention may be expressed  

or implied and what is relevant is their intention as to  

matters  that  are  characteristic  of  a  marriage.    The

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expression “relationship in the nature of marriage”, of  

course,  cannot be construed in the abstract,  we must  

take it in the context in which it appears and apply the  

same bearing in mind the purpose and object of the Act  

as well as the meaning of the expression “in the nature  

of marriage”.  Plight of a vulnerable section of women in  

that  relationship  needs  attention.  Many  a  times,  the  

women  are  taken  advantage  of  and  essential  

contribution  of  women  in  a  joint  household  through  

labour  and emotional  support  have been lost  sight  of  

especially  by  the  women  who  fall  in  the  categories  

mentioned in (a) and (d) supra.  Women, who fall under  

categories  (b)  and  (c),  stand  on  a  different  footing,  

which we will deal with later.  In the present case, the  

appellant  falls  under  category  (b),  referred  to  in  

paragraph 37(b) of the Judgment.

      40. We  have,  therefore,  come  across  various  

permutations  and  combinations,  in  such  relationships,  

and to test whether a particular relationship would fall  

within  the  expression  “relationship  in  the  nature  of

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marriage”, certain guiding principles have to be evolved  

since the expression has not been defined in the Act.  

 41. Section  2(f)  of  the  DV  Act  defines  “domestic  

relationship” to mean, inter alia, a relationship between  

two  persons  who  live  or  have  lived  together  at  such  

point  of  time  in  a  shared  household,  through  a  

relationship in  the nature of marriage.  The expression  

“relationship in the nature of marriage” is also described  

as  defacto  relationship,  marriage  –  like  relationship,  

cohabitation,  couple  relationship,  meretricious  

relationship  (now  known  as  committed  intimate  

relationship) etc.   

42. Courts  and  legislatures  of  various  countries  now  

began to think that denying certain benefits to a certain  

class of persons on the basis of their marital status is  

unjust where the need of those benefits is felt by both  

unmarried and married cohabitants.   Courts in various  

countries  have  extended  certain  benefits  to  

heterosexual  unmarried cohabitants.   Legislatures  too,

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of  late,  through  legislations  started  giving  benefits  to  

heterosexual cohabitants.   

 43. In U.K. through the Civil Partnership Act, 2004, the  

rights  of  even  the  same-sex  couple  have  been  

recognized.   Family Law Act, 1996, through the Chapter  

IV,  titled  ‘Family  Homes  and  Domestic  Violence’,  

cohabitants can seek reliefs if there is domestic violence.  

Canada  has  also  enacted  the  Domestic  Violence  

Intervention  Act,  2001.   In  USA,  the  violence  against  

woman is a crime with far-reaching consequences under  

the  Violence Against  Women Act,  1994 (now Violence  

Against Women Reauthorization Act, 2013).   

44. The  Interpretation  Act,  1984  (Australia)  has  laid  

down certain indicators to determine the meaning of “de  

facto relationship”, which are as follows:

“13A . De facto relationship and de  facto partner, references to  

(1) A reference in a written law to a de  facto relationship shall be construed as a  reference to a relationship (other than a  legal  marriage)  between 2 persons who  live  together  in  a  marriage-like  relationship.

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(2) The following factors are indicators of  whether  or  not  a  de  facto  relationship  exists  between  2  persons,  but  are  not  essential —  

(a)  the  length  of  the  relationship  between them;  (b)     whether  the  2  persons  have  resided together;  (c)   the nature and extent of common  residence;  (d)    whether there is, or has been, a  sexual relationship between them;  (e) the degree of financial dependence  or  interdependence,  and  any  arrangements  for  financial  support,  between them;  (f)   the ownership, use and acquisition  of  their  property  (including  property  they own individually);  (g)  the degree of mutual commitment  by them to a shared life;  (h)  whether they care for and support  children;  (i)   the reputation, and public aspects,  of the relationship between them.  xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx”

45. The Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act,  

2012 (Queensland) has defined the expression “couple  

relationship” to mean as follows”:

“18. Meaning of couple relationship

(1)     xxx    xxx xxx

(2) In  deciding  whether  a  couple  relationship exists, a court may have  regard to the following –

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(a) the  circumstances  of  the  relationship  between  the  persons, including, for example–

(i) the degree of trust between  the persons; and

(ii)  the  level  of  each  person’s  dependence  on,  and  commitment  to,  the  other  person;

(b) the  length  of  time  for  which  the  relationship  has  existed  or  did exist;  

(c) the  frequency  of  contact  between the persons;

(d) the  degree  of  intimacy  between the persons.

(3)  Without  limiting  sub-section  (2),  the court may consider the following  factors in deciding whether a couple  relationship exists-      

(a) Whether  the  trust,  dependence  or  commitment  is  or was of the same level;

(b) Whether one of the persons is  or was financially dependent on  the other;

(c) Whether  the  persons  jointly  own or owned any property;

(d) Whether the persons have or  had joint bank accounts;

(e) Whether  the  relationship  involves  or  involved  a  relationship of a sexual nature;

(f)Whether  the  relationship  is  or  was exclusive.

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(4) A  couple  relationship  may  exist  even  if  the  court  makes  a  negative  finding in relation to any or all of the  factors mentioned in subsection (3).

(5) A  couple  relationship  may  exist  between  two  persons  whether  the  persons are of the same or a different  gender.

(6) A couple relationship does not exist  merely because two persons date or  dated  each  other  on  a  number  of  occasions.”

46. The  Property  (Relationships)  Act,  1984  of  North  

South Wales, Australia also provides for some guidelines  

with  regard  to  the  meaning  and  content  of  the  

expression  “de  facto  relationship”,  which  reads  as  

follows:

“4 De facto relationships  (1)  For the purposes of  this  Act,  a  de facto  relationship is  a  relationship  between  two  adult persons:  

(a)  who live together as a couple, and  (b) who are not married to one another  

or related by family.  (2) In determining whether two persons are in  a  de facto relationship, all the circumstances  of  the  relationship  are  to  be  taken  into  account,  including  such  of  the  following

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commencement  of  this  subsection,  was  a  party to such a relationship.”

47. “In  Re  Marriage  of  Lindsay, 101  Wn.2d  299  

(1984),  Litham v. Hennessey 87 Wn.2d 550 (1976),  

Pennington 93 Wash.App. at 917, the Courts in United  

States  took  the  view  that  the  relevant  factors  

establishing  a  meretricious  relationship  include  

continuous  cohabitation,  duration  of  the  relationship,  

purpose of the relationship, and the pooling of resources  

and services for  joint  projects.   The Courts  also ruled  

that  a  relationship  need  not  be  “long  term”  to  be  

characterized  as  meretricious  relationship.     While  a  

long term relationship is  not  a threshold requirement,  

duration is a significant factor.  Further, the Court also  

noticed  that  a  short  term  relationship  may  be  

characterized as a meretricious, but a number of other  

important factors must be present.   

48. In  Stack v. Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432,  Baroness  

Hale of Richmond said:

“Cohabitation  comes  in  many  different  shapes and sizes.  People embarking on their

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first  serious  relationship  more  commonly  cohabit  than  marry.   Many  of  these  relationships  may  be  quite  short-lived  and  childless.   But  most  people  these  days  cohabit  before  marriage…..    So  many  couples  are  cohabiting  with  a  view  to  marriage at some later date – as long ago as  1998  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey  found  that  75%  of  current  cohabitants  expected to marry, although only a third had  firm  plans:   John  Ermisch,  Personal  Relationships  and  Marriage  Expectations  (2000)  Working  Papers  of  the  Institute  of  Social and Economic Research:  Paper 2000- 27.   Cohabitation is much more likely to end  in  separation  than  is  marriage,  and  cohabitations which end in separation tend to  last for a shorter time than marriages which  end in divorce.   But increasing numbers of  couples  cohabit  for  long  periods  without  marrying and their reasons for doing so vary  from  conscious  rejection  of  marriage  as  a  legal institution to regarding themselves ‘as  good as married’ anyway:  Law Commission,  Consultation  Paper  No  179,  Part  2,  para  2.45.”

49. In  MW  v.  The  Department  of  Community  

Services  [2008]  HCA  12,  Gleeson,  CJ,  made  the  

following observations:

“Finn J  was correct  to  stress  the difference  between living  together  and living together  ‘as a couple in a relationship in the nature of  marriage or civil  union’.     The relationship  between two people who live together, even  though  it  is  a  sexual  relationship,  may,  or  may not,  be a relationship in the nature of

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marriage or civil union.   One consequence of  relationships  of  the  former  kind  becoming  commonplace  is  that  it  may  now  be  more  difficult, rather than easier, to infer that they  have the nature of marriage or civil union, at  least  where  the  care  and  upbringing  of  children are not involved.”

50. In  Lynam  v.  The  Director-General  of  Social   

Security (1983)  52  ALR  128,  the  Court  considered  

whether a man and a woman living together ‘as husband  

and wife on a bona fide domestic basis’ and Fitzgerald, J.  

said:

“Each  element  of  a  relationship  draws  its  colour  and  its  significance  from  the  other  elements,  some of  which may point  in  one  direction and some in the other.   What must  be looked at is the composite picture.   Any  attempt  to  isolate  individual  factors  and  to  attribute  to  them  relative  degrees  of  materiality or importance involves a denial of  common  experience  and  will  almost  inevitably  be  productive  of  error.   The  endless  scope  for  differences  in  human  attitudes and activities means that there will  be an almost infinite variety of combinations  of  circumstances  which  may  fall  for  consideration.  In any particular case, it will  be  a  question  of  fact  and  degree,  a  jury  question, whether a relationship between two  unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets  the statutory test.”

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51. Tipping, J. in Thompson v. Department of Social  

Welfare (1994)  2  SZLR  369  (HC),  listed  few  

characteristics  which  are  relevant  to  determine  

relationship in the nature of marriage as follows:

“(1) Whether and how frequently the parties  live in the same house.

(2) Whether  the  parties  have  a  sexual  relationship.

(3) Whether  the  parties  give  each  other  emotional support and companionship.

(4) Whether  the  parties  socialize  together  or attend activities together as a couple.

(5) Whether and to what extent the parties  share the responsibility for bringing up  and supporting any relevant children.

(6) Whether  the  parties  share  household  and other domestic tasks.

(7) Whether  the  parties  share  costs  and  other  financial  responsibilities  by  the  pooling of resources or otherwise.

(8) Whether  the  parties  run  a  common  household, even if one or other partner  is absent for periods of time.

(9) Whether  the  parties  go  on  holiday  together.

(10) Whether the parties conduct themselves  towards,  and  are  treated  by  friends,  relations  and others  as  if  they were a  married couple.”

52. Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is  

a relationship which has not been socially accepted in  

India,  unlike many other countries.   In  Lata Singh v.

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State of U.P.  [AIR 2006 SC 2522] it was observed that  

a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of  

heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even  

though  it  may  be  perceived  as  immoral.  However,  in  

order to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of  

women, from being victims of such relationship, and to  

prevent  the  occurrence  of  domestic  violence  in  the  

society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted  

to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of  

marriage,  persons  related  by  consanguinity,  marriages  

etc.  We have few other legislations also where reliefs  

have  been  provided  to  woman  placed  in  certain  

vulnerable situations.

53. Section  125  Cr.P.C.,  of  course,  provides  for  

maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498A IPC is  

related  to  mental  cruelty  inflicted  on  women  by  her  

husband and in-laws.  Section 304-B IPC deals with the  

cases relating to dowry death.   The Dowry Prohibition  

Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry  

demands by the  husband and family  members.    The

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Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for  

grant  of  maintenance to a legally  wedded Hindu wife,  

and  also  deals  with  rules  for  adoption.   The  Hindu  

Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with  

solemnization of marriage also deals with the provisions  

for divorce.    For the first time, through, the DV Act, the  

Parliament has recognized a “relationship in the nature  

of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simplicitor.  

54. We have already stated, when we examine whether  

a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship  

in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section  

2(f) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the  

entire  relationship,  in  other  words,  all  facets  of  the  

interpersonal relationship need to be taken into account.  

We cannot isolate individual factors, because there may  

be endless scope for differences in human attitudes and  

activities and a variety of combinations of circumstances  

which may fall for consideration. Invariably, it may be a  

question  of  fact  and  degree,  whether  a  relationship

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between  two  unrelated  persons  of  the  opposite  sex  

meets the tests judicially evolved.

55. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out  

some guidelines for testing under what  circumstances, a  

live-in  relationship  will  fall  within  the  expression  

“relationship in the nature of marriage” under  Section  

2(f)  of  the DV Act.   The guidelines, of  course,  are not  

exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such  

relationships.

(1) Duration of period of relationship   

Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression  “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable  period  of  time  to  maintain  and  continue  a  relationship  which  may  vary  from  case  to  case,  depending upon the fact situation.

(2) Shared household

The expression has been defined under Section 2(s)  of  the  DV  Act  and,  hence,  need  no  further  elaboration.

(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements

Supporting  each  other,  or  any  one  of  them,  financially,  sharing  bank  accounts,  acquiring  immovable properties in joint names or in the name

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of the woman, long term investments in business,  shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a  long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor.  

(4) Domestic Arrangements Entrusting  the  responsibility,  especially  on  the  woman to run the home, do the household activities  like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the  house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the  nature of marriage.

(5) Sexual Relationship Marriage  like  relationship  refers  to  sexual  relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional  and  intimate  relationship,  for  procreation  of  children,  so  as  to  give  emotional  support,  companionship and also material  affection,  caring  etc.     

(6) Children  Having  children  is  a  strong  indication  of  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage.    Parties,  therefore,  intend  to  have  a  long  standing  relationship.  Sharing the responsibility for bringing  up and supporting them is also a strong indication.

(7) Socialization in Public Holding  out  to  the  public  and  socializing  with  friends, relations and others, as if they are husband  and  wife  is  a  strong  circumstance  to  hold  the  relationship is in the nature of marriage.

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(8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common  intention  of  parties  as  to  what  their  relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their  respective  roles  and  responsibilities,  primarily  determines the nature of that relationship.

STATUS OF THE APPELLANT

56. Appellant,  admittedly,  entered  into  a  live-in-

relationship  with  the  respondent  knowing that  he was  

married person, with wife and two children, hence, the  

generic  proposition  laid  down  by  the  Privy  Council  in  

Andrahennedige  Dinohamy  v.  Wiketunge  

Liyanapatabendage  Balshamy,  AIR  1927  PC  185,  

that where a man and a woman are proved to have lived  

together  as  husband and wife,  the law presumes that  

they  are  living  together  in  consequence  of  a  valid  

marriage  will  not  apply  and,  hence,  the  relationship  

between the  appellant  and  the  respondent  was  not  a  

relationship in the nature of a marriage, and the status  

of the appellant was that of a concubine. A concubine  

cannot maintain a relationship in the nature of marriage  

because such a relationship will not have exclusivity and

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will  not be monogamous in character.  Reference may  

also be made to the judgments of this Court in  Badri  

Prasad  v.  Director  of  Consolidation  1978  (3)  SCC  

527 and  Tulsa v. Durghatiya 2008 (4)  SCC 520.   In  

Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari AIR 1952 SC 231 this  

Court held that the continuous cohabitation of man and  

woman as husband and wife may raise the presumption  

of marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn  

from long cohabition is a rebuttable one and if there are  

circumstances  which  weaken  and  destroy  that  

presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.  Polygamy,  

that is a relationship or practice of having more than one  

wife or husband at the same time, or a relationship by  

way of a bigamous marriage that is marrying someone  

while already married to another and/or maintaining an  

adulterous relationship that  is  having voluntary  sexual  

intercourse between a married person who is not one’s  

husband or wife, cannot be said to be a relationship in  

the nature of marriage.

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57. We  may  note,  in  the  instant  case,  there  is  no  

necessity to rebut the presumption, since the appellant  

was aware that  the respondent  was a married person  

even  before  the  commencement  of  their  relationship,  

hence the status of the appellant is that of a concubine  

or a mistress, who cannot enter into relationship in the  

nature of a marriage.  Long standing relationship as a  

concubine, though not a relationship in the nature of a  

marriage, of course, may at times, deserves protection  

because  that  woman  might  not  be  financially  

independent, but we are afraid that DV Act does not take  

care of such relationships which may perhaps call for an  

amendment of the definition of  Section 2(f)  of  the DV  

Act, which is restrictive and exhaustive.    

58. Velusamy  case (supra)  stated that  instances are  

many where married person maintain and support such  

types of women, either for sexual pleasure or sometimes  

for  emotional  support.   Woman,  a  party  to  that  

relationship  does  suffer  social  disadvantages  and  

prejudices,  and  historically,  such  a  person  has  been

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regarded  as  less  worthy  than  the  married  woman.  

Concubine suffers social ostracism through the denial of  

status and benefits, who cannot, of course, enter into a  

relationship in the nature of marriage.   

59. We  cannot,  however,  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  

inequities do exist in such relationships and on breaking  

down  such  relationship,  the  woman  invariably  is  the  

sufferer.   Law  of  Constructive  Trust  developed  as  a  

means of recognizing the contributions, both pecuniary  

and non-pecuniary, perhaps comes to their aid in such  

situations, which may remain as a recourse for such a  

woman  who  find  herself  unfairly  disadvantaged.  

Unfortunately, there is no express statutory provision to  

regulate  such  types  of  live-in  relationships  upon  

termination  or  disruption  since  those  relationships  are  

not in the nature of marriage.  We can also come across  

situations  where  the  parties  entering  into  live-in-

relationship and due to their  joint  efforts  or  otherwise  

acquiring properties, rearing children, etc.  and disputes  

may also arise when one of the parties dies intestate.  

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60. American  Jurisprudence,  Second  Edition,  Vol.  24  

(2008)  speaks  of  Rights  and  Remedies  of  property  

accumulated by man and woman living together in illicit  

relations or under void marriage, which reads as under:

“Although  the  courts  have  recognized  the  property rights of persons cohabiting without  benefit  of  marriage,  these  rights  are  not  based on the equitable distribution provisions  of the marriage and divorce laws because the  judicial recognition of mutual property rights  between unmarried cohabitants would violate  the  policy  of  the  state  to  strengthen  and  preserve  the  integrity  of  marriage,  as  demonstrated by its abolition of common-law  marriage.”

61. Such relationship, it may be noted, may endure for  

a long time and can result pattern of dependency and  

vulnerability,  and  increasing  number  of  such  

relationships, calls for adequate and effective protection,  

especially to the woman and children born out of that  

live-in-relationship.   Legislature,  of  course,  cannot  

promote  pre-marital  sex,  though,  at  times,  such  

relationships  are  intensively  personal  and  people  may  

express  their  opinion,  for  and  against.   See  S.

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Khushboo v. Kanniammal and another (2010) 5 SCC  

600.

62. Parliament has to ponder over these issues, bring in  

proper legislation or make a proper amendment of the  

Act, so that women and the children, born out of such  

kinds of relationships be protected, though those types  

of relationship might not be a relationship in the nature  

of a marriage.

63. We may now consider whether the tests, we have  

laid down, have been satisfied in the instant case.  We  

have found that the appellant was not ignorant of the  

fact that the respondent was a married person with wife  

and two children, hence, was party to an adulterous and  

bigamous  relationship.   Admittedly,  the  relationship  

between the appellant and respondent was opposed by  

the wife of the respondent, so also by the parents of the  

appellant and her brother and sister and they knew that  

they  could  not  have  entered  into  a  legal  marriage  or  

maintained  a  relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage.  

Parties never entertained any intention to rear children

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and on three occasions the pregnancy was terminated.  

Having children is  a strong circumstance to indicate a  

relationship in the nature of marriage. No evidence has  

been adduced to show that the parties gave each other  

mutual  support and companionship.    No material  has  

been  produced  to  show  that  the  parties  have  ever  

projected or conducted themselves as husband and wife  

and treated by friends, relatives and others, as if they  

are  a  married  couple.   On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  

specific case of the appellant that the respondent had  

never held out to the public that she was his wife.   No  

evidence of  socialization in  public  has been produced.  

There  is  nothing  to  show  that  there  was  pooling  of  

resources or financial arrangements between them.  On  

the other hand, it  is the specific case of the appellant  

that the respondent had never opened any joint account  

or executed any document in the joint name.  Further, it  

was also submitted that the respondent never permitted  

to suffix his name after the name of the appellant.  No  

evidence is forthcoming, in this case, to show that the  

respondent  had  caused  any  harm  or  injuries  or

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endangered the health, safely, life, limb or well-being, or  

caused any physical or sexual abuse on the appellant,  

except that he did not maintain her or continued with the  

relationship.   

ALIENATION OF AFFECTION

64. Appellant had entered into this relationship knowing  

well  that  the  respondent  was  a  married  person  and  

encouraged bigamous relationship. By entering into such  

a  relationship,  the  appellant  has  committed  an  

intentional  tort,  i.e.  interference  in  the  marital  

relationship with intentionally alienating respondent from  

his family, i.e. his wife and children.  If the case set up by  

the  appellant  is  accepted,  we  have  to  conclude  that  

there has been an attempt on the part of the appellant  

to alienate respondent from his family, resulting in loss  

of marital  relationship,  companionship,  assistance,  loss  

of consortium etc., so far as the legally wedded wife and  

children of the respondent are concerned, who resisted  

the relationship from the very inception.  Marriage and  

family  are  social  institutions  of  vital  importance.

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Alienation of affection, in that context, is an intentional  

tort,  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Pinakin  Mahipatray  

Rawal case (supra), which gives a cause of action to the  

wife and children of the respondent to sue the appellant  

for alienating the husband/father from the company of  

his  wife/children,  knowing  fully  well  they  are  legally  

wedded wife/children of the respondent..

65. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant,  

having been fully aware of the fact that the respondent  

was a married person, could not have entered into a live-

in  relationship  in  the  nature  of  marriage.   All  live-in-

relationships  are  not  relationships  in  the  nature  of  

marriage.  Appellant’s and the respondent’s relationship  

is,  therefore,  not  a  “relationship  in  the  nature  of  

marriage”  because  it  has  no  inherent  or  essential  

characteristic  of  a  marriage,  but  a  relationship  other  

than  “in  the  nature  of  marriage”  and  the  appellant’s  

status  is  lower  than  the  status  of  a  wife  and  that  

relationship  would  not  fall  within  the  definition  of  

“domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act.

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If  we hold that the relationship between the appellant  

and the respondent is a relationship in the nature of a  

marriage,  we  will  be  doing  an  injustice  to  the  legally  

wedded wife and children who opposed that relationship.  

Consequently,  any  act,  omission  or  commission  or  

conduct of the respondent in connection with that type  

of relationship, would not amount to “domestic violence”  

under Section 3 of the DV Act.  

66. We have, on facts, found that the appellant’s status  

was that of a mistress, who is in distress, a survivor of a  

live-in relationship which is of serious concern, especially  

when such persons are poor and illiterate, in the event of  

which  vulnerability  is  more  pronounced,  which  is  a  

societal reality.   Children born out of such relationship  

also  suffer  most  which  calls  for  bringing  in  remedial  

measures by the Parliament, through proper legislation.  

67. We are conscious of the fact that if any direction is  

given  to  the  respondent  to  pay  maintenance  or  

monetary consideration to the appellant, that would be  

at the cost of the legally wedded wife and children of the

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respondent,  especially  when  they  had  opposed  that  

relationship  and  have  a  cause  of  action  against  the  

appellant for alienating the companionship and affection  

of the husband/parent which is an intentional tort.    

68. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the  

judgment of the High Court and the appeal is accordingly  

dismissed.  

………………………….……J.    (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

………………………………J.       (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

New Delhi  November 26, 2013