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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

S.L.P. (C) NOS.9036-9038 OF 2016)  

INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY        ….PETITIONER  

VERSUS  

MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC.                  ….RESPONDENT(S)  

WITH  

S.L.P.(C) NOS. 9798-9799 OF 2016)  

S.L.P.(C) NOS. 17088-17089 OF 2016)  

 S.L.P.(C) NO. 37375 OF 2016)  

S.L.P.(C) NO. 37372 OF 2016)  

S.L.P.(C) NOS. 16573-16605 OF 2016)  

 S.L.P. (C) CC NO. 15967 OF 2016  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19356 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19362 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19361 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19358 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19357 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19360 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19359 OF 2017  

S.L.P.(C) NOS. 34752-34753 OF 2016)    

S.L.P.(C) NO. 15890 OF 2017)  

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19363 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19364 OF 2017  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 19412 OF 2017  

MA 1423 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12247 OF 2016  

S.L.P.(C) NO. 33022 OF 2017  

S.L.P.(C) NO. 33127 OF 2017  

S.L.P.(C) NO. 33114 OF 2017  

MA 1787 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10210 OF 2016  

MA 1786 OF 2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10207 OF 2016  

MA 45 OF 2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6239 OF 2017  

S.L.P.(C) NO. 16051 OF 2019  

DIARY NO. 23842 OF 2018  

 S.L.P.(C) NO. 30452 OF 2018  

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 4835 OF 2015  

 S.L.P.(C) NOS. 30577-30580 OF 2015  

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J U D G M E N T  

ARUN MISHRA, J.  

1. The correct interpretation of Section 24 of the Right to Fair  

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation  

and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act of 2013'), is the subject  

matter of reference to this five Judge Bench of this Court.  

 2. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation  

& Anr v Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors1, interpreted Section 24 of  

the Act of 2013. The order reported as Yogesh Neema & Ors v State of  

Madhya Pradesh2, a two-judge Bench, however doubted the decision in  

Sree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v  State of Tamil Nadu3  (which  

had followed Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and also held that  

Section 24 (2)  of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any period during  

which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on  

account of stay or injunction granted by any court) and referred the  

issue to a larger Bench. Later, in another appeal (arising out of S.L.P.  

(C) No.2131 of 2016 (Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (dead)  

through Lrs. & Ors.4) the matter was referred to a larger Bench on  

7.12.2017; the Court noticed that:   

“cases which have been concluded are being revived. In spite of  not accepting the compensation deliberately and statement are  made in the Court that they do not want to receive the  compensation at any cost, and they are agitating the matter time  

                                                           1 (2014) 3 SCC 183  2 (2016) 6 SCC 387  3 (2015) 3 SCC 353  4 2018 SCC Online SC 100

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and again after having lost the matters and when proceedings  are kept pending by interim orders by filing successive petitions,  the provisions of section 24 cannot be invoked by such  landowners.”  

3. The Court noticed that the reference to a larger Bench was  

pending, and had been made in Yogesh Neema (supra). The Court also  

felt that several other issues arose which it outlined, but were not  

considered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). The Court therefore,  

stated that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench and  

referred the case to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate  

orders. Indore Development Authority v Shailendra (hereafter, “IDA v  

Shailendra”) a Bench of three Judges was of the view that the judgment  

in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) did not consider several aspects  

relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Since Pune  

Municipal Corporation (supra) was a judgment by a Bench of coordinate  

strength, two learned judges in IDA v Shailendra opined prima facie that  

decision appeared to be per incuriam.  

4. Later, in Indore Development Authority v Shyam Verma & Ors (SLP  

No. 9798 of 2016) considered it appropriate to refer the matter to  

Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to refer the issues to be resolved by a  

larger Bench at the earliest. Yet again in State of Haryana v Maharana  

Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd) & Anr (CA No.4835 of 2015) referred the  

matter to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate  

Bench for consideration of the larger issue. These batch appeals were  

referred to a five Judge Bench, which after hearing counsel, framed the  

following questions, which arise for consideration:

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“1. What is the meaning of the expression paid'/tender' in Section  

24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land  

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of  

2013') and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (Act of  

1894')? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under  

section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 results into lapse of acquisition  

under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. What are the consequences  

of non- deposit in Court especially when compensation has been  

tendered and refused under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 and  

section 24(2) of the Act of 2013? Whether such persons after  

refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?  

2. Whether the word or' should be read as conjunctive or  

disjunctive in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013?  

3. What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part of sub-

Section (2) or main Section 24 of the Act of 2013?  

4. What is mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition  

Act and true meaning of expression the physical possession of  

the land has not been taken occurring in Section 24(2) of the Act  

of 2013?  

5. Whether the period covered by an interim order of a Court  

concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excluded for  

the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 ?  

6. Whether Section 24 of the Act of 2013 revives barred and stale  

claims? In addition, question of per incuriam and other incidental  

questions also to be gone into.”  

5. Question nos.1 to 3 are interconnected and concern the correct  

interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Following questions  

are required to be gone into to interpret the provisions of Section 24(2)  

of the Act of 2013:  

(i) Whether the word “or” in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 used in  

between possession has not been taken or compensation has not been  

paid to be read as “and”?  

(ii) Whether proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has to be  

construed as part thereof or proviso to Section 24(1)(b)?

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(iii) What meaning is to be given to the word "paid" used in Section  

24(2) and "deposited" used in the proviso to Section 24(2)?  

(iv) What are the consequences of payment not made?  

(v)  What are the consequences of the amount not deposited?   

(vi)  What is the effect of a person refusing to accept the compensation?  

6. The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition Act,  

1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which  

had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain  

inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act.  

 7. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already  

initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject  

to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a non-

obstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013.  

8. On behalf of the Union, the States and various acquiring bodies  

and development authorities, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor  

General (who led the arguments, hereafter “SG”), Ms. Pinky Anand,  

learned Additional Solicitor General (hereafter “ASG”), Mr. Anoop  

Chaudhary and Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, learned Senior Counsel, Ms.  

Shashi Kiran, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Mr. R.M. Bhangade and Mr.  

Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel, made their submissions.   

9. The learned SG, arguing that this Court should overrule the ratio  

in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other judgments which

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followed it, contended that the Court did not consider the various  

interpretations of Section 31 of the (repealed) Land Acquisition Act, (“LA  

Act” hereafter). He urged that the provisions of the Act of 2013, vis-à-

vis the timelines and consequences that would ensue if the acquisition  

proceeding prolongs, were not examined. He highlighted that Section 24  

is a transitional provision and such provisions should be given an  

interpretation which accords with legislative intent, rather than so as to  

impose hitherto absent standards, upon past proceedings, or  

proceedings initiated under the previous regime, but which have not  

worked themselves out. He urged that there is a presumption in favour  

of restricted retrospective applicability of any provision in an enactment  

unless a contrary intention appears. It is submitted that designedly, it  

is the stage of passing of award under Section 11 of the LA Act, that  

represents the determinative factor in the segregation for the  

applicability of the provisions of the Act of 2013 or the LA Act. It is urged  

that the opening part of the provision in Section 24(1) is a non-obstante  

clause providing for a limited overriding effect of the Land Acquisition  

Act, in case of the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (1) (a) and (b)  

of the Act of 2013.  

10. Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates that where no award under Section  

11 of the LA Act has been made, but proceedings had been initiated  

under said Act, provisions of the Act of 2013 would apply limited to the  

determination of compensation. In other words, the entire exercise de

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novo, under the Act of 2013, will not be required to be undertaken.  

Therefore, Section 24 (1) (a) contemplates a limited applicability of the  

Act of 2013. Section 24 (1) (b) stipulates that where an award under  

Section 11 of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would  

continue under that law and the provisions of the Act of 2013 would be  

inapplicable. Section 24 (1) (b) is the larger umbrella clause under  

Section 24, which protects the vested rights of the parties under the LA  

Act if the stage of passing of award has been crossed. It is argued that  

the umbrella clause Section 24 (1) (b), is followed by Section 24(2) -  

which provides for the exclusionary clause. Section 24 (2), the learned  

SG highlighted, is the only lapsing clause under the provision which  

brings in the rigours of the Act of 2013 in totality by mandating the land  

acquisition to be initiated de novo.  

 11. It is urged that Section 24 (2) opens with a non obstante clause  

carving out an exception only from Section 24 (1). It visualizes that land  

acquisition proceedings which had been initiated under the LA Act, an  

award under Section 11 of the LA Act had been made. Consequently,  

Section 24 (2) has no relation to Section 24 (1) (a) as it does not  

contemplate an award under Section 11 of the LA Act at all. It is,  

therefore, a limited exception to Section 24 (1) (b). Section 24 (2)  

consequently is umbilically related to Section 24 (1) (b) as an exception,  

wherein land acquisition proceedings would lapse in certain

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contingencies even when an award under Section 11 of the LA Act had  

been made.  

12. It is submitted that the contingencies for lapsing in Section 24(2),  

are subject to an award under Section 11 of the LA Act being made five  

years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 (which is 1.1.2014).  

If the award is so made, two contingencies result in complete lapse -: (a)  

Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (b) compensation  

has not been “paid”. The provision for lapse, per Section 24(2)  is, by its  

nature, a vital provision, inviting serious consequences, in case those  

contingencies arise. It is the interpretation of these “contingencies” that  

requires further consideration. The “contingencies” ought to be  

interpreted in a manner which saves the past transactions to the extent  

they can be saved as it is clearly not the intention of the Act of 2013 to  

tide over all past transactions.  

 13. The learned SG argued that the proviso to Section 24(2) further  

carves out an exception to Section 24(2) viz, in case the award has been  

made and compensation in respect of majority of landholdings has not  

been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, no lapsing will take  

place, but all the beneficiaries specified in the notification for  

acquisition shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the  

provisions of the Act of 2013.   

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14. Therefore, if only a minority of the claimants are disbursed with  

the compensation, such claimants would get benefit of compensation  

under the Act of 2013 to a limited extent without lapsing. Thus, it is  

clear that even if the acquisition does not lapse, all the beneficiaries to  

whom the compensation is payable would be entitled to compensation  

under the Act of 2013.  

 15. It is submitted that Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) are  

balancing provisions controlling the extent of retrospectivity and  

curtailing the effacement of rights. Such balance of protecting  

acquisitions under the LA Act in some defined circumstances whilst  

providing the enhanced compensation provisions under the Act of 2013  

under some defined circumstances is the “middle path” that Parliament  

adopted. It is contended that Section 24(2) is, therefore, controlled by  

the proviso mandating again a further middle path consciously chosen  

by Parliament.  

16. It is argued that while providing for a transitory provision or  

situations resulting into “lapsing” of all the steps already taken under  

the Act under repeal, the legislature always envisages several  

contingencies which emerge out of its day-to-day experience.  The  

manner in which section 24[2] and the proviso attached therewith are  

drafted clearly discloses that Parliament intended certain inevitable  

contingencies which frequently arose in land acquisition proceedings.   

It was urged illustratively, that often, land acquired belongs to benami

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owners, who cannot put forward title, or claim compensation or identify  

themselves.  In such situations, it may not be possible for an acquiring  

authority to “pay” [which, as plain language indicates, would mean  

setting apart for being taken by the entitled persons as explained  

hereafter] to “all” land holders/ entitled persons.  However, as is clear  

from the proviso to Section 24[2], if it can be shown that the amount is  

deposited for majority of share-holding, the acquisition would be saved  

and cannot lapse; the only consequence would be the determination of  

benefits under the Act of 2013. Parliamentary intent in the proviso  

clearly appears to be to ascertain the stage up to which the land  

acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached.  If nobody is paid  

the compensation or compensation is not taken by everyone though  

tendered and/or kept ready, the legislature contemplates such a  

situation to be a reversible one and, therefore, provides for lapsing of all  

previous stages prior to “non-payment”. However, if it can be  

demonstrated that though - (1) compensation was tendered to all; (2)  

some of them [for whatever reason] did not take the compensation; and  

(3) compensation is deposited in case of majority of the land holdings  

[viz. setting apart the share of such persons and making it available for  

them to take it], then, neither proceedings would lapse nor the  

compensation will be required to be determined under the Act of 2013.  

In substance, therefore, the legal situation would be akin to the one  

contemplated under Section 24[1][b] for all practical purposes.   

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17. It is submitted that during the drafting of the Bill, the legislative  

intent and the apprehensions of the stakeholders in the acquisition  

process is clearly depicted in 31st Report of the ‘Standing Committee on  

Rural Development’ while discussing the ‘The Land Acquisition,  

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011’ which was the precursor to  

the Act of 2013.  The learned SG relied on extracts of the Standing  

Committee Reports, the draft Bill, various comments from government  

and public agencies and departments and other stakeholders, the  

stage(s) during which amendments were proposed to the draft  

provisions (of Section 24) and its culmination into the present form and  

structure.   

18. The learned SG argued that the amendments proposed by the  

Minister while introducing the Bill - to incorporate an explanation, as  

to what constitutes “deposit” was not accepted in the legislative wisdom  

of the Lok Sabha and the Bill so passed consciously did not incorporate  

the Explanation (in the form of Proviso to Section 24(2)) providing for an  

extensive and artificial meaning of the word paid. Further, reference to  

“bank” account was also consciously not incorporated thereby leaving  

the expression “to pay” and "to deposit" with its natural meaning and  

leaving it to the discretion of the acquiring authorities to deposit the  

compensation amount even in the treasury.  It is possible that the  

legislature may have considered the reality of 2012-13 where crores of  

people did not have bank accounts.  It was also urged that the rejection

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of the amendment is in consonance with the apprehensions expressed  

by other stakeholders and ministries at the said time. After the said Bill  

was passed in the Lok Sabha, amendments were proposed and accepted  

by the Rajya Sabha, giving the provision its final form. Further, it is  

clear that the effort at the time was towards the drafting of a balancing  

provision which protects the acquisitions from lapsing and at the same  

time provides enhanced compensation under the new Act depending  

upon the stage up to which the acquisition has progressed. This was  

the genesis behind Section 24(1)(a) and proviso to Section 24(2) which  

protect acquisitions from lapsing whilst providing for higher  

compensation under the Act of 2013 to the land owners under limited  

defined circumstances. It is submitted that it is necessary to read the  

proviso to Section 24(2) along with the same provision and not Section  

24(1)(b) as the former would be in accord with Parliamentary intent.  

19. It was submitted that Section 24(2) intended a limited  

retrospective operation: yet such retrospectivity operated and has to be  

construed narrowly considering the nature and width of Section 24(2)  

and the drastic consequences flowing from it.  It is submitted that the  

field of retrospectivity to be given under Section 24 needs to be  

considered in the context of legislative intention manifested from  

Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  

1897. Both Section 114 (of the Act of 2013) and Section 6 of the 1897  

Act clearly point to a narrow interpretation of Section 24 with the object

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of saving on-going acquisition proceedings as far as possible.  The  

learned SG referred to the provisions of UK’s Interpretation Act, 1978;  

he also relied on Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation Bennion’s Fifth  

Edition, (2012) Indian Reprint, which reads as under:   

“Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some  retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption  against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as  narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention”   

20. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State for Social Security v  

Tunnicliffe5, to the effect that:  

“Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law  applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is  unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention  appears”.   

The learned SG also referred to the later judgment of the House of  

Lords which dealt with the said question. It is submitted that sitting in  

a combination of eight judges, in Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.  

Ltd.v L'office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr6, where it was held that  

retrospective application of a statute can be made only when it does not  

                                                           5 [1991] 2 All ER 712  6 [1994] 1 A.C. 486, where it was held that:  

"The rule that a person should not be held liable or punished for conduct not  criminal when committed is fundamental and of long standing. It is reflected in the  maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is protected by article 7 of the  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969). The rule also applies, but with less force,  outside the criminal sphere. It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non  respicit and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere debet non  praeteritis. The French Civil Code provides that “La loi ne dispose que pour l'avenir;  elle n'a point d'effet retroactif:”   

…..  But both these passages draw attention to an important point, that the exception only  applies where application of it would not cause unfairness or injustice. This is consistent  

with the general rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of fairness  and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted, ante, p. 494C–E, and recently  emphasised by Staughton L.J in Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe  [1991] 2 All E.R 712, 724..”   

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visit anyone with unfairness. The learned SG referred to Zile Singh v.  

State of Haryana7  where a three-judge Bench held that retrospectivity  

should not be presumed to have been given to a provision, unless it says  

so clearly, or through necessary implication. The guidance was given to  

construe provisions for determining whether such intention is  

expressed, in a given case.  

21. It was urged that this Court, after assessing the unintended and  

absurd results that an amendment may result in, purposefully  

interpreted the provisions to be prospective in operation. It was also  

emphasized that Section 24(2) is retrospective in nature and cannot be  

held to be prospective; nevertheless, the extent of retrospectivity ought  

to be narrowly construed while interpreting, given the harsh  

consequences that it results in particularly against projects of public  

interest. Reliance was placed on CIT v. Sarkar Builders8.  

22. It is submitted that apart from the above, this Court has  

consistently ruled on principles guiding the retrospective operation of  

statutes. Though there is no bar against retrospective operation yet this  

Court considered the practical realities before analysing the extent of  

retrospective operation of the statutes. Reliance in this regard is placed  

                                                           7 (2004) 8 SCC 01  8 2015 (7) SCC 579

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on Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan9 and Rai Ramkrishna v. State of  

Bihar10.  

 23. The learned SG next submitted that a spate of decisions of this  

Court had followed the ratio in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).  

Emphasizing that the overall interpretation of Section 24 of the Act of  

2013 has to accord with its scheme, it was stated that the object of that  

provision was not only to declare that certain acquisitions lapsed.  

Learned counsel, in this context, highlighted that Section 24 (1) (a) in  

fact saves acquisition proceedings, where awards were not made before  

the advent of the Act of 2013, by declaring that the award would be  

made under that Act and compensation payable, in accordance with its  

provisions. Section 24 (1) (b) on the other hand contemplates making of  

award, under the old (LA) Act, but significantly states that all further  

“proceedings” after the award would be taken under the new Act. It was  

highlighted here, that Parliament clearly intended that the  

compensation determined under the old Act had to be paid in terms of  

the new Act, which is under Section 77. The learned SG submitted that  

given these aspects, which are expressed in Section 24 (1), the non  

obstante clause and the following provisions of Section 24 (2) have to be  

interpreted contextually, and in a purposive manner. It was submitted  

that Parliament did not intend that settled matters should be undone,  

and whatever had attained finality, in acquisition matters, should not  

                                                           9 1966 (1) SCR 890  10 1964 (1) SCR 897

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be re-opened. He cited the decisions of this Court reported as Southern  

Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill11; Tinsukhia  

Electric Supply Company Ltd v. State Of Assam & Ors12; Commissioner  

of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers13; D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of  

India & Ors14; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India15; New India Assurance  

Co. v. Nulli Nivelle16; Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors v. Smt. P.  

Laxmi Devi17; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette  

Industries Ltd.18; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose & Ors19; H.S Vankani v.  

State of Gujarat,20; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao  

Andolan & Ors.21   

24. It was submitted that hitherto, in accord with Pune Municipal  

Corporation (supra) and Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of Tamil  

Nadu22 most decisions had accepted that the expression “or”- (occurring  

in Section 24 (2)), where an award has been made under the old Act, 5  

years before the commencement of the Act of 2013 “but the physical  

possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not  

been paid” – is to be read disjunctively, i.e., that if either condition is  

                                                           11 (2012) 2 SCC 108  12 (1989) 3 SCC 709 @ para  118-121  13 (2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21  14 (2003) 6 SCC 186 para 16-18  

15 (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24  16 (2008) 3 SCC 279 @ para 51-54  

17 (2008) 4 SCC 720 para 41 & 42  18 (2008) 13 SCC 30 para 132-137  19 (2009) 7 SCC 1 para 54-67  20  (2010) 4 SCC 301 para 43-48  21 (2011) 7 SCC 639 para 78-85  22  2015 (3) SCC 353

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satisfied, the acquisition would lapse. However, submitted the learned  

SG, the true and correct interpretation of the term “or” would be that it  

ought to be construed as a conjunctive word.   

25. Learned counsel next submitted that the expression “paid” should  

be construed reasonably and not in a literal manner, as was done in  

Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).  Before the Act of 2013 was brought  

into force, the modes of payment recognized by the law were: tendering  

payment, payment into court in the event no one entitled to alienate the  

property received it and payment into court upon disputes about the  

entitlement to receive payment. These three situations were visualized  

in Section 31 (2) of the old Act. It was emphasized that the consequence  

of lapse of acquisition was never contemplated, in the event of refusal  

to accept payment, or absence of anyone entitled to receive it, or in the  

contingency of a dispute regarding entitlement to receive the amount.  

This clearly meant that while payment of compensation was essential  

and mandatory, the mode of payment was not mandatory. If, for  

instance, the amount was tendered and not received, but instead, the  

landowner refused it, the appropriate government could well deposit it  

in the treasury, in accordance with prevailing financial rules, to  

facilitate disbursement, as and when the landowner or the one entitled  

to receive it, came forward and established entitlement. In such event,  

the only consequence of non-deposit (in court, under Section 31) meant  

that higher interest as mandated by Section 34 was to be paid.

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26. The context of Section 24, learned counsel urged, is to provide for  

a transitory provision viz. to take care of the pending land acquisition  

proceedings which are ongoing under the LA Act when the Act of 2013  

is brought into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. The purpose and object of making  

this provision is to balance the competing rights of public projects vis-

à-vis holders of the land. The object and purpose was to ensure that  

where acquisition proceedings under LA Act have reached an advanced  

stage and investment of public money had already been made, firstly,  

the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be avoided and secondly as  

far as possible, the land owners also can, without disturbing the process  

of acquisition, be given the compensation under the Act of 2013.    

 27. It was reiterated that the legislature knows about the ground  

realities faced in land acquisition proceedings.  There are very few cases  

where one or two land parcels are acquired in isolation.  Mostly,  

acquisitions take place of bigger tracts of land involving more than one  

parcel of land and more than one person “entitled to compensation”.  

When Parliament provided for a transitory provision in relation to  

acquisitions under the old Act, it did not contemplate the possibility of  

the entire payment procedure to all being not processed given the  

practical situations arising in all such proceedings.  Parliament is also  

presumed to be aware of the fact that in almost all cases of acquisition,  

the proceedings are stiffly opposed and in most of the cases, the tender  

of compensation is also opposed under a wrong and misplaced notion

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that the acceptance of the tender may be treated as acquiescence with  

the quantum being tendered.  

28. The learned counsel argued that Parliament did not expect the  

acquiring authority to perform an impossible task of forcing payment to  

the land owners unwilling, for any reason to accept it.  The legislature,  

therefore, does not use the expression of the land owners having  

“accepted” the payment.  It merely uses the expression “paid”.  The  

legislature clearly tries to balance the rights of land owners only in one  

contingency viz. in a post award scenario and the award having been  

made five years prior to 1.1.2014, when the amount is not “deposited”  

in the accounts of the majority of the beneficiaries.   

 29. It was urged that on a true construction and taking the literal,  

natural and grammatical meaning of the provisions in the context  

referred above and keeping in mind the object it can safely be concluded  

that the words “paid” and “deposit” are expressions of the same act  

namely making the amount available (i.e. tendering) for being taken by  

those entitled to it. It was urged that if this interpretation is not given  

then the refusal by few persons or few persons being untraceable in the  

acquisition of a vast tract of land would result in the drastic  

consequence of lapsing of the acquisition proceedings.    

30. It was urged by the learned ASG and Mr. Muthuraj, learned senior  

counsel that the legislature cannot be presumed to intend such an

21    

anomalous situation.  The only way in which the object behind section  

24 can be achieved is to give natural meaning to the words and  

expressions used keeping the object in mind and treating the words  

“paid” and “deposit” as connoting expression of the very same Act  

depending upon the fact situation in each case. Learned counsel  

submitted that by using the terms “paid” and “deposit”, Parliament  

consciously left a leeway to save the drastic consequence of lapsing by  

dealing with a particular situation in light of fact situation emerging in  

each case. Not treating “paid” and “deposit” as synonymous or the  

“deposit” so as to keep it available being the next step after “pay”, would  

lead to disastrous situations as the acquiring authority may have  

acquired vast tract of land and may have put substantial portion from  

it to public use by constructing infrastructural projects.  Such a  

disastrous situation /consequence would never have been anticipated  

or envisaged by the legislature. Learned counsel also referred to various  

Standing Orders, framed as part of the financial code of several States,  

which provided for procedure to deposit money in the treasury, when  

landowners refused to accept compensation, or were untraceable, at the  

time the amount was to be tendered.   

 31. It is submitted by the learned ASG that this Court should not  

assume any omission or add or amend words to the statute. It is  

submitted that plain and unambiguous construction has to be given  

without addition and substitution of the words. It is submitted that

22    

when a literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to  

read words or add words to statute. In support of this proposition,  

reliance was placed on some decisions23.  It was therefore submitted  

that the word “paid” does not and cannot mean actual de-facto payment  

as it would amount to adding words which do not exist in the provision.  

Similarly, the word “deposit” cannot mean “deposit in the Court” as that  

was never the legislative intent nor can it be deduced from any accepted  

interpretive process.   

 32. It was submitted that this Court, whilst interpreting Section 24 of  

the Act of 2013, for the first time in Pune Municipal Corporation [supra]  

and subsequent judgments, presumed that the word “paid” occurring  

in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would have to be interpreted as per  

Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that the said presumption  

neither has any justification nor any such justification is examined in  

the said judgments. It is submitted that the said presumption has  

resulted in grave consequences without ascertaining the conscious  

omissions on the part of the Legislature. The learned SG illustrated how  

the terms “paid” and “deposit” have been used in different senses under  

the LA Act and in the Act of 2013.   

33. Learned counsel submit that firstly, Section 31 of the LA Act is  

pari materia to Section 77 of the Act of 2013. There is neither any  

                                                           23 BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552; Howard de Walden  (Lord) v. IRC, (1948) 2 All ER 825 (HL); V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 278;  and Ram Narain v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 18.

23    

justification nor any requirement of interpreting Section 24 of the Act of  

2013 in the shadow of Section 31 of the LA Act. It is submitted that if  

as an alternative argument it is assumed that the expressions “paid”/  

“tender” and the expression “deposited” have both been used  

consciously in Section 31, as is the reason of drafting Section 24(2), an  

anomalous situation occurs. In the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013, expression used is compensation has not been “deposited” “in the  

account of the beneficiaries", which is separate from the “deposit in  

Court” envisaged under Section 31(2) of the LA Act. It is submitted that  

the expression “bank account” has not been used in Section 31 of the  

LA Act at all and the expression “in the Court” has not been used in  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 at all. The said omissions carry weight  

and cannot be ignored.   

34. It is urged that if Section 24 of the Act of 2013 intended to attract  

the rigours and technicalities of Section 31 of the LA Act, it would have  

used the requisite phrase. It is submitted that the term Section 31 of the  

LA Act is conspicuous by its absence in Section 24 of the Act of 2013.  

Parliament intentionally used the phrases “paid” and “deposit” not in  

terms of their meanings under Section 31 so as to avoid the rigours of  

the said provision and to keep the practical exigencies of land  

acquisition in mind, more particularly when Section 24 of the Act of  

2013 is merely a transitory provision. It was argued that it is a settled  

canon of interpretation that when the Legislature uses two different

24    

phrases, the meaning they carry would be different. Harbhajan Singh v.  

Press Council of India,24  is relied on.  

35. It is submitted that Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante  

clause, providing for a limited overriding effect of the LA Act in case of  

the contingencies mentioned in Section 24 (a) and (b). Section 24 (1) (a)  

contemplates that where land acquisition proceedings were initiated  

under the LA Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act  

came into force viz. 1.1.2014, acquisition proceedings could continue,  

however compensation will have to be determined under the Act of  

2013.  Section 24 (1) (b) provides that where an award under Section 11  

of the LA Act has been made, the entire proceedings would continue  

under the Act of 1894, as if it were not repealed. Section 24(2) provides  

for an exclusionary clause which mandates the land acquisition  

proceedings to be lapsed and initiated de novo.  

 36. It was submitted that the requirements for lapsing (of acquisition)  

in Section 24(2), are subject to an award under Section 11 of the LA Act  

being made five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 viz.  

1.1.2014.  If the award is made and the following two situations  

occurred, the proceedings will lapse; one, physical possession has not  

been taken or (to be read as "and") and two, compensation has not been  

paid.  

                                                           24 (2002) 3 SCC 722

25    

37. Elaborating on the expressions “paid”/“tender” it was urged by  

learned counsel that the meaning of expression “tender" is that when a  

person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available  

and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has  

tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be  

visited for non-payment of the amount. Reliance is placed on the  

meaning of the term in Black’s Law Dictionary.  

38. It is apparent from aforesaid that "tender” may save the tendering  

party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance if another  

party is unjustifiably refusing the tender.  The expression “paid" would  

mean in Section 31(1) of the LA Act and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013  

as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available. Merely, if a  

landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been  

paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment.   

Thus, the term “paid” does not mean actual payment to be made but  

whatever is possible for an incumbent to make the payment is only  

contemplated.  "Paid” does not mean receipt or deposited in court. There  

may be refusal to receive an amount in spite of its tender.  Thus, in view  

of the decisions of this Court in Benares State Bank Ltd.v.CIT, 25  

Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spg.&Wvg.Mills Co.Ltd.26 and  

                                                           25 (1969) 2 SCC 316  26 (1971)1 SCC 337

26    

J.Dalmia v Commissioner of Income Tax27, the provisions of Section 24(2)  

should be construed as tender of the amount.  

 39. It is submitted that the three Judge Bench in judgment in Pune  

Municipal Corporation (supra), while deciding the expression  

"compensation has not been paid", held that for the purposes of Section  

24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as "paid”:   

“if the compensation has been offered to the person interested  and such compensation has been deposited in the court where  reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of  the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the Land  Acquisition  Act. In other words,the compensation may be said to  have been“paid"within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the  Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has  discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of  compensation in court and made that amount available to the  interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and  33.”  

40. It was argued that the conclusion in Pune Municipal Corporation  

(supra) that deposit of the amount of compensation in the Government  

treasury cannot amount to the said sum (amount of compensation)  

“paid” to the landowners or persons interested. This view was taken  

without dwelling on the legal connotation of the expression “paid” in  

Section 24(2). In the process, it has also not taken into account the  

binding law as held in Dalmia's case and Benares State Bank's case.  

Though Section 34 of the LA Act was mentioned in passing para 16,  

however it has not at all been considered. It is a very crucial provision,  

which deals with the consequences of compensation not having been  

                                                           27 (1964) 53 ITR 83 [AIR 1964 SC 1866]

27    

deposited. Further, submit counsel, the matter relates to payment of  

compensation from out of Government funds.  Handling of Government  

funds has to be strictly in accordance with the Standing Orders issued  

by the States.  The effect of those Standing Orders has also not been  

considered in the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).  The  

said judgment, therefore, having been rendered without taking into  

consideration the aforesaid judgments, Section 34 of the LA Act and the  

Standing Orders is, in the submission of the counsel, per incuriam.   

 41. It is submitted that another aspect which arises is, whether  

prejudice or injustice would be caused in case the amount is not  

deposited in the court and is deposited in the treasury, particularly  

when the provision contained in Section 31 of the LA Act has to be read  

conjointly with those in Section 34. By reason of Section 34, (of the LA  

Act) one could claim interest - at a higher rate in case amounts were not  

deposited under Section 31(2) if the authorities were at fault.  

 42. Arguing about whether the expression “or” should be read as  

conjunctive or disjunctive, it was argued that after the stage of section  

11 under the LA Act, there are two possibilities.  The requisite authority  

may take possession of the land in terms of Section 16 of the LA Act or  

the said authority may proceed to tender payment under Section 31 of  

the LA Act. The said two possibilities may be conducted simultaneously  

or one after the other, there is no embargo in the LA Act regarding the  

same.

28    

43. It is submitted that Section 24(2), while providing for lapsing, uses  

the two phrases concerning possession of the land and the tendering of  

payment with the disjunctive word “or" thereby making it mandatory for  

the acquiring authority to satisfy both contingencies in order to avoid  

lapsing.  It is submitted that the same would be against the legislative  

intention of limited lapsing. Further, the said interpretation would be  

against the purport of the possession and the title "being vested” in the  

acquiring authority by virtue of the interpretation of section 16 in the  

LA Act [as dealt with the latter part of the submissions].  It is submitted  

that the intention of the Legislature could not have been to divest the  

acquiring authority of the land after the said has been vested "free from  

all encumbrances". In line with the same, it is submitted that the word  

"or" may be read as "and" so as to limit the lapsing only in cases where  

both, payment has not been made (subject to proviso) and possession  

has not been taken.  

 44. Reliance is placed on the judgments reported as Ishwar Singh  

Bindra v State of UP28, where this Court approved and extracted  

passages from Maxwell on Interpretation and Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary  

to the effect that generally, the conjunctive “and” is used in a cumulative  

sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together,  

and herein it is the antithesis of "or" and that however, sometimes, even  

in such a connection, it is, by force of its contents, read as "or".  

                                                           28 1969 (1) SCR 219

29    

Similarly, Maxwell accepted that "to carry out the intention of the  

legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or'  

and 'and' one for the other". Learned counsel also relied on Mobilox  

Innovations (P) Ltd v  Kirusa Software (P) Ltd29  which held that:  

“38....Even otherwise ,the word “and” occurring in Section  8(2)(a)must be read as "or" keeping in mind the legislative intent  and the fact that an anomalous situation would arise if it is not  read as "or” if read as “and", disputes would only stave off the  bankruptcy process if they are already pending in a suit or  arbitration proceedings and not otherwise. This would lead to  great hardship; in that a dispute may arise a few days before  triggering of the insolvency process, in which case, though a  dispute may exist, there is no time to approach either an Arbitral  Tribunal or a court..."   

Learned counsel also relied on several other decisions in support  

of the same proposition (i.e. that the disjunctive “or” has to be read  

contextually, and if need arises as “and”, i.e., as a conjunctive).30  

 45. Highlighting that the placement of the proviso (following Section  

24 (2)) is significant, and not accidental, it was argued that the field of  

operation of the proviso is immediately preceding provision, i.e. Section  

24 (2) and not Section 24 (1) (b). It is submitted that the proviso to  

Section 24 (2) contemplates a situation where with respect to majority  

of the holdings, compensation not deposited in the account of  

landowners (even though there being tendering of payment to all land  

                                                           29 (2018)1SCC 353  30 Brown v Harrison 1927 All ER 195 @ pp. 203, 204 (CA); Ranchhodddas Atmaram & Anr v  Union of India 1961 (3) SCR 718; State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala 1957 (1) SCR  874 (hereafter “RMDC”); Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab  

Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 1971 SCR 977; Ishwar  Singh Bindra & Ors v State of UP 1969 (1) SCR 219; Joint Director of Mines Safety v Tandur  and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P0 Ltd 1987 (3) SCC 308; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan 1998 (7)  SCC 59. Prof. Yashpal & Ors v State of Chhatisgarh & Ors 2005 (5) SCC 420  

30    

owners and physical possession being taken), the benefits of the Act of  

2013 qua the compensation would follow. It is argued that if the said  

proviso is not interpreted to be a proviso to Section 24(2), a valuable  

benefit extended by Parliament would evaporate. Learned counsel  

contended that the said proviso provides for enhanced benefit even if  

the twin conditions of Section 24 (2) are met. Therefore, the said proviso  

saves the land acquisition and furthers the purpose and the object of  

giving benefit of computation of compensation to all landholders.  

Therefore, it is evident that the proviso is appropriately treated as a  

proviso to Section 24 (2) and cannot be read as proviso to Section 24 (1)  

(b) of the Act of 2013. It was argued that Parliamentary intent is clearly  

discernible, because of the colon (a punctuation mark) occurring at the  

end of Section 24 (2), which means that the proviso constitutes an  

exception to that provision. Reference was made to Aswini Kumar Ghosh  

& Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr31 (where it was held that "...Punctuation is  

after all a minor element in the construction of a statute and very little  

attention is paid to it by English Courts. ......When a statute is  

carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight  

should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation."). Reliance was also  

placed on Jamshed Guzdar v State of Maharastra.32   

 46. It was argued by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned ASG, that payment of  

compensation is not a sine qua non for vesting in terms of Section 16 of  

                                                           31 1953 SCR 1  32 2005 (2) SCC 591

31    

the old LA Act. It is urged, in this context, that the old Act did not  

provide any time line for depositing compensation; nor even for taking  

over of possession. Ordinarily, the repeal provision under the Act of  

2013 (Section 114) would prevail; however, Section 24 carves out an  

important, albeit a limited scope from the repeal clause. Section 24 (2)  

freshly introduces the concept of lapsing, in relation to acquisitions that  

were initiated under the old Act. Necessarily, lapsing is to be considered  

as a narrow concept. Supporting the learned SG’s argument that “or” is  

to be read conjunctively, she highlighted that by reason of Section 16 of  

the old Act, title vested in the State, upon taking of possession.  

Divesting under old Act was impermissible. It was urged that were the  

court to accept an interpretation, that either non-payment of  

compensation, or taking of possession – under Section 24 (2), would  

result in lapsing of acquisition, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation  

(supra) and other decisions, land vested in the State, and conveyed to  

third parties (either as allottees of housing schemes or public sector  

undertakings, for one development project or another, or for public  

purposes such as construction of roads, bridges and other public works)  

would be divested.   

47. Under Section 16 of the LA Act once award is made and possession  

of land is taken, then the land vests absolutely with the Government.  

Therefore, the word deemed to lapse in Section 24(2) should not be  

interpreted to mean divesting of land from the Government which is

32    

already vested in the Government and moreover in the absence of any  

provision of divesting in the 1894 Act.  In this context, the observations  

in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar33 that the legislature is  

presumed to be acquainted with the construction which the courts have  

put upon the words, and when legislature repeats the same words. This  

Court had, in that judgment, quoted with approval the previous decision  

in Sri K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo v, State of Orissa34 that  

"Section of the Act empowers the State Government to  declare, by notification, that the estate described in the  notification has vested in the State free from all  encumbrances. ….. The consequences of vesting ether by Issue of  notification or as a result of surrender are described in detail in  Section 5 of the Act. It would be sufficient for our present purpose  to state that the primary consequence is that all lands comprised  in the estate including communal lands, non-ryoti lands, waste  and trees orchards pasture lands, forests, mines and  minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks, water channels,  fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars, and buildings or structures  together with the land on which they stand shall, subject to the  other provisions of the Act, vest absolutely in the State  Government free from all encumbrances and the intermediary  shall cease to have any interest in them.”  

Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in  

Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math35, at para 53,  

that “it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an  

Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be  

divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such  

property under such law."  

48. It was urged that serious consequences arise when condition nos.  

(ii) and (iii) are to be read as not conjunctive or disjunctive.  The word  

                                                           33 (1955) 2 SCR 603  34 1954 SCR 11  35 (2015) 16 SCC 542 @ para 53

33    

used to connect these two conditions is "or"; if it is not read  

conjunctively, disastrous consequence leading to absurd result would  

emanate. Once possession is taken over vesting occurs under Section  

16 of the LA Act. Section 24(2) contains no stipulation that such vesting  

of title of land stands nullified or divested. If the intention of Parliament  

was to divest the State of its title that had to be stated in plain and clear  

language. It was emphasized that the conjunctive use of “or” in Section  

24 (2) would have not only momentous consequences to the State, but  

innocent third parties, who would be exposed to the risk of being  

divested title to the lands and properties, perfected by them, as allottees  

or subsequent purchasers. Merely because a person who has received  

compensation clungs on to the possession of the land and the same  

shall lead to lapsing cannot be the intention of Parliament. Similarly,  

one who received compensation, is not obliged to return the money to  

the State in the event of lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.  

It was urged, therefore, that absence of provision to return the  

compensation received to Government convincingly points to  

Parliamentary intent that "or" should be read as "and"; thus, only if  

neither possession is taken (of acquired lands) nor is compensation  

paid, (i.e., tendered to the party or parties) would the acquisition under  

the LA Act lapse. Learned counsel also relied on several decisions in this  

context.36   

                                                           36 Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; Gulam  Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v.

34    

49. It was highlighted by M/s Bhangde, Mr. Rajesh Mahale, and Ms.  

Shashi Kiran, that the consequence of literally interpreting Section 24  

(2) as to mean that the conditions are disjunctive (either that “or” should  

be read as such) are too drastic and severe. Learned counsel pointed  

out that as a result of allegations of non-payment of compensation,  

lands which had been vested in the State and were subsequently made  

over to the requisitioning agencies, and in respect of which title had  

passed multiple times to other parties, now are exposed to the threat of  

divesting of title. Learned counsel submitted that a deeming fiction  

cannot be taken to this extent; such disastrous consequences could not  

have been attributed by Parliament, because even if such were the  

intent, there has to be a mechanism to restitute those likely to be  

affected. Besides, the legality of such a law, divesting or taking away the  

title of such innocent third-party purchasers, would be suspect,  

because there is absolutely no provision for restitution or any form of  

compensation in their favour.    

50. On the question relating to the mode of taking possession, it was  

argued that when the State is involved in taking possession of the  

property acquired, it can take possession by drawing a panchnama.  The  

normal rule of State possessing the land through some persons would  

not be applicable in such cases. On open land, possession is deemed to  

                                                           Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 and  Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405  

35    

be of the owner.  The way the State takes possession of large chunk of  

property acquired is by drawing a memorandum of taking possession  

as State is not going to put other persons in possession or its police  

force or going to cultivate it or start residing or physically occupy it after  

displacing who were physically in possession as in the case of certain  

private persons, in case they re-enter in possession of open land, start  

cultivation or residing in the house. Lawful possession is deemed to be  

of the State. A number of decisions that accepted the mode of drawing  

panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of taking possession  

were cited. In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal37 this  

Court observed that preparing a panchnama is sufficient to constitute  

taking of possession. If acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not  

be possible to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the  

land and it would be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by  

preparing an appropriate document in the presence of independent  

witnesses and getting their signatures. Even subsequent utilisation of  

a portion of acquired land for public purpose was still sufficient to prove  

taking possession.   

 51. It is submitted that when the State acquires land and has drawn  

memorandum of taking possession that is the way the State takes  

possession of large tract of land acquired, it ought not necessarily to  

physically occupy such land after forcefully displacing those physically  

                                                           37 (2011)5 SCC 394 (hereafter referred to as “Banda Development Authority”)

36    

in possession. Possession in law is deemed to be physical possession  

for the State. This Court in a number of decisions has accepted the  

mode of drawing panchnama by the State consistently to be a mode of  

taking possession. It is submitted that this Court in T.N. Housing  

Board v. A. Viswam38 held that recording of memorandum/panchnama  

by the Land Acquisition Officer in the presence of witnesses signed by  

them would constitute taking possession of land.  

Also, reliance is placed on other decisions.39   

52. Dealing next with the manner by which the period covered by an  

interim order of Court ought to be excluded for the purpose of  

applicability of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, it is argued that a  

settled proposition of law is that an act of a Court should not prejudice  

any party. In view of the maxim actus curae neminem gravabit or even  

in its absence, any interim order granted by the court cannot prejudice  

any rights of the parties. It is argued that for a proper working of the  

justice delivery system, once the court passes an order staying  

dispossession, the State cannot take possession of the land. If an order  

of the Court disables a person to take any action, the doctrine nemo  

tentur ad impossible would be applicable that is, the law in general  

excuses a party which is disabled to perform a duty and impossibility of  

performance of a duty is a good excuse. Further, the Latin maxim lexnon  

                                                           38 (1996) 8 SCC 259  39 Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700; State of T.N. v. Mahalakshmi  Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269;  T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 and Om  Prakash Verma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, (2010) 13 SCC 158.  

37    

cogitad impossibilia, that is, the law does not compel a man to do that  

which he cannot possibly perform.   Since, it becomes impossible for the  

State to take possession, for the duration a stay or interim order is in  

operation, the consequence of an interim order cannot be used against  

the State. Reliance for this legal position is placed on the judgments in  

A.R. Antulay vs R.S.Nayak & Ors40, Sarah Mathew v Institute of Cardio  

Vascular Diseases41  and in Dau Dayal v  State of U.P42. In A.R.Antulay  

(supra) it was held that no party is prejudiced by the court's mistake.  

Therefore, urged counsel, in cases where conduct of acquisition  

proceedings were held up after the passing of an award, due to the  

interim order of any court, in the absence of any specific provision to  

that effect, a party who cannot perform its duties, and but for the order,  

could have performed its stipulated task, within the time assigned,  

should not be placed at a disadvantage, as that would amount to  

granting a premium for one’s wrongdoing, or rank speculation. It is  

urged, therefore, that it is imperative that the period during which the  

State or the acquiring authority was prohibited/ injuncted by an interim  

order of the court from taking possession has to be excluded. This  

principle, submit learned counsel, is based on settled common law  

principles. These are in fact rules of equity, justice and sound logic. In  

the absence of their being a prohibition in the law these principles would  

be attracted. The efficacy and binding nature of such common law  

                                                           40 1988 Suppl (1) SCR 01  41 2014 (2) SCC 62  42 1959 Supp (1) SCR 639

38    

principles cannot be diminished or whittled down in the absence of any  

express prohibition in law. Coupled with the aforesaid principle is also  

a principle of restitution. An interim order passed by the Court merges  

into the final decision, goes against the party successful at the interim  

stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at  

the end of the litigation would be justified in being placed in the same  

place in which it would have been, had the interim order not been  

passed. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to the  

principle of restitution is in fact an obligation of the court. The above  

principles have been culled out and applied by this Court in the  

judgment in South Eastern Coal Field Ltd v State of M.P. & Ors.43.   

Learned counsel argued that general common law rules of equity,  

justice and sound logic would certainly apply. It is submitted that  

similarly, the doctrine of restitution has been discussed in several other  

judgments of this Court including State of Gujarat v Essar Oil Ltd44. It  

is, thus, submitted that the mere absence of an express provision under  

Section 24(2) – to exclude the period during which an interim order  

operates, which prevents the making of an award, or taking over of  

possession of acquired land, would not in law imply that such  

restitutionary and equitable principles would be inapplicable.  

Contentions on behalf of landowners  

                                                           43 2003 SCC 648  44 2012 (3) SCC 522

39    

53. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel, led the arguments on  

behalf of landowners.  He urged that the Act of 2013 is a new,  

transformative and radical measure. The new law is a welfare state law,  

not a colonial law - unlike the Act of 1894. Mr. Divan submitted that  

the Act of 1894 resulted in several rounds of repeated litigation on  

various aspect, such as payment of compensation, lack of legislatively  

mandated timelines for completion of acquisition proceedings, etc. This  

also resulted in amendments to the Act of 1894 (notably, the  

amendments of 1967 and 1984) which, to some extent, sought to grant  

relief to landowners. However, these too got mired in litigation. Learned  

counsel relied on the judgments, reported as Dev Sharan v State of Uttar  

Pradesh45 and Radhey Shyam v State of UP46.  Repeated litigation was  

the result of an unfair legal regime. It was submitted that such  

judgments of this Court highlighted that the Act of 1894 was enacted  

more than 116 years ago to facilitate acquisition of land and immovable  

properties for construction of roads, canals, railways, etc. This law was  

frequently used in the post-independence era for different public  

purposes like laying of roads, construction of bridges, dams and  

buildings of various public establishments/institutions, planned  

development of urban areas, providing of houses to different sections of  

the society and for developing residential colonies/sectors. In the recent  

years, there is acquisition of large tracts of land in rural parts of the  

                                                           45 (2011) 4 SCC 769  

46  (2011) 5 SCC 553

40    

country in the name of development and their transfer to private  

entrepreneurs, who utilize it to construction of multi-storied complexes,  

commercial centres and for setting up industrial units. Similarly, large  

scale acquisitions were made on behalf of companies by invoking the  

provisions contained in Part VII of the Act. Resultantly, such acquisition  

led to deprivation of the source of livelihood of land owners, engaged in  

agricultural operations and other ancillary activities in rural areas. A  

large number of these people are unaware of, and unable to assert their  

rights, and secure fair compensation. The unrest and inequity which  

arose out of these deprivations, impelled the State to enact a modern  

law, which ensured not only fair compensation, but other rights such  

as rehabilitation, employment, higher solatium and a guarantee against  

deprivation of certain kinds of lands.  Thus, the Act of 2013 ushered a  

new regime that starts from a fresh direction. Learned counsel also  

relied on Bharat Sewak Samaj v. Lieutnant Governor & Ors.,47 to say that  

the provisions of the Act of 1894 were outdated and were misused and  

were oppressive to the interest of the landowners.  Hence, the Act of  

2013 was enacted and that this Court ought to interpret in the spirit of  

the new beneficial legislation. Learned counsel urged that the benefits  

so conferred should not be taken away by this Court by narrowly  

interpreting its provisions.  

                                                           47 2012 (12) SCC 675

41    

54.  Mr. Divan relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  

Act of 2013 to say that the new law was framed, in  recognition of  

concerns expressed by the property owners of forcible acquisition  

without following due process and without paying appropriate  

compensation affecting livelihood of such owners, many times, who are  

small property owners or persons having small agricultural holdings  

and having been dependant on the said holdings, the new Act is made.   

The Act aims to provide just and fair compensation, make adequate  

provision for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons in  

the family, determination of compensation package on scientific  

methods. It was urged that being a welfare legislation, the Act of 2013  

constitutes a wholesome rejection of the colonial approach.  Learned  

counsel urged that under the new Act, unlike the Act of 1894, a Social  

Impact Assessment (SIA) report has to be prepared, under Section 7, as  

an integral component of acquisition proceedings. If acquisition is not  

resorted to, in a time frame, the acquisition lapses; likewise, the new  

Act contemplates the preparation of a rehabilitation scheme, which  

would note the (a) particulars of lands and immovable properties being  

acquired of each affected family; (b) livelihoods lost in respect of landless  

who are primarily dependent on the lands being acquired; (c) a list of  

public utilities Government buildings, amenities and infrastructural  

facilities which are affected or likely to be affected, where resettlement  

of affected families is involved and (d) details of any common property  

resources being acquired.

42    

55. Learned senior counsel argued that Section 24 constitutes an  

exception to the general rule, i.e., lapsing of all acquisition proceedings,  

by reason of repeal of the Act of 1894, and operation of Section 114.  

Therefore, Section 24 has to be given effect to strictly, given that  

Parliamentary intent was to ensure that acquisition proceedings did not  

result in oppression and hardship. It was argued that having regard to  

this salient feature, the provision (Section 24) should be literally  

construed.  Learned counsel submitted that the objective of new Act  

must be kept in mind to understand the scope of Sections 11, 11 (A),  

12, 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act, on the one hand, and provisions of  

Section of 24 of the Act of 2013 on the other. Furthermore, it was argued  

that the non-obstante clause must be allowed to operate with full vigour  

in its own field. It was stressed that such a provision is equivalent to  

saying that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-

obstante clause, the enactment following it, will have its full operation  

of that, the provision indicated in the non-obstante clause will not be an  

impediment for the operation of the enactment. Decisions in this regard  

were cited by counsel.48   

 56. Mr. Divan relied upon the three stages preceding the Act of 2013  

to urge that there was no doubt in the mind of Parliament, that lapsing  

of acquisition proceedings was intended to ensue, in the event  

                                                           48 Madhav Rao Scindhia v. Union of India 1971 (1) SCC 85 (11 Judges); Smt. Parayankandiyal  Eravath v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 (2 Judges).  

43    

compensation were not paid; or possession were not taken, in respect  

of awards made five years prior to coming into force of the Act of 2013.  

It was argued that Section 24 should be given a plain and literal  

construction, except to the extent that the term “paid” occurring in  

Section 24(2) would also cover cases where a deposit is made before the  

Reference Court in situations covered by Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act.  

Elaborating on this, it is urged that the first decision of this Court, i.e.,  

Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) took note of Section 24(2) in the  

context of a pre-existing law. The Court was alive to the fact that under  

the Act of 1894, where payment of compensation was tendered and the  

land owner refused to accept the amount, the State is nevertheless  

obliged to ensure that at all times, the amount should be made  

available, in a place or an account, not within its control. It was urged,  

therefore, that actual tender of the amount of compensation is a sine  

qua non for the act of payment to be completed. It was considered that  

in that event, the land owner does not accept the amount, it should be  

deposited with the Court, a neutral and independent authority to whom  

the land owner or anyone claiming under him can approach and draw  

the amount. It was submitted that this obligation cannot be brushed  

aside because aside from the question of acceptance of compensation  

without prejudice, even at a later stage, the land owner might wish to  

reconsider the compensation and avail of the amount.   

44    

57. Learned counsel submitted that the obligation to deposit the  

amount in the Reference Court is an independent and absolute one in  

that it is irrespective of whether the land owner sought a reference for  

higher compensation to the Court (under the Act of 1894). Learned  

counsel urged this Court to accept this interpretation, which according  

to him, would give full effect to the intention of Parliament, i.e., to save  

intention of Parliament. It was again highlighted that Parliamentary  

intention was firstly to repeal the previous law to a limited extent and  

save ongoing acquisition proceedings – in terms of Section 24(1) and  

usher a new regime, i.e. Section 24(2) whereby indolence on the part of  

the State agencies either with respect to payment of compensation or  

with respect to taking over of possession, resulting in the lapse of  

acquisition proceedings itself. Learned counsel relied upon the  

decisions of this Court which followed and applied the law declared in  

Pune Municipal Corporation 49.  

58. It was argued that the submissions on behalf of the State and the  

development authorities that “payment” included deposit with the  

treasury or some other authority other than the Reference Court, could  

                                                           49 Bharat Kumar v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586 (hereafter “Bharat Kumar”); Bimla Devi  v State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583 @ para 3; Union of India v Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 at  para 22; Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) at para 14; State of Haryana v Vinod  Oil and General Mills 2014 (15) SCC 410 at para 21; Sita Ram v State of Haryana (2015) 3  SCC 597 at paras 19, 21; Ram Kishan v State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 347 at paras 8, 9, 12;  Velaxan Kumar v Union of India 2015 (4) SCC 325 at paras 15, 16, 17 (hereafter “Velaxan”);  Karnail Kaur v State of Punjab (2015) 3 SCC 206 at paras 17, 18, 23; Rajive Chowdhrie HUF  v State (NCT) of Delhi  (2015) 3 SCC 541 at para 1; Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd v Union of  India AIR 2015 SC 3186 at para 4; Govt of NCT of Delhi v Jagjit Singh AIR 2015 SC 2683 at  para 3; Karan Singh v State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCC 738 at para 5; Shashi Gupta & Ors. v.  State of Haryana 2016 (13) SCC 380 at para 5; Delhi Development Authority v Sukhbir Singh  (2016) 16 SCC 258 at para 1 (hereafter “Sukhbir”).

45    

not have been termed as compliance with the Act of 1894. Here, it was  

urged that Parliament was acutely alive of the fact that the previous  

land acquisition regime resulted in injurious and unconscionable delays  

in payment of compensation. Furthermore, even after awards were  

made, possession was never taken. This led to a great deal of  

uncertainty as far as the land owners were concerned because they  

could not move ahead in their life without compensation nor could they  

take any steps to acquire new lands or properties. It was precisely to  

address this mischief, rather a widespread one, that the Parliament  

wished to enact a “bright line approach” whereby all acquisitions which  

did not culminate either in payment of compensation or taking over of  

possession in respect of awards made five or more years prior to  

1.1.2014 had to lapse. It was submitted that Section 24(1) provided a  

limited window in that it saved some acquisitions, i.e., notably where  

awards had been made but further proceedings had not been taken or  

where awards had not been made in both cases less than 5 years prior  

to 1.1.2014. It was only in these two limited instances that acquisition  

proceedings were allowed to continue or preserved. Thus, Parliamentary  

intent was that in cases of all awards made five years or more prior to  

the coming into force of the Act, if compensation was not paid or  

possession of the acquired land not taken, automatically, as a matter of  

law there was to be a lapse (of such acquisitions). This legal  

consequence crystallised and was in consonance with the other  

provisions of the Act of 2013. Arguing that if one were to take into

46    

account this perspective, there can be no doubt that the expression  

“paid” cannot mean anything other than tendering of compensation and  

in the event of its refusal, or the three contingencies contemplated  

under Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it is deposited in Court. If these  

eventualities were not fulfilled and the amounts were merely kept back  

with the Government by it, any compliance with some norms evolved as  

part of the treasury or financial code there could have been no payment  

or deposit in the eyes of law. Learned counsel submitted that this Court  

should affirm the decision in Sukhbir Singh. It was also submitted that  

unless Section 31 of the 1894 Act which postulates the performance of  

a public duty in a particular manner and (through stipulated three  

eventualities), such duty could be said to be fulfilled only and only if  

that procedure were followed. Learned counsel relied upon the  

judgment in Bharat Kumar, which noted that Section 24(2) has a  

beneficial intent and begins with a non-obstante clause. Therefore,  

urged counsel, literal meaning is to be preferred. It was highlighted that  

Section 24(2) achieved a two-fold purpose, i.e., to preserve acquisition  

proceedings initiated before the commencement of the Act and secondly,  

conferring rights upon the land owners and other parties which did not  

hitherto exist. Since these rights relate to the right to property which is  

guaranteed by Article 300A of the Constitution, full effect must be given  

to them rather than the construction which would destroy its very

47    

purpose. In support of this argument, learned counsel relied upon Union  

of India v. Shivraj 50.   

 59. Learned counsel submitted that the decision in Pune Municipal  

Corporation (supra) was itself conscious of Section 31 and the  

contingencies or eventualities contemplated under Section 31(2). That  

apart, it also relied upon Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v. State of  

Goa51, to say that the State cannot be – in the event of non-acceptance  

of the compensation by the land owner or its inability to locate the land  

owner or in the event of a dispute – keep the compensation amount with  

itself and claim it to be part of same general treasury amount and  

proceed to utilise it. It was submitted that precisely to deal with this  

practice, the appeal provided that non-payment of compensation – and  

in the event of any of the contingencies accruing in Section 31(2) of the  

1894 Act, the failure to deposit it with the Reference Court would result  

in lapse of entire acquisition itself. It was submitted that this  

interpretation is not only literal but followed the objective and purpose  

sought to be achieved by the Parliament through the provision. Learned  

counsel urged this Court that the literal interpretation in this case  

would also accrue with an equitable interpretation and ensure that the  

real benefit of the new law would accrue to land owners deprived of their  

properties and livelihoods for long periods without payment of  

                                                           50  (2014) 6 SCC 564.  51 (2011) 11 SCC 506

48    

compensation. Learned counsel, therefore, urged that the beneficial  

interpretation adopted by this Court in Velaxan Kumar (supra) should  

be accepted. Rajive Chowdhurie HUF (supra)52, it was argued, while  

interpreting Section 24 of the Act of 2013 Act, the Court should not in  

the guise of an interpretative exercise don the cap of a legislature. It was  

submitted as to the State’s argument that the disjunctive “or” in Section  

24(2) should not be read as conjunctive “and”. It was argued in this  

regard that in all the three drafts that the Bill (which ultimately  

culminated in the Act of 2013) went through53, the expression used  

consistently was “but the physical possession”. In the three stages, the  

intent was to normally ensure that the acquisition proceedings pending  

for a long time were to lapse. It was emphasised that in the first version,  

i.e., the Bill introduced on 5.9.2011, all acquisitions were deemed to  

have lapsed regardless of whether the award was made or not, if  

possession were not taken and also in those cases where the awards  

were not made. Therefore, this Court should be cautious in interpreting  

the disjunctive “or” in any manner other than in the literal sense.  

 60. The three broad situations covered under Section 24 are (i) cases  

where the land acquisition process shall be deemed to have lapsed; (ii)  

cases where the landholders are entitled to compensation in accordance  

                                                           52  (2015) 3 SCC 541  53  Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011 – introduced in Lok  

Sabha on 05.07.2011; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition  Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2013 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 29.08.2013 and  

the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and  

Resettlement Act 2013 (as passed by both Houses of Parliament on 05.09.2013).

49    

with the provisions of the Act of 2013; and (iii) cases where the land  

acquisition proceedings continue under the 1894 Act as if it had not  

been repealed.  It was urged that the first set of cases are covered by  

Section 24(2). The two conditions to be fulfilled as on 1.1.2014 to trigger  

the deeming provision into operation, according to Mr. Divan, are firstly,  

there must be an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act which has  

been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of  

2013 (i.e., an award made on or before 1.1.2009); and secondly either  

physical possession of the land has not been taken from the landowner  

or compensation had not been paid as required under the Act of 1894.  

61. It was argued that the second set of cases, where enhanced  

compensation has to be paid, under the Act of 2013, are covered under  

Section 24(1) and the proviso to Section 24. Section 24(1) provides that  

where proceedings have not reached the stage of an award under  

section 11 of the 1894 Act, the provisions to determine compensation  

under the Act of 2013 apply.  Further, the proviso to Section 24 provides  

for compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 where the following  

conditions are fulfilled, firstly an award has been made under section  

11 of the 1894 Act; and secondly, compensation in respect of the  

majority of the land holdings has not been paid to the landowners. It  

was submitted that the “majority” is required to be reckoned with  

reference to the award passed under the Act of 1894, and that awards  

contemplated by the proviso are awards made within the period of five

50    

years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e., awards made  

between 1.1.2009 and 31.12.2013.  

62. Learned counsel stated that the third set of cases is where the  

land owners do not get any benefit under the Act of 2013 and the  

acquisition proceeds under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It was  

argued that these cases are covered by section 24(1)(b) and to which  

neither section 24 (2) nor the proviso applies. This covers situations  

where though an award has been passed five years prior to the  

commencement of the Act, neither of the conditions for deemed lapsing  

are present. Mr. Divan urged that the provisions of the Act of 1894 will  

continue to apply without any benefit in terms of increased  

compensation where an award is passed within 5 years of the  

commencement of the Act of 2013 but the majority of landholders have  

been paid.  

63. Mr. Divan then urged that this understanding of the provisions of  

Section 24 is based on established rules of interpretation i.e., first, the  

golden rule of interpretation requiring the Court to interpret statutory  

provisions literally. Second, the rule of purposive interpretation was to  

be used, having regard to the object of the enactment, the purpose of  

the law in seeking to correct historical injustices and the legislative  

intent to confer the benefit of the Act of 2013 on certain landholders  

affected by the regime under the Act of 1894. The third rule to be  

employed, is the rule of harmonious interpretation, such that all words

51    

of the provision are given effect and no part of the provision is rendered  

otiose; fourth, contemporaneous understanding of administrators  

responsible for implementing a new law. Also an interpretation in such  

a manner as to avoid inserting words, subtracting words, and avoids  

anomalies or absurdities was necessary. Lastly it was urged that giving  

a deeming provision its natural effect, which in this case results in a  

rule of interpretation that the provisions of a beneficent legislation  

ought to be interpreted in the case of ambiguity in favour of the  

citizens.54  

 64. It was submitted that the interpretation of Section 24 outlined  

above gives the plain and natural meaning to the key expressions used  

in section 24 - “physical possession”, “paid”, and “deemed to have  

lapsed”.  He further argued that since Section 24 of the Act of 2013  

must be read with section 31 of the Act of 1894, the expression “tender”  

is also relevant and the interpretation he has advanced is consistent  

with the natural meaning of “tender”.  

 65. Learned counsel for the landowners urged that the words ‘paid’  

and ‘deposited in the account of the beneficiaries’ are two permissible  

modes of making compensation available to landowners. Mr. Divan  

                                                           54 Counsel cited Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 (5 Judges); Central  

Railway Workshop vs. Vishwanath (1969) 3 SCC 95; and M/s International Ore and Fertilisers  

(india) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employee State Insurance (1987) 4 SCC 203 in support of the rule of  

beneficial construction of a welfare and remedial statute.  

52    

contended that these are two modes of paying the money to the  

landowners. ‘Paid’, it was urged, means paid. It does not mean a deposit  

in treasury. He further submitted that ‘deposit in the account of the  

beneficiaries’ does not mean a deposit in the treasury. He argued that  

there was no reason to depart from the rule of literal interpretation, and  

the manner of payment, as held in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra),  

is to be strictly in terms of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 as it is an  

expropriatory legislation. It was contended as to the learned Solicitor  

General’s submission that payment in terms of Section 24 is complied  

with if the amount is tendered to the landowners, overlooks the  

obligation of payment in terms of Section 24 is only met if the amount  

is actually paid to the landowners. On the occurrence of the  

contingencies mentioned in Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894, it ought to  

be deposited in the Reference Court as defined under Section 3(d) of the  

Act of 1894. He submitted that tendering money is not payment and  

Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 uses the words ‘tender’ and ‘paid’ to  

convey different meanings and obligations.  Mr. Divan argued that the  

judgments cited by the learned Solicitor General in this regard  

essentially deal with labour laws, and are inapplicable as these statutes  

did not contain a provision such as Section 31 of the Act of 1894, which  

strictly and precisely prescribes what is to be done in the event when  

the payment is not accepted.  

53    

66. It was argued that no rules under the Act of 1894 contemplate  

deposit in the treasury. Learned counsel submitted that standing  

orders, which are merely administrative instructions issued for  

conducting monetary transactions of the State, have in some cases been  

confused to be Rules framed under Section 55 of the Act of 1894. The  

Rules or the Standing Orders have not been produced and no evidence  

has been furnished of compliance with the requirements of Section 55,  

such as notification in the Gazette. All learned counsel submitted that  

in any case, delegated/subordinate legislation cannot be inconsistent  

with, or in any manner depart from the express and precise language of  

the parent enactment.  Again, it was submitted that the State’s  

argument with respect to deposit of compensation amounts in the  

treasury, is untenable, for two strong reasons: one, that Section 31 itself  

directed the compensation to be deposited in the court. In the teeth of  

this express position, the State cannot be heard to say that it could  

nevertheless “deposit” the amount in the treasury, which is nothing but  

keeping the money with itself. It was secondly urged, that even  

otherwise, the Act of 1894 visualized that in regard to matters not  

provided expressly, rules could be made (Section 55).  

 67. Learned counsel submitted that the State’s argument regarding  

the interpretation of ‘physical possession’ to be possession as per the  

ratio in Banda Development Authority (supra), is incorrect. It was  

submitted that it is important to take note of the conscious inclusion of

54    

the word ‘physical’ in relation to possession.  An important distinction  

is required to be drawn in respect of de jure / constructive / deemed  

possession and ‘physical’ possession.  Even if it is conceded that  

drawing of a Panchnama is a valid mode of initially taking possession of  

vast tracts of vacant land, the intention of the legislature is that over a  

period of five years, such possession must transform to evident and  

demonstrable ‘physical’ possession i.e., the manifestation of actual  

control and dominion over the subject land(s). Learned counsel relied  

on several decisions in support of their argument that “physical  

possession” should be construed as actual physical possession, and not  

constructive, or de jure possession, which in most cases is possession  

on paper.55  

 68. Arguing next regarding the interpretation of the proviso to Section  

24, it was stated that the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24  

and not Section 24 (1) (b).  Mr. Divan submitted that a proviso may in  

certain cases operate as an independent provision, and the proviso to  

Section 24 is a stand-alone provision which operates on its own terms.  

To the extent it is linked to any provision in Section 24, it is linked to  

Section 24(1)(b) since it permits enhanced compensation (in a particular  

contingency of non-payment to majority of the landowners) even if an  

                                                           55 Seksaria Cotton mills v. State of Bombay 1953 SCR 325 Para 21; Superintendent v. Anil  

Kumar (1979) 4 SCC 274 (Paras11-16); B. Gangadhar v. Rajalingam (1995) 5 SCC 238 (Para  

5-6) Guruchand Singh v. Kamla Singh (1976) 2 SCC 152 (Paras 21-24).  

Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 (2 Judges)  

Para 11 to 15 endorsing contextual interpretation of the term

55    

award may have been passed as contemplated in Section 24(1)(b). Mr.  

Divan placed reliance on the reasons given in the judgment of Delhi  

Development Authority v. Virendra Lal Bahri, [SLP [C] No.37375/2016].  

69. All counsel for landowners submitted that there is no valid reason  

to exclude from the period of 5 years under section 24(2), the time  

during which a landowner had the benefit of an interim order of a court.  

In support of this argument, it was argued firstly, that Parliament did  

not expressly exclude such a period in Section 24. Second, where in the  

Act of 2013, the legislature did want to exclude the period of a stay or  

injunction, it has done so by using express words such as in the proviso  

to Section 19 and the explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013.  

Third, he submitted that the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”  

which means that “the act of court shall prejudice no one” has no  

application here, as this is a maxim which is applied generally as a  

principle of equity in individual cases to ensure that there is no  

injustice. The maxim rarely, if ever, is applied to interpret a statute. Mr.  

Divan submitted that this Court has declined to rely on this maxim in  

at least two reported decisions - Padma Sundar Rao v. State of Tamil  

Nadu56  and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Khandaka Jain Jewellers57.  

Mr. Divan further placed reliance on Snell’s Equity (33rd Edition, 2015),  

which states that the maxim of equity is not a specific rule of principle  

of law. It is a statement of a broad theme which underlies equitable  

                                                           56 (2002) 3 SCC 533  57 (2007) 14 SCC 339

56    

concepts and principles and as a result, the utility of equitable maxims  

is limited. It further states that the maxim may provide some limited  

assistance to court in two broad types of situation:    

“The first is when there is some uncertainty as to the scope of a  particular rule of principle, and a court has to fall back on more  basic principles to resolve that uncertainty. The second is when  a court is exercising an equitable discretion, and seeks to  structure that exercise by referring to broader, underlying  principles.”  

70. Learned counsel further placed reliance on a three-judge Bench  

decision of this Court in The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Parson Tools  

and Plants58, where it was held that:   

‘If the Legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an  analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus  omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain  and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the  omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise  of interpretation, by analogy or implication, something what it  thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity.’  

It was submitted that there is no occasion for excluding time spent  

on litigation. Parliament could have specified a particular date such as  

1.1.2009 as the cut-off point under section 24(2). Had a date been so  

specified, there would have been no occasion to exclude time. Instead  

of specifying a particular date, the Legislature in the Act of 2013  

prescribed the cut-off point with reference to the commencement of the  

Act. This method of specifying the cut-off point would not attract the  

maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. It was argued that the occasion  

for excluding time would arise only where there is a starting point and  

                                                           58 (1975) 4 SCC 22

57    

a statutory period to complete the task. In such provisions, it may be  

reasonable to provide for the exclusion of time by appropriate language  

in the section. Here, where a cut-off date is prescribed and as such there  

is no starting point and period for completion of the task, the notion of  

excluding time spent in litigations is an alien concept. It was, therefore,  

submitted that it is not the court’s business to stretch the words used  

by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omit words used in the provisions of  

an Act, i.e., to fill in an obvious and conscious exclusion of a  

contingency, or a casus omissus. In support of this submission, learned  

counsel relied on decisions of this Court.59 It was also argued that this  

Court should not also exclude any period or periods, spent in litigation,  

when interim orders were operating, because, firstly, in each such  

instance, the landowners were aggrieved by different kinds of arbitrary  

behaviour, such as not providing opportunity of mandatory hearing  

(under an absolutely absurd rejection of objections; failure to take note  

of actual developmental needs, and taking of lands, unconnected with  

a public purpose, or obvious instances of expropriation of utilities and  

amenities such as schools, community assets, etc. These led the courts,  

on a prima facie consideration to assess the merit in the challenge and  

grant interim orders. Such instances could not be called as frivolous  

litigation, warranting exclusion of time, to deprive the benefit of lapsing,  

enjoined by the new law. Secondly, it was argued that repeated attempts  

                                                           59 G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 and Kuldip Nayar vs Union Of  India (2006) 7 SCC 1- both decisions of Constitution Benches.  

58    

were made in Parliament to amend the law, to exclude the time, in the  

manner sought by the State, by use of the maxim actus curiae neminem  

gravabit. However, such amendment could not pass muster.   

71. Learned counsel contended that Parliament’s intent is to confer a  

benefit on landholders who were impacted by the erstwhile unfair  

regime. Urging that under the old law, landholders, to protect their  

assets from expropriation of their land at paltry amounts, were  

compelled to use legitimate systems of securing redress by filing cases  

in court, counsel urged that the correct approach, is to view litigation  

as a necessity under an unjust former regime and not exclude the period  

spent under litigation in such an unfair regime.  He further urged that  

the deeming provision with its clear and verifiable benchmarks on the  

five-year cut-off period, physical possession and payment is easy to  

operate. Introducing notions such as exclusion of time due to pending  

litigation would complicate the working of the statute.  

 72. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) uses the expression “or”.  

The Legislature intended the two conditions separated by the word “or”  

to be alternative conditions. Four situations arise where the conditions  

are disjunctive: firstly, when physical possession is with the State and  

compensation is with the citizen, there is no deemed lapse; secondly,  

when physical possession is with the citizen and compensation is with  

the State, there is no need for restitution as the State has retained the  

compensation amount; thirdly, when physical possession is with the

59    

citizen, and the compensation is also with the citizen, in such scenarios,  

the citizen must return the compensation. It was urged that where the  

State has paid the money by deposit in the Reference Court and the  

money was lying with the Court, the State may withdraw the money on  

deemed lapsing. However, if the State were to decide to acquire the land  

afresh, the compensation already paid may be adjusted; and further  

since inherent in the notion of lapsing is the requirement for restitution,  

the State can recover the compensation, inter alia by framing suitable  

rules. The citizen cannot retain compensation “had and received” since  

this would amount to unjust enrichment. It was submitted that where  

the physical possession as well as compensation are with the State, i.e.,  

where the State has taken possession without paying compensation as  

required under the Act of 1894, there is no absolute vesting free from  

all encumbrances as contemplated under Section 16. In the absence of  

vesting, the State is required to restore possession to the citizen.     

 73. Learned counsel argued that having regard to the unfair working  

of the Act of 1894, giving effect to the legislative intent by reading the  

expression “or” as “or” is the correct interpretation with beneficent  

consequences for the landowner. The learned counsel submitted that  

reading the expression “or” as “and” not only does violence to the plain  

language of section 24(2) but it also reduces the deeming provision  

down to vanishing point. Should a conjunctive reading of the conditions  

be combined with exclusion of the time spent in litigation or due to a

60    

stay, then the whole of section 24(2) will be robbed of content since it  

will apply to very rare cases. It was further submitted that Section 24  

does not lay down any specific conditionality in terms of how far back  

in time the awards contemplated under section 24(2) could have been  

made. The deeming provision under Section 24(2) operates w.e.f.  

1.1.2014 and its effect would cover all cases that fulfil the conditions  

provided in the statute. Learned counsel cited decisions in support of  

the interpretation that “or” should be construed disjunctively, not  

conjunctively as “and”.60  

 74. Learned counsel stressed that there are no vested rights created  

in the State in any case till compensation has been paid and possession  

has been taken.  The Act of 2013 is a beneficial legislation and a radical  

departure from the previous unjust and oppressive regime. It intends to  

confer significant benefits to the landowners and makes the exercise of  

the power of eminent domain compatible with our constitutional values.  

It ought to therefore be given an interpretation which favours the  

landowners. Finally, he argued that the decision in Indore Development  

Authority (supra) erroneously upset a consistent line of decisions which  

began with Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Subsequent decisions of  

this Court following Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) have also  

considered a host of arguments/issues and there is no compelling  

                                                           60 Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 109 (5 Judges);  

R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay 1984 (2) SCC 183; and Life Insurance Corporation v  D. J. Bahadur  

1981 (1) SCC 315.   

61    

reason to make a departure. He submitted that even a larger Bench of  

this Court is bound to pay due deference to the principle of Stare  

Decisis.  

 75. Supplementing the submissions, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned  

senior counsel for the landowners, argued that the meaning of the  

phrase “compensation has not been paid” should be considered, given  

that in Section 24(2) "paid” is not used. The phrase "has not been” is  

used in respect of both "possession" as well as "paid”. Therefore, it must  

mean the same in both respects.  The important factors to be borne in  

mind – and to distinguish the phrase “paid” from "deposit", is whether  

in the court under Section 31 (2) or in the treasury under Section 31(1).  

It is urged that an analysis of Sections 17 (3A) & (3B), 31 (1) & (2) and  

Section 28 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 shows that these  

provisions clearly distinguish between tender, paid or deposit whether  

in the court or the treasury.  

 76. Learned counsel argued that three different words used in the  

same Act, in various provisions of the Act, cannot mean the same.  It  

follows also from the reading of Section 19(1)(c) and (cc). In both these  

provisions word "tender” is used in contrast to word "paid” while word  

paid is used in contrast to word "deposit". The word "deposit", wherever  

used, is in the context of "deposit in Court" only not treasury. The  

expression "tender payment” under Section 17 (3A) and Section 31(1) of  

the Act of 1894 were followed by the words "pay it to them”. Therefore,

62    

tender cannot mean "paid”. It is urged that these terms fall in Part V of  

the Act, titled as "Payment”.  The term "pay it to them” under Section 31  

after "tender" must mean an additional action or step. When after  

"tender" an effort is made "to pay” the compensation and the same is  

accepted by the beneficiary, it becomes "paid”. The "deposit" under  

Section 31(2) only comes in when the beneficiary declines payment.   

This clearly implies that "tender of payment" cannot be equated with  

"pay it to them" or "deposit in Court" under Section 31(1) and 31 (2). It is  

argued that what follows is that tender of payment by itself is not  

enough. The State’s interpretation is contested as incorrect because if  

tender is equal to being paid then why does legislature provide for  

"deposit in court".   The amount is deemed to be paid on tender and the  

obligation to pay is discharged then the question is why require "deposit  

in Court".  Learned counsel argued that “Tender" can never be deemed  

as "paid”:  This is not only evident from reading of Section 19(c) where  

the term "paid or tendered” is depicted as alternates. Similarly, "paid or  

deposited" are used alternately. Likewise, Sections 17(3)(b), 19(cc) and  

34 use these words alternately. As said above if "tender” would amount  

to "paid” and then the compensation would be deemed to be paid,  

resulting in discharge of obligation to pay, then why deposit in court  

under Section 31(2) to make it "custodia legis". Section 31(2) would  

become redundant in most of the cases.  

63    

77. Learned counsel conceded that there is no doubt that on a decline  

of payment by the beneficiary it has to be mandatorily deposited in  

Court under Section 31(2). The provision uses the phrase "shall deposit"  

and this gives a valuable right to the payee, not only of interest in the  

event it is not "deposited in court" but also a right to seek investment of  

compensation under Section 33. These statutory rights are adversely  

affected if "deposit” is not in “court".  Therefore, it is amply clear that  

"deposit in treasury is not an option available. It cannot be a substitute  

for "deposit in Court". Besides Section 31(1) and 31 (2) of the Act of 1894  

present a complete code for payment and there is no gap or uncovered  

area to permit rules to supplement. Any deposit in treasury was in  

breach of Section 31 and therefore, impermissible. Also, most of the  

States had no rules under Section 55. In this context, executive  

instructions cannot prevail over law. Law can never be interpreted with  

the aid of subordinate legislation or executive instructions. It was  

further submitted that Sections 17(3A) and (3B), 28, 31, 33 and 34 of  

the Act of 1894 are a clear pointer that "tender" is not "paid” and neither  

is "deposit". Likewise, these provisions frequently use words “paid or  

deposited” which shows they are different. Deposit cannot be, therefore,  

equated with paid as they are more than once separated by word 'or'.  

 78. It was contended that the scheme of the Act of 1894 was clear and  

categorical that the amount of compensations when accepted by the  

beneficiary is deemed to be "paid” for interest to stop running.  The

64    

running of interest under Section 34 denotes non-discharge of  

obligation to pay, otherwise why pay interest? The "deposit in Court" may  

stop running of interest and therefore, may for this purpose be taken to  

be paid, but when it comes to actual meaning in the above provisions,  

"paid and deposit” are invariably separated by the use of word “or” in  

between them.  Therefore, it is submitted that when Section 24(2) of the  

New Act uses the phrase "compensation has not been paid” it uses the  

terminology of the proviso to Section 34(proviso) and must have the  

same meaning "has not been paid” cannot be read as "has not been  

deposited". If this is the right interpretation than the coverage of Section  

24(2) also expands to cover those cases in which the compensation has  

not been actually paid but has been deposited in the Court. This would  

also be in keeping with the legislative policy contained in the Preamble,  

to give just and fair compensation to those whose lands have been  

acquired as per the Old Act.  Coverage of the New Act is co-related to  

persons whose "land has been acquired”. The policy of Section 24 also  

reflects this expansive liberal approach of "just and fair compensation".  

Section 24 would therefore have to be seen in the light of this liberal  

policy intent.  

79. It was urged that these States’ arguments regarding revival of  

claims or resulting in impossible situations causing irreparable harm  

are not very relevant once the legislative policy is clear.  The provision  

has to be interpreted in a manner that it subserves the legislative policy

65    

intent of giving just and fair compensation to those whose lands were  

acquired (possession taken) under the Act of 1894. Once the legislative  

policy or intent is clear then the objections relating to harsh  

consequences are not really relevant. It was stated that State may be  

put into a difficult situation, but the solution too is provided in the last  

part of Section 24(2) which reflects the words "if it so chooses”, it can  

acquire afresh under Section 24. Learned counsel relied on Padma  

Sunder Rao (supra); Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition  

Officer61  and B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal62. It was urged that the  

legislative policy may cause hardship or difficulties to some or the State  

may be put to an impossible situation; yet cannot take away from  

Parliamentary intent. Parliament has enough wisdom to know these  

difficulties, the law prevailing earlier or the ground realities. It would be  

deemed to be not only aware of the difficulties, but also to have assessed  

them while framing the liberalised policy.  The question is one of intent.  

The intent has to be seen primarily from the words used in the text. It  

is only if such intent is not clear that courts have to see them with the  

aid of the context. The difficulties as well as harsh consequences cannot  

be utilized to assess the intent embedded in the provision if they are  

clear, otherwise from the text, or the context. Not only has Parliament  

not provided any clause creating any kind of exception, or extension of  

five years in cases of litigating land oustees who may have an interim  

                                                           61 2003 (10) SCC 765  62 (2011) 4 SCC 266

66    

orders in their favour, stalling the acquisition or payment of  

compensation. All that the provision says is "or compensation has not  

been paid”. The projected policy intent is broad and unencumbered by  

any exception. This is a clearest indicator of legislative intent to cover  

all such cases that may cause hardship to the State or may be due to  

the fault of Court or the litigious land oustee. The intent is clear and  

therefore, has to be read apart from difficulties or hardships.  

 80. It is submitted that the State’s contention with regard to a  

differential approach for possession and compensation is irrational and  

is against the very grain of Section 24(2) and is also unreasonable and  

discriminatory. It is unreasonable because there are hardly any cases  

where compensation may have been paid, yet possession may not have  

been taken.  Most of the cases are under Section 17(1) where possession  

is invariably taken while compensation remains unpaid as award is not  

made.  By reading word 'or' as 'and', the words "or the compensation has  

not been paid" become otiose or redundant. Parliament could have only  

said that lapsing would occur only if possession has not been taken,  

because if possession is taken then there would never be lapsing and  

there would be no need to consider "or" as "and”. Therefore, such an  

interpretation (i.e., reading “or” conjunctively) is contrary to every rule  

of interpretation and contrary to the Legislative policy indicated in the  

Preamble of giving just and fair compensation in cases of earlier  

acquisitions, which includes cases where possession has been taken.  

67    

81. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) would become  

discriminatory if "or" is read as "and”. For this, it would be necessary to  

analyse Section 24(1)(a).  Section 24(1)(a) applies to a situation where  

there is no award made till the commencement of the New Act. No award  

primarily means "compensation has not been paid”. Importantly in a  

case under Section 17 of the Act of 1894, which is most frequently  

utilised, possession may be taken before award is made or  

compensation is paid. In other words, Section 24(1)(a) does visualize or  

cover cases where possession may have been taken but “compensation  

has not been paid". It, therefore, requires re-determination of  

compensation under Sections 26-30 of the New Act. The problems of  

who to pay the enhanced compensation, as referred above, would also  

arise in this situation. Yet Parliament has ignored these difficulties and  

provided for redetermination. Section 24(1)(a) may travel back to period  

of five years or more, or may be 10-15 years as in case of Section 24(2).  

It would not be reasonable to restrict the retrospectivity of Section  

24(1)(a) with the aid of Section 11A of the old Act, to 2 years before  

commencement. It would be incorrect because then one would be  

ignoring Explanation to Section 11A (proviso). The said Explanation  

visualises indefinite extension of the period of award from 2 years. It  

would not be, therefore, reasonable to exclude such cases where though  

possession may have been taken, but compensation may not have been  

paid for a very long period of time upto commencement of the new Act.  

Section 24(1)(a) does not contain any provision like Section 25 (proviso),

68    

Section 19(7)(proviso) and Section 69(2)(explanation) and therefore, is  

wide in its coverage in the absence of exceptions as above.  

82. Learned counsel urged that Section 24(2) is a special provision  

giving higher benefit because in the cases covered by Section 24(2)  

"compensation has not been paid” despite award.  Would it be rational  

to read Section 24(2) in such a manner that deprives it of its value and  

worth and makes it ineffective.  Section 24(2) would become ineffective  

as a whole because there would be rarest of the rare cases, where both  

the conditions would be fulfilled.  The experience shows in vast majority  

of cases of acquisition under the old Act, possession is taken while  

award & compensation come much later.  This is because Sections 9 &  

17(6) of the Act of 1894 were used in vast majority of acquisitions and  

the Legislature was aware of it. The law does not compel doing of an act  

that is impossible. It is emphasized that the principle does not apply as  

the new Act is not requiring any such performance. The new Act after  

recognising the past, is providing new solutions, rights and benefits.  

Section 24(2) by itself does not compel performance of an impossible  

act. This principle could have been relevant during earlier Act but is  

hardly relevant for interpreting the scope of Section 24(2) of the New  

Act. Section 24 clearly postulates that even though the Act may be  

impossible of performance, or results in undue advantage to the  

beneficiary despite his fault in declining, yet benefit of Section 24(2) may  

be given without creating any exception.  There is no constitutional

69    

restriction on the Legislature that such cases or situations have to be  

excluded.  The legislature can provide benefit in the same manner to all,  

difficulties apart. Reliance is placed on certain decisions in support of  

this proposition.63 Therefore, such interpretation which excludes the  

benefits under Section 24(2) by resorting to such arguments of  

difficulties is meaningless. The giving of benefit to all by ignoring above  

circumstance is neither illegal nor unjust. It is neither anomalous nor  

absurd. It is urged that what the court feels is not important; what is  

relevant is the view of the legislature, to be culled out from the reading  

of only the text or the context; not in any other manner. For this rule,  

reliance was placed on Mohd. Kavi v. Fatmabal Ibrahim64 and other  

decisions.  

 83. Other learned senior counsel, i.e M/s Dushyant Dave, Gopal  

Shankarnarayan, Siddharth Luthra, Nakul Dewan, Manoj Swaroop,  

Anukul Chandra Pradhan supplemented the submissions of Mr. Divan  

and Mr. Dwivedi. It was argued by them that this Court should not  

depart from the rule of literal interpretation, because that would be both  

beneficial and purposive, given the oppressive nature of the Act of 1894.  

In this context, it was submitted that the expressions “paid” and “or”  

should be construed in the manner that Parliament intended, having  

                                                           63 Martin Burn Ltd v Corporation of Calcutta 1966 (1) SCR 543; Commissioner of Agricultural  Income Tax v Keshab Chandra Mandal 1950 SCR 435; and  State of Maharastra v Nanded  

Parbhani Sangh 2000 (2) SCC 69.  64 1997 (6) SCC 71 and M.V. Javali v Mahajan Borewell & Co. Ltd 1997 (8) SCC 72; and   Nanded Parbhani Sangh (supra); and SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC  89.  

70    

regard to the overall intent of ensuring the acquisition proceedings,  

where either compensation was not paid, or possession was not taken,  

in respect of awards made before 1.1.2009, should lapse. It was  

submitted that there is no insurmountable difficulty or impossibility,  

even if possession is taken (but compensation not paid) and even if  

vesting occurs, Section 24(2) of the new Act expressly provides for  

lapsing. The remedy in that case, for the appropriate Government is the  

option of going through the acquisition again using emergency  

provisions. In that event, the authorities would have to provide for  

rehabilitation and enhanced compensation. In any case, the court  

always has the option in such cases where third party rights have  

ensued to do complete justice, by duly compensating those whose land  

is acquired, without disturbing the possession of third party who has  

been given the land.  

84. The learned counsel submit that this Court should base itself on  

the approach to interpret Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is that it is a  

savings clause with an exclusionary deeming provision.  It is urged that  

the words "physical possession” under Section 24(2) should be read to  

reflect the actual state of affairs as on the date when the Act of 2013  

came into force, i.e., there was actual physical possession of the land.  

This would also be the case in relation to the term "compensation not  

paid" under Section 24(2), where compensation would either have had  

to be paid or deposited in court; and that use of the term "or" signifies

71    

that the two conditions set out above are disjunctive. It is argued that  

Section 114 consists of two sections (1) a repeal clause set out in Section  

114 (1); and (2) a savings clause set out in Section 114(2). It is  

contended that there is a distinction in the manner in which a repealing  

clause is construed as compared to the manner in which a savings  

clause is construed. While a repealing clause, followed by a new  

legislation on the same subject-matter would result in a line of enquiry  

about what rights are obliterated under the old Act by the new Act, a  

savings clause would be construed in a manner that resurrects a  

provision, which would otherwise be obliterated on account of the  

repeal. In relation to a repeal clause, the effect of obliterating the  

provisions of the previous enactment would be as if it never existed,  

except for vested rights, which would be protected under Section 6 of  

the General Clauses Act.  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, thus  

operated as a savings clause. Learned counsel rely on the judgment of  

this court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh65 that the effect of repealing  

a statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely from the records  

of Parliament as if it had never been passed, except for the purpose of  

those actions, which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while  

it was an existing law and that:   

“A repeal therefore without any saving Clause would destroy any  proceeding whether not vet begun or whether pending at the time  of the enactment of the Repealing Act and not already prosecuted  to a final judgment so as to create a vested right".  

                                                           65 (1955) 1 SCR 893

72    

85. Submitting that the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  

is that unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal does not affect  

the previous operation of the repealed enactment or anything duly done  

or suffered under it and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy  

may be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of any right, liability  

and penalty under the repealed Act as if the Repealing Act had not been  

passed. However, in case of the Act of 2013, it is urged that  

Parliamentary intent was not to simply let Section 6 of the General  

Clauses Act operate as the savings provision. Apart from Section 6, the  

intent, evident from Section 114(2), was to set out a specific provision  

which would save proceedings.  It was submitted that those would be  

provisions that would otherwise not have been saved by the General  

Clauses Act.  

 86. It is in this background that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 must  

be interpreted. While the Respondent accepts that Section 24 could  

have been more clearly worded to reflect the legislative intent as a  

savings provision, to fully appreciate the operation of Section 24 (1)(b)  

as a classical savings provision which saves proceedings under the Act  

of  1894 if an award had been made under Section 11, in a manner as  

if the Act of 1894 had not been repealed. Section 24(1)(a) deals with a  

situation where no award has been made and in providing for  

determination of compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 naturally  

would mean that proceedings under the Act of 1894 would be revived,

73    

save and except on the issue of computation of compensation. Having  

revived proceedings under Section 24(1), Section 24(2) provides for a  

deemed lapsing through a non-obstante provision for an award made  

five years or prior to the date of the commencement of the Act of 2013.  

This creates a legal fiction which, as held by this court in J.K.Cotton  

Spg. & Wvg.Mils Ltd. v. Union of India,66 is:   

"...an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed...The  legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision for the  purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really  exist."  

 Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the  

Constitution Bench in Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar67 to the  

following effect:  

"[l]egal fictions are created only for some definite purpose"and  referred to the decision East End Dwellings Co.Ltd.v. Finsbury  Borough Council,1952 AC 109 at paragraph 71,which reads as  follows:  

"if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as  real,you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so,also  imagine as real the consequences and incidents which,if the  putative state of affairs had in fact existed,must inevitably  have flowed from or accompanied it.One of these in this case  is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.The statute says  that you must imagine a certain state of affairs;it does not say  that having done so,you must cause or permit your  imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable  corollaries of that state of affairs."” (Emphasis Supplied)  

87. Other decisions of this Court were also relied on, in this context.68   

Learned counsel stated that given that it is a legal fiction which leads to  

a deemed lapsing of proceedings under the Act of 1894, Parliamentary  

intent under Section 24(2) ought to be construed so that "physical  

                                                           66 1987 Supp SCC 350  67 (1955)2 SCR 603  68 MIG Cricket Club v.AbhinavSahakar Education Society, (2011) 9 SCC 97

74    

possession" under Section 24(2) reflects the actual state of affairs as on  

the date when the Act of 2013 came into force; similarly, too the term  

compensation not paid under Section 24(2). It was stated, that retaining  

amounts in the treasury, pursuant to executive rules would not suffice  

for compliance with the payment condition. Learned counsel also urged  

that this court should interpret "or" as signifying a disjunctive reading  

of the two conditions. Comparing this legal fiction created under Section  

24(2) with the State’s obligations under the Act of 1894 would be  

inconsistent with the decisions of this Court, under which legal fictions  

are to be read as it is i.e., the state of affairs as plainly set out in the  

legal fiction.  Therefore, the effect of Section 24 (2) is that if either of the  

situations are not met, the acquisition proceedings under the Act of  

1894 lapse and the State can initiate proceedings afresh in accordance  

with the Act of 2013. This construction, urge learned counsel is also  

purposive and practical. If the State has not taken physical possession  

of a property even if compensation has been paid for over 5 years prior  

to the commencement of the Act of 2013, because it no longer serves  

the purpose of acquisition, it can drop the proceedings as those would  

have lapsed. In such an event, the State would naturally be entitled to  

restitutory recovery. However, if the State has failed to take physical  

possession, it cannot be benefited by its inactions and must restart  

proceedings under the Act of 2013. In such a case, the compensation  

paid can always be re-adjusted against compensation determined under  

the Act of 2013. Arguendo, it is urged that even if Section 114 (2) of the

75    

Act of 2013 is construed to keep alive the State’s vested rights by virtue  

of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such rights are limited by  

Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Thus, while  

ordinarily the acquisition proceedings that were pending in respect of  

awards passed under the Act of 1894 would have continued, the  

legislature by way of a creating a legal fiction, provided for the deemed  

lapse of these proceedings in respect of which physical possession has  

not been taken or compensation not paid. Learned counsel placed  

reliance on some decisions of this Court.69 VKNM Vocational Higher  

Secondary School v. State of Kerala,70 where it was held that:  

“...a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent  enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides by  express words or by necessary intendment. In other words, in the  event of the extinction of any such right by express provision in  the subsequent enactment, the same would lose its value."  

88. It was submitted that in order to determine the accrued rights and  

incurred liabilities that have been saved under the Act of 1894, the line  

of inquiry is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new  

provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law,  

but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities.  

89. All learned counsel supported the submission that the proviso is  

not restricted in its operation to Section 24 (2) only and that its  

placement is not determinative. It was emphasized that the proviso does  

                                                           69 Jayantilal Amrathlal v. Union of India,(1972) 4 SCC 174, T.S.Baliah v. Income Tax Officer,  Central Circle VI,Madras,1969 (3) SCR 65  70 2016 (4) SCC 216.  

76    

not say that higher compensation would be paid, in the contingency  

provided by it, as an option to avoid lapsing. The absence of any  

reference to lapsing, or the ingredients of Section 24 (2) clearly meant  

that the benefit of higher compensation in the event a majority of the  

landowners were not paid compensation (under the old Act) was to  

enure to all falling in the same class, i.e., those whose lands were  

subjected to acquisition, whether five years prior to or less than coming  

into force of the Act of 2013.   

Relevant provisions  

90. For appreciating the controversy in the present cases, it is  

essential to extract certain relevant provisions of the Act of 1894 as well  

as the Act of 2013. The provisions of the Act of 1894 are reproduced  

below:  

“12 Award of Collector when to be final.   (1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall,  except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence,  as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether  they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the  true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the  compensation among the persons interested.  (2)  The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such  of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their  representatives when the award is made.   

***      ***  “17. Special powers in case of urgency. – (1) In cases of  urgency, whenever the appropriate Government, so directs, the  Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the  expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice  mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any  land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest  absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.    [(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1)  or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the  provisions of sub-section (3)-

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(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for  such land as estimated by him to the persons interested  entitled thereto, and  

(b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the  contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2),  

and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section  31, sub-section (2) (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply  as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section.    (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the  [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct  that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so  direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of  the land at any time after the date of the publication of the  notification under section 4, sub-section (1).]”    16. Power to take possession.—When the Collector has made  an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land,  which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free  from all encumbrances.    

***      ***  31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.  - (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall  tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the  persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and  shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the  contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.    (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person  competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the  title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it,  the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the  Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:     Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive  such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:    Provided also that no person who has received the amount  otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any  application under section 18:    Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the  liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of  any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to  the person lawfully entitled thereto.     (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may,  with the sanction of the appropriate Government instead of  awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make  any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such  land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission  of land revenue on other lands held under the same title or in  such other way as may be equitable having regard to the  interests of the parties concerned.

78    

 (4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to  interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any  arrangement with any person interested in the land and  competent to contract in respect thereof.”  

***      ***  34 Payment of interest     When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited  on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay  the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 72 [nine  per centum] per annum from the time of so taking possession until  it shall have been so paid or deposited:   Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid  or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which  possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per  annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period  of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which  has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”     

The relevant provisions of the Act of 2013 are as follows:  

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984  shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.   

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case  of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894,--  

 (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land  Acquisition Act   has been made, then, all provisions of this Act  relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or  

  (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then  such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said  Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.  

(2)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),  in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said  section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the  commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land  has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the  said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the  appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the  proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with  the provisions of this Act:  

Provided that where an award has been made and  compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not  been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all  beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under  section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to  compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”   

***      ***  114. Repeal and saving.–(1) The Land Acquisition Act, LA (1 of  LA), is hereby repealed.

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 (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub- section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general  application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of  1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”    Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows:     “Section 6 - Effect of repeal  

Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the  commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made  or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention  appears, the repeal shall not—    (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the  repeal takes effect; or    (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or  anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or    (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,  accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or    (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect  of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or    (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect  of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture  or punishment as aforesaid;    and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be  instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture  or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or  Regulation had not been passed.”  

Salient features of the Act of 2013  

91. There can no dispute, no two opinions about the fact that  

provisions of the Act of 2013, were enacted with the object of providing  

fair compensation and rehabilitating those displaced from their land.  

The Introduction and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of  

2013 are extracted hereunder:  

“INTRODUCTION  

The Land Acquisition Act, LA was a general law relating to  

acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies  

and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on  

account of such acquisition.  The provisions of the said Act was  

found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the

80    

exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary  

acquisition of private land and property.  The Act did not address  

the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected  

persons and their families. There had been multiple amendments  

to the Land Acquisition Act, LA not only by the Central  

Government but by the State Governments as well.  However,  

there was growing public concern on land acquisition, especially  

multi-cropped irrigated land.  There was no central law to  

adequately deal with the issues of rehabilitation and  

resettlement of displaced persons.  As land acquisition and  

rehabilitation and resettlement were two sides of the same coin,  

a single integrated law to deal with the issues of land acquisition  

and rehabilitation and resettlement was necessary.  

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land  

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013  

addresses concerns of farmers and those whose livelihood are  

dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time  

facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure  

and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner.  

This Act represents a change in the legislative approach to  

land acquisition.  It introduces for the first time provisions for  

social impact analysis, recognizes non-owners as affected  

persons, a mode of acquisition requiring consent of the displaced  

and statutory entitlements for resettlement.  In addition, it has  

restricted the grounds on which land may be acquired under the  

urgency clause.  

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS  

The Land Acquisition Act, LA is the general law relating to  

acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies  

and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on  

account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act have  

been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related  

to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary  

acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not  

address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the  

affected persons and their families.  

2. The definition of the expression "public purpose" as given in the  

Act is very wide. It has, therefore, become necessary to re-define  

it so as to restrict its scope for acquisition of land for strategic  

purposes vital to the State, and for infrastructure projects where  

the benefits accrue to the general public. The provisions of the Act  

are also used for acquiring private lands for companies. This  

frequently raises a question mark on the desirability of such State  

intervention when land could be arranged by the company  

through private negotiations on a "willing seller-willing buyer"  

basis, which could be seen to be a more fair arrangement from  

the point of view of the land owner. In order to streamline the  

provisions of the Act causing less hardships to the owners of the

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land and other persons dependent upon such land, it is proposed  

repeal the Land Acquisition Act, LA and to replace it with  

adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the  

affected persons and their families.  

3. There have been multiple amendments to the Land Acquisition  

Act, LA not only by the Central Government but by the State  

Governments as well. Further, there has been heightened public  

concern on land acquisition, especially multi-cropped irrigated  

land and there is no central law to adequately deal with the  

issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced persons. As  

land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement need to be  

seen as two sides of the same coin, a single integrated law to  

deal with the issues of land acquisition and rehabilitation and  

resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed  

legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those  

whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired,  

while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for  

industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a  

timely and transparent manner.  

4. Earlier, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 and  

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007 were introduced in the  

Lok Sabha on 6th December 2007 and were referred to the  

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development for  

Examination and Report. The Standing Committee presented its  

reports (the 39th and 40th Reports) to the Lok Sabha on 21st  

October 2008 and laid the same in the Rajya Sabha on the same  

day. Based on the recommendations of the Standing Committee  

and as a consequence thereof, official amendments to the Bills  

were proposed. The Bills, along with the official amendments,  

were passed by the Lok Sabha on 25th February 2009, but the  

same lapsed with the dissolution of the 14th Lok Sabha.  

5. It is now proposed to have a unified legislation dealing with  

acquisition of land, provide for just and fair compensation and  

make adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement  

mechanism for the affected persons and their families. The Bill  

thus provides for repealing and replacing the Land Acquisition  

Act, LA with broad provisions for adequate rehabilitation and  

resettlement mechanism for the project affected persons and their  

families.   

6. Provision of public facilities or infrastructure often requires the  

exercise of powers by the State for acquisition of private property  

leading to displacement of people, depriving them of their land,  

livelihood, and shelter, restricting their access to traditional  

resource base and uprooting them from their socio-cultural  

environment. These have traumatic, psychological, and socio-

cultural consequences on the affected population, which call for  

protecting their rights, particularly in case of the weaker sections

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of the society, including members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs),  

the Scheduled Tribes (STs), marginal farmers and their families.  

7. There is an imperative need to recognise rehabilitation and  

resettlement issues as intrinsic to the development process  

formulated with the active participation of affected persons and  

families. Additional benefits beyond monetary compensation  

have to be provided to families affected adversely by involuntary  

displacement. The plight of those who do not have rights over the  

land on which they are critically dependent for their subsistence  

is even worse. This calls for a broader concerted effort on the part  

of the planners to include in the displacement, rehabilitation, and  

resettlement process framework, not only for those who directly  

lose their land and other assets but also for all those who are  

affected by such acquisition. The displacement process often  

poses problems that make it difficult for the affected persons to  

continue their traditional livelihood activities after resettlement.  

This requires a careful assessment of the economic  

disadvantages and the social impact arising out of displacement.  

There must also be holistic effort aimed at improving the all-round  

living standards of the affected persons and families.  

8. A National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project  

Affected Families was formulated in 2003, which came into force  

with effect from February 2004. Experience gained in  

implementation of this policy indicates that there are many issues  

addressed by the policy which need to be reviewed. There should  

be a clear perception, through a careful quantification of the costs  

and benefits that will accrue to society at large, of the desirability  

and justifiability of each project. The adverse impact on affected  

families-economic, environmental, social and cultural-must be  

assessed in participatory and transparent manner. A national  

rehabilitation and resettlement framework thus needs to apply to  

all projects where involuntary displacement takes place.  

9. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, has  

been formulated on these lines to replace the National Policy on  

Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families,  

2003. The new policy has been notified in the Official Gazette and  

has become operative with effect from the 31st October, 2007.  

Many State Governments have their own Rehabilitation and  

Resettlement Policies. Many Public Sector Undertakings or  

agencies also have their own policies in this regard.  

10. The law would apply when Government acquires land for its  

own use, hold and control, or with the ultimate purpose to  

transfer it for the use of private companies for stated public  

purpose or for immediate and declared use by private companies  

for public purpose. Only rehabilitation and resettlement  

provisions will apply when private companies buy land for a  

project, more than 100 acres in rural areas, or more than 50 acres  

in urban areas. The land acquisition provisions would apply to

83    

the area to be acquired but the rehabilitation and resettlement  

provisions will apply to the entire project area even when private  

company approaches Government for partial acquisition for  

public purpose.  

11. “Public purpose” has been comprehensively defined, so that  

Government intervention in acquisition is limited to defence,  

certain development projects only. It has also been ensured that  

consent of at least 80 per cent of the project affected families is  

to be obtained through a prior informed process. Acquisition  

under urgency clause has also been limited for the purposes of  

national defence, security purposes, and Rehabilitation and  

Resettlement needs in the event of emergencies or natural  

calamities only.  

12. To ensure food security, multi-crop irrigated land shall be  

acquired only as a last resort measure. An equivalent area of  

culturable wasteland shall be developed if multi-crop land is  

acquired. In districts where net sown area is less than 50 per  

cent of total geographical area, no more than 10 per cent of the  

net sown area of the district will be acquired.  

13. To ensure comprehensive compensation package for the land  

owners, a scientific method for calculation of the market value of  

the land has been proposed. Market value calculated will be  

multiplied by a factor of two in the rural areas. Solatium will also  

be increased upto 100 per cent of the total compensation. Where  

land is acquired for urbanization, 20 per cent of the developed  

land will be offered to the affected land owners.  

14. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for  

land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, house, one  

acre of land in cases of irrigation projects, transportation  

allowance, and resettlement allowance is proposed.  

15. Comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for  

livelihood losers, including subsistence allowance, jobs, house,  

transportation allowance, and resettlement allowance is  

proposed.  

16. Special provisions for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled  

Tribes have been envisaged by providing additional benefits of  

2.5 acres of land or extent of land lost to each affected family;  

one-time financial assistance of Rs. 50,000/-; twenty-five per  

cent additional rehabilitation and resettlement benefits for the  

families settled outside the district; free land for community and  

social gathering and continuation of reservation in the  

resettlement area, etc.  

17. Twenty-five infrastructural amenities are proposed to be  

provided in the resettlement area including schools and play  

grounds, health centres, roads, and electric connections, assured

84    

sources of safe drinking water, Panchayat Ghars, Anganwadis,  

places of worship, burial and cremation grounds, village level  

post offices, fair price shops, and seed-cum-fertilizers storage  

facilities.  

18. The benefits under the new law would be available in all the  

cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, LA,  

where award has not been made, or possession of land has not  

been taken.  

19. Land that is not used within ten years in accordance with the  

purposes, for which it was acquired, shall be transferred to the  

State Government's Land Bank. Upon every transfer of land  

without development, twenty per cent of the appreciated land  

value shall be shared with the original land owners.  

20. The provisions of the Bill have been made fully compliant with  

other laws such as the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled  

Areas) Act, 1996; the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional  

Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and Land  

Transfer Regulations in Fifth Scheduled Areas.  

21. Stringent and comprehensive penalties both for the  

companies and Government in cases of false information, mala  

fide action, and contravention of the provisions of the propose  

legislation have been provided.  

22. Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition have  

been enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in addition  

to and not in derogation of these Acts. The provisions of this Act  

can be applied to these existing enactments by a notification of  

the Central Government.  

23. The Bill also provides for the basic minimum requirements  

that all projects leading to displacement must address. It contains  

a saving clause to enable the State Governments, to continue to  

provide or put in place greater benefit levels than those prescribed  

under the Bill.  

24. The Bill would provide for the basic minimum that all projects  

leading to displacement must address. A Social Impact  

Assessment (SIA) of proposals leading to displacement of people  

through a participatory, informed and transparent process  

involving all stake-holders, including the affected persons will be  

necessary before these are acted upon. The rehabilitation process  

would augment income levels and enrich quality of life of the  

displaced persons, covering rebuilding socio-cultural  

relationships, capacity building, and provision of public health  

and community services. Adequate safeguards have been  

proposed for protecting rights of vulnerable sections of the  

displaced persons.  

85    

25. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. The notes on  

clauses explain the various provisions contained in the Bill.”  

92. Section 2(2) of the Act of 2013, provides that in the event of  

acquisition for private companies, consent of 80% of the affected  

families has to be obtained and for the public-private partnerships,  

consent of 70% of the affected families is required to be taken.  In  

Section 3(c), the term 'affected family' has been widened, which inter  

alia includes members of the Schedule Tribes, forest dwellers, and  

families whose livelihood is dependent on forests or water bodies.  A  

“Social Impact Assessment” (“SIA”) has to be prepared, as provided in  

Sections 4 to 9.  Special provisions to safeguard food security have been  

made by prohibiting the acquisition of multi-cropped land except in  

exceptional circumstances as enumerated in Section 10.  Section 11 is  

akin to Section 4 of the Act of 1894 regarding issuance of preliminary  

notification.  The SIA report lapses in case preliminary notification  

under Section 11 is not issued within a period of 12 months from the  

date of the report.  A Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme (“RR  

Scheme”) is provided in Sections 16 to 18.  The Collector has to pass  

the award under Section 23. Section 26 deals with the determination of  

the market value by the Collector.  Section 30 provides for Solatium at  

100%.  The RR award has to be passed by the Collector under Section  

31, and notice has to be given immediately under Section 37, which is  

equivalent to Section 12 of the Act of 1894.  Section 38 provides that  

Collector has to take possession after full payment of compensation has

86    

been made as well as rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are  

paid or tendered to the entitled persons.  Thus, there is a departure  

from Section 16 Act of 1894 in the provisions contained in Section 38  

of the Act of 2013.  The Collector has to ensure under Section 38 of Act  

of 2013 that the rehabilitation and resettlement process is complete  

before displacing people.  Section 40 deals with urgent cases.  The  

Government may acquire land without making award in the case of  

urgency for the defence of India or national security.  In other  

emergencies arising out of natural calamities or any other emergencies  

special provisions under Section 40 may be exercised with the approval  

of the Parliament.  In such event, the provisions of the Social Impact  

Assessment and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme may be  

exempted.  Additional compensation of 75% is payable in such cases.   

Section 41 contains special provisions for Scheduled Castes and  

Scheduled Tribes by prohibiting acquisition in scheduled areas as far  

as possible.  Sections 43 to 50 deal with appointment and constitution  

of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authorities and Monitoring  

Committees at Project as well as National Levels.  Sections 51 to 74 deal  

with the establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and  

Resettlement Authority.  Sections 77 to 80 are pari materia to the  

provisions contained in Sections 31 to 34 of the Act of 1894, relating to  

payment, deposit, and interest, etc.  Section 93 is equivalent to Section  

48 of the Land Acquisition Act.  The Government shall be at liberty to  

withdraw from acquisition if possession of land has not been taken.  

87    

Section 101 provides that land be returned to the original owner or the  

Land Bank of the appropriate Government if acquired land remains  

unutilized for a period of five years.  Thus, various departures have been  

made from the old Land Acquisition Act, in the Act of 2013 relating to  

Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme,  

etc.  It ensures higher compensation than the old Act; the public  

purpose has been defined; consent provisions have also been made.   

The interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been  

adequately protected.  Various Committees and Authorities have been  

constituted.   The definition of 'affected families' has been widened.  

 93. Undoubtedly the Act of 2013 has provided safeguards, in the form  

of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation, which are  

necessary.  In that light, the court has to interpret its provisions, to give  

full and meaningful effect to the legislative intent keeping in mind the  

language and tenor of the provisions, it is not for the court to legislate.   

The Court can only iron out creases to clear ambiguity. The intended  

benefit should not be taken away.  At the same time, since the Act of  

2013, envisages lapse of acquisitions notified (and in many cases,  

completed by the issuance of the award) due to indolence and inaction  

on the part of the authorities and therefore, intends acquisition at a fast  

track, the full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in  

Section 24.  

Scope of Section 24

88    

94. Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other  

provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of 2013,  

dealing with repeal and saving.  In terms of Section 114 of the Act of  

2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  

1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved.  Section  

6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different  

intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or  

existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the  

previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done  

or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in  

Section 6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right,  

privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred.  

 95. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non-obstante  

clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated under the Act of  

1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the  

provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of  

compensation would apply.  However; the proceedings held earlier do  

not lapse.  In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11  

is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of  

the Act of 1894.  It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on  

the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and  

taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24 (1)(b) is  

provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where

89    

the award has been passed five years or more prior to the  

commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession of the land  

has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the  

proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings  

cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of  

2013.  

 96. Section 24(2) carves out an exception to Section 24(1)(b), where  

the award has been passed, and the proceedings are pending, but in  

such proceedings, physical possession of the land has not been taken,  

or compensation has not been paid, proceedings shall lapse.  There are  

twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not  

been taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid.  In case,  

possession has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no  

lapse of the proceedings.  The question which is to be decided is whether  

the conditions are cumulative, i.e both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of  

acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative  

(“either/or”). According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a  

situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not  

paid, there is no lapse: also in case where compensation has been paid,  

but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1.1.2014, there  

is no lapse.  Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending.  They  

argue that the word “or” used in phrase ‘the physical possession of the  

land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid’, has

90    

to be interpreted as "and" as two negative requirements qualify it.  

Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are  

connected by "or," they are construed as cumulative, the word "or" is to  

be read as "nor" or "and." Naturally, the landowners argue to the  

contrary, i.e., that lapse of acquisition occurred if compensation were  

not paid, or possession were not taken, 5 years before the coming into  

force of the Act of 2013.  

 97. It would be useful to notice rules of Statutory Interpretation in  

this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice  

G.P. Singh, speaks of the following general rule of Statutory  

Interpretation of positive and negative conditions whenever prescribed  

by a statute:  

“…Speaking generally, a distinction may be made between  positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for  acquiring a right or benefit.  Positive conditions separated by ‘or’  are read in the alternative71 but negative conditions connected by  'or' are construed as cumulative and 'or' is read as 'nor' or 'and’72.    

The above rule of Statutory Interpretation is based upon the  

decision of this Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. vs. Narayanrao  

Khanderao Jambekar and Anr.73, in which this court held:  

“(19) It may be recalled that amendments to S. 32 were made  from time to time, and the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 added to  sub-s. (1)(b), cl. (iii) and the preceding "or". It is to be noticed that  the conditions mentioned in sub-ss. (1)(a) and (1)(b) are mutually  exclusive. In spite of the absence of the word “or” between sub- ss. (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two sub-sections lay down alternative  conditions. The tenant must be deemed to have purchased the  

                                                           71 Star Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR 1970 SC 1559: (1970) 3 SCC 864   72Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao, 1965 (2) SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v.  Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, (1971) 2 SCC 540; Brown & Co. v. Harrison, (1927)  All ER Rep 195, pp. 203, 204 (CA).  

For convenience, the numbers in the extracted portion above have been renumbered.  73 AIR 1965 SC 1457

91    

land if he satisfies either of the two conditions. The appellant is  not a permanent tenant, and does not satisfy the condition  mentioned in sub-s.(1)(a). Though not a permanent tenant, he  cultivated the lands leased personally, and, therefore, satisfies  the first part of the condition specified in sub-s. (1)(b). The  appellant’s contention is that sub-ss. (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii)  lay down alternative conditions, and as he satisfies the condition  mentioned in sub-s. (1)(b)(iii), he must be deemed to have  purchased the land on April 1, 1957. Colour is lent to this  argument by the word “or” appearing between sub-s.(1)(b)(ii) and  sub-s.(1)(b)(iii). But, we think that the word “or” between sub-ss.  (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) in conjunction with the succeeding negatives  is equivalent to and should be read as "nor." In other words, a  tenant (other than a permanent tenant) cultivating the lands  personally would become the purchaser of the lands on April 1,  1957, if on that date neither an application under S.29 read with  S.31 nor an application under S.29 read with S.14 was pending.  If an application either under S.29 read with S.31 or under S.29  read with S.14 was pending April 1, 1957, the tenant would  become the purchaser on "the postponed date", that is to say,  when the application would be finally rejected. But if the  application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the  purchaser. The expression "an application" in the proviso means  not only an application under S.31 but also an application under  S.29 read with S.14. If an application of either type was pending  on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on  that elate. Now, on April 1, 1957, the application filed by  respondent No.1 under S.29 read with S.31 was pending.  Consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to have  purchased the lands on April 1, 1957.”  

The decision of this Court in The Punjab Produce and Trading Co.  

Ltd. vs. The C.I.T., West Bengal, Calcutta74, was relied upon in the  

discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23A of the  

Income Tax Act, 1922 and the Explanation (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for  

consideration.  This Court ruled with respect to "or" and held that it had  

to be read as "and" construing negative conditions thus:  

“7. On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has been  placed on decision of this Court in Star Company Ltd. v. The  Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Calcutta, (1970) 3 SCC  864. In that case, sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for consideration, and  it was held that the two parts of the Explanation contained in that  sub-clause were alternative. In other words, if one part was  satisfied it was unnecessary to consider whether the second part  was also satisfied. Thus the word "or" was treated as having  

                                                           74 1971 (2) SCC 540

92    

been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. The same  reasoning is sought to be invoked with reference to sub-clause  (b)(iii).  

8. It is significant that the language of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of  clause (b) is different. The former relates to a positive state of  affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions. The  word “or” is often used to express an alternative of terms defined  or explanation of the same thing in different words. Therefore, if  either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in sub- clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the  entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear  import of the opening part of clause (b) with the word “and”  appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying  conditions in sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to  satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the other sub- clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year  controlled by less than six persons and shares carrying more  than 50 per cent of the total voting power were during the same  period not held by less than six persons. We are unable to find  any infirmity in the reasoning or the conclusion of the Tribunal  and the High Court so far as question 1 is concerned.”  

It was observed that if either of the two negative conditions, which  

are to be found in Sub-clause (b)(iii), remains unfulfilled, the conditions  

laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied.  

98. It would also be useful to note that in Brown & Co. v. Harrison75,  

the provisions contained in Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 came  

up for consideration before the Court of Appeal.  The Court held that  

the word “or” in Article IV, R 2 (q), must be read conjunctively and not  

disjunctively.  It has been observed that quite commonly collation of the  

words “or” can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the  

disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity.  

                                                           75 (1927) All ER Rep 195 pp. 203, 204 (CA)

93    

99. In this Court’s considered view, as regards the collation of the  

words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been  

prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse,  

and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of  

Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail  

illogical results.  That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to  

two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be  

read as “nor” or “and”.  Brown & Co. v. Harrison (supra), ruled thus,  

about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the  

word "or":  

“…..I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a  conjunctive sense.  It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain  from the collation of words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense,  and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to  repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles  of construction adopted by the court to give the word a conjunctive  use.  Here, it is quite plain that the word leads to an absurdity,  because the contention put forward by the shipowners in this  matter amounts to this, as my Lord said, that, if a shipowner  himself breaks open a case and steals the contents of it, he is  exempted from liability under r 2(q) if none of his servants stole  the part of the case or broke it open.  That seems to me to be a  plain absurdity.  In addition to that, there is a repugnancy  because it is plainly repugnant to the second part of r 2(q).   Therefore I say no more about that.”    

100. In Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and  

Industry76, the then House of Lords ruled as follows:  

“If all these meanings are rejected, there remains the course of  treating “or” as expressing a non-exclusionary alternative – in  modern logic symbolised by "v."  In lawyer's terms, this may be  described as the course of substituting "and" for "or," rather the  course of redrafting the phrase so as to read: "the owner and the  master shall each be guilty," or, if the phrase of convenience were  permitted "the owner and/or the master."  To substitute "and" for  "or" is a strong and exceptional interference with a legislative text,  and in a penal statute, one must be even more convinced of its  

                                                           76 1974 (1) WLR 505

94    

necessity.  It is surgery rather than therapeutics.  But there are  sound precedents for so doing: my noble and learned friend, Lord  Morris of Borth-y-Gest, has mentioned some of the best known:  they are sufficient illustrations and I need not re-state them.  I  would add, however, one United States case, a civil case, on an  Act concerning seamen of 1915.  This contained the words: "Any  failure of the master shall render the master or vessel or the  owner of the vessel liable in damages."  A District Court in  Washington D.C. read "or" as "and" saying that there could not  have been any purpose or intention on the part of Congress to  compel the seamen to elect as to which to pursue and thereby  exempt the others from liability – The Blakeley, 234 Fed. 959.   Although this was a civil, not a criminal case, I find the conclusion  and the reasoning reassuring.”  

101. In M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and  

Ors.77, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there are two  

negative conditions, the expression “or” has to be read as conjunctive  

and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled.  It was observed:  

“(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence,  then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In  such a case, "or" really means "either" "or." In the Shorter Oxford  Dictionary one of the meanings of the word "or" is given as "A  particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses  between which there is an alternative." It is also there stated,  "The alternative expressed by “or” is emphasised by prefixing the  first member or adding after the last, the associated adv.  EITHER." So, even without "either," "or" alone creates an  alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative  one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be  chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case  it must be held that a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be  imposed.  

(14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the position  becomes different. The word "or" between the two clauses would  then spread the negative influence over the clause following it.  This rule of grammar is not in dispute. In such a case the  conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled and the result  would be that the penalty that can be imposed can never exceed  Rs. 1,000.  

(15) The question then really comes to this: Is the sentence before  us a negative or an affirmative one? It seems to us that the  sentence is an affirmative sentence. The substance of the  sentence is that a certain person shall be liable to a penalty. That  

                                                           77 AIR 1961 SC 935

95    

is a positive concept. The sentence is therefore not negative in its  import.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old  

law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither  

physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land  

acquisition proceedings lapse.  Several decisions were cited at Bar to  

say that "or" has been treated as "and" and vice versa.  Much depends  

upon the context.  In Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh &  

Ors.78, the expression "established or incorporated" was read as  

"established and incorporated."  In R.M.D.C (supra), to give effect to the  

clear intention of the Legislature, the word "or" was read as "and."   

102. In Ishwar Singh Bindra (supra) it was observed that:  

“11. Now if the expression "substances" is to be taken to mean  something other than "medicine" as has been held in our previous  decision it becomes difficult to understand how the word "and"  as used in the definition of drug in S. 3(b)(i) between “medicines”  and “substances” could have been intended to have been used  conjunctively. It would be much more appropriate in the context  to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd  Edn. it is stated at page 135 that "and" has generally a  cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions  that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or.  Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of  a contexts, read as "or." Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of  Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry out the  intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to  read the conjunctions “or” and “and’ one for the other.”  

 103. In Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone  

Quarries (P) Ltd79, “and” was read disjunctively considering the  

legislative intent.  In Samee Khan (supra), the term “and” was construed  

                                                           78 (2005) 5 SCC 420  79 (1987) 3 SCC 308

96    

as “or” to carry out the legislative intention.  In Mobilox Innovations  

Private Limited (supra), similar observations were made.  In Green v.  

Premier Glynrhonwy State Co. L.R80, it has been laid down that  

sometimes word “or” read as “and” and vice versa, but does not do so  

unless it becomes necessary because “or” does not generally mean “and”  

and "and" does not generally mean "or”.  

 104. In R.M.D.C. (supra) the definition under Section 2(1)(d) came up  

for consideration.  The qualifying clause consisted of two parts  

separated from each other by the disjunctive word "or".  Both parts of  

the qualifying clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize  

competitions that they qualified were of a gambling nature.  The court  

held considering the apparent intention of the legislature, it has  

perforce to read the word "or" as “and”.  In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji  

Maharaj etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors81, this Court considered the  

composition of the Board prescribed under Section 5.  The expressions  

used were not belonging to professing the Hindu religion or not  

belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya.  Two negative  

conditions were used.  This Court has observed that "or" in clause (g)  

dealing with disqualification must mean "and".  The relevant portion of  

the same is extracted hereunder:  

“(39) …The composition of the Board has been prescribed by  Section 5; it shall consist of a President, the Collector of Udaipur  District, and nine other members.  The proviso to the section is  important: it says that the Goswami shall be one of such  

                                                           80 (1928) 1 KB 561  81 AIR 1963 SC 1638

97    

members if he is not otherwise disqualified to be a member and  is willing to serve as such. Section 5(2) prescribes the  disqualifications specified in clauses (a) to (g) – unsoundness of  mind adjudicated upon by competent court, conviction involving  moral turpitude; adjudication as an insolvent or the status of an  undischarged insolvent; minority, the defect of being deaf-mute  or leprosy; holding an office or being a servant of the temple or  being in receipt or any emoluments or perquisites from the temple;  being interested in a subsisting contract entered into with the  temple; and lastly, not professing the Hindu religion or not  belonging to the Pushti-MargiyaVallabhi Sampradaya.  There can  be no doubt that "or" in clause (g) must mean "and," for the context  clearly indicates that way.  There is a proviso to Section 5(2)  which lays down that the disqualification as to the holding of an  office or an employment under the temple shall not apply to the  Goswami and the disqualification about the religion will not apply  to the Collector; that is to say, a Collector will be a member of the  Board even though he may not be a Hindu and a follower of the  denomination. Section 5(3) provides that the President of the  Board shall be appointed by the State Government and shall for  all purposes be deemed to be a member.  Under Section 5(4) the  Collector shall be an ex-officio member of the Board.  Section 5(5)  provides that all the other members specified in sub-clause (1)  shall be appointed by the State Government so as to secure  representation of the Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas from all over  India.  This clearly contemplates that the other members of the  Board shall not only be Hindus, but should also belong to the  denomination, for it is in that manner alone that their  representation can be adequately secured.”  

 (emphasis supplied)  

105. In Prof. Yashpal (supra), the word “or” occurring in the expression  

“established or incorporated” was read as “and” so that the State  

enactment did not come in conflict with the Central legislation and  

create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter.  This court  

has observed:  

“59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has also submitted that insofar as  private universities are concerned, the word “or” occurring in the  expression “established or incorporated” in Sections 2(f), 22 and  23 of the UGC Act should be read as "and." He has submitted that  the normal meaning of the word "established" is to bring into  existence. In order to avoid the situation which has been created  by the impugned enactment where over 112 universities have  come into existence within a short period of one year of which  many do not have any kind of infrastructure or teaching facility,  it will be in consonance with the constitutional scheme that only  after establishment of the basic requisites of a university  (classrooms, library, laboratory, offices, and hostel facility, etc.)

98    

that it should be incorporated and conferred a juristic personality.  The word "or" is normally disjunctive and "and" is normally  conjunctive, but at times, they are read vice versa to give effect to  the manifest intentions of the legislature, as disclosed from the  context. If literal reading of the word produces an unintelligible or  absurd result, "and" maybe read for "or" and "or" maybe read for  "and." (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh,  7th Edn., p. 339 and also State of Bombay v. R.M.D.  Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699, AIR at p. 709 and  Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1958 SC 861) We are of the  opinion that having regard to the constitutional scheme and in  order to ensure that the enactment made by Parliament, namely,  the University Grants Commission Act is able to achieve the  objective for which it has been made and UGC is able to perform  its duties and responsibilities, and further that the State  enactment does not come in conflict with the Central legislation  and create any hindrance or obstacle in the working of the latter,  it is necessary to read the expression “established or  incorporated” as “established and incorporated” insofar as the  private universities are concerned.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

106. Reference has also been made to Pooran Singh v. State of M.P82, in  

which the Court considered the scheme of the M.V. Act. The magistrate  

was bound to issue summons of the nature prescribed by sub-section  

(1) of Section 130. The Court held that there was nothing in the sub-

section which indicated that he must endorse the summons in terms of  

both the clauses (a) and (b), that he is so commanded would be to  

convert the conjunction 'or' into 'and'.  There is nothing in the language  

of the legislature which justifies such a conversion and there are  

adequate reasons which make such an interpretation wholly  

inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.  

 107. Reliance has been placed on Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport  

Appellate Tribunal83. The word 'or' was given grammatical meaning. The  

                                                           82 1965 (2) SCR 853  83 1975 (2) SCC 671  

99    

order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High Court and the  

Judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such  

other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may appoint.  

It was held that the word 'or' cannot be read as 'and'. They should be  

considered in an ordinary sense. If two different interpretations are  

possible, the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and  

sensible. The Court observed thus:  

"27. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court  that the permanent seat of the High Court is at Allahabad is not  quite sound. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the  new High Court and the judges and Division Bench thereof shall  sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces  as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the  United Provinces, appoint. The word "or" cannot be read as "and”.  If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are  bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that  the results of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a court to  refuse to give it effect. If there are two different interpretations of  the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just,  reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those  things. If the inconvenience is an absurd inconvenience, by  reading an enactment in its ordinary sense, whereas if it is read  in a manner in which it is capable, though not in an ordinary  sense, there would not be any inconvenience at all; there would  be reason why one should not read it according to its ordinary  grammatical meaning. Where the words are plain, the Court  would not make any alteration."  

 108. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia84, for  

interpretation of 'and' and 'or' in the context of the term ‘adulterated’ as  

defined in section 2(i)(f), the Court observed:  

“7. We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong  in its interpretation of Section 2(i)(f). On the plain language of the  definition section, it is quite apparent that the words "or is  otherwise unfit for human consumption" are disjunctive of the rest  of the words preceding them. It relates to a distinct and separate  class altogether. It seems to us that the last clause "or is  otherwise unfit for human consumption" is residuary provision,  which would apply to a case not covered by or falling squarely  

                                                           84 (1980) 1 SCC 158

100    

within the clauses preceding it. If the phrase is to be read  disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food being "filthy,  putrid, rotten, decomposed . . . or insect-infested" would be per se  sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word  "adulterated" as defined in sub-clause (f), and it would not be  necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food  was unfit for human consumption.  

***  

11. In the definition clause, the collection of words "filthy, putrid,  rotten, decomposed and insect-infested," which are adjectives  qualifying the term "an article of food," show that it is not of the  nature, substance, and quality fit for human consumption. It will  be noticed that there is a comma after each of the first three  words. It should also be noted that these qualifying adjectives  cannot be read into the last portion of the definition i.e., the word'  "or is otherwise unfit for human consumption," which is quite  separate and distinct from others. The word "otherwise" signifies  unfitness for human consumption due to other causes. If the last  portion is meant to mean something different, it becomes difficult  to understand how the word "or" as used in the definition of  "adulterated" in Section 2(i)(f) between "filthy, putrid, rotten, etc."  and "otherwise unfit for human consumption" could have been  intended to be used conjunctively. It would be more appropriate  in the context to read it disjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial  Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1, it is stated at p. 135:  

“And” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the  fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it  is the antithesis of “or”. Sometimes, however, even in such a  connection, it is, by force of a context, read as “or”.  

While dealing with the topic 'OR is read as AND, and vice versa’,  Stroud says in Vol. 3, at p. 2009:  

"You will find it said in some cases that 'or' means 'and'; but 'or'  never does mean 'and’.  

Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp.  229-30, it has been accepted that "to carry out the intention of the  legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the  conjunctions 'or' and 'and' one for the other." The word "or" is  normally disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at  times they are read as vice versa. As Scrutton, L.J. said in Green  v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co., LR (1928) 1 KB 561, 568: "You  do sometimes read "or" as "and" in a statute . . . . But you do not  do it unless you are obliged, because "or" does not generally  mean "and" and "and" does not generally mean "or." As Lord  Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v.  Henderson, LR (1888) 13 AC 603, the reading of "or" as "and" is  not to be resorted to "unless some other part of the same statute  or the clear intention of it requires that to be done." The  substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes made  without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted whether  some of the cases of turning "or" into "and" and vice versa have  not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation."  

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109. In State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh85, ‘or’ was read as  

‘nor’ and not as ‘and’ in the context of Section 2 of the Armed Forces  

Special Powers Act, 1948. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights  

(supra), the Court held that the language of section 4(a) does not  

support the said construction.  

  110. In Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith  

(Liverpool) Ltd.86, the Court observed as follows: (at page 603)  

"…unless the context makes the necessary meaning of "or" "and,"  as in some instances it does; but I believe it is wholly unexampled  so to read it when doing so will upon one construction entirely  alter the meaning of the sentence unless some other part of the  same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be  done,……It may indeed be doubted whether some of the cases of  turning “or” into “and” and vice versa have not gone to the  extreme limit of interpretation, but I think none of them would  cover this case.”  

 111. In Re Hayden Pask v. Perry87, the expression "or their issue" had  

been considered, and it was observed that the words "or their issue"  

must be read as words of limitation and not of substitution.  The word  

"or" was construed to mean "and." The learned SG placed reliance on  

the Queen's Bench decision in Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street  

Bros88 to submit that the issue was whether, in terms of its grammatical  

meaning, if two things were prohibited, both were permitted and not  

merely permitted in the alternative. It would have been more strictly  

                                                           85 (1992) 4 SCC 54  86 LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595  87 (1931) 2 Ch.333  88 (1881) VIII QBD 445

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grammatical to have written "nor" instead of "or." The following  

discussion was made in the decision:  

"Dec.13. GROVE, J.  The main question before us turns on the  meaning of the word "or," used in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s.98.  Read  shortly, s. 98 enacts that no existing road, passage or way, shall  be hereafter formed or laid out for carriage traffic unless such  road shall be forty feet wide, or for the purposes of foot traffic,  unless such road be of the width of twenty feet, or unless such  streets respectively shall be open at both ends.  The question is  whether that word "or" should be read in the disjunctive or  conjunctive, or perhaps read as either "and" or "nor:" I think it  means "nor;" that is to say, that the two things comprised in the  prohibition are both prohibited, and not merely prohibited in the  alternative.  If the sense which I attribute to the word is right, it  would have been more strictly grammatical to have written "nor"  instead of "or."  But I think that the meaning of the enactment is  that the road must be of the width specified, and that no road  shall be allowed unless it is of the width specified, nor unless it  is open at both ends.  That seems to me to be the object of the  statute, which was passed for sanitary purposes, and also for  the purpose of comfort and traffic.    

It was contended that the object of the provision is sanitary  only, and that if a street is forty feet wide, or if however narrow,  it is open at both ends, good ventilation is secured.  But a very  long narrow street would hardly be more salubrious with both  ends open than if one end were closed and the street were a cul  de sac.     

Our construction of the Act is according to the ordinary use of  language, although it may not be strictly grammatical.  We might  have referred to authorities by good writers, shewing that where  the word "or" is preceded by a negative or prohibitory provision,  it frequently has a different sense from that which it has when it  is preceded by an affirmative provision.  For instance, suppose  an order that "you must have your house either drained or  ventilated."  The word "or" would be clearly used in the  alternative.  Suppose again, the order was that "you must have  your house drained or ventilated," that conveys the idea to my  mind that you must have your house either drained or ventilated.   But supposing the order were that "you must not have your house  undrained or unventilated."  The second negative words are  coupled by the word "or," and the negative in the preceding  sentence governs both.  In s. 98 there is a negative preceding a  sentence; "no existing road" shall be formed as a street for  carriage traffic unless such road be widened to forty feet, or for  the purposes of foot traffic only unless such road or way be  widened to the width of twenty feet, "or" unless such streets shall  be open at both ends.  Probably, if the word "or" in the sentence,  "or for purposes of foot traffic only," had been written "nor," the  language there too would have been more clear and more  decidedly prohibitory; but with regard to the sentence "or unless  such streets shall be open at both ends" I think that by reading

103    

the word "or" as "nor" we carry out the intention of the Act, which  was to have streets of a proper width and properly opened at  both ends, and that there should not be incommodious and  unhealthy cross streets which are culs de sac, shut up at one  end.     There have been frequently cases on the construction of  statutes where the Courts have held “or” to mean “and,” taking  the rest of the sentence in which the word “or” occurred, the object  and intention being prohibition, and the two things prohibited  being coupled by the word “or.”  I think the prohibition in s.98  relates to both the width and open ending of streets.  The street  must be both of the width prescribed and also open at both ends.”  

   112. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is, in our opinion, a penal  

provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not  

taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making  

the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of  

2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The  

expression where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall  

continue used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the Act of 1894  

means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of  

enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in  

that context, an exception has been carved out in section 24(2).  

113. Even if possession has been taken, despite which payment has  

not been made nor deposited, (for the majority of the land-holdings),  

then all beneficiaries holding land on the date of notification under  

Section 4 of the Act of 1894, are to be paid compensation under the  

provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 frowns upon  

indolence and stupor of the authorities. The expression “possession of  

the land has not been taken” or “compensation has not been paid”

104    

indicates a failure on the part of the authorities to take the necessary  

steps for five years or more in a pending proceeding under Section  

24(1)(b). Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause overriding what  

is contained in Section 24(1). Thus, Section 24(2) has to be read as an  

exception to Section 24(1)(b). Similarly, the proviso has to be read as a  

proviso to Section 24(2) for the several reasons to be discussed  

hereafter. Parliament enacted a beneficial provision in case authorities  

delayed in taking of the possession for more than five years nor paid  

compensation, meaning thereby acquisition has not been completed.  

Section 24(2) clearly contemplates inaction on the part of the authorities  

not as a result of the dilatory tactics and conduct of the landowners or  

other interested persons.  

 114. There are other reasons to read the word 'or' in Section 24 as 'and.'  

When we consider the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the award was  

made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake possession of the  

land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from  

all encumbrances. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 enables the Collector  

to take possession of acquired land, when an award is made under  

Section 11. Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 confers special powers in  

cases of urgency. The Collector could, on the expiration of 15 days from  

the publication of notice under Section 9(1), take possession of any land  

needed for a public purpose and such land was to thereupon vest  

absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Under

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Section 17(3A) before taking possession, the Collector had to tender  

payment of 80% of the compensation, as estimated by him and also had  

to pay the landowners or to persons interested, unless prevented by  

exigencies mentioned in Section 31(2). It is also provided in sub-section  

(3B) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 that the amount paid or deposited  

under Section 17(3A) shall be taken into account for determining the  

compensation required to be tendered under Section 31.  

 115. It is apparent from a plain reading of Section 16 (of the Act of  

1894) that the land vests in the Government absolutely when  

possession is taken after the award is passed. Clearly, there can be  

lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not  

taken. The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the  

Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the  

date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no  

award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition  

of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period  

during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once  

an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land  

vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of  

land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing  

award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16.  Once  

possession is taken under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the owner of

106    

the land loses title to it, and the Government becomes the absolute  

owner of the land.  

116. Payment of compensation under the Act of 1894 is provided for by  

Section 31 of the Act, which is to be after passing of the award under  

Section 11. The exception, is in case of urgency under Section 17, is  

where it has to be tendered before taking possession. Once an award  

has been passed, the Collector is bound to tender the payment of  

compensation to the persons interested entitled to it, as found in the  

award and shall pay it to them unless “prevented” by the contingencies  

mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 31. Section 31(3) contains a non-

obstante clause which authorises the Collector with the sanction of the  

appropriate Government, in the interest of the majority, by the grant of  

other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands  

or in such other way as may be equitable.  

 117. Section 31(1) enacts that the Collector has to tender payment of  

the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled  

thereto according to the award and shall pay such amount to a person  

interested in the land, unless he (the Collector) is prevented from doing  

so, for any of the three contingencies provided by sub-section (2).  

Section 31 (2) provides for deposit of compensation in Court in case  

State is prevented from making payment in the event of (i) refusal to  

receive it; (ii) if there be no person competent to alienate the land; (iii) if  

there is any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation; or (iv) if

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there is dispute as to the apportionment. In such exigencies, the  

Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to  

which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted.  

118. Section 34 deals with a situation where any of the obligations  

under Section 31 is not fulfilled, i.e., when the amount of compensation  

is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the  

Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate  

of 9% per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall  

have been so paid or deposited; and after one year from the date on  

which possession is taken, interest payable shall be at the rate of 15%  

per annum. The scheme of the Act of 1894 clearly makes it out that  

when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is  

taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State  

Government.  Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be  

issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon  

payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the  

Collector is “prevented from making payment," as provided under  

section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also  

Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest  

under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have  

been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%.  Thus, once land has been  

vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the  

compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2),

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compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-

compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition. The same  

spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section  

24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not  

been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as  

envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made,  

possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2).  

In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as  

provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State,  

free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no  

divesting there will be no lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9%  

or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to  

Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has  

not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an  

event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for  

minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to  

higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of  

2013. The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the  

notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition  

Act”, i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher  

compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on  

the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and  

furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made  

after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the

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benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is  

intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification  

under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.  

 119. It is apparent from the Act of 1894 that the payment of  

compensation is dealt with in Part V, whereas acquisition is dealt with  

in Part II. Payment of compensation is not made pre-condition for taking  

possession under Section 16 or under Section 31 read with Section 34.  

Possession can be taken before tendering the amount except in the case  

of urgency, and deposit (of the amount) has to follow in case the  

Collector is prevented from making payment in exigencies as provided  

in Section 31(3). What follows is that in the event of not fulfilling the  

obligation to pay or to deposit under Section 31(1) and 31(2), the Act of  

1894 did not provide for lapse of land acquisition proceedings, and only  

increased interest follows with payment of compensation.  

 120. The terms of object clause No. 18 (of the Statement of Objects and  

Reasons) to the Act of 2013 reveals that the option of taking possession  

(of acquired land) upon making of an award the new law would be  

available in the cases of land acquisition under the Act of 1894 where  

award has not been made, or possession of land has not been taken. It  

is apparent that the benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where  

the award had not been made, or award has been made, but possession  

has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land is vests in  

the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt about that

110    

payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision  

of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in  

respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation  

under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date  

of notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is  

nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific  

reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been  

made, and possession has been taken.  While interpreting the  

provisions of an Act, the court to consider the objects and reasons of  

the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that  

once vesting is complete, there is no divesting as held in Workmen of  

Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate89, thus:  

“(9)  A little careful consideration will show, however, that the  expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the  definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this  wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate  to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment  or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a  limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the  employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly  exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers  and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the  context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and  consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is  well settled that  "the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their  meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best  harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which  the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much  in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language,  nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on  which they are used, and the object to be attained."  (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).”  

                                                           89 1958 SCR 1156

111    

121. In Mukesh K. Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors.90,  

the decision in Workmen of Dimakuchi Estate (supra) was reiterated, on  

the issue of discerning the object of an enactment.  

 122. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only where  

the award has been made 5 years or more before the commencement of  

the Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken, nor  

compensation has been paid. It does not visualize a situation where  

possession has been taken under the urgency provision of Section 17(1),  

but the award has not been made. In such cases, under Section 24(1)(a)  

of the Act of 2013, there is no lapse of entire proceedings: but  

compensation is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of  

the Act of 2013. In case of urgency, possession is usually taken before  

the award is passed. Thus, where no award is passed, where urgency  

provision under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894 had been invoked, there  

is no lapse, only higher compensation would follow under Section  

24(1)(a) even if payment has not been made or tendered under Section  

17(3A) of the Act of 1894.  

123. The provision for lapsing under Section 24 is available only when  

the award has been made, but possession has not been taken within  

five years, nor compensation has been paid. In case word 'or' is read  

disjunctively, proceedings shall lapse even after possession has been  

taken in order to prevent lapse of land acquisition proceedings, once the  

                                                           90 (2004) 8 SCC 387

112    

land has vested in the Government and in most cases, development has  

already been made. The expressions used in Section 24(2) “possession  

of the land has not been taken” and “the compensation has not been  

paid” are unrelated and carry different consequences under the Act of  

1894. As already discussed above, these conditions are merely exclusive  

conditions and cannot be used as alternative conditions. There is a  

catena of cases where compensation has been paid, but possession has  

not been taken due to one reason or the other for no fault of authorities  

or otherwise, and there are cases where possession is taken, but  

compensation has not been paid.  

124. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is to be given full effect. Section 24(2)  

has been carved out as an exception to the otherwise general  

applicability of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General  

Clauses Act and Section 24(1)(a) and (b) apply to the proceedings which  

are pending. Sub-section (2) is an exception to sub-section (1) which  

reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)” where an  

award has been made, but possession has not been taken nor  

compensation has been paid, an exception has been carved in Section  

24 where an award has been passed, but no steps have been taken to  

take the possession nor payment of compensation has been made in  

pending proceedings under Section 24(1). The provision has to be  

construed in the spirit behind what is saved under Section 6 (of the

113    

General Clauses Act) as provided in Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and  

the non-obstante clause in Section 24(2).  

125. It was also submitted on behalf of the States that neither a  

transitory provision nor a repealing law could be interpreted so as to  

take away, disturb or adversely affect rights created by operation of law.  

It cannot divest the State Government of the land absolutely vested in  

it. Reliance has been placed on K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala &  

Ors91 thus:  

“12. It is further necessary to bear in mind that the amending Act  has added, among others, the provisions of Section 23(1-A) and  Section 28-A and has amended the provisions of Section 23(2). It  has also made independent transitional provision in its Section  30. The relevant provisions of Section 30 read as follows:  

30. Transitional provisions.— (1) The provisions of sub-section (1- A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of  Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have  applied, also to, and in relation to,—  

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the  principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of  introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the  House of the People], in which no award has been made by the  Collector before that date;  

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the  principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award  has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement  of this Act.  

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28  of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and  Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be  deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award  made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High  Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under  the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982  [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,  1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement  of this Act.  

The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act is 30- 4-1982 and the date of its commencement is 24-9-1984.  

                                                           91 1994 (5) SCC  593

114    

***  

38. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling  one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is  made to take care of the period between 30-4-1982 and 24-9- 1984, i.e., between the date of the introduction of the Bill of the  amending Act and the date of the commencement of the Act. Since  some awards might have been made by the Collector and the  reference Court during the said interregnum, the legislature did  not want to deprive the awardees concerned either of the newly  conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the increased benefit  under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the  Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings  pending before them where they had not made awards. The only  limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector in this  behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made  by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30-4- 1982 to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such awardees. This  was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are  pending before the reference Court on the date of the  commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24-9-1984, the  reference Court would be able to give the said benefit to the  awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had  accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not  be reopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections  23(2) and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not  only to the proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24- 9-1984 but also to those where awards were made by the  Collector and the reference Courts between 30-4-1982 and 24-9- 1984. Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they  were the subject-matter of the appeal before High Courts or the  Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to  extend the said benefits.  

***  

71. Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading  "Transitional provisions." Explaining the role of transitional  provisions in a statute, Bennion has stated:  

“Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing  enactments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions  which regulate the coming into operation of those enactments and  modify their effect during the period of transition. Where an Act  fails to include such provisions expressly, the court is required to  draw inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements as,  in the light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parliament to  have intended.”  

(Francis Bennion: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., p. 213)  

The learned author has further pointed out:  

“Transitional provisions in an Act or other instrument are  provisions which spell out precisely when and how the operative  parts of the instrument are to take effect. It is important for the  interpreter to realise, and bear constantly in mind, that what  appears to be the plain meaning of a substantive enactment is  often modified by transitional provisions located elsewhere in the  Act.” (p. 213)

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Similarly Thornton in his treatise on Legislative Drafting [3rd Edn.,  1987, p. 319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State for Social  Security, (1991) 2 All ER 726, 730 Per Lord Keith], has stated:  

“The function of a transitional provision is to make special  provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances  which exist at the time when that legislation comes into force.”  

For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent  the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 by the  amending Act are applicable to proceedings that were pending on  the date of the commencement of the amending Act it is necessary  to read Section 23(1-A) along with the transitional provisions  contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 126. For interpretation of repeal and saving clauses, reliance has been  

placed on Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd92 thus:  

“70. Section 85 of the 1996 Act repeals the 1940 Act. Sub-section  (2) of Section 85 provides for a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) of  the said sub-section provides for saving clause stating that the  provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to  arbitral proceedings which commenced before the said Act came  into force. Thus, those arbitral proceedings which were  commenced before coming into force of the 1996 Act are saved  and the provisions of the 1996 Act would apply in relation to  arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after the said Act  came into force. Even for the said limited purpose, it is necessary  to find out as to what is meant by commencement of arbitral  proceedings for the purpose of the 1996 Act wherefor also  necessity of reference to Section 21 would arise. The court is to  interpret the repeal and savings clauses in such a manner so as  to give a pragmatic and purposive meaning thereto. It is one thing  to say that commencement of arbitration proceedings is  dependent upon the facts of each case as that would be subject  to the agreement between the parties. It is also another thing to  say that the expression “commencement of arbitration  proceedings” must be understood having regard to the context in  which the same is used; but it would be a totally different thing  to say that the arbitration proceedings commence only for the  purpose of limitation upon issuance of a notice and for no other  purpose. The statute does not say so. Even the case-laws do not  suggest the same. On the contrary, the decisions of this Court  operating in the field beginning from Shetty’s Constructions Co.  (P) Ltd. v. Konkan Rly. Construction, (1998) 5 SCC 599 are ad  idem to the effect that Section 21 must be taken recourse to for  the purpose of interpretation of Section 85(2)(a) of the Act. There  is no reason, even if two views are possible, to make a departure  from the decisions of this Court as referred to hereinbefore.  

***  

105. In the present matter, one is concerned with transitional  provision i.e. Section 85(2)(a) which enacts as to how the statute  

                                                           92 2004 (7) SCC 288

116    

will operate on the facts and circumstances existing on the date  it comes into force and, therefore, the construction of such a  provision must depend upon its own terms and not on the basis  of Section 21 (see Singh, G.P.: Principles of Statutory  Interpretation, 8th Edn., p. 188). In Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH v.  Steel Authority of India Ltd., (1999) 9 SCC 334 Section 48 of the  old Act and Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act came for  consideration. It has been held by this Court that there is a  material difference between Section 48 of the 1940 Act, which  emphasised the concept of “reference” vis-à-vis Section 85(2)(a)  of the 1996 Act which emphasises the concept of  “commencement”; that there is a material difference in the  scheme of the two Acts; that the expression “in relation to”  appearing in Section 85(2)(a) refers to different stages of  arbitration proceedings under the old Act; and lastly, that Section  85(2)(a) provides for limited repeal of the 1940 Act, therefore, I am  of the view that one cannot confine the concept of  “commencement” under Section 85(2)(a) only to Section 21 of the  1996 Act which inter alia provides for commencement of arbitral  proceedings from the date on which a request to refer a particular  dispute is received by the respondent. ….   

***  

109. To sum up, in this case, the question concerns interpretation  of transitional provisions; that Section 85(2)(a) emphasises the  concept of “commencement” whereas Section 48 of the 1940 Act  emphasised the concept of “reference”; that Section 85(2)(a)  provides for implied repeal; that the scheme of the 1940 Act is  different from the 1996 Act; that the word “reference” in Section  48 of the old Act had different meanings in different contexts; and  for the said reasons, I am of the view that while interpreting  Section 85(2)(a) in the context of the question raised in this  appeal, one cannot rely only on Section 21 of the 1996 Act.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 127. Under Section 48 of the Act of 1894, withdrawal of the land  

acquisition proceedings was permissible only if the possession has not  

been taken under Section 16 or 17(1). Section 48(1) is extracted  

hereunder:  

“48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but  

compensation to be awarded when not completed. –   (1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government  shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of  which possession has not been taken.  (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such  acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of  compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in  consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and  shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all

117    

costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the  proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.  (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may  be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this  section.”  

In case possession has been taken, there cannot be any  

withdrawal from the land acquisition proceedings under the Act of  

1894.  

 128. Various decisions were referred on behalf of the State of Haryana  

that once possession has been taken and land has not been utilised,  

there cannot be withdrawal from the acquisition of any land. Land  

cannot be restituted to the owner after the stage of possession is over.  

Following decisions have been pressed into service:  

 (a). In Gulam Mustafa & Ors (supra), it was observed:  

“5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the  municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking  them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the  fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original  acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how  it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and  cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no  principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands  voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a  public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3)  declaration.”  

Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr. (supra) when restitution of  

land was sought, on the basis of some Government resolutions, after  

possession had been taken, this observed thus:  

“2… Since he had sought enforcement of the said government  resolution, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground  of constructive res judicata. He also seeks to rely upon certain  orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity

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with enforcement of the government resolution. We do not think  that this Court would be justified in making direction for  restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was  taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all  encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the  notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the  land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other  public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original  public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained  unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom  adequate compensation was paid according to the market value  as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the  High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the  writ petitions.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

  Again, in C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors93, this court  

stated that:  

“4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification  published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, LA (for  short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962,  total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village,  Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was  acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of  Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras.  The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of  the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement  executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson  and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold  Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by  the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in  respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was  transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in  favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service  Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the  Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same  came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after  resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries  dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986,  the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged  the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962  contending that since the original purpose for which the land was  acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are  entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The  learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the  acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of  the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants,  they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ  petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.  

                                                           93 (1997) 2 SCC 627

119    

5. Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  appellants, contends that when by operation of Section 44-B read  with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose ceased to be  existing, the acquisition became bad and therefore, the GO was  bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after  the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published,  the acquisition proceeding had become final, the compensation  was paid to the appellants’ father and thereafter the lands stood  vested in the State. In terms of the agreement as contemplated in  Chapter VII of the Act, the Company had delivered possession  subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one  of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the  lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In  furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the  Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS  Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated  company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose  for which acquisition was made was substituted for another  public purpose. Moreover, the question stood finally settled 32  years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after  three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not  public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose.  

6. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was  right in refusing to entertain the writ petition.”  

(emphasis supplied)                          

The decision in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh  

& Ors94 thus:  

“9…There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay  in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced  compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself  was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the  writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in  ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that  the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired.  It is a well-settled position in law that after passing the award  and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired  land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even  if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the  landowner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in  him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as  early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra,  (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC p. 802, para 5)  

“5. At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the  municipal committee had sold away the excess land marking  them out into separate plots for a housing colony. Apart from the  fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original  acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality, how  it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and  cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no  

                                                           94 (2003) 1 SCC 335

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principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands  voided because long after the requiring authority diverts it to a  public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3)  declaration.””  

(emphasis supplied)  

Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra)95 the Court observed  

that:  

“28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would  reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and notional  possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the  manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend  upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in mind,  this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259  after considering the judgment in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v.  M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700, observed that while taking  possession of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a  pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken. This Court then  examined the context under which the judgment in Narayan  Bhagde case had been rendered and held as under: (Viswam  case, SCC p. 262, para 9)  

“9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one  of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land  is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the  presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would  constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible  to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common  knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may  not be cooperative in taking possession of the land.”  

***  

***************    ************  

40. In Narayan Bhagde case one of the arguments raised by the  landowner was that as per the communication of the  Commissioner the land was still with the landowner and  possession thereof had not been taken. The Bench observed that  the letter was based on a misconception as the landowner had  re-entered the acquired land immediately after its possession had  been taken by the Government ignoring the scenario that he stood  divested of the possession, under Section 16 of the Act. This Court  observed as under: (Narayan Bhagde case, SCC p. 712, para 29)  

“29. … This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is  clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and  resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was  actually taken possession of and became vested in the  Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have  the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting.”  

To our mind, therefore, even assuming that the appellant had re- entered the land on account of the various interim orders granted  by the courts, or even otherwise, it would have no effect for two  reasons,  

(1) that the suits/petitions were ultimately dismissed and  

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(2) that the land once having vested in the Government by  virtue of Section 16 of the Act, re-entry by the landowner would  not obliterate the consequences of vesting.”  

 This court stated, in Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors96 thus:  

“19. If Para 493 is read in the manner suggested by the learned  counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the acquired land  will have to be returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap  between the date of acquisition and the date on which the  purpose of acquisition specified in Section 4 is achieved and the  Government will not be free to use the acquired land for any other  public purpose. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to  the language of Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the  acquired land vests in the State Government free from all  encumbrances and the law laid down by this Court that the lands  acquired for a particular public purpose can be utilised for any  other public purpose.  

***  

22. The approach adopted by the High Court is consistent with  the law laid down by this Court in State of Kerala v. M.  Bhaskaran Pillai, (1997) 5 SCC 432 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed  Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558. In the first of these cases, the Court  considered the validity of an executive order passed by the  Government for assignment of land to the erstwhile owners and  observed: (M. Bhaskaran Pillai case, SCC p. 433, para 4)  

“4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was  acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, LA by operation of  Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State  free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the  Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is  settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after  the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be  used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public  purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by  way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to  public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can  be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive  Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find  is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision  of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances,  the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive  order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a  public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be  sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets  benefited by getting a higher value.”  

***  

24. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appellants  have failed to make out a case for issue of a mandamus to the  respondents to release the acquired land in their favour. In the  result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

                                                           96 (2012) 1  SCC 66

122    

129. Section 31 of the Act of 1894 is in pari materia with the provisions  

Section 77 of the Act of 2013; Section 34 (of the Act of1894) is pari  

materia with Section 80 of the Act of 2013. Section 77 of the Act of 2013  

deals with payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the  

Authority. Section 77 is reproduced hereunder:  

“77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority.– (1) On making an award under section 30, the Collector shall  tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the  persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and  shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank  accounts unless prevented by some one or more of the  contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2).    (2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to  receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land,  or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the  compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall  deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority to which  a reference under section 64 would be submitted:     Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive  such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:    Provided further that no person who has received the amount  otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any  application under sub-section (1) of section 64:    Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the  liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of  any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to  the person lawfully entitled thereto.”  

 130. The Collector has to tender payment under Section 77(1) and to  

pay the persons interested by depositing the amount in their bank  

accounts unless prevented under Section 77(2) which are the same  

contingencies as provided in Section 31(2) mentioned above. Section 80  

of the Act of 2013 is pari materia to Section 34 of the Act of 1894, is  

reproduced hereunder:

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“80. Payment of interest.–When the amount of such compensation  is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the  land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest  thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum from the time of  so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:    Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid  or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which  possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent, per  annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of the said period  of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which  has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”    

131. The provisions are identical concerning the rate of interest in case  

there is a failure to make payment of compensation before taking  

possession of the land. The award amount has to be paid @ 9% per  

annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum.  

 132. Since the Act of 1894 never provide for the lapse in case the  

compensation amount was not deposited, non-deposit carried higher  

interest. The provisions under the new Act are identical: there is no  

lapse of any acquisition proceeding by non-compliance with Section 77.   

Interpreting "or" under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively,  

would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation  

has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. It  

was fairly conceded on behalf of the landowners that they must return  

the compensation in the case of lapse if possession has not been taken.  

In case possession is with the landowner and compensation has been  

paid, according to landowners’ submission, there is deemed lapse under  

Section 24(2) by reading the word “or” disjunctively. It would then be  

open to the State Government to withdraw the money deposited in the  

Reference Court. It was also submitted that it is inherent in the notion

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of lapse that the State may recover the compensation on the ground of  

restitution.  In our opinion, the submissions cannot be accepted as an  

anomalous result would occur. In case physical possession is with the  

landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the  

Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any  

provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover  

compensation paid.  The landowner would be unjustly enriched. This  

could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section 24(2) of  

the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act,  

cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence of  

provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces our conclusion that  

the word "or" has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as  

"and." The landowners’ argument about the State’s ability to recover  

such amounts, in the absence of any provision, by relying on the  

principle of restitution, is without merit, because firstly such principle  

is without any legal sanction. The State would have to resort to the  

remedy of a suit, which can potentially result in litigation of enormous  

proportions; besides, the landowners can well argue that the property  

(i.e. the amounts) legally belonged to them and that the limitation for  

claiming it back would have expired. Several other potential defences  

would be available, each of which would result in multifarious litigation.  

Therefore, the contention is ex-facie untenable and insubstantial.  

125    

133. It was submitted that in the case State had taken possession  

without paying compensation as required under the Act of 1894, there  

cannot be absolute vesting free from all encumbrances under Section  

16. It is clear that vesting under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 does not  

depend upon payment of compensation. Vesting takes place as soon as  

possession is taken after the passing of the award. Undoubtedly,  

compensation has also to be paid. For that, provisions have been made  

in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. Section 31(1) requires tender  

and payment, which is making the money available to the landowner  

and in case State is prevented: i.e., in case the landowner does not  

consent to receive it for three other exigencies provided in Section 31(2),  

the amount has to be deposited in the court. Deposit in the court  

absolves the Government of liability to make payment of interest.  

However, if payment is not tendered under Section 31(1) nor deposited  

in court as envisaged under Section 31(2) from the date of taking  

possession, the interest for the first year is 9% and thereafter 15% per  

annum follows. The effect of vesting, under no circumstance, is taken  

away due to non-compliance of Section 31(1) or 31(2) as the case may  

be as the payment is secured along with interest under the provisions  

of Section 34 read with Section 31. The State cannot be asked to restore  

possession once taken but in case it fails to make deposit under Section  

31(3) or otherwise with respect to majority of the landholdings, in that  

exigency, all the beneficiaries as on the date of notification under

126    

Section 4 shall be entitled to higher compensation under the Act of 2013  

and there would be no lapse in that case.  

134. The landowners had complained that in some cases, under  

various schemes, close to 80% of the compensation amount was not  

handed over to the concerned Collector. It was also submitted that in  

some of the schemes, 50% beneficiaries, for whose benefit the land had  

been acquired, had not paid even a single rupee. Since this Court is not  

deciding individual cases here, what is the effect of the interpretation of  

the law, in the light of this decision, has to be considered in each and  

every case. We refrain from commenting on the merits of the said  

submissions as we are not deciding the cases on merits in the reference  

made to us. Various aspects may arise on the merits of the case as the  

schemes were framed at different points of time and the dates of  

notifications under Section 4 issued thereunder, whether there is one  

or different notifications and various other attendant circumstances  

have to be looked into like whether possession has been taken or not,  

to what extent compensation has been paid and whether proviso to  

Section 24(2) is attracted for the benefits of those entitled to it. In case  

there is failure to deposit the compensation with respect to the majority  

of the holdings, the facts have to be gauged in individual cases and then  

decided.  

127    

In re: Vesting and divesting  

135. In Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors97, the concept  

of vesting under the Act of 1894 had been taken into consideration.  The  

Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48, once  

it has taken the possession.  This Court has observed that once  

possession has been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the making of  

the award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested  

in the Government and there is no provision by which land can be  

reverted to the owner.  This Court has observed thus:  

“14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must note.  In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84 it  was held that the Government could not withdraw from  acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the  land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC  149 it was held that: (SCC p. 152, para 8)  

“… after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification  under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the  notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of  the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any  other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the  specific provision by relying upon a general power. When  possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land  vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land  statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner  by mere cancellation of the notification.”  

15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land  proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in  respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking  of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say,  the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This  is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are  intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is  made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6  declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government  fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under  Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its  title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still  pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse.  When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government  takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award  

                                                           97 (1993) 4 SCC 369

128    

under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title  to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1)  states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have  no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because  the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no  provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the  Government can revert to the owner.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra) that  

even if compensation was not paid to the appellant under Section 17(3-

A), it could not be said that possession was taken illegally.  Vesting is  

absolute.  This Court has observed thus:  

“17. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated  compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section  17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession  of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the  possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not  thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open  to the third respondent, who, as the letter of the Special Land  Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990 shows, failed to make  the necessary monies available and who has been in occupation  of the said land ever since its possession was taken, to urge that  the possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said  land has not vested in the first respondent and the first  respondent is under no obligation to make an award.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 136. In Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.98, the  

question considered was in case possession is taken, and compensation  

is not paid, what is the effect?  This Court has held that there is no  

lapse of acquisition and observed thus:  

“91. However, the question is as to what happens when such  payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the whole  acquisition be set at naught?  

92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the appellants is  also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole acquisition process  on account of the non-payment of 80% of the compensation, then  the further question would be as to whether the estimation of 80%  of compensation is correct or not. A further controversy can then  be raised by the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and  

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129    

was short of 80% and therefore, the acquisition should be set at  naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded because  indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the  enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the  part of the State Government for the land to be acquired for any  eventuality discovered by either sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)  of Section 17 of the Act.  

93. The only question that would remain is that of the estimation  of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the  compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would  not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the  situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as  contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is  not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would  entail serious consequences.  

 ***  

95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of  Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1 a similar view was reported. That was  a case under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under  which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The  Court took the view that once the possession was taken under  Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw from  that position under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section  11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the  award was not passed under Section 11-A after taking of the  possession. A clear-cut observation came to be made in that  behalf in para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with  Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is  concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition  proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad  Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 was approved. The Court  also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994)  5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6  SCC 31 where similar view was taken regarding the land  acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that  may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest,  as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by  the 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the  matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel and  Shri Qamar Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants.  Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any  reference.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

It has further been observed that the only result that may follow  

by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as contemplated  

in Section 34 of the Act of 1894.  

130    

137. In Pratap & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors99, this Court held that  

when the possession of land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests  

absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and the  

Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 and  

provisions of Section 11-A of passing the award within two years were  

not attracted.  The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an  

award within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once possession  

had been taken.  The part payment of compensation would also not  

render the possession illegal.  This Court observed thus:  

“12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are somewhat  similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, LA. Just as the  publication of a notification under Section 52(1) vests the land in  the State, free from all encumbrances, as provided by Section  52(4), similarly when possession of land is taken under Section  17(1) the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all  encumbrances. A question arose before this Court that if there is  a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A and an  award is not made in respect to the land so acquired, would the  acquisition proceedings lapse. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State  of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 this Court held that once possession  had been taken under Section 17(1) and the land vested in the  Government then the Government could not withdraw from  acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A  were not attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings  would not lapse on failure to make an award within the period  prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance of  Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of compensation before  taking possession, would also not render the possession illegal  and entitle the Government to withdraw from acquisition. The  aforesaid principle has been reiterated by this Court in P.  Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari  Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31.  In view of the aforesaid  ratio it follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not  attracted in the present case and even if it be assumed that the  award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the  acquisition of land does not come to an end.  

(emphasis supplied)”  

                                                           99 (1996) 3 SCC 1

131    

138. In Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors100, question  

was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition proceedings in view  

of the provisions contained in Section 11-A as award had not been made  

within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition  

Amendment Act, 1984.  Possession had been taken by the Government  

under Section 17(1).  It was held that it was not open to the Government  

to withdraw from the acquisition.  Provisions of Section 11-A was not  

attracted.  Following is the relevant portion of the observations made by  

this Court:  

“8. ..It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the  entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under  Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of  commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984.  We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case,  the Government had taken possession of the land in question  under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to  withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a  case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition  proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award  was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act.  ….”  

 139. In P. Chinnanna & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors.101 question again  

arose with respect to possession taken under Section 17(1) invoking  

urgency clause, this Court has held that once possession is taken, there  

is absolute vesting and subsequent proceedings were void.  This Court  

stated as follows:  

“10. The said provision enables the appropriate Government to  take possession of the land concerned on the expiration of 15  days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9  sub-section (1) notwithstanding the fact that no award has been  made in respect of it. When the possession of the land concerned  is once taken as provided for thereunder such land is made to  

                                                           100 (1995) 6 SCC 31  101 (1994) 5 SCC 486

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vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It  must be noted here that taking possession of the land concerned  and its vesting absolutely in the Government free from all  encumbrances does not depend upon an award to be made under  Section 11, making of which award alone in the case of ordinary  acquisition of land could have empowered the Collector to take  possession of the land under Section 16 and the taking of which  possession would have made the land vest absolutely in the  Government free from all encumbrances. As seen from the  judgment dated 23-8-1982 of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of  1978, taking possession of the appellants’ land along with land  of others by the Collector on 10-7-1978 under Section 17(1) is, in  fact, made the basis for its holding that invoking of urgency  clause to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry was made by the  Government mechanically. No doubt, when the High Court took  the view that acquisition of the land concerned under Section 17  of the Act was made pursuant to an order of the Government  without application of its mind in the matter of making Section 5- A not to apply, it was open to it to set aside or quash the  subsequent acquisition proceedings except Section 4(1)  notification which had followed and restore the ownership of the  land to the appellants’ land if it had to order fresh enquiry on the  basis of Section 4(1) notification. Such a setting aside or quashing  was inevitable because the acquisition proceedings had been  completed under Section 17 and the land had vested in the State  Government, inasmuch as, without setting aside that vesting of  the land in the State Government and restoring the land to the  appellant-owners, that land was unavailable for subsequent  acquisition by following the procedure under Section 5-A, Section  6, Section 11 and Section 16. Thus in the circumstances of the  case in respect of the land of the appellants, when publication of  Section 4(1) notification was made on 21-7-1977, when  declaration under Section 6 was published on 21-7-1977 and  taking possession of that land under Section 17(1) by the  Collector was made on 10-7-1978 and the vesting in the State  Government of that land had occurred on that day, setting aside  by the judgment of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978 of  merely the direction given by the Government relating to non- applicability of Section 5-A to the land, given on 7-7-1977, in our  view, did not enable to Court to order the starting of fresh  proceedings for acquisition of the land concerned under Section  5-A, inasmuch as, that land concerned on Section 4(1) notification  had already become the land of the Government. In this state of  facts, when the previous acquisition of the land of the appellants  made under Section 17 of the Act did never stood affected.  Section 5-A enquiry held and subsequent declaration made were  superfluous proceedings which were inconsequential. Hence, we  feel that there is no need to set aside the impugned declaration  inasmuch as the earlier acquisition was complete and had  resulted in vesting of the land in the State Government and there  was no land available for acquisition in the subsequent  proceedings which have been carried pursuant to the judgment  of the High Court made in WP No. 3416 of 1978. Therefore, in the  stated facts, although we find that no need arises to declare the  impugned declaration as void we clarify that the earlier  proceedings which had taken place in respect of the appellants’

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land, resulting in its vesting in the State Government free from  encumbrances, has stood unaffected and any award made by  the Collector or be made by him under the L.A. Act shall be  regarded as that based on earlier acquisition proceedings.”  

 140. In May George v. Special Tahsildar & Ors.102, this Court considered  

the question to declare a provision mandatory, test is to be applied as  

to whether non-compliance of the provision could render entire  

proceedings invalid or not.  This Court referred to various decisions  

(which are referred to in the footnote103) and summarized the position  

thus:  

“24. In Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC  714, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under  (SCC p. 719, para 17)   

“17. … The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words of  Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but  mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a  marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the  1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu  marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnised  according to the ceremonies indicated therein.”  

25. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect that in  order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is  as to whether non-compliance with the provision could render the  entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is  mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the legislature  and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. The  issue is to be examined having regard to the context, subject- matter and object of the statutory provisions in question. The  Court may find out as to what would be the consequence which  would flow from construing it in one way or the other and as to  whether the statute provides for a contingency of the non- compliance with the provisions and as to whether the non- compliance is visited by small penalty or serious consequence  

                                                           102 (2010) 13 SCC 98  103 Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and Ors., AIR 1952 SC 181; State of U.P.  and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v.  Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895;State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC  2190; Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303; Balwant Singh and Ors. v. Anand  Kumar Sharma and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 433; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt.  Ltd. and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 511; Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004  SC 2036; M/s. Rubber House v. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1160; B.S.  Khurana and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 679; State of  Haryana and Anr. v. RaghubirDayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133; and GullipilliSowria Raj v. Bandaru  Pavani @ Gullipili Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714

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would flow therefrom and as to whether a particular  interpretation would defeat or frustrate the legislation and if the  provision is mandatory, the act done in breach thereof will be  invalid.  

***  

27. In G.H. Grant (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237,  this  Court has held that if a “person interested” is aggrieved by the  fact that some other person has withdrawn the compensation of  his land, he may resort to the procedure prescribed under the Act  or agitate the dispute in suit for making the recovery of the award  amount from such person.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

141. This Court opined, therefore, that once the land vests in the State,  

it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition  

proceedings.   There is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that non-

compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty.  

 142. Now, coming back to the main issue, the legal fiction of lapsing  

(under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013) cannot be extended to denude  

title which has already vested in the beneficiaries of the acquisition  

Corporation/Local Bodies, etc., and who, in turn, have also conveyed  

title and transferred the land to some other persons after development.  

In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Modi Sugar Mills104 the Court has  

held that “A legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it has  

been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field.”  

Similarly, in Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I.C105 , this Court held that a legal  

fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there  

is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the  

legislature has adopted. Lapsing is provided only where possession has  

                                                           104 1961 (2) SCR 189  105 1968 (1) SCR 771

135    

not been taken nor compensation has been paid, divesting of vested  

land is not intended nor specifically provided.  

143. Black's Law Dictionary defines "vested" as follows:  

“vested, adj. (18c) Having become a completed, consummated  right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent;  unconditional; absolute a vested interest in the estate.  

"Unfortunately, the word 'vested' is used in two senses. Firstly,  an interest may be vested in possession, when there is a right to  present enjoyment, e.g. when I own and occupy Blackacre. But  an interest may be vested, even where it does not carry a right to  immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of taking  possession in the future." George Whitecross Paton, A Textbook  of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton & David P. Derham eds., 4th  ed. 1972).    "A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements: first, that  there be no condition precedent to the interest's becoming a  present estate other than the natural expiration of those estates  that are prior to it in possession; and second, that it be  theoretically possible to identify who would get the right to  possession if the interest should become a present estate at any  time." Thomas F. Bergin 8. Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in  Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2d ed. 1984).”  

144. In Webster's Dictionary, ‘vested’ is defined as:  

“vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in church  vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not contingent upon  anything: as, a vested interest.”  

 145. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram106, it has been observed that once  

possession is taken and the award has been passed, no title remains  

with the landowner and the land cannot be de-notified under Section  

48(1) and observed thus:  

“3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure prescribed in  disposal of the land acquired by the Government for public  purposes, has held that the said procedure was not followed for  surrendering the land to the erstwhile owners. The respondent  

                                                           106 1996 (7) JT 118

136    

having purchased the land had improved upon the land and is,  therefore, entitled to be an equitable owner of the land. We wholly  fail to appreciate the view taken by the High Court. The learned  Judge had net referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and  law. It is an undisputed fact that consequent upon the passing of  the award under Section 11 and possession taken of the land, by  operation of Section 16 of the Act, the right, title and interest of  the erstwhile owner stood extinguished and the Government  became absolute owner of the property free from all  encumbrances. Thereby, no one has nor claimed any right, title  and interest in respect of the acquired land. Before the possession  could be taken, the Government have power under Section 48(1)  of the Act to denotify the land. In that event, land is required to  be surrendered to the erstwhile owners. That is not the case on  the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, the Government  having become the absolute owner of the property free from all  encumbrances, unless the title is conferred on any person in  accordance with a procedure known to law, no one can claim any  title much less equitable title by remaining in possession. The trial  Court as well as the appellate Court negative the plea of the  respondent that he was inducted into possession as a lessee for  a period of 20 years. On the other hand, the finding was that he  was in possession as a lessee on yearly basis. Having lawfully  come into possession as a lessee of the Government, Session 116  of Evidence Act estops him from denying title of the Government  and set it up in third party. By disclaiming Government title, he  forfeited even the annual lease. Under these circumstances,  having come into possession as a lessee, after expiry and  forfeiture of the lease, he has no right. Illegal and unlawful  possession of the land entails payment of damages to the  Government.”  

146. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors107, it was  

observed that once the award has been passed and possession has been  

taken, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances.  This  

Court held thus:  

“2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court made on 25-4-1996 in LPA No.  437 of 1996. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land  Acquisition Act, LA (for short, 'the Act') was published on 1-6- 1976. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on  16-2-1977. The award was passed on 3-7-1981. Thereafter, the  reference also become final. The petitioner has challenged the  notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. It contends  that the award does not come in the way of the petitioner in filing  the writ petition on 21-1-1994. The High Court has dismissed the  writ petition on the grounds of laches.”  

                                                           107 (1996) 11 SCC 698

137    

147. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v. Krishan  

Murari108 and Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. & Anr109. The  

concept of ‘vesting’ was also considered in The Fruit & Vegetable  

Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust110.  Once vesting takes  

place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in  

possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting  

contemplates absolute title, possession in the State.  This court  

observed thus:   

“(19) That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown  by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the  Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the  time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to  appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further  provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such  receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of  administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his  debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent  vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose  of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own  in the property. On the other hand, Ss. 16 and 17 of the Land  Acquisition Act (Act 1 of LA), provide that the property so acquired,  upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in  the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases  contemplated by Ss. 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes  the property of Government without any conditions or limitations  either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear  that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or  limited duration. It would thus appear that the word “vest” has  not got a fixed connotation meaning in all cases that the property  is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may  vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited  sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used  in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the  Improvement Act, particularly Ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when  they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land  vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not  necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.”  

                                                           108 (1996) 1 SCC 311  109 (1996) 3 SCC 99  110 1957 SCR 01

138    

In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013  

148. This Court is of opinion that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does  

not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific  

provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally  

vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or  

third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired,  

through sales or transfers.  There is a specific provision made for  

divesting, nor does the Act of 2013 by necessary intendment, imply  

such a drastic consequence.  Divesting cannot be said to have been  

intended. Here, the decision in VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary  

School v. State of Kerala111 is relevant; it was observed as follows by this  

Court:  

“21. In our considered view, the above principles laid down by  the Constitution Bench of this Court in Garikapati case will have  full application while considering the argument of the learned  Senior Counsel for the fifth respondent claiming a vested right by  relying upon unamended Rule 7-A(3). Principles (i), (iii), (iv) and  (v) of the said judgment are apposite to the case on hand. When  we make a comprehensive reference to the above principles, it  can be said that for the legal pursuit of a remedy it must be shown  that the various stages of such remedy are formed into a chain or  rather as series of it, which are connected by an intrinsic unity  which can be called as one proceeding, that such vested right, if  any, should have its origin in a proceeding which was instituted  on such right having been crystallised at the time of its origin  itself, in which event all future claims on that basis to be pursued  would get preserved till the said right is to be ultimately  examined. In the event of such preservation of the future remedy  having come into existence and got crystallised, that would date  back to the date of origin when the so-called vested right  commenced, that then and then only it can be held that the said  right became a vested right and it is not defeated by the law that  prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of subsequent  filing of the claim. One other fundamental principle laid down  which is to be borne in mind, is that even such a vested right can  also be taken away by a subsequent enactment if such  subsequent enactment specifically provides by express words or  by necessary intendment. In other words, in the event of the  

                                                           111 (2016) 4 SCC 216

139    

extinction of any such right by express provision in the  subsequent enactment, the same would lose its value."  

 149. The decision in State of Haryana v. Hindustan Construction Co.  

Ltd112, is relied upon to contend that the line of enquiry is not to enquire  

if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and  

liabilities under the repealed law or whether it has taken away those  

rights and liabilities.  When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on  

the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would  

undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new  

enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed  

Act.  The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights  

and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an  

intention to do away with or destroy them.  If the new Act manifests  

different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will  

stand excluded.  

 150. We have examined the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013  

in the light of the said pleas and thereafter arrived at our conclusions  

as to when and to what extent proceedings lapsed or/and were saved  

and what liabilities have been taken away and to what extent there is  

obliteration of the rights acquired and liabilities incurred earlier under  

the Act of 1894 and what is done away or destroyed by the new Act.  

                                                           112 (2017) 9 SCC 463

140    

151. The Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be interpreted consistent  

with the legislative intent, particularly when it has provided for the lapse  

of the proceedings.  It has to be interpreted in the light of provisions  

made in Sections 24 and 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6 of the  

General Clauses Act, what it protects and to what extent it takes away  

the rights of the parties.  Undoubtedly, Section 24(2) has retroactive  

operation with respect to the acquisitions initiated under the Act of  

1894 and which are not completed by taking possession nor  

compensation has been paid in spite of lapse of 5 years and proceedings  

are kept pending due to lethargy of the officials.  The drastic  

consequences follow by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in  

such cases.  

152. For considering the legislative intent, Bennion, Statutory  

Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) has been referred to, in which it has  

been observed:  

“Where, on a weighing of the factors, it seems that some  retrospective effect was intended, the general presumption  against retrospectively indicates that this should be kept to as  narrow a compass as will accord with the legislative intention.    Principle against doubtful penalisation.  It is a general principle  of legal policy that no one should suffer detriment by the  application of a doubtful law.  The general presumption against  retrospectivity means that where one of the possible opposing  constructions of an enactment would impose an ex post facto law,  that construction is likely to be doubtful.  

….  If the construction also inflicts a detriment, that is a second factor  against it.  A retrospective enactment inflicts a detriment for this  purpose ‘if it takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under  existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty,  or attaches a new disability, in regard to events already past.   The growing propensity of the courts to relate legal principle to

141    

the concept of fairness was shown by Staughton LJ when he  said:  “In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is presumed  not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events  and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned  in them, unless a contrary intention appears.””  

(emphasis supplied)  

 It has been observed in Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th  

Edition (2012) that when Parliament is presumed not to have intended  

to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions, which is  

unfair to those concerned in them unless the contrary intention  

appears.  

153. Another decision in Lauri v. Renad113, has been referred to in  

which it was observed that a statute is not to be construed so as to have  

a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.   

Following observations have been relied upon:  

“It certainly requires very clear and unmistakable language in a  subsequent Act of Parliament to revive or recreate an expired  right.  It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall  be construed so as to have a retrospective operation unless its  language is such as plainly to require such a construction; and  the same rule involves another and subordinate rule to the effect  that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater  retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

154. In Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (supra) the House of  

Lords has observed that question of the extent of retrospectivity would  

also be dependent upon the degree of unfairness it causes to the parties.   

It has been observed:  

                                                           113 (1892) 3 Ch. 402

142    

“The rule that a person should not be held liable or punished for  conduct not criminal when committed is fundamental and of long  standing.  It is reflected in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena  sine lege.  It is protected by article 7 of the European Convention  for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (1953) (Cmd. 8969).    The rule also applies, but with less force, outside the criminal  sphere.  It is again expressed in maxims, lex prospicit non respicit  and omnis nova constitutio futuris temporibus formam imponere  debet non praeteritis.  The French Civil Code provides that “La loi  ne dipose que pour l’avenir; elle n’a point d’effet retroactif:”  

…..  But both these passages draw attention to an important point,  that the exception only applies where application of it would not  cause unfairness or injustice.  This is consistent with the general  rule or presumption which is itself based on considerations of  fairness and justice, as shown by the passage in Maxwell quoted,  ante, p. 494C-E, and recently emphasised by Staughton LJ in  Secretary of State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All  E.R. 712, 724:    “In my judgment the true principle is that Parliament is presumed  not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events  and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned  in them, unless a contrary intention appears.  It is not simply a  question of classifying an enactment as retrospective or not  retrospective.  Rather it may well be a matter of degree – the  greater the unfairness, the more it is to be expected that  Parliament will make it clear if that is intended.”    The distinction between rights and procedure, and unfairness  and fairness, may well overlap.  Thus, if a limitation period is  shortened but a plaintiff has time to sue before expiry of the  shortened period, he is likely to be statute-barred if he does not  sue within the shortened period (see The Ydun [1899] P. 236.);  but if a limitation period is extended after a previous shorter  limitation period has already expired, the plaintiff will be unable  to take advantage of the new period because an absolute defence  has by then accrued to the defendant and it would not be fair to  deprive him of it:  See Yew Bon Tew v. Kenderaan Bas Mara  [1983] 1 A.C. 553 and Maxwell v. Murphy (1957) 96 C.L.R. 261.  

 Further, Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Slynn of  

Hadley, held as under:  

“The principle governing the proper approach to a statutory  provision alleged to have retrospective effect has been stated in  a number of different ways, but no difference of substance is  revealed by the authorities.  Thus:    (1) the principle has been described as "a prima facie rule of  construction" (Yew Bon Tew [1983]  1 A.C 553, 558F), "an  established principle in the construction of statutory provisions"

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(Pearce v. Secretary of State for Defence [1988] A.C 755, 802C) or  "a fundamental rule of English law" (Lauri v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch.  402, 421, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed., p.  215, cited with approval in Carson v. Carson and Stoyek [1964]  1 W.L.R 511, 516-517).    (2) The principle is that a statute or statutes will not be interpreted  so as to have a retrospective operation unless (i) “that result is  unavoidable on the language used” (Yew Bon Tew, at pp. 558F,  563D-E) or “that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence  to the language of the enactment: (In re Athlumney, Ex parte  Wilson [1898] 2 Q.B 547, 552) or “its language is such as plainly  to require such a construction” (Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421); or (ii)  “they expressly or by necessary implication to provide: see Yew  Bon Tew, at p. 558F” (Pearce v. Secretary of State for Defence  [1988] A.C 755, 802C-D) or “such a construction appears very  clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct  implication” (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed.,  p.215]    

(3) “if the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly  capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as  prospective only” (In re Athlumney, at p. 552).    

(4) If the statute does have some retrospective operation on the  basis of the above principles, it is not to be construed as having  greater retrospective operation “than its language renders  necessary” (Lauri v. Renad, at p. 421) or “than is necessary to  give effect either to its clear language or to its manifest purpose”  (Arnold v. Central Electricity Generating Board [1988] A.C 228,  275.    

The absence of express limiting words cannot be used as a basis  for implying retrospective operation.  That would reverse the true  presumption.  A necessary and distinct implication typically  arises in the context of a statute that, by repealing a previous  statute, would leave a “lacuna” in the law if the new statute were  not to be construed as having retrospective effect: see, e.g., Food  Corporation of India v. Marastro Compania Naviera S.A. [1987] 1  W.L.R. 134, 152.  The particular problem in the present case is a  transitional problem only, applicable only to those arbitrators that  are stale as at 1 January 1992, in respect of which applications  to strike out are made shortly thereafter.  In the future, such  claimants will either continue to be dilatory or not, in which case  the references will proceed to a conclusion.  The concern of the  legislature, and the mischief at which the section was aimed, was  not a limited number of existing stale arbitrations but future  arbitrations.  Moreover, although the mischief at which the section  was aimed is not to be ignored, one should start by looking at the  words themselves: see Chebaro v. Chebaro [1987] Fam. 127,  130, 134-135.    It would be unfair to a claimant to give a retrospective operation  to section 13A.  So far as claimants in existing arbitrations are  concerned, they may well have been (correctly) advised prior to 1  January 1992 that they could proceed slowly with the claim  without risk of having their claims dismissed by reason of such  delay.  A retrospective application of the statute would expose  him to a penalty on the strength of conduct not susceptible to  penalty when committed.  It would not, however, be unfair to a  respondent to limit section 13A to delay occurring after 1 January

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1992.  Even if such delay were causative of prejudice or the risk  of an unfair resolution of the dispute, under the existing law laid  down in Bremer Vulkan a respondent should have been aware  that it was a respondent’s obligation (as well as a claimant’s) to  seek directions from the arbitrator to ensure a speedy resolution  of disputes: see the Hannah Blumenthal case [1983] 1 A.C. 854,  923H.  A retrospective alteration to the legitimate expectations of  the parties as to the consequences of their conduct at the time it  occurred would be contrary to the principles of legal and  commercial certainty that formed part of the grounds on which  the House of Lords declined in Hannah Blumenthal to depart from  Bermer Vulkan: see pp. 913C, 917D, 922H.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

155. Reliance was placed on Gloucester Union v. Woolwich Union114,  

with respect to effect on existing rights wherein following observations  

have been made:  

“Before considering the legal effect of art. xxxi. of this Order it is  necessary, we think, to bear in mind that by the common law,  upon such a division of the parish of Upton St. Leonard’s, any  settlement already acquired in that parish would have been lost:  see Reg v. Tipton Inhabitants 3; Dorking Union v. St. Saviour’s  Union.  The purpose and effect of par.  1 of art. xxxi is to get rid  of this difficulty and preserve the settlements that have been  already acquired before the commencement of the Order.  The  purpose and effect of par. 2 is in like manner to preserve a status  of irremovability that has been acquired at that date; and the  question raised in this case is whether par. 3 of the article is to  be construed in all its generality as applicable to acts or  circumstances which have been done or occurred completely in  the past and before the commencement of the Order, so as to  create or confer a settlement where none existed before, or  whether, as the appellants contend, it is to be construed as  supplemental to pars. 1 and 2 and limited to the cases where  persons are in process of acquiring a settlement or status of  irremovability so as to preserve their inchoate rights.  If the words  in par. 3 are construed without limitation, then, the residence of  the pauper at Chequer’s Row in Upton St. Leonard’s between  1893 and 1897 being deemed to be residence in Gloucester, a  settlement in Gloucester is conferred upon him and the  respondents succeed.  We think this paragraph should be so  construed subject to the general principle that a statute is prima  facie prospective and does not interfere with existing rights  unless it contains clear words to that effect, or unless, having  regard to its object, it necessarily does so, and that a statute is  not to be construed to have a greater to retrospective operation  than its language renders necessary – see per Lindley LJ in Lauri  v. Renad – whatever view may be entertained of the probably  intention of the Legislature, unless some manifest absurdity or  

                                                           114 (1917) 2 K.B. 374

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inconsistency results from such construction; but we have come  to the conclusion that the construction of the paragraph  contended for by the respondents produces such a practical  inconsistency with par. 1 of the same article that it is necessary  to put some limitation upon it.  If a person had resided before the  commencement of the Order for two years in that portion of the  parish of Upton St. Leonards’ which has been added to  Gloucester and for one year following in the portion which  remains the parish of Upton St. Leonard’s, he would by the latter  part of par.1 be deemed to have acquired a settlement in the  parish of Upton St. Leonard’s, but if par.3 is to be applied to such  a case his residence in the added portion of Upton St. Leonard’s  is to be deemed to have been residence in the parish of  Gloucester; and if so deemed, then he has not had three years’  consecutive residence in any one parish and has no settlement –  in other words, the effect of par.3 in such a case is to destroy the  settlement which is preserved by par.1 and to restore the common  law rule which is intended to be abolished.  The same result  would follow in the converse case where the later period of  residence completing the three years in the old parish of Upton  St. Leonard’s is in the area which has been added to the parish  of Gloucester.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 156. In The King v. The General Commissioners of Income Tax for  

Southampton115 it was observed:  

“The language of the section shows clearly that Parliament  intended it to have a retrospective effect.  The object was to  prevent loss to the revenue when Commissioners had acted who  were not, under the statutes, the right Commissioners to make  the charge, provided that it was made by the Commissioners for  the parish or place in which the person charged ordinarily  resided.  That the section was retrospective in effect was not  disputed by Sir Robert Finlay, but he argued that the  retrospective operation is limited by the language of the section  and does not extend to a charge made in respect of profits derived  from foreign possessions or securities under s.108 of the Income  Tax Act, 1842.  In support of this argument he relied upon the  express reference in the first sub-section of s.32 to s.106, and  s.146 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, upon the omission of any  reference in this sub-section to s.108, and upon the repeal in sub- s.2 of s.32 of s.108.  He contended that if the Legislature had  meant to include s.108 in the first sub-section it would have  referred to it in express berms and would not merely have  repealed it by the second sub-section.  In the first sub-section  mention is made of other sections of the Income Tax Acts, but not  of s.108.  It must be taken, he argued, that Parliament had in  mind the difficulties created by s. 108, which were pointed out in  Aramayo’s Case by the House of Lords, and that Parliament  intended to remove these difficulties by the repeal of s.108 so as  to prevent its operation in future, but did not mean to change the  

                                                           115  (1916) 2 K.B. 249, (1917) 2 K.B. 374

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law as regards acts done before passing of the statute.  The  question must depend upon the construction of the language of  s.32.  The rules to be applied are well settled.  It is a fundamental  rule of English law that enactments in a statute are generally to  be construed as prospective and intended to regulate future  conduct, but this rule is one of construction only and must yield  to the intention of the Legislature: Moon v. Durden, per Parke B.   It is also the law that a statute is not to be construed to have  greater retrospective operation than its language renders  necessary: Lauri v. Renad, per Lindley LJ to ascertain the  intention regard should be had to the general scope and purview  of the enactment, to the remedy sought to be applied, to the former  state of the law, and to what was in the contemplation of the  Legislature: Pardo v. Bingham per Lord Hatherly L.C”    

(emphasis supplied)  

157. In K.S. Paripoornan (supra), it was observed that in the case of  

retrospective operation the Court has to consider the effect on existing  

rights and obligations and for that purpose, the intention of the  

legislature has to be ascertained as indicated in the statute itself.  This  

court observed that:  

“66. The dictum of Lord Denman, C.J. in R. v. St. Mary,  Whitechapel, (1848) 12 QB 120, 127 that a statute which is in its  direct operation prospective cannot properly be called a  retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action  is drawn from time antecedent to its passing, which has received  the approval of this Court, does not mean that a statute which is  otherwise retrospective in the sense that it takes away or impairs  any vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new  obligation or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in  respect to transactions or considerations already past, will not be  treated as retrospective. In Alexander v. Mercouris, (1979) 3 All  ER 305 Goff, L.J., after referring to the said observations of Lord  Denman, C.J., has observed that a statute would not be operating  prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of past  transactions. The question whether a particular statute operates  prospectively only or has retrospective operation also will have to  be determined on the basis of the effect it has on existing rights  and obligations, whether it creates new obligations or imposes  new duties or levies new liabilities in relation to past  transactions. For that purpose it is necessary to ascertain the  intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute itself.”  

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158. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (supra), this Court has  

observed that the rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect  

from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to the  

accrued right.  This court, while dealing with retrospectivity of a statute,  

observed that retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or  

harsh; otherwise, it runs the risk of being struck down for being  

unconstitutional.  Following observations have been made:  

“15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather  there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies  (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws  having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express  enactment or by necessary implication from the language  employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language  employed that the legislature intended a particular section to  have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an  operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been  expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the  provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had  sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute  retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general  scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be  applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the  legislature contemplated. (p. 388) The rule against retrospectivity  does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege  which did not amount to accrued right. (p. 392)  

***  

18. In a recent decision of this Court in National Agricultural  Coop. Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (2003)  5 SCC 23 it has been held   

that there is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative  intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Every legislation  whether prospective or retrospective has to be subjected to the  question of legislative competence. The retrospectivity is liable to  be decided on a few touchstones such as: (i) the words used must  expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective operation; (ii) the  retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh,  otherwise, it runs the risk of being struck down as  unconstitutional; (iii) where the legislation is introduced to  overcome a judicial decision, the power cannot be used to subvert  the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision.  There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to  give retrospectivity to an enactment. A validating clause coupled  with a substantive statutory change is only one of the methods to  leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute,  undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause

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would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the  statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.”  

159. This Court has considered the harsh consequences of  

retrospective operation of the statute in Commissioner of Income Tax-19,  

Mumbai v. Sarkar Builders116  and observed thus:  

“25. Can it be said that in order to avail the benefit in the  assessment years after 1-4-2005, balconies should be removed  though these were permitted earlier? Holding so would lead to  absurd results as one cannot expect an assessee to comply with  a condition that was not a part of the statute when the housing  project was approved. We, thus, find that the only way to resolve  the issue would be to hold that clause (d) is to be treated as  inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the  housing project and an assessee cannot be called upon to comply  with the said condition when it was not in contemplation either of  the assessee or even the legislature, when the housing project  was accorded approval by the local authorities.  

26. Having regard to the above, let us take note of the special  features which appear in these cases:  

26.1. In the present case, the approval of the housing project, its  scope, definition and conditions, are all decided by and are  dependent on the provisions of the relevant DC Rules. In contrast,  the judgment in Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (1980)  1 SCC 139 was concerned with income tax only.  

26.2. The position of law and the rights accrued prior to  enactment of the Finance Act, 2004 have to be taken into account,  particularly when the position becomes irreversible.  

26.3. The provisions of Section 80-IB(10) mention not only a  particular date before which such a housing project is to be  approved by the local authority, even a date by which the housing  project is to be completed, is fixed. These dates have a specific  purpose which gives time to the developers to arrange their  affairs in such a manner that the housing project is started and  finished within those stipulated dates. This planning, in the  context of facts in these appeals, had to be much before 1-4-2005.  

26.4. The basic objective behind Section 80-IB(10) is to encourage  developers to undertake housing projects for weaker sections of  society, inasmuch as to qualify for deduction under this provision,  it is an essential condition that the residential unit be constructed  on a maximum built-up area of 1000 sq ft where such residential  unit is situated within the cities of Delhi and Mumbai or within 25  

                                                           116 (2015) 7 SCC 579

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km from the municipal limits of these cities and 1500 sq ft at any  other place.  

26.5. It is the cardinal principle of interpretation that a  construction resulting in unreasonably harsh and absurd results  must be avoided.  

26.6. Clause (d) makes it clear that a housing project includes  shops and commercial establishments also. But from the day the  said provision was inserted, they wanted to limit the built-up area  of shops and establishments to 5% of the aggregate built-up area  or 2000 sq ft, whichever is less. However, the legislature itself  felt that this much commercial space would not meet the  requirements of the residents. Therefore, in the year 2010,  Parliament has further amended this provision by providing that  it should not exceed 3% of the aggregate built-up area of the  housing project or 5000 sq ft, whichever is higher. This is a  significant modification making complete departure from the  earlier yardstick. On the one hand, the permissible built-up area  of the shops and other commercial shops is increased from 2000  sq ft to 5000 sq ft. On the other hand, though the aggregate built- up area for such shops and establishment is reduced from 5% to  3%, what is significant is that it permits the builders to have 5000  sq ft or 3% of the aggregate built-up area, “whichever is higher”.  In contrast, the provision earlier was 5% or 2000 sq ft, “whichever  is less”.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 160. This Court in Jawarharmal (supra) and Rai Ramkrishna (supra),  

has considered the practical realities before analysing the extent of  

retrospective operation of the statute. Several decisions were cited in  

regard to conflict of interest (which are referred to in the footnote  

hereafter117) and it was urged that the rule of construction that is to be  

adopted is one of purposive interpretation.  

                                                           117 Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108  

@ 19-21; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709  

@ para 118-121; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 @ para 14-21; D. Saibaba  

v. Bar Council of India & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 186 @ para 16-18; Balram Kamanat v. Union  

of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628 para 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC  

279 @ Para 51-54; Government of Andhra Pradesh &Ors. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4  

SCC 720 Para 41 & 42.; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd.,  

(2008) 13 SCC 30 para 132-137; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 1 para  

54-67; H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301 para 43-48; State of Madhya  

Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 639 para 78-85; State of Gujarat  

& Anr. v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1: para 96-98).

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In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013  

161. The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011  

(Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament.  The provisions  

of Section 24, as introduced in the said Bill, read as under:  

"24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any  case where a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition  Act, LA was issued before the commencement of this Act but the  award under section 11 thereof has not been made before such  commencement, the process shall be deemed to have lapsed and  the appropriate Government shall initiate the process for  acquisition of land afresh in accordance with the provisions of  this Act.    (2) Where possession of land has not been taken, regardless of  whether the award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,  LA Act has been made or not, the process for acquisition of land  shall also be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate  Government shall initiate the process of acquisition afresh in  accordance with the provisions of this Act."  

 162. It is apparent from Section 24(1), as introduced originally,  

contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made,  

but it was later on amended, and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a),  

there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case  

award has not been passed.  The earlier Section 24(2) contained only  

the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been  

taken.  Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed  

that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse.  

Clause 24 of Notes on clauses of Bill read thus:  

“Clause 24 seeks to provide that land acquisition process under  the Land Acquisition Act, LA shall be deemed to have lapsed in  certain cases where the award has not been made and  possession of land has not been taken before the commencement  of proposed legislation."  

151    

163. After considering the various suggestions of the State  

Government, the Committee made some recommendations, which are  

extracted hereunder:  

“16.5  The Committee note that Clause 24 of the Bill provides that  land acquisition cases/process shall be invalid on enactment of  the new Act in cases where Collector has not given award or  possession of the land has not been taken before the  commencement of the proposed legislation.  Some of the  representatives of the industry and also the Ministries like  Railways and Urban Development submitted before the  Committee that land acquisition proceedings already initiated  under the existing Land Acquisition, LA should not lapse as it  would lead to time and cost over-run in many infrastructural  projects.  However, in such cases land compensation and R&R  benefits could be allowed as per the provisions of LARR Bill.  The  Committee would like the Government to re-examine the issue  and incorporate necessary provisions in the Rules to be framed  under the new Act with a view to ensuring that the land  owners/farmers/affected families get enhanced compensation  and R & R package under the provisions of the LARR Bill, 2011  and at the same time, the pace of implementation of  infrastructural projects is not adversely impacted."  

 164. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during  

the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question  

why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition  

has not been completed.  Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at  

the relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective part with  

respect to Section 24 thus:  

“… The hon’ble member has also raised question about  

retrospective clause.  This is about section 24 under  which it has been provided that if the award has not  been passed under the previous law than the new law  will be applicable.  Secondly, if the award has been  passed and no compensation has been given and no  physical possession has been taken the new law will  be applicable.  The third situation where this clause will  

be applicable is when award has been passed but  farmer has not been given more than 50 per cent  compensation which will entail enforcement of this law.   The hon’ble member and several others have raised

152    

this apprehension that this Act will ultimately give vast  powers to the bureaucracy.  In regard to this  apprehension I would like to say that we have fixed  time limit at every level of the procedure and I hope that  the states will adhere to these timelines.”   

(emphasis supplied)    165. It is clear that while replying to the debate, the Minister concerned  

has stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession has not  

been taken and compensation has not been paid.  The emphasis right  

from the beginning was on possession.  Thus, from the perusal of debate  

too, it is apparent that the word "or" had been understood as “and”.  

In Re: Objectives of the Act  

 166. It was submitted on behalf of the landowners that the  

consideration of difficulties, harsh consequences, the importance of  

performance, time lost during litigation, revival of stale claims would  

not permit deviation from the mandate of the law of Section 24. If  

obligations are mandatory, then also intendment of the Act cannot be  

defeated. As such, it is the duty of the court to disregard such factors  

and to give contextual interpretation to the intendment. The language  

of the statute, wherever the context requires, its objects and reasons,  

the Preamble, its legislative history as well as the accompanying  

provisions (including the relevant provisions of the old Act) are to be  

considered by the court. In Arnit Das v. State of Bihar118, the court  

observed that the ambiguity in the definition of “juvenile” is to be  

resolved by taking into consideration the Preamble and the statement  

                                                           118 2000 (5) SCC 488

153    

of objects and reasons. Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India119 and  

A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti120. During the  

hearing, the State had also relied on other decisions to say that where  

the issue had attained finality, relief ought not to be granted.121 The Act  

of 2013 has been enacted considering the difficulties caused by the  

operation of the earlier laws and to subserve the public interest. Thus,  

the Court should interpret it in the context of the attendant  

circumstances. At the same time, the court should not, while ostensibly  

adopting a purposive or liberal interpretation, affect matters which have  

become final, or stale. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. (supra) this  

aspect, in the context of limitation provisions, was highlighted in the  

following terms:  

“16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may  harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all  its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power  to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The  statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a  particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving  full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which  means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such  a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is  not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a  statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an  evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what  it considers a distress resulting from its operation.”  

                                                           119 1962 (1) SCR 44  120 1955 SCR 1196  121 Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258, Padma Sundara Rao  (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors., 2002 (3) SCC 533; Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors.  

v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., 2013 (10) SCC 765; B. Premanand & Ors. v.  

Mohan Koikal & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 266 and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)  

Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111

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In Re: proviso to Section 24(2)  

 167. In reference to the question whether the proviso is part of section  

24(2) or Section 24(1), it was submitted on behalf of the acquiring  

authorities and the States that the proviso needs to be read along with  

the main provision of section 24(2) and cannot be read with section  

24(1)(b). It was pointed out that this Court has taken the view in Delhi  

Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors., (2018) 14 SCC 161  

that the proviso should be read as part of section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013, cannot be construed as proviso to section 24(1)(b) whereas in  

Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors. (supra), a  

different view has been taken while referring the matter, and it has been  

observed that it should be treated as a proviso to section 24(1)(b) and  

not to section 24(2). As the interpretation of section 24(2) is involved in  

the matter, it is absolutely necessary to socio-justice and whether the  

proviso is part of section 24(2) or has to be read as an independent  

provision or it has to be treated as part of the proviso to section 24(1)(b),  

the question is required to be decided as it arises for the purpose of the  

very provisions of section 24(2).  

 168. It was submitted that the statutory provisions are to be read as  

they exist. Relocation of a proviso by the interpretive process, resulting  

in its placement at a different place is a drastic judicial measure which  

can be adopted in rarest of rare cases, and such an exercise may  

amount to encroaching upon the legislative field or causing violence to

155    

the plain language used by the legislature. By the proviso, Parliament  

has tried to balance the competitive new rights, and the proviso cannot  

be lifted and bodily placed at a different place. It was also submitted on  

behalf of the acquiring authorities that as the Section 24(1(b) ends with  

a 'full stop' (.) Section 24 (2) ends with a colon (:). These punctuation  

marks leave no room for any doubt that Parliament consciously used  

the proviso as an exception to section 24(2). The placement of the  

proviso needs no further comparative rules of interpretation. There is a  

very clear indication of legislative intent in section 24(2) itself.  

Punctuation plays a vital role in interpretation if some ambiguity is  

there in its interpretation. It is argued that punctuations play a very  

important role in interpreting statutes if some ambiguity is raised in its  

interpretation. Considering the use of a particular punctuation mark is  

an accepted method of statutory interpretation.  

 169. Considering the use of punctuation marks, as a statutory mode of  

interpretation, full stop means the particular sentence ends and stands  

detached from the next part.  It was also submitted that the proviso is  

to be read together with the main provision to which it is attached.  

 170. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the landowners  

that the proviso does not refer to the main factors of lapse under section  

24(2).  The proviso is not an exemption from lapsing if it is read as part  

of Section 24(2), then the absurd consequences would follow. The  

proviso is in accord with section 24(1)(b) and has to be read as part of

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it. Reliance has been placed on D.D.A. v. Virendra Lal Bahri & Ors.  

(supra). It was submitted that the proviso could not have been intended  

to be part of section 24(2) dealing with lapsing of acquisition where the  

subject-matter of the proviso is wholly unrelated to physical possession  

of the land, but only relating to compensation not being deposited. It  

was also submitted that if the proviso is read with section 24(2),  

arbitrary results will follow. The proviso would be arbitrary and liable to  

be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case notification  

under section 4 applies only to a single plot of land or single owner, the  

conditions of section 24(2) are not fulfilled acquisition would lapse, and  

in a case where several pieces of land have been acquired, if  

compensation in respect of majority landholdings has not been  

deposited, such acquisition will not lapse, but only higher  

compensation under the Act of 2013 would be paid. The words “award  

being made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act” are  

absent in the proviso. Reading these words to proviso would do violence  

to the literal language, and its plain meaning proviso and being a  

beneficial provision must be construed in the way which furthers its  

performance. It was also submitted that in respect of large chunks of  

land carved out by the same notification, the compensation in respect  

of the majority of landholdings has been deposited. In such a case no  

lapse will take place because the proviso in such a case will not apply  

and whether in respect of the majority of landholdings, compensation

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has or has not been deposited, would have no bearing on the issue  

whether lapsing does or does not take place under section 24(2).  

With respect to the proviso, various questions arise for consideration.    

(a) Interpretation:  

171. The main question is whether under the scheme of section 24 the  

proviso is treated as part of Section 24(1)(b) or it is part of the exception  

carved out in section 24(2) particularly in view of the fact that the word  

'or' has been interpreted by us as 'and.' In that context, when Delhi  

Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors122 as well as when  

the question was considered in Delhi Development Authority v. Virender  

Lal Bahri & Ors., [SLP [C] No.37375/2016], the question did not come  

up for consideration in any of the matters whether ‘or’ in two negative  

conditions in Section 24(2) has to be read conjunctively or disjunctively.  

When we read the word “or” as 'and' in the main part of section 24(2), it  

is clear that the proviso has to stay as part of section 24(2) where it has  

been placed by the legislature, and only then it makes sense. If 'or' used  

in-between two negative conditions of 'possession has not been taken' or  

'compensation has not been paid,' disjunctively, in that case, the proviso  

cannot be operative and would become otiose and would make no sense  

as part of Section 24(2). In case of amount not having been paid the  

acquisition has to lapse, though possession (of the land) has been taken  

would not be the proper interpretation of the main part as mentioned  

                                                           122 (2018) 14 SCC 161

158    

above, when “or” is read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for lapse  

in a case where possession has not been taken, nor compensation has  

been paid, in such a case proviso becomes operative in given exigency  

of not depositing amount with respect to majority of landholdings.  

172. A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been  

taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall  

not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with  

respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the  

beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification  

under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation  

under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals  

with failure to take physical possession but also failure to make  

payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is  

lapse of the acquisition proceeding. But where payment has been made  

though possession has been taken or payment has been made to some  

of the persons but not to all, and it has also not been deposited as  

envisaged in the proviso, in that event all beneficiaries (under the same  

award) shall get higher compensation. This is because once possession  

is been taken, there can be no lapse of the proceedings, and higher  

compensation is intended on failure to deposit the compensation. Once  

an award has been passed and possession has been taken, there is  

absolute vesting of the land, as such higher compensation follows under  

the proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a case where both the

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negative conditions have not been fulfilled, as mentioned in section  

24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso, in our opinion is a wholesome  

provision and is, in fact, a part of section 24(2); it fits in the context of  

section 24(2) as deposit is related with the payment of compensation  

and lapse is provided due to non-payment along with not taking  

possession for five years or more whereas for non-deposit higher  

compensation is provided. Thus, when one of the conditions has been  

satisfied in case payment has been made, or possession has not been  

taken, there is no lapse of the proceedings as both the negative  

conditions must co-exist.  

 173. When we consider the provisions of section 24(1)(b) where an  

award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894, then such  

proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act as if it  

has not been repealed. The only exception carved out is the period of 5  

years or more and that too by providing a non-obstante clause in  

Section 24(2) to anything contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante  

clause qualifies the proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as  

part of Section 24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b).  In our  

opinion, Section 24(1)(b) is a self-contained provision, and is also a part  

of the non-obstante clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided  

in sub-section (1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a  

non-obstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation is  

to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not under

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the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception to section 24(1)(b)  

and the proviso is also an exception which fits in with non-obstante  

clause of Section 24 (2) only. Any other interpretation will be derogatory  

to the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the  

pending proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had  

not been repealed, that would include the part relating to compensation  

too. Even if there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only  

higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). Section 24(2) deals  

with the award having been made five years or before the  

commencement of the new Act. The legislative history also indicates/it  

was intended that five years' period should be adequate to make  

payment of compensation and to take possession. In that spirit, the  

proviso has been carved out as part of section 24(2). Thus when  

Parliament has placed it at a particular place, by a process of reasoning,  

there can be no lifting and relocation of the provision. To bodily lift it  

would be an impermissible exercise. Unless it produces absurd results  

and does not fit in the scheme of the Act and the provisions to which it  

is attached such an interpretation, doing violence to the express  

provision, is not a legitimate interpretative exercise. There is no need to  

add it as the proviso to Section 24(1)(b) as it has not been done by the  

legislature, and it makes sense where it has been placed. It need not be  

lifted.  

161    

(b) Punctuation used in Section 24(2):  

 174. Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and colon  

(:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a  

vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of  

the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-clause that  

follows logically from the text before it. We are examining this aspect of  

the colon, additionally. Though as the interpretation of the provision of  

Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its  

placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not  

Section 24(1)(b). Use of punctuation colon reinforces our conclusion and  

punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory  

interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes  

punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop after  

section 24(1)(b) expresses deliberate intent to end a particular sentence  

and detach it from the next part. With regard to the meaning of the  

punctuation colon, the University of Oxford Style Guide states as under:  

 “Use a colon to introduce a subclause which follows  logically from the text before it, is not a new concept and  depends logically on the preceding main clause. Do not use a  colon if the two parts of the sentence are not logically connected.”  

  175. The note of the University of England “Writing Correctly” has also  

been relied upon on behalf of the State of Haryana. Following discussion  

has been made:   

“Colons have a number of functions in a sentence. If you use  colons in your writing, use them sparingly, and never use a colon  more than once in any sentence.   

162    

Rule 1: Colons can be used to introduce a list, but they must  follow a complete sentence (independent clause).    Rule 2: Colons can be used to explain, summarise or extend the  meaning in a sentence by introducing a word, phrase or clause  that enlarges on the previous statement.    Rule 3: Colons are used to separate the title from the subtitle.    Rule 4: Colons can be used to introduce a quotation in formal  academic writing.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

176. It is clear that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous  

statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the  

sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the  

previous provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not  

section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows.  The colon proves,  

explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes it. In case  

the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after section 24(1(b), section 24(2)  

will end with a "colon," which is never done to end a provision. Certain  

decisions have been referred to saying that importance and weightage  

are to be given to punctuation marks. The earlier view was that  

punctuations were added by the proof readers, and the Acts passed by  

Parliament did not contain any punctuation. However, it was submitted  

that in the past century, the English courts realised that the drafts  

placed before the Parliament also carry punctuations and, thus, it is  

important to give meaning to the same. Bennion on Statutory  

Interpretation has this to say regarding punctuation marks:   

“16.8 Punctuation is a part of an Act and may be considered in  construing a provision. It is usually of little weight, however, since  the sense of an Act should be the same with or without its  punctuation.

163    

…  Although punctuation may be considered, it will generally be of  little use since the sense of an Act should be the same with or  without it. Punctuation is a device not for making meaning, but  for making meaning plain. Its purpose is to denote the steps that  ought to be made in oral reading and to point out the sense. The  meaning of a well-crafted legislative proposition should not turn  on the presence or absence of a punctuation mark."     

 177. In Marshall v. Cottingham123 [1982] Ch 82 at 88, at 12 while  

referring to the change of position and establishing that punctuation  

may be used in interpretation, it was held that:  

“the day is long past when the courts would pay no heed to  punctuation in an Act of Parliament.”  

In Hanlon v Law Society124  it was held as under :   “… not to take account of punctuation disregards the reality  that literate people, such as parliamentary draftsmen, punctuate  what they write, if not identically, at least in accordance with  grammatical principles. Why should not other literate people,  such as judges, look at the punctuation in order to interpret the  meaning of the legislation as accepted by parliament?”  Yet again in Houston v Burns125, it was held that:    “Punctuation is a rational part of English composition and is  sometimes quite significantly employed. I see no reason for  depriving legal documents of such significance as attaches to  punctuation in other writings.”  

 178. Other decisions were also cited.126  On similar lines, the American  

approach to the interpretation of punctuations is different. In Taylor v.  

Caribou127 , it was held as under:  

 “We are aware that it has been repeatedly asserted by courts  and jurists that punctuation is no part of a statute, and that it  ought not to be regarded in construction. This rule in its origin  was founded upon common sense, for in England until 1849  statutes were entrolled upon parchment and enacted without  punctuation …. Such a rule is not applicable to conditions where,  as in this State, a bill is printed and is on the desk of every  member of the Legislature, punctuation and all, before its final  

                                                           123 [1981] 3 All ER 8  124 [1981] AC 124 at 197  125 [1910] AC 337 at 348  126 Dingmar v. Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information Commissioner and  

another (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524  127 102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907)

164    

passage. There is no reason why punctuation, which is intended  to and does assist in making clear and plain the meaning of all  things else in the English language, should be rejected in the case  of the interpretation of statutes. “Cessante ratione legis cessat  ipso lex.” Accordingly we find that it has been said that in  interpreting a statute punctuation may be resorted to when other  means fail …; that it may aid its construction …; that by it the  meaning may often be determined; that it is one of the means of  discovering the legislative intent …; that it may be of material  assistance in determining the legislative intention….”                   (emphasis supplied)  

In Aswini Kumar Ghose (supra) stated that:  

“Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a  statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English courts.  Cockburn, C.J. said in Stephenson v. Taylor: “On the Parliament  Roll there is no punctuation and we therefore are not bound by  that in the printed copies.” It seems, however, that in the Vellum  copies printed since 1850 there are some cases of punctuation,  and when they occur they can be looked upon as a sort of  contemporanea expositio. When a statute is carefully punctuated  and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should  undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. I need not deny that  punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot  certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be  allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.    *********       *******  

“77. The High Court has rejected the contention of the petitioner  Aswini Kumar Ghosh on two grounds. In the first place it has  been said that the comma was no part of the Act. That the  orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that punctuation  formed no part of the statute appears quite clearly from the  observations of Willes, J. in Claydon v. Green. Vigorous  expression was given to this view also by Lord Esher, M.R. in  Duke of Devonshire v. Connor where he said:  

“In an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets  any more than there are such things as stops.”  

This view was also adopted by the Privy Council in the matter of  interpretation of Indian statutes as will appear from the  observations of Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v.  Murtunjoy Singh, namely, that “it is an error to rely on  punctuation in construing Acts of the legislature”. Same opinion  was expressed by the Privy Council in Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen. If,  however, the Rule regarding the rejection of punctuation for the  purposes of interpretation is to be regarded as of imperfect  obligation and punctuation is to be taken at least as  contemporanea expositio, it will nevertheless have to be  disregarded if it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. If  punctuation is without sense or conflicts with the plain meaning  of the words, the court will not allow it to cause a meaning to be  placed upon the words which they otherwise would not have.  This leads me to the second ground on which mainly the High  Court rejected the plea of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh,

165    

namely, that the word “other” in the phrase “any other law” quite  clearly connects the Indian Bar Councils Act with other laws as  alternatives and subjects both to the qualification contained in  the adjectival clause. I find myself in complete agreement with  the High Court on this point. If the intention was that the  adjectival clause should not qualify the Indian Bar Councils Act,  then the use of the word “other” was wholly in apposite and  unnecessary. The use of that word unmistakably leads to the  conclusion that the adjectival clause also qualifies something  other than “other law”. If the intention were that the Indian Bar  Councils Act should remain unaffected by the qualifying phrase  and should be superseded in toto for the purposes of this Act the  legislature would have said “or in any law regulating the  conditions etc.” It would have been yet simpler not to refer to the  Indian Bar Councils Act at all and to drop the adjectival clause  and to simply say “Notwithstanding anything contained in any  law”. In the light of the true meaning of the title of the Act as I  have explained above and having regard to the use of the word  “other” I have no hesitation in holding,   

in agreement with the High Court, that what the non obstante  clause intended to exclude or supersede was not the whole of the  Indian Bar Councils Act but to exclude or supersede that Act and  any other law only insofar as they or either of them purported to  regulate the conditions subject to which a person not entered in  the roll of advocates of a High Court might be permitted to practise  in that High Court and that the comma, if it may at all be looked  at, must be disregarded as being contrary to this plain meaning  of the statute.”  

 179. In Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra) this court held that:  

“42. The general jurisdiction of the High Courts is dealt with in  Entry 11-A under the caption “administration of justice”, which  has a wide meaning and includes administration of civil as well  as criminal justice. The expression “administration of justice” has  been used without any qualification or limitation wide enough to  include the “powers” and “jurisdiction” of all the courts except the  Supreme Court. The semicolon (;) after the words “administration  of justice” in Entry 11-A has significance and meaning. The other  words in the same entry after “administration of justice” only  speak in relation to “constitution” and “organisation” of all the  courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts. It follows that  under Entry 11-A the State Legislature has no power to constitute  and organise the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is an  accepted principle of construction of a Constitution that  everything necessary for the exercise of powers is included in the  grant of power. The State Legislature being an appropriate body  to legislate in respect of “administration of justice” and to invest  all courts within the State including the High Court with general  jurisdiction and powers in all matters, civil and criminal, it must  follow that it can invest the High Court with such general  jurisdiction and powers including the territorial and pecuniary  jurisdiction and also to take away such jurisdiction and powers  from the High Court except those, which are specifically conferred  under the Constitution on the High Courts. It is not possible to say

166    

that investing the City Civil Court with unlimited jurisdiction,  taking away the same from the High Court, amounts to dealing  with “constitution” and “organisation” of the High Court. Under  Entry 11-A of List III the State Legislature is empowered to  constitute and organise City Civil Court and while constituting  such court the State Legislature is also empowered to confer  jurisdiction and powers upon such courts inasmuch as  “administration of justice” of all the courts including the High  Court is covered by Entry 11-A of List III, so long as Parliament  does not enact law in that regard under Entry 11-A. Entry 46 of  the Concurrent List speaks of the special jurisdiction in respect of  the matters in List III. Entry 13 in List III is “… Code of Civil  Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution …”. From  Entry 13 it follows that in respect of the matters included in the  Code of Civil Procedure and generally in the matter of civil  procedure Parliament or the State Legislature, as provided by  Article 246(2) of the Constitution, acquire the concurrent  legislative competence. The 1987 Act deals with pecuniary  jurisdiction of the courts as envisaged in the Code of Civil  Procedure and as such the State Legislature was competent to  legislate under Entry 13 of List III for enacting the 1987 Act.  

68. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in  Rajinder Singh v. Kultar Singh AIR 1980 P&H 1, touching the  same topic stated thus: (AIR p. 1)  

“So far as the High Courts are concerned, the topic of jurisdiction  and powers in general is not separately mentioned in any of the  entries of List I, but ‘administration of justice’ as a distinct topic  finds a place in Entry 3 of List II (now Entry 11-A of List III).  

The expression ‘administration of justice’ occurring in Entry 3 of  List II of the VIIth Schedule has to be construed in its widest sense  so as to give power to the State Legislature to legislate on all  matters relating to administration of justice.  

After the words 'administration of justice' in Entry 3 there is a  semicolon, and this punctuation cannot be discarded as being  inappropriate. The punctuation has been put with a definite  object of making this topic as distinct and not having relation only  to the topic that follows thereafter. Under Entry 78 of List I, the  topic of jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts is not dealt  with. Under Entry 3 of List II the State Legislature can confer  jurisdiction and powers or restrict or withdraw the jurisdiction  and powers already conferred on any of the courts except the  Supreme Court, in respect of any statute. Therefore, the State  Legislature has the power to make a law with respect to the  jurisdiction and powers of the High Court.”  

 180. There are several other decisions, which support the proposition  

that punctuation marks, especially colons have a significant role in the  

interpretation of words in a statute. These judgments include Falcon

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Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka128. It was submitted that the semicolon  

after the word “cotton” did not mean that the first part of the section  

was disjunctive from “such produce” as has been subjected to any  

physical, chemical or other process. It was further submitted that  

punctuation is not a safe tool in construction of statute and if the first  

part of the section is read as disjunctive from the other part it conflicts  

with Sl. No. 2 in the Second Schedule. Further it was submitted that  

definition section which is the interpretation clause to the statute  

begins with the expression “unless the context otherwise requires”. This  

court held that:  

“11. We do not find any substance in the submission of the  learned counsel for the appellant that the semicolon after the  word “cotton” does not mean that the first part of the section is  disjunctive from “such produce” as has been subjected to any  physical, chemical or other process. Section 2(A)(1) is in two parts,  it excludes two types of food from agricultural produce. According  to us, the definition of the agricultural and horticultural produce  does not say as to what would be included in the agricultural or  horticultural produce, in substance it includes all agricultural or  horticultural produce but excludes, (1) tea, coffee, rubber,  cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton from the definition of the  agricultural or horticultural produce though all these products as  per dictionary meaning or in common parlance would be  understood as agricultural produce; and (2) “such produce as has  been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for  being made fit for consumption”, meaning thereby that the  agricultural produce other than what has been excluded, which  has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for  making it fit for consumption would also be excluded from the  definition of the agricultural or horticultural produce except where  such agricultural produce is merely cleaned, graded, sorted or  dried. For example, if the potatoes are cleaned, graded, sorted or  dried, they will remain agricultural produce but in case raw  potato is subjected to a process and converted into chips for  human consumption it would cease to be agricultural produce for  the purposes of the Entry Tax Act. The words “such produce” in  the second part do not refer to the produce which has already  been excluded from the agricultural or horticultural produce but  refer to such other agricultural produce which has been subjected  

                                                           128 (2006) 6 SCC 530

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to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for  human consumption.”  

  The other judgment cited was State of Gujarat v. Reliance  

Industries Ltd.129 With respect to ‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi  

in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition discussed the issue thus:  

“The Stop. – The most important punctuation mark is the period  or full stop.  It has to be placed at the end of a complete sentence  which is neither exclamatory nor interrogatory.  Of course, in  legislative drafting exclamatory or interrogative sentences will  not occur.  An incomplete sentence should however end with a  dash.  It should be noticed carefully whether the final stop should  be inside or outside the quotes.  One can tell easily by the sense.  

Colon. – It implies that what follows explains and amplifies the  sentence that comes before it.  It is generally used before a  quotation, or to take the place of some word such as “namely”.”  

181. Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr (supra) also dealt with full stops and  

held that as long as punctuation does not detract from the meaning of  

the words in the text, it can be a controlling factor in interpretation.  In  

State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors130, this court  

observed that grammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace  

of life and sometimes are used both as a matter of convenience and of  

meaningfulness.  Besides, how far a clause which follows upon a comma  

governs every clause that precedes the comma is a matter not free from  

doubt.  This Court observed that:  

“5. Since the sole question for consideration arising out of the FIR,  as laid, is whether the accused are conducting a money  circulation scheme, it is necessary to understand what is  comprehended within the statutory meaning of that expression.  Section 2(c) of the Act provides:  

“2. (c) ‘money circulation scheme’ means any scheme, by  whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy money, or  for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as the consideration  

                                                           129 (2017) 16 SCC 28  130  (1982) 1 SCC 561

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for a promise to pay money, on any event or contingency relative  or applicable to the enrolment of members into the scheme,  whether or not such money or thing is derived from the entrance  money of the members of such scheme or periodical  subscriptions;”  

Grammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of life,  and I prefer in this case not to go merely by the commas used in  clause (c) because, though they seem to me to have been placed  both as a matter of convenience and of meaningfulness, yet, a  more thoughtful use of commas and other gadgets of punctuation  would have helped make the meaning of the clause clear beyond  controversy. Besides, how far a clause which follows upon a  comma governs every clause that precedes the comma is a matter  not free from doubt. I, therefore, consider it more safe and  satisfactory to discover the true meaning of clause (c) by having  regard to the substance of the matter as it emerges from the object  and purpose of the Act, the context in which the expression is  used and the consequences necessarily following upon the  acceptance of any particular interpretation of the provision, the  contravention of which is visited by penal consequences.”  

 182. The present case involves placement of colon preceding to the  

Proviso to Section 24 (2) and not Section 24 (1), which ends with a full  

stop, and it makes sense and the true meaning where Parliament has  

placed it. The proviso is part of section 24(2). It is not permissible to  

alter the provision and to read it as a proviso to section 24(1)(b), mainly  

when it makes sense where Parliament so placed it. To read the proviso  

as part of section 24(1)(b), will create repugnancy which the provisions  

contained in section 24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided  

to complete the acquisition proceedings where the award has been  

passed, and the provisions of the Act of 1894 shall be applied as if it  

has not been repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non-obstante clause;  

it plainly is notwithstanding Section 24 (1), and the proviso to section  

24(2) enlarges the scope of section 24(2). When the window period has  

been provided under section 24(1)(b), i.e., section 24(2) and its proviso,  

higher compensation cannot follow in case of an award which has been

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passed within 5 years of the enactment of the Act of 2013 otherwise  

anomalous results shall accrue. In case proviso is read as a part of  

section 24(1)(b), it would be repugnant to the consideration of the  

provision which has been carved out saving acquisition and providing  

window period of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings. There  

were cases under the Act of 1894, in which award may have been made  

in December 2013, a few days before the Act was enforced on 1.1.2014.  

As the provisions of the Act of 1894 are applicable to such awards,  

obviously notice of the award has to be given under Section 12 of the  

said Act. There is no question of outright deposit. In such event as the  

deposit is to be made when the Collector is prevented by the exigencies  

specified in Section 31(2) from making payment.  The deposit is not  

contemplated directly either in the court or the treasury, as the case  

may be as provided in section 31(2), corresponding to section 77(2) of  

the Act of 2013.  

 183. The proviso relates to the non-payment.  Compensation is  

deposited when the Collector is prevented from making payment.  It is  

the obligation made under section 31(1) to tender the amount and pay  

unless prevented by the contingencies specified in section 31(2). Thus,  

the deposit has a co-relation with the expression "payment has not been  

made," and the proviso makes sense with Section 24 (2) only. In case of  

non-payment or prevention from payment, compensation is required to

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be deposited as the case may be in the Reference Court or otherwise in  

Treasury, if permissible.  

184. The proviso uses the expression that the amount is to be deposited  

in the account of beneficiaries. Earlier under the Act of 1894, there was  

no such provision for depositing the amount in the bank account of  

beneficiaries but the method which was used as per the forms which  

were prescribed to deposit the amount, it was credited to the Reference  

Court or in the Treasury in the names of the beneficiaries and as against  

the award.  It was not a separate account but an account of the  

Reference Court or set apart in the treasury. The proviso has to be  

interpreted and given the meaning with Section 24(2) as an amount was  

required to be paid and on being prevented had to be deposited as  

envisaged under the Act of 1894.  

185. If we hold that even if the award has been passed within 5 years  

and the compensation amount has not been deposited with respect to  

such an award passed in the window period, higher compensation to  

follow if it is not deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings  

would amount to re-writing the statute. The provision of section 24(1)(a)  

is clear if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow.  

No lapse is provided.  In case award has been passed within the window  

period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation  

would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to section 24(1) is

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created by the non-obstante clause in section 24(2) by providing that in  

case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then  

there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher  

compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the  

amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the  

holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were  

holding land on the date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso  

is added, section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section  

24(1)(b) providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which  

is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to  

explain it.  It is not to cause repugnancy with the main provision. The  

function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled  

proposition of law that the proviso cannot travel beyond the provision  

to which it is attached. The proviso would travel beyond the Act of 1894  

as it is the intention of section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the  

Act of 1894. Thus, the proviso has no space to exist with section  

24(1)(b), and it has rightly not been attached by Parliament, with  

Section 24(2) and has been placed at the right place where it should  

have been.   

186. It is in the cases where there is no lapse under section 24(2) if  

either step has been taken proviso operates to provide higher  

compensation. In the cases where possession has been taken, but the  

amount has not been deposited as required under the proviso, higher

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compensation to all the beneficiaries has to follow as once possession  

has been taken, the land is vested in the State and payment is necessary  

for any acquisition. As such, Parliament has provided in such cases  

higher compensation to follow as envisaged in the proviso to section  

24(2). Lapse of acquisition is provided only in the exigencies where  

possession has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid in the  

proceedings for acquisition pending as on the date on which the Act of  

2013 came into force, then the State Government has to initiate fresh  

proceedings if it so desires. The proviso is part of the scheme of section  

24(2), and the entire provision of section 24(2), including the proviso,  

operates when inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as  

contemplated therein.  

187. The fundamental consideration is that the proviso cannot  

supersede the main provision of section 24(1)(b) and destroy it. The  

function of the proviso is to except out the pressing provisions to which  

it is attached. In case possession has been taken, but only a few  

beneficiaries have been paid, there is no lapse. Even if nobody has been  

paid, there is no lapse once possession has been taken. In case  

compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the  

holdings, there is no lapse, but higher compensation to all the  

beneficiaries has to follow. The provision provides equal treatment to  

all, not only to a few- and, in effect, is similar to Section 28A of the Act  

of 1894- in case the obligation to pay or deposit has not been discharged

174    

and there is no arrangement of money to discharge the obligation either  

by paying or depositing in the Reference Court and, if permissible, in  

the treasury. Section 24(2) saves land which has been vested in the  

State, once award has been passed and possession of land. However, in  

case compensation has not been deposited with respect to majority of  

landowners, in any given award, all beneficiaries have to be paid higher  

compensation under the new Act.  

188. It was urged that section 24(1) and 24(2) deal with different  

subjects. It was submitted that Section 24(1) deals with compensation,  

whereas section 24(2) deals with the lapsing of the acquisition. We are  

unable to accept the submission. Section 24(2) also deals with payment  

of compensation and taking of possession. Section 24(1)(a) is  

concerning a situation where no award has been made, higher  

compensation under the new Act to follow. In section 24(1)(b) where the  

award is made (at the time of coming into force of the new Act) further  

proceedings would be under the new law; subject to Section 24(2), the  

provisions of the Act of 1894 would apply to such an award.  Thus, the  

main part of section 24(2) deals with payment of compensation; also the  

proviso which provides for higher compensation to be paid to all is in  

the context of section 24(2) and cannot be lifted and added to Section  

24(1)(b) in the aforesaid circumstances. What would be the majority of  

the landholdings has to be seen in the context, what has been acquired  

in the case of a single plot being acquired, and in case compensation

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has not been deposited with respect to that, it will constitute the  

majority. The majority does not depend upon the number of holdings  

acquired, but what constitutes the majority as per the acquired area  

under the notification.  

 189. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no award is made in a pending  

acquisition proceeding; in such event all provisions of the new Act  

relating to determination of compensation would apply. Section 24 (1)  

(b) logically continues with the second situation, i.e. where the award  

has been passed, and states that in such event, proceedings would  

continue under the Act of 1894. Section 24 (2) – by way of an exception,  

states that where an award is made but requisite steps have not been  

taken for five years or more to take possession nor compensation has  

been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of the steps has been  

taken, then the proviso can operate. Time is the essence. It is on the  

basis of time-lag that the lapse is provided and in default of payment  

for five years as provided on failure to deposit higher compensation is  

to be paid. It is based on that time-lag higher compensation has to  

follow. It is not the mere use of colon under section 24(2) but the  

placement of the proviso next to Section 24 (2) and not below Section  

24(1)(b). Thus, it is not permissible to alter a placement of proviso more  

so when it is fully in consonance with the provisions of section 24(2).   

Section 24(2) completely obliterates the old regime to the effect of its  

field of operation. Under section 24(1)(a), there is a partial lapse of the

176    

old regime because all proceedings, till the stage of award are preserved.  

The award, in such proceedings, made after coming into force of the Act  

of 2013 has to take into account its provisions, for determination of  

compensation. Thus, proceedings upto the stage of the award are  

deemed final under the old Act. In the case under section 24(1)(b), the  

old regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to section 24(2) and in  

part the new regime for payment of higher compensation in case of  

default for 5 years or more after award.  

In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended  

190. A proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to which it  

is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which it is  

attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is  

repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. Though in  

absolute terms of a later Act. Its placement has been considered, and  

purpose has been considered in the following decisions. It was observed  

in State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors that131:  

“14.  . . . So far as a general principle of construction of a proviso  is concerned, it has been broadly stated that the function of a  proviso is to limit the main part of the section and carve out  something which but for the proviso would have been within the  operative part. ….”  

(emphasis supplied)  

  Similarly, this court in Sales-tax Officer, Circle 1, Jabalpur v.  

Hanuman Prasad132 stated that:  

“5. ….  It is well-recognised that a proviso is added to a principal  clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that  

                                                           131 1965 (1) SCR 276  132 1967 (1) SCR 831

177    

principal clause what is included in it and what the Legislature  desires should be excluded. ….”  

(emphasis supplied)  

                              In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Board of Revenue, Madras  

and Anr. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc133 it was observed:  

“8. … Generally speaking, it is true that the proviso is an  exception to the main part of the section; but it is recognised that  in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substantive provision  itself. ….”  

(emphasis supplied)  

   191. In S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors134 , the  

scope of a proviso was clarified. The relevant discussion is quoted as  

under:  

“27. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what  is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit of an Explanation  either to a proviso or to any other statutory provision. We shall  first take up the question of the nature, scope and extent of a  proviso. The well established rule of interpretation of a proviso is  that a proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a  proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main  enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for  the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In  other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main  enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real  object of the main enactment.”  

***  

“29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th Edn.)  while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned the following  ingredients:  

“P. 317. Provisos —These are clauses of exception or qualification  in an Act, excepting something out of, or qualifying something in,  the enactment which, but for the proviso, would be within it.  

P. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may  exceptionally have the effect of a substantive enactment.”  

30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-295 has  collected the following principles in regard to a proviso:  

                                                           133 AIR (1968) SC 59  134 (1985) 1 SCC 591

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(a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption  is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would  have included the subject-matter of the proviso.  

(b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding  parts of the clause to which it is appended.  

(c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso  shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the proviso  speaks the latter intention of the makers.  

(d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a  guide to its interpretation: but when it is clear, a proviso cannot  imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the  section.  

(e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section.  

(f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling  reasons.  

(g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of  abundant caution.  

(h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into  general harmony with the terms of section should prevail.  

(i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso  will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to  be read as supplemental to the earlier one.  

(j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.  ***  

35. A very apt description and extent of a proviso was given by  Lord Loreburn in Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale  Railway Co., 1909 AC 253, where it was pointed out that  insertion of a proviso by the draftsman is not always strictly  adhered to its legitimate use and at times a section worded as a  proviso may wholly or partly be in substance a fresh enactment  adding to and not merely excepting something out of or qualifying  what goes before. To the same effect is a later decision of the  same Court in Jennings v. Kelly, 1940 AC 206, where it was  observed thus:  

  “We must now come to the proviso, for there is, I think, no doubt  that, in the construction of the section, the whole of it must be  read, and a consistent meaning, if possible, given to every part of  it. The words are:... ‘provided that such licence shall be granted  only for premises situate in the ward or district electoral division  in which such increase in population has taken place...’ There  seems to be no doubt that the words “such increase in  population” refer to the increase of not less than 25 per cent of  the population mentioned in the opening words of the section.”  

36. While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that it is used  to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide  for them separately.    

37. In short, generally speaking, a proviso is intended to limit the  enacted provision so as to except something which would have  otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the  enacting clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded in the  main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount  to a substantive provision itself.

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***  

43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this  point because the legal position seems to be clearly and  manifestly well established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four  different purposes:  

(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main  enactment:  

(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of  the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be  fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable:  

(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an  integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and  colour of the substantive enactment itself; and  

 (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the  enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment  of the statutory provision.”   

(emphasis supplied)  

   192. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., has observed, with respect to the  

construction of provisos thus:  

“The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the  ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the preceding  portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein,  which but for the proviso would be within it; and such a proviso  cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment  when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing  to it that effect.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 R. v. Dibdin, 1910 P 57 (CA), held as under:  

  “The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to  seek.  It sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a  proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter  to which it stands as a proviso.  It treats it as if it were an  independent enacting clause instead of being dependent on the  main enactment. The courts … have refused to be led astray by  arguments such as those which have been addressed to us,  which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their strict  literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that  they are appearing in the proviso.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

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193. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai135, considered  

the effect of a proviso and said that its function is “to except or qualify  

something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso  

would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be presumed in construing  

a proviso that it was intended that the enacting part of the section would  

have included the subject-matter of the proviso.”  Similar observations  

and considerations weighed in Haryana State Cooperative Land  

Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Land Development  

Banks Employees Union & Anr.136 and other decisions noted below.137  

In Subhaschandra Yograj Sinha (supra) it was observed that :  

“(9) The law with regard to provisos is well settled and well  understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment  to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and  ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.  But, provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications  to the main enactment but as savings clauses, in which cases  they will not be construed as controlled by the section. The  proviso which has been added to Section 50 of the Act deals with  the effect of repeal. The substantive part of the section repealed  two Acts which were in force in the State of Bombay. If nothing  more had been said, Section 7 of the Bombay General clauses Act  would have applied, and all pending suits and proceedings  would have continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act  had not been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the  matter out of Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and  to provide for a special saving. It cannot be used to decide  whether Section 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed by  Wood, V.C., in Fitzgerald v. Champneys, (1861) 70 ER 958 that  saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses  are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights  which, but for the savings, would be lost. The proviso here saves  pending suits and proceedings, and further enacts that suits and  proceedings then pending are to be transferred to the courts  

                                                           135 1966 (1) SCR 367  136 (2004) 1 SCC 574  137 Shimbhu & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318; Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing  Co. Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., 1965 (3) SCR 626. Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil  

Mills & Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961 SC 1596; Dwarka  

Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1976 (1) SCC 128; The Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore,  

Travancore-Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 (Supp 2)  

SCR 256 In Romesh Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 510.

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designated in the Act and are to continue under the Act and any  or all the provisions of the Act are to apply to them. The learned  Solicitor-General contends that the savings clause enacted by the  proviso, even if treated as substantive law, must be taken to  apply only to suits and proceedings pending at the time of the  repeal which, but for the proviso, would be governed by the Act  repealed. According to the learned Attorney-General, the effect of  the savings is much wider, and it applies to such cases as come  within the words of the proviso, whenever the Act is extended to  new areas.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

194. In Motiram Ghelabhai v. Jagan Nagar & Ors138 , the view taken in  

Bhojraj (supra) was affirmed and applied.   It was observed that provisos  

are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main  

enactment but as savings clauses, in which case they will not be  

construed as controlled by the section. In Madhu Gopal v. VI Additional  

District Judge & Ors.139 this Court has laid down that in any event, it is  

a well-settled principle of construction that unless clearly indicated, a  

proviso would not take away substantive rights given by the section or  

the sub-section. In The King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd.140, it was  

held that where a section of an enactment contains two provisions and the  

second proviso is repugnant in any way to the first, the second proviso  

must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and speaks the last  

intention of the makers.  The following observations were made:  

“(7) Proviso 2 qualifies the main enactment in the matter of  delivery no less than does proviso 1 and it also qualifies proviso  1 itself.  For it provides “further” that “in any case where there is  no physical delivery of the goods,” the tax is to be payable when  the property in the goods passes to the purchaser.  Thus where  there is no physical delivery the notional delivery which proviso  1 introduces is rendered inapplicable.  Anger J. found in proviso  2 an alternative ground for his decision against the Crown and it  

                                                           138 (1985) 2 SCC 279  139 1988 (4) SCC 644  140 AIR (34) 1947 PC 94

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is the main ground of Hudson J.’s judgment in the Supreme Court.   In their Lordships’ view this proviso presents an insuperable  obstacle to the Crown’s claim.  There has been no physical  delivery of the goods by the Dominion Company to the Pulp  Company.  The proviso enacts that “in any case” where there has  been no physical delivery the tax is to be payable when the  property passes.  The property in the goods in question has never  passed to the Pulp Company.  Consequently the tax has nevern  become payable.  If proviso 2 is repugnant in any way to proviso  1 it must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and so to quote  Lord Tenterden C.J., “speaks the last intention of the maker”  ((1831), 2 B. & Ad. 818 at p.821).  The word is with the  respondent, the Dominion Company, and must prevail.”  

195. The proviso thus, is not foreign to compensation to be paid under  

section 24(2). It provides what is dealt with in Section 24(2) and takes  

to its logical conclusion, and provides for higher compensation, where  

there is and can be no lapsing of acquisition proceedings. The rule of  

construction- as is clear from the preceding case law discussed, is that  

the proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter in a  

clause. A proviso is ordinarily a proviso and has to be harmoniously  

construed with the provisions. In our opinion, the proviso is capable of  

being harmoniously construed with Section 24(2) and not with section  

24(1)(b), once we interpret the word 'or' as 'nor' in section 24(2).  

196. In keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid decisions, this court is  

of the considered view that the proviso cannot nullify the provision of  

Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment,  

but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing with  

matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award is not made  

[Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made but compensation is  

not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification

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(for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable  

in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013.   

197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering the placement of the  

proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2),  

considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy  

which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not  

permissible and particularly when we read the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in  

section 24(2), it has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it,  

it has not been wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is intended  

for beneficial results of higher compensation for one and all where there  

is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. Higher compensation  

is contemplated by the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried  

forward by the placement and interpretation.  

 In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid” used in  

section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to section 24(2)  

198. Connected with this issue are questions like what is the  

consequence of payment not being made under section 31(1) and what  

are the consequences of amount not deposited under section 31(2). The  

provision of section 24(2) when it provides that compensation has not  

been paid where award has been made 5 years or more prior to the  

commencement of the Act of 2013. In contradistinction to that, the  

proviso uses the expression "an award has been made and  

compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been

184    

deposited in the account of the beneficiaries". We have to find out when  

an amount is required to be deposited under the Act of 1894 and how  

the payment is made under the Act of 1894. The provisions of Section  

31 of the Act of 1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of  

section 24(2) to find out the meaning of the words 'paid' and 'deposited'.  

Section 31(1) makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has  

to be tendered to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to them.  

The payment is provided only in section 31(1). The expression ‘tender’  

and pay to them in section 31(1) cannot include the term 'deposited.'   

 199. Section 31 (2) of the Act of 1894 deals with deposit in case  

Collector is ‘prevented’ from making payment by one or more  

contingencies mentioned in section 31(2). The deposit follows if the  

Collector is prevented from making payment. In case Collector is  

prevented from making payment due to contingencies such refusal to  

receive the amount, or if there be no person competent to alienate the  

land, or if there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation  

or as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold it  

or in case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the parties  

to get a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court and to clear  

the title. In such exigencies, the amount of compensation is required to  

be deposited in the court to which reference would be submitted under  

section 18. Section 31(2) requires deposit in case of reference under

185    

section 18 and not the reference, which may be sought under section  

30 or section 28A of the Act of 1894.  

200. Section 24(2) deals with the expression where compensation has  

not been paid. It would mean that it has not been tendered for payment  

under section 31(1). Though the word 'paid' amounts to a completed  

event however once payment of compensation has been  

offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be  

penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to  

refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from  

making the payment. Thus, the word 'paid' used in section 24(2) cannot  

be said to include within its ken 'deposit' under section 31(2). For that  

special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section 24(2),  

which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of  

beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in section 24.  

In the main part of section 24, the word 'paid' and in its proviso  

'deposited' have been used.    

201. The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been dealt  

with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2), if the amount  

has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse.  

Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with  

respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act  

of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been

186    

specified in the proviso as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be read  

with it, particularly in view of the colon and placement by the legislature  

as held above. Two different consequences of non-deposit of  

compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession  

has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not  

been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case there  

is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged  

under section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9%  

per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum.  

202. The word “paid” has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean  

thus:  

“paid past and past participle of pay”; Give a sum of money thus owned.”  

Cambridge English Dictionary, defines “paid” as follows:  

“being given money for something.”  

P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advance Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005,  

uses the following definition of “paid”:  

“applied; settled: satisfied.”  

203. The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include  

in its ambit the expression "deposited" in court.  Deposit cannot be said  

to be payment made to landowners.  Deposit is on being prevented from  

payment. However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is to  

mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a  

discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such

187    

a person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment.  In  

default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of  

interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894.  Sections 32 and 33 (which  

had been relied upon by the landowners’ counsel to say that valuable  

rights inhere, in the event of deposit with court, thus making deposit  

under Section 31 mandatory) provide for investing amounts in the  

Government securities, or seeking alternative lands, in lieu of  

compensation, etc. Such deposits, cannot fetch higher interest than  

the15 per cent contemplated under Section 34, which is pari materia to  

Section 80 of Act of 2013.  Section 34 is pari materia to section 80 of  

Act of 2013 in which also the similar rate of interest has been specified.   

Even if the amount is not deposited in Reference Court nor with the  

treasury as against the name of the person interested who is entitled to  

receive it, if Collector has been prevented to make the payment due to  

exigencies provided in Section 31(2), interest to be paid.  However, in  

case the deposit is made without tendering it to the person interested,  

the liability to pay the interest under section 34, shall continue. Even  

assuming deposit in the Reference Court is taken to be mandatory, in  

that case too interest has to follow as specified in section 34. However,  

acquisition proceeding cannot lapse due to non-deposit.    

204. The concept of "deposit" is different and quite apart from the word  

“paid”, due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013.  In  

the case of non-deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher

188    

compensation would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its  

ambit word “deposited”.  To hold otherwise would be contrary to  

provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different  

consequences.  It is provided in Section 34 of Act of 1894, in case  

payment has not been tendered or paid, nor deposited the interest has  

to be paid as specified therein.  In Section 24(2) also lapse is provided  

in case amount has not been paid and possession has not been taken.   

205. In our considered opinion, there is a breach of obligation to  

deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference  

court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section  

31(2).  The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded  

proceedings.  The legal position and consequence which prevailed from  

1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and  

all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the  

provisions contained in Section 24.  It is only in the case where in a  

pending proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not  

been taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation,  

then there is a lapse under section 24(2).  In case amount has not been  

deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher  

compensation has to follow.  Both lapse and higher compensation are  

qualified with the condition of period of 5 years or more.  

 206. It was submitted that mere tender of amount is not payment.  The  

amount has to be actually paid.  In our opinion, when amount has been

189    

tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector.  Landowners  

cannot be forced to receive it.  In case a person has not accepted the  

amount wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the  

amount has remained due to his own act.  It is not open to him to  

contend that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should  

be lapse of the proceedings.  Even in a case when offer for payment has  

been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest  

subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate  

provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2).  The  

scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as  

that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894.  

207. It was urged that landowners can seek investment in an interest  

bearing account, there is no doubt about that investment can be sought  

from the court under Sections 32 and 33 of Act of 1894, but interest in  

Government securities is not more than what is provided in section 34  

at the rate of 9 percent from the date of taking possession for one year  

and thereafter, at the rate of 15 percent. We take judicial notice of the  

fact in no other Government security rate of interest is higher on the  

amount being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894.   

Higher rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of  

landowners.  It was submitted that in case the amount is deposited in  

the court, it is on behalf of the beneficiary.  The submission overlooks  

the form in which it used to be deposited in the treasury too, that

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amount is also credited in the treasury payable to the beneficiary  

specified in his name with land details, date of award, etc.  

208. There is another reason why this court holds that such an  

interpretation is reasonable and in tune with Parliamentary intent.   

Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient  

date or dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the  

event of refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as  

absence of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive  

it, no doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited  

with the court: as it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during  

the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of  

2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the  

compensation amount in court.  This is a significant aspect which none  

of the previous decisions have noticed. Thus, it would be incorrect to  

imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, under Section 31  

(2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years  

or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Such an  

interpretation would lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and  

the nullification of acquisition proceedings, long completed, by  

imposition of a norm or standard, and its application for a time when it  

did not exist.   

209. If the expression “deposited” is held to be included in the  

expression “paid” used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency

191    

and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main  

sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the  

provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal.  Even if the amount has not been  

deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to  

Section 24(2).  

210. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word "tender" has been defined to  

mean thus:   

“tender, n. (16c) 1. A valid and sufficient offer of  performance; specific, an unconditional offer of money or  performance to satisfy a debt or obligation a tender of  delivery. The tender may save the tendering party from a penalty  for non-payment or non-performance or may, if the other party  unjustifiably refuses the tender, place the other party in  default. Cf. OFFER OR PERFORMANCE; CONSIGNATION.”  

211. It is apparent that “tender” of the amount saves the party  

tendering it from the consequence to be visited on non-payment of the  

amount.  The obligation to make the payment has been considered in  

various other laws and decisions.  When obligation to payment is  

fulfilled as to the scheme in the context of a particular act, for that  

purpose, decisions under various other laws are relevant and cannot be  

said to be irrelevant.  

 212. In The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v.  

Gobind141 , this Court considered the provisions requiring payment of  

one month’s wage under Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act for  

                                                           141 1962 (Supp 3) SCR 318

192    

making a valid discharge or dismissal.  This Court has held that the  

employer has tendered the wages and that would amount for payment,  

otherwise a workman can make the provision unworkable by refusing  

to take the wages.  This Court has observed thus:  

“(8) Let us now turn to the words of the proviso in the background  of what we have said above. The proviso lays down that no  workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been  paid wages for one month and an application has been made by  the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is  pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. It will  be clear that two kinds of punishment are subject to the  conditions of the proviso, namely, discharge or dismissal. Any  other kind of punishment is not within the proviso. Further  the proviso lays down two conditions, namely, (i) payment of  wages for one month and (ii) making of an application by the  employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending  for approval of the action taken. It is not disputed before us that  when the proviso lays down the conditions as to payment of one  month's wages, all that the employer is required to do in order to  carry out that condition is to tender the wages to the employee.  But if the employee chooses not to accept the wages he cannot  come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages  to him by the employer. Therefore, though S. 33 speaks of  payment of one month's wages it can only mean that the  employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to  payment, for otherwise a workman could always make the  section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. So far as the  second condition about the making of the application is  concerned, the proviso requires that the application should be  made for approval of the action taken by the employer.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

213. In The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The  

Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr142, a three-Judge Bench of this Court  

has laid down the law to the similar effect.  It is not actual payment, but  

tender of amount which is necessary to fulfil obligation to pay.  This  

Court observed thus:  

“4. …The proviso does not mean that the wages for one month  should have been actually paid, because in many cases the  

                                                           142 1965 (1) SCR 998

193    

employer can only tender the amount before the dismissal but  cannot force the employee to receive the payment before  dismissal becomes effective. In this case the tender was  definitely made before the order of dismissal became effective  and the wages would certainly have been paid if Hari Chand had  asked for them. There was no failure to comply with the provision  in this respect.”  

(emphasis supplied  

 214. In Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik143, it was held that the  

“the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean that wages  

have to be actually paid but if wages are tendered or offered, such a  

tender or offer would be sufficient compliance” with the statute. The  

Benares State Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow144,  

was decided in the context of Section 14(2)(c) of the Income Tax Act,  

1922. It was observed that "paid" under Section 16 does not  

contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the Member of the  

community.  It is to be made unconditionally available to the members  

entitled to it.  It observed thus:  

“5. …This Court observed in J. Dalmia v. Commissioner of  Income-tax, Delhi, 53 ITR 83 that the expression “paid” in Section  16(2) does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the  member: in general, dividend may be said to be paid within the  meaning of Section 16(2) when the company discharges its  liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally  available to the member entitled thereto. …”  

 215. Two different expressions have been used in Section 24(2).  The  

expression "paid" has been used in Section 24(2) and whereas in the  

proviso “deposited” has been used.  “Paid” cannot include “deposit”, or  

else Parliament would have used different expressions in the main sub-

                                                           143 (1968) 1 PLJR 94  144 (1969) 2 SCC 316

194    

section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same.  The Court  

cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain  

and literal meaning and when compensation has not been paid under  

Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as  

used in the proviso.  While interpreting the statutory provisions,  

addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible.  It is not  

open to the court to either add or subtract a word.  There cannot be any  

departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis  

Legis Non Est Recedendum”. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation  

(14th Edition) by Justice G.P. Singh, plethora of decisions have been  

referred. There is a conscious omission of the word "deposit" in Section  

24(2), which has been used in the proviso.  Parliament cannot be said  

to have used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same  

provision, whereas words "paid" and "deposited" carry a totally different  

meaning.  Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is  

made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner.  It  

may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than  

that.  Applying the rule of literal construction also natural, ordinary and  

popular meaning of the words “paid” and “deposited” do not carry the  

same meaning; the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given  

to them, as observed in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice  

G.P. Singh (at page 91) thus:  

“… Natural and grammatical meaning. The words of a statute  are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense  and phrases and sentences are construed according to their  grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or

195    

unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the  statute to suggest the contrary." "The true way", according  to LORD BROUGHAM is, "to take the words as the Legislature  have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given  naturally imply, unless where the construction of those Words is,  either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question,  controlled or alter "; and in the words of VISCOUNT HALDANE,  L.C., if the language used "has a natural meaning we cannot  depart from that meaning unless reading the statute as a whole,  the context directs us to do so. In an oft-quoted passage, LORD  WENSLEYDALE stated the Rule thus: "In construing wills and  indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and  ordinary sense of the word is adhered to, unless that would lead  to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the  rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and  ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that  absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further". And stated LORD  ATKINSON: "In the construction of statutes, their words must be  interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be  something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which  they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to  show that they were used in a special sense different from their  ordinary grammatical sense". 28 VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said:  "The golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie  be given their ordinary meaning". Natural and ordinary meaning  of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown  that the legal context in which the words are used requires a  different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by  the judges "in the light of their own views as to policy" although  they can "adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the  statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted  by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of  Parliament's purpose or policy". For a modern statement of the  rule, one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE  in a case where he said: "Parliament is prima facie to be credited  with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting  of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under  the Rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek  whenever possible to apply 'the golden rule' of construction, that  is to read the statutory language, grammatically and  terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it  bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of  course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that  when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity,  contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language  may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though  no further". The Rules stated above have been quoted with  approval by the Supreme Court.......”  

(emphasis supplied)  

216. The same work also notes that when two different expressions are  

used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they

196    

are not used in the same sense. The following passage is relevant  

(Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh at page 395):  

“.......When in relation to the same subject matter, different words  are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are  not used in the same sense.    In construing the words 'distinct matters' occurring in Section 5 of  the Stamp Act, 1899, and in concluding that these words have  not the same meaning as the words 'two or more of the  descriptions in Schedule I' occurring in Section 6, VENKATARAMA  AIYAR, J., observed: "When two words of different import are  used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be  difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense."  Similarly, while construing the word 'gain' Under Section 3(ff) of  the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which used the  words 'profit or gain', the Supreme Court relied on the dictionary  meanings of the words to hold that the word 'gain' is not  synonymous with the word 'profit' as it is not restricted to  pecuniary or commercial profits, and that any advantage or  benefit acquired or value addition made by some activities would  amount to 'gain'......."    ***14. Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union  Guardians, (1891) 2 QB 156, p. 167 (CA); Member, Board  of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall  AIR 1956 SC 35, p. 38 : 1955  (2) SCR 842; CIT v. East West Import & Export (P.) Ltd.,  Jaipur  AIR 1989 SC 836, p. 838 : (1989) 1 SCC 760; B.R.  Enterprises v. State of U.P.  AIR 1999 SC 1867, p. 1902: (1999) 9  SCC 700 ('trade and business' in Article 298 have different  meaning from 'trade and commerce' in Article 301); ShriIshal  Alloy Steels Ltd. v. JayaswalasNeco Ltd.,  JT 2001 (3) SC 114, p.  119: (2001) 3 SCC 609 : AIR 2001 SC 1161 (The words 'a bank'  and 'the bank' in Section 138 N.I. Act, 1881 do not have the same  meaning); The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Hansrajbhai v.  Kodala  AIR 2001 SC 1832, p. 1842 : (2001) 5 SCC 175; Kailash  Nath Agarwal v. Pradeshiya Indust and Inv. Corporation of  U.P.,  2003 AIR SCW 1358, p. 1365: (2003) 4 SCC 305, p. 313.  (The words 'proceeding' and 'suit' used in the same Section  construed differently); But in Paramjeet Singh Pathak v. ICDS  Ltd.,  (2006) 13 SCC 322: AIR 2007 SC 168 different view was  taken therefore in Zenith Steel Tubes v. Sicom Ltd.,  (2008) 1 SCC  533: AIR 2008 SC 451 case referred to a larger Bench; D.L.F.  Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of  Haryana,  2003 AIR SCW 1046, p. 1057: AIR 2003 SC 1648 :  (2003) 5 SCC 622 (The expressions 'at his own cost' and 'at its  cost,' used in one Section given different meanings)”  

197    

217. In Privy Council decisions in Crawford v. Spooner145 and Lord  

Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr146 following observations have been  

made:  

"… we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act,  we cannot add or mend and, by construction, makeup  deficiencies which are left there.   

…  

It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act  unless it is necessary to do so.  Similarly, it is wrong and  dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words  of the statute.  Speaking briefly the court cannot reframe the  legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to  legislate."   

218. In V.L.S. Finance Ltd. (supra) this Court observed that:  

“17. Ordinarily, the offence is compounded under the provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the power to accord  permission is conferred on the court excepting those offences for  which the permission is not required. However, in view of the non- obstante clause, the power of composition can be exercised by the  court or the Company Law Board. The legislature has conferred  the same power on the Company Law Board which can exercise  its power either before or after the institution of any prosecution  whereas the criminal court has no power to accord permission for  composition of an offence before the institution of the proceeding.  The legislature in its wisdom has not put the rider of prior  permission of the court before compounding the offence by the  Company Law Board and in case the contention of the appellant  is accepted, same would amount to addition of the words “with  the prior permission of the court” in the Act, which is not  permissible.  

18. As is well settled, while interpreting the provisions of a  statute, the court avoids rejection or addition of words and resorts  to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose  of the Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also a cardinal rule of  interpretation that words, phrases, and sentences are to be given  their natural, plain, and clear meaning. When the language is  clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in an ordinary  sense, and no addition or alteration of the words or expressions  used is permissible. As observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment  was brought in view of the need of leniency in the administration  of the Act because a large number of defaults are of technical  

                                                           145 (1846) 6 Moore PC 1  146 (1948) 2 AER 825

198    

nature, and many defaults occurred because of the complex  nature of the provision.  

(emphasis supplied)  

 219. In Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical  

Services Inc.147 , this Court observed thus:  

“65. Mr. Sorabjee has also rightly pointed out the observations  made by Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, (1980) 1 WLR  142.  In the aforesaid judgment, the House of Lords disapproved  the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in discerning the  intention of the legislature; it is observed that: (WLR p. 157 C-D)  

“… the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the  words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention  what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the  meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous, it is  not for the Judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for  failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves  consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient,  or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are  involved in industrial relations, there is room for differences of  opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally  justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on  these matters that is paramount."  

(emphasis supplied)  

In the same judgment, it is further observed: (WLR p. 157 F)  

“… But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the judiciary,  to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as  stated in the Acts….”  

(emphasis supplied)  

***  

67. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned  counsel for the appellants that the omission of the word “only”  from Section 2(2) indicates that applicability of Part I of the  Arbitration Act, 1996 is not limited to the arbitrations that take  place in India. We are also unable to accept that Section 2(2)  would make Part I applicable even to arbitrations which take  place outside India. In our opinion, a plain reading of Section 2(2)  makes it clear that Part I is limited in its application to arbitrations  which take place in India. We are in agreement with the  submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents,  and the interveners in support of the respondents, that  Parliament by limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations  which take place in India has expressed a legislative declaration.  It has clearly given recognition to the territorial principle.  Necessarily therefore, it has enacted that Part I of the Arbitration  Act, 1996 applies to arbitrations having their place/seat in India.  

***  

                                                           147 (2012) 9 SCC 552

199    

82. Another strong reason for rejecting the submission made by  the learned counsel for the appellants is that if Part I were to be  applicable to arbitrations seated in foreign countries, certain  words would have to be added to Section 2(2). The section would  have to provide that “this part shall apply where the place of  arbitration is in India and to arbitrations having its place out of  India.” Apart from being contrary to the contextual intent and  object of Section 2(2), such an interpretation would amount to a  drastic and unwarranted rewriting/alteration of the language of  Section 2(2). As very strongly advocated by Mr Sorabjee, the  provisions in the Arbitration Act, 1996 must be construed by their  plain language/terms. It is not permissible for the court while  construing a provision to reconstruct the provision. In other  words, the court cannot produce a new jacket, whilst ironing out  the creases of the old one. In view of the aforesaid, we are unable  to support the conclusions recorded by this Court as noticed  earlier.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 220. In Harbhajan Singh (supra) the following observations were made:  

“7. …. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned  to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule  — the legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it  intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as  is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result  in absurdity or anomaly or unless material — intrinsic or external  — is available to permit a departure from the rule.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

221. In The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall148 this  

Court held as under:  

“4. We are unable to accept the contention that the word  “matter” in S. 5 was intended to convey the same meaning as the  word “description” in S. 6. In its popular sense, the expression  “distinct matters” would connote something different from distinct  “categories”. Two transactions might be of the same description,  but all the same, they might be distinct.  

If A sells Black-acre to X and mortgages White-acre to Y, the  transactions fall under different categories, and they are also  distinct matters. But if A mortgages Black-acre to X and  mortgages White-acre to Y, the two transactions fall under the  same category, but they would certainly be distinct matters.  

If the intention of the legislature was that the expression  ‘distinct matters’ in S. 5 should be understood not in its popular  sense but narrowly as meaning different categories in the  Schedule, nothing would have been easier than to say so. When  two words of different import are used in a statute in two  consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they  

                                                           148 1955 (2) SCR 842,

200    

are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that  the expression “distinct matters” in S. 5 and “descriptions” in  section 6 have different connotations.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

222. In Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West  

Import and Export (P) Ltd149, it was observed as under:  

“7. The Explanation has reference to the point of time at two  places: the first one has been stated as “at the end of the previous  year” and the second, which is in issue, is “in the course of such  previous year”. Counsel for the revenue has emphasised upon the  feature that in the same Explanation reference to time has been  expressed differently and if the legislative intention was not to  distinguish and while stating “in the course of such previous  year” it was intended to convey the idea of the last day of the  previous year, there would have been no necessity of expressing  the position differently. There is abundant authority to support  the stand of the counsel for the revenue that when the situation  has been differently expressed the legislature must be taken to  have intended to express a different intention.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

Several other decisions have reiterated the same proposition, i.e  

that when the legislature uses two different expressions in the same  

statute, they must be given different meanings, to carry out legislative  

intent.150  

223. The land owners had argued that the obligation to pay gets  

discharged only when compensation is actually paid and/or deposited.   

Even if it is received under protest under Section 31(1), it is finally  

accepted by the landowners post-settlement by the Reference Court.  We  

                                                           149 (1989) 1 SCC 760  150 B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700; Kailash Nath Agarwal and  Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC  

305 (which interpreted “proceeding” and “suit” differently; In DLF Qutab Enclave Complex  

Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 (where “at his  

cost” and “at its cost” were interpreted to mean different situations.  

201    

are not able to accept the submission as Section 34 of the Act of 1894,  

is clear even if the amount is not paid or deposited, it carries interest.   

The logic behind this is that if the State is retaining the amount with  

peace and its liability to pay does not cease, but it would be liable to  

make the payment with interest as envisaged therein.  Once tender is  

made, obligation to pay is fulfilled so that the amount cannot be said to  

have been paid, but obligation to pay has been discharged and if a  

person who has not accepted it, cannot penalise the other party for  

default to pay and non-deposit carries only interest as money had been  

retained with the Government.  

 224. Thus, in our opinion, the word "paid" used in Section 24(2) does  

not include within its meaning the word “deposited”, which has been  

used in the proviso to Section 24(2). Section 31 of the Act of 1894, deals  

with the deposit as envisaged in Section 31(2) on being ‘prevented’ from  

making the payment even if the amount has been deposited in the  

treasury under the Rules framed under Section 55 or under the  

Standing Orders, that would carry the interest as envisaged under  

Section 34, but acquisition would not lapse on such deposit being made  

in the treasury.  In case amount has been tendered and the landowner  

has refused to receive it, it cannot be said that the liability arising from  

non-payment of the amount is that of lapse of acquisition.  Interest  

would follow in such a case also due to non-deposit of the amount.  

Equally, when the landowner does not accept the amount, but seeks a

202    

reference for higher compensation, there can be no question of such  

individual stating that he was not paid the amount (he was determined  

to be entitled to by the collector). In such case, the landowner would be  

entitled to the compensation determined by the Reference court.     

 In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing Orders  

issued by State Governments  

225. It was urged on behalf of acquiring Authorities that various State  

Governments have framed rules under Section 55 of the Act of 1894  

and/or have issued the Standing Orders/instructions with respect to  

the Government money under Article 283 of the Constitution of India.   

These Standing Orders and Rules have remained in force from time  

immemorial; their provisions require the amount to be tendered, notice  

to be issued to the landowners to collect the amount of compensation  

awarded to them.  If they do not appear and apply to the reference under  

Section 18, the officer shall cause the amounts due to be paid into the  

treasury as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are  

respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form (marked E).   

When the payee ultimately claims the payment, they shall be paid in  

the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits.  The Land Acquisition  

(Bihar and Orissa) Rules were framed under Section 55 of the Act of  

1894.  Rule 10 thereof is extracted hereunder:  

“10. In giving notice of the award under Section 12(2) and  tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the persons  interested as were not present personally or by their  representatives when the award was made, the officer shall  require them to appear personally or by representatives by a  certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded to  them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if

203    

they fail to appear. If they do not appear, and do not apply for  reference to the Civil Court Under Section 18, the officer shall after  any further endeavour to secure their attendance that may seem  desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into the Treasury as  Revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are  respectively due and vouched for in the accompanying form  (marked E). The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such  deposits, the Treasury in which the deposits specifying have been  made. When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed  in deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner  as ordinary revenue deposits. The officer should, as far as  possible, arrange to make the payments due in or near the village  to which the payees belong, in order that the number of  undisbursed sums to be placed in deposit on account of non- attendance may be reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is  claimed through a representative whether before or after deposit  of the amount awarded, such representative, must show legal  authority for receiving the compensation on behalf of his  principal.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

226. In the State of Assam, rules have also been framed under Section  

55 of the Act of 1894, dealing with the deposit.  Rule 9 provides that in  

case reference is not sought under Section 18, the amount has to be  

deposited in treasury.  Rule 9 is extracted hereunder:  

“9. In giving notice of the award Under Section 12(2) and  tendering payment Under Section 31(1), to such of the persons  interested as were not present personally or by their  representatives when the award was made, the Collector shall  require them to appear personally or by representatives by a  certain date, to receive payment of the compensation awarded to  them intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them, if  they fail to appear. If they do not appear and do not apply for a  reference to the Civil Court Under Section 18, he shall, after any  further endeavour to secure their attendance or make payment  that may seem desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid into  the WW as revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they  are respectively due, and vouched for in the form prescribed or  approved by Government from time to time. He shall also give  notice to the payees of such deposits, specifying the Treasury in  which the deposits have been made. When the payees ultimately  claim payment of sums placed in deposit, the amount will be paid  to them in the same manner as ordinary revenue deposits. The  Collector should, as far as possible, arrange to make the payment  due in or near the village to which the land pertains in order that  the number of undisbursed sum to be placed in deposit on  account of nonattendance may be reduced to a minimum.  Whenever payment is claimed through a representative, such

204    

representative, must show legal authority for receiving the  compensation on behalf of the principal.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

227. In the State of Karnataka too similar rules were framed in 1965  

under Section 55 of the Act of 1894.  Similarly, in the State of Kerala  

also Rule 14(2) of the Land Acquisition (Kerala) Rules, 1990 were framed  

under Section 55 of the Act of 1894, provided that payment relating to  

award shall be made or the amount shall be credited to the court or  

revenue deposit (treasury) within one month from the date of the award.   

Similar rules were framed in the State of Bihar and Orissa.    

228. Standing Order No.28 was issued in 1909 by the State of Punjab  

and was applicable to Delhi also, which provided five modes of payment  

in para 74 and 75 thus:  

“74. Methods of making payments.—There are five methods  of making payments:  

(1) By direct payments, see Para 75(I) infra  

(2) By order on treasury, see Para 75(II) infra  

(3) By money order, see Para 75(III) infra  

(4) By cheque, see Para 75(IV) infra  

(5) By deposit in a treasury, see Para 75(V) infra  

75. Direct payments.—               *               *               *  

(V) By treasury deposit.— In giving notice of the award under  Section 12(2) and tendering payment under Section 31(1) to such  of the persons interested as were not present personally or by  their representatives when the award was made, the officer shall  require them to appear personally or by representatives by a  certain date to receive payment of the compensation awarded to  them, intimating also that no interest will be allowed to them if  they fail to appear, if they do not appear and do not apply for a  reference to the civil court under Section 18, the officer shall after  any further endeavours to secure their attendance that may seem  desirable, cause the amounts due to be paid to the treasury as  revenue deposits payable to the persons to whom they are  respectively due and vouched for in the form marked E below.  The officer shall also give notice to the payees of such deposits,

205    

specifying the treasury in which the deposit has been made.  When the payees ultimately claim payment of sums placed in  deposit, the amounts will be paid to them in the same manner as  ordinary revenue deposit. The officer should, as far as possible,  arrange to make the payments due in or near the village to which  the payee belong in order that the number of undisbursed sums  to be placed in deposits on account of non-attendance may be  reduced to a minimum. Whenever payment is claimed through a  representative whether before or after deposit of the amount  awarded, such representative, must have legal authority for  receiving the compensation on behalf of his principal.”  

Sub-para (V) of the above made it clear that payment is credited  

to the treasury when a person who is served with a notice under Section  

12(2) of the Act of 1894, is not present and the award is passed.  When  

a notice is given to receive the payment of compensation and in case  

they fail to appear, the amount has to be paid to the treasury as revenue  

deposit payable to the landowner.  

 229. Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned  

Authorities and they have to follow them.  They deposit the amounts in  

court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not

206    

otherwise.  Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is  

deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows  

under Section 34.  Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it  

is assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from  

payment as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the  

payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State.  The liability to  

pay the amount with interest would subsist.  When amounts are  

deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the  

adverse consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of the Act of 1894.   

The consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the  

landowner cannot be invested in the Government securities as  

envisaged under Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894, in which interest  

is not more 15 per cent.  Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners  

rather they stand to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the  

court.  We have already held that there is a distinction between the  

expression “paid” and “deposited”, thus the amount being deposited as  

per Rules in the treasury or as per the Standing Orders considering the  

scheme of Section 31 read with Section 34 of the Act of 1894, which are  

pari materia to Sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013.  We are of the  

considered opinion that acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher  

compensation would follow in case amount has not been deposited with  

respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be  

entitled for higher compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section  

24(2).

207    

230. Deposit in treasury in place of deposit in court causes no prejudice  

to the landowner or any other stakeholder as their interest is adequately  

safeguarded by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of  

1894, as it ensures higher rate of interest than any other Government  

securities.  Their money is safe and credited in the earmarked quantified  

amount and can be made available for disbursement to him/them.   

There is no prejudice caused and every infraction of law would not  

vitiate the act.    

231. In Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa151, this Court observed that  

every infraction of law would not vitiate the act.  It has further been  

observed that test is actual prejudice has been caused to a person by  

the supposed denial to him of a particular right.  Following observations  

have been made:  

“5. From this material it is argued that the principles of natural  justice were violated because the right of the appellant to have  his own evidence recorded was denied to him and further that  the material which was gathered behind his back was used in  determining his guilt. In support of these contentions a number of  rulings are cited chief among which are State of Bombay v. Narul  Latif Khan, (1965) 3 SCR 135; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sri C.S.  Sharma, (1967) 3 SCR 848 and Union of India v. T.R. Varma,  (1958) SCR 499. There is no doubt that if the principles of natural  justice are violated, and there is a gross case, this Court would  interfere by striking down the order of dismissal, but there are  cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has  been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a  particular right. Here the question was a simple one, viz. whether  the measurement book prepared for the contract work had been  properly scrutinised and checked by the appellant or not. He did  the checking in March 1954 and immediately thereafter in May  1954 the Executive Engineer re-checked the measurements and  found that the previous checking had not been done properly.  

                                                           151 (1969) 3 SCC 392

208    

Between March and May there could not be much rainfall, if at  all, and the marks of digging according to the witnesses could not  be obliterated during that time. It is however said that at the 6th  and 7th mile the checking was done in July and by that time rains  might have set in. Even so the witnesses at the sites of the pits  could not be so considerably altered as to present a totally wrong  picture. If anything had happened the earth would have swollen  rather than contracted by reason of rain and the pits would have  become bigger and not smaller. Anyway the questions which  were put to the witnesses were recorded and sent to the Chief  Engineer and his replies were received. No doubt the replies were  not put in the hands of the appellant but he saw them at the time  when he was making the representations and curiously enough  he used those replies in his defence. In other words, they were  not collected behind his back and could be used to his advantage  and he had an opportunity of so using them in his defence. We  do not think that any prejudice was caused to the appellant in  this case by not examining the two retired Superintending  Engineers whom he had cited or any one of them. The case was  a simple one whether the measurement book had been properly  checked. The pleas about rain and floods were utterly useless  and the Chief Engineer’s elucidated replies were not against the  appellant. In these circumstances a fetish of the principles of  natural justice is not necessary to be made. We do not think that  a case is made out that the principles of natural justice are  violated. The appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed, but  we will make no order as to costs.”  

                                       (emphasis supplied)  

232. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,152 the  

Court observed:   

“3. There is no substance in the contention of the appellant that  the 1955 Rules and not the 1969 Rules were followed. As pointed  out by the High Court, in the charges framed against the  appellant and in the first show cause notice the reference was  clearly to the 1969 Rules. The appellant himself mentioned in one  of his letters that the charges have been framed under the 1969  Rules. The enquiry report mentions that Shri Mukherjee was  appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 Rules. It is,  however true that the appellant was not questioned by the  Enquiry Officer under Rule 8(19) which provided as follows:  

“The enquiring authority may, after the member of the services  closes his case and shall if the member of the service has not  examined himself generally question him on the circumstances  appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling  the member of the service to explain any circumstances appearing  in the evidence against him.”  

It may be noticed straight away that this provision is akin to  Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and Section  313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It is now well  established that mere non-examination or defective examination  

                                                           152 (1980) 3 SCC 304

209    

under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for  interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.C. Mathew v.  State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 24; Bibhuti Bhusan Das  Gupta v. State of W.B., AIR 1969 SC 381 We are similarly of the  view that failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(19) of  the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent  officer is able to establish prejudice. In this case the learned  Single Judge the High Court as well as the learned Judges of the  Division Bench found that the appellant was in no way  prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of Rule 8(19).  The appellant cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted  his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself  at all stages. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations  against him and dealt with all aspects of the allegations in his  written defence. We do not think that he was in the least  prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in  accordance with Rule 8(19).  

(emphasis supplied)”  

    A similar view has been taken in the State of Andhra Pradesh v.  

Thakkidiram Reddy153 and other decisions.  

233. There is a dual obligation, namely, part mandatory and part  

directory.  In Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975)  

Q.B. 235, Lord Denning has cited a portion from the speech of Lord  

Penzance, which is extracted hereunder:  

“Now the distinction between matters that are directory and  matters that are imperative is well known to us all in the common  language of the courts at Westminster … A thing has been  ordered by the legislature to be done.  What is the consequence if  it is not done?  In the case of statutes that are said to be  imperative, the courts have decided that if it is not done the whole  thing fails, and the proceedings that follow upon it are all void.   On the other hand, when the courts hold a provision to be  mandatory or directory, they say that, although such provision  may not have been complied with, the subsequent proceedings  do not fail.”  

Later Lord Denning M.R. said, at pp. 242-243:  

“The section is no doubt imperative in that the notice of appeal  must be in writing and must be made within the specified time.   But I think it is only directory as to the contents.  Take first the  requirement as to the ‘grounds’ of appeal.  The section is either  

                                                           153 (1998) 6 SCC 554

210    

imperative in requiring ‘the grounds’ to be indicated, or it is not.   That must mean all or none.  I cannot see any justification for the  view that it is imperative as to one ground and not imperative as  to the rest.  If one was all that was necessary, an appellant would  only have to put in one frivolous or hopeless ground and then  amend later to add his real grounds.  That would be a futile  exercise.  Then as to ‘stating the facts.’  It cannot be supposed  that the appellant must at all cost state all the facts on which he  bases his appeal.  He has to state the facts, not the evidence: and  the facts may depend on evidence yet to be obtained, and may  not be fully or sufficiently known at the time when the notice of  appeal is given.  All things, considered, it seems to me that the  section, in so far as the ‘grounds’ and ‘facts’ are concerned, must  be construed as directory only: that is, as desiring information to  be given about them.  It is not to be supposed that an appeal  should fail altogether simply because the grounds are not  indicated, or the facts stated.  Even if it is wanting in not giving  them, it is not fatal.  The defects can be remedied later, either  before or at the hearing of the appeal, so long as an opportunity  is afforded of dealing with them.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

234. In Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore Developments  

Ltd.154, a distinction was made between essential and supportive  

provisions.  The following observations are pertinent:  

“By way of final comment I would add that I am strongly  attracted to the view that legislation of the present kind should  be evaluated and construed on an analytical basis.  It should be  considered which of the provisions are substantive and which are  secondary, that is, simply part of the machinery of the legislation.   Further, the provisions which fall into the latter category should  be examined to assess whether they are essential parts of the  mechanics or are merely supportive of the other provisions so that  they need not be insisted on regardless of the circumstances.  In  other words, as in the construction of contractual and similar  documents, the status and effect of a provision has to be  assessed having regard to the scheme of the legislation as a  whole and the role of that provision in that scheme – for example,  whether some provision confers an option properly so called,  whether some provision is equivalent to a condition precedent,  whether some requirement can be fulfilled in some other way or  waived.  Such an approach when applied to legislation such as  the present would assist to enable the substantive rights to be  given effect to and would help to avoid absurdities or unjustified  lacunae.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

                                                           154 (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 at p. 1032

211    

235. In Sharif-ud-Din (supra) the difference between mandatory and  

directory rules was pointed out thus:  

“9. The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule  is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of  the latter substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the  object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain broad  propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of  courts regarding the rules of construction that should be followed  in determining whether a provision of law is directory or  mandatory may be summarised thus: The fact that the statute  uses the word “shall” while laying down a duty is not conclusive  on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision.  In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court  has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question  has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is  enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance  with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision  of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the  invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes  serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at  the same time who have no control over the performance of the  duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where,  however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to  be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a  right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an  immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner,  the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural  rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect  in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting  appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage  unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on,  another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute  prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular  manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said  requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult  to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified  consequence should not follow.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

236. Similarly, in Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and  

Ors155  this Court observed that non-compliance with the directory  

provision does not affect the validity of the act done in breach thereof.  

                                                           155 (2009) 6 SCC 735

212    

In Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.156, this Court  

considered the mode of publication and held that publication in a  

newspaper was the only effective mode and that the provision was  

mandatory.   

 237. This Court also considered the effect of non-deposit of the amount  

in Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr157 and held that  

in case compensation has not been paid or deposited, the State is liable  

to pay interest as provided in Section 34. The Court held thus:  

“5. It cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the  landowner in the event of the compensation not being paid or  deposited in time in court. Before taking possession of the land,  the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded, as  stated in Section 31, failing which he is liable to pay interest as  provided in Section 34.  

6. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in stating that  interest was due and payable to the landowner. The High Court  was justified in directing the necessary parties to appear in the  executing court for determination of the amount.”  

 238. In Kishan Das v. State of U.P158 , this Court observed that where  

land owners themselves delayed the acquisition proceedings, it is  

discretionary for the court to award the interest and they cannot get the  

premium on their dilatory tactics.  This Court stated that:  

“4. In the light of the operation of the respective provisions of  Sections 34 and 28 of the Act, it would be difficult to direct  payment of interest. In fact, Section 23(1-A) is a set-off for loss in  cases of delayed awards to compensate the person entitled to  receive compensation; otherwise a person who is responsible for  the delay in disposal of the acquisition proceedings will be paid  premium for dilatory tactics. It is stated by the learned counsel  for the respondents that the amount of interest was also  calculated and total amount was deposited in the account of the  

                                                           156 (2003) 6 SCC 401  157 1990 Supp SCC 806   158 (1995) 6 SCC 240

213    

appellants by the Land Acquisition Officer after passing the  award, i.e., on 15-11-1976 in a sum of Rs 20,48,615. Under these  circumstances, the liability to pay interest would arise when  possession of the acquired land was taken and the amount was  not deposited. In view of the fact that compensation was  deposited as soon as the award was passed, we do not think  that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 239. In D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn. v. State of  

U.P.159, it was observed that liability to pay interest under Section 34  

arises from the date of taking possession.  

240. It was argued that in fact in many cases, reference was sought as  

such the amounts being deposited in the treasury were not valid.   

Reference was sought for higher compensation and landowners had  

declined to accept the compensation for no good reason they could have  

received it under protest reserving their right to seek the reference and  

in case compensation was not paid or deposited, they could have  

claimed it along with interest as envisaged under Section 34.  

241. It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and possession  

has been taken, it has vested in the State.  It had been allotted to  

beneficiaries.  A considerable infrastructure could have been developed  

and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have  

been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose  

schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense  

                                                           159  (1997) 10 SCC 77

214    

infrastructure.  We are unable to accept the submission that merely by  

deposit of amount in treasury instead of court, we should invalidate all  

the acquisitions, which have taken place. That is not what is  

contemplated under Section 24(2).  We are also not able to accept the  

submission that when law operates these harsh consequences need not   

be seen by the court.  In our opinion, that submission is without merit  

in as such consequences are not even envisaged on proper  

interpretation of Section 24(2), as mentioned above.  

242. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that the  

Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the  

majority of landholdings.  In case compensation has not been paid or  

deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries  

are entitled for higher compensation.  In case money has not been  

deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in  

court with respect to majority of landholdings, the consequence has to  

follow of higher compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act  

of 2013.  Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the  

interest would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894.  

Section 24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed  

within 5 years after the pronouncement of award.  Parliament  

considered the period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the  

acquisition proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the land and  

payment of compensation.  It is the clear intent of the Act of 2013, that

215    

provision of Section 24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending  

as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force  

and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings.  It was urged before  

us by one of the Counsel that lands in the Raisina Hills and Lutyens’  

Zones of Delhi were acquired in 1913 and compensation has not been  

paid.  The Act of 2013 applies only to the pending proceedings in which  

possession has not been taken or compensation has not paid and not  

to a case where proceedings have been concluded long back, Section  

24(2) is not a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity  

of taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s,  

1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of  

amount in the treasury.  The Act of 2013 never intended revival such  

claims.  In case such landowners were interested in questioning the  

proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with the treasury,  

such a challenge was permissible within the time available with them  

to do so.  They cannot wake from deep slumber and raise such claims  

in order to defeat the acquisition validly made.  In our opinion, the law  

never contemplates -nor permits- misuse much less gross abuse of its  

provisions to reopen all the acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the  

duty of the court to examine the details of such claims.  There are  

several litigations before us where landowners, having lost the challenge  

to the validity of acquisition proceedings and after having sought  

enhancement of the amount in the reference succeeding in it

216    

nevertheless are seeking relief arguing about lapse of acquisition after  

several rounds of litigation.  

243. The expression used in Section 24(1)(b) is ‘where an award under  

Section 11 has been made”, then ‘such proceedings shall continue’ under  

the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if the said Act has not been  

repealed’. The expression “proceedings shall continue” indicates that  

proceedings are pending at the time; it is a present perfect tense and  

envisages that proceedings must be pending as on the date on which  

the Act of 2013 came into force. It does not apply to concluded  

proceedings before the Collector after which it becomes functus officio.   

Section 24 of the Act of 2013, does not confer benefit in the concluded  

proceedings, of which legality if question has to be seen in the  

appropriate proceedings.  It is only in the pending proceedings where  

award has been passed and possession has not been taken nor  

compensation has been paid, it is applicable.  There is no lapse in case  

possession has been taken, but amount has not been deposited with  

respect to majority of land holdings in a pending proceeding, higher  

compensation under the Act of 2013 would follow under the proviso to  

Section 24(2).  Thus, the provision is not applicable to any other case in  

which higher compensation has been sought by way of seeking a  

reference under the Act of 1894 or where the validity of the acquisition  

proceedings have been questioned, though they have been concluded.  

217    

Such case has to be decided on their own merits and the provisions of  

Section 24(2) are not applicable to such cases.  

In re: Issue no.4: mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894  

244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may  

be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and  

thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State  

Government.  Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in  

Section 17(1).  The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894,  

whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression “physical  

possession” is used.  It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for  

taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical  

possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires  

actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other  

form.  When the State has acquired the land and award has been  

passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances.   

The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person  

retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and  

has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all  

encumbrances.  

245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between  

taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression “physical  

possession” used in Section 24(2).  As a matter of fact, what was  

contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant

218    

only physical possession of the land.  Taking over the possession under  

the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of  

the land.  When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a  

memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical  

possession of the land.  On the large chunk of property or otherwise  

which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other  

person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating  

it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been  

acquired.  The Government is not supposed to start residing or to  

physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the  

inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof.  Thereafter, if any  

further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone  

starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse,  

etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the  

State.  The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the  

real owner that is the State Government in the case.  

246. It was urged on behalf of acquiring authorities and the states that  

there is no conflict of opinion with respect to the mode of taking  

possession in IDA v Shailendra and Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr  

(supra), and that the latter is not a decision as to the aspect of  

possession.  A two-Judge Bench decision in Shree Balaji Nagar  

Residential Association (supra) has been overruled in the Indore  

Development Authority case (supra).  The view taken in Indore

219    

Development Authority (supra) has to prevail as the decision in Velaxan  

Kumar (supra), was rendered by a two judge Bench of this court.  This  

court, however, proceeds to examine the matter afresh as issues have  

been framed.  

247. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right  

to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi.  

Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed.  

If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead  

to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established  

principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the  

control over the property. The element of possession is the physical  

control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the  

power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist.  

Possession of the acquired land is taken under the Act of 1894 under  

Section 16 or 17 as the case may be. The government has a right to  

acquire the property for public purpose. The stage under Section 16  

comes for taking possession after issuance of notification under Section  

4(1) and stage of Section 9(1). Under section 16, vesting is after passing  

of the award on taking possession and under section 17 before passing  

of the award.  

248. Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”, 2nd Edn.,  

expressions ‘trespass’ and ‘trespasser’ have been dealt with by the

220    

learned Author with the help of Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,  

West Publishing Co. which has also been quoted with respect to who is  

a trespasser:  

 “A “trespasser” is a person who enters or remains upon land in  the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by  the possessor’s consent or otherwise. In re Wimmer’s Estate, 182  P.2d 119, 121, 111 Utah 444.”    “A “trespasser” is one entering or remaining on land in another’s  possession without a privilege to do so created by possessor’s  consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker v. G.M.  Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio App. 505.”   

 249. One who enters or remains in possession on land of another  

without a privilege to do so, is also treated as a trespasser. On the  

strength of Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in S.M. Yaqub v.  

T.N. Basu160, Mitra, has referred to the observation that the possession  

should not be confused with occupation. A person may be in actual  

possession of the property without occupying it for a considerable time.  

The person who has a right to utilise the whole in any way he likes.  

Possession in part is good enough to infer that the person is in  

possession of the rest. Learned Author has referred to Jowitt’s  

Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969, so as to explain what constitutes  

possession.   

  “There are three requisites of possession. First, there must be  actual or potential physical control. Secondly, the physical control  is not possession unless accompanied by intention hence if a  thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person he has no  possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention must be  visible or evidence by external signs for if the thing shows no  signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not possession.”  

                                                           160 AIR 1949 Pat 146

221    

 250. In order to constitute possession, a person should be in physical  

control. The same is not possession unless and until the intention is  

there and thirdly, possibility and intention must be visible; otherwise,  

it is not possession.  Mitra has further dealt with how to determine  

possession. The relevant extract is quoted hereunder:  

   “36. Who is in possession – Determination of.—In Jones  v. Chopman, (1849) 2 Ex. 803: 18 LJ Ex. 456: 76 PR 794; Maule,  J, expounded the doctrine thus:     “If there are two persons in a field, each asserting that the field  is his, and each doing some act in the assertion of the right of  possession, and if the question is, which of these two is in actual  possession, I answer, the person who has the title is in actual  possession and the other person is a trespasser.    In such a case who is in possession is to be determined by the  fact of the title and having the same apparent actual possession;    The question as to which of the two really is in possession is  determined by the fact of the possession; following the title, that  is by the law, which makes it follow the title.”    In Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands, (1912) 1Ch 527; LJ Ch 340; 106  LT 316; per Joyce, J, where his Lordship says:     “It is a well settled principle with reference to land at all events  …… that where possession in fact is underterminate or the  evidence is undecisive, possession, in law follows the right to  possess. As far back as the time of Littleton it was said, “Where  two be in one house or other tenements together to claim the said  lands and tenements, and the one claimeth by one title, and the  other by another title, the law shall adjudge him in possession  that has right to have the possession of the same tenements.”      

(emphasis supplied)  

 251. A person with title is considered to be in actual possession. The  

other person is a trespasser. The possession in law follows the right to  

possess as held in Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands161. Ordinarily, the owner  

                                                           161 (1912) 1Ch 527

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of the property is presumed to be in possession and presumption as to  

possession is in his favour. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of  

Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors., 162, this Court  

observed that possession implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy  

annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It  

involves the power of control and intent to control. Possession is  

annexed to right of property.  

“13. “Possession” is a polymorphous term which may have  different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to work  out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession”  uniformally applicable to all situations in the contexts of all  statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say  that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of  "possession." Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed  out in Salmond’s Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the  fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. "Possession,"  implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right  of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of  control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.)  

14. According to Pollock and Wright,  

“when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as  regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual  control of it at pleasure, and so far as regards other persons, the  thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on  a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to  him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the  thing.”  

15. While recognising that “possession” is not a purely legal  concept but also a matter of fact, Salmond (12th Edn., p. 52)  describes “possession, in fact”, as a relationship between a  person and a thing. According to the learned Author the test for  determining “whether a person is in possession of anything is  whether he is in general control of it”.  

   252. In Ram Dass v. Davinder163, this Court stated that possession and  

occupation in common parlance may be used interchangeably, but in  

                                                           162 (1979) 4 SCC 274  163 (2004) 3 SCC 684

223    

law possession amounts to holding property as an owner, while to  

occupy is to keep possession by being present in it. In Bhinka & Ors. v.  

Charan Singh, Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh164, this court considered  

the dichotomy between taking and retaining possession. They are  

mutually exclusive expressions and apply to two different situations.  

The word ‘taking’ applies to a person taking possession of a land  

otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the  

word ‘retaining’ applies to a person taking possession in accordance  

with the provisions of the law, but subsequently retaining the same  

illegally. In Bhinka & Ors. (supra), as to retaining possession, it was  

observed:  

“14. If the appellants did not take possession of the disputed  lands, did they retain possession of the same in accordance with  the provisions of the law for the time being in force? The  dichotomy between taking and retaining indicates that they are  mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations. The  word “taking” applies to a person taking possession of a land  otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law,  while the word “retaining” to a person taking possession in  accordance with the provisions of the law but subsequently  retaining the same illegally. So construed, the appellants’  possession of the lands being illegal from the inception, they  could not be described as persons retaining possession of the  said lands in accordance with the provisions of any law for the  time being in force, so as to be outside the scope of Section 180  of the Act.”  

   253. Under section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the  

Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking  

possession. Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894, the acquired  

land became the property of the State without any condition or  

                                                           164 1959 (Suppl 2) SCR 798

224    

limitation either as to title or possession. Absolute title thus vested in  

the State.  

254. This Court in V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer  

& Ors165 dealt with the concept of vesting under the Act of 1894. The  

facts of the said case indicated that the appellants and the officials of  

the State and Development Board connived with each other to enable  

the appellant to grab/encroach upon the public land, which was  

acquired and falsified the documents so as to construct flats thereon.  

Considering the gravamen of the fraud, the Chief Secretary of the State  

was directed to trace out such officials and to take suitable action  

against each of them. It was also held by this Court that alienation of  

land subsequent to notification under Section 4(1) is void and no title  

passes on the basis of such sale deed. This Court held that once land  

vested in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested.  

Once land has been acquired, it cannot be restored to tenure-

holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for  

which it is so acquired. Once possession of land has been taken, it vests  

in the State free from all encumbrances. Under sections 16 and 17, the  

acquired property becomes the property of the Government without any  

limitation or condition either as to title or possession. Reliance has been  

placed on Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union (supra):  

“19. That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown  by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of  

                                                           165 (2012) 12 SCC 133

225    

the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at  the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to  appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further  provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such  receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of  administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his  debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent  vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose  of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own  in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the  Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of LA), provide that the property so  acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest  absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the  cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired  becomes the property of Government without any conditions or  limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has  made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited  purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word  “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that  the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it  vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may  vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may  have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions  of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and  54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or  other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a  trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any  of them.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

255. In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar  

Jagad & Ors166, the concept of vesting was considered. This court  

observed that vesting means an absolute and indefeasible right.  

Vesting, in general sense, means vesting in possession. Vesting may  

include vesting of interest too. This Court observed thus:  

“38. “Vesting” means having obtained an absolute and  indefeasible right. It refers to and is used for transfer or  conveyance. “Vesting” in the general sense, means vesting in  possession. However, “vesting” does not necessarily and always  means possession but includes vesting of interest as well.  “Vesting” may mean vesting in title, vesting in possession or  vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it  is used in a particular provision of the Act. The word “vest” has  different shades, taking colour from the context in which it is  used. It does not necessarily mean absolute vesting in every  situation and is capable of bearing the meaning of a limited  vesting, being limited, in title as well as duration. Thus, the word  

                                                           166 2011 (12) SCC 695

226    

"vest" clothes varied colours from the context and situation in  which the word came to be used in the statute. The expression  "vest" is a word of ambiguous import since it has no fixed  connotation and the same has to be understood in a different  context under different sets of circumstances. [Vide Fruit &  Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957  SC 344, Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2602,  Municipal Corpn. of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy AIR 1987 SC 802,  Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama  Deekshithulu 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union  of India AIR 1995 SC 605, SCC p. 404, para 41, Govt. of A.P. v.  Nizam, Hyderabad (1996) 3 SCC 282, K.V. Shivakumar v.  Appropriate Authority (2000) 3 SCC 485, Municipal Corpn. of  Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. AIR 2001 SC  3630 and Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal  Transport (2010) 8 SCC 467.]”  

(emphasis supplied)  

   256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute  

has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once  

possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right  

and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under  

section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under  

section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award  

under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of  

vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be  

accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all  

other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the  

landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in  

possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the land-

owner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the  

property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or  

otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the

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State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for  

his benefit and on behalf of the owner.  

257. After the land has vested in the State, the total control is of the  

State. Only the State has a right to deal with the same. In Municipal  

Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum  

Corporation & Anr167, this Court discussed the concept of vesting in the  

context of Section 220 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It has  

referred to various decisions including that of Richardson v. Robertson,  

(1862) 6 LT 75 thus:  

“8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any drain  which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain and shall be  under the control of the Corporation. In this context, the question  arises as to what meaning is required to assign to the word “vest”  occurring in Section 220 of the Act? In Richardson v. Robertson 6  LT at p. 78, it was observed by Lord Cranworth as under: (LT p.  78)  

“The word ‘vest’ is a word, at least, of ambiguous import.  Prima facie ‘vesting’ in possession is the more natural  meaning. The expressions ‘investiture’ — ‘clothing’ — and  whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the  word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the  obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the  argument that was pressed at the Bar, that by long usage  ‘vesting’ originally means the having obtained an absolute  and indefeasible right, as contradistinguished from the not  having so obtained it. But it cannot be disputed that the  word ‘vesting’ may mean, and often does mean, that which  is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in  possession.”  

15. We are, therefore, of the view that the word “vest” means  vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense,  as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular  provision of the Act.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

                                                           167 2001 (8) SCC 143

228    

258. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context in which it is  

used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free  

from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting  

of land, once possession has been taken, section 24(2) does not  

contemplate divesting of the property from the State as mentioned  

above.  

 259. Now, the court would examine the mode of taking possession  

under the Act of 1894 as laid down by this Court.  In Balwant Narayan  

Bhagde (supra) it was observed that the act of Tehsildar in going on the  

spot and inspecting the land was sufficient to constitute taking of  

possession.  Thereafter, it would not be open to the Government or the  

Commission to withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48(1) of the  

Act.  It was held thus:  

“28. We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother  Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion  is based. But we are writing a separate judgment as we feel that  the discussion in the judgment of our learned Brother Untwalia,  J., in regard to delivery of "symbolical" and "actual" possession  under Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of Order 21of the Code of Civil  Procedure, is not necessary for the disposal of the present  appeals and we do not wish to subscribe to what has been said  by our learned Brother Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we  wish to express our assent with the discussion of the various  authorities made by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to  state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of  the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, LA, it must  take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land  are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking  "symbolical" possession in the sense understood by judicial  decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would  possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act  contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in  the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land.  How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature  of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the  nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule  laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of

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possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying  down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the  spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise  would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in  every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying  fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of  the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the  purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and  should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its  extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It  appears that the appellant was not present when this was done  by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant  of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession.  It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement  that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the  land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though  it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before  possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate  the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking  of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever  coming to know of it.”  

 260. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (supra) it was held that  

drawing of Panchnama in the presence of witnesses would constitute a  

mode of taking possession. This court observed:  

“9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one  of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land  is recording of a memorandum or Panchnama by the LAO in the  presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would  constitute taking possession of the land as it would be  impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It  is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested  person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 261. In Banda Development Authority (supra) this Court held that  

preparing a Panchnama is sufficient to take possession. This Court has  

laid down thus:  

“37. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted  judgments are:   

(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would  constitute taking of possession of the acquired land.  

(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority  concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will

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ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of  possession.  

(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure  exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by  itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such  cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the  occupier of the building/structure or the person who has  cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of  independent witnesses and get their signatures on the  panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or  building/structure may not lead to an inference that the  possession of the acquired land has not been taken.  

(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be  possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical  possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be  sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing  appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses  and getting their signatures on such document.  

(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality  of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in  terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired  land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public  purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession  of the acquired land has been taken.”  

 262. In State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Ors.,  

(supra), this court dealt with the effect of vesting on possession and  

mode of taking it and opined thus:   

“9. It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration under  Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was  made on 26-9-1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was made  on 31-8-1990. Possession having already been undertaken on  24-11-1981, it stands vested in the State under Section 16 of the  Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government  acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been  made within two years under Section 11 of the Act, the fact that  subsequent award was made on 31-8-1990 does not render the  initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of  dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further  proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid  down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand  as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11-A of  the Act. Equally, even if there is an irregularity in service of notice  under Sections 9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and  on account thereof, award made under Section 11 does not  become invalid. Award is only an offer on behalf of the State. If  compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party  but subject to Section 28-A. Possession of the acquired land  would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama,  which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take

231    

any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if  any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful  possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under  Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this  perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in  interfering with the award.”  

 263. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v.  

State of Punjab & Ors168, this Court ruled that under compulsory  

acquisition it is difficult to take physical possession of land. The normal  

mode of taking possession is by way of drafting the Panchnama in the  

presence of Panchas. This Court observed thus:  

“4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings  stood completed by 17-4-1976 by which date possession of the  land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that  the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled  legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the  land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking  possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence of panchas  and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is  the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent  thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to  illegal or unlawful possession.  

5. Under these circumstances, merely because the appellant  retained possession of the acquired land, the acquisition cannot  be said to be bad in law. It is then contended by Shri Parekh that  the appellant-Institution is running an educational institution and  intends to establish a public school and that since other land was  available, the Government would have acquired some other land  leaving the acquired land for the appellant. In the counter- affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that apart from the  acquired land, the appellant also owned 482 canals 19 marlas of  land. Thereby, it is seen that the appellant is not disabled to  proceed with the continuation of the educational institution which  it seeks to establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may  be given to the appellant to make a representation to the State  Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give any  such liberty since acquisition process has already been  completed.”  

                                                           168 (1996) 4 SCC 212

232    

264. In P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors., 169, with respect of  

mode of possession, this Court laid down as under:  

“6. Moreover, the Hon’ble Minister who passed the order of  denotification of the lands in question sought to make a  distinction between symbolic possession and actual possession  and proceed to pass the order on the basis of his understanding  of the law that symbolic possession did not amount to actual  possession, and that the power to withdraw from the acquisition  could be exercised at any time before “actual possession” was  taken. This view appears to be contrary to the majority decision  of this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat,  wherein this Court observed that how such possession would be  taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession  would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There  can be no hard-and-fast rule laying down what act would be  sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. In the instant  case the lands of which possession was sought to be taken were  unoccupied, in the sense that there was no crop or structure  standing thereon. In such a case only symbolic possession could  be taken, and as was pointed out by this Court in the aforesaid  decision, such possession would amount to vesting the land in  the Government. Moreover, four acres and odd belonging to the  appellant was a part of the larger area of 118 acres notified for  acquisition. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court has  not committed any error in holding that possession of the land  was taken on 6-11-1985. Even the order of the Minister on which  considerable reliance has been placed by the appellant indicates  that possession of the lands was taken, though symbolic.”  

 265. In Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) this Court held  

that when possession of large area of land is to be taken, then it is  

permissible to take possession by drawing Panchnama.  A similar view  

was expressed in Om Prakash Verma & Ors (supra) which stated that:  

“85. As pointed out earlier, the expression “civil appeals are  allowed” carry only one meaning i.e. the judgment of the High  Court is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. Moreover,  the determination of surplus land based on the declaration of  owners has become final long back. The notifications issued  under Section 10 of the Act and the panchnama taking  possession are also final. On behalf of the State, it was asserted  that the possession of surplus land was taken on 20-7-1993 and  the panchnama was executed showing that the possession has  been taken. It is signed by the witnesses. We have perused the  details which are available in the paper book. It is settled law  that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land         

                                                           169 (2005) 12 SCC 489

233    

then it is permissible to take possession by a properly executed  panchnama. [Vide Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of  Delhi) (2009) 10 SCC 501.]  

86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not been  questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants. Though  it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society was in  possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises  was given possession by the owners and possession was also  given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it  was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are  not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High  Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and  validly through a panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves  to be upheld.”  

266. In M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development  

Authority, etc.170, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has opined that one  

of the modes of taking possession is by drawing panchnama.  The Court  

observed:  

“17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Ajay  Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721, Mahavir  v. Rural Institute (1995) 5 SCC 335, Gian Chand v. Gopala (1995)  2 SCC 528, Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC  177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689 More  importantly, as on the date of the suit, the respondents had not  completed 12 years in possession of the suit property so as to  entitle them to claim adverse possession against BDA, the true  owner. The argument that possession of the land was never  taken also needs notice only to be rejected for it is settled that  one of the modes of taking possession is by drawing a  panchnama which part has been done to perfection according to  the evidence led by the defendant BDA. Decisions of this Court in  T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam (1996) 8 SCC 259 and Larsen  & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387, sufficiently  support BDA that the mode of taking possession adopted by it  was a permissible mode.”  

   267. In Ram Singh v. Jammu Development Authority171, this Court  

stated that the mode of taking possession is by drawing a Panchnama.  

Concerning the mode of taking possession in any other land, law to a  

                                                           170 (2015) 17 SCC 1  171 2017 (13) SCC 474

234    

similar effect has been laid down in NAL Layout Residents Association  

v. Bangalore Development Authority172. Certain decisions were cited with  

respect to other statutes regarding coalfields etc. and how the  

possession is taken and vesting is to what extent. Those have to be seen  

in the context of the particular Act. Possession comprises of various  

rights, thus it has to be couched in a particular statute for which we  

have a plethora of decisions of this Court. Hence, we need not fall back  

on the decisions in other cases. The decision in Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd.  

(supra) held that a person can be said to be in possession of minerals  

contained in a well-defined mining area even though his actual physical  

possession is confined to a small portion. Possession in part extends to  

the whole of the area. The decision does not help the cause of the  

petitioner. Once possession has been taken by drawing a Panchnama,  

the State is deemed to be in possession of the entire area and not for a  

part. There is absolute vesting in Government with possession and  

control free from all encumbrances as specifically provided in Section  

16 of the Act of 1894.  

 268. Maguni Charan Dwivedi v. State of Orissa173 , dealt with the  

provision of land laws requiring actual cultivating possession with  

which we are not concerned here. Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar  

Dass Dey & Co.174, it was again a case relating to mining. The decision  

                                                           172 (2018) 12 SCC 400  173 1976 (2) SCC 134  174 1979 (3) SCC 106

235    

is of no avail. The decision in Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai175  

related to khas possession and physical possession of the tenant with  

which we are not concerned in the instant case, and the decision has  

no relevance so as to determine the expression. In the instant case, we  

are not dealing with the question, what are the rights to be conferred  

on the actual cultivators under revenue laws?  

 269. Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India176, was again a case  

of mines. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat177, this Court relied  

upon Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (supra), Balmokand  

Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust (supra) and held that drawing of  

Panchnama is sufficient to take possession and acquisition was held to  

be valid.  

 270. The decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be laying  

down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to  

hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence  

as to whether possession was taken or not.  Drawing of a Panchnama is  

an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a  

photograph can be taken; equally, it taken be taken after committing  

trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established mode of  

proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of  

little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person may  

                                                           175 (1979) 4 SCC 27  176 (1988) Supp. SCC 488  177 (1998) 4 SCC 387

236    

re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would not  

impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing  

Panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of  

taking possession.  

 271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana178,   

the observation made was that it is not possible to take the possession  

of entire land in a day on which the award was declared, cannot be  

accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary to a  

large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan  

v. State of M.P179, is confined to particular facts of the case. The  

Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs.  

and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in possession. The  

District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holder.  

We do not approve the method of determining the possession by  

appointment of Commissioner or by DVDs and CDs  as an acceptable  

mode of proving taking of possession. The drawing of Panchnama  

contemporaneously is sufficient and it is not open to a court  

Commissioner to determine the factum of possession within the purview  

of Order XXVII, Rule 9 CPC. Whether possession has been taken, or not,  

is not a matter that a court appointed Commissioner cannot opine.  

However, drawing of Panchnama by itself is enough and is a proof of the  

fact that possession has been taken.  

                                                           178 (2012) 1 SCC 792  179 (2011) 7 SCC 639

237    

272. It was submitted on behalf of landowners that under Section 24  

the expression used is not possession but physical possession. In our  

opinion, under the Act of 1894 when possession is taken after award is  

passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the  

award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of  

taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter,  

any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal  

and trespasser’s possession inures for the benefit of the owner and even  

in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner.  

When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of  

the owner by this Court as held in Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose180.  

Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests  

absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right  

to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once  

it vests in the State.  

 273. In Maria Margadia Sequeria v Erasmo Jack De Sequeria181,  

approving a decision of this Court, this court clarified what amounts to  

"possession" in law and held:  

"Possession is flexible term and is not necessarily restricted to  mere actual possession of the property. The legal conception of  possession may be in various forms. The two elements of  possession are the corpus and the animus. A person though in  physical possession may not be in possession in the eye of law,  if the animus be lacking. On the contrary, to be in possession, it  is not necessary that one must be in actual physical contact. To  gain the complete idea of possession, one must consider  

                                                           180 AIR 1958 SC 434  181 2012 (5) SCC 370

238    

(i) the person possessing, (ii) the things possessed and, (iii) the  persons excluded from possession. A man may hold an object  without claiming any interest therein for himself. A servant  though holding an object, holds it for his master. He has,  therefore, merely custody of the thing and not the possession  which would always be with the master though the master may  not be in actual contact of the thing. It is in this light in which the  concept of possession has to be understood in the context of a  servant and master."  ************** *****    **************  

Principles of law which emerge in Maria Margadia Sequeria (supra)  

are crystallized as under:-  

“1. No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed  to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of  years or decades such person would not acquire any right or  interest in the said property."  

 274. In the decision reported as National Thermal Power Ltd v Mahesh  

Dutta182 this court held that:  

“28. When possession is to be taken over in respect of the fallow  or Patit land, a mere intention to do so may not be enough. It is,  however, the positive stand by the appellant that the lands in  question are agricultural land and crops used to be grown  therein. If the lands in question are agricultural lands, not only  actual physical possession had to be taken but also they were  required to be properly demarcated. If the land had standing  crops, as has been contended by Mr. Raju Ramachandran, steps  in relation thereto were required to be taken by the Collector. Even  in the said certificate of possession, it had not been stated that  there were standing crops on the land on the date on which  possession was taken. We may notice that delivery of possession  in respect of immoveable property should be taken in the manner  laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  

29. It is beyond any comprehension that when possession is  purported to have been taken of the entire acquired lands, actual  possession would be taken only of a portion thereof. The  certificate of possession was either correct or incorrect. It cannot  be partially correct or partially incorrect. Either the possession  had actually been delivered or had not been delivered. It cannot  be accepted that possession had been delivered in respect of  about 10 acres of land and the possession could not be taken in  respect of the rest 55 acres of land. When the provisions of  Section 17 are taken recourse to, vesting of the land takes effect  immediately.  

30. Another striking feature of the case is that all the actions had  been taken in a comprehensive manner. The Collector in his  

                                                           182 2009 (8) SCC 339

239    

certificate of possession dated 16th November, 1984 stated that  the possession had been taken over in respect of the entire land;  the details of the land and the area thereof had also been  mentioned in the certificate of possession; even NTPC in its letter  dated 24th February, 1986 stated that possession had not been  delivered only in respect of land situated in four villages  mentioned therein. Indisputably NTPC got possession over  10.215 acres of land. It raised constructions thereover. It is  difficult to comprehend that if the NTPC had paid 80% of the total  compensation as provided for under sub-section (3A) of Section  17  of the Act, out of 65.713 acres of land it had obtained  possession only in respect of about 10.215 acres of land and still  for such a long time it kept mum. Ex-facie, therefore, it is difficult  to accept that merely symbolic possession had been taken.”  

 275. In V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors.183,  

the land was acquired and possession was handed over to the  

authorities. Later on the land was sold, documents were manipulated,  

and flats were constructed in an illegal manner. It was held that the  

land once acquired, cannot be restored. The State has no right to  

reconvey the land and no person can claim such a right nor derive an  

advantage. Sale of land after a notification under section 4 of the LA Act  

was held to be void. It was held in the facts of the case that the judicial  

process cannot be used to subvert its way. Such persons must not be  

permitted to profit from the frivolous litigation, and they must be  

prevented from taking false pleas by relying on forged documents or  

illegal action.  

276. We have seen the blatant misuse of the provisions of section 24(2).  

Acquisitions that were completed several decades before even to say 50-

                                                           183 (2012) 12 SCC 133

240    

60 years ago, or even as far back as 90 years ago were questioned; cases  

filed were dismissed. References were sought claiming higher  

compensation and higher compensation had been ordered. Now, there  

is a fresh bout of litigation started by erstwhile owners even after having  

received the compensation in many cases by submitting that possession  

has not been taken and taking of possession by drawing a Panchnama  

was illegal and they are in physical possession. As such, there is lapse  

of proceedings.  

 277. The court is alive to the fact that are a large number of cases  

where, after acquisition land has been handed over to various  

corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies, etc. After depositing  

compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have  

been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of  

such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests  

have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover of  

section 24(2) to invalidate all such actions. As held by us, section 24  

does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the  

provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated,  

without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners’  

argument that after possession too, in case of non-payment of  

compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments’ sake,  

be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands,  

lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. Thus, we

241    

have no hesitation to overrule the decisions in Velaxan Kumar (supra)  

and Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), with regard to mode of taking  

possession. We hold that drawing of Panchnama of taking possession is  

the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, thereupon land  

vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter  

is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits under section  

24(2) of the Act of 2013.                 

In Re Question No.5: the effect of interim order of Court  

278. On behalf of acquiring authorities, it was submitted that period  

spent during the interim stay or injunction by which Authorities have  

not been able to take possession or to make payment, has to be  

excluded from computing the period of 5 years or more as provided in  

Section 24(2).  It was submitted that in case authorities are restrained  

by interim order passed by the court in a pending litigation, the land  

acquisition cannot lapse by including the period for which interim stay  

order preventing the Authorities from taking action has operated.   

Reliance has been placed on the principles contained in maxim “actus  

curiae neminem gravabit”.  It was also submitted even in the absence of  

the provisions specifically excluding the period of interim  

stay/injunction having been made in Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the  

aforesaid principles are attracted and the period has to be excluded.  

279. The landowners, on the other hand argued that there is no valid  

reason to exclude the period spent during the interim order by the court

242    

from the prescribed period of 5 years under Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013.  For the main reason that the legislature has not specially  

provided for exclusion of such period in Section 24 and secondly, where  

Parliament has desired to exclude the period of interim order has made  

provision for exclusion of such period in proviso to Section 19 and  

explanation to Section 69 of the Act of 2013.  In the Act of 1894, there  

was a similar provision made in Section 6 and explanation to Section  

11A.  During the process of consultation of the stakeholders while  

enacting the Act of 2013, the Government of NCT of Delhi had suggested  

that an explanation be added in the provisions of Section 24 to exclude  

the period of interim order passed by the court.  The suggestion was not  

accepted by the Department of Land Reforms on the ground that same  

would be in conflict with the retrospective effect of the clause.   

Ultimately, in the final recommendation, the period of interim order of  

the court was not made.  Thus, it is “casus omissus” which cannot be  

applied by the court.  The maxim “actus curiæ neminem gravabit” is not  

applied and is rare if ever applied to interpret the statute.  

280. In Padma Sundar Rao (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court  

has declined to rely on the maxim and similarly in Khandaka Jain  

Jewellers, (supra), the maxim was not applied.  It was urged that in  

Snell’s Equity (33rd Edition), 2015 with respect to the maxim, it has been  

observed that maxim of equity is not a specific rule of principle of law.   

It is a statement of a broad theme which underlies equitable concepts

243    

and principles.  As a result, the utility of equitable maxim is limited.  It  

can provide some support to the court when there is some uncertainty  

as to the scope of a particular rule of principle and a court in exercising  

an equitable discretion may apply the same.  

281. Reference was also made to decision of Parson Tools and Plants  

(supra) to contend that court cannot supply the omission by engrafting  

on it or introducing in it under the guise of interpretation.  To do so, it  

would be entrenching upon the preserves of the legislature.  Where  

under Section 24 cut-off date is prescribed and there is no starting point  

and period for completion of task, the notion of excluding time spent in  

litigations is an alien concept to the provisions.  The court must assume  

that the old law was oppressive and unjust and such introduction of  

exclusion of time may create complication in the working of the statute.  

It was also submitted that common law principles can be excluded by  

the legislature by express or implied implication in the statute itself.  In  

this regard, reliance has been placed upon Union of India v. SICOM  

Ltd184.  It was submitted on behalf of landowners that no provision had  

been enacted by issuing any ordinance and later amending the law, for  

providing for exclusion of the time spent on interim order under Section  

24(2), but Ordinance lapsed.  The legislature could have amended the  

provisions as such the court cannot exclude the period.  

                                                           184 (2009) 2 SCC 121

244    

282. Before we go to various rival submissions, the pivotal question for  

consideration is the interpretation of Section 24 and aims and objectives  

of the Act of 2013.  Section 24 contemplates that the proceedings  

initiated under the Act of 1894, are pending as on the date on which  

Act of 2013 has been enacted and if no award has been passed in the  

proceedings, then there is no lapse and only determination of  

compensation has to be made under the Act of 2013.  Where an award  

has been passed, it is provided under Section 24(1)(b), the pending  

proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894 as if  

the old Act has not been repealed. The provisions totally exclude the  

applicability of any provision of Act of 2013.  There are two requirements  

under Section 24(2), which are to be met by the Authorities, where  

award has been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of  

the Act of 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been  

taken nor compensation has been paid.  If possession has been taken,  

compensation has to be paid by the acquiring authorities. The time of  

five years is provided for authorities to take action, not to sleep over the  

matter.  In case of lethargy or machinery and default on the part of the  

Authorities and for no other reason the lapse is provided.  Lapse is  

provided only in case of default by Authorities acquiring the land, not  

caused by any other reason or order of the court.  When the  

interpretation of the provision is clear, there was no necessity for  

Parliament to make such a provision under Section 24(2) for exclusion  

of the period of the interim order.  Though it has excluded the period of

245    

interim order for making declaration under the proviso to Sections 19(7)  

and exclusion has also been made for computation of the period under  

Section 69 of the Act of 2013.  It is due to the necessity to provide so in  

view of the language of the provision.  Under section 69 of the Act of  

2013, additional compensation at the rate of 12 per cent has to be given  

on market value for the period commencing from the date of the  

publication of the preliminary notification under Section 11.  The  

additional compensation at the rate of 12 per cent has been excluded  

for the period acquisition proceedings have been held up on account of  

the interim injunction order of any court.  The provisions of Section 24  

cast an obligation upon the Authorities to take steps meaning thereby  

that it is open to them to take such steps, and inaction or lethargy on  

their part has not been countenanced by Parliament. Resultantly, lapse  

of proceedings takes place.  It is by the very nature of the provisions if  

it was not possible for authorities for any reason not attributable to  

them or the Government to take requisite steps, the period has to be  

excluded.  The Minister concerned Shri Jairam Ramesh in answer to  

the debate quoted above has made it clear that time limit of five years  

has been fixed for the Authorities to take action. If we do not exclude  

the period of interim order, the very spirit of the provision will be  

violated.  

283. With respect to fixation of period is five years for the executive  

Authorities to take the requisite steps, Delhi Development Authority v.

246    

Sukhbir Singh and Ors. (supra) observed that what the legislature is in  

effect telling the executive is that they ought to have put their house in  

order and completed the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable  

time after the pronouncement of award. Not having done so even after  

a leeway of five years, would cross the limits of legislative tolerance, after  

which the whole proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. Thus, it  

is apparent from the decision of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir  

Singh and Ors. (supra), which is relied upon by the landowners, that  

time limit is fixed for the executive authorities to take steps.  In case  

they are prevented by the court's order, obviously, as per the  

interpretation of the provisions is that such period has to be excluded.   

In case such a provision would have been made, it would have been “ex  

abundanti cautela”.  There was no necessity of making such a provision  

even if this proposition has been discussed during the formulation of  

legislation. However, the provision providing exclusion has been  

enacted. It casts an obligation upon the Authorities to take requisite  

steps within five years, that by itself excludes such period of interim  

order.  

284. It was pointed out that in certain States, amendments have been  

incorporated in Section 24(2), excluding the period of interim order  

passed by the Court.  In our opinion, there is no such necessity for  

providing exclusion of time and it has been done by the States “ex  

abundanti cautela” and there is no doubt about it that Central

247    

Government has also tried to introduce the provision of the exclusion of  

time by issuance of ordinances, however, they lapsed.  It was due to the  

interpretation and the decision rendered by this Court in Shree Balaji  

Nagar Residential Association (supra), which cannot be said to be laying  

down the law correctly.  

285. The intent of the Act of 2013, is not to benefit litigants only.  It  

has introduced a new regime which is beneficial to the landowners.  The  

provisions of Section 24 by itself do not intend to confer the benefits on  

litigating parties, while as per Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and section  

6 of the General Clauses Act, has to be litigated as per the provisions of  

the Act of 1894.  

286. Section 24 treats land acquisition proceedings as one and  

prescribes the transition mechanism for the said proceedings.   

Possession of the land holdings in normal course is to be taken at one  

go, not in piecemeal by the Authorities.  Once award is made,  

possession can be taken and on that the land vests in State under  

section 16, and under Section 17(1) of the Act of 1894, the possession  

of any land can be taken for public purposes in cases of urgency without  

passing of the award.  The expression “acquisition proceedings” is  

referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 24 and its proviso  

makes it clear that in case in majority of the landholdings compensation  

has not been deposited, all the beneficiaries as on the date of  

notification under Section 4 (of the Act of 1894) shall be entitled to

248    

compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013.   

That also intends to give benefits to all the concerned.  Payment of  

compensation too has to be made.  Possession of land holdings is to be  

taken in terms of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under  

section 6 and payment has to be made to the beneficiaries.  In case  

payment has not been made to the landowners nor is possession taken,  

there is a lapse.  In case compensation has not been deposited within 5  

years with respect to majority of land holdings, then all the beneficiaries  

are entitled for higher compensation under the Act of 2013.  

287. In the opinion of this court it is not the intendment of the Act of  

2013 that those who have litigated should get benefits of higher  

compensation as contemplated under Section 24 benefit is conferred on  

all beneficiaries. It is not intended by the provisions that in piecemeal  

the persons who have litigated and have obtained the interim order  

should get the benefits of the provisions of the Act of 2013.  Those who  

have accepted the compensation within 5 years and handed over the  

possession too, are to be benefited, in case amount has not been  

deposited with respect to majority of holdings.  There are cases in which  

projects have come up in part and as per plan rest of the area is required  

for planned development with respect to which interim stays have been  

obtained.  It is not the intendment of the law to deliver advantage to  

relentless litigants. It cannot be said hence, that it was due to the  

inaction of the authorities that possession could not be taken within 5

249    

years.  Public policy is not to foment or foster litigation but put an end  

to it.  In several instances, in various High Courts writ petitions were  

dismissed by single judge Benches and the writ appeals were pending  

for a long time and in which, with respect to part of land of the projects,  

efforts were made to obtain the benefit of Section 24(2).  Parliament in  

our view did not intend to confer benefits to such litigants for the  

aforementioned reasons.  Litigation may be frivolous or may be worthy.   

Such litigants have to stand on the strength of their own case and in  

such a case provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and Section 6  

of the General Clauses Act, 1897, are clearly attracted and such  

proceedings have to be continued under the provisions of the old Act  

that would be in the spirit of Section 24(1)(b) itself of the Act of 2013.   

Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that repeal will  

not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or  

anything duly done or suffered thereunder.  Section 6(c) states that  

repeal would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability  

acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed.  When  

there is a provision itself in Section 24(1)(b) of continuance of the  

proceedings where award has been passed under the Act of 1894, for  

the purposes of Section 24 as provided in Section 24(b), the provisions  

of Section 114 is clearly attracted so as the provisions of Section 6 of  

the General Clauses Act, 1897, to the extent of non obstante clause of  

Section 24, where possession has not been taken nor payment has been  

made, there is a lapse, that too by the inaction of the Authorities.  Any

250    

court’s interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or  

agencies; thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years  

period as envisaged in Section 24(2).  As per proviso to Section 24(2),  

where possession has been taken, but compensation has not been paid  

or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the  

beneficiaries would be entitled for higher compensation only to that  

extent, the provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, would be  

superseded but it would not obliterate the general application of Section  

6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which deals with effect of repeal  

except as provided in section 24(2) and its proviso.  

288. It was submitted on behalf of acquiring authorities that principle  

of casus omissus is not necessarily applicable in all the cases.  Reliance  

has been placed on Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher185, in which  

following observations have been made:  

“The question for decision in this case is whether we are at  liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of “burden” so as to  include a contingent burden of the kind I have described.  Now  this court has already held that this sub-section is to be liberally  construed so as to give effect to the governing principles embodied  in the legislation (Winchester Court Ld. v. Miller); and I think we  should do the same.  Whenever a statute comes up for  consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human  powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise,  and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms  free from all ambiguity.  The English language is not an  instrument of mathematical precision.  Our literature would be  much the poorer if it were.  This is where the draftsmen of Acts of  Parliament have often been unfairly criticized.  A judge, believing  himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to  the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have  not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other  ambiguity.  It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of  Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect  

                                                           185 (1949) 2 K.B. 481

251    

clarity.  In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge  cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.  He must  set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of  Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the  statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions  which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to  remedy, and then he must supplement the written word sc as to  give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature.  That was  clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon’s  case, and it is the safest guide to-day.  Good practical advice on  the subject was given about the same time by Plowden in his  second volume Evston v. Studd.  Put into homely metaphor it is  this: A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the  Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how  would they have straightened it out?  He must then do as they  would have done.  A judge must not alter the material of which it  is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.  

Approaching this case in that way, I cannot help feeling that the  legislature had not specifically in mind a contingent burden such  as we have here.  If it had, would it not have put it on the same  footing as an actual burden?  I think it would.  It would have  permitted an increase of rent when the terms were so changed as  to put a positive legal burden on the landlord.  If the parties  expressly agreed between themselves the amount of the increase  on that account the court would give effect to their agreement.   But if, as here, they did not direct their minds to the point, the  court has itself to assess the amount of the increase.  It has to  say how much the tenant should pay "in respect of" the transfer  of this burden to the landlord.  It should do this by asking what  a willing tenant would agree to pay and a willing landlord would  agree to accept in respect of it.  Just as in the earlier cases the  courts were able to assess the value of the "fair wear and tear"  clause, and of a "cooker." So they can assess the value of the hot  water clause and translate it fairly in terms of rent; and what  applies to hot water applies also to the removal of refuse and so  forth.  I agree that the appeal should be allowed, and with the  order proposed by Asquith LJ.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

289. Reliance was also placed on M. Pentiah v. Muddala  

Veeramallappa186, in which this Court observed that where the  

language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical  

construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose  

of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or  

                                                           186 (1961) 2 SCR 295

252    

injustice, which is not intended, a construction may be put upon it  

which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the  

sentence. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar187 , it  

was held that absurdity has to be avoided.  In that decision reliance was  

placed on the decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra), wherein it  

was observed that when a defect or omission appears, a judge cannot  

simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.  It is the duty to give  

force and life to the intention of the legislature.  The court has to  

construe the words of the statute in a reasonable way having regard to  

the context.  

 290. Again, in Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India188 , the  

decision in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra) has been followed.   

Following observations have been made:  

“18. Applying the above rule, we are of the opinion that the rule- makers did not intend to deprive the army personnel of the benefit  of the disability pension solely on the ground that the cost of the  journey was not borne by the public exchequer. If the journey was  authorised, it can make no difference whether the fare for the  same came from the public exchequer or the army personnel  himself.”  

 291. There cannot be any dispute with the above propositions.  

However, in the present case, when we construe the provisions of  

Section 24, it clearly ousts the period spent during the interim stay of  

the court.  Five years’ period is fixed for the purpose to take action, if  

they have not taken the action for 5 years or more, then there is lapse,  

                                                           187  (1988) 2 SCC 513  188 (1999) 6 SCC 459

253    

not otherwise.  Even if there had been a provision made with respect to  

the exclusion of time spent in the court proceedings with respect to  

interim stay due to court’s order, it could have been ex abundanti  

cautela, which has been considered by this Court in Union of India and  

Ors. v. Modi Rubber Ltd189.  It would have been superfluous to make  

such a provision.  Following observations were made in Modi Rubber  

Ltd. (supra):  

“7. Both these notifications, as the opening part shows, are  issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and  since the definition of ‘duty’ in Rule 2, clause (v) must necessarily  be projected in Rule 8(1) and the expression “duty of excise” in  Rule 8(1) must be read in the light of that definition, the same  expression used in these two notifications issued under Rule 8(1)  must also be interpreted in the same sense, namely, duty of  excise payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and  the exemption granted under both these notifications must be  regarded as limited only to such duty of excise. But the  respondents contended that the expression “duty of excise” was  one of large amplitude and in the absence of any restrictive or  limitative words indicating that it was intended to refer only to  duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,  1944, it must be held to cover all duties of excise whether leviable  under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or under any other  enactment. The respondents sought to support this contention by  pointing out that whenever the Central Government wanted to  confine the exemption granted under a notification to the duty of  excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the  Central Government made its intention abundantly clear by using  appropriate words of limitation such as “duty of excise leviable ...  under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944” or  “duty of excise leviable ... under the Central Excises and Salt Act,  1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the said Act” as in the  Notification No. CER-8(3)/55-C.E. dated September 17, 1955,  Notification No. 255/77-C.E. dated July 20, 1977, Notification No.  CER-8(1)/55-C.E. dated September 2, 1955, Notification No. CER- 8(9)/55-C.E. dated December 31, 1955, Notification No. 95/61- C.E. dated April 1, 1961, Notification No. 23/55-C.E. dated April  29, 1955 and similar other notifications. But, here said the  respondents, no such words of limitation are used in the two  notifications in question and the expression “duty of excise” must,  therefore, be read according to its plain natural meaning as  including all duties of excise, including special duty of excise and  auxiliary duty of excise. Now, it is no doubt true that in these  various notifications referred to above, the Central Government  

                                                           189 (1986) 4 SCC 66

254    

has, while granting exemption under Rule 8(1), used specified  language indicating that the exemption, total or partial, granted  under each such notification is in respect of excise duty leviable  under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. But, merely  because, as a matter of drafting, the Central Government has in  some notifications specifically referred to the excise duty in  respect of which exemption is granted as “duty of excise” leviable  under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it does not follow  that in the absence of such words of specificity, the expression  “duty of excise” standing by itself must be read as referring to all  duties of excise. It is not uncommon to find that the legislature  sometimes, with a view to making its intention clear beyond  doubt, uses language ex abundanti cautela though it may not be  strictly necessary and even without it the same intention can be  spelt out as a matter of judicial construction and this would be  more so in case of subordinate legislation by the executive. The  officer drafting a particular piece of subordinate legislation in the  Executive Department may employ words with a view to leaving  no scope for possible doubt as to its intention or sometimes even  for greater completeness, though these words may not add  anything to the meaning and scope of the subordinate legislation.  Here, in the present notifications, the words duty of excise  leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944’ do not find  a place as in the other notifications relied upon by the  respondents. But, that does not necessarily lead to the inference  that the expression “duty of excise” in these notifications was  intended to refer to all duties of excise including special and  auxiliary duties of excise. The absence of these words does not  absolve us from the obligation to interpret the expression “duty of  excise” in these notifications. We have still to construe this  expression — what is its meaning and import — and that has to  be done bearing in mind the context in which it occurs. We have  already pointed out that these notifications having been issued  under Rule 8(1), the expression “duty of excise” in these  notifications must bear the same meaning which it has in Rule  8(1) and that meaning clearly is — excise duty payable under the  Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as envisaged in Rule 2 clause  (v). It cannot in the circumstances bear an extended meaning so  as to include special excise duty and auxiliary excise duty.”                             

(emphasis supplied)  

 292. Relying on State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn.  

and Ors.,190 it was submitted that whether a piece of legislation has  

spent itself or exhausted in operation are matters of law and no such  

rights exist in a citizen to ask for a declaration that the law has been  

impliedly repealed on any such ground.  In extreme and clear cases, no  

                                                           190 (1979) 3 SCC 229

255    

doubt, an antiquated law may be said to have become obsolete and,  

more so, if it is a penal law and has become incapable of user by a  

drastic change in the circumstances.  Craies on Statute Law, Seventh  

Edition, has discussed about different classes of enactments such as  

expired, spent, repealed in general terms, virtually repealed, superseded  

and obsolete.   

293. The Act of 2013 operates prospectively. Section 114 of the Act of  

2013, effects a repeal, but with certain savings, in accordance with  

Section 24. Thus, acquisition proceedings are preserved under the Act  

of 1894, till the stage of making of award; where award is not made, the  

provisions of compensation under the Act of 2013 apply; where award  

is made, further proceedings would be under the new Act (of 2013).  In  

case possession has been taken by the authorities concerning awards  

which were made 5 years or before, under the Act of 1894 and such  

proceedings are pending, that would be due to inaction of the  

authorities on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force.  The  

lapse (of acquisition) and higher compensation to follow only under  

Section 24(2), where compensation is not paid, nor possession of lands  

is taken.  A period of 5 years or more has been provided under Section  

24. In the case, however, where possession is taken, but compensation  

is not deposited in respect of majority landholdings, compensation  

under the Act of 2013 is payable to all- including those who received  

compensation earlier.  

256    

294. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Syndicate Bank v.  

Prabha D. Naik and Anr191, in which it was observed that the legislature  

is supposed to be conscious of the needs of the society at large and the  

prevalent laws.  It was held that there is no reason for assuming that  

the legislature was not aware of the difficulties and the prevailing  

situation.  There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition; however,  

it does not espouse the cause of the landowners.  

295. The correctness of the decision of Shree Balaji Nagar Residential  

Association (supra) was doubted in Yogesh Neema and Ors. (supra), and  

the matter was referred to a larger Bench.  In Shree Balaji Nagar  

Residential Association (supra) following observations were made:  

“11. From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, it is clear  that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period  during which the land acquisition proceeding might have  remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any  court. In the same Act, the proviso to Section 19(7) in the context of  limitation for publication of declaration under Section 19(1) and  the Explanation to Section 69(2) for working out the market value  of the land in the context of delay between preliminary  notification under Section 11 and the date of the award,  specifically provide that the period or periods during which the  acquisition proceedings were held up on account of any stay or  injunction by the order of any court be excluded in computing the  relevant period. In that view of the matter, it can be safely  concluded that the legislature has consciously omitted to extend  the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) even if the  proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or  injunction granted by a court of law or for any reason. Such casus  omissus cannot be supplied by the court in view of law on the  subject elaborately discussed by this Court in Padma Sundara  Rao v. State of T.N (2002) 3 SCC 533.  

12. Even in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the legislature had  brought about amendment in Section 6 through an Amendment  Act of 1984 to add Explanation 1 for the purpose of excluding the  

                                                           191 (2001) 4 SCC 713

257    

period when the proceeding suffered stay by an order of the court,  in the context of limitation provided for publishing the declaration  under Section 6(1) of the Act. To a similar effect was the  Explanation to Section 11-A, which was added by Amendment  Act 68 of 1984. Clearly, the legislature has, in its wisdom, made  the period of five years under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act  absolute and unaffected by any delay in the proceedings on  account of any order of stay by a court. The plain wordings used  by the legislature are clear and do not create any ambiguity or  conflict. In such a situation, the court is not required to depart  from the literal rule of interpretation.”  

296. This Court held that the conscious omission by Parliament in  

Section 24(2) to exclude the period, an interim order operates is to be  

given effect and that the court should not fill in the gap.  In Indore  

Development Authority (supra), the decision rendered in Shree Balaji  

Nagar Residential Association (supra) was overruled with consensus and  

it was not the subject matter in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra).   

However, the learned counsel for the parties had urged that this  

question arises as such it should be framed and considered by the  

present larger Bench.  Hence, we have examined the matter afresh.  

297. In  cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to  

litigation (which they have a right to) and have obtained interim orders  

on taking possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical  

reality it is not possible for the authorities or State officials to take the  

possession or to make payment of the compensation. In several  

instances, such interim orders also impeded the making of an award.  

Now, so far as awards (and compensation payments, pursuant to such  

proceedings were concerned) the period provided for making of awards  

under the Act of 2013 could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to

258    

Section 11A.192 Thus, no fault of inaction can be attributed to the  

authorities and those who had obtained such interim orders, cannot  

benefit by their own action in filing litigation, which may or may not be  

meritorious.  Apart from the question of merits, when there is an interim  

order with respect to the possession or order of status quo or stay of  

further proceedings, the authorities cannot proceed; nor can they pay  

compensation.  Their obligations are intertwined with the scheme of  

land acquisition.  It is observed that authorities may wait in the  

proceedings till the interim order is vacated.  

298. In our considered opinion, litigation which initiated by the  

landowners has to be decided on its own merits and the benefits of  

Section 24(2) should not be available to the litigants.  In case there is  

no interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not  

otherwise as a result of fruit of litigation, delays and dilatory tactics and  

some time it may be wholly frivolous pleas and forged documents as  

observed in V. Chandrasekaran (supra) mentioned above.  

                                                           192 “11-A. Period within which an award shall be made   

The Collcctor shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the  

date of the publication of the declaration and ifno award is made within that period. the  

entire proceedings for the acquisition ofthc land shall lapse:   

Provided that in a case where thc said declaration has been published before the  

commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984 the award shall be made  

within a period oftwo years from such commencements.   

Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this section. the period  

during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the s..'lid declaration is  

stayed by an order ofa court shall be excluded.

259    

299. In Abhey Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India and  

Ors193., this Court considered the extended meaning of words "stay of  

the action or proceedings".  It was observed that any type of orders  

passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the  

Authorities to proceed further.  This Court observed thus:  

“9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of India,  37 (1989) DLT 150 (Del) DB, are obvious with reference to the  quashing of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 vis- à-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question that arises for  consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the  persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the  declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the  cases relating to the appellants. We proceed on the premise that  the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the  declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in  fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication  of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not restricted  the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the  petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till  the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given  extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various  cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of  Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531, Hansraj H. Jain v. State of  Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634, Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan  v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145, Gandhi Grah Nirman  Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662, G.  Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261  and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India, (1986) 1 Apex Dec 6. The  words “stay of the action or proceeding” have been widely  interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders  passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of  the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting  an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the  declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless  the Court holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was properly  conducted and the declaration published under Section 6 was  valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into  the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some  would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in  that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the  earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and  consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the  respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness,  though it is open to doubt.”  

                                                           193 (1997) 5 SCC 421

260    

300. In Om Parkash v. Union of India and Ors.194, it was observed that  

interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners  

would put complete restraint on the respondents to proceed further to  

issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  It was observed as under:  

“72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in  one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint  on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification  under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification  during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously  they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court.  The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such  that it had completely restrained the respondents from  proceeding further in the matter by issuing  declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.”  

301. In Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti195, this Court considered the  

provision where tenant would not be entitled to the protection of Section  

39.  If the suit had prolonged beyond ten years, then the tenant would  

be entitled to such protection.  The interpretation suggested was not  

accepted by this Court as that would encourage the tenant to protract  

the litigation.  This Court frowned upon obtaining of fruits by  

protracting the litigation on the ground of public policy.  This Court  

observed thus:  

“17. It was argued that the words ‘commencement of this Act’  should be construed to mean the date on which the moratorium  period expired and the Act became applicable to the demised  building. Such a view would require this Court to give different  meanings to the same expression appearing at two places in the  same section. The words ‘on the date of commencement of this  Act’ in relation to the pendency of the suit would mean July 15,  1972 as held in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta,  (1982) 2 SCC 61, but the words ‘from such date of  commencement’ appearing immediately thereafter in relation to  the deposit to be made would have to be construed as the date of  actual application of the Act at a date subsequent to July 15,  1972. Ordinarily, the rule of construction is that the same  

                                                           194 (2010) 4 SCC 17  195 (1990) 1 SCC 593

261    

expression where it appears more than once in the same statute,  more so in the same provision, must receive the same meaning  unless the context suggests otherwise. Besides, such an  interpretation would render the use of prefix 'such' before the  word 'commencement' redundant. Thirdly such an interpretation  would run counter to the view taken by this Court in Atma Ram  Mittal case, (1988) 4 SCC 284,  wherein it was held that no man  could be made to suffer because of the court's fault or court's  delay in the disposal of the suit. To put it differently, if the suit  could be disposed of within the period of 10 years, the tenant  would not be entitled to the protection of Section 39, but if the suit  is prolonged beyond ten years, the tenant would be entitled to  such protection. Such an interpretation would encourage the  tenant to protract the litigation, and if he succeeds in delaying the  disposal of the suit till the expiry of 10 years, he will secure the  benefit of Section 39, otherwise not. We are, therefore, of the  opinion that it is not possible to uphold the argument.”  

 302. In Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr.196, a  

Constitution Bench of this Court observed that substantive rights of the  

parties are to be examined on the date of the suit unless the legislature  

makes such rights retrospective. The Court made following  

observations:  

“28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that emerges  is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh  legislation, such legislation does not affect the substantive rights  of the parties on the date of the suit or adjudication of the suit  unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal  cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence  after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the  rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law  in force on the date of the suit. However, the position in law would  be different in the matters which relate to procedural law, but so  far as substantive rights of parties are concerned, they remain  unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are,  therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an  enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act,  such legislation is prospective in operation and does not affect  substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made  retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We  are further of the view that there is a presumption against the  retrospective operation of a statute and further a statute is not to  be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its  language renders necessary, but an amending Act which affects  the procedure is presumed to be retrospective unless the  amending Act provides otherwise. We have carefully looked into  the new substituted Section 15 brought in the parent Act by the  

                                                           196 (2001) 8 SCC 24

262    

Amendment Act, 1995 but do not find it either expressly or by  necessary implication retrospective in operation which may affect  the rights of the parties on the date of adjudication of the suit and  the same is required to be taken into consideration by the  appellate court. In Shanti Devi v. Hukum Chand, (1996) 5 SCC  768, this Court had occasion to interpret the substituted Section  15 with which we are concerned and held that on a plain reading  of Section 15, it is clear that it has been introduced prospectively  and there is no question of such section affecting in any manner  the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption  affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. We are  respectfully in agreement with the view expressed in the said  decision and hold that the substituted Section 15 in the absence  of anything in it to show that it is retrospective, does not affect  the right of the parties which accrued to them on the date of the  suit or on the date of passing of the decree by the court of the first  instance. We are also of the view that the present appeals are  unaffected by the change in law insofar it related to the  determination of the substantive rights of the parties and the  same are required to be decided in the light of the law of pre- emption as it existed on the date of passing of the decree.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

 303. In Sarah Mathew (supra), it was observed that delay caused by the  

court in taking cognizance cannot deny justice to the litigant.  A court  

of law would interpret and make the reasonable construction rather  

than applying a doctrine which would make the provision  

unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution.  This Court observed  

thus:  

“37. We are inclined to take this view also because there has to  be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of  limitation relating to criminal offenses. If, as stated by this Court,  taking cognizance is the application of mind by the Magistrate to  the suspected offense, the subjective element comes in. Whether  a Magistrate has taken cognizance or not will depend on facts  and circumstances of each case. A diligent complainant or the  prosecuting agency which promptly files the complaint or initiates  prosecution would be severely prejudiced if it is held that the  relevant point for computing limitation would be the date on  which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the  prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the  Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period  because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be  the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant out  of the court in this manner. Besides, it must be noted that the  complainant approaches the court for redressal of his grievance.

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He wants action to be taken against the perpetrators of crime.  The courts functioning under the criminal justice system are  created for this purpose. It would be unreasonable to take the  view that delay caused by the court in taking cognizance of a  case would deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an  interpretation of Section 468 CrPC would be unsustainable and  would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a court of  law would interpret a provision which would help to sustain the  validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable  construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make  the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P.  Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra. (2008) 10 SCC  139)”  

304. When the authorities are disabled from performing duties due to  

impossibility, would be a good excuse for them to save them from rigour  

of provisions of Section 24(2).  A litigant may be right or wrong.  He  

cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation created by him of  

interim order.  The doctrine “commodum ex-injuria sua Nemo habere  

debet" that is convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong.   

Provisions of Section 24 do not discriminate litigants or non-litigants  

and treat them differently with respect to the same acquisition,  

otherwise, anomalous results may occur and provisions may become  

discriminatory in itself.  

305. In Union of India v. Shiv Raj197, this Court did not consider the  

question of exclusion of the time. In Karnail Kaur and Ors. v. State of  

Punjab and Ors., (supra) and in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential  

Association (supra), various aspects including the interpretation of  

provisions of Section 24 were not taken into consideration.  Thus, the  

said rulings cannot be said to be laying down good law.  

                                                           197 2014 (6) SCC 564

264    

306. In Union of India and Ors. v. North Telumer Colliery & Ors198,  this  

Court observed that delaying tactics should not be permitted to fructify.   

By causing delay, the owner would get huge amount of interest, but he  

may not get a penny out of the principal amount.  It would amount to  

conferring unjust benefit on the owners which can never be the  

intention of the Parliament.  This Court observed:  

“8. The High Court’s conclusions are primarily based on the  interpretation of Section 18(5) of the Coal Act. The High Court has  quoted the meaning of words “enure” and “benefit” from various  dictionaries. No dictionary or any outside assistance is needed to  understand the meaning of these simple words in the context and  scheme of the Coal Act. The interest has to enure to the benefit of  the owners of the coal mines. The claims before the Commissioner  under the Coal Act are from the creditors of the owners, and the  liabilities sought to be discharged are also of the owners of the  coal mines. When the debts are paid and the liabilities  discharged, it is only the owners of coal mines who are benefited.  Taking away the interest amount by the owners without  discharging their debts and liabilities would be unreasonable.  They have only to adopt delaying tactics to postpone the  disbursement of claims and consequently earn more interest. Due  to such delay, the owner would get huge amount of interest  though ultimately, he may not get a penny out of principal amount  on the final settlement of claims. It would amount to conferring  unjust benefit on the owners which can never be the intention of  the Parliament. We do not agree with the interpretation given by  the High Court and hold that the interest accruing under the Coal  Act is the money paid to the Commissioner in relation to the coal  mine and the same has to be utilized by the Commissioner in  meeting the claims of the creditors and discharging other  liabilities in accordance with the provisions of the Coal Act.”  

 307. It may not be doubtful conduct to file frivolous litigation and  

obtain stay; but benefit of Section 24 (2) should not be conferred on  

those who prevented the taking of possession or payment of  

compensation, for the period spent during the stay.  

                                                           198 1989 (3) SCC 411

265    

308. In Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. (supra), this Court  

considered the question of casus omissus and observed thus:  

“12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus  omissus need careful consideration. It is a well-settled principle  in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory  provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict  of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the  determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary  rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be  found in words used by the legislature itself. The question is not  what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has  been said. "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of  Euclid," Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed  with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them."  (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547) The view  was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem  Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277.  

13. In D.R. Venkatchalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner  (1977) 2 SCC 273, it was observed that Courts must avoid the  danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision  based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure  or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat  fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the  disguise of interpretation.  

14. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the  law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and  subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature  to amend, modify, or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh  Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC  515) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the  judicial interpretative process. The language of Section 6(1) is  plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something  into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case. In Nanjudaiah's  case, the period was further stretched to have the time period run  from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view  cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view  is accepted, it would mean that a case can be covered by not only  clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also  by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative  intent.  

16. The plea relating to the applicability of the stare decisis  principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K.  Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of T.N., AIR 1980 Mad 251  was rendered on 22-6-1979, i.e., much prior to the amendment  by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of  life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is  quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by  specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature  specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or

266    

injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be  excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period  of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit  highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no  application to the fact situation of this case.”  

 309. There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition that casus  

omissus cannot be applied by the court and in case of clear necessity,  

the court has to interpret the law, if the provision of law is misused and  

subjected to abuse of process of law.  It is for the legislature to amend,  

modify and repeal a law, if deemed necessary.  Because of the above-

mentioned interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 itself, we are  

unable to accept the submission made.  We are not applying casus  

omissus as urged.  In Padma Sundara Rao (supra), this Court  

considered the period of limitation for issuances of declaration under  

Section 6 of the Act of 1894.  The period has been stretched further in  

the case of State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah199.  Few expressions  

in the aforesaid decision were held to be incorrect.  In Padma Sundara  

Rao (supra), this Court held that when a period, which the legislature  

has specifically provided, is covered by orders of stay and injunction, no  

other period could be intended to be excluded by providing time period  

to run from the date of service of the High Court’s order and it would  

not be open to court to add to that period.  The question in Padma  

Sundara Rao (supra) was totally different and it was of counting the  

period over and above excluded in the provisions, inter alia, from the  

very interpretation of Section 24.  

                                                           199 (1996) 10 SCC 619

267    

310. As regards application of the maxim to a statute, in Rana Girders  

Ltd. v. Union of India200, this Court observed that the statutory provision  

would prevail upon the common law principles.  The decision in Rana  

Girders Ltd. (supra) was considered in Union of India (supra) where this  

Court observed thus:  

“9. Generally, the rights of the Crown to recover the debt would  prevail over the right of a subject. Crown debt means the "debts  due to the State or the King; debts which a prerogative entitles  the Crown to claim priority for before all other creditors." [See  Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edn.), p.  1147.] Such creditors, however, must be held to mean unsecured  creditors. The principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the  common law principle. A common law, which is law within the  meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution, is saved in terms of  Article 372 thereof. Those principles of common law, thus, which  were existing at the time of coming into force of the Constitution  of India, are saved by reason of the aforementioned provision. A  debt that is secured or which by reason of the provisions of a  statute becomes the first charge over the property having regard  to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India  must be held to prevail over the Crown debt, which is an  unsecured one.  

10. It is trite that when Parliament or a State Legislature makes  an enactment, the same will prevail over the common law. Thus,  the common law principle which was existing on the date of  coming into force of the Constitution of India must yield to a  statutory provision. To achieve the same purpose, Parliament as  also the State Legislatures inserted provisions in various  statutes, some of which have been referred to hereinbefore,  providing that the statutory dues shall be the first charge over the  properties of the taxpayer. This aspect of the matter has been  considered by this Court in a series of judgments.”  

311. There is no doubt that common law principles have to be weighed  

upon the statutory provision and latter has to prevail, but the statutory  

provision itself makes it clear that in the instant matter such period has  

to be excluded, thus, the principles of common law also apply with full  

                                                           200 2013 (10) SCC 746

268    

force. In Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of T.N.201, the maxim "expressio  

unius est exclusio alterius" came to be considered by this Court.  It was  

held that maxim needs to be applied when its application having regard  

to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency  

or injustice. This Court observed:  

“19. Further, for the rule of interpretation on the basis of the  maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius," it has been  considered in the decision rendered by the Queen's Bench in the  case of Dean v. Wiesengrund, (1955) 2 QB 120. The Court  considered the said maxim and held that after all, it is no more  than an aid to construction and has little if any, weight where it  is possible to account for the "inclusio unius" on grounds other  than the intention to affect the “exclusio alterius." Thereafter, the  Court referred to the following passage from the case of  Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1887) 19 QBD 400, QBD at 406 wherein  the Court called for its approval—  

“… ‘The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been  pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below by  Wills, J., about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a  dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes or  documents. The exclusio is often the result of inadvertence or  accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its  application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to  be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.' In my opinion, the  application of the maxim here would lead to inconsistency and  injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the Act of 1920  uncertain and capricious in its operation.”  

312. The maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” means that the law does  

not expect the performance of the impossible. Though payment is  

possible but the logic of payment is relevant. There are cases in which  

compensation was tendered, but refused and then deposited in the  

treasury.  There was litigation in court, which was pending (or in some  

cases, decided); earlier references for enhancement of compensation  

were sought and compensation was enhanced. There was no challenge  

                                                           201 1999 (5) SCC 209

269    

to acquisition proceedings or taking possession etc.  In pending matters  

in this Court or in the High Court even in proceedings relating to  

compensation, Section 24 (2) was invoked to state that proceedings have  

lapsed due to non-deposit of compensation in the court or to deposit in  

the treasury or otherwise due to interim order of the court needful could  

not be done, as such proceedings should lapse.  

313. In Chander Kishore Jha v. Mahabir Prasad202 ,  an election petition  

was to be presented in the manner prescribed in Rule 6 of Chapter XXI-

E of the Patna High Court Rules.  The rules stipulated that the election  

petition, could under no circumstances, be presented to the Registrar  

to save the period of limitation.  The election petition could be presented  

in the open court upto 4.15 p.m. i.e., working hours of the court.  The  

Chief Justice had passed the order that court shall not sit for the rest  

after 3.15 p.m.  Thus, the petition filed the next day was held to be  

within time.  In Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. & Ors203., the maxim  

“actus curiae neminem gravabit” came up for consideration along with  

maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” – the law does not compel a man  

to perform act which is not possible.  Following observations had been  

made:  

“7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of  equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit — an act of the  court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is  founded upon justice and good sense, which serves a safe and  certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is,  lex non cogit ad impossibilia — the law does not compel a man to  

                                                           202 1999 (8) SCC 266  203 2000 (4) SCC 342

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do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its  administration are understood to disclaim as it does in its general  aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the  administration of law must adopt that general exception in  consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the  aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar  Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398 and Gursharan Singh v.  New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1996) 2 SCC 459.”  

314. Another Roman Law maxim “nemo tenetur ad impossibilia”, means  

no one is bound to do an impossibility.  Though such acts of taking  

possession and disbursement of compensation are not impossible, yet  

they are not capable of law performance, during subsistence of a court's  

order; the order has to be complied and cannot be violated.  Thus, on  

equitable principles also, such a period has to be excluded.  In Industrial  

Finance Corporation of India Ltd. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills  

Ltd. & Ors.204, this Court observed that where law creates a duty or  

charge and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default and  

has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him.  This Court  

relying upon the aforesaid maxim observed as under:  

“30. The Latin maxim referred to in the English judgment lex non  cogit ad impossibilia also expressed as impotentia excusat legem  in common English acceptation means, the law does not compel  a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. There ought  always thus to be an invincible disability to perform the  obligation, and the same is akin to the Roman maxim nemo  tenetur ad impossible. In Broom’s Legal Maxims, the state of the  situation has been described as below:  

“It is, then, a general rule which admits of ample practical  illustration, that impotentia excusat legem; where the law  creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to  perform it, without any default in him, and has no  remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him (t):  and though impossibility of performance is, in general, no  excuse for not performing an obligation which a party has  expressly undertaken by contract, yet when the  obligation is one implied by law, impossibility of  performance is a good excuse. Thus in a case in which  

                                                           204 2002 (5) SCC 54

271    

consignees of a cargo were prevented from unloading a  ship promptly by reason of a dock strike, the Court, after  holding that in the absence of an express agreement to  unload in a specified time there was implied obligation to  unload within a reasonable time, held that the maxim lex  non cogit ad impossibilia applied, and Lindley, L.J., said:  ‘We have to do with implied obligations, and I am not  aware of any case in which an obligation to pay damages  is ever cast by implication upon a person for not doing  that which is rendered impossible by causes beyond his  control.’ ”  

 315. In HUDA and Anr. v. Dr. Babeswar Kanhar & Anr205, this Court  

considered the general principle that a party prevented from doing an  

act by some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first  

subsequent opportunity as held in Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami  

Reddi206.  In Dr. Babeswar Kanhar (supra), it was observed thus:  

“5. What is stipulated in clause 4 of the letter dated 30-10-2001  is a communication regarding refusal to accept the allotment. This  was done on 28-11-2001. Respondent 1 cannot be put to a loss  for the closure of the office of HUDA on 1-12-2001 and 2-12-2001  and the postal holiday on 30-11-2001. In fact, he had no control  over these matters. Even the logic of Section 10 of the General  Clauses Act, 1897, can be pressed into service. Apart from the  said section and various provisions in various other Acts, there is  the general principle that a party prevented from doing an act by  some circumstances beyond his control, can do so at the first  subsequent opportunity (see Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami  Reddi, (1898) 8 MLJ 265). The underlying object of the principle  is to enable a person to do what he could have done on holiday,  on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed  for the performance of an act in a court or office, and that period  expires on holiday, then the act should be considered to have  been done within that period if it is done on the next day on which  the court or office is open. The reason is that the law does not  compel the performance of an impossibility. (See Hossein Ally v.  Donzelle, ILR (1880) 5 Cal 906.) Every consideration of justice  and expediency would require that the accepted principle, which  underlies Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, should be  applied in cases where it does not otherwise in terms apply. The  principles underlying are lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law  does not compel a man to do the impossible) and actus curiae  neminem gravabit (the act of court shall prejudice no man). Above  being the position, there is nothing infirm in the orders passed by  the forums below. However, the rate of interest fixed appears to  

                                                           205 (2005) 1 SCC 191  206 ILR (1899) 22 Mad 179

272    

be slightly on the higher side and is reduced to 9% to be paid with  effect from 3-12-2001, i.e., the date on which the letter was  received by HUDA.”  

 316. In re Presidential Poll207, this Court made similar observations.   

When there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a charge  

has to be excused.  When performance of the formalities prescribed by  

a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances over which the  

persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken as a valid excuse.   

The Court observed:  

“15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the  vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the  term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear  from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its  mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat  legam is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non  cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legam is that when  there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the  mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does  not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform.  "Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is  disabled to perform it, without any default in him and has no  remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him."  Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities  prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by  circumstances over which the persons interested had no control,  like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid  excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance of the  words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its  mandatory character because of supervening impossibility  caused by the act of God. (See Broom’s Legal Maxims 10th Edn.  At pp. 162-163 and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn. at p. 268).”  

317. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement208, the  

legal maxim “impotentia excusat legem” has been applied to hold that  

law does not compel a man to do that which cannot possibly be  

performed.  Though the maxim with respect to the impossibility of  

                                                           207 (1974) 2 SCC 33  208 (2005) 4 SCC 530

273    

performance may not be strictly applicable, however, the effect of the  

court's order, for the time being, made the Authorities disable to fulfill  

the obligation.  Thus, when they were incapable of performing, they  

have to be permitted to perform at the first available opportunity, which  

is the time prescribed by the statute for them, i.e., the total period of 5  

years excluding the period of the interim order.  

318. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon the  

principle due to court proceedings or acts of court, no party should  

suffer. If any interim orders are made during the pendency of the  

litigation, they are subject to the final decision in the matter. In case  

the matter is dismissed as without merit, the interim order is  

automatically dissolved. In case the matter has been filed without any  

merit, the maxim is attracted commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere  

debet, that is, convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong.  

No person ought to have the advantage of his own wrong. In case  

litigation has been filed frivolously or without any basis, iniquitously in  

order to delay and by that it is delayed, there is no equity in favour of  

such a person. Such cases are required to be decided on merits. In  

Mrutunjay Pani and Anr. v. Narmada Bala Sasmal and Anr209, this Court  

observed that:  

“(5)  X x x The same principle is comprised in the latin maxim  commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, that is,  convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. To put  it in other words, no one can be allowed to benefit from his own  wrongful act. …”   

                                                           209 AIR 1961 SC 1353

274    

319. It is not the policy of law that untenable claims should get  

fructified due to delay. Similarly, sufferance of a person who abides by  

law is not permissible. The Act of 2013 does not confer the benefit on  

unscrupulous litigants, but it aims at and frowns upon the lethargy of  

the officials to complete the requisites within five years.   

320. The States urge that by refusal to accept compensation, one  

cannot take advantage of own conduct. This idea is explained in  

Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) by P. St. J.  

Langon, wherein following observations have been made:  

“On the principles of avoiding injustice and absurdity, any  construction will, if possible, be rejected (unless the policy of the  Act requires it) if it would enable a person by his own act to impair  an obligation which he has undertaken, or otherwise to profit by  his own wrong.  He may not take advantage of his own wrong.   He may not plead in his own interest a self created necessity”  (Kish v. Taylor, (1911) 1 K.B. 625, per Fletcher Moulton I.J. at  page 634).  

Thus an Act which authorised justices to discharge apprentice  from his indenture in certain circumstances “on the master’s  appearance” before them justified a discharge in his wilful  absence.  It would have been unreasonable to have construed the  Act in such a way that the master derived an advantage from his  own obstinacy (Ditton’s Case (1701) 2 Salk. 490)”  

321. In G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India210, it was observed that  

while vacating stay, it is the court’s duty to account for the period of  

delay and to settle equities. It is not the gain which can be conferred. In  

Jaipur Municipal Corporation v. C. L. Mishra211, it has been observed that  

interim order merges in the final order, and it cannot have an  

independent existence, cannot survive beyond final decision. In Ram  

                                                           210 (1998) 3 SCC 376  211 (2005) 8 SCC 423

275    

Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P212, reliance was placed on Grindlays  

Bank Ltd. v. C.I.T213. It was held that no one could be permitted to suffer  

from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed  

and ultimately petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed,  

the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage  

gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be  

neutralized.  

 322. In Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation214, it  

has been observed that the Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex  

debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the  

defendants by the act of the court. Such action is necessary to put a  

check on abuse of process of the court. In Amarjeet Singh and Ors. v.  

Devi Ratan and Ors215, and Ram Krishna Verma (supra), it was observed  

that no person can suffer from the act of court and unfair advantage of  

the interim order must be neutralized. In Amarjeet Singh (supra), this  

Court observed:  

“17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of the  case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the  final order to be passed in the case, and if the writ petition is  ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified  automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of  its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame  the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any  merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The  maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act  of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a  case. In such a fact situation, the court is under an obligation to  

                                                           212 (1992) 2 SCC 620  213 (1980) 2 SCC 191  214 (1995) 3 SCC 33  215 (2010) 1 SCC 417

276    

undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any  undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the  jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized, as the institution of  litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor  from delayed action by the act of the court. (Vide Shiv Shankar v.  U.P. SRTC, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726, GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union  of India, (1998) 3 SCC 376 and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L.  Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423.)  

18. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. (1992) 2 SCC 620,  this Court examined a similar issue while placing reliance upon  its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO, (1980) 2 SCC  191 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the court and  in case an interim order has been passed, and the petitioner  takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the petition is found to  be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice  requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a  party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralized."   

323. In Karnataka Rare Earth and Anr. v. Senior Geologist, Department  

of Mines & Geology216, this Court observed that maxim actus curiae  

neminem gravabit requires that the party should be placed in the same  

position but for the court's order which is ultimately found to be not  

sustainable which has resulted in one party gaining advantage which  

otherwise would not have earned and the other party has suffered but  

for the orders of the court. The successful party can demand the delivery  

of benefit earned by the other party, or make restitution for what it has  

lost. This Court observed:   

“10. In x x x x the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit and  held that the doctrine was not confined in its application only to  such acts of the court which were erroneous; the doctrine is  applicable to all such acts as to which it can be held that the court  would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the  facts and the law. It is the principle of restitution that is attracted.  When on account of an act of the party, persuading the court to  pass an order, which at the end is held as not sustainable, has  resulted in one party gaining advantage which it would not have  otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an  impoverishment which it would not have suffered, but for the  order of the court and the act of such party, then the successful  party finally held entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money  

                                                           216 (2004) 2 SCC 783

277    

at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the  same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim  order of the court would not have been passed. The successful  party can demand: (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the  opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make  restitution for what it has lost.  

11. In the facts of this case, in spite of the judgment of the High  Court, if the appellants would not have persuaded this Court to  pass the interim orders, they would not have been entitled to  operate the mining leases and to raise and remove and dispose  of the minerals extracted. But for the interim orders passed by  this Court, there is no difference between the appellants and any  person raising, without any lawful authority, any mineral from  any land, attracting applicability of sub-section (5) of Section 21.  As the appellants have lost from the Court, they cannot be  allowed to retain the benefit earned by them under the interim  orders of the Court. The High Court has rightly held the  appellants liable to be placed in the same position in which they  would have been if this Court would not have protected them by  issuing interim orders. All that the State Government is  demanding from the appellants is the price of the minor minerals.  Rent, royalty or tax has already been recovered by the State  Government and, therefore, there is no demand under that head.  No penal proceedings, much less any criminal proceedings, have  been initiated against the appellants. It is absolutely incorrect to  contend that the appellants are being asked to pay any penalty  or are being subjected to any penal action. It is not the case of the  appellants that they are being asked to pay the price more than  what they have realized from the exports or that the price  appointed by the respondent State is in any manner arbitrary or  unreasonable."  

(emphasis supplied)  

   324. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed that it is a settled  

principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim  

actus curiae neminem gravabit is founded upon justice and good sense  

and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law.  

No man can be denied his rights. In India, a delay occurs due to  

procedural wrangles. In A.R. Antulay (supra), this Court observed:  

“102. This being the apex court, no litigant has any opportunity  of approaching any higher forum to question its decisions. Lord  Buckmaster in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normadin, 1917 AC  170 (sic) stated:  

"All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure  the proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential that

278    

they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that  purpose."  

This Court in State of Gujarat v. Ramprakash P. Puri, (1970) 2  SCR 875, reiterated the position by saying: [SCC p. 159: SCC (Cri)  p. 31, para 8]  

“Procedure has been described to be a handmaid and not a  mistress of law, intended to subserve and facilitate the cause of  justice and not to govern or obstruct it. Like all rules of procedure,  this rule demands a construction which would promote this  cause.”  

Once judicial satisfaction is reached that the direction was not  open to be made and it is accepted as a mistake of the court, it is  not only appropriate but also the duty of the court to rectify the  mistake by exercising inherent powers. Judicial opinion heavily  leans in favour of this view that a mistake of the court can be  corrected by the court itself without any fetters. This is on  principle, as indicated in (Alexander) Rodger case (1869-71) LR 3  PC 465. I am of the view that in the present situation, the court’s  inherent powers can be exercised to remedy the mistake.  Mahajan., J. speaking for a Four Judge Bench in Keshardeo  Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, 1953 SCR 136 at Page 153  stated:  

“The judge had jurisdiction to correct his own error without  entering into a discussion of the grounds taken by the decree- holder or the objections raised by the judgment-debtors.”  

325. In Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust217, this  

Court considered the conduct of the State Government in not  

questioning the interim order at any stage in seeking variation or  

modification of the order of injunction. It was held that the State could  

not take advantage of its own wrong and lack of diligence and could not  

contend it was impossible to issue notice within the purview of Section  

7(2) of the new Act. The decision is distinguishable and turns on its own  

facts. Though the act is possible to be performed but not as per the  

public policy which frowns upon violation of the court's interim order.  

                                                           217 (1976) 1 SCC 766

279    

The decision cannot be applied, particularly in view of the provisions  

contained in Section 24(2), and on facts, it has no application.  

326. Reliance was placed on Neeraj Kumar Sainy v. the State of U.P.218.  

There, this Court observed that no one should suffer any prejudice  

because of the act of the court; the legal maxim cannot operate in a  

vacuum.  It has to get the sustenance from the facts. As the appellants  

resigned to their fate and woke up to have control over the events  

forgetting that the law does not assist the non-vigilant. One cannot  

indulge in the luxury of lethargy, possibly nurturing the feeling that  

forgetting is a virtue. If such is the conduct, it is not permissible to take  

shelter under the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. There is no  

dispute with the aforesaid principle. Party has to be vigilant about the  

right, but the ratio cannot be applied. In the opinion, the ratio in the  

decision cannot be applied for the purpose of interpretation of Section  

24(2).  

327. There can be no doubt that when parties are before court, the final  

decision has to prevail, and they succeed or fail based on the merits of  

their relative cases. Neither can be permitted to take shelter under the  

cover of court’s order to put the other party in a disadvantageous  

position. If one has enjoyed under the court's cover, that period cannot  

be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps  

                                                           218 (2017) 14 SCC 136

280    

under Section 24. The State authorities would have acted but for the  

court's order. In fact, the occasion for the petitioners to approach the court  

in those cases, was that the State or acquiring bodies were taking their  

properties. Ultimately case had to stand on its merit in the challenge to  

the acquisition or compensation, and no right or advantage could  

therefore be conferred (or accrue) under Section 24(2) in such  

situations.   

328. The argument of the landowners was that on the one hand, the  

court should not discern a casus omissus and in effect, the absence of  

provision to exclude the time during which an interim order operated,  

means that Parliament intended such omission. The maxim ‘expressio  

unius est exclusio alterious’ means that express mention of one or more  

persons or things of a particular class may be regarded as by  

implication excluding all others of that class. The maxim, however, does  

not apply when the provisions of the legislation in question show that  

the exclusion could not have been intended. In Colquhoun v. Brooks219,   

the House of Lords opined that:  

“The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterious’ has been  pressed upon us. I agree with what is said in the court below by  Wills, J. about this maxim. It is often a valuable servant, but a  dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes or  documents. The ‘exclusio’ is often the result of inadvertence or  accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when its  application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is to  be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice.”   

                                                           219 (1889) 21 QBD 52

281    

Lewis Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (2nd ed.), Section 491,  

applies the rule as follows:  

“Expressio unius est exclusio alterious - The maxim, like all rules  of construction, is applicable under certain conditions to  determine the intent of the lawmaker when it is not otherwise  manifest. Under these conditions, it leads to safe and satisfactory  conclusions; but otherwise the expression of one or more things  is not a negation or exclusion of other things. What is expressed  is exclusive only when it is creative, or in derogation of some  existing law, or of some provisions in the particular act. The  maxim is applicable to a statutory provision which grants  originally a power or right.”  

 329. In a case before the United States Court of Customs and Patent  

Appeals decided on 5th November, 1934, Yardley & Co. Ltd. V. United  

States, the court considered the question  of classification and  

assessment with duty of certain merchandise consisting of empty glass  

jars and lids, and whether these could be considered as ‘entireties’ that  

would be dutiable under paragraph 33 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The  

court in that case relied on the observations in Colquhoun v. Brooks  

(supra) and held that the glass jars with their lids would be dutiable as  

entireties, despite there not being an express legislative provision to that  

effect. It was held that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterious  

would not be applicable in the context of the legislative provision in the  

Tariff Acts of 1909, 1913 and 1922, as the relevant provision therein (in  

the 1930 Act) was merely declaratory in nature and not in derogation of  

existing law. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco

282    

Company of India Ltd.220, this Court held that the rule of expressio unius  

est exclusio alterious:   

“is subservient to the basic principle that courts must endeavour  to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a  rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that may  defeat these.”    

330. In Karnataka State v. Union of India221, the Court observed that:  

“Before the principle can be applied at all the Court must find an  express mode of doing something that is provided in a statute,  which, by its necessary implication, could exclude the doing of  that very thing and not something else in some other way. Far  from this being the case here, as the discussion above has  shown, the Constitution makers intended to cover the making of  provisions by Parliament for inquiries for various objects which  may be matters of public importance without any indications of  any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in  the Lists. I have also indicated why a provision like Section 3 of  the Act would, in any case, fall under entry 97 of List I of Schedule  VII read with Articles 248 and 356 of the Constitution even if all  subjects to which it may relate are not found specified in the lists.  Thus, there is express provision in our Constitution to cover an  enactment such as Section 3 of the Act, hence, there is no room  whatsoever for applying the "Expressio Unius" rule to exclude  what falls within an expressly provided legislative entry. That  maxim has been aptly described as a "useful servant but a  dangerous master " (per Lopes L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks [1888]  21 Q.B.D. The limitations or conditions under which this principle  of construction operates are frequently overlooked by those who  attempt to apply it.  

To advance the balder and broader proposition that what is not  specifically mentioned in the Constitution must be deemed to be  deliberately excluded from its purview, so that nothing short of a  Constitutional amendment could authorise legislation upon it, is  really to invent a "Cams Omissus" so as to apply the rule that,  where there is such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The  rule, however, is equally clear that the Court cannot so interpret  a statute as "to produce a casus omissus" where there is really  none (see: The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Penderson  Brothers [1888] 13 A.C. 595). If our Constitution itself provides for  legislation to fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna, how  can legislation seeking to do this be held to be void because it  performs its intended function by an exercise of an expressly  conferred legislative power? In declaring the purpose of the  provisions so made and the authority for making it, Courts do not  supply an omission or fill up a gap at all. It is Parliament which  can do so and has done it. To hold that parliament is incompetent  

                                                           220 (1972) 2 SCC 560  221 (1977) 4 SCC 608

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to do this is to substitute an indefensible theory or a figment of  one's imagination- that the Constitution stands in the way  somehow-for that which only a clear Constitutional bar could  achieve.”  

In Mary Angel (supra) this Court observed as follows:  

“…The rule of interpretation on the basis of the maxim "expressio  unius est exclusio alterius", … has been considered in the  decision rendered by the Queen's Bench in the case of Dean v.  Wiesengrund (1955) 2 QBD 120. The Court considered the said  maxim and held that after all it is more than an aid to construction  and has little, if any, weight where it is possible to account for  the "exclusio unius" on grounds other than intention to effect the  "exclusio alterius". Thereafter, the Court referred to the following  passage from the case of Colquhoon v. Brooks (1887) 19 QBD 400  wherein the Court called for its approval – “The maxim 'expressio  unius est exclusio alterius' has been pressed upon us. I agree  with what is said in the Court below by Wills J, about this maxim.  It is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in  the construction of statutes of documents. The exclusio is often  the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not  to be applied, when its application having regard to the subject  matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or  injustice. In my opinion, the application of the maxim here would  lead to inconsistency and injustice, and would make Section  14(1) of the Act of 1920 uncertain and capricious in its operation.”  

The aforesaid maxim was referred to by this Court in the case of  Asst. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. 1978 (2)  ELT 416 (SC), the Court in that case considered the question  whether there was or was not an implied power to hold an inquiry  in the circumstances of the case in view of the provisions of the  Section 4 of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 10(A) of the  Central Excise Rules and referred to the aforesaid passage "the  maxim" is often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master ...'  and held that the rule is subservient to the basic principle that  Courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and  purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates  rather than one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule of  prohibition by necessary implication could be applied only where  a specified procedure is laid down for the performance of a duty.  In the case of Parbhani Transport Co-op Society Ltd. v. R.T.A.  Aurangabad [1960] 3 SCR 177, this Court observed that the  maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ is a maxim for  ascertaining the intention of the legislature and where the  statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no  scope for applying. Further, in Harish Chander Vajpai v. Triloki  Singh, [1957] 1 SCR 370, the Court referred to the following  passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition,  pages 316-317:  

“Provisions sometimes found in statutes, enacting  imperfectly or for particular cases only that which was  already and more widely the law, have occasionally  furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter

284    

the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited  enactment, resting on the maxim expressio unius, exclusio  alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in such cases. The  only inference which a court can draw from such  superfluous provisions (which generally find a place in Acts  to meet unfounded objections and idle doubts), is that the  Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the real  state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of  excessive caution.  

Lastly, we would state that in the case of Pampathy v. State of  Mysore (supra), the Court has specifically observed that no  legislative enactment dealing with the procedure can provide for  all cases and that Court should have inherent powers apart from  the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper  discharge of duties.”  

331. For all these reasons, it is held that the omission to expressly  

enact a provision, that excludes the period during which any interim  

order was operative, preventing the State from taking possession of  

acquired land, or from giving effect to the award, in a particular case or  

cases, cannot result in the inclusion of such period or periods for the  

purpose of reckoning the period of 5 years. Also, merely because  

timelines are indicated, with the consequence of lapsing, under Sections  

19 and 69 of the Act of 2013, per se does not mean that omission to  

factor such time (of subsistence of interim orders) has any special  

legislative intent. This Court notices, in this context, that even under  

the new Act (nor was it so under the 1894 Act) no provision has been  

enacted, for lapse of the entire acquisition, for non-payment of  

compensation within a specified time; nor has any such provision been  

made regarding possession. Furthermore, non-compliance with  

payment and deposit provisions (under Section 77) only results in  

higher interest pay-outs under Section 80. The omission to provide for  

exclusion of time during which interim orders subsisted, while

285    

determining whether or not acquisitions lapsed, in the present case, is  

a clear result of inadvertence or accident, having regard to the subject  

matter, refusal to apply the principle underlying the maxim actus  curae  

neminem gravabit would result in injustice.   

In Re: Principle of Restitution:   

332. The principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing  

complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed  

in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any,  

passed in the matter. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. &  

Ors.222, it was held that no party could take advantage of litigation. It  

has to disgorge the advantage gained due to delay in case lis is lost. The  

interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The  

validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed  

in the event of a final order going against the party successful at the  

interim stage. Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the  

fountain source of restitution. It is rather a statutory recognition of the  

rule of justice, equity and fair play. The court has inherent jurisdiction  

to order restitution so as to do complete justice. This is also on the  

principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it  

alive and respecting it. In exercise of such power, the courts have  

applied the principle of restitution to myriad situations not falling  

within the terms of section 144 CPC. What attracts applicability of  

                                                           222 (2003) 8 SCC 648

286    

restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or mistake or an  

error committed by the court; the test is whether, on account of an act  

of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as  

not sustainable, resulting in one party gaining an advantage which it  

would not have otherwise earned, or the other party having suffered an  

impoverishment, restitution has to be made. Litigation cannot be  

permitted to be a productive industry. Litigation cannot be reduced to  

gaming where there is an element of chance in every case. If the concept  

of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the  

litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of  

the interim order. This Court observed in South Eastern Coal Field  

(supra) thus:   

“26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this  submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological sense  means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or  reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in  execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence  of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P.,  1984 Supp SCC 505) In law, the term “restitution” is used in three  senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful  owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a  wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for  the loss caused to another. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn.,  p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M.  Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that "restitution" is an  ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of  something which has been taken and at times referring to  compensation for the injury done:   

"Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be  the same. … Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust  enrichment, is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is  guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of  recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution,  such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the  fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and  not attributable to the fault of either party need to be  weighed."  

287    

The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in  Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC  speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or  modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The  scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein  almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or  modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the  court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order,  passed in favor of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final  decision going against the party successful at the interim stage.  x x x  

27.  x x x    

This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be  perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri  Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, (1971) 1 MLJ 220). In the exercise of  such inherent power, the courts have applied the principles of  restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms  of Section 144.  

28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule  confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the court”  embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court  may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court  would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the  facts and the law. x x x the concept of restitution is excluded from  application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain  by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even  though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be  countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the  successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in  terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be  compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate  for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding  the release of money had remained in operation.”  

(emphasis supplied)    

333. In State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Essar Oil Ltd. & Anr223, it was observed  

that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment  

or unjust benefit. The Court observed:  

“61. The concept of restitution is virtually a common law  principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust  benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the court,  which prevents a party from retaining money or some benefit  derived from another, which it has received by way of an  erroneous decree of the court. Such remedy in English Law is  generally different from a remedy in contract or in tort and falls  

                                                           223  (2012) 3 SCC 522

288    

within the third category of common law remedy, which is called  quasi-contract or restitution.   

62. If we analyze the concept of restitution, one thing emerges  clearly that the obligation to restitute lies on the person or the  authority that has received unjust enrichment or unjust benefit  (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, p. 434).”  

334. In A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu  

Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam224, it was stated that  

restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralize the  

advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of the law should not  

be deprived, on account of the effects of litigation; the wrongful gain of  

frivolous litigation has to be eliminated if the faith of people in the  

judiciary has to be sustained. The Court observed:   

“37. This Court, in another important case in Indian Council for  Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (of which one of us, Dr.  Bhandari, J. was the author of the judgment) had an occasion to  deal with the concept of restitution. The relevant paragraphs of  that judgment dealing with relevant judgments are reproduced  hereunder: (SCC pp. 238-41 & 243-46, paras 170-76, 183-88 &  190-93)   

“170.  x x x   

171. In Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P. this Court  observed as under: (SCC p. 630, para 16)  

‘16. The 50 operators, including the appellants/private  operators, have been running their stage carriages by blatant  abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as  directed in Jeewan Nath Wahal's case and the High Court earlier  thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of the grant  after 29-9-1959, they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply  their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative.  However, by sheer abuse of the process of law, they are  continuing to ply their vehicles pending the hearing of the  objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO held that the  High Court, while exercising its power under Article 226, the  interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair  advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court  must be neutralized. It was further held that the institution of the  litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair  advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law  

                                                           224  (2012) 6 SCC 430

289    

and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution  this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete  justice and neutralize the unfair advantage gained by the 50  operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run  the stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion  thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed  by them to the draft scheme dated 26-2-1959.'   

172. This Court in Kavita Trehan v. Balsara Hygiene Products  Ltd. observed as under: (SCC p. 391, para 22)  

‘22. The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every  court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case  demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers, where the  case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144. Section  144 opens with the words:  

“144. Application for restitution.—(1) Where and insofar as a  decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or  other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted  for the purpose ….”  

The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section  144, but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the  larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court.'  

173. This Court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi  Oretrans (P) Ltd. observed as under: (SCC pp. 326-27, para 4)  

‘4. From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us,  prima facie, that a decree in favor of the appellant is not being  executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper  at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver the possession to  the appellant since the suit filed by the respondent is still  pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time  on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly  technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage,  providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay,  unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage,  and the person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in  delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of  procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after  obtaining a decree for possession of the immovable property, its  execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the  interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass  appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be  equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding  over the property. Inappropriate cases, the court may appoint a  Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property  to act as an agent of the [Receiver with a direction to deposit the  royalty amount fixed by the] Receiver or pass such other order  which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further  injury to the plaintiff in whose favor the decree is passed and to  protect the property, including further alienation.'  

174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh decided by the  Delhi High Court on 6-11-2008, the Court held as under: (DLT p.  413, para 6)  

‘6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defenses and  frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks  situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the

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litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the  fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where the court  finds that using the courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated  illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the court  must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the  benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation  suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous  litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of  illegal acts through the courts. One of the aims of every judicial  system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using courts as  a tool. The costs imposed by the courts must in all cases should  be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful  person.’  

We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the case  mentioned above.  

175. The High Court also stated: (Padmawati case, DLT pp.  414-15, para 9)  

‘9. Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary to  observe that one of the [main] reasons for overflowing of court  dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the courts are engaged  by the litigants and which is dragged on for as long as possible.  Even if these litigants ultimately lose the lis, they become the real  victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who  perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from  the courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire  illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his  right but also must be burdened with exemplary costs. The faith  of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the  right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for  justice in the court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be  a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make the  wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all  those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the courts to see that  such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step, and even if they  succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power,  ultimately, they must suffer the costs of all these years' long  litigation. Despite the settled legal positions, the obvious  wrongdoers, use one after another tier of judicial review  mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always  loaded in their favour since even if they lose, the time gained is  the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the courts.'  

176. Against this judgment of the Delhi High Court, Special  Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 29197 of 2008 was preferred to this  Court. The Court passed the following order: (SCC p. 460, para 1)  

‘1. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the  parties. We find no ground to interfere with the well-considered  judgment passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is,  accordingly, dismissed.’  

* * *  

183. In Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd.  this Court in para 4 of the judgment observed as under: (SCC pp.  326-27)

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‘4. … It is true that proceedings are dragged on for a long time  on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly  technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage,  providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay,  unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage,  and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in  delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of  procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after  obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its  execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the  interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass  appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be  equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding  over the property. In appropriate cases, the court may appoint a  Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property  to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the  royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order  which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further  injury to the plaintiff in whose favour the decree is passed and to  protect the property, including further alienation.'  

184. In Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, this Court  reiterated the legal position that: (SCC p. 328, para 13)  ‘13. … [the] stay granted by the court does not confer a right upon  a party and it is granted always subject to the final result of the  matter in the court and at the risks and costs of the party  obtaining the stay. After the dismissal of the lis, the party  concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the  filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. Grant  of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory  protection."  

There are other decisions as well, which iterate and apply the  

same principle.225  

 335. A wrong-doer or in the present context, a litigant who takes his  

chances, cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty  

of the judicial system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of  

undue advantage, by using the court as a tool.  In Kalabharati  

Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania226, it was observed that  

                                                           225 Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161, Grindlays  Bank Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 2 SCC 191, Ram Krishna Verma v. the State of U.P., (1992) 2 SCC  

620. Also Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 325.  226 (2010) 9 SCC 437

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courts should be careful in neutralizing the effect of consequential  

orders passed pursuant to interim orders. Such directions are  

necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure reliefs  

as an interim measure and avoid adjudication of the case on merits.  

Thus, the restitutionary principle recognizes and gives shape to the idea  

that advantages secured by a litigant, on account of orders of court, at  

his behest, should not be perpetuated; this would encourage the prolific  

or serial litigant, to approach courts time and again and defeat rights of  

others- including undermining of public purposes underlying  

acquisition proceedings. A different approach would mean that, for  

instance, where two landowners (sought to be displaced from their lands  

by the same notification) are awarded compensation, of whom one  

allows the issue to attain finality- and moves on, the other obdurately  

seeks to stall the public purpose underlying the acquisition, by filing  

one or series of litigation, during the pendency of which interim orders  

might inure and bind the parties, the latter would profit and be  

rewarded, with the deemed lapse condition under Section 24 (2). Such  

a consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was never intended by  

Parliament; furthermore, the restitutionary principle requires that the  

advantage gained by the litigant should be suitably offset, in favour of  

the other party.   

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336. In Krishnaswamy S. Pd. v. Union of India227, it was observed that  

an unintentional mistake of the Court, which may prejudice the cause  

of any party, must and alone could be rectified. Thus, in our opinion,  

the period for which the interim order has operated under Section 24  

has to be excluded for counting the period of 5 years under Section 24(2)  

for the various reasons mentioned above.  

In Re Question no.6: Whether Section 24 revives stale and barred  

claim  

337. Before proceeding further, in our opinion, Section 24  

contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones in which  

possession has been taken, and compensation has been paid or  

deposited.  Section 24 does not provide an arm or tool to question the  

legality of proceedings, which have been undertaken under the Act of  

1894 and stood concluded before five years or more.  It is only in cases  

where possession has not been taken, nor compensation is paid, that  

there is a lapse. In case possession has been taken, and compensation  

has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, the  

beneficial provision of the statute provides that all beneficiaries shall be  

paid compensation as admissible under the Act of 2013.  The  

beneficiaries, i.e., landowners contemplated under the proviso to  

Section 24(2), are the ones who were so recorded as beneficiaries as on  

the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.   

                                                           227 (2006) 3 SCC 286

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The provision is not meant to be invoked on the basis of void  

transactions, and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of  

power of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit under  

Section 24 as is apparent from proviso to Section 24(2) and the decision  

in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors228.  

338. This Court is cognizant that Section 24 is used for submitting  

various claims, by way of filing applications in the pending proceedings  

either before the High Court or this Court.  There are cases in which in  

the first round of litigation where the challenge to acquisition  

proceedings has failed, validity has been upheld, and possession has  

been taken after passing of the award.  It is contended that drawing of  

panchnama was not the permissible mode to take possession, and  

actual physical possession remains with such  

landowners/purchasers/power of attorney holders as such benefit of  

Section 24 should be given to them notwithstanding the fact that they  

have withdrawn the compensation also.  

339. This Court is cognizant of cases where reference was sought for  

enhancement of compensation, money was deposited in the treasury,  

enhancement was made, and possession was taken. Yet, acquisitions  

have been questioned, and claims are being made under Section 24,  

that acquisition has lapsed, as the deposit (of compensation amount) in  

                                                           228 2019 (13) SCALE 698

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the treasury was not in accordance with the law, the amount should  

have been deposited in reference court. Further, this Court also notes  

that there have been cases in which after taking possession, when  

development is complete, infrastructure has developed despite which  

claims are being made under Section 24, on the ground that either the  

possession has not been taken in accordance with law or compensation  

has been deposited in the treasury, thus questioning the acquisitions.  

The decision in Mahavir and Ors. v. Union of India229 was an instance in  

which a claim was made that acquisition was made more than a century  

ago, and compensation has not been paid as such acquisition has  

lapsed relating to the land of Raisina Hills in New Delhi.  The importance  

of Raisina Hills is well-known to everybody.  The grossest misuse of  

Section 24 has been sought to be made, which is intended to confer  

benefit. It was never intended to revive such claims and be used in the  

manner in which it has been today, where large numbers of acquisitions  

and development projects, such as construction of roads, hospitals,  

townships, housing projects, etc., are sought to be undone, though  

such acquisitions have been settled in several rounds of litigation. In  

several matters, the validity has been questioned under the guise as if  

the right has been conferred for the first time under the Act of 2013,  

claiming that such acquisitions have lapsed. There are also cases in  

which the claims for release of land under Section 48 of the Act of 1894  

                                                           229  (2018) 3 SCC 588

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have been dismissed.  Now, claims are made that as land is open and  

landowners/intermediaries/POA holders continue to be in physical  

possession, thus, it should be returned to them, as the acquisition has  

lapsed under Section 24(2).  Before us also arguments have been raised  

to grant relief in all such cases by making purposive interpretation of  

benevolent provisions.  It was urged that this Court is bound to give  

relief as Section 24 is retrospective in operation, and the authorities  

have not cared to take possession for more than five years or more, and  

they have not paid the compensation and deposited it in treasury which  

cannot be said to be legal.  It is declared that the acquisition has lapsed,  

and the land is given back to them.  In case any infrastructure is  

existing, the State Government should acquire the land afresh after  

following the process of Act of 2013. Earlier, injustice was done to  

landowners, as observed in various decisions mentioned above.  We  

should not disturb the decisions of this Court and are bound to follow  

the law laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and the  

principle of stare decisis.  

340. By and large, concluded cases are being questioned by way of  

invoking the provisions contained in Section 24.  In our considered  

opinion, the legality of concluded cases cannot be questioned under the  

guise of Section 24(2) as it does not envisage or confer any such right  

to question the proceedings and the acquisitions have been concluded

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long back, or in several rounds of litigation as mentioned above, rights  

of the parties have been settled.  

341. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Urban Land (Ceiling and  

Regulation) Act, 1976, was repealed in the year 1999; thereafter, claims  

were raised.  After repeal, it was claimed that actual physical possession  

has not been taken by the State Government as such repeal has the  

effect of effacing the proceedings of taking possession, which it was  

alleged, was not in accordance with the law.  In State of Assam v.  

Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and Ors230, submission was raised by the State of  

Assam that physical possession has been taken over by the competent  

authority and it was submitted on behalf of landowner that procedure  

prescribed under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and  

Regulation) Act, 1976, was not followed.  It was before taking possession  

under Section 10(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,  

1976, the notification under Section 10(5) was necessary; thus, no  

possession can be said to have been taken within the meaning of  

Section 3 of the Repeal Act.  The question this Court had to consider  

was whether actual physical possession was taken over in that case by  

the competent authority.  The State of Assam submitted that though  

possession was taken over in the year 1991, may be unilaterally and  

without notice to the landowner.  It was urged that mere non-

compliance with Section 10(5) would be insufficient to attract the  

                                                           230 (2015) 5 SCC 321

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provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.  This Court repelled the  

submission of the landowner and held as under:  

“15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was  not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act.  Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7- 12-1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the  land in question, he could have made a grievance based on  Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no  matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be  evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure  to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore  unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to  affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the  land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a  similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an  adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the  same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not  consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for  he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his  contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed,  it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the  authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same  by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that  view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in  possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that  no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him.  

16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming  that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter  without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is  whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged  violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken  over from the erstwhile landowner on 7-12-1991 as is alleged in  the present case, any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to  have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession.  If the owner did not do so, forcibly taking over of possession  would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such  situation, the owner or the person in possession must be deemed  to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other  view would, in our opinion, give a license to a litigant to make a  grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that  needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous  circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue  regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed  procedure.   

17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of  this Court in Hari Ram case. That decision does not, in our view,  lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so because this  Court was in State of UP v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280  considering whether the word "may" appearing in Section 10(5)  gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to  issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in

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question under Section 10(6). The question of whether the breach  of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would  vitiate the Act of dispossession itself or render it non-est in the  eye of the law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our  opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical  course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities  decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section  10(6). In the case at hand, if the appellant's version regarding  dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is  correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice  under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not  vitiate or obliterate the Act of taking possession for the purposes  of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma,  erstwhile owner, had not made any grievance based on breach  of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime, implying thereby  that he had waived his right to do so.”  

 This Court held that provisions of the Repeal Act could not be  

extended in such a case where possession has been taken without  

following the procedure, and the landowner cannot retain the land.  This  

Court also observed that once possession has been taken over in the  

year 1991, any grievance as to non-compliance of Section 10(5) ought  

to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession.  By  

sheer lapse of time, the possession would acquire legitimacy.  Thus, the  

owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his  

right under Section 10(5) of the Act.  This Court also observed that only  

because of the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act, which confers  

certain rights, the litigation had tempted the landowner to raise the  

issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed  

procedure.  It is clear from the aforesaid decision that such claims  

cannot be entertained, and any such dispute raised belatedly was  

repelled by this Court.