Indian Bank Vs Manilal Govindji Khona

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C.A. @ SLP (C) NO. 12513 of 2013 1

NON REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1416 OF 2015

(Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 12513 of 2013)

INDIAN BANK ………APPELLANT

Vs.

MANILAL GOVINDJI KHONA ………RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant in this appeal has challenged the

judgment and order dated 29.08.2012 of the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay, passed in Writ

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Petition No. 3652 of 2012, whereby the High Court

allowed the writ petition and Misc. Application No.

7 of 2012 for condonation of delay in filing Misc.

Application (L) No. 34 of 2012 filed by the

respondent before the Debt Recovery Tribunal(for

short “DRT”) and quashing the orders dated

10.04.2012 and 22.02.2012 passed by the Debt

Recovery Appellate Tribunal(for short “DRAT”),

Mumbai, in Misc. Appeal No.35 of 2012 and the DRT

respectively.

3. The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder

in a nutshell :-

A Civil Suit No. 2636 of 1987 was filed by the

appellant-Bank before the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay against the respondent on 07.09.1987 for

recovery of Rs.69,50,213.59 with interest @ 18.5%

p.a. with quarterly rests and enforcement of the

mortgage. The High Court vide its order dated

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09.12.1996 passed a consent decree in the Civil

Suit for the suit amount together with concessional

rate of interest at 12% p.a. which was to be paid

by the respondent to the Bank on or before

31.05.1997. On 31.05.1997, the respondent tendered

the amount in terms of the decree dated 09.12.1996,

which was refused by the appellant. The respondent

moved Chamber Summons No.1066 of 1997, inter alia,

for recording the payment of decreetal amount

tendered on 31.05.1997. On 01.08.1997, the

respondent applied for ad interim relief in terms

of the above Chamber Summons. However, by the order

dated 01.08.1997, the High Court was pleased to

decline to grant ad interim relief but adjourned

the said Chamber Summons for recording evidence to

establish the fact that the respondent had tendered

the payment of the decreetal amount on or before

31.05.1997. Being aggrieved by the same, the

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respondent preferred Appeal No.960 of 1997 before

the Division Bench of the High Court. By an order

dated 05.12.1997, the said appeal was dismissed and

the S.L.P filed by the respondent was also

dismissed by this Court on 23.03.1998.

4. Thereafter, the High Court directed the Court

Receiver by its order dated 03.12.1999, to sell the

mortgaged property of the respondent and permitted

the appellant-Bank to participate in the auction,

and the Court Receiver issued notices for

auctioning the mortgaged property. The auction was

held on 06.05.2000 at which the appellant-Bank

purchased the mortgaged property for

Rs.2,00,00,000/-, the sale of which was approved by

the High Court vide its order dated 21.07.2000. The

Court Receiver issued the Sale Certificate on

18.4.2002 and the same was registered in the name

of the appellant-Bank. Thereafter, a series of

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applications and proceedings were initiated by the

respondent before the DRT, DRAT and different High

Courts and Civil Courts seeking various reliefs

against the appellant-Bank. After the period of 7

years of the issuance of the recovery certificate

in favour of the appellant-Bank, the respondent

moved a Misc. application before the Recovery

Officer to set aside the sale of the mortgaged

property which was dismissed on 2.12.2011 by DRT-

II, Mumbai. The respondent moved an application for

rectification of recovery certificate dated

29.11.2004 along with an application for

condonation of delay in filing the Misc.

application for rectification of recovery

certificate dated 29.11.2004 and an application

seeking interim orders in respect of the property

which was sold in the public auction by the Court

Receiver. The DRT dismissed the interim application

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by its order dated 30.01.2012. The DRT-II further

rejected the condonation of delay application filed

by the respondent by its order dated 22.02.2012.

The respondent aggrieved by the above said order

filed an appeal before the DRAT and the same was

dismissed vide order dated 10.04.2012. The

respondent further chose to challenge the order of

DRAT before the High Court in W.P.No.3652 of 2012

urging various grounds and prayed to quash the same

and pass appropriate order in the light of the

facts and circumstances of the case. On 29.8.2012,

the High Court after hearing the learned counsel

for the parties has allowed the writ petition by

setting aside the orders of the DRT and the DRAT

and condoned the delay in filing Misc. Application

(L) No. 34 of 2012 filed by the respondent and

restored the Misc. application filed by him before

the DRT-II, Mumbai to its file and directed it to

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decide the same on its own merits in accordance

with law afresh in the light of the law declared by

this Court and the High Court on the subject

matter.

5. As the issue before us is with regard to the

condonation of delay in filing the Misc. Application

by the respondent and allowing the same in the writ

petition filed by the respondent which is under

challenge in this appeal at the instance of the

appellant-Bank by urging various legal grounds, we

will deal with this aspect of the case only, in this

judgment. On 25.01.2012, the respondent filed Misc.

Application (L) No.34 of 2012 before DRT-II, Mumbai

for avoiding the sale and seeking rectification of

Recovery Certificate and decree dated 9.12.1996,

passed by the High Court. The filing of that Misc.

application was delayed by 23 days. Therefore, the

respondent filed Misc. Application No. 7 of 2012 for

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condonation of delay in filing the Misc.

Application(L) No.34 of 2012 before the DRT-II,

which application was dismissed by its order dated

22.02.2012, by declining to exercise its

discretionary power to condone the delay in filing

such Misc. application by the respondent. Being

aggrieved of the said order, the respondent filed

Misc. Appeal No. 35 of 2012 before the DRAT

questioning the correctness of the above order and

prayed to set aside the same and allow the

application by condoning the delay in filing that

application before the DRT. The DRAT vide its order

dated 10.4.2012 dismissed the appeal holding that

the same is barred by limitation and no proper and

satisfactory explanation was assigned by the

respondent.

6. Being aggrieved of the same, the respondent

approached the High Court by filing Writ Petition

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No.3652 of 2012 questioning the correctness of the

order dated 10.04.2012 passed by the DRAT urging

various grounds with a prayer to set aside the above

said order. The High Court after hearing the parties

vide its order dated 29.08.2012 has held that the

order passed by the DRT-II in dismissing the

application of the respondent without deciding the

issue i.e. whether the public auction of the sale of

the mortgaged property conducted by the Court

Receiver as per the direction of the High Court,

after the execution proceedings initiated by the

appellant-Bank against the respondent stood

transferred to the DRT in view of Section 31 of DRT

Act as the DRT came into existence on 16.07.1999,

as per the notification issued by the Central

Government, is not legal and valid in law. The sale

of the property of the respondent has affected his

rights as the same is in contravention of the

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provisions of the DRT Act and the relevant rules

applicable for sale of the property which go to the

root of the matter and therefore, he has prayed to

set aside the order dated 10.04.2012 passed by the

DRAT along with the order passed by the DRT on the

Misc. Application No.7 of 2012 seeking for

condonation of delay in filing Misc. Application(L)

No.34 of 2012 and requested to restore the same to

its original file of the DRT, Mumbai and also

further directed it to decide the same on its own

merits keeping in view the law declared by the High

Court as well as this Court. The appellant-Bank was

aggrieved by the above said judgment and order it

has filed this appeal questioning the correctness of

the same by urging various grounds in support of its

case.

7. The learned Solicitor General Mr. Ranjit Kumar

appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Rafeeq

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P., the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent, have made elaborate submissions in

support of the respective claim and counter claim of

the parties.

8. The learned Solicitor General has placed

reliance upon Article 127 of the Schedule of Part I

of the Limitation Act, 1963, in support of his

contention that the period of 60 days is prescribed

in Limitation Act, 1963 for filing Misc. application

and a period of one year under Article 99 of the

Schedule of Part IX of the said Act is stipulated

for filing a suit from the date of sale of the

property for setting aside the order of the sale of

the mortgaged property. He submits that the

provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to

the DRT proceedings as well, in view of the relevant

provisions of Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts

due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993

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(for short “the Act of 1993”). The learned Solicitor

General has made submission that the orders of the

DRT and DRAT in dismissing the condonation of delay

application and consequently, the Miscellaneous

application are erroneously set aside in the

impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court

as they are barred by limitation under the aforesaid

Articles of the Schedule referred to supra as the

said applications are filed beyond the prescribed

period of limitation under the aforesaid provisions

of the Limitation Act. In support of his

submissions, he has placed reliance upon the

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Dadi

Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors.1 which decision

is followed by this Court in another case viz.

Annapurna v. Mallikarjun & Anr.2. He has further

contended that the decree was passed by the Bombay

1 (2001) 7 SCC 71 2 (2014) 6 SCC 397

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High Court in the original suit proceedings way back

on 9.12.1996 in favour of the appellant-Bank against

the respondent for recovery of the debt amount due

from him. The sale of the property of the respondent

was conducted by the Court Receiver, who was

appointed by the High Court in the execution

proceedings initiated by the appellant-Bank by

issuing notices on 08.09.1998 and 07.12.1998 for

conducting the sale in public auction of the said

mortgaged property of the respondent. The DRT,

Mumbai was established on 16.07.1999 pursuant to the

notification issued by the Central Government under

the provisions of the Act of 1993. Further, it has

been contended by him that although, the DRT was

empowered to appoint the Court Receiver for

conducting the sale of the mortgaged property in

public auction, there was no adequate infrastructure

provided by the Central Government to the DRT to

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take possession and charge of the properties from

the Court Receiver of the High Court at the time the

property was ordered to be sold in public auction by

the Court Receiver. The jurisdiction of the High

Court with regard to the recovery of debt has been

transferred to the DRT in view of Section 31 of the

DRT Act with effect from 16.7.1999, it was not in a

position to take possession of the mortgaged

properties from the Court Receiver of the High Court

and manage the same as there was no infrastructure

provided to it by the Central Government. Since the

above assets which were in custody and possession of

the Court Receiver in respect of which securities

were created in favour of the banks and financial

institutions and therefore, the same should not have

been permitted to be dissipated by the High Court

and therefore, the High Court has rightly permitted

the Court Receiver to sell the mortgaged property of

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the respondent in public auction pursuant to the

decree passed by it in favour of the appellant-Bank.

9. Further, it is contended by the learned

Solicitor General that the power conferred upon the

High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India is exercised by it even after the DRT was

established permitting the Court Receiver of the

High Court to conduct the sale of the property of

respondent in public auction to recover the

decreetal money in favour of the appellant-Bank in

terms of the judgment and decree passed by it for

the reason the DRT had no infrastructure to receive

the possession of the property from Court Receiver

and sell the same. Therefore, he has submitted that

the High Court could not have found fault with its

earlier order in permitting the Court Receiver to

sell the mortgaged property in public auction to

recover the decreetal amount by the Bank by way of

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sale of the mortgaged property. The learned

Solicitor General has further contended that the

mortgaged property sold by the Court Receiver in the

public auction as per the order passed by the Bombay

High Court, could not have been interfered with by

the DRT-II and the DRAT on the Misc. application

filed by the respondent along with the condonation

of delay application. Therefore, he has submitted

that the impugned order passed by the High Court is

liable to be set aside in this appeal as the same is

not in accordance with law.

10. It has been further contended by him that the

order dated 3.12.1999 passed by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Bombay directing the

Court Receiver to proceed with the sale of the

mortgaged property of the respondent in the

execution proceedings pursuant to the decree passed

by it with the respondent’s consent and therefore,

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it is not permissible for him at the belated stage

to turn around and contend that the execution of the

decree and sale of the property by the Court

Receiver in the public auction is not legal and

valid. Further, the High Court has exercised its

power in issuing the direction to the Court Receiver

for conducting the sale of the property through

public auction on the basis of the judgment of

Bombay High Court in the case of Industrial Credit &

Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Patheja

Brothers Forgings And Stampings Ltd. & Ors.3 in which it has examined the provisions of Section 3 of

the Act of 1993, wherein it has held that after

16.7.1999, in several proceedings, the parties have

challenged the power of the Court Receiver to manage

the properties in view of the DRT Act and therefore,

the Court Receiver had no authority to act in the

matter. The High Court held that the Court Receiver, 3 (2000) 2 BOMLR 567

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who is appointed prior to the cut-off date and

pending proceedings before the High Court stands

transferred to the DRT by virtue of the provision

under Section 31 of the DRT Act as he had the power

to sell the properties. It is urged by him that it

has been held by the High Court in the above

referred case that there is no question of

conducting de novo proceedings. It is submitted by

him that in view of the above said statement of law

laid down by the Bombay High Court it has passed an

order dated 03.12.1999 in exercise of its power

traceable to Article 227 of the Constitution of

India, in the execution proceedings, wherein it has

directed the Court Receiver to take steps to recover

the decreetal amount from the respondent by selling

the mortgaged property in public auction and

therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by the

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DRT in the Misc. Applications filed by the

respondent.

11. On the other hand, it has been contended by the

learned counsel on behalf of the respondent that the

Court Receiver had no jurisdiction to sell the

property by way of execution of the decree after the

DRT has come into existence by placing the reliance

upon the above case. It has been further contended

by him that the suit proceedings of the Bank stood

transferred automatically to the DRT by operation of

law. Further, reliance was also placed by him on

behalf of the respondent upon the case of Raghunath

Rai Bareja & Anr. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.4 in

support of his legal contention that in view of

Section 31 of the DRT Act, the Court Receiver had no

jurisdiction to sell the mortgaged property by way

of execution of the decree in the public auction as

4 (2007) 2 SCC 230

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directed by the High Court after the DRT was

established by way of notification, pursuant to the

DRT Act. Thus, even if the direction was given by

the Bombay High Court to the Court Receiver, to

execute the decree and sell the mortgaged property,

he should not have executed the same in view of

Section 31 of the DRT Act, as the execution

proceedings were automatically transferred to the

DRT. Therefore, the learned counsel on behalf of the

respondent has contended that the order dated

03.12.1999 passed by the High Court in directing the

Court Receiver to proceed with the sale of the

mortgaged property in execution of the order/decree

dated 09.12.1996 is null and void ab initio in law

and therefore, the same is wholly unsustainable in

law. He has placed reliance upon the cases of this

Court which will be adverted in the later portion of

the judgment that the question of limitation does

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not arise at all in fling application for setting

aside the sale as the same is vitiated and void ab

initio in law.

12. The said rival legal contentions are examined

by us very carefully with a view to find out as to

whether the impugned judgment and order warrant

interference keeping in view the interpretation of

the provisions of the DRT Act and the constitutional

validity of the Act of 1993, which has been upheld

by this Court in the case of George v. State of

Kerala5 and the other decisions of this Court

referred to supra upon which reliance is placed by

the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent.

13. The learned Solicitor General appearing for the

appellant has placed reliance on the following

judgments of this Court, upon which the High Court

5 (2002) 4 SCC 475

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has relied viz. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v.

Ballabh Das & Co. & Ors.6 and Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju Ram & Ors.7 in holding that the

High Court has no jurisdiction to pass orders and

give directions to the Court Receiver for sale of

the property in public auction after the

establishment of the DRT Act. He has submitted that

the said decisions are distinguishable from the

facts of this case that the properties alongwith

the property of the respondent were in possession

and custody of the Court Receiver and the same

could not have been transferred by him to the DRT

for want of infrastructure, to be provided by the

Central Government to it after it was established.

With regard to the above legal contentions, it

would be necessary for this Court to extract

relevant paragraph 9 from the case of State Bank of

6 (1999) 7 SCC 539 7 (2000) 6 SCC 655

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Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Ballabh Das & Co. & Ors.

(supra), for the purpose of examining the relevance

and validity of the submissions made by the learned

Solicitor General, as the same would be applicable

to the fact situations of the respondent. The

learned counsel for the respondent has also

strongly relied upon the same which reads thus: “9. ……As the suits were filed by the Bank before establishment of the Tribunal and were pending in the civil court when the Tribunal came to be established under the Act, Section 31 became applicable to those suits and they shall have to be treated as transferred to the Tribunal on and from the date the Tribunal was established. Section 31 of the Act makes it clear that the transfer is automatic because of the operation of law and, therefore, the Bank was really not required to file applications. Those applications should have been really treated as applications for forwarding the records of the suits to the Tribunal….”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

Further, it would be relevant for us to extract the

paragraph 7 from the case of Punjab National Bank,

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Dasuya v. Chajju Ram & Ors. (supra), wherein this

Court has held as under:-

”7. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the use of the words “cause of action” in Section 31 indicated that it is only pending suits which could be transferred. We are unable to agree with this submission. The words “cause of action” are preceded by the words “being a suit or proceeding”. Section 31 contemplates not only the transfer of a suit but also transfer of a proceeding which may be other than a suit, like an execution application.…….”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

In view of the law laid down by this Court in the

above cases upon which strong reliance is placed by

the learned counsel for the respondent, the

submission made by the learned Solicitor General to

distinguish the same on facts cannot be accepted by

us as the same is contrary to the law laid down by

this Court.

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14. The other contention of the learned Solicitor

General that the sale of the mortgaged property

made by the Court Receiver in favour of the

appellant-Bank by way of execution of the decree

dated 09.12.1996 passed by the High Court and

issuance of the sale certificate in favour of the

appellant-Bank and handing over of the possession

of the schedule property to it on 08.08.2000, and

the Miscellaneous Application filed by the

respondent before the DRT seeking the relief as

stated above, cannot be entertained and accepted by

us in view of the above referred cases upon which

strong reliance placed by the learned counsel on

behalf of the respondent. The contention urged on

the question of limitation by the learned Solicitor

General on behalf of the appellant-Bank placing

reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the

cases of Dadi Jagannadham and Annapurna (supra) are

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wholly inapplicable to the fact situation of the

case on hand in view of the decision of the three

Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sushil Kumar

Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra8. In this case, this Court

has dealt with regard to the Limitation Act, in

exercise of its power under Article 136 of the

Constitution after examining the fact situation in

the above said case in support of the proposition

of law that a decree, which is passed by the court

without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eye of law

and the same cannot be allowed to operate and such

decree is executed during pendency of the Special

Leave Petition before this Court, in such cases it

would grant relief to the aggrieved party, who has

suffered from injustice by setting aside the

execution order and further held that defect of

jurisdiction of the court cannot be cured by

consent or waiver of the parties. In the said case 8 (1990) 1 SCC 193

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this Court has elaborately considered the relevant

factual and legal aspect of the case and has laid

down the law at paragraph 10, after referring to

its earlier decision of a Four Judge Bench of this

Court speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in

Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117,

which would be worthwhile to be extracted as

under:-

“10.……It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram

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non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

Further, vide paragraphs 16 and 17 in Sushil

Kumar Mehta (supra), this Court held as under:-

“16. In Ledgard v. Bull, (1886) 11 App Cas 648, the Privy Council laid down that where the original court in a suit was inherently lacking jurisdiction, and was incompetent to try the same, on its transfer by consent of parties, to a court with jurisdiction such consent did not operate as a waiver of the plea of want of jurisdiction. 17. In Barton v. Fincham, (1921) 2 KB 291, 299, wherein it was held that:

“… the court cannot give effect to an agreement whether by way of compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.”

In view of the aforesaid legal principle laid

down by this Court after referring to its earlier

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decision, Privy Council judgment and also the Kings

Bench decision, we are of the view that the decree

which is sought to be executed by the Court Receiver

as per the order dated 3.12.1999 passed by the High

Court, giving directions to him to sell the

mortgaged property of the respondent in the

execution proceedings of the decree and the

subsequent proceedings of the Court Receiver,

including the confirmation of the sale and the

issuance of the sale certificate in favour of the

appellant-Bank is void ab initio in law. In view of

the law laid down by this Court in the cases

referred to supra, the contentions urged by the

learned Solicitor General on behalf of the

appellant-Bank cannot be accepted and therefore, we

have to hold that the impugned judgment and order

cannot be interfered with by this Court.

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15. We are of the view that the High Court has

rightly found fault with the DRT and DRAT in

rejecting the Misc. Application filed by the

respondent, who has sought for rectification of the

recovery certificate filed by him. Therefore, the

High Court has rightly rejected the same after

adverting to the judgments in the cases of State

Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Ballabh Das & Co. & Ors.

(supra) and Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju

Ram & Ors. (supra). The exercise of jurisdiction by

the High Court for giving the direction to the Court

Receiver to sell the mortgaged property even after

the DRT was established at Mumbai and in view of the

fact that the proceedings before the High Court were

automatically transferred to it in view of Section

31 of the DRT Act and therefore it was impermissible

in law for the High Court to direct the Court

Receiver to sell the property of the respondent in

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public auction by executing the Court decree, which

action of the Court Receiver is void ab initio in

law. Therefore, the order of the DRT and the DRAT,

in dismissing the condonation of delay application

by the respondent holding that the same is barred by

limitation and consequently dismissing Misc.

Application to set aside the sale is untenable in

law and therefore, the High Court has rightly

answered the legal contentions in favour of the

respondent by giving valid and cogent reasons in the

impugned judgment in exercise of its Judicial Review

power.

16. The provisions of the Limitation Act are

applicable to the proceedings of the DRT in view of

Section 24 of the Act of 1993 and therefore, the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are

applicable to the provisions of the said Act. The

same has not been examined and considered by the

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DRT-II and the DRAT at the time of passing the

impugned orders in the writ petitions. Therefore,

the High Court has rightly exercised its

discretionary power keeping in view the rights of

the respondent upon the immovable property involved

in this case and it has condoned the delay in filing

Misc. Application and accordingly the orders of the

DRT-II and the DRAT impugned in the writ petition

are set aside by allowing the same.

17. In view of the foregoing reasons, the legal

contentions urged on behalf of the appellant-Bank

have no substance in the matter for the reason that

the recovery certificate issued on 29.11.2004, was

sought to be modified by the appellant-Bank itself

by filing an application before the DRT-II and the

same has not been modified, which is another strong

ground for the respondent to file Misc. application

for the cancellation of the sale of the property in

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favour of the appellant-Bank, along with condonation

of delay application urging tenable grounds.

18. The issue raised by the respondent in the

present case strikes at the very authority of the

High Court in permitting the Court Receiver by its

order dated 3.12.1999 to auction the mortgaged

property of the respondent in public auction

pursuant to the decree passed by the High Court in

favour of the appellant-Bank. The above said

important aspect of the case is required to be

examined and considered by the DRT-II in the

Miscellaneous application which is remitted back to

it in the impugned judgment of the High Court.

19. Further, we make it clear that we have recorded

our reasons in this judgment on the basis of the

rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the

parties. Nonetheless, the DRT-II is required to

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C.A. @ SLP (C) NO. 12513 of 2013 34

examine the Miscellaneous application of the

respondent independently on its own merit and in

accordance with law without being influenced by our

observations made in this judgment.

20. For the above stated reasons, the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court by

setting aside the orders of DRT-II and DRAT and

further remanding the matter to DRT-II for its re-

consideration of the Miscellaneous application, is

in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the

law laid down by this Court in this regard and the

same cannot be found fault with by this Court.

Hence, there is no merit in this appeal, and the

same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the

appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/-

payable to the respondent.

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C.A. @ SLP (C) NO. 12513 of 2013 35

21. The parties are directed to maintain status quo

of the property involved in these proceedings which

exists as on today till the disposal of the

Miscellaneous Application by the DRT-II.

……………………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

……………………………………………………………J. [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, February 3, 2015

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C.A. @ SLP (C) NO. 12513 of 2013 36

ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.12 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s)........../2015 arising from SLP(C)No 12513/2013 INDIAN BANK Appellant(s) VERSUS MANILAL GOVINDJI KHONA Respondent(s) Date : 03/02/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s) Mr. Himanshu Munshi,Adv.

Mr. Durga Dutt, Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Praveen Swarup,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed Non- reportable Judgment.

(VINOD KR. JHA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER (Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)