REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3827 OF 2014

HUKUM CHANDRA (D) THR. LRS.                  …..Appellants

VERSUS

NEMI CHAND JAIN & ORS.                …..Respondents

J U G E M E N T  

R. BANUMATHI, J.

This  appeal  arises  out  of  the  judgment  dated  25.04.2012

passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal

No.279 of 2007 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the

first appellate court for eviction of appellant from the suit premises.  

2. The appellant is a tenant in the shop measuring 6.3 feet x 15

feet  on  the  ground  floor  of  a  building  located  at  Sarrafa  Bazar,

Muraina,  Madhya Pradesh. The respondent No.1 filed a civil  suit

under  Section  12(1)(f)  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Accommodation

Control Act, 1961 (the Act) seeking eviction of the appellant from the

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suit shop on the ground of bona fide requirement to settle his son

Rajendra Kumar Jain. By judgment dated 30.06.2004, the trial court

dismissed the suit holding that Rajendra Kumar was already doing

an independent business of utensils and he was not unemployed

and also  found that  respondent-landlord  has  not  established  the

genuine bona fide requirement. The trial court dismissed the suit by

finding that  there is no ground for  decree of  eviction against  the

appellant  herein under  Section 12(1)(f)  of  the Act.  So far  as the

arrear of rent is concerned, the trial court found that no ground for

eviction was made out under Section 12 (1)(a) of the Act.

3. The respondent - landlord appealed against the judgment of

the trial court. The first appellate court set aside the judgment of the

trial court by holding that the documents produced by the appellant

that  they  pertain  to  the  year  1996,  2000  and  2001 and  those

documents do not show that Rajendra Kumar was engaged in the

business on the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 22.01.1992. The first

appellate court held that the bona fide requirement of the suit shop

is to be examined on the date of filing of the suit i.e. 22.01.1992.

After referring to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in

Bishanswaroop v. Rajkumar Kuchata & Ors. 2015 (1) M.P.A.C.J.-

151, the first appellate court held that it would be inappropriate to

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expect that the land owner should sit idle and not to perform any

work till  the suit for eviction is decided on the basis of bona fide

requirement. Observing that the landlord has established the bona

fide  requirement  for  establishing  business  for  his  son  Rajendra

Kumar, the first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial

court and allowed the first appeal.  

4. The second appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed

upholding the judgment passed by the first appellate court that once

landlord establishes the bona fide requirement by evidence on the

standard of preponderance of probabilities under Section 12 (1)(f) of

the Act, technicalities raised by the defendant – tenant should be

ignored.  Insofar  as the application filed  under  Order  41 Rule  27

CPC to bring on record the additional documents to show that the

respondent - landlord on 14.11.2006 obtained vacant possession of

the adjacent shop from tenant Babulal is concerned, the High Court

held that the same is of no avail to the appellant – defendant. Being

aggrieved, the appellant - defendant has preferred this appeal.

5. The learned senior  counsel for the appellant  submitted that

the conditions required for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 12

(1)(f)  of  the  Act  was  not  proved in  as  much as,  the  son  of  the

respondent - landlord was already in the business of utensils from

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the shop in  the same building and this  aspect  was not  properly

considered by the High Court. It was submitted that the High Court

has  not  appreciated  the  additional  evidence  adduced  by  the

appellant  that  the  other  tenant  Babulal  has  vacated  the  shop

occupied by him. Placing reliance upon Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal

(2001) 5 SCC 705, it  was contended that the requirement of the

landlord which has not been established in the case must continue

to exist till the final decision of the court.

6. Per  contra,  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the

respondent  -  landlord  placed  reliance  upon  Gaya  Prasad  v.

Pradeep  Srivastava (2001)  2  SCC  604  and  submitted  that  the

crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement of the landlord, is

the  date  on  which  the  suit  was  filed  for  eviction  and  that  the

subsequent  event  cannot  eclipse the said  bona fide requirement

unless the subsequent event overshadows the requirement of the

landlord.  The  learned  senior  counsel  further  submitted  that  after

detailed analysis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the first

appellate court rightly held that the requirement of the suit shop for

the utensils business of landlord’s son Rajendra Kumar is genuine

and bona fide which was rightly affirmed by the High Court. It was

urged that when there are concurrent findings of fact arrived at by

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the courts below that there is bona fide requirement and that the

respondent  has  no  suitable  accommodation  other  than  the  suit

shop, the same cannot be interfered by this Court.

7. We  have  considered  the  submissions  of  the  parties  and

perused the impugned judgment and materials on record.

8. The respondent - landlord sought eviction under Section 12

(1)(f) of the Act, on the ground of bona fide requirement for use of

his  son  Rajendra  Kumar  Jain.  Section  12(1)(f)  of  the  Act  under

which the eviction of the tenant was sought reads as follows:-

“12.  Restriction  on  eviction  of  tenants.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil  court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation  except  on  one  or  more  of  the following grounds only, namely: (a)-(e) * * * (f)  that  the  accommodation  let  for  non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is  the  owner  thereof  or  for  any  person  for  whose benefit  the  accommodation  is  held  and  that  the landlord  or  such  person  has  no  other  reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;”

9. Considering the scope of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, this Court

in Deena Nath’s case held as under:-

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“15…. The section, on a plain reading, is clear and specific.  The  criteria  to  be  fulfilled  for  an  order  of eviction under the provision are:

(i)  that  the  non-residential accommodation is required bona fide by the  landlord  for  the  purpose  of continuing  or  starting  his  business  or that of any of his major sons; and (ii)  that the landlord or such person has no  other  reasonably  suitable  non- residential accommodation of his own in his  occupation  in  the  city  or  town concerned.”

The legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical  action of a landlord to evict  his tenant.  The  statutory  mandate  is  that  there  must  be  first  a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bona fide which is intended to avoid a mere whim or desire. The “bona fide requirement” must be in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear  by  making  the  provision  that  the  landlord  has  no  other reasonably  suitable  residential  accommodation  of  his  own in  his occupation in  the city  or  town concerned.  This  requirement  lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in clause (e) of Section  12(1)  of  the  Act  in  respect  of  accommodation  let  for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the court is duty-bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also  whether  any  other  reasonably  suitable  non-residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available….”

10. Based on the documents Exs.D-13 to D-15 and Ex.D-25, the

trial court held that the documents show that Rajendra Kumar was

doing the business under the name “Rajendra Bartan Bhandar” and

that  Rajendra  Kumar  cannot  be  said  to  be  unemployed.  After

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referring to the ration card of Rajendra Kumar, the trial court held

that  in  the  ration  card  which  was issued by  the Chief  Municipal

Corporation Officer  to  Rajendra Jain  S/o.  Nemichand Jain,  Ward

No.21/121,  Lohiya Bazar,  Muraina,  it  is  mentioned that  Rajendra

Kumar is in the business for utensils. Likewise, in the insurance -

Ex.D-27  in  the  name of  Rajendra  Kumar,  it  is  stated  that  he  is

presently having a business of “Bartan Ki Dukaan” and his annual

income is Rs.30,000/- per year. The trial court also referred to Ex.D-

13  -  the  summary  case  presented  before  the  Chief  Judicial

Magistrate  for  violation  of  provisions  of  the  Weight  and

Measurement Act, 1976 in which Rajendra Kumar was imposed with

a penalty of Rs.1,000/-. Upon consideration of various documents,

the  trial  court  held  that  Rajendra  Kumar  is  already  carrying  a

business of  utensils  and cannot  be said to be unemployed and,

therefore, held that the respondent - landlord has not established

bona fide and genuine requirement of the suit premises for business

of Rajendra Kumar.

11. Contention  of  the  appellant  is  that  when  the  trial  court

recorded  the  findings  of  defendant  that  Rajendra  Kumar  was

already in  the business of  utensils,  this  aspect  was not  properly

appreciated by the first  appellate  court  and the High Court.  The

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learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is a distinction between

a mere desire and need of the landlord and mere desire cannot be

equated with the genuine requirement. It was submitted that, since

Rajendra Kumar was already in business, there was no bona fide

and genuine requirement of the suit premises and the High Court

ought not to have affirmed the order of eviction. In support of his

contention,  the  learned senior  counsel  placed  reliance  upon two

judgments  T. Sivasubramaniam and Others. v. Kasinath Pujari

and Others. (1999) 7 SCC 275 and Hameedia Hardware Stores,

represented by its partner S. Peer Mohammed v. B. Mohan Lal

Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513.

12. The first  appellate  court  considered the  various  documents

produced by the appellant - tenant and held that those documents

do not relate to the date of filling of the eviction petition. So far as

Exs.D-13, D-14 and D-15, the first appellate court held that those

bills were issued in the year 1996, 2000 and 2001 and that they do

not show that Rajendra Kumar was engaged in the business on the

date of filing of the suit for eviction i.e. on 22.01.1992. Insofar as,

the levy of fine of Rs.1,000/- in the criminal case for the violation of

provisions of the Weights and Measurements Act, the first appellate

court  held  that  the  said  penalty  was  of  the  year  1988  and  not

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relating  to  the  period of  1992 -  the time of  filing  of  the  eviction

petition.  So  far  as  Ex.D-25,  application  made  to  the  telephone

department, the first appellate court pointed out that the date below

the  signature  of  Rajendra  Kumar  has  been  mentioned  as

08.06.1996 and not relating to the year 1992. Likewise, regarding

Exs.D-26 and D-27, the documents concerning the life insurance

policy, the first appellate court pointed out that the insurance was

taken  for  the  year  1994  and  not  for  the  year  1992.  Likewise,

referring to the other documents filed by the appellant/defendant,

the first appellate court held that those documents are not related to

the time of filing of  the suit  i.e.  1992 and they do not show that

Rajendra Kumar was engaged in the business of utensils in the year

1992  i.e.  at  the  time  of  filling  of  the  eviction  petition.  Upon

consideration of  the documents,  the first  appellate  court  and the

High  Court  recorded  concurrent  findings  that  the  respondent

landlord  has  clearly  established  that  Rajendra  Kumar  was  not

employed on the date of filling of the eviction petition i.e. 22.01.1992

and the bona fide requirement has been proved.

13. In  the  present  case,  mere  fact  that  Rajendra  Kumar  was

involved in the business of utensils – “Rajendra Bartan Bhandar” a

bona fide need of  the premises cannot  be doubted.  It  would  be

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inappropriate to expect the son of the respondent – landlord to sit

idle without doing any work till the eviction petition is decided on the

basis of the bona fide requirement. If there is categorical averment

by the respondent that the premises is required for his son Rajendra

Kumar;  engaging  in  the  business  of  utensils  in  the  meanwhile,

cannot be a ground to deny a decree for eviction.

14. The  other  contention  of  the  appellant  is  that  respondent  –

landlord had obtained possession of the adjacent shop from another

tenant - Babulal subsequently and the landlord, therefore, has an

alternative  shop  in  the  same  building  in  the  same  market  and,

therefore, the condition precedent for exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 12(1)(f) of the Act was not satisfied. Before the High Court,

the appellant – tenant had filed I. A. No.18652/09 under Order 41

Rule 27 CPC to bring on record the eviction of the tenant Babulal as

per judgment in S.A. No.472/2002 dated 01.09.2005, pursuant to

which the respondent – landlord has obtained vacant possession on

14.11.2006 of another shop by vacating another tenant – Babulal.

The contention of  the appellant  is  that  the availability  of  another

shop by subsequent event was not properly appreciated by the High

Court and the requirement of the landlord was not praesenti.

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15. Rights  of  the  parties  stand  crystallised  on  the  date  of

institution of the suit. However, in appropriate cases, court can take

note of  all  the subsequent  events.  Observing that  the court  may

permit subsequent event being introduced into the pleadings by way

of  amendment  as  it  would  be  necessary  to  do  so  for  the

performance of determining the rule in controversy for the parties

provided  certain  conditions  are  being  satisfied,  in  Om  Prakash

Gupta  v.  Ranbir  B.  Goyal,  (2002)  2  SCC  256,  it  was  held  as

under:-  

“11. The ordinary rule of civil  law is that the rights of the parties stand  crystallised  on  the  date  of  the  institution  of  the  suit  and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation  and enable complete justice  being  done to  the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law  so  that  the  opposite  party  is  not  taken  by  surprise.  In Pasupuleti  Venkateswarlu v.  Motor  &  General  Traders  (1975)  1 SCC 770, this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court  cannot be blinked at.  The court  may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances.  The  Court  speaking  through  Krishna  Iyer,  J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial  justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling resort to that course in

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law  or  justice,  (iii)  such  cognizance  of  subsequent  events  and developments should be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously obeyed.”

16. The  normal  rule  is  that  in  any  litigation  the  rights  and

obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtained at

the commencement of the litigation. Whenever, there is subsequent

events of fact or law, which have a material barring on the rights of

the parties to relief or on the aspects of moulding appropriate relief

to the parties, the court is not precluded from taking cognizance of

the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief (vide

Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram (1992) Supp 2 SCC 623)

17. In  Gaya Prasad relying on earlier decisions, this Court held

that  the crucial  date for  deciding as to bona fide requirement  of

landlord is the date of his application for eviction. It was a case of

bona fide requirement  of  the  premises  in  question  for  starting  a

clinic by the son of the landlord. The litigation continued for 23 years

and  during  that  period  the  son  of  the  landlord  joined  Provincial

Medical  Service  and  was  posted  at  different  places.  The  Court

refused  to  take  notice  of  the  subsequent  event  holding  that  the

crucial date was the date of filing of the eviction petition.  

18. In the light of the above principles and considering the case in

hand, the fact remains that the present case is of a landlord – tenant

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dispute.  As  discussed infra,  the  shop vacated by other  tenant  –

Babulal is for the bona fide requirement of respondent – landlord’s

another son Rajesh Kumar Jain. In that view of the matter, the court

would not  be justified in taking notice of  such a subsequent fact

sought to be projected by the appellant to oppose the relief granted

by the courts below. In the facts and circumstances of the present

case, the subsequent event relied upon by the appellant – tenant

cannot be taken cognizance.  

19. Admittedly, respondent – landlord obtained vacant possession

of the adjacent shop from the other tenant – Babulal on 14.11.2006

in  pursuance of  an  order  dated  01.09.2005 passed by  the  High

Court  in  Second Appeal  No.472 of  2002.  But  the learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the respondent – landlord submitted that the

decree for eviction of the said tenant – Babulal was on the ground of

bona  fide  requirement  of  Rajesh  Kumar  Jain  (other  son  of

respondent – landlord) as envisaged under Section 12(1)(f) of the

Act.  It  was  submitted  that  respondent  –  landlord’s  another  son

Rajesh Kumar Jain has occupied the said adjacent shop and doing

the business of “Sara”. Respondent – landlord has four sons and

the other shop vacated by tenant – Babulal is meant for the bona

fide requirement of another son Rajesh Kumar Jain. If that shop is

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not actually occupied by the other son Rajesh Kumar Jain, the other

tenant Babulal  has a right  to initiate the proceedings against  the

landlord for his re-entry in the said adjacent shop in terms of the

provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, it cannot

be  said  that  alternative  accommodation  was  available  for  the

respondent – landlord’s son Rajendra Kumar due to vacation of the

said adjacent shop by another tenant Babulal.  

20. Considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the High

Court rightly held that there is no ground to entertain the additional

documents  and  no  substantial  question  of  law  arises.  Upon

consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the first appellate

court and the High Court recorded concurrent findings of fact that

the suit shop is required bona fide for the son of the landlord for the

purpose of doing business and that the respondent – landlord has

no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation for the

business of his son. We do not find any good ground warranting

interference with the impugned judgment and this appeal is bound

to fail.  

21. In the result, the judgment passed on 25.04.2012 in Second

Appeal No.279 of 2007 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is

confirmed and this appeal is dismissed. The appellant – tenant is

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granted three months’ time to vacate and handover the possession

of the suit property. No costs.

.….......................J. [R. BANUMATHI]   

…….....................J.  [INDIRA BANERJEE]         

       New Delhi; December 14, 2018.

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