HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. Vs TATA STEEL LTD.
Bench: R.V. RAVEENDRAN,A.K. PATNAIK
Case number: C.A. No.-005077-005077 / 2011
Diary number: 6105 / 2009
Advocates: KAVEETA WADIA Vs
RAJAN NARAIN
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HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. v.
TATA STEEL LTD. (Civil Appeal No. 5077 of 2011)
JULY 05, 2011 [R.V. Raveendran and A.K. Patnaik, JJ.]
[2011] 7 SCR 60
The Order of the Court was delivered by
O R D E R
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The respondent (‘TISCO’ for short) filed a suit (C.S.No.12/2003) in the
Calcutta High Court against the appellant for recovery of a sum of
Rs.2,02,72,505/40 in regard to supply of steel. In the said Suit, the
respondent filed an application on 8.8.2003 praying for a decree upon
admission for Rs.74,57,074/50 alleging that the appellant had admitted
liability for such sum, as per minutes of the meeting held on 9.12.2000
between representatives of respondent and appellant. The said application
was resisted by the appellant contending that there was no such admission
on 9.12.2000 or any other date and pointing out that what transpired on
9.12.2000 was only a tentative agreement to have the accounts verified and
not a final settlement or admission of liability.
3. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by order dated
22.2.2008, granted a judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the
Civil Procedure Code (‘Code’ for short) for a sum of Rs.47,06,775/- in favour
of the respondent-plaintiff, subject to respondent furnishing a bank guarantee
for a sum of Rs.48,00,000/- in favour of the Registrar of the High Court. The
intra appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the
High Court by judgment dated 22.9.2008. The said judgment is under
challenge in this appeal by special leave.
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4. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code provides that where admission of facts
have been made in the pleadings or otherwise, whether oral or in writing, the
Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of
its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question
between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think
fit, having regard to such admissions.
5. The specific case of the respondent-plaintiff in the application was that
at a meeting held on 9.12.2000 for reconciling the accounts as on 31.3.1999,
the appellant admitted that a sum of Rs.74,57,074/50 was outstanding to the
respondent and therefore it was entitled to a judgment on admission for that
amount. The learned single Judge found that there was no such admission in
regard to Rs.74,57,074/50 in the minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000. He
however held that the minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000 recorded an
admission by the appellant in respect of a sum of Rs.47,06,775/70 and
consequently made a judgment on admission in regard to Rs.47,06,775/70
against the appellant. The question is whether such judgment on admission
was justified.
6. The sum of Rs.74,57,074/50 described as the amount admitted to be
due by the appellant, has nothing to do with appellant (Himani Alloys Ltd.). It
is an amount that actually figures in the minutes of a meeting held on
23.2.2001 between the representatives of the respondent and another
company by name Himani Ferro Alloys Ltd. Thus the specific case of
admission put forth by the respondent in its application seeking a judgment
on admission, was found to be incorrect. The respondent did not refer to or
rely upon any other admission, nor sought judgment in regard to any other
admission. Once the claim of the respondent regarding admission was
proved to be incorrect, its application for judgment on admission ought to
have been rejected by the High Court. The High Court could not have
embarked upon an enquiry as to whether there was some other admission
nor given a judgment on the basis of such other admission, not pleaded by
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the respondent-plaintiff. If the respondent wanted to rely upon some other
admission, it ought to have made a separate application, so that the appellant
could have filed its objections to the same. That was not done.
7. Assuming that the High Court could have examined whether there was
some other ‘admission’ in the minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000 relied
on by the respondent, let us examine whether there was in fact any
admission, on the basis of which a judgment on admission could have been
passed. The minutes of the meeting dated 9.12.2000 no doubt starts by
noting that the “As per Himani’s records: credit TISCO Rs.47,06,789.00” as
on 31.3.1999. It also records that as per TISCO’s records, as on 31.3.1999,
the amount due by Himani(appellant) was Rs.61,49,449/30 and if three
deductions (which were yet to be checked) were made, the amount due
would be Rs.47,06,775/70. Thereafter, in paragraphs 3,4 and 5, there is a
reference to both parties agreeing to provide particulars, agreeing to hold
further discussions on 26.12.2000 and respondent agreeing to check up its
records to find out the correctness of certain entries. Thereafter the minutes
conclude that the “final figure will be arrived at the meeting accordingly”.
When the minutes merely notes certain figures and states that they are
tentative and both parties will verify the same and says that the final figure will
be arrived at the next meeting, after discussions, we fail to understand how
the same could be termed as an “admission” for the purpose of Order 12 Rule
6 of the Code.
9. Another aspect regarding the minutes dated 9.12.2000 requires to be
noticed. The Minutes do not refer to any admission by HIMANI (appellant) to
pay any amount to TISCO (respondent). If a buyer states on 9.12.2000 that
his account as on 31.3.1999 shows a balance of amount ‘X’ to the credit of
the supplier, it can not be treated as an admission that the said amount ‘X’
was due to the supplier on 9.12.2000. In a continuing account, it may be
possible that between 31.3.1999 and 9.12.2000, there may be debits to the
account, or ‘reveral of credits’ or ‘settlement of the account’. We therefore
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hold that there was no admission on 9.12.2000 which could result in a
judgment under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.
10. It is true that a judgment can be given on an “admission” contained in
the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should
be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention
to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither
mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the
facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in
mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which
permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on
merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and
unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the
valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion
should be used only when there is a clear ‘admission’ which can be acted
upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India
[2000 (7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust
[2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh
Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601]. There is no such admission in this case.
11. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the
learned Single Judge and the division bench of the High Court dated
22.2.2008 and 22.9.2008. We make it clear that we have not recorded any
finding nor expressed any opinion in regard to the merits of the case or in
regard to any part of the suit claim. It is possible that on evidence being led,
the respondent is able to establish that Rs.47,06,775/70 was in fact due as on
31.3.1999 and that it continues to be due. We request the High Court to
dispose of the suit expeditiously.