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       REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  31 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9190 of 2011)

Hema               .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State, thr. Inspector of Police,  Madras                                                         .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and  

common  order  dated  29.04.2011  passed  by  the  Madurai  

Bench of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.  

37 of 2004 whereby the  High Court  dismissed the appeal  

filed by the appellant herein (A-5 therein) while confirming  

the  judgment  dated  28.07.2004,  passed  by  the  Court  of  

Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Madurai.  

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3)   Brief facts:

a) According to the prosecution, during the year 1992, the  

appellant  herein  (A-5),  along  with  other  accused  persons  

(A-1 to A-4 therein) had entered into a criminal conspiracy to  

cheat the Regional Passport Office, Trichy in order to obtain  

passports  on  the  basis  of  creating  ante-dated  passport  

applications with duplicate file numbers, so as to make them  

appear as old cases, accompanied by forged enclosures such  

as police verification certificates etc.   In  pursuance of the  

said conspiracy, A-2 being the Lower Division Clerk  in the  

Regional  Passport  Office,  Trichy  fraudulently  received  and  

processed  42  forged  passport  applications  filed  by  one  

Goodluck Travels, Trichy run by A-3 with the assistance of A-

4  and  A-5  (the  appellant  herein)  and  made  false  

endorsement  of  reference  numbers,  fee  certifications  etc.  

and A-1, being the Superintendent of the Regional Passport  

Office, Trichy, by abusing his official position, granted orders  

for  the  issue  of  passports  in  respect  of  the  said  42  

applications.   

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b) In pursuance of the same, on 09.02.1993, the District  

Crime Branch at Ramanathapuram, Tamil Nadu received a  

letter  from  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  (DSP),  DCRB  

Ramanad,  containing  a  complaint  given  by  the  Passport  

Officer,  Trichy.    On  the  basis  of  the  same,  a  case  was  

registered  by  the  District  Crime  Branch,  Ramanad  as  

Criminal Case No. 1 of 1993 under Sections 419, 420, 465  

and 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).   

c) When  the  Inspector  of  Police,  DCB,  took  up  the  

investigation, the CBI intervened and filed a First Information  

Report being RC-21(A)/93 on 11.05.1973 under Section 120-

B read with Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and  

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of  

Corruption  Act,  1988  (in  short  ‘the  PC  Act’).   After  

investigation, the case was committed to the Special Court  

for CBI Cases, Madurai and numbered as CC No. 38 of 1996.  

On  01.08.1996,  the  Special  Court,  framed  charges  under  

Section 120-B of IPC against A-1 to A-5 and under Sections  

420, 465 and 471 of  IPC against the appellant herein (A-5)  

and  specific  charges  under  Section  13(1)(d)  read  with  

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Section 13(2) of the PC Act against A-1 and under Sections  

420,  467,  468 and 471 of IPC and under Section 13(1)(d)  

read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act against A-2 and under  

Sections 420, 465 and 471 of IPC against A-3.   

d) By order dated 28.07.2004, the Principal Special Judge  

convicted and sentenced A-1 to A-3 and A-5.  In the present  

appeal, we are concerned only with A-5 who was convicted  

and sentenced to undergo RI for 2 years along with a fine of  

Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI for 6 months for  

each of the offences under Sections 120-B, 420 read with  

Sections 511, 465 and 471 of IPC. (Total fine of Rs. 15,000/-).  

e) Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence,  

the  appellant  herein  filed  Criminal  Appeal  No.  37  of  2004  

before  the  Madurai  Bench  of  the  Madras  High  Court.   By  

impugned order dated 29.04.2011, the High Court dismissed  

the same along with other set of appeals filed in respect of  

other accused and confirmed their conviction and sentence  

awarded by the trial Court.  Being aggrieved by the judgment  

of the High Court, A-5 alone has preferred this appeal by way  

of special leave before this Court.  

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4) Heard  Mr.  S.  Prabhakaran,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant  and  Mr.  H.P.  Rawal,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  

General for the respondent-CBI.

Contentions:

5) Mr. S. Prabhakaran, learned counsel for the appellant,  

after  taking  us  through the  entire  materials  including  the  

order of the trial Court and the High Court submitted that the  

initial  proceedings  by  the  State  Crime  Branch  and  the  

subsequent  proceedings  by  the  CBI  cannot  be  permitted,  

hence, the entire investigation is to be thrown out.  In other  

words, according to him, parallel  proceedings by the State  

Crime Branch and the CBI are not permissible.  In addition to  

the same, he submitted that the original seals and rubber  

stamps have not been seized from the police officials and  

those were not produced by the I.O. to prove that the seals  

and  stamps  were  forged.   He  further  submitted  that  the  

prosecution has failed to exhibit the FSL report with regard to  

the impression of seals of M.Os 1 to 3 alleged to have been  

recovered by the prosecution at the instance of A-3 despite  

the  same  were  being  sent  by  Shri  Madavanan  (PW-30),  

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Inspector  of  Police.   According  to  him,  the  specimen  

signatures of Shri Natarajan (PW-16), DSP, and R. Muniyandi  

(PW-29), Sub-Inspector of Police, have not been sent to the  

hand writing expert for his opinion.  Further, the seal  and  

specimen signature of attesting officer, viz., Dr. Muthu (PW-

18) were not collected by the CBI to prove that the seal and  

specimen signature were forged.  There is no document or  

indication found in Exh.P-3 to P-43 to show that they were  

sent by M/s Goodluck Travels to the Passport Office at Trichy.  

Finally, he submitted that inasmuch as the certificates issued  

by  the  Village  Administrative  Officers  that  the  applicants  

were  not  the  residents  of  the  place  mentioned  in  the  

application form, their reports have no legal sanctity in the  

absence of certification by the Tahsildar.  

6) Mr. Rawal, learned ASG appearing for the CBI, met all  

the contentions.  He submitted that the claim that parallel  

proceedings by the District Crime Branch (DCB) and the CBI,  

though not urged before the trial Court, High Court and even  

in the grounds of appeal, however, there is no legal basis for  

such claim.  Even otherwise, according to him, if there is any  

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defect in the investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted  

on this ground.  By taking us through the evidence relied on  

by the prosecution, findings by the trial Court and the High  

Court,  learned  ASG  submitted  that  in  view  of  concurrent  

decision  of  two  courts,  in  the  absence  of  any  perversity,  

interference by this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article  

136 is not warranted.  

Discussion:

7) With  regard  to  the  main  objection  as  to  parallel  

proceedings as claimed by Mr. Prabhakaran, learned counsel  

for  the appellant,  as stated earlier,  this  objection was not  

raised either before the trial Court or before the High Court  

and  even  in  the  grounds  of  appeal  before  this  Court,  

however,  considering  the  fact  that  we are  dealing  with  a  

matter  pertaining  to  criminal  prosecution,  we  heard  the  

counsel  on this  aspect.   He  pointed  out  that  the  first  FIR  

dated  09.02.1993  was  registered  at  the  instance  of  the  

complaint by Shri V.A. Britto, Passport Officer, Trichy.  The  

said FIR has been marked as Exh.P-214.  He also pointed out  

that  the second FIR,  at  the  instance of the  Special  Police  

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Establishment,  Madras  Branch,  was  lodged  on  11.05.1993  

against three persons, namely, (1) P. Durai, Superintendent,  

Passport  Office,  Trichy  (2)  P.M.  Rajendran,  LDC,  Passport  

Office,  Trichy and  (3)  M/s  Goodluck  Travels,  Thiruvadanai,  

Ramanad District, Tamil Nadu.  By taking us through the said  

reports,  particularly,  the  second  FIR,  the  counsel  for  the  

appellant has pointed out that the said report proceeds on  

the basis of credible information from a reliable source.  The  

same was entertained and registered as R.C.No. 21(A)/93 by  

S.  Arulnadu,  Inspector  of  Police,  SPE:CBI:ACB:Madras.   By  

pointing out these details, it is contended by the counsel for  

the appellant that the course adopted by the prosecution in  

examining certain  persons by the DCB,  namely,  the  State  

Police  and  the  remaining  persons  by  the  CBI  is  not  

permissible.  

8) It  is  settled  law  that  not  only  fair  trial,  but  fair  

investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed  

under  Articles  20  and  21  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  

Accordingly,  investigation  must  be  fair,  transparent  and  

judicious and it is the immediate requirement of rule of law.  

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As observed by this Court in Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat  

and Others,  2010 (12)  SCC 254, the Investigating Officer  

cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted  

and biased manner.  It was further observed that where non-

interference of the Court would ultimately result in failure of  

justice,  the  Court  must  interfere.   Though  reliance  was  

placed on the above decision by the appellant, it is not in  

dispute that in that case, the High Court has concluded by  

giving  detailed  reasons  that  the  investigation  has  been  

totally one-sided based on malafide.  Further, in that case,  

the charge-sheets filed by the Investigating Agency in both  

the cases were against the same set of accused.  This was  

not  the situation in  the case  on hand.   Though the State  

Crime Branch initiated investigation, subsequently, the same  

was  taken  over  by  the  CBI  considering  the  volume  and  

importance of the offence.   

9) In this regard, Mr. Rawal, learned ASG by drawing our  

attention to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Special Police  

Establishment Act, 1946 submitted that the course adopted  

by the CBI is, undoubtedly, within the ambit of the said Act  

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and legally sustainable.   Section 5 of the said  Act  speaks  

about  extension  of  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  special  

establishment to other areas.  Section 5 of the Act is relevant  

for our purpose which reads as under:-

“5.  Extension of powers and jurisdiction of special  police establishment to other areas.—(1) The Central  Government may by order extend to any area (including  Railway areas), in a State, not being a Union Territory the  powers and jurisdiction  of  members  of  the Delhi  Special  Police Establishment for the investigation of any offences  or  classes  of  offences  specified  in  a  notification  under  Section 3. (2)  When by an order  under  sub-section  (1)  the powers  and  jurisdiction  of  members  of  the  said  police  establishment are extended to any such area, a member  thereof  may,  subject  of  any  orders  which  the  Central  Government  may  make  in  this  behalf,  discharge  the  functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so  discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member of  a police force of that area and be vested with the powers,  functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of  a police officer belonging to that police station.

(3) where any such order under sub-section (1) is made in  relation  to  any  area,  then,  without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  any  member  of  the  Delhi  Special Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub- Inspector  may  subject  to  any  orders  which  the  Central  Government may make in this behalf, exercise the powers  of the officer in charge of a police station in that area and  when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police  station  discharging  the  functions of such an officer within the limits of his station.”

Sub-section  (3)  which  was  inserted  with  effect  from  

18.12.1964 by Act  40 of 1964 makes it  clear  that  on the  

orders of the Central Government, any member of the Delhi  

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Special  Police  Establishment  is  permitted  to  exercise  the  

powers of the officer in charge of a police station in that area  

and while exercising such powers, he shall be deemed to be  

an officer in charge of a police station concerned discharging  

the functions of such officer within the limits of his station.  In  

the light of the mandates as provided in sub-section (3), we  

are of the view that learned ASG is right in contending that  

there is no infirmity or flaw in continuing the investigation by  

the officers of the CBI in spite of the fact that the State Crime  

Branch  registered  a  complaint  and  proceeded  with  the  

investigation to a certain extent.

10) It  is  also  settled  law  that  for  certain  defects  in  

investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted.  This aspect  

has been considered in various decisions.  In C. Muniappan  

and Others vs.  State of Tamil Nadu, 2010 (9) SCC 567,  

the following discussion and conclusion are relevant which  

are as follows:-

“55. There  may  be  highly  defective  investigation  in  a  case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is  any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any  benefit  should be given to the accused. The law on this  issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by  itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given  

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to  such  designed  or  negligent  investigations  or  to  the  omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith  and  confidence  of  the  people  in  the  criminal  justice  administration  would  be  eroded.  Where  there  has  been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  investigating  agency  or  omissions,  etc.  which resulted in  defective investigation,  there  is  a  legal  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  court  to  examine  the  prosecution  evidence  dehors  such  lapses,  carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable  or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether  such lapses affected the object  of  finding  out  the truth.  Therefore,  the  investigation  is  not  the  solitary  area  for  judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial.  The conclusion of  the  trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the  probity of investigation.  

11) In Dayal Singh and Others vs. State of Uttaranchal,  

2012 (8) SCC 263, while reiterating the principles rendered in  

C. Muniappan (supra), this Court held thus:

“18.   … Merely  because PW 3 and PW 6 have failed  to  perform their duties in accordance with the requirements  of  law,  and  there  has  been  some  defect  in  the  investigation, it will  not be to the benefit  of the accused  persons to the extent  that they would be entitled to an  order of acquittal on this ground. …”

12) In Gajoo vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2012 (9) SCC 532,  

while reiterating the same principle  again,  this  Court  held  

that defective investigation, unless affects the very root of  

the prosecution case and is prejudicial to the accused should  

not  be  an  aspect  of  material  consideration  by  the  Court.  

Since, the Court has adverted to all the earlier decisions with  

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regard to defective investigation and outcome of the same, it  

is useful to refer the dictum laid down in those cases:

20. In  regard  to  defective  investigation,  this  Court  in  Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal while dealing with the  cases of omissions and commissions by the investigating  officer, and duty of the court in such cases, held as under:  (SCC pp. 280-83, paras 27-36)

“27. Now, we may advert to the duty of the court in  such cases. In Sathi Prasad v. State of U.P this Court  stated that it is well settled that if the police records  become  suspect  and  investigation  perfunctory,  it  becomes the duty of the court to see if the evidence  given in court should be relied upon and such lapses  ignored.  Noticing  the  possibility  of  investigation  being  designedly  defective,  this  Court  in  Dhanaj  Singh v. State of Punjab, held: (SCC p. 657,  para  5)

‘5. In the case of a defective investigation the court  has  to  be  circumspect  in  evaluating  the  evidence.  But  it  would  not  be right  in  acquitting  an accused  person  solely  on account  of  the  defect;  to  do  so   would tantamount to playing into the hands of the  investigating officer if the investigation is designedly  defective.’

28.  Dealing with the cases of  omission and commission,  the Court in Paras Yadav v.  State of Bihar enunciated the  principle, in conformity with the previous judgments, that  if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating  agency, negligently or otherwise, the prosecution evidence  is required to be examined dehors such omissions to find  out  whether  the  said  evidence  is  reliable  or  not.  The  contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the  way of evaluating the evidence by the courts, otherwise  the designed mischief  would  be perpetuated  and justice  would be denied to the complainant party.

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29. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, the  Court noticed the importance of the role of witnesses in a  criminal trial. The importance and primacy of the quality of  trial process can be observed from the words of Bentham,  who states that witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice.  The court issued a caution that in such situations, there is  a greater responsibility of the court on the one hand and  on the other the courts must seriously deal with persons  who are involved in creating designed investigation.  The  Court held that: (SCC p. 398, para 42)

‘42.  Legislative  measures  to  emphasise  prohibition  against tampering with witness, victim or informant  have become the imminent  and inevitable need of  the  day.  Conducts  which  illegitimately  affect  the   presentation of evidence in proceedings before the   courts have to be seriously and sternly dealt with.   There  should  not  be  any  undue  anxiety  to  only   protect the interest of  the accused. That would be   unfair, as noted above, to the needs of the society.   On the contrary,  efforts should be to ensure a fair   trial  where  the  accused  and  the  prosecution  both   get  a  fair  deal.  Public  interest  in  the  proper   administration  of  justice  must  be  given  as  much   importance,  if  not  more,  as  the  interest  of  the   individual accused. In this courts have a vital role to   play.’ (emphasis in original)

30. With the passage of time, the law also developed  and  the  dictum  of  the  court  emphasised  that  in  a  criminal case, the fate of proceedings cannot always be  left  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  parties.  Crime  is  a  public  wrong,  in  breach and violation  of  public  rights  and  duties,  which  affects  the  community  as  a  whole  and is harmful to the society in general.

31. Reiterating the above principle, this Court in  NHRC  v. State of Gujarat held as under: (SCC pp. 777-78, para  6)

‘6. … “35. … The concept of fair trial entails familiar  triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim  and the  society  and it  is  the community  that  acts  through the State and prosecuting agencies. Interest  of  society  is  not  to  be  treated  completely  with  disdain and as persona non grata. The courts have  always been considered to have an overriding duty  to maintain public confidence in the administration  of justice—often referred to as the duty to vindicate  and  uphold  the  ‘majesty  of  the  law’.  Due  administration of justice has always been viewed as  

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a continuous process, not confined to determination  of  the  particular  case,  protecting  its  ability  to  function as a court of law in the future as in the case  before  it.  If  a  criminal  court  is  to  be  an  effective  instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge  must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording  machine  by  becoming  a  participant  in  the  trial  evincing  intelligence,  active  interest  and  elicit  all  relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct  conclusion,  to  find  out  the  truth,  and  administer  justice  with  fairness  and  impartiality  both  to  the  parties and to the community it serves. The courts  administering  criminal  justice  cannot  turn  a  blind  eye  to  vexatious  or  oppressive  conduct  that  has  occurred  in  relation  to  proceedings,  even  if  a  fair  trial  is  still  possible,  except  at  the  risk  of  undermining  the  fair  name  and  standing  of  the  Judges as impartial  and independent adjudicators.”  (Zahira Habibullah case, SCC p. 395, para 35)’

32. In  State of Karnataka v.  K. Yarappa Reddy this Court  occasioned  to  consider  the  similar  question  of  defective  investigation as to whether any manipulation in the station  house  diary  by  the  investigating  officer  could  be  put  against the prosecution case. This Court, in para 19, held  as follows: (SCC p. 720)

‘19. But can the above finding (that the station house  diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the  other evidence in this case? If the other evidence, on  scrutiny,  is found credible and acceptable,  should the  court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated  by the investigating officer in conducting investigation  or in preparing the records so unscrupulously? It can be  a  guiding  principle  that  as  investigation  is  not  the  solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the  conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to  depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well- nigh settled that even if  the investigation is illegal or  even  suspicious  the  rest  of  the  evidence  must  be  scrutinised independently of the impact of it. Otherwise  the  criminal  trial  will  plummet  to  the  level  of  the  investigating officers ruling the roost.  The court  must  have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials  over the action taken by the investigating officers. The  criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the  wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the  case. In other words, if the court is convinced that the  testimony  of  a  witness  to  the  occurrence  is  true  the  court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer’s  suspicious role in the case.’

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33.  In  Ram Bali v.  State of  U.P. the judgment  in  Karnel   Singh v.  State of M.P. was reiterated and this Court had  observed that: (Ram Bali case15, SCC p. 604, para 12)

‘12. … In case of defective investigation the court has  to be circumspect [while] evaluating the evidence. But  it  would not be right in acquitting an accused person  solely  on  account  of  the  defect;  to  do  so  would  tantamount  to  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  investigation  officer  if  the  investigation  is  designedly  defective.’

34. Where our criminal justice system provides safeguards  of fair trial and innocent till proven guilty to an accused,  there it also contemplates that a criminal trial is meant for  doing  justice  to  all,  the  accused,  the  society  and  a  fair  chance to prove to the prosecution.  Then alone can law  and  order  be  maintained.  The  courts  do  not  merely  discharge the function to ensure that no innocent man is  punished, but also that a guilty man does not escape. Both  are public duties of  the Judge.  During the course of  the  trial,  the  learned  Presiding  Judge  is  expected  to  work  objectively  and  in  a  correct  perspective.  Where  the  prosecution attempts to misdirect the trial on the basis of  a perfunctory or designedly defective investigation, there  the court is to be deeply cautious and ensure that despite  such  an  attempt,  the  determinative  process  is  not  subverted. For truly attaining this object of a ‘fair trial’, the  court  should  leave  no  stone  unturned  to  do  justice  and  protect the interest of the society as well. 35. This brings us to an ancillary issue as to how the court  would  appreciate  the  evidence  in  such  cases.  The  possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and  ocular  evidence  cannot  be  ruled  out.  But  it  is  not  that  every  minor  variation  or  inconsistency  would  tilt  the  balance  of  justice  in  favour  of  the  accused.  Of  course,  where  contradictions  and  variations  are  of  a  serious  nature,  which apparently  or  impliedly  are  destructive  of  the  substantive  case  sought  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution,  they  may  provide  an  advantage  to  the  accused.  The  courts,  normally,  look  at  expert  evidence  with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true  that the courts are not absolutely guided by the report of  the  experts,  especially  if  such  reports  are  perfunctory,  unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to  misdirect  the  prosecution.  In  Kamaljit  Singh v.  State  of  

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Punjab,  the  Court,  while  dealing  with  discrepancies  between ocular and medical evidence, held: (SCC p. 159,  para 8)

‘8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical  evidence  and  ocular  evidence  do  not  take  away  the  primacy  of  the  latter.  Unless  medical  evidence  in  its  term  goes  so  far  as  to  completely  rule  out  all  possibilities whatsoever of  injuries taking place in the  manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of  the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out.’

36.  Where the eyewitness account is found credible and  trustworthy,  medical  opinion  pointing  to  alternative  possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive.

‘34. … The expert witness is expected to put before the  court all materials inclusive of the data which induced  him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the court  on the technical aspect of the case by [examining] the  terms  of  science  so  that  the  court  although,  not  an  expert may form its own judgment on those materials  after giving due regard to the expert’s opinion, because  once  the  expert’s  opinion  is  accepted,  it  is  not  the  opinion of the medical officer but [that] of the court.’”

13) It is clear that merely because of some defect in the  

investigation, lapse on the part  of the I.O., it  cannot be a  

ground  for  acquittal.   Further,  even  if  there  had  been  

negligence  on  the  part  of  the  investigating  agency  or  

omissions etc., it is the obligation on the part of the Court to  

scrutinize the prosecution evidence  de hors such lapses to  

find  out  whether  the  said  evidence  is  reliable  or  not  and  

whether such lapses affect the object of finding out the truth.  

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In the light of the above principles, as noticed, we reject the  

main  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant,  

however, as observed in the above decisions, let us examine  

the  material  relied  on  by  the  prosecution  and  find  out  

whether a case has been made out against the appellant.  

Discussion as to the merits of the prosecution case:

14) It is the claim of the appellant that the prosecution has  

not  proved that  the  travel  agency was purported  to have  

been run by S. Rajendran (A-3) for the purpose of submitting  

passport applications.  According to the appellant, Exh.P-2 to  

P-43 is incorrect.  The said contention is liable to be rejected  

since Palaniappan (PW-11), who is the owner of the building  

bearing No.48/9, MCT Building, near Bus Stand, Karaikudi has  

leased out the first floor of the said building to S. Rajendran  

(A-3) for the purpose of running a travel agency in the name  

and  style  of  Goodluck  Travels.   Even  in  the  cross-

examination, PW-11, the owner of the said building, admitted  

that A-3 was a tenant under him.  In addition to the same, it  

is also clear from the evidence of one Dawood (PW-13) that  

Rajendran (A-3) was running a travel agency at Karaikudi in  

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the name and style of Goodluck Travels.  It is also relevant to  

point  out  that  as  per  the  evidence  of  Assistant  Registrar,  

Ramanad District (PW-9), Goodluck Travels was registered as  

a firm in the Office of the District Registrar, Karaikudi.  It is  

clear from the above materials that A-3 was occupying the  

said  premises pertaining to PW-11 during the  period from  

1991-93 and he was running a travel agency in that place.  

15) The claim of the appellant that there is no evidence to  

show  that  Exh.P-2  to  P-43  had  been  presented  by  the  

Goodluck  Travels  is  incorrect  since  Hema  (A-5),  who  was  

working  as  a  clerk  in  the  said  travel  agency  of  A-3  has  

admitted in the statement under Section 313 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure that at the relevant time she was working  

with  the  Goodluck  Travels  and  she  used  to  submit  the  

passport applications in the passport office and receive the  

passports from the office.   The above statement  makes it  

clear that she was assisting S. Rajendran (A-3) in preparing  

applications and filing them before the passport office and  

dealing  the  affairs  connected  therewith.   This  fact  is  also  

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evident from Exh. P-2, which is a folder marked on the side of  

the prosecution and captioned as “Goodluck Travels”.

16) The other relevant aspect is the admissible portion of  

the confessional statement of A-3 which is marked as Exh.P-

215  and  which  led  to  the  recovery  of  forged/fabricated  

rubber stamp seals, M.Os 1 to 3 seized at his behest under  

Exh.P-216,  the  Mazahar,  in  the  presence  of  Village  

Administrative Officer (PW-15) and Village Menial also prove  

the prosecution case and disprove the stand of the appellant.  

17) The trial Court, on verification and perusal of Exh.P-2 to  

P-43, passport applications, noted that the same were filed  

by Goodluck  Travels.   It  is  pointed  out  that  the  applicant  

concerned  in  Exh.P-2  (passport  application)  namely,  Shri  

Rasool,  authorized  M/s  Goodluck  Travels  to  deal  with  the  

matter relating to his passport and to receive the same on  

his  behalf.   The evidence of PW-12 and PW-13 also lends  

credence  to  the  above aspect.   Further,  we have already  

noted  that  the  appellant  (A-5)  has  admitted  in  her  

examination under Section 313 that  she was working with  

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Goodluck Travels and she used to submit the applications in  

the passport office and receive the passports from the office.  

18) Next, it  is contended by the appellant that the police  

verification forms, namely, Exh.128 to 136 and 161 to 202  

were not proved to have been forged in the light of the fact  

that the subsequent signatures of PWs 16 and 29 were not  

sent to PW-28, the hand writing expert, for his opinion.  The  

said  contention  is  liable  to  be  rejected  in  view  of  the  

categorical  statement  of  Shri  Selvin  (PW-26),  DSP,  DCRB,  

Ramanad  who  has  stated  that  as  soon  as  the  personal  

particulars,  forms  of  passport  applications  were  received  

from the  Passport  Office  for  police  verification,  they  were  

entered in the register maintained for the purpose and each  

application was given a number and all the applications were  

sent to the respective Police Stations for report.  He further  

explained that  after  verification by the officials concerned,  

the paper would again come to the office of DSP, DCRB for  

forwarding the same to the concerned Passport Offices.  He  

asserted that 42 application forms, viz., Exh. P-2 to P-43 were  

not received at the office of DSP, DCRB, Ramanad.  He also  

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highlighted that these forms were neither sent to the sub-

Inspector of Police Thiruvadanai for verification nor received  

back from the S.I. Police and not dispatched to the Passport  

Office, Trichy for recommendation for issue of passports.  A  

perusal of the evidence of Shri Natarajan (PW-16), DSP, R.  

Muniyadi (PW-29), Sub-Inspector of Police clearly shows that  

they did not sign the verification forms.  PW-29 specifically  

stated that  during the relevant time, passport applications  

(Exh.P-2 to 43) were not received by his office and he did not  

sign the verification forms Exh.P-161 to P-202.   It  is  clear  

from their  statements  and  assertions  that  the  verification  

forms of the said 42 applications have not been dealt with by  

the  concerned  officials  and  the  trial  Judge  was  right  in  

concluding that they were forged.  Mere non-production of  

registers maintained in the office of DSP, DCRB, Ramanad  

cannot be construed to be an infirmity in this case in the light  

of  the  evidence  of  PWs  16,  26  and  29  who are  relevant  

officers concerned with those documents.

19) Regarding the contention that the specimen signatures  

of  Dr.  Muthu (PW-18),  Civil  Surgeon,  Government  Hospital  

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and Shri Vairavan (PW-20), Executive Officer (Retired), Town  

Panchayat,  Thondi  in  Ramanad  District,  who  are  all  

independent witnesses, were not forged, it is very much clear  

from their evidence that their signatures were forged in the  

applications.  There is no reason to disbelieve their evidence  

and the trial Judge has rightly accepted the same.   

20) Regarding  the  evidence  of  Village  Administrative  

Officers and the certificates issued by them, it is relevant to  

point  out  that  those  documents  were  properly  marked  

through  Village  Administrative  Officers  of  the  villages  

concerned and also by the officers who made a field enquiry  

for the same.  We are satisfied that there is no legal infirmity  

as claimed.  

21) Insofar as the contention relating to recoveries of M.Os  

1  to  3  –  Seals  of  Superintendent  of  Police,  Ramanad,  as  

rightly  concluded  by  the  trial  Court,  the  evidence  of  the  

concerned  Village  Administrative  Officers,  Deputy  

Superintendent of Police, Civil Surgeon (PW-18), Government  

Hospital, Executive Officer (Retired) of Town Panchayat (PW-

20)  are  sufficient  to  establish  that  the  forged  attested  

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documents  were  created  and  enclosed  for  the  purpose of  

getting passports in support of false addresses given in the  

applications by the appellant.  The above fact is also evident  

from the evidence of Village Administrative Officer (PW-15),  

Thiruvadanani,  the  confessional  statement  given  by  A-3  

which was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in  

his presence and M.Os 1 to 3 which were recovered under a  

cover of mazahar (Exh. P-216) at the behest of A-3 and the  

admissible portion of the evidence leading to recovery which  

is marked as Exh. 215. The contradictions as pointed out by  

the learned counsel for the appellant are only trivial in nature  

as  found  by  both  the  trial  Court  and  the  High  Court,  

accordingly, it cannot be construed to be a material one so  

as to affect the version of the prosecution.  We are satisfied  

that  there  is  no  infirmity  in  the  recovery  and  reject  the  

argument of the learned counsel for the appellant.

22) Coming to the next contention, namely, the failure of  

the prosecution to exhibit  the report  of FSL, Chennai  with  

regard to the impression of seals M.Os 1 to 3 is fatal to the  

prosecution, it is relevant to note that PWs 16, 26 and 29  

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DSPs  and  S.I.  of  Police  have  categorically  denied  the  

genuineness  of  the  above  seals  since  the  same  were  

recovered pursuant to the confessional statement of A-3 and  

the absence of expert opinion by itself does not absolve the  

liability of the appellant.

23) The contention that the evidence of Sundaram (PW-14),  

who  was  examined  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  

handwriting  of  the  appellant  and  whose  competency  to  

identify  the  writing  of  the  appellant  itself  is  doubtful,  as  

rightly pointed out by the respondent that it was admitted by  

A-5 (appellant herein), while questioning under Section 313  

that she had been working in Sugir Tours and Travels run by  

PW-14 during 1987-91 and, hence, the evidence of PW-14,  

who identified the writings available in Exhs.P-2 to P-43 as  

that  of  A-5  is  admissible  under  Section  47  of  the  Indian  

Evidence Act.   We are satisfied that the same was rightly  

acted  upon  by  the  trial  Court  and  the  High  Court  while  

holding the charge against the accused-appellant as proved  

to have committed in pursuance of the conspiracy.

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24) Finally,  the  contention  of  the  appellant  that  simply  

because the applications were filled up by a person does not  

automatically lead to the inference that a person is a party to  

the  conspiracy.   In  the  case  on  hand,  it  is  very  well  

established by the  prosecution  that  the  filled  up  passport  

applications  were  submitted  by  A-5  (appellant  herein)  on  

behalf of her employer A-3.  Further, in majority of passport  

applications (Exh. P-2 to P-43), bogus particulars were filled  

by A-5 (appellant herein), at Trichy.  The prosecution has also  

established that A-5 has given false particulars regarding the  

place of residence of applicants’ in the passport applications  

in  view of  her  admission  in  313  statement  that  she  was  

working in Goodluck Travels and assisting Rajendran (A-3) in  

preparing applications and filing them before the Passport  

Office  as  well  as  handling  the  affairs  connected therewith  

which clearly prove that A-5 has filled up the said passport  

applications (Exh.P-2 to P-43).  We are also satisfied that the  

prosecution  has  clearly  established  that  false  documents  

were made for the purpose of cheating and those documents  

were used as genuine for obtaining passports.

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25) In the light of the overwhelming evidence placed by the  

prosecution, analyzed by the trial Court and affirmed by the  

High  Court,  interference  by  this  Court  with  concurrent  

findings of fact by the courts below is not warranted except  

where there is some serious infirmity in the appreciation of  

evidence and the findings are perverse.  Further, this Court

will not ordinarily interfere with appreciation of evidence by  

the High Court and re-appreciation is permissible only if an  

error  of  law  or  procedure  and  conclusion  arrived  are  

perverse.

26) Taking note of the fact that the appellant is having a  

small  child,  while confirming the conviction we reduce the  

sentence to six months from two years.

27)   With the above modification i.e., reduction of sentence,  

the appeal stands disposed of.

………….…………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)                                  

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       ………….…………………………J.                   (RANJAN GOGOI)  

       ………….…………………………J.                   (V. GOPALA GOWDA)  

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 7, 2013.

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