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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO. 1213 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.1913 of 2012)

HDFC Securities Ltd. & Ors ...     Appellants

:Versus:

State of Maharashtra & Anr.  ...    Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been filed assailing the judgment and

order dated 16th November, 2011, passed by the High

Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Criminal  Writ

Petition No.672 of  2011,  whereby the  writ  petitions

filed  by  the  appellants  were  dismissed by  the  High

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Court on the ground that the filing of the writ petition

was premature and there was no need for exercising

the  powers  either  under  Article  227  of  the

Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: appellant No.1 -

HDFC Securities  Ltd.,  is  a  public  liability  company

(hereinafter referred to as “the Company” for short),

appellant  No.2  is  the  Managing  Director  of  the

Company,  appellant  No.3  is  Business  Head  of  the

Company, and appellant No.4 is the Regional head of

Mumbai  Region  of  the  Company,  respectively.

Respondent  No.1  is  State  of  Maharashtra  and

respondent  No.2  is  an  individual,  who  held  an

account with the Company. The Company is engaged

in the business of dealing in shares and securities on

behalf  of  its  constituents  and  clients  on  Brokerage

Charge  and  it  is  also  a  member  of  National  Stock

Exchange of India Limited (NSE) and Bombay Stock

Exchange of India Limited (BSE).

4. Respondent  No.2,  had  registered  herself  with  the

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Company  as  a  constituent/client  by  opening

Securities Trading Account vide No.342889 and was

an imperial customer of the Company for about eight

years.  She  executed  a  Member-Client  Agreement

dated  28th June,  2005.  On  3rd August,  2009,

respondent  No.2,  through  a  legal  Notice  dated

03.08.2009,  requested the  appellants  to  make good

the losses caused to her by indulging in unauthorized

and fraudulent trading in her account by one Vinod

Koper (Relationship Manager of the company-”RM” in

short)  during the period July,  2008 to June,  2009.

This Notice was also sent to RM and one Rohan Raut,

Assistant  Vice  President  of  the  Company,  on  20th

October,  2009.  Thereafter,  she  filed  arbitration

proceedings before NSE Panel  of  Arbitrators against

the Company for a sum of Rs.48.99 Lacs and costs of

Rs.2.5 Lacs, and chose the Arbitrators of her choice,

being two retired High Court Judges and sought to

call RM as a witness. The Arbitrators passed an award

in  favour  of  the  Company  on  18th August,  2010,

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recording  a  shift  in  the  stand  of  respondent  No.2,

authorizing her husband to trade on her behalf. In the

meantime, as the Police did not take cognizance of the

matter,  albeit she  filed  a  complaint  on  31st march,

2010,  against  the appellants,  RM and AVP, on 10th

June, 2010, she also filed a criminal complaint under

Section  156(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,

1973 (hereinafter  referred to  as  Cr.P.C.)  before  10th

Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Andheri,  bearing  Case

No.143/2010,  alleging  execution  of  unauthorized

trades  in  her  account  without  her  consent  by  the

appellants and claimed that she had thereby suffered

losses amounting to Rs.70 Lacs. Specific allegations

were levelled against RM and appellant No.3 as she

was introduced to RM by appellant No.3 and was told

that  RM  would  handle  her  investment  portfolio

honestly  and  efficiently  with  her  prior  instructions.

General allegations of involvement of other appellants

were made. On 25th September, 2010, she preferred

an appeal before NSE Appellate Panel of Arbitrators,

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being Arbitration REF No.CM/M-213/2009,  wherein

she disputed the trades which had taken place during

the  period  December  2008  to  April  2009.  Being

completely  oblivious  of  the  Arbitration  proceedings,

the award passed therein and the appeal preferred by

respondent  No.2,  on  04.01.2011,  the  learned

Metropolitan  Magistrate  directed  registration  of  FIR

against the appellants and ordered for a report after

investigation.

5. Pursuant  to  the  order  of  the  learned  Metropolitan

Magistrate  dated  4.01.2011,  Juhu  Police  Station

registered the FIR, being MECR No.7 of  2011 dated

30th January,  2011,  under  Sections 409,  420,  465,

467  read  with  Sections  34  and  120-B  of  the  IPC.

Meanwhile,  the  Appellate  Tribunal  had  decided  the

appeal against respondent No.2, vide its Award dated

24th January, 2011. The Appellate tribunal found that

respondent  No.2  had not  denied  the  fact  of  having

received  all  the  necessary  documents,  including

Contract  notes,  etc.  with regard to the transactions

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undertaken by  the  appellants  on her  behalf,  which

were required to be issued by the trading member to

the  investor  immediately  after  the  trade  is

undertaken.  Thereafter,  the  appellants  filed  a  writ

petition  before  the  Bombay  High  Court,  being

Criminal  Writ  Petition  No.672  of  2011,  inter  alia

praying for  quashing of  the said FIR and the same

prayer  was  also  made  in  Criminal  Writ  Petition

No.767 of 2011, filed by RM before the High Court.

The  High Court  by  its  judgment  dated  16.11.2011,

dismissed both the writ petitions as according to it,

the  filing  of  the  writ  petitions  was  premature  and

there  was  no  need for  exercising  the  powers  either

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under

Section  482  Cr.P.C.  Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid

judgment  of  the  High  Court,  the  appellants  have

approached this Court by filing this appeal by special

leave.   

6. The  only  question  that  arises  for  decision  in  this

appeal is whether the order dated 04.01.2011 passed

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by the Court of 10th Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri,

in  Private  Complaint,  C.C.  No.143/Misc/2010,  filed

by respondent No.2 for the offences punishable under

Sections 409, 420, 465, 467 read with Sections 34,

120(B) IPC, as well as FIR bearing MECR No.7 of 2011

dated 30th January, 2011, registered at Police Station,

Juhu, District Mumbai,  are liable to be quashed.

7. In order  to answer this  question,  it  is  necessary to

first set out the relevant provisions i.e. Sections 156

and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

“156.  Police  officer's  power  to  investigate  cognizable case. (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which  a  Court  having  jurisdiction  over  the  local  area within  the  limits  of  such  station  would  have  power  to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case  was  one  which  such  officer  was  not  empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any  Magistrate  empowered  under  Section  190  may order such an investigation as above- mentioned.”

“482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this

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Code,  or  to  prevent  abuse  of  process  of  any  Court  or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

8. The High Court dismissed the application filed by the

appellants for quashing and setting aside the order of

the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 4th January, 2011,

on the ground that the appellants had applied before

the stage of issuance of process so to be issued by the

Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 156(3) of  the

Criminal Procedure Code. According to the appellants,

the  fundamental  rights  of  the  appellants  would  be

compromised if the order so passed by the Magistrate

is allowed to be given effect to. The contention before

the High Court on this question is that the order so

passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is illegal and

amounts  to  abuse  of  the  process  of  law.   On  the

contrary, before the High Court it was submitted on

behalf of respondent No.2 that an order under Section

156(3)  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code  requiring

investigation by the police does not cause any injury

of irreparable nature which requires quashing of the

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investigation.  It  is  further  stated  that  the  stage  of

cognizance would arise after the investigation report

is  filed.  Therefore,  the  application  filed  by  the

appellants  before  the  High  Court  is  nothing  but

prematured and thus there is no need for exercising

the powers of the High Court either under Article 227

of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of

the Code. Further contention of the respondent before

the High Court was that the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code should be sparingly used.   

9. The High Court held that the direction given to the

police by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the

Code  for  carrying  out  the  investigation  into  the

complaint and to submit a report, cannot give a right

to the appellants for quashing the same since such an

order would be based absolutely on speculations upon

the  report  not  filed.   Further,  it  would  result  in

prejudging the complaint. In these circumstances, the

High Court dismissed the said application.

10. Dr.  Abhishek  Singhvi,  learned  senior  counsel

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appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that

the initiation of proceedings in the instant case is an

abuse of process of law and is liable to be quashed.

He  argued  that  it  is  a  settled  principle  that

summoning  of  an  accused  in  a  criminal  case  is  a

serious matter and the criminal law cannot be set in

motion as a matter of course. Therefore, the order of

the magistrate must reflect application of mind to the

facts of the case and the law applicable thereto.  In

support of this submission, the learned counsel has

relied upon  Anil Kumar  Vs.   M. K. Aiyappa, (2013)

10 SCC 705, paragraph 11, of which is quoted below:

“11. The  scope  of  Section  156(3)  CrPC  came  up  for consideration  before  this  Court  in  several  cases.  This Court in Maksud Saiyed case examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction  under  Section  156(3)  and  held  that  where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section  156(3)  or  Section  200  CrPC,  the  Magistrate  is required to  apply his mind, in such a case,  the Special Judge/Magistrate  cannot  refer  the  matter  under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected  in  the  order.  The  mere  statement  that  he  has gone  through  the  complaint,  documents  and  heard  the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be

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sufficient.  After  going  through the complaint,  documents and  hearing  the  complainant,  what  weighed  with  the Magistrate  to  order  investigation  under  Section  156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We  have  already  extracted  the  order  passed  by  the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation.”

11. Learned  Magistrate  had  passed  an  order  on

04.01.2011 holding that:

“The bare reading of the complaint and the accompanying documents  disclose  the  cognizable  offence.  Therefore  in view of the judgement of Hon’ble  Supreme Court in case of  Srinivas Gunduri & Ors. vs. M. S. SEPCO Electric Power  Construction & Anr. In  the  matter  of  criminal appeal  No.1377/2010  and  1378/2010  decided  on 30.07.2010  when  the  complaint  discloses  a  cognizable offence, then the Magistrate instead of applying his mind to  the  complaint  for  deciding  whether  or  not  there  is sufficient ground for proceedings may direct the police for investigation.

Therefore,  considering  all  these  aspects,  the  complaint discloses the commission of cognizable offence. Therefore, considering the nature of  offence it  needs to  be sent  to police for investigation under section 156(3) of CrPC.”

12. Dr.  Abhishek  Singhvi,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants has relied upon

the  following  decisions  of  this  Court  to  assail  the

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aforesaid order passed by the Magistrate:  Devarapall

Lakshminarayana  Vs. V.  Narayana Reddy & Ors.,

(1976) 3 SCC 252, and Ram Dev Food Products Pvt.

Ltd.  Vs. State of Gujrat, reported in (2015) 6 SCC

439.  

13. Further, it was submitted by the learned counsel for

the  appellants  that  there  is  no  merit  in  the

complainant’s  (respondent No.2)  contention that the

transactions  from  her  trading  account  were

unauthorized. Trading from the complainant’s trading

account  were  being  carried  out  by her  husband as

admitted by the complainant in the complaint made

before  the  learned  Magistrate,  and  at  the  time  of

opening the trading account with appellant No.1, she

was  made  aware  of  all  the  risks  involved  and  the

complainant had agreed to the same and understood

that  she would be responsible  for  all  the risks and

consequences  of  entering  into  trades.  The  relevant

clause of the Agreement entered into by complainant

is reproduced hereinbelow:

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“2.11 The Client agrees and declares as follows: (i)  The Client shall  be wholly responsible for all  the investment decisions and trades of the Client; (ii) The Client will pay receive applicable daily margins; (iii) Payment of margins by  the  Client  does  not  necessarily  imply  complete satisfaction of all dues; (iv) In spite of consistent having paid margins, the Client may, on the closing of his trade, be obliged to pay (or entitled to receive) such further sums as  the  market  price  or  an  instrument  of  contract  may dictate; and (v) The failure of a Client to understand the risk involved or the failure of the member to explain the risk to the Client shall  not  render a contract  as void or voidable and the Client shall be and shall continue to be responsible for all the risks and consequences for entering into trades in Derivatives.”

14. In  the  light  of  the  Agreement  entered  into  between

complainant-respondent No.2 and the appellants, the

learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  further  averred

that criminal prosecution of the appellants could not

be  allowed  to  continue  because  the  criminal

prosecution requires a much higher standard of proof

beyond  reasonable  doubt,  whereas  civil  matters

require  lower  standard  of  proof  -  preponderance  of

probabilities.  He drew our  attention towards a  very

recent pronouncement in the case of Lalitha Kumari

Vs. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2014) 2 SCC

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1, wherein this Court held:  “Therefore,  in  view of  various  counter  claims  regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration  of  an  FIR  is  mandatory.  However,  if  no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then  the  FIR  need  not  be  registered  immediately  and perhaps  the  police  can  conduct  a  sort  of  preliminary verification  or  inquiry  for  the  limited  purpose  of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option  but  to  register  an  FIR  forthwith.  Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether  the  information  is  genuine,  whether  the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether  the  information  given  ex  facie  discloses  the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.”

15. We  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  in  the

present case a fact finding investigation was directed

by  the  impugned  order.  Consequently,  FIR  was

registered against  appellants  No.2 to  4 and against

RM (Vinod Kopar). The accused under Indian Criminal

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Legal  System,  unless  proved  guilty  shall  always  be

given a reasonable space and liberty to defend himself

in  accordance  with  the  law.  Further,  it  is  always

expected from a person accused of an offence pleading

not guilty that he shall co-operate and participate in

criminal  proceedings  or  proceedings  of  that  nature

before a court of law, or other Tribunal before whom

he  may  be  accused  of  an  ‘offence’  as  defined  in

Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, i.e., an act

punishable under  the Penal  Code or any special  or

local law. At the same time, courts, taking cognizance

of the offence or conducting a trial while issuing any

order, are expected to apply their mind and the order

must be a well reasoned one.  

16. Learned counsel for the appellants has further invited

our  attention  to  the  order  of  the  High  Court

dismissing the writ petitions. According to the learned

counsel  for  the  appellants,  the  High  Court,  relying

upon  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Iqbal  Singh

Marwah  &  Anr.  Vs.  Meenakshi  Marwah  &  Anr.,

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(2005) 4 SCC 370 and Rukhmni Narvekar Vs. Vijya

Statardekar and Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 1, found that

there  was  no  substance  in  the  argument  that

respondent  No.2  ought  to  have  disclosed  the

arbitration  proceedings  and  the  outcome  thereof  in

her  complaint  and that  non-disclosure  of  the  same

amounts  to  suppression  of  material  facts.  Learned

counsel for the appellants further submitted that the

High Court failed to appreciate that it was within its

inherent  jurisdiction  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  to

consider the correspondence exchanged as well as the

admitted  documents  under  the  arbitration

proceedings.  In the case of All Cargo Movers (India)

(P.) Limited  Vs. Dhanesh Badarwal Jain, (2007) 14

SCC 776, relied upon in paragraph 17 thereof, it was

held by this Court: “We are of the opinion that the allegations made in the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, do not disclose an offence. For the said  purpose,  This  Court  may  not  only  take  into consideration the admitted facts but it is also permissible to look into the pleadings of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in the suit. No allegation whatsoever was made against the appellants herein in the notice. What was contended

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was negligence and/or breach of contract on the part of the carriers and their agent. Breach of contract simplicitor does  not  constitute  an  offence.  For  the  said  purpose, allegations  in  the  complaint  petition  must  disclose  the necessary  ingredients  therefor.  Where  a  civil  suit  is pending and the complaint petition has been filed one year after  filing  of  the  civil  suit,  we may for  the  purpose  of finding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie cannot notice the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other admitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would not consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible  also  to  look  to  the  admitted  documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Superior Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants further relied upon

few more judgments wherein it was well settled that

the  test  to  be  applied  for  quashing  is,  whether

uncontroverted  allegations  made,  prima  facie

establish  the  offence.  This  is  because  the  Court

cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where,

in  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  the  chances  of  an

ultimate conviction are bleak, no useful purpose will

be  served  by  allowing  the  criminal  prosecution  to

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continue. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in

Madhavrao  Jiwanrao  Scindia  &  Ors.  Vs.

Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre & Ors., (1998)  1

SCC 692 (para 7-8); State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (para 102); Rajiv Thapar &

Ors Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 at para

30; Rishi Pal Singh  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

Anr. (2014) 7 SCC 215, at para 12-13.

18. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  have  not

rebutted this issue in any of his arguments. With the

meticulous understanding of the orders of the Courts

below in the instant case, we can see that general and

bald allegations are made in the context of appellant

No.1  who  is  a  juristic  person  and  not  a  natural

person.  The  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860,  does  not

provide for vicarious liability for any offence alleged to

be committed by a company.  If  and when a statue

contemplates  creation  of  such  a  legal  fiction,  it

provides  specifically  therefor,  e.g.  Negotiable

Instruments Act,  1881. Further,  reliance  was made

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on S.K. Alagh  Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,

reported in (2008) 5 SCC 662, where at paragraph 16,

this Court observed that “Indian Penal Code, save and

except some provisions specifically providing therefor,

does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part

of a party who is not charged directly for commission of

an offence.”  Further in Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of

Gujrat  &  Ors.,  reported  in  (2008)  5  SCC  668,  at

paragraph  13,  this  Court  observed  that  where  a

jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed

in terms of Section 156(3) or  Section 200 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to

apply his mind. Indian  Penal Code does not contain

any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the

part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the

Company  when  the  accused  is  the  Company.  The

Learned  Magistrate  failed  to  pose  unto  himself  the

correct  question  viz.  as  to  whether  the  complaint

petition,  even  if  given  face  value  and  taken  to  be

correct in its  entirety,  would lead to the conclusion

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criminality  on  their  behalf.  It  has  been  further

submitted that the allegations made against them do

not amount to disclosure of an offence and were made

with  the  purpose  of  harassing  the  appellants.

Additionally, learned counsel contends that vicarious

liability cannot be attributed to appellant Nos.2 to 4,

while relying upon R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Mehta &

Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 516, wherein it was held:  “Whereas, thus, no allegation whatsoever has been made against the respondent No.1, the only allegation against the respondent No.2 was that he had forwarded the said letter  dated 10.1.2002 to  National  Stock Exchange.  The act of forgery on/or fabrication of the said letter had been attributed to Respondent No.3.

Respondent  Nos.1  and  2  herein  were  sought  to  be proceeded against on the premise that they are vicariously liable for the affairs of the company. As Mr. Mani had time and again referred to the allegations relating to forgery of the said document dated 10.1.2002, we may also notice a disturbing fact. Before lodging the said  First  Information,  a  notice  was  issued  by  the appellant against the respondents herein on 15.10.2002, whereas  the  address  of  respondent  Nos.1  and  2  were shown as 404, Embassy Centre, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021 and 302, Veena Chambers, 21, Dalal Street, Fort, Mumbai - 400 001 respectively. However, in the complaint petition, they were shown to be residents of Chennai”.

20. In Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangta Rane, reported

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primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will

be justified in adopting that course as an alternative

to  taking  cognizance  of  the  offence,  himself.  It  is

settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint,

he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged

in the complaint, do not disclose the commission of

an offence.

22. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  further

submitted that there is a marked difference between

the civil nature of the arbitration proceedings and the

Criminal  nature  of  the  current  proceedings  and

relieving  the  RM  on  the  same  day  when  he  had

tendered his resignation reflects the conduct whereby

conspiracy could be proved. It was further argued that

respondent  No.2  has  also  sent  the  legal  notice

requesting for making good the losses caused to her

by the  appellants  of  which Criminal  Court  and the

Arbitration Tribunal took notice of. Thus, allegations

were already made against all the appellants. We find

no substance in the said submission being completely

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opposed to the settled legal principles. Nevertheless,

we  find  patent  illegalities  which  would  result  in

vitiating the entire investigation which would result in

miscarriage of justice.

23. Mr.  Basava  Prabhu  Patil,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing  on  behalf  of  respondent  No.2  submitted

that respondent No.2 in her complaint had set out the

conduct  of  the  appellants  and  alleged  that  their

conduct  had  caused  wrongful  loss  to  her  and

wrongful gain to the appellants and other accused. It

is  a  fact  that  at  the  time  of  summoning  of  the

accused, the Courts must be careful to scrutinize the

evidence  brought  on  record  and  in  elicitation  of

answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations.

24. It appears to us that the appellants approached the

High  Court  even  before  the  stage  of  issuance  of

process. In particular, the appellants challenged the

order  dated  04.01.2011  passed  by  the  learned

Magistrate  under  Section  156(3)  of  Cr.P.C.  The

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants

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after summarizing their arguments in the matter have

emphasized  also  in  the  context  of  the  fundamental

rights of the appellants under the Constitution, that

the order impugned has caused grave inequities to the

appellants.  In  the  circumstances,  it  was  submitted

that the order is illegal and is an abuse of the process

of law. However, it appears to us that this order under

Section  156(3)  of  Cr.P.C.  requiring  investigation  by

the police, cannot be said to have caused an injury of

irreparable  nature  which,  at  this  stage,  requires

quashing of the investigation. We must keep in our

mind that  the stage of  cognizance would arise  only

after  the  investigation  report  is  filed  before  the

Magistrate.   Therefore,  in our opinion, at this stage

the High Court has correctly assessed the facts and

the law in this situation and held that filing of  the

petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

or  under  Section  482  of  Cr.P.C.,  at  this  stage  are

nothing but premature. Further, in our opinion, the

High Court correctly came to the conclusion that the

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inherent  powers of  the Court  under  Section 482 of

Cr.P.C.  should  be  sparingly  used.  In  these

circumstances, we do not find that there is any flaw in

the  impugned  order  or  any  illegality  has  been

committed  by  the  High  Court  in  dismissing  the

petitions filed by the appellants before the High Court.

Accordingly,  we  affirm  the  order  so  passed  by  the

High Court dismissing the writ petitions. The appeal

is dismissed.  

………………………………….J (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

………………………………….J (Amitava Roy)

New Delhi; December 9, 2016.