02 July 2012
Supreme Court
Download

HARYANA STATE INDUSL.DEVT.CORP.LTD. Vs MAWASI & ORS.ETC.ETC.

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: R.P.(C) No.-000235-000578 / 2011
Diary number: 844 / 2011
Advocates: ANNAM D. N. RAO Vs GAGAN GUPTA


1

Page 1

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (C) NO(s). 235-578/2011

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6561/2009,6528/2009, 6531/2009, 6529/2009,  6552/2009, 6567/2009, 6535/2009, 6836/2009, 6560/2009, 6571/2009,  6530/2009, 6525/2009, 6527/2009,  6570/2009, 6546/2009, 6565/2009,  6548/2009, 6550/2009, 6563/2009, 6537/2009, 6532/2009, 6569/2009,  6534/2009, 6559/2009, 6572/2009, 6583/2009, 6580/2009, 6573/2009,  6584/2009, 6588/2009, 6590/2009, 6575/2009, 6823/2009, 6853/2009,  6855/2009, 6554/2009, 6566/2009, 6557/2009, 6533/2009, 6558/2009,  6541/2009, 6556/2009, 6562/2009, 6568/2009, 6564/2009, 6539/2009,  6538/2009, 6553/2009, 6540/2009, 6852/2009, 6576/2009, 6587/2009,  6582/2009, 6581/2009, 6577/2009, 6574/2009, 6585/2009, 6578/2009,  6579/2009, 6854/2009, 6666-6667/2009, 6757/2009, 6747-6755/2009,  6831/2009, 6756/2009, 6591/2009, 6651/2009, 6606/2009, 6592/2009,  6658/2009, 6594/2009, 6595/2009, 6650/2009, 6657/2009, 6655/2009,  6596/2009,   6597/2009, 6620/2009, 6621/2009, 6602/2009, 6603/2009,  6622/2009, 6598/2009, 6624/2009, 6647/2009, 6654/2009, 6599/2009,  6607/2009, 6608/2009, 6623/2009, 6609/2009, 6600/2009, 6601/2009,  6649/2009, 6593/2009, 6605/2009, 6610/2009, 6611/2009, 6612/2009,  6653/2009, 6613/2009, 6642/2009, 6652/2009, 6643/2009, 6614/2009,  6659/2009, 6645/2009, 6648/2009, 6656/2009, 6646/2009, 6626/2009,  6615/2009, 6616/2009, 6644/2009, 6625/2009, 6639/2009, 6636/2009,  6637/2009, 6627/2009, 6631/2009, 6628/2009, 6638/2009, 6641/2009,  6629/2009, 6630/2009, 6619/2009, 6635/2009, 6640/2009, 6632/2009,  6633/2009, 6824- 6827/2009, 6664-6665/2009, 7724/2009, 7725/2009,  

7723/2009, 6871-6875/2010, 6876-6878/2010, 53/2010, 1370/2010,  2475/2010, 4212/2010, 4213/2010, 4214/2010, 4215/2010, 4218/2010,  4220/2010, 4221/2010, 4222/2010, 4224/2010, 4225/2010, 4226/2010,  4227/2010, 4228/2010, 4223/2010, 4229/2010, 4230/2010, 4231/2010,  4232/2010, 4233/2010, 4234/2010, 6879/2010, 6880/2010, 6881/2010,  

6882/2010, 6883/2010, 6884/2010, 6885-6888/2010, 6889/2010, 6890/2010,  6891/2010, 6892/2010, 6893/2010, 6894/2010, 6895/2010, 6896/ 2010,  6897/2010, 6898/2010, 6899/2010, 6900/2010, 6901/2010, 6902/2010,  

Page 1 of 39

2

Page 2

6903/2010, 6904/2010, 6905/2010, 6906/2010, 6907/2010, 6908/2010,  6909/2010, 6910/2010, 6911/2010, 6912/2010, 6913/2010, 6914/2010,  6915/2010, 6916/2010, 6917/2010, 6918/2010, 6919/2010, 6920/2010,  6921/2010, 6922/2010, 6923/2010, 6924/2010, 6925/2010, 6926/2010,  6927/2010, 6928/2010, 6929/2010, 6930/2010, 6931/2010, 6932/2010,  6933/2010, 6934/2010, 6935/2010, 6936/2010, 6937/2010, 6938/2010,  6939/2010, 6940/2010, 6941/2010, 6942/2010, 6943/2010, 6944/2010,  6945/2010, 6946/2010, 6947/2010, 6948/2010, 6949/2010, 6950/2010,  6951/2010, 6952/2010, 6953/2010, 6954/2010, 6955/2010, 6956/2010,  6957/2010, 6958/2010, 6959/2010, 6960/2010, 6961/2010, 6962/2010,  6963/2010, 6964/2010, 6965/2010, 6966/2010, 6967/2010, 6968/2010,  6969/2010, 6970/2010, 6971/2010, 6972/2010, 6973/2010, 6974/2010,  6975/2010, 6976/2010, 6977/2010, 6978/2010, 6979/2010, 6980/2010,  6981/2010, 6982/2010, 6983/2010, 6984/2010, 6985/2010, 6986/2010,  6988/2010, 6989/2010, 6990/2010, 6991/2010, 6992/2010, 6993/2010,  

6994/2010, 6995/2010, 6996-6997/2010, 7002/2010, 7003/2010, 7004/2010,  7005/2010, 7006/2010, 7007/2010, 7008/2010, 7009/2010, 7010/2010,  7011/2010, 7012/2010, 7013/2010, 7014/2010, 7015/2010, 7016/2010,  7017/2010, 7018/2010, 7019/2010, 7020/2010, 7021/2010, 7022/2010,  7023/2010, 7024/2010, 7025/2010, 7026/2010, 7027/2010, 7028/2010,  7029/2010, 7030/2010, 7031/2010, 7032/2010, 7033/2010, 7034/2010,  7035/2010, 7036/2010, 7037/2010, 7038/2010, 7039/2010, 7040/2010,  7041/2010, 7042/2010, 7043/2010, 7044/2010, 7045/2010, 7046/2010,  

7047/2010, 7048/2010

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.                 Petitioner

VERSUS

MAWASI & ORS. ETC.ETC.                             Respondent(s)

With

I.A.Nos.2066-2067

With

Conmt.Pet.(C)No.51/2011 In C.A.No.6526/2009

Page 2 of 39

3

Page 3

Conmt.Pet.(C)No.52/2011 In C.A.No.6537/2009

Conmt.Pet.(C)No.89/2011 In C.A.No.6854/2009

J U D G M E N T

G. S. Singhvi, J.

1. Undeterred  by  the  dismissal  of  two  similar  petitions,  Haryana  State  

Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) has filed these petitions for  

review of judgment dated 17.08.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 6515 of  

2009 and batch whereby the appeals filed by it against the judgments of  

the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court were  

dismissed, those filed by the landowners were allowed and a direction  

was given for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 lakhs per  

acre with all statutory benefits.  

2. The facts necessary for deciding whether the petitioner has succeeded in  

making out a case for review are encapsulated below:

    2.1. For the purpose of setting up an Industrial  

Model  Township  at  Manesar,  District  Gurgaon,  the  Government  of  

Haryana acquired large chunks of land.  By Notification dated 30.4.1994  

issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short,  

Page 3 of 39

4

Page 4

‘the Act’), the State Government proposed the acquisition of 256 acres 3  

kanals and 17 marlas land situated in village Manesar.  The declaration  

under Section 6(1) was published on 30.3.1995.  The Land Acquisition  

Collector passed award dated 28.3.1997 and fixed market value of the  

acquired land at the rate of Rs.3,67,400/- per acre.  Additional District  

Judge, Gurgaon (hereinafter described as ‘the Reference Court’) to whom  

the reference was made under Section 18 considered the pleadings and  

evidence of the parties and determined the amount of compensation by  

dividing the acquired land into two blocks, i.e., ‘A’ and ‘B’.  For the land  

comprised in Block ‘A’ which fell within 500 yards of National Highway  

No.8, the Reference Court fixed  the amount of compensation at the rate  

of Rs.6,57,994.13 per acre. The remaining land was included in Block  

‘B’  and the amount  of  compensation was fixed at  Rs.3,91,196.97 per  

acre.   

2.2. By  another  Notification  dated  15.11.1994  issued  under  

Section  4(1),  the  State  Government  proposed  the  acquisition  of  1490  

acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land situated in villages Manesar, Naharpur  

Kasan, Khoh and Kasan.  The declaration issued under Section 6(1) was  

published  on  10.11.1995.   By  an  award  dated  3.4.1997,  the  Land  

Acquisition Collector fixed market value at the rate of Rs.4,13,600/- per  

Page 4 of 39

5

Page 5

acre. The Reference Court divided the land into two Blocks.  For the land  

comprised in Block ‘A’, the Reference Court determined the amount of  

compensation at the rate of Rs.6,89,333/- per acre. The remaining land  

was  included  in  Block  ‘B’  and  no  enhancement  was  granted  in  the  

compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Collector.

2.3. Before proceeding further, we may mention that in support of their  

claim for award of higher compensation, the land owners had produced 13  

sale  deeds which were marked Exhibits P1 to P13. Of these,  Exhibit  P1  

dated 16.9.1994 was in respect of 12 acres land situated in village Naharpur  

Kasan, which was sold by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. Duracell  

India Pvt. Ltd. and was proved by Shri Albel Singh, authorised signatory of  

M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd.  The land owners also produced copy of  

Massavi Chakbandi of Village Khoh (Exhibit P14) and Aks-shajras of the  

four villages (Exhibits P15 to P18). On behalf of the State Government, Shri  

Arun Kumar Pandey, Manager,  HSIDC was examined as RW-1 and sale  

deeds  marked  Exhibits  R1  to  R15  were  produced  along  with  other  

documents.  The Reference Court did consider Exhibit P1 but did not rely  

upon the same for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.   

2.4. The  appeals  filed  by  the  landowners  who  were  affected  by  

Page 5 of 39

6

Page 6

Notification dated 15.11.1994 were disposed of by the learned Single Judge  

of the High Court vide judgment dated 19.5.2006 and market value of the  

entire acquired land was fixed at Rs.15 lakhs per acre.  The learned Single  

Judge referred to the sale deed Exhibit P1 and opined that the same reflected  

market value which a willing buyer would have paid to a willing seller.  The  

reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for arriving at this conclusion  

are extracted below:

“The claimants have produced various sale instances to  prove their claim. Sale deed Ex.Pl is dated September 16,  1994 whereby 96 kanals and 13 marlas ( more than  12  acres ) of land in village Naharpur Kasan was sold by the  owner,  M/s.  Heritage Furniture Private Limited to M/s  .Dura Cell India Private Limited for a sale consideration  of  Rs,.2,42,00,000/-,  reflecting  the  average  price  of  Rs,20,03,103/- per acre. The aforesaid sale instance has  been proved by the statement of one Albel Singh PWl,  who at the relevant time was the authorised signatory of  the  seller  Company,  M/s.  Heritage  Furniture  Private  Limited.  The aforesaid witness  has  clearly proved that  the said transaction was genuinely entered between the  two companies and the entire payment was made through  bank  drafts.  The  factum  of  the  payment  having  been  made  through  bank  drafts  is  also  reflected  in  the  sale  deed Ex.Pl. Some other sale instances relied upon by the  claimants are Ex.P2, P3, P4, P7 and P8. Vide Ex.P2 land  measuring  9  kanals  was  sold  on  June  4,  1994  for  consideration  of  Rs.7,87,500/-,  reflecting  an  average  price of Rs.7 lacs per acre. Similarly Ex.P3 is also dated  June 24, 1994 pertaining to sale of 10 kanals 10 marlas of  land reflecting average sale price of Rs,7,00,000/- Ex.P4  is  dated  October  25,1991  whereby  land  measuring  9  kanals 9 marlas in Manesar was sold for Rs. 9,15,470/-  

Page 6 of 39

7

Page 7

reflecting  an  average  price  of  Rs,7,75,000/-  per  acre.  Ex.P7 and Ex.P8 are also the sale instances dated June  24,  1994  with  regard  land  measuring  9  marlas  each  reflecting an average price of Rs,7,00,000/-per acre. The  remaining sale instances Ex.P9 and P13 are of the year  1996  i.e.  more  than  two  years  after  the  date  of  notification under section 4 of the Act. Similarly the sale  instances Ex.Pl0, P11 and PI2 pertain to the sale of land  in village Noorangpur. The said sale instances are, thus,  not relevant.

   On the other hand, the sale instances relied upon  by the State are Ex.Rl to Ex. R15 but they have rightly  been rejected by the reference court itself on the ground  that  the  said  sale  instance  reflected  an  average  price  which is even less than the one assessed by the Collector  and, as such, in view of the provisions of section 25 of  the  Act,  the  same  were  not  relevant  and  worth  consideration.

As noticed above, the land which was acquired in  the present proceedings is approximately 1500 acres. The  sale  instance  Ex.Pl  in  my considered  view,  reflects  as  near as possible, the market value of the acquired land on  the date of notification under section 4 of the Act. The  said  sale  had  taken  place  on  September  16,1994.  The  recitals  in  the  sale  deed  reflect  that  there  was  a  prior  agreement between the two companies on May 31, 1994  with regard to the sale of the land. It is also recited in the  sale deed that the entire sale consideration was paid by  the  purchaser-company to  the  seller  company by bank  drafts. The aforesaid fact is also proved by Albel Singh,  PWl.   In  this  view  of  the  matter,  since  the  aforesaid  transaction was between two companies, then obviously ,  there is no justification to doubt the authenticity of the  said sale transaction. Moreover, the land covered under  the aforesaid sale transaction is a big chunk of land i.e  more than 12 acres. The said land was situated in village  Naharpur Kasan i.e. one of the villages from which the  present land was also acquired. In these circumstances to  

Page 7 of 39

8

Page 8

my  mind,  the  said  sale  instance  could  not  have  been  rejected by the reference Court, in any manner. Although  the other sale instances Ex. P2, P3, P7 and P8 reflect the  market price of Rs.7 lacs per acre but it is also apparent  that the aforesaid transactions pertain to small piece of  land  and  are  between  private  persons.  In  these  circumstances, the possibility of the aforesaid sale deeds  being undervalued, with a view to save stamp duty and  registration charges, can also not be ruled out. However,  there is no justification to prefer the aforesaid sale deeds  Ex.P2, P3, P7 and P8 over and above the sale deed Ex.Pl  which is a transaction between the two cooperate bodies  and wherein the entire sale consideration had been paid  through bank drafts. The aforesaid sale also pertains to a  big chunk of land i.e. more than 12 acres. It may also be  noticed  that  the  acquired  land  was  owned  by  approximately more than 350 persons, thus each having a  small  holding.  Therefore,  the  sale-deed  Ex.Pl  duly  reflects the market value, which a willing buyer would  have paid to a willing seller.   “   

(underlining  is  ours)

2.5. The appeals filed by the landowners affected by the first acquisition  

were disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 5.9.2008.  

He referred to judgment dated 19.5.2006 but applied the cut of 20% and  

fixed market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.12 lakhs per acre.  

2.6. The petitioner had challenged the judgments of  the High Court  on  

several  grounds but  the  only point  argued by the  learned senior  counsel  

appearing on its behalf was that the High Court committed serious error by  

determining market value of the acquired land solely on the basis of Exhibit  

Page 8 of 39

9

Page 9

P1 ignoring other sale deeds by which similar parcels of land were sold at  

the rate of Rs.7 lakhs per acre or less.  This is evinced from the following  

extracts of the judgment under review:

“Shri  Amarendera  Sharan,  learned Senior  Counsel  and  Shri  Ravindra Bana,  learned counsel  appearing for  the  Corporation  argued  that  the  High  Court  committed  serious error by fixing market value of the acquired land  at Rs. 15 lakhs per acre in one batch of appeals and Rs.  12 lakhs in the other batch of appeals by relying upon the  sale  deed,  Ext.  P-1  excluding  other  sale  transactions,  which were produced before the Reference Court.  The  learned counsel submitted that the value of 12 acres of  land  which  was  sold  by  Ext.  P-1  was  wholly  disproportionate  to  the  prevailing  market  value  and,  therefore, the same could not be made basis for fixing  market value of the acquired land measuring more than  1490  acres.  Shri  Amarendera  Sharan  emphasised  that  actual market value of the acquired land was not more  than Rs. 7 lakhs and the High Court committed serious  error by discarding other sale transactions through which  similar parcels of land were sold for Rs. 7 lakhs or less.  The learned Senior Counsel  submitted that  if  the High  Court had given due weightage to other sale transactions,  market value of the acquired land could not have been  fixed at Rs. 15 lakhs or even Rs. 12 lakhs per acre.”

2.7. This Court rejected the aforesaid argument and observed:  

“In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit  any error by relying upon sale transaction Exhibit P1 for  the purpose of fixing market value of the acquired land.  Undisputedly,  that  sale  transaction  was  between  two  corporate  entities  and  the  entire  sale  price  was  paid  through bank drafts. It is also not in dispute that the land  which was subject  matter  of  Exhibit  P1 is  situated at  

Page 9 of 39

10

Page 10

village Naharpur Kasan and is adjacent to the acquired  land. The Corporation and the State Government did not  adduce any evidence to  prove that  the land sold vide  Exhibit P1 was over valued with an oblique motive of  helping the land owners to claim higher compensation.  Therefore, we do not find any justification to discard or  ignore sale deed Exhibit P1. The refusal of the learned  Single  Judge  to  rely  upon  other  sale  transactions  in  which sale price of the land was shown as Rs.7 lakhs  per acre also does not suffer from any legal infirmity  because  it  is  well-known  that  transactions  involving  transfer  of  properties  are  usually  undervalued  with  a  view to avoid payment of the requisite stamp duty and  registration charges.”

2.8. With a view to generate funds necessary for payment of additional  

compensation to the landowners, the petitioner increased the cost of  

land  to  be  allotted  to  the  prospective  industrial  entrepreneurs  and  

others.  IMT  Industrial  Association,  which  claims  to  be  a  

representative body of the plot holders protested against this decision  

of the petitioner and persuaded it to seek review of judgment dated  

17.8.2010.

2.9.  In the review petitions filed on behalf of the petitioner, which were  

registered as Review Petition Nos.2107-2108 of 2010, it was pleaded  

that the determination of market value needs reconsideration because  

the sale deed Exhibit P1 on which reliance was placed by the High  

Court and this Court was not a genuine transaction. According to the  

Page 10 of 39

11

Page 11

petitioner, M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India  

Pvt. Ltd. were controlled by the same management and this fact was  

brought to the notice of the concerned officers only after disposal of  

the appeals by this Court.  IMT Industrial Association filed I.A.Nos.5  

and 6 for impleadment as party to the review petitions.  This Court  

dismissed the  review petitions and the impleadment applications vide  

order  dated  13.1.2011,  paragraphs  4  to  8  of  which  are  extracted  

below:

 

“4. In the review petitions, it has been averred that the  sale  transaction  dated  16.9.1994,  upon  which  reliance  was placed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and  Haryana  High Court   and   by  this  Court  for  grant  of  enhanced  compensation   was motivated because parties  to  the  transaction  were  under  the  control  and  management of the common board of directors and this  fact came to the notice of the review petitioner only after  dismissal of the appeals by this Court.

5.      In  paragraph  'A'  of  the  grounds  of  the  review  petitions,  the  review  petitioner  has  referred  to  the  composition of M/s. Dura Cell India Private Limited and  Heritage Furniture Private Limited to show that both the  companies have common management.

6.     The review petition is supported by an affidavit of  Shri  Hamvir  Singh,  Deputy  General  Manager  (I.A.),  Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development  Corporation Ltd.    In paragraph 2 of  his  affidavit,  the  deponent has stated that contents of the review petition  (pages 25 to 43), list of dates (pages B to P) and other  

Page 11 of 39

12

Page 12

applications  are  true  to  my  knowledge  and  the  information derived from records of the case.   However,  he has not enclosed any document on the basis of which  this assertion has been made.

7.     We    have    carefully      perused       the    entire   record   and   are convinced that the judgment of which  review has been sought does not suffer from any error  apparent   warranting   its  reconsideration.   The review  petitioner has not produced any material to substantiate  its  assertion  that  the  price  mentioned  in  the  sale  deed  relied  upon  by  the  courts  was  manipulated  with  an  oblique  motive.  Hence,  the  review  petitions  are  dismissed.  

8.    The application filed by IMT Industrial Association  is wholly misconceived.   The members of the applicant  are beneficiaries of  the acquisition of  the land because  plots have been allotted to them out of the acquired land  which belong to the respondents and others.  Therefore,  they  do  not  have  the  locus  standi  to  be  heard  in  the  proceedings relating to determination of market value of  the acquired land and that too in a petition filed by the  Corporation for review of the judgment of this Court.  It  is not the pleaded case of the applicant that its members  were not aware of the fact that the plots have been carved  out of the land acquired by the State Government for and  on  behalf  of  the  Corporation  and  that  the  price  mentioned in the allotment letter   was    tentative    and  further that in paragraph 5 of the allotment letter, it was  specifically  mentioned  that  they  will  have  to  pay  additional  price  in  the  event  of  enhancement  in  the  compensation. It is quite surprising that members of the  applicant-Association paid price of the plots at the rate of  Rs.2200/- per square yard and they are objecting to the  payment of compensation to the land owners at the rate  of  less  than  Rs.500/-  per  square  yard.  This shows that members of the applicant want to take  advantage of the measure taken by the State Government  for   compulsory acquisition of the land of the farmers  

Page 12 of 39

13

Page 13

and  want  to  deprive  them  of  just  and  reasonable  compensation.  Consequently,  the  impleadment  application is dismissed.”

3. Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed these petitions by reiterating that  

sale deed Exhibit P1 dated 16.9.1994 executed by M/s. Heritage Furniture  

Pvt.  Ltd.  in favour of  M/s.  Duracell  India Pvt.  Ltd.  was not  a bona fide  

transaction and the High Court and this Court committed serious error by  

relying  upon  the  same  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  amount  of  

compensation.  In paragraph A of the review petition, the petitioner has set  

out the brief history of the two companies and pleaded that at the time of the  

execution of sale deed both the entities were under the control of the same  

set of persons.  It has also been averred that the facts relating to composition  

of  the Board of  Directors  of  two companies could not  be ascertained by  

exercising due diligence and the true nature of Exhibit P1 was revealed only  

after the judgment of this Court.  According to the petitioner, M/s. Heritage  

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. had purchased different parcels of land from the farmers  

by executing 10 different sale deeds executed on 16th and 18th   August, 1993  

at  an  average  price  of  Rs.6  lakhs  per  acre  and,  as  such,  there  was  no  

occasion for M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. to have purchased the same land  

just after one year at the rate of Rs.20,03,103/- per acre.  It is the petitioner’s  

case that exorbitant price is shown to have been paid by the vendee to the  

Page 13 of 39

14

Page 14

vendor because its Indian promoters were to be benefited by the proposed  

joint  venture  between  the  Indian  company and  M/s.  Duracell  Inc.  USA.  

Another ground taken by the petitioner is that sale deeds Exhibits P-2, P-3,  

P-4, P-7 and P-8, three of which were executed in June, 1994 and one in  

October,  1991  at  an  average  price  of  Rs.7  lakhs  per  acre  reflected  true  

market value of the acquired land and in the absence of any cogent evidence,  

the  High  Court  and  this  Court  could  not  have  discarded  the  same  by  

assuming that the same were undervalued.  

4. On 30.3.2011, this Court issued notice to the landowners and granted  

stay subject to certain conditions which included a direction to the Managing  

Director of the petitioner to file an affidavit and disclose the names of the  

officers/officials responsible for not bringing the facts relating to Exhibit P1  

to the notice of the High Court and this Court.  In compliance of that order,  

Shri  Rajiv  Arora,  the  Managing  Director  of  the  petitioner  filed  affidavit  

dated 27.7.2011 in which he did not disclose the names of the concerned  

officers/officials but claimed that the functionaries of the Corporation did  

not suspect the bona fides of the sale deed executed between M/s. Heritage  

Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. because the same was a  

registered instrument and they did not know that the two companies were  

controlled by the same set of persons. Shri Arora further claimed that the  

Page 14 of 39

15

Page 15

facts relating to two companies were brought to the notice of the concerned  

officers  by  the  representatives  of  the  Manesar  Industrial  Welfare  

Association, who were given opportunity of personal hearing in compliance  

of the order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Writ Petition  

No.6527/2010. According to Shri Arora, the information made available by  

the  Association  was  got  verified  from  the  records  of  the  Registrar  of  

Companies and the same was found to be correct. In support of the affidavit  

of its Managing Director, the petitioner has placed on record the following  

documents:  

(i)Search Reports issued by M/s AKG and Co relating to M/s Heritage  Furniture Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Duracell India Pvt Ltd dt. 20.1.2011 and  21.2.2011;  

(ii)Certificate of Incorporation of Heritage;  

(iii)MoA and AoA of Heritage;  

(iv)Mutations showing the purchase of land by Heritage under sale  deeds dt. 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993 at an average price of Rs 6 lac per  acre;  

(v)Annual  Return  of  Duracell  dt.  14.6.2000  showing  Saroj  Kumar  Poddar, Gurbunder Singh Gill and Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors;  

(vi)True copy of sale deed dt. 16.9.1994;  

(vii)Statement  of  Albel  Singh  substantiating  the  statements  of  the  petitioners.

Page 15 of 39

16

Page 16

5. Some of the landowners have filed reply affidavits.  Their stand is that  

Exhibit P1 reflected true market value of the acquired land as on the date of  

issue of notifications under Section 4(1) and that the petitioner’s assertion  

that the transaction was not genuine is not correct. They have denied that the  

vendor and vendees were under the control of the same management and  

that  exorbitantly high price was paid for 12 acres land in anticipation of  

some collaboration between M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell  

Inc. USA, which would have benefited the former. With a view to avoid  

repetition, we may notice the averments contained in paragraphs 4 to 9 of  

the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No.239/2011 and paragraph 5 of  

the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the landowners who were respondents  

in Civil Appeal No.6561/2009. The same read as under:

Paragraphs  4  to  9  of  the  reply  affidavit  filed  in  Review Petition No.239/2011

“4. I state that vide 5 sale deeds all dt. 6.7.1992 land  measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village Kherka  Daula,  District  Gurgaon  was  sold  by  some of  the  co- owners to one Sh. D. C. Rastogi s/o Sh. L. P. Rastogi at  the sale price of Rs.1,35,000/- per acre.  The said village  is at the distance of about 2 km from the land in question.  Copies of 5 sale deeds all dt.  6.7.1992 are collectively  Annexure R-1 hereto.  Thereafter the vendee Sh. D. C.  Rastogi sold the said land in terms of agreement to sell  dt.6.12.1993 vide sale deed dated 16.3.1994 at the rate of  about Rs.15,73,289/- per acre.  This shows that there was  a jump in the price of the land in that area equal to almost  

Page 16 of 39

17

Page 17

11  times  of  the  original  price.   It  is  also  common  knowledge  that  the  parties  often  undervalue  the  land  price in order to minimize stamp duty and the land might  have been sold at a higher price.  Copy of sale deed dt.  16.3.1994 is Annexure R-2 hereto.  Thus if M/s Heritage  Furniture  Pvt.  Ltd.  purchased  land,  which  is  subject  matter of sale deed dt.16.9.1994, Ex.P.1, in the year 1993  at a price of about Rs.6 lakhs per acre as alleged by the  review petitioner  even  though  there  is  no  evidence  of  purchase at such rate then its value increasing to Rs.20  lakhs per acre in the year 1994 is commensurate with the  market trend.  Moreover agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994  was executed after first  notification u/s 4 on 30.4.1994  and it is a common knowledge that after publication of  section 4 notification, the value of the land increases.

5. It  is  further   submitted  that  vide  sale  deed  dt.14.12.1993 (Ex.P.10) one M/s. DCN Internatinal Ltd.  sold  land  measuring  62  kanals  7  marlas  situated  in  Village Naurangpur District Gurgaon for Rs.95,21,160/-  i.e. at the rate of Rs.13,74,345/- per acre.  Copy of sale  deed dt. 14.12.1993 is Annexure R.3 hereto.

6. I further state that sale deed dt. 16.9.1994 (Ex.P.1)  was executed pursuant to agreement to sell dt.31.5.1994  between M/s Heritage Furniture Pvt.  Ltd. (vendor) and  M/s  Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  (vendee)  wherein  the  vendor  agreed  to  sell  the  land  in  question  measuring  about  12  acres  to  the  vendee  at  a  sale  price  of  Rs.2,42,00,000/- (Rs. Two crore forty lakhs only) as is  clear from the recital in the sale deed itself.  Ultimately  vide sale deed dt.16.9.1994 the said land was sold at the  same sale price by the vendor to the vendee.  Thus the  sale  price  of  the  land  was  agreed  upon  and  fixed  on  31.5.1994 as is clear from the recitation of the sale deed  itself.

7. I further state that as per assertion of the review  petitioner M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. (vendor) and M/s  Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had common persons  

Page 17 of 39

18

Page 18

in  their  Board  of  Directors  namely  Sh.  Saroj  Kumar  Poddar,  Ms.  Jyotsana Poddar and Sh. Gurvinder Singh  Gill.   The review petitioner has filed search reports of  both  the  said  companies  to  show that  the  abavoe  said  three  persons  were  common  directors  of  both  the  companies.  However, from the said search report of M/s.  Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  it  is  clear  the  two directors  namely  Sh.  Saroj  Kumar  Poddar  and  Ms.  Jyotsana  Poddar were appointed as Directors of this company on  9.6.1994 whereas Sh. Gurvinder Singh gill was appointed  as its Director on 9.2.1997.  Thus all  the three alleged  common Directors of the vendor and vendee companies  were  not  on  the  Board  of  Directors  of  M/s  Duracell  (India) Pvt. Ltd. on or before 31.5.1994 on which date  the agreement to sell of the land in question was executed  and the sale price was fixed.   The said three directors  had no interest in M/s. Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. (vendee)  as  on  31.5.1994  when  the  sale  price  of  the  land  was  fixed.

8. I  further  state  that  except  for  making  a  bald  allegation that the sale price of the said land was inflated  intentionally so that the vendee company would increase  its share holding in a Joint Venture it was going to enter  into with one Duracell INC USA, this assertion has not  been  substantiated  by  placing  ay  cogent  evidence  on  record.  So much so that even it has not been pleaded in  the review petition as to whether Joint Venture between  M/s  Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  M/s.  Duracell  INC  USA did take place  or  not.   To the knowledge of  the  deponent  there  was  no  joint  venture  between  M/s.  Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Duracell INC USA.  This  fact  that  there  was no Joint  Venture between the  said two companies also stands proved from the fact that  the land purchased vide said sale deed dt.16.9.1994 was  sold  by  M/s  Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  vide  sale  deed  dt.28.4.2004  to  one  M/s  Lattu  Finance  &  Investments  Ltd.  at  a  sale  consideration  Rs.13,62,00,000/-  i.e.  approximately  at  the  rate  of  Rs.1,13,00,000/-  (Rs.one  crore thirteen lakhs per acre approximately).  At the time  

Page 18 of 39

19

Page 19

the  name  of  M/s  Duracell  (India)  Pvt.  Ltd.  had  been  changed  to  M/s  Gillette  India  Ltd.  on  account  of  its  amalgamation with other company.  In this sale deed dt.  28.4.2004  entire  history  of  purchase  of  land  by  M/s.  Duracell (India) Pvt. Ltd. from M/s. Heritage Furniture  Pvt.  Ltd.  in  1994  onwards  has  been  recited,  which  includes construction of industrial building over the said  land, its conversion of status from Pvt. Ltd. to Public Ltd.  Company,  its  amalgamation  with  Indian  Shaving  Products Ltd. in the year 2000 and its change of name  from Indian Shaving Products Ltd. to Gillette India Ltd.  in December, 2000 and thereafter its sale to M/s. Lattu  Finance  &  Investments  Ltd.   However,  in  the  entire  recitation there is no mention of any joint venture with  M/s Duracell INC USA.

9. It is submitted by the respondents/land owners that  the said sale deed (Ex.P.1) reflects true market price of  the land in the year 1994 when section 4 notifications for  the  acquired  land  was  issued.   The  allegation  of  the  review  petitioner  that  the  sale  deed  (Ex.P.1)  reflects  inflated price is false and baseless.  It is further submitted  that another sale deed dt.17.7.1996 which is on record as  (Ex.P.9) reflects the market value of the land in one of  the acquired villages at Rs.25,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty five  lakhs) per acre.  In this transaction 1 kanal 11 marlas of  land situated in Village Naharpur Kasan, has been sold at  a price of Rs.4,84,375/-.  This sale deed also proves that  the market price of the acquired land in the year 1994  was Rs.20 lakhs per acre.  Copy of sale deed dt.17.7.1996  is Annexure R-4 is hereto.  It may be mentioned here that  the same purchaser purchased different pieces of land at  the same rate vide 15 different sale deeds and the total  land purchased was 18 kanals  5  marlas  i.e.  more than  2.25 acres.”

Paragraph 5 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of  the landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal  No.6561/2009.

Page 19 of 39

20

Page 20

“5. That the present review petition is being filed only on  the ground that Ex. P-1, which has been relied upon by  the Hon’ble High Court as well as upheld by this Hon’ble  Court was entered by the corporate which were under the  control and management of common board of directors  and  hence  it  is  not  the  correct  market  value.  In  reply  thereto the respondents humbly submits that:-

a) This fact for the first time is brought into the notice at  the level of this Hon’ble Court, therefore review petition  are estopped by their own conduct.

b)  That  merely  the  both  the  corporate  have  common  board of directors does not prove that the sale in between  the corporate was an escalated rates, rather it should be  on other side i.e. common board would have trying to get  the  sale  as  possible  as  on  lower  rate.  Therefore  the  ground for review is not legally justifiable.

c)  It  is  submitted that  later  on corporate  Gillette  India  Ltd.  made a  sale  deed (land in  issue  of  Ex.P-1)  dated  28.4.2004 to another corporate namely Laltu Finance and  Investment Ltd. for a sum of Rs. 13,62,00,000/- of land  measuring 96 Kanalas and 13 Marlas. (i.e. one crore sixty  lacs per acre). It is submitted that this sale can not be said  to be an escalated rate and therefore the Ex. P-1 denotes  the correct market value at the relevant time. A copies of  the relevant sale deeds are annexed herewith and marked  as ANNEXURE R-1.

d) It is also submitted that some other sale deeds at the  relevant  time  (20.9.1996)  were  executed  in  favour  of  Time Master Pvt. Ltd. which came around 25 lakh per  acre. Details of the same are as follows-

Sr. No. Vasika No. Dt. Land sold Sale  consideration 1. 8725 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,55,000/- 2. 8726 20.9.1996 1K 8M 3,59,375/- 3. 8727 20.9.1996 1K 1-1/2M 3,53,000/- 4. 8728 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/- 5. 8799 20.9.1996 1K 9M 3,75,000/- 6. 8807 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/- 7. 8815 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/- 8. 8825 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,53,000/-

Page 20 of 39

21

Page 21

9. 8832 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/- 10. 8839 20.9.1996 1K 6M 4,08,000/- 11. 8846 20.9.1996 1K 5M 4,06,000/- 12. 8854 20.9.1996 1K 1M 3,55,000/- 13. 8861 20.9.1996 0K 17M 2,75,000/-

Total land sale is 15 Kanals 3 Marlas total amount 4734375/- i.e. at rate of Rs.25 lakh per   acre.

14. 5431 17.7.96 1K 11M 4,84,375/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. 25 lakh per acre.

It is submitted at sale deed No.5431 (at sr. no. 14) was already produced as Ex.P-9 before   Reference Court in favour of Time Master Pvt. Ltd. by Vinod Kumar vendor.

Thus time master India Pvt. Ltd. purchased total land measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at   the rate of Rs. 25 lakhs per acre.

e) It is also relevant to point out the following are the  sale  transactions  in  December  2006  of  the  village  Naharpur/Kasan.

Land sold of Village Naharpur/Kasan Sr. No.Vasika No.       Dt  .              Land sold Sale  consideration

Per acre 1.          18628         4.12.06            12K 16.5M 2,56,50,000/-

1,60,00000 2.          18742          5.12.06            5K 13M 1,13,00,000/-

1,60,00000 3.          18743          5.12.06            5K 14M 74,00,000/-

1,60,00000 4.          19350         14.12.06            5K 13M 1,13,00,000/-

1,60,00000

f)      it is also submitted that the rate on which auction  sale of Tower side on acquired land is done on 30.6.2006.

Tower Site No.       Area in meters            Amount of consideration per sq yard J                                 6804                                95.10 crores   116865/- per sq. yd K                                5832                             101.50 crores   145518/- per sq. yd L                                6804                              93.00 crores   114284.50/- per sq. yd

g)      It is also submitted the following details of auction  by HSIDC IMT Manesar.

          Auction sales by HSIDC IMT Manesar

Allotment  of  SCO  Sites  for  shopping  booth  in  Sector-I, IMT Manesar auction held on 18.8.2009. Sr.No.                   Site No.                Area in Sq. Mts           Price of Site 1.                              T-1                              144

2,67,50,000/- 2.                              T-2                              144

Page 21 of 39

22

Page 22

2,33,50,000/- 3.                              T-3                               144

2,29,00,000/- 4.                              T-4                               144

2,29,00,000/- 5.                              T-5                               144

2,31,00,000/- 6.                             T-7                                144

2,28,00,000/- 7.                             T-8                                144

2,25,00,000/- 8.                            T-9                                 144

2,22,00,000/- 9.                           T-10                                 144

2,16,00,000/- 10.                          D-1                                108

1,82,00,000/- 11.                        D-2                                  108

1,58,00,000/- 12.                     D-3                                    108

1,62,50,000/- 13.                     D-4                                    108

1,60,00,000/- 14.                     D-5                                    108

1,51,00,000/- 15.                     D-6                                    108

1,38,50,000/- 16.                     D-7                                    108

1,40,00,000/- 17.                     D-8                                    108

1,37,00,000/- 18.                     D-9                                    108

1,35,00,000/- 19.                     D-10                                  108

1,33,50,000/-

Total area 2376 square mts. total Rs.35,78,50,000/-  i.e. 150610.26 per Mt.i.e. Rs.12,5928.58 per yard  i.e. Rs.60,94,94,327/- per acre.

Allotment  of  SCO  Sites  for  shopping  booth  in  Sector-1, IMT Manesar auction held on 11.8.2010.

1.                        D-10                                108

2,12,50,000/-

Page 22 of 39

23

Page 23

2.                        D-12                                108

1,89,50,000/- 3.                        D-14                                108

1,90,00,000/- 4.                        D-15                                108

1,88,50,000/-                   5.                       D-16 108  1,92,00,000/-

Allotment  of  Triple  Storey  SCO Sites  for  in  Sector-1,  IMT Manesar,  auction held on 11.8.2010 on following  rates.

1.                           11                                 144

3,03,00,000/-

1.                           11                                 144

3,03,00,000/- 2.                           12                                 144

3,00,00,000/- 3.                           12-A                             144

2,87,00,000/-

Total  area  972  sq  mts  allotted  for  total  amount  of  Rs.186250000/-  i.e  Rs.191615.22  per  Mt.  i.e.  Rs.160213.67 per square yard or Rs. 77,54,34189/- per  acre.”

6. S/Shri  Gopal  Subramanium  and  Altaf  Ahmed,  learned  senior  

advocates  and other  counsel  who appeared for  the petitioner  relied upon  

reports  dated  20.1.2011  and  21.1.2011  prepared  by  the  Chartered  

Accountant  M/s.  AKG  and  Company  to  show  that  at  least  two  of  the  

Directors, namely, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar were  

common to the management of the two companies and submitted that land  

was shown to have been purchased by M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. at a very  

high  price  because  it  was  hoping  to  reap  benefit  of  the  joint  venture  

Page 23 of 39

24

Page 24

agreement with M/s. Duracell Inc. USA.  Learned counsel pointed out that  

the  vendor,  namely,  M/s.  Heritage  Furniture  Pvt.  Ltd.  had  purchased  12  

acres land from different landowners at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per  

acre and argued that even if the benefit of 12% notional increase in the value  

of land was allowed to the vendor, no person of ordinary prudence would  

have purchased the same land after a period of 13 months at the rate of more  

than Rs.20 lakhs per acre.  Learned counsel also referred to the statement of  

the authorised signatory of the vendor M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. to  

drive home the point that the Sale Deed Exhibit  P1 was not a bona fide  

transaction.  Learned senior counsel then argued that dismissal of Review  

Petition  Nos.2107-2108  of  2010  cannot  operate  as  a  bar  to  the  

maintainability of these petitions because till 13.1.2011, the officers of the  

petitioner  did  not  have  any  inkling  about  the  composition  of  the  two  

companies and the fact that the vendor had purchased the land in 1993 at the  

rate of Rs.6 lakhs per acre only and the relevant facts came to their notice  

only  in  October,  2010  from  the  representatives  of  IMT  Industrial  

Association.  

7. S/Shri J.L. Gupta, S.R. Singh, P.S. Patwalia and Paras Kuhad, senior  

advocates and other counsel, who appeared for the landowners argued for  

dismissal of the review petitions.  They emphasized that the very premise on  

Page 24 of 39

25

Page 25

which the review petitions have been filed, namely, discovery of the facts  

relating to composition of the board of directors of the two companies is  

incorrect because no-one from the Poddar group on the board of directors of  

M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. till 9.6.1994.  Shri J. L. Gupta and Shri Paras  

Kuhad pointed out that Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar  

were taken on the board of directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. after  

execution  of  the  agreement  for  sale  and no joint  venture  agreement  was  

executed between the vendee, i.e., M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.  

Duracell Inc. USA. Shri Paras Kuhad also referred to the Memorandum of  

Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. to  

show that S/Shri Jyoti Sagar and Sajay Singh were the only promoters of the  

company.   Learned  counsel  then  argued  that  the  petitioner  cannot  seek  

review of  judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the pretext  of  discovery of  facts  

relating  to  composition  of  the  two  companies  because  no  evidence  was  

adduced before the Reference Court to prove that the sale deed Exhibit P1  

was not a bona fide transaction or that vendee had paid exorbitant price for  

extraneous reasons.  Learned counsel further argued that after dismissal of  

Review Petition  Nos.2107-2108 of  2010,  the  petitioner  cannot  revive  its  

prayer because there was total absence of diligence on the part of its officers.

Page 25 of 39

26

Page 26

8. We  shall  first  consider  whether  the  petitioner’s  prayer  for  review  

should be entertained by ignoring the dismissal of similar petitions by this  

Court vide order dated 13.1.2011.  A careful reading of that order shows that  

in  Review  Petition  Nos.2107-2108  of  2010,  the  petitioner  had  sought  

reconsideration of judgment dated 17.8.2010 on the premise that the vendor  

and the vendee had common management and that the price mentioned in  

the  sale  deed  had  been  manipulated  with  an  oblique  motive.  The  Court  

declined  to  entertain  this  plea  by  observing  that  the  petitioner  had  not  

produced any material to substantiate its assertion.  Along with the present  

batch  of  review petitions,  the  petitioner  has  placed on record  the  search  

reports prepared by M/s AKG and Company, Certificate of Incorporation,  

Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of M/s. Heritage  

Furniture  Pvt.  Ltd.,  mutations  showing  the  purchase  of  land  by  M/s.  

Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vide sale deeds dated 16.8.1993 and 18.8.1993,  

annual return of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. showing Shri Saroj Kumar  

Poddar, Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill and Ms. Jyotsana Poddar as the Directors  

and the statement of Albel Singh, but these documents neither singularly nor  

collectively  support  the  petitioner’s  plea  that  management  of  the  two  

companies,  i.e.,  the vendor and the vendee,  was under the control of the  

same set of persons or that the vendee had paid unusually high price with  

Page 26 of 39

27

Page 27

some oblique motive. As a matter of fact, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms.  

Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd.  

on 9.6.1994 and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was so appointed on 9.2.1997  

whereas the agreement for sale was executed on 31.5.1994. The petitioner  

has not controverted the averments contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the  

reply  affidavit  filed  in  Review  Petition  No.239/2011,  perusal  of  which  

makes it clear that in 1993 similar parcels of land had been sold at the rate of  

Rs.15,73,289/- and Rs.13,74,345/- per acre.  Therefore, it cannot be said that  

M/s.  Duracell  India  Pvt.  Ltd.  had  paid  exorbitantly  high  price  to  M/s.  

Heritage Furniture Pvt. Ltd. for extraneous reasons and we do not find any  

valid ground for indirect review of order dated 13.1.2011.  

9. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is  

a  creature  of  the  statute  and  no  Court  or  quasi-judicial  body  or  

administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless  

it is legally empowered to do so.  Article 137 empowers this Court to review  

its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or  

any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Rules framed by  

this Court under that Article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any  

of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  

1908 which reads as under:

Page 27 of 39

28

Page 28

“Order 47, Rule 1:  

1. Application for review of judgment.—

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,  but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,  or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small  Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter  or  evidence  which,  after  the  exercise  of  due  diligence  was not within his knowledge or could not be produced  by him at the time when the decree was passed or order  made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on  the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason,  desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order  made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to  the court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order  may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the  pendency of an appeal by some other party except where  the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and  the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present  to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for  the review.  

Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of  law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been  reversed  or  modified  by  the  subsequent  decision  of  a  superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for  the review of such judgment.”

Page 28 of 39

29

Page 29

10. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We  

shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp (4)  

SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal  

Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai  

Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 and observed:

“Review  literally  and  even  judicially  means  re- examination  or  re-consideration.  Basic  philosophy  inherent  in  it  is  the  universal  acceptance  of  human  fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the  statutes  lean  strongly  in  favour  of  finality  of  decision  legally  and  properly  made.  Exceptions  both  statutorily  and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental  mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was  no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the  highest  court  indicating  the  circumstances  in  which  it  could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to  avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja  Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v.  Sukhraj Rai the Court  observed  that  even  though  no  rules  had  been  framed  permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was  available on the limited and narrow ground developed by  the  Privy Council  and the  House  of  Lords.  The Court  approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in  Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order  made by the Court was final and could not be altered:

“... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the  judgments, by errors have been introduced, these  Courts possess, by Common law, the same power  which  the  Courts  of  record  and  statute  have  of  rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The  House  of  Lords  exercises  a  similar  power  of  rectifying mistakes  made in  drawing  up its  own  judgments, and this Court must possess the same  

Page 29 of 39

30

Page 30

authority.  The  Lords  have  however  gone  a  step  further,  and  have  corrected  mistakes  introduced  through inadvertence in the details of judgments;  or  have  supplied  manifest  defects  in  order  to  enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added  explanatory  matter,  or  have  reconciled  inconsistencies.”

Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same  decision as under:

“It  is  impossible  to  doubt  that  the  indulgence  extended  in  such  cases  is  mainly  owing  to  the  natural  desire  prevailing  to  prevent  irremediable  injustice  being  done  by  a  Court  of  last  resort,  where by some accident,  without any blame, the  party has  not  been heard and an order  has  been  inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.”

Rectification  of  an  order  thus  stems  from  the  fundamental  principle  that  justice  is  above  all.  It  is  exercised  to  remove  the  error  and  not  for  disturbing  finality.  When  the  Constitution  was  framed  the  substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by  this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the  Constitution.  Our  Constitution-makers  who  had  the  practical  wisdom  to  visualise  the  efficacy  of  such  provision expressly  conferred  the  substantive  power  to  review  any  judgment  or  order  by  Article  137  of  the  Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this  Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which  any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of  this power Order XL had been framed empowering this  Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds  analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure  Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in  the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a  decree  or  order  passed  under  misapprehension  of  true  state  of  circumstances  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule  1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent  

Page 30 of 39

31

Page 31

power to make such orders as may be necessary in the  interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of  Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or  reviewing  its  own  order  if  it  is  satisfied  that  it  is  necessary to do so for sake of justice.”

11. In  Moran  Mar  Basselios  Catholicos  v.  Most  Rev.  Mar  Poulose  

Athanasius  AIR  1954  SC  526, the  three-Judge  Bench  referred  to  the  

provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to  

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:

“It  is  needless  to  emphasise  that  the  scope  of  an  application for review is much more restricted than that  of  an  appeal.  Under  the  provisions  in  the  Travancore  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  which  is  similar  in  terms  to  Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,  the  court  of  review  has  only  a  limited  jurisdiction  circumscribed  by  the  definitive  limits  fixed  by  the  language used therein.  

It  may  allow  a  review  on  three  specified  grounds,  namely,  (i)  discovery  of  new and  important  matter  or  evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was  not  within  the  applicant's  knowledge  or  could  not  be  produced by him at the time when the decree was passed,  (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,  and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.  

It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words  “any  other  sufficient  reason”  must  mean  “a  reason  sufficient  on  grounds,  at  least  analogous  to  those  specified  in  the  rule”.  See  Chhajju  Ram v.  Neki  AIR  1922 PC 12 (D). This conclusion was reiterated by the  Judicial Committee in  Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v.  Parath  Nath AIR  1934  PC  213  (E)  and  was  adopted  by  on  Federal Court in Hari Shankar Pal v.  Anath Nath Mitter  AIR 1949 FC 106 at pp. 110, 111 (F). Learned counsel  

Page 31 of 39

32

Page 32

appearing  in  support  of  this  appeal  recognises  the  aforesaid  limitations  and  submits  that  his  case  comes  within the ground of “mistake or error apparent on the  face of the record” or some ground analogous thereto.”

12. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (1964) 5 SCR 174,  

another  three-Judge  Bench  reiterated  that  the  power  of  review  is  not  

analogous to the appellate power and observed:  

“A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby  an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies  only  for  patent  error.  We  do  not  consider  that  this  furnishes  a  suitable  occasion  for  dealing  with  this  difference  exhaustively  or  in  any  great  detail,  but  it  would  suffice  for  us  to  say  that  where  without  any  elaborate argument one could point to the error and say  here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the  face,  and  there  could  reasonably  be  no  two  opinions,  entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the  face of the record would be made out.”

13. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC  

389, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court  

can  review  an  order  passed  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  and  

proceeded to observe:

“But,  there  are  definitive  limits  to  the  exercise  of  the  power of review. The power of review may be exercised  on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence  which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within  the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could  not be produced by him at the time when the order was  made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error  

Page 32 of 39

33

Page 33

apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be  exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be  exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous  on  merits.  That  would  be  the  province  of  a  court  of  appeal.  A power of  review is  not  to  be confused with  appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to  correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate  court.”

14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC  

170, the Court considered as to what can be characterised as an error  

apparent on the fact of the record and observed:

“…….it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on  the  face  of  record  must  be  such  an  error  which  must  strike one on mere looking at the record and would not  require any long-drawn process  of  reasoning on points  where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may  usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case  of  Satyanarayan  Laxminarayan  Hegde v.  Mallikarjun  Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 wherein, K.C.  Das  Gupta,  J.,  speaking  for  the  Court  has  made  the  following  observations  in  connection  with  an  error  apparent on the face of the record:

“An error which has to be established by a long- drawn process of reasoning on points where there  may conceivably  be  two opinions  can hardly  be  said  to  be  an  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record.  Where  an  alleged  error  is  far  from self- evident and if  it  can be established,  it  has to be  established,  by  lengthy  and  complicated  arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ  of  certiorari  according to  the  rule  governing  the  powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.”

Page 33 of 39

34

Page 34

15. In  Parsion  Devi  v.  Sumitri  Devi  (1997)  8  SCC  715,  the  Court  

observed:  

“An error which is not self-evident and has to be  detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be  said  to  be  an  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record justifying the Court to exercise its power of  review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC…….. A review  petition,  it  must  be  remembered  has  a  limited  purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in  disguise”.”

16. In  Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224, R.P. Sethi, J.,  

who  concurred  with  S.  Saghir  Ahmad,  J.,  summarised  the  scope  of  the  

power of review in the following words:  

“Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the  statute dealing with the exercise of power.  The review  cannot be treated like an appeal  in disguise.  The mere  possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for  review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further  petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of  following the practice of the binding nature of the larger  Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of  coordinated  jurisdiction  of  equal  strength  has  to  be  followed and practised.”

17. In  Haridas  Das  v.  Usha  Rani  Banik  (2006)  4  SCC  78,  the  Court  

observed:

“The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for  the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for  a  rehearing  “on  account  of  some  mistake  or  error  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  records  or  for  any  other  

Page 34 of 39

35

Page 35

sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with  a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a  jural  action  which is  manifestly  incorrect  or  on  which  two  conclusions  are  not  possible.  Neither  of  them  postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had  not  highlighted  all  the  aspects  of  the  case  or  could  perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited  binding precedents  to  the  court  and thereby enjoyed a  favourable verdict.”

18. In  State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612, the  

Court  considered  the  question  whether  a  Tribunal  established  under  the  

Administrative  Tribunals  Act,  1985  can  review  its  decision,  referred  to  

Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:

“At  this  stage  it  is  apposite  to  observe  that  where  a  review  is  sought  on  the  ground  of  discovery  of  new  matter  or  evidence,  such  matter  or  evidence  must  be  relevant and must be of such a character that if the same  had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In  other words, mere discovery of new or important matter  or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito  justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also  to show that such additional matter or evidence was not  within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due  diligence,  the  same  could  not  be  produced  before  the  court earlier.

The  term  “mistake  or  error  apparent”  by  its  very  connotation  signifies  an  error  which  is  evident  per  se  from the record of the case and does not require detailed  examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts  or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and  detection  thereof  requires  long  debate  and  process  of  reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the  face of  the record for the purpose of  Order 47 Rule 1  

Page 35 of 39

36

Page 36

CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently  an  order  or  decision  or  judgment  cannot  be  corrected  merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground  that  a  different  view  could  have  been  taken  by  the  court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while  exercising  the  power  of  review,  the  court/tribunal  concerned  cannot  sit  in  appeal  over  its  judgment  /  decision.”

19. In  the  light  of  the  propositions  laid  down  in  the  aforementioned  

judgments, we shall now examine whether the petitioner has succeeded in  

making out a case for exercise of power by this Court under Article 137 of  

the Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.  This consideration needs  

to be prefaced with an observation that the petitioner has not offered any  

explanation as to why it  did not  lead any evidence before the Reference  

Court to show that sale deed Exhibit P1 was not a bona fide transaction and  

the vendee had paid unusually high price for extraneous reasons. The parties  

had produced several sale deeds, majority of which revealed that the price of  

similar parcels of land varied from Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs per acre. A reading of the  

sale deeds would have prompted any person of ordinary prudence to make  

an enquiry as to why M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. (vendee) had paid more  

than Rs.2,42,00,000/- for 12 acres land, which have been purchased by the  

vendor only a year back at an average price of Rs.6 lakhs per acre. However,  

the fact of the matter is that neither the advocate for the petitioner nor its  

Page 36 of 39

37

Page 37

officers/officials, who were dealing with the cases made any attempt to lead  

such evidence.  This may be because they were aware of the fact that at least  

in two other cases such parcels of land had been sold in 1993 for more than  

Rs.13 lakhs and Rs.15 lakhs per acre and in 1996, a sale deed was executed  

in respect of the land of village  Naharpur Kasan at the rate of Rs.25 lakhs  

per acre.  This omission coupled with the fact that the petitioner’s assertion  

about  commonality  of  the  management  of  two  companies  is  ex-facie  

incorrect  leads  to  an  irresistible  inference  that  judgment  dated  17.8.2010  

does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting  

its review.  Surely, in guise of seeking review, the petitioner cannot ask for  

de novo hearing of the appeals.

20. The  petitioner’s  plea  that  the  documents  produced  along  with  the  

review petitions could not be brought to the notice of the Reference Court  

and the High Court despite exercise of due diligence by its officers does not  

commend acceptance because it had not explained as to why the concerned  

officers/officials,  who  were  very  much  aware  of  other  sale  transactions  

produced  by  themselves  and  the  landowners  did  not  try  to  find  out  the  

reasons for wide difference in the price of land sold by Exhibit P1 and other  

parcels of land sold by Exhibits P2 to P13 and Exhibits R1 to R15.  

Page 37 of 39

38

Page 38

21. Before  concluding,  we  would  like  to  add  that  while  deciding  the  

review petitions, this Court cannot make roving inquiries into the validity of  

the transaction involving the sale of land by M/s. Heritage Furniture Pvt.  

Ltd. to M/s. Duracell India Pvt. Ltd. or declare the same to be invalid by  

assuming  that  the  vendee  had  paid  higher  price  to  take  benefit  of  an  

anticipated joint venture agreement with a foreign company.  Of course, the  

petitioner has not controverted the statement made by the respondents that  

the vendee had sold the land to M/s. Lattu Finance and Investments Ltd. in  

2004 for a sum of Rs.13,62,00,000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.1,13,00,000/- per  

acre.       

22. In the result, the review petitions are dismissed.  The interim order  

passed on 30.3.2011 stands automatically vacated. The petitioner shall pay  

cost of Rs.25,000/- in each case. The amount of cost shall be deposited with  

the  Supreme  Court  Legal  Services  Committee  within  a  period  of  three  

months.   

23. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be free to withdraw  

the amount which it had deposited in compliance of this Court’s order dated  

30.3.2011.  In  any  case,  the  petitioner  shall  pay  the  balance  amount  of  

Page 38 of 39

39

Page 39

compensation to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with  

other statutory benefits within three months from today.

24. In view of the dismissal of the review petitions and the direction given  

for  payment  of  the  balance  amount,  the  contempt  petitions  and  all  the  

pending interlocutory applications are disposed of as infructuous.  

……….....……..….………………….…J.     [G.S. Singhvi]

………..………..….………………….…J.    [Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]

New Delhi, July 02, 2012.  

  

Page 39 of 39