REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3674 OF 2009

HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC. ..... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

The  afore-captioned  Civil  Appeal  impugns  the  judgment

dated  6th July  2006  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and

Haryana which dismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires

of  the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent

Recovery) Act, 1997 (‘Religious Premises Act’, for short).

2. The  appellants  before  us  are  tenants  in  occupation  of  shops

located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra,

G.T. Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab.

The appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the

period 1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha.  However, no formal

lease or agreements were executed and  albeit, over a period of

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 1 of 29

time, rents were progressively increased.  The appellants further

claim that they are small businessmen carrying on trade primarily

connected with steel industry, while one of the appellants runs a

dhaba.  By the letter dated 2nd March 1978, the appellants were

informed that  the affairs of  the gurudwara had come under the

control of  Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (‘SGPC’

for short) and they should, therefore, pay the rent to SGPC.  It is

alleged that the appellants have been paying rent to SGPC or the

manager of the gurudwara but receipts have not been regularly

issued.

3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against one

of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East

Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’,

for short) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC

needed the property for construction of shops.  Harbhajan Singh

had,  thereafter,  deposited  arrears  of  rent  on  the  first  date  of

hearing.   The  eviction  proceedings,  however,  had  remained

pending and were not decided.  

4. On 29th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was enforced,

and  thereby  introduced  a  summary  procedure  for  evicting

unauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to

the religious institutions.  Thereafter,  SGPC had filed ejectment Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 2 of 29

petitions under the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for

eviction  of  the  appellants  stating  that  the  appellants  were  in

unauthorised occupation.   The appellants,  on receipt  of  notices

from the Collector under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act,

had filed the writ petitions challenging the vires of the enactment

before  the  High  Court,  which  by  the  impugned judgment  have

been dismissed.   The primary challenge before the High Court

was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section 3 of the Religious

Premises  Act  on  the  ground  that  the  provision  creates  an

unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants who

are otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under

the East Punjab Rent Act.   

5. The pleas raised by the appellants were rejected by the Division

Bench of the High Court after referring to the object and purpose

behind the impugned enactment, that is, to preserve the property

of religious institutions, by observing that public at large has an

inherent interest in the “religious institutions” which were prone to

maladministration and mismanagement. Referring to the definition

of “unauthorised occupants”, it was observed that a person who is

in occupation of the premises belonging to a “religious institution”

on a valid  allotment,  lease or  grant  is  not  to  be treated as an

“unauthorised occupant” for the period of allotment, lease or grant.

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 3 of 29

The explanation states that mere payment of rent by the tenant

who is in unauthorised occupation shall not raise any presumption

that  such  person  had  entered  into  possession  as  an  allottee,

lessee  or  under  a  grant.   Referring  to  the  detailed  and

comprehensive procedure for eviction under Sections 4 and 5 of

the Religious Premises Act, it was held that the Collector has to be

satisfied that the opposite party was in “unauthorised occupation”

and  only  thereupon  an  eviction  order  can  be  passed  after

following  the  due  procedure.   A person  aggrieved  against  the

order  passed  by  the  Collector  can  file  an  appeal  before  the

Commissioner under Section 8 of the Act.  Referring to the factual

matrix, the High Court has observed that all contentions on merits

should  be  raised  before  the  authorities  under  the  Religious

Premises Act, in accordance with law.

6. The primary contention raised by the appellants before us is that

as tenants they are entitled to protection against eviction under

the East Punjab Rent Act, which protection it is submitted cannot

be withdrawn and taken away under the Religious Premises Act.

Further, the definition of “unauthorised occupants”, as a result of

explanation to clause (a) of Section 3, is highly unjust and unfair

as  a  tenant  who  has  been  paying  rent  over  a  long  period  is

deemed  to  be  in  “unauthorised  occupation”  because  of  the

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 4 of 29

termination of the lease, licence or grant, or the time stipulated in

the  lease,  license  or  grant  has  come  to  an  end.   This  it  is

submitted is unjust and unfair. The Religious Premises Act creates

an  artificial  classification  as  tenants  of  land  and  buildings

belonging  to  or  owned  by  “religious  institutions”  are  no  longer

entitled to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such

protection continues to be available to other tenants.  Expansion

or construction of a new building by a religious institution as was

pleaded by SGPC in their eviction petition under the East Punjab

Rent Act would not justify eviction.  There is no public purpose or

objective in enacting the law, that is, the Religious Premises Act,

which has become a calculable  device and means to increase

income  of  the  religious  institutions.  This  Court  in  Ashoka

Marketing  Ltd.  and  Another  v.  Punjab  National  Bank  and

Others1 had examined and rejected the challenge to the vires of

the  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act,

1971  (‘Public  Premises  Act’,  for  short)  after  recording  that  the

property belonging to the government would fall under a separate

class and that the government, while dealing with the citizens in

respect of the property belonging to it, would not act for its own

purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest.  This

is  a  crucial  distinction  between  the  government  and  private

1 (1990) 4 SCC 406 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 5 of 29

landlords and, therefore, for the same reasoning in inverse, the

present appeal should be allowed as the Religious Premises Act

creates  an  artificial  distinction  and  discriminates  against  the

tenants of “religious institutions”, though “religious institutions” as

landlords are not a separate class. Thus, the Religious Premises

Act should be declared unconstitutional and illegal as it violates

Article 14 of the Constitution.  

7. The respondents, namely,  the State of Punjab and also SGPC,

have  contested  the  said  submissions  and  contentions.   Their

submissions and contentions would be noticed in the subsequent

portion and in our reasoning below.

 8. The East Punjab Rent Act was enacted in the year 1949, soon

after the Partition, with a view to protect tenants and to curtail the

right of the landlords to seek eviction notwithstanding the contract

under  the  provisions  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882,

(“Transfer of Property Act”, for short) which is a general enactment

regulating landlord and tenant relationships.  There cannot be any

doubt that the State legislature, that is, the Legislative Assembly of

the State of Punjab is entitled to enact the Religious Premises Act,

despite the fact that they had enacted the East Punjab Rent Act.

We must accept and take judicial notice by acknowledging that the

State legislature while enacting the Religious Premises Act was Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 6 of 29

aware  that  it  has  enacted  East  Punjab  Rent  Act,  an  existing

statute governing landlord and tenant relationship. However, the

State legislature in its wisdom has deemed it appropriate to enact

a  law  in  respect  of  land  and  buildings  belonging  to  “religious

institutions”.  The vires of the Religious Premises Act, a special

enactment  concerning landlord and tenant  relationships,  cannot

be  challenged  on  the  ground  that  there  are  already  two  other

enactments governing general  landlord and tenant  relationships

(Transfer  of  Property  Act  and  East  Punjab  Rent  Act).  The

Constitution confers the power and authority on the State to enact

two  separate  enactments  on  a  similar  subject  if  they  seek  to

achieve  different  objectives  and  protect  and  preserve  different

sets  of  rights  and make necessary  classification to  serve such

varied ends. The Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab

Rent  Act  and the Public  Premises Act,  concerns itself  with  the

administration of premises belonging to religious institutions and

seeks to regulate their rights as landlords vis-à-vis the tenants in

occupation. In this regard, reference can be made to the object

and purpose behind enacting the Religious Premises Act, which is

as follows:

“Since  long  various  religious  institutions  have  been representing  to  the  Government  for  vacation  of  their premises  under  unauthorised  occupation.  On  careful thought  being  given  by  the  Government,  the  State Government  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  religious

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 7 of 29

institutions are facing a lot of difficulties in this behalf. It is, therefore, expedient for the State Government to help the religious institutions in getting their premises which are  under  unauthorised  occupation  vacated  through summary  proceedings.  Hence,  the  Punjab  Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Bill, 1996.”  

9. Section  2(d)  of  the  Religious  Premises  Act  defines  “religious

institution”.  Section 2(e) defines ‘religious premises’ and Section 3

defines  “unauthorised  occupation  of  religious  premises  by  a

person”.  These provisions read as under:

“(d)  "Religious  Institution'  means  any  gurudwara, temple, church, mosque, temple of Jains or Budhas - which  is  registered  under  the  provisions  of  the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act No. XXI of 1860) or is established under any statute and includes any other place of worship by whatever name, it may be  called,  which  is  registered  as  aforesaid  or  is established under any statute;

(e) "religious premises", means any land whether used for  agricultural  or  non-agricultural  purposes,  or  any building or part of a building belonging to a Religious Institution and includes, - (i) the  garden,  grounds  and  out-houses,  if  any,

appertaining to such building or part of a building; and

(ii) any  fittings  affixed  to  such  building  or  part  of  a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;”

xxx

3. Unauthorised occupation of religious premises. - For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  any  religious premises- (a)  where  he  has,  whether  before  or  after  the commencement  of  this  Act,  entered  into  possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 8 of 29

(b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee has, by reason of  the determination or cancellation of  his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in  that  behalf  therein  contained,  ceased,  whether before or  after the commencement of  this Act,  to be entitled to occupy or hold such religious premises; or (c)  where  any  person  authorised  to  occupy  any religious  premises  has,  whether  before  or  after  the commencement of this Act, - (i)  sub-let,  in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, without the permission of the Religious Institution,  the  whole  or  any  part  of  such  religious premises; or (ii)  otherwise  acted  in  contravention  of  any  of  the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such religious premises. Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (a), a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee.”

“Religious  institution”  means  any  gurudwara,  temple,  church,

mosque or temple of Jains or Buddhists which is registered under

the  provisions  of  the  Societies  Registration  Act  or  established

under  any  statute.   It  also  includes  any  place  of  worship  by

whatever  name  called  which  is  registered  as  aforesaid  or

established  under  any  statute.   The  definition  is  clear  and  no

contention  or  issue  is  raised  that  the  definition  of  the  term

“religious institution” is vague or incomprehensible.  Similarly, the

expression “religious premises” has been defined in clear terms to

mean land used for  agricultural  or  non-agricultural  purposes or

any  building  or  part  of  the  building  belonging  to  a  religious

institution.  The  definition  clarifies  that  the  expression  “religious

premises”  would  include  garden,  ground and out-house  or  any

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 9 of 29

fittings in the building or part of the building for more beneficial

enjoyment.  The expression “unauthorised occupation” is of some

importance in view of the challenge and the contentions raised.  A

person  is  deemed  to  be  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  any

religious premises if he has, before or after commencement of the

Religious  Premises  Act,  entered  into  possession  of  a  land  or

building belonging to a religious institution otherwise than under or

pursuant to any allotment, lease or grant.  A person who enters

into possession of the land or building belonging to or owned by a

religious institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease

or grant is clearly not an unauthorised occupant.  Such allottees,

lessees or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or

lease  that  entitles  the  person  to  retain  possession  are  fully

protected and cannot be evicted.  In other words, primacy to the

terms of  allotment,  lease or grant  is not  interfered,  and is duly

accorded.  The terms of  the allotment,  lease or  grant  would be

binding. Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has

been  determined  or  cancelled  whether  before  or  after  the

commencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of the

person would be treated as unauthorised occupation.    Clause (c)

states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religious

premises,  before  or  after  commencement  of  the  Religious

Premises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention of Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 10 of 29

the  terms  of  allotment,  lease  or  grant,  or  otherwise  acted  in

contravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be treated

as an “unauthorised occupant”.  No contention, issue or objection

has  been  raised  viz.  clause  (c)  to  Section  3.   Explanation  to

Section 3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes

the term of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining

whether  a  person  is  in  authorised  or  unauthorised  occupation,

shall  not  be affected by the mere reason or  the fact  that  such

person has paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered

into  possession  as  an  allottee,  lessee  or  guarantee.  In  other

words, payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant

factor  in  deciding  the  issue  and  question  of  “unauthorised

occupation”. The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms

and conditions as agreed or stated, and not mere payment of rent

would be the crucial and determinative criterion.  

10. Under  Section  4  of  the  Religious  Premises  Act,  a  religious

institution can make an application before the Collector if it is of

the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any

religious premises, situated within the Collector’s jurisdiction.  The

Collector  thereupon is required to issue notice in writing calling

upon the person to show-cause why the eviction order should not

be made.  Sub-section (2) prescribes the requirement of a notice

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 11 of 29

and sub-section (3) to Section 4 prescribes the manner in which

the  notice  is  to  be  served.   Under  Section  5,  the  Collector  is

authorised and is  competent  to  pass an order  of  eviction after

considering the cause, if any, shown by the person to whom notice

under  Section  4  has  been  issued  and  after  examining  the

evidence that may be produced by such person.  The person in

occupation has to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard.

The statutory requirement is that the Collector should be satisfied

that the religious premises are in unauthorised occupation before

he can make the order of eviction.  The Collector must also record

reasons.   The  Collector  is  required  to  pass  an  order  within  a

period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the application under

Section 4 and the order passed has to be affixed on the outer door

or on some other conspicuous part of the religious premises.  If a

person fails to comply with the order of eviction within 30 days

from the date of the order, the Collector, or any other officer duly

authorised by him, can evict the person and deliver possession of

the religious premises to the religious institution.  He is entitled to

use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved, can file

an appeal against the Collector’s order before the Commissioner.

Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke the writ jurisdiction

of the High Court under Articles 227 and 226 of the Constitution of

India if the grievance still persists. Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 12 of 29

11. The issue of whether the properties of the religious institutions for

the  purpose  of  rent  control  legislations  can  be  treated  as  a

separate  category  is  no  longer  res  integra  as this  aspect  was

examined  in  several  decisions  where  this  Court  has  held  that

separate classification of properties of religious institutions for rent

legislations  will  pass  a  challenge  under  Article  14  of  the

Constitution.  In  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Others  v.

Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others2, this Court was faced with a

challenge  to  the  validity  of  Section  82  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh

Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act,

1987  which  had  cancelled  the  leases  of  tenants  of  properties

belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable

or  any  religious  institution  or  endowment  falling  under  the

enactment,  notwithstanding  the  prevailing  tenancy  laws  in  the

State of Andhra Pradesh, in order to augment the rents payable

for such properties which stood frozen on account of the tenancy

laws  and  since  sale  of  such  lands  was  not  feasible.  While

examining the question of religious institutions as a separate and

distinguishable class, this Court had expounded on the scope of

Article  14 of  the Constitution and the kind of  classification that

would stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, as under:  

2 AIR 2001 SC 3616 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 13 of 29

“8. What  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  prohibits  is “class legislation” and not “classification for purpose of legislation”.  If  the  legislature  reasonably  classifies persons for  legislative purposes so as to bring them under a well-defined class, it is not open to challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment that the law does  not  apply  to  other  persons.  The  test  of permissible  classification  is  twofold:  (i)  that  the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia which  distinguishes  persons  grouped  together  from others  who  are  left  out  of  the  group,  and  (ii)  that differentia must have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon classification, which is scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classification would be justified unless it is patently arbitrary. If there is equality and uniformity in each  group,  the  law  will  not  become  discriminatory, though due to some fortuitous circumstance arising out of  peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. In substance, the differentia required is that it must be real and substantial, bearing some just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.”

Holding the above, this Court in  Nallamilli  Rami Reddi  (supra)

had reversed the decision of  the Division Bench of  the Andhra

Pradesh High Court observing that religious institutions fall into a

separate  category  and  land  or  property  held  by  them  have  a

special character. Clearly, the tenants under a religious institution

would  form  a  separate  class  by  themselves  and  such

classification, if made, would achieve the object of promoting the

interests  of  the religious  institutions.  Therefore,  classification of

properties of “religious institutions” as a separate and distinctive

class of properties would not fall foul or be violative of Article 14 of

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 14 of 29

the Constitution.   It  was elucidated that  whether  a tenancy act

should be applicable to religious institutions or should be kept out

is not an aspect which the Court would decide. It is instead for the

legislature to determine the extent of applicability of such tenancy

laws  to  religious  institutions  and  the  extent  of  protection  that

should be made available. This Court has, therefore, rejected the

argument  that  religious  institutions  as  landlords  or  tenants  of

religious institutions cannot be treated and regarded as a separate

category  in  respect  of  whom  protection  as  available  to  other

tenants  under  the  rent  law  would  not  be  available.  Such

classification cannot be a ground or the basis to interfere with the

validity of an act or provision.  However, the Courts can interfere

when the policy is irrational.  Summing up the ratio, this court in

Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra) had held:

“15. We may sum up the upshot of our discussion:

1. That  charitable  or  religious  institutions  or endowments fall into a separate category and form a class by themselves. If that is so, tenants coming under them also form a separate class. Therefore, they can be treated differently from others.

2. In  operation  of  the  Act  it  is  possible  that  it  may result in hardship to some of the tenants but that by itself  will  not  be a consideration  to  condemn the Act.

3. The  manner  in  which  the  charitable  or  religious institution  or  endowment  would  deal  with  the properties that are resumed after the provisions of Section 82 of the Act come into force by cancelling the existing leases, is in the region of speculation.

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 15 of 29

4. Fresh tenancy can be entered into and there is no material before the court as to what was the rent paid by tenants at the time when the Act came into force,  in  terms of  Section 18(2)  of  the Act  or  as provided  under  the  Andhra  Act  or  under  the Telangana Act. In the absence of such a material, it would  be  hazardous  for  the  court  to  reach  any conclusion, one way or the other, to state that the tenants would be frozen and, therefore, there is no likelihood  of  charitable  or  religious  institution  or endowment  getting  higher  rents.  If  there  is  no material one way or the other, the presumption that the Act is good should prevail.

5. It  is  a  matter  of  policy  with  the  legislature  as  to whether all provisions of the Tenancy Acts should be  exempt  in  its  application  to  the  charitable  or religious institution or endowment in their entirety.

6. The  identification  of  “landless  poor  persons”  and protection given to them is justified as enunciated earlier.

7. It will be very difficult to predict at this stage that the result  of  Section  82  of  the  Act  would  be  so hazardous as not to achieve the object for which it was enacted. It would not only result in displacing the old tenants by new tenants, it may also achieve other  social  objectives  in  another  manner.  If appropriate provisions are made under the Rules and if the leases are given to small holders of land, another social objective could be achieved.

8. In what manner charitable or religious institution or endowment would deal with matters of this nature is  mere  guesswork  at  this  stage.  On  some hypothetical  approach  the  High  Court  could  not have declared a law to be invalid.”

Therefore,  it  was  clearly  held  that  tenants  of  religious

institutions fall in a separate class which is identifiable.  Further,

on the question, whether cancellation of a “lease” in their favour

would  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  act  in  question,  it  was

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 16 of 29

observed, that there was no material before the Court to show that

such  cancellation  would  not  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the

“religious institutions”.

12. There have been number of central and state legislations wherein

religious institutions with or without other charitable organisations

have been treated as a separate and distinct class and accorded

legal  treatment  concomitant  to  such  distinctiveness  within  the

scope  of  the  same  enactment  or  other  enactments.  {See  –

Sections 11 and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka

Rent  Act,  1999 and Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and

Charitable  Endowments  Act,  1997;  Orissa  Hindu  Religious

Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious

Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 as amended in

2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent

and  Eviction)  Act,  1972  and  Goa,  Daman  and  Diu  Buildings

(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control  Act, 1968, among others}.

13. We  would  like  to  refer  to  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  S.

Kandaswamy Chettiar  v.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu and Another3

wherein  challenge  was  made  to  the  exemption  granted  to

buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public

trusts and public charitable trusts from the provisions of the Tamil

3 AIR 1985 SC 257 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 17 of 29

Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, by delegated

legislation, in the form of an exemption notification issued under

Section 29 of the above Act.  A three Judge Bench of this Court in

S. Kandaswamy Chettiar  (supra) referred to the judgment of a

five Judge Bench of this Court in  P.J. Irani  v.  State of Madras4

wherein  identical  provisions  contained  in  earlier  enactment,

namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959

were upheld in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India

on the basis that the Preamble and operative provisions of that Act

gave  sufficient  guidance  for  exercise  of  discretionary  power

vested  with  the  State  Government.   Whether  a  notification

granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or

secular institutions would violate the equal protection mandate of

Article  14,  it  was  observed,  that  Article  14  requires  that  the

classification must be based on rational grounds, that is, grounds

germane to carrying out the policy or the purpose of the Act and

by way of illustration it was stated that if such exemptions were

granted  in  favour  of  all  the  buildings  belonging  to  charities,

religious  or  secular  institutions,  such  classification  would  be

reasonable  and  proper  being  based  on  intelligible  differentia

having nexus to the object sought to be achieved.  Rent Act, it was

observed,  would  unquestionably  be  a  piece  of  beneficial

4 AIR 1961 SC 1731 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 18 of 29

legislation intended to remedy the two evils, that is, rack-rentingꟷ

extraction  of  exorbitant  rents  and  unreasonable  eviction  orders

generated by a largescale influx of  population to big cities and

urban areas post the Second World War creating acute shortage

of accommodation in such areas.  Rent enactments overtly protect

the rights of the tenants in occupation of buildings in such areas

from  being  charged  unreasonable  rents  and  from  being

unreasonably evicted.  Therefore, such enactments even protect

tenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods by

enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’.  At the same time, the

rent enactments often contain other significant  provisions which

indicate that the legislature itself felt that there may be areas and

cases  where  these  two  evils  were  neither  prevalent  nor

apprehended,  and  as  such  landlords’  freedom  need  not  be

curtailed at all.  It is in this context that several enactments give

wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable, educational

and  other  public  institutions  if  the  possession  is  required  for

purposes of such institutions.  In other words, the legislature is

entitled and can make rational classification of buildings belonging

to  government  and  those  belonging  to  religious,  charitable,

educational  and  other  public  institutions  which  are  accorded

different  treatment  on  the  well-founded  assumption  that  such

landlords  are  not  expected  to  and  would  not  indulge  in  rack- Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 19 of 29

renting or unreasonable eviction.  Relying upon the observations

in  P.J.  Irani  (supra),  it  was  held  that  constitutional  validity  of

granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or

secular institutions, from rent control legislation, would not offend

the equal protection clause of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is

a  reasonable  classification  based  on  intelligible  differentia  and

also satisfies the test of nexus as such institutions not only serve

public purpose but disbursement of their income is governed by

the objects for which they are created. The income and activities

are not for private benefit.  Reference in this regard was made to

the counter affidavit wherein the government had explained that

they were satisfied that the rents received by exempted religious

institutions  were  very  low,  meagre  and  that  the  provisions  of

fixation of fair rent under the rent act would not meet the ends of

justice  and  would  in  fact  result  in  the  tenant  exploiting  the

situation.  Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the tenants of

such buildings was justified.  It was observed in S. Kandaswamy

Chettiar (supra) as under:

“11... In our view, the aforesaid material clearly shows that  buildings  belonging  to  such public  religious  and charitable endowments or trusts clearly fell into a class where undue hardship and injustice resulting to them from the uniform application of the beneficial provisions of  the Act  needed to  be relieved and the exemption granted will have to be regarded as being germane to the policy and purposes of the Act.  In other words the classification made has a clear nexus with the object

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 20 of 29

with  which  the  power  to  grant  exemption  has  been conferred upon the State Government  under S.29 of the Act.

xx xx xx

14...  It  is  obvious  that  if  the  trustees  of  the  public religious  trusts  and  public  charities  are  to  be  given freedom to charge the normal market rent then to make that freedom effective it will be necessary to arm the trustees  with  the  right  to  evict  the  tenants  for  non- payment of such market rent.  The State Government on materials before it came to the conclusion that the ‘fair rent’ fixed under the Act was unjust in case of such buildings and it was necessary to permit the trustees of such buildings to recover from their tenants reasonable market  rent  and  if  that  be  so  non-eviction  when reasonable  market  rent  is  not  paid  would  be unreasonable  and  if  the  market  rent  is  paid  by  the tenants  no  trustee  is  going  to  evict  them.   It  is, therefore, clear that granting total exemption cannot be regarded as excessive or unwarranted.

15.   Apart  from  this  aspect  of  the  matter  it  is conceivable that trustees of buildings belonging to such public  religious  institutions  or  public  charities  may desire  eviction  of  their  tenants  for  the  purpose  of carrying  out  major  or  substantial  repairs  or  for  the purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the State Government  may have felt  that  the  trustees of  such buildings  should  be  able  to  effect  evictions  without being required to fulfil other onerous conditions which must be complied with by private landlords when they seek  evictions  for  such  purposes.   In  our  view, therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildings under the impugned notification is perfectly justified.”

14. These  two  judgments  were  followed  by  the  two  Judge  Bench

decision  of  this  Court  in  Christ  the  King  Cathedral  v.  John

Ancheril  and  Another5 wherein  similar  exemption  notification

5 (2001) 6 SCC 170 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 21 of 29

under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act,  1965

granting  exemption  in  public  interest  to  the  buildings  of  all

churches/mosques of  all  minority  religions and of  all  Dioceses,

Archdioceses,  Monasteries,  etc.  was  challenged.   One  of  the

contentions raised was that no data or material was produced by

the State and hence the decision and ratio in  S. Kandaswamy

Chettiar  (supra)  would  not  be  applicable.   Rejecting  the  said

contention, it was observed:

“6. The law had been stated by this Court to the effect that public religious or charitable endowments or trusts constitute  a  well-recognised  group  which  serves  not only public purposes, but disbursement of their income is governed by the objects with which they are created and buildings belonging to such endowments or trusts clearly fall into a class distinct from the buildings owned by private landlords. It  is in respect of  three areas a regulation would be made under the Act, as has been done in other similar enactments and these areas are: (i)  with  respect  to  regulation  of  lease  of  buildings (residential  or  non-residential);  (ii)  control  of  rent  of such buildings; and (iii)  control  of  eviction of  tenants from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held in S.  Kandaswamy  Chettiar  case is  not  likely  to  act unreasonably either in the matter of  enhancement of rent or eviction of tenants being institutions of religion or charity. On that basis, this Court upheld the validity of the exemption granted under the Tamil Nadu Act in favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case, the contention has been specifically put forth that the appellants fall  into that very category which came up for consideration before this Court in  S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case.  Therefore,  no distinction can be made between that class of owners of the buildings in that case and in the present case. We do not understand as to what other material was required by the Court in a matter of this nature if the contention put forth before this Court is not that churches or mosques, dioceses, archdioceses,  monasteries,  convents,  wakfs  and madarsas are not religious and charitable in nature.

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 22 of 29

7. Shri  Nageswara  Rao,  the  learned  counsel appearing  for  the  contesting  respondents  submitted that  there  is  total  non-application  of  mind  by  the Government in the matter of  grant  of exemption and the  guidelines  indicated  in  S.  Kandaswamy  Chettiar case have not been followed in the present case and, therefore, the exemption should not have been granted in the present case. In  S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case an affidavit  had been filed as to the lower rents that were being paid and that the tenants were exploiting the situation and had brought the charitable institutions to  a  situation  of  helplessness  and  that  position  not having been challenged the Court made those orders. If we bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is apparently to prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent and if the trustees of religious and public charities are given freedom to charge normal market rent with the further freedom to evict the tenants for not paying such market rent, the result would be unjust and cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself, is not sufficient. There is no material on record to show that in any of these cases the landlords would resort to such  a  course  of  action.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the building  belonging  to  such  public  trust  or  religious institution is exempt from the Act, the purpose of the trust could be carried out much better, is quite clear. If that  is  the  object  with  which  the  Government  has granted exemption, we do not think there is any reason to  quash the  notifications  impugned before  the  High Court.

xx xx xx

9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of ownership of property that there should not have been a distinction as is being made in the present case. That was  the  very  basis  of  distinction  made  in  case  of statutory  bodies  like  the  Housing  Board,  local authorities which was noticed in  Jayakaran v.  Kerala Health R & W Society case or registered wakfs which was considered in  Lakshmanan v.  Mohamood.  When such bodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by themselves  and  exemption  granted  to  them  would serve a public purpose, namely, to carry out the objects of the trust or the endowment or religious activity in a broad  sense, we do not think that the fine distinction

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 23 of 29

sought to be made by the High Court in this regard is justified.

15. Appropriate at  this stage would also be reference to two earlier

decisions of this Court which had examined the provisions of the

rent control legislations, namely,  Kewal Singh v.  Smt. Lajwanti6

and Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava7.

16. In Kewal Singh (supra), the challenge made was to the provisions

of summary eviction in case of  bona fide  requirement under the

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  It was observed that the rent control

legislations are a piece of social legislations and are meant mainly

to protect tenants from frivolous evictions but, at the same time,

they  must  do  justice  to  the  landlord  and  to  this  extent  the

enactment should avoid placing such restrictions on their right to

evict  the  tenants  so  as  to  destroy  the  legal  right  to  property.

Therefore, the landlords have been given certain statutory rights

under the rent enactments to seek eviction and these provisions

provide relief.  In the absence of such rent control legislations, a

landlord  has  the  right  in  law  to  evict  the  tenant  either  on  the

termination  of  tenancy  by  efflux  of  time or  other  grounds  after

giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act.  Such rights have

been curtailed by the rent control legislations to give protection to

6 AIR 1980 SC 161 7 AIR 1984 SC 967 Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 24 of 29

tenants having regard to the genuine and dire needs but these

should not be construed to destroy the rights which have been

given to the landlords.  It was observed:

“21. There is yet another important aspect of the matter which may be mentioned here. Prior to the enactment of  the  rent  control  legislation  in  our  country,  the relationship  of  landlord  and tenant  was governed by our  common  law  viz.  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act (Sections 107 to 111).  The tenant was inducted with his tacit agreement to be regulated by the conditions embodied in the contract and could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement reached between him and the landlord during that period. The tenant was, therefore, bound in law to vacate the premises either voluntarily or  through  a  suit  after  he  was  given  a  notice  as required  by  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  under  the terms and conditions of the lease. However, as a piece of  social  reform in  order  to  protect  the tenants  from capricious  and  frivolous  eviction,  the  legislature stepped in and afforded special protection to the tenant by conferring on him the status of  a statutory tenant who could not be evicted except under the conditions specified  and  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  Rent Control  Acts.  Thus  to  this  extent,  the  agreement  of lease and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act stood superseded. At the same time, the Rent Control Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord on certain  specified  grounds  like  bona  fide  personal necessity or default in payment of rent, etc. Thus any right that the tenant possessed after the expiry of the lease was conferred on him only by virtue of the Rent Control  Act.  It  is,  therefore,  manifest  that  if  the legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certain rights  or  facilities  on  the  tenants,  it  could  due  to changed  circumstances  curtail,  modify,  alter  or  even take away such rights or the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction and leave the tenants to seek their remedy under the common law.

22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge the  validity  of  such  a  provision  enacted  by  the legislature  from which  the  tenant  itself  derived  such rights.”

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 25 of 29

17. Similar are the observations of this Court in  Ravi Dutt Sharma

(supra) which had quoted several passages from  Kewal Singh

(supra) to observe that it is open to the legislature to pick out one

class of landlords out of several covered under a specific provision

of a rent enactment so long as they form a class by themselves

and  the  legislature  was  free  to  provide  benefit  of  a  special

procedure to them in the matter of eviction against the tenants as

long as the legislation had the object  to achieve and a special

procedure has reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved.

18. In  Ashoka Marketing Ltd.  (supra),  the five Judge Constitution

Bench of this Court had upheld applicability of the Public Premises

Act to a corporation established by a Central Act that is owned

and controlled by the Central Government, therein a nationalised

bank.   After  referring  to  several  judgments,  this  Court  had

explained the effect of Article 14 of the Constitution observing that

the  two  statutes,  namely,  the  Rent  Control  Act  and  the  Public

Premises Act were enacted by the same legislature, that is, the

Parliament, in exercise of powers for matters enumerated in the

Concurrent List.  The Public Premises Act being a later enactment

would  prevail  over  the  provisions  of  the  Rent  Control  Act  in

respect of public premises.  Referring to the provisions of the Rent

Control Act, it was observed: Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 26 of 29

“55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of  landlord and tenant  contained  in  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act inasmuch  as  it  makes  provision  for  determination  of standard  rent,  it  specifies  the  grounds  on  which  a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in  such  proceedings.  The  Rent  Control  Act  can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy  machinery  to  secure  eviction  of  unauthorised occupants  from  public  premises.  As  opposed  to  the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and  for  trial  of  such  a  suit  in  accordance  with  the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order of  eviction  of  an  unauthorised  occupant  in  a  public premises  on  a  designated  officer  and  prescribes  the procedure  to  be  followed  by  the  said  officer  before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act  is  also  a  special  statute  relating  to  eviction  of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, are special statutes in relation  to  the  matters  dealt  with  therein.  Since,  the Public  Premises  Act  is  a  special  statute  and  not  a general  enactment  the  exception  contained  in  the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier  special  law cannot  be invoked and in accordance  with  the  principle  that  the  later  laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act.”

19. What  has  been  said  about  the  Public  Premises  Act  would  be

equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislature

of the State of  Punjab in  respect  of  the two enactments under

consideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the Religious

Premises Act.  No doubt, in this decision it has been observed that

the underlying reason for exclusion of property belonging to the

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 27 of 29

government  from the ambit  of  the Rent  Control  Act  is  that  the

government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property

belonging to it would not act as a private landlord but would act in

public  interest,  albeit  this  reasoning  would  equally  apply  to

“religious institutions” as defined.  The religious institutions as held

are  meant  to  carry  out  public  purpose  and the  legislature  can

proceed  accordingly  that  the  religious  institutions  would  act  in

public  interest  for  which they were established.  {See above  S.

Kandaswamy Chettiar  (supra) and  Christ the King Cathedral

(supra)}

20. As  noticed  above,  valid  grants,  leases  and  allotments  are  not

construed and treated as unauthorised occupation.  It is only when

the terms of the grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or

have been determined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as

fixed has come to an end, that the person in occupation is treated

to be in unauthorised occupation.  This is a pre-condition which

confers the right on the religious institution to seek eviction of a

person  in  unauthorised  occupation  of  the  religious  premises.

Further, an order passed by the Collector is appealable before the

Commissioner and if still aggrieved, a tenant can invoke the writ

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court,  as  mentioned  above.  Therefore,

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 28 of 29

power of judicial review is always available and can be exercised

by the High Court when required and necessary.

21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appeal and

the same is dismissed.  However, in the facts of this case, there

would be no order as to costs.  

......................................J. (N. V. RAMANA)

......................................J. (SANJIV KHANNA)

......................................J. (KRISHNA MURARI)

NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 04, 2019.

Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009 Page 29 of 29