H.G.RANGANGOUD Vs M/S STATE TRADING CORP.OF INDIA L..
Bench: H.L. DATTU,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002056-002059 / 2011
Diary number: 2216 / 2008
Advocates: LAWYER S KNIT & CO Vs
V. N. RAGHUPATHY
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 2056-2059 OF 2011 (@ SLP(Crl.) Nos. 844-847 of 2008)
H.G. RANGANGOUD … APPELLANT
VERSUS
M/S.STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
1. Petitioner, aggrieved by the order passed by
the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court
initiating proceeding for contempt in exercise of
its suo motu power, has preferred these special
leave petitions.
2. Leave granted.
3. Bereft of unnecessary details the facts giving
rise to the present appeals are that the appellant
applied on 16th of April, 2003 for grant of mining
lease for iron ore over an area of 350 acres in
Yeshawanthnagar Range of the Kumarswamy Reserve
Forest Area within Sandur Taluk in Bellary District
of the State of Karnataka. The State Government
processed the request and in exercise of powers
under Section 5 (1) of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’) by its letter dated 9th of
February, 2004 recommended to the Central
Government for grant of mining lease in favour of
the appellant to the extent of 16.8 hectares.
However before any decision could be taken, the
Central Government issued notification dated 27th of
June, 2005 in exercise of the power under Section
17 A (1A) of the Act and reserved iron ore deposits
in the area in question for exploitation by State
Trading Corporation of India Limited, a public
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sector undertaking. In view of the aforesaid
reservation the Central Government returned the
proposal of the State Government to grant mining
lease to the appellant by its letter dated 21st of
July, 2005. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
notification appellant preferred WP No. 19339 of
2005 (H.G. Rangangoud v. Minister of Coal & Mines,
represented by the Secretary & Ors.) before the
Karnataka High Court, inter alia praying for
quashing the notification reserving the iron ore
deposits in favour of the State Trading Corporation
of India Limited. The writ petition filed by the
appellant was heard along with another writ
petition filed by Salgaocar Mining Industries
Private Limited and the learned Single Judge by its
judgment and order dated 14th of August, 2007
quashed the aforesaid notification dated 27th of
June, 2005. Armed with the order of the High
Court, appellant represented to the State
Government to consider his application for grant of
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mining lease by its representation dated 18th of
September, 2007. After one day of filing of the
representation i.e. on 20th of September, 2007 the
State Trading Corporation, aggrieved by the order
of the learned Single Judge preferred appeal before
the High Court. Said appeal was posted for
consideration on 3rd of October, 2007 and the
Division Bench of the High Court taking into
consideration the ‘enormity’ of the case and
finding that all the parties have been served and
represented, directed for its final disposal on 11th
of October, 2007. However, no interim order was
passed. As directed, the matter was heard and
reserved for judgment but before the judgment could
be pronounced the State Trading Corporation, the
appellant before the High Court, brought to its
notice that “when the matter was in the hearing
process, Government of Karnataka has sent a
communication to the Union of India for mining
lease in favour of the writ petitioners”. The
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Division Bench of the High Court, when informed
about the aforesaid fact “called upon the
Government Advocate to explain this situation”.
The explanation was furnished in which it was inter
alia stated that “as there was no interim order
granted in the writ appeal and keeping in view the
fact that if the mining area is not sanctioned to
the writ petitioners the existing mining operation
would be forced to close down and keeping in view
the jeopardy to the workmen, such recommendation
has been made.” The explanation put forth by the
State Government did not find favour with the High
Court and on its prima facie finding that the
aforesaid conduct “amounts to interference with the
due course of judicial process” initiated suo motu
criminal contempt proceedings against the appellant
herein and K. Jayachandra, Under Secretary to the
Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries
Department. While doing so the High Court observed
as follows:
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“……..On going through the affidavit as well as the records, prima facie it appears to us that there is a clear attempt on the part of the writ petitioner Mr. H.G. Rangangoud and the concerned official to take such action when the grant of lease/licence itself was seized and was under consideration by this Court thereby cause on the merit or decision of this court.”
4. Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that
the appellant had filed the representation in the
light of the order of the learned Single Judge even
before the appeal was filed against the judgment of
the learned Single Judge and hence it cannot be
said that the appellant in any way interfered with
the due course of judicial process. Accordingly he
submits that the order initiating the proceeding
for criminal contempt deserves to be set aside.
Ms. Anitha Shenoy appears on behalf of the State of
Karnataka and submits that the act of filing the
representation by the appellant and the
recommendation made by the Under Secretary in no
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way interferes with the due course of judicial
process and in such a state of affairs she is not
in a position to defend the order of the
High Court. At the same breath she reminds us that
contempt is a matter between the court and the
contemnor and this Court may take the view which it
considers just and proper.
5. We have given our most anxious consideration to
the submissions advanced and at the outset we may
observe that this Court seldom interferes with an
order initiating a contempt proceeding and
ordinarily relegates the person charged with
contempt to file a show cause before the court
which had initiated the proceeding. But this is
not an absolute rule and in the facts of a given
case when this Court comes to the conclusion that
the allegation made, even when not denied do not
constitute contempt, interferes with the order
initiating contempt proceeding so as to avoid
unnecessary harassment to the person served with
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contempt notice. We proceed to consider the
present appeal bearing in mind the aforesaid
principle.
6. It is relevant here to state that the
proceeding has been initiated against the appellant
for criminal contempt on the ground that the act
done by the appellant amounts to interference with
the due course of judicial process. The expression
“criminal contempt” has been defined under Section
2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in
the present case we are concerned with Section 2
(c) (ii), the same reads as follows:
“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
xxx xxx xxx
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which –
xxx xxx xxx
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(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
xxx xxx xxx.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision
it is evident that an act which prejudices or
interferes or tends to interfere with the due
course of judicial proceeding comes within the
mischief of criminal contempt. The power to punish
for contempt is inherent in Courts of record and
described as a necessary incident to every court of
justice. The power is inalienable attribute of
court and inheres in every Court of record. This
power though inherent to the High Court is given a
constitutional status by Article 215 of the
Constitution. It is to secure public respect and
confidence in the judicial process. Rule of law is
the basic rule of governance of any civilized
democratic polity. It is only through the courts
that rule of law unfolds its contours and
establishes its concept. For the judiciary to
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carry out its obligations effectively and true to
the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted the
task, constitutional courts have been given the
power to punish for contempt, but greater the
power; higher the responsibility.
7. In the present case, even before filing of the
appeal the appellant has brought to the notice of
the State Government the order passed by the
learned Single Judge and sought its implementation.
In the representation he had not voiced and could
not have voiced any opinion on the appeal as the
same was not filed till then. The Under Secretary
while making recommendation also did not voice any
opinion on the pending appeal. It has to be borne
in mind that any attempt to influence the outcome
of the matter pending before the court to prejudice
the parties therein may prejudice or interfere with
the due course of any judicial proceeding but in
our opinion, mere filing of the representation and
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making recommendation thereon in no way prejudices
or interferes or tends to interfere with the due
course of any judicial proceeding. In our opinion,
it is criminal contempt to voice opinion on a case
pending in court as that would seem to influence
the outcome of the matter and to prejudice the
parties therein. However, we hasten to add that
fair reporting of court proceedings and fair
comments on the legal issues do not amount to
contempt. The order of the learned Single Judge
was not stayed. Further, mere filing of the appeal
would not operate as a stay of order appealed from.
8. When tested on the aforesaid anvil we are of
the opinion that the act alleged in no way
prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with
the due course of any judicial proceeding. From
the conspectus of the discussion aforesaid we have
no doubt in our mind that the proceeding initiated
against the appellant as also the Under Secretary
to the Government of Karnataka, Commerce and
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Industries Department is not just and appropriate
and an abuse of the process of the court. This
being so, we are duty bound to interfere at this
stage itself.
9. True it is that Under Secretary to the
Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries
Department against whom the contempt proceeding has
been initiated by the impugned order, not chosen to
file any petition before this Court but in view of
what has been observed above we are of the opinion
that it shall be too technical to deny him the
relief by this Court, which has jurisdiction for
doing complete justice in any cause or matter
pending before it. Therefore, he shall also be
entitled to the same relief as that of the
appellant.
10. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, the
impugned judgment and order is set aside.
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…..………….………………………………….J. (H.L. DATTU)
..…. ………..……………………………….J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 11, 2011.
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