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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT     PETITION     (CIVIL)     NO.     200     OF     2006   

Gurpal Singh                        ...Petitioner  

VERSUS

High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan         ...Respondent

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

SURINDER     SINGH     NIJJAR,     J.   

1. In this petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of  

India, the petitioner seeks a writ in the nature of Certiorari  

for quashing the order of suspension dated 20th December,  

1985 by declaring the same to be void-ab-initio.  The  

petitioner also claims a declaration that the order dated 24th  

January, 2009 is void and that the petitioner is entitled to  

all benefits for the period of suspension from 20th  

December, 1985 till 26th March, 2008, when he was  

reinstated in service.

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2. We may briefly advert to the relevant facts on the basis of  

which the petitioner claims the aforesaid relief.

3. On 28th December, 1979, the petitioner was selected by the  

Rajasthan Public Service Commission (R.P.S.C.) for the post  

of Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade II.  He served on the  

said post till 28th July, 1980.  On the very next day,  

i.e. 29th July, 1980, he was selected for appointment to the  

Rajasthan Judicial Service and joined as Judicial  

Magistrate First Class.  For sometime, he remained posted  

at Banswara as Judicial Magistrate. During this period, his  

judgments were graded as above average and integrity as  

“beyond doubt”.       In the inspection report, it was further  

remarked that “his behaviour with members of the Bar,  

litigants and the persons coming to the Court needs  

improvement”. It appears that he was not on best of terms  

with the local Bar, which led to his transfer.

4. On 24th November, 1985, at about 10.30 p.m., a dead body  

was found near Ajmer Pulia on the railway track in the city  

of Jaipur.  The dead body was identified as that of one   Mr.  

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Suresh Chand Gupta, Advocate.  A ‘Marag’ (death) case was  

registered on 24th November, 1985, at Serial No. 35/85 at  

Police Station GRP, Jaipur.  It appears that the local bar  

association of which the deceased was a member protested  

that proper investigation was not being conducted about  

the manner in which Mr. Suresh Chand Gupta was found  

dead on the railway track.  The members of the Bar  

Association insisted that his death was result of some foul  

play.                On 11th December, 1985, that is about 20  

days after the incident, wife of the deceased gave a written  

complaint, alleging that the Petitioner was involved in the  

murder of her husband.  In her written complaint, she  

alleged that her husband had informed her about three  

months prior to the incident that the petitioner had  

demanded a sum of Rs.1 lac for exercising his influence  

with the high-ups, in securing the appointment of the  

deceased as a member of Board of Revenue. She claimed  

that the money which was paid to the petitioner was  

arranged by her deceased husband by selling a plot of land.  

He had also borrowed money from her father and other  

relatives.  Inspite of having paid the aforesaid money, her  

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husband was not provided any appointment. Consequently,  

her husband had been insisting that the petitioner return  

the amount unnecessarily paid to him.  She claimed that  

the petitioner had agreed to return the money and asked  

her husband to meet at a pre-arranged place.  Her husband  

left home at 5.00 p.m. on 24th November, 1985 and did not  

return.    She, therefore, concluded that the petitioner must  

have killed her husband on account of the dispute over  

money.

5. Upon coming to know about the complaint made by the wife  

of the deceased, the petitioner himself went to the Police  

Station on 18th December, 1985 and offered to join the  

investigation. He requested the police to complete the  

investigation as soon as possible, as in the meantime, he  

has been transferred and had to join at Vallabhnagar.  In  

the meantime, the local bar association continued the  

agitation against the inaction of the police.  The lawyers  

resorted to strike and the work at the Courts was paralysed  

for many days to come.  The situation was so grave that  

when the application of the petitioner for anticipatory bail  

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came up for hearing before the High Court on 20th  

December, 1985, members of the Bar Association did not  

allow the advocate of the petitioner to argue the case.  The  

petitioner relies on the order passed by M.B. Sharma, J. on  

20th December, 1985, which is as under:-

“20.12.1985

Mr. M.I. Khan, Public Prosecutor for the State.

The bail application was fixed for orders at  2.00 p.m. and the Public Prosecutor had sought  time to get the case diary from the Investigating  Officer.  I am in the court for last 15 minutes, but  the entry to the Court has been blocked by the  advocates and others.  It is for the members of the  August profession to consider how far it is justified.  The advocate for the petitioner could not come to  the court because of that blockade.  Hence the case  cannot be taken up.  I have no option but to retire  to the Chamber.  The case is adjourned to January  2, 1986.

Sd/- Sharma, M.B.”

6. Thereafter, the High Court was closed for winter break on  

21st December, 1985.  On 20th December, 1985, the  

petitioner was formally arrested and taken into custody by  

the police (CBI, Jaipur).  He was placed under suspension  

on 22nd December, 1985 w.e.f. 20th December, 1985.  Since  

the petitioner had already been arrested, the anticipatory  

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bail application was dismissed as having become  

infructuous on 2nd January, 1986. In view of the volatile  

atmosphere, the petitioner apprehended that he would not  

get a fair trial in the Criminal Case No. 3/86 pending before  

the Sessions Judge, Jaipur against him. He, therefore,  

approached this Court with a prayer for transfer of the  

criminal trial.  By Order               dated 4th August, 1986,  

this Court transferred the trial in the aforesaid criminal  

case to a Court of competent jurisdiction in Delhi.  

Thereafter, the trial was duly conducted at Delhi.  

By judgment and order dated 1st May, 2002, the petitioner  

was acquitted by the Additional Session Judge, Delhi.

7. Upon acquittal by the trial court, the petitioner submitted a  

joining report on 6th May, 2002 to the Registrar General,  

Rajasthan High Court.  The request made by the petitioner  

remained under consideration of the High Court from the  

said date.  The decision was deferred to await the result of  

the appeal, if any, preferred against the acquittal of the  

petitioner. It appears that an appeal was filed by the CBI,  

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which, however, came to be dismissed by a Division Bench  

of the Delhi High Court on 27th September, 2005.

8. The petitioner submitted his joining report  

on 3rd October, 2005. However, no action was taken by the  

High Court. It was only on 17th November, 2005 that he was  

directed to mark his attendance at the office of the District  

and Session Judge, Jaipur.  By this time, the petitioner had  

been under suspension for a period of 20 years. He,  

therefore, submitted another representation on 2nd March,  

2006 setting out the grievances and seeking permission to  

appear in person before the Chief Justice.   

9. In the meantime, the petitioner came to know that instead  

of revoking the order of suspension, the High Court may  

initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.  At that stage,  

the petitioner was only about 2 years short of the age of  

superannuation. He, therefore, moved the present Writ  

Petition, seeking immediate revocation of the order of  

suspension and consequential benefits.   On 8th May, 2006,  

it was brought to the notice of this Court that after filing of  

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the writ petition, the High Court has initiated the  

departmental proceedings against the petitioner, but no  

fresh order of suspension has been passed.  It was,  

therefore, submitted that direction be issued to the High  

Court to reinstate the petitioner forthwith.  This Court  

issued notice on the Writ Petition and also on the  

application for ex-parte stay.  Subsequently, the matter  

came up for hearing                         on 25th January, 2007  

when this Court directed that the matter be posted for final  

disposal in the last week of            March, 2007.  On 4th  

January, 2008, it was submitted on behalf of the  

respondent that the enquiry proceedings were in progress  

against the petitioner. Therefore, this Court directed the  

High Court to complete the enquiry within a period of eight  

weeks and submit its report.

10. The enquiry was duly completed.  In the Enquiry Report  

dated 27th February, 2008, the petitioner was exonerated of  

the charges levelled against him.  It was only at that stage,  

that he was reinstated with immediate effect, by order dated  

26th March, 2008.  The orders passed by the respondent  

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were placed on the record of these proceedings with the  

affidavit dated 22nd April, 2008 filed by the Registrar (Writs).  

The petitioner was, thereafter, given the posting order at  

Vijai Nagar on 12th May, 2008.  He retired from service on  

attaining the age of superannuation on 30th June, 2008.  

11. It appears that the trials and tribulations of the petitioner  

did not come to an end, even after retirement. In fact  

on 24th January, 2009, an order was issued on the basis of  

the resolution passed by the Full Court in its meeting held  

on 29th November, 2008, wherein it was resolved as under:-

“  RAJASTHAN     HIGH     COURT,     JODHPUR   

ORDER

No. Estt. (RJS) 15/2009    Date :- 24.01.2009

WHEREAS SHRI GURPAL SINGH, RJS  presently retired was placed under suspension vide  this office Order No. Estt. (RJS) 199/85 dated  22.12.1985.

AND WHEREAS it was decided that regular  disciplinary proceedings under rule 16 of the  Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control &  Appeal) Rules, 1958 be initiated against Shri Gurpal  Singh, RJS presently retired.  

AND WHEREAS Hon’ble the Chief Justice in  exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 13 of the  

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Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control &  Appeal) Rules, 1958 read with Full Court Resolution  dated October 30, 1971 was pleased to order that  on account of initiation of a regular enquiry under  rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification,  Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 the suspension of  Shri Gurpal Singh shall continue.

AND WHEREAS Departmental Enquiry under  rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification,  Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was initiated  against said Shri Gurpal Singh vide Memorandum  No. Estt. B2(iii)        /  /2006/1544 dated  20.04.2006.   

AND WHERAS in the above departmental  enquiry said Shri Gurpal Singh has been  exonerated vide order No. Estt. (RJS) 25/2008  dated 26.03.2008.

AND WHEREAS, Shri Gurpal Singh has been  reinstated with immediate effect as Civil Judge (Jr.  Div.) & Judicial Magistrate in the RJS vide order No.  Estt. (RJS) 26/2008 dated 26.03.2008.  

AND WHEREAS the matter regarding  regularization of suspension period of Shri Gurpal  Singh was considered by the Hon’ble Full Court in  its meeting held on 29.11.2008 and it was resolved  as under:-

“Perused office note and relevant record.  RESOLVED that period of his suspension shall be  treated as a period spent on duty, but without  salary except subsistence allowances already paid  to him.  However, this will not effect (sic) his  pensionary benefits but he will not be entitled for  any promotion.”

NOW THEREFORE, the period of his  suspension shall be treated as a period spent on  

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duty, but without salary except subsistence  allowances already paid to him.  However, this will  not effect (sic) his pensionary benefits but he will  not be entitled for any promotion.  

                                          BY ORDER

                                            Sd/ 24.01.2009 REGISTRAR (ADMN.)”

12. The petitioner, therefore, sought amendment of the writ  

petition through I.A. No. 6 of 2009.  The aforesaid  

application for amendment was allowed by this Court on  

27th February, 2009.  After the amendment, the counter  

affidavit was filed by the respondents to the amended writ  

petition.  The matter was heard by this Court on a number  

of occasions.  On 5th April, 2011, this Court passed the  

following order:-

“Having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is  of the opinion that interest of justice would be  served if the High Court is given an opportunity to  pass appropriate orders under    Rule    54     of  the    Rules.      Therefore,     the matter is remitted  to the High Court on its administrative side to pass  appropriate orders under Rule 54.  The High Court  shall   issue notice    to    the petitioner   and  afford   him    an opportunity   of hearing by calling  upon him to file reply to the notice. The High Court  shall thereafter      consider      the     reply   and  pass   a reasoned order under Rule 54 of the Rules  of 1951. This exercise shall be completed as early  

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as   possible     and    without       any    avoidable  delay but in any case not later than six weeks from  today. The High Court to file the order which may  be passed by it in the present proceedings.”

13. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, it appears that a  

Committee was constituted by the Rajasthan High Court  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Committee’) to examine the case  

of the petitioner, in terms of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan  

Service Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “1951 Rules”)  

for determining “whether his suspension was wholly  

justified or wholly unjustified or partly justified and to what  

extent, he was entitled for salary and/or full salary during  

period of suspension?”  

14. In this respect, a notice dated 25th April, 2011 was sent to  

the petitioner by the Registrar (Admn.), directing him to file  

a reply, and remain present before the aforesaid Committee  

on 5th May, 2011. In response to the said notice, the  

petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 2nd May, 2011  

and appeared before the Committee on 5th May, 2011.  

Thereafter                  on 16th May, 2011, the Committee  

passed the following order:

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“THEREFORE, in the present facts &  circumstances (Supra), period during which Shri  Gurpal Singh remained under Suspension cannot  be said to be wholly unjustified and sub-rule (2) of  R. 54 of RSR in negative form where the authority  has to examine as to whether suspension was  wholly unjustified.  However, after going through  complete material on record (supra), the Court is of  the view that in the given facts & circumstances  (supra), suspension of Shri Gurpal Singh cannot be  said to be wholly unjustified and what he was  entitled for under law has been paid to him in terms  of Resolution of Full Court dt.29.11.2008 (supra)  conveyed vide order dt. 24.01.2009.”

15. It becomes clear from the perusal of the aforesaid order  

that the Rajasthan High Court after giving an opportunity of  

hearing to the petitioner, reiterated the Resolution of the  

Full Court dated 29th November, 2008, communicated vide  

order dated 24th January, 2009.

16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at  

length.

17. Very elaborate submissions have been made by the learned  

counsel for the parties. We may, however, briefly notice the  

very crux of the submissions.    

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18. Mr. M.R. Calla, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

petitioner, submitted that the respondent has to justify the  

suspension order on the day it was passed, i.e.  

on 20th December, 1985. Further, since the suspension of  

the petitioner had continued for 22 years, 3 months and 7  

days, the respondent would have to satisfy the court that  

such a prolong suspension was also justified. Whether or  

not the order of suspension was justified, partly justified or  

wholly unjustified would have to be seen in the light of  

result of not only the trial in criminal case but also of the  

departmental enquiry where the petitioner was proceeded  

against by the department. According to the learned senior  

counsel, whilst taking a decision under Rule 54 of the 1951  

Rules, the disciplinary authority was required to keep in  

mind the outcome of the criminal trial and the  

departmental proceeding.  

19. Relying on some judgments of this Court, Mr. Calla had  

submitted that an employee who is suspended due to the  

pendency of the criminal investigation/trial has to be  

reinstated upon acquittal. Further upon reinstatement, he  

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would be entitled to full salary and allowances for the  

period he is kept under suspension. According to the  

learned senior counsel, an acquittal either by trial court or  

by the appellate court would relate back to the date on  

which the order of suspension was passed.  Mr. Calla then  

submitted that in the facts of this case, the petitioner was  

suspended due to the registration of the criminal case  

against him. At the time when the petitioner was acquitted  

he was entitled to be reinstated. However, since an appeal  

was filed against the acquittal by the CBI, the petitioner was  

neither reinstated nor his suspension was revoked. Even  

when the aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the High  

Court, the request of the petitioner for reinstatement was  

not considered. This, according to           Mr. Calla, was a  

second stage when the appellant was entitled to  

reinstatement and to the payment of full salary and  

allowances. Mr. Calla further pointed out that even after  

acquittal, the appellant was unjustly subjected to a  

departmental enquiry. The charges in the departmental  

enquiry were based on the facts, which were alleged to be  

the motive for the murder. Since the petitioner was  

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acquitted in the criminal trial, the departmental  

proceedings against him were wholly unjustified. Therefore,  

according to Mr. Calla, the continuation of suspension was  

also wholly unjustified.  

20. Even at this stage, the respondent did not pass any order  

under Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules. It was only on the  

directions issued by this Court on 5th April, 2011 that the  

respondent examined the case under Rule 54 and passed  

the necessary order on 16th May, 2011. It was also  

submitted that the order passed on the directions of this  

Court on 16th May, 2011 is contrary to the order passed by  

the High Court                       on 24th January, 2009. The  

latter order was passed after the petitioner was reinstated  

in service on 26th May, 2008, regarding regularization of the  

suspension period of the petitioner. In the order passed  

under Rule 54, the High Court had concluded that the  

period during which the appellant was kept under  

suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but  

without salary except subsistence allowance already paid to  

him. Even this order was passed during the pendency of the  

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present petition.  Mr. Calla then submitted that not only the  

petitioner has been deprived of full pay and allowances  

during the period of suspension, but even his case for  

promotion was not considered with effect from the date a  

person junior to him was considered for promotion and  

promoted.  

In support of his submission, Mr. Calla had relied on a  

number of judgments which are as under :    

Shri     Manni     Lal   Vs. Shri     Parmai     Lal     &     Ors.  1,  

Muhammad     Ayoob     Khuhro   Vs. Emperor2, Robert  

Stuart     Wauchope   Vs. Emperor3, Vidya     Charan     Shukla    

Vs. Purshottam     Lal     Kaushik  4, O.P.     Gupta   Vs. Union     of    

India     &     Ors.  5, R.P.     Kapur   Vs. Union     of     India     &     Anr.  6,  

Commissioner     of     Police,     New     Delhi   Vs. Narender  

Singh,7 Corporation     of     the     City     of     Nagpur,     Civil     Lines,    

Nagpur     &     Anr.   Vs. Ramchandra     &     Ors.  8, Jasbir     Singh    

Vs. Punjab     &     Sind     Bank     &     Ors.  9, The     Divisional    

1 (1970) 2 SCC 462 2 AIR (33) 1946 SIND 121 3 (1933) 61 ILR 168 4 (1981) 2 SCC 84 5 (1987) 4 SCC 328 6 (1964) 5 SCR 431  7 (2006) 4 SCC 265 8 (1981) 2 SCC 714 9 (2007) 1 SCC 566

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Superintendent,     Northern     Railway     &     Anr.     Vs.   R.B.    

Hanifi10, Govind     Prasad   Vs. Union     of     India,  11   Union     of    

India     &     Ors.   Vs. K.V.     Jankiraman     &     Ors.  12, Union     of    

India     &     Ors.   Vs. Sangram     Keshari     Nayak  13, Sulekh  

Chand     &     Salek     Chand   Vs. Commissioner     of     Police     &    

Ors.14, State     of     Kerala     &     Ors.   Vs. E.K.     Bhaskaran    

Pillai15, Union     of     India     &     Ors.   Vs. Lt.     Gen.     Rajendra    

Singh     Kadyan     &     Anr.  16  

21. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel on behalf of  

Respondent No.1, sought dismissal of the present writ  

petition, inter-alia, on the ground of delay. It was pointed  

out that there is a delay of more than 20 years in  

challenging the order of suspension dated 20th December,  

1985.  The learned senior counsel, in response to  

submissions of Mr. Calla, submitted that the initial  

suspension of the petitioner and further continuation of the  

same, during the criminal trial; during pendency of the  

10 (1976) Lab. I.C. 1403 11 (1980) RLW 258 12 (1991) 4 SCC 109 13 (2007) 6 SCC 704 14 1994 Supp (3) SCC 674 15 (2007) 6 SCC 524 16 (2000) 6 SCC 698

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appeal against acquittal; and during the pendency of the  

departmental enquiry; was not “only justified, but  

imperative,” in the view of “sensitive nature of judicial work”  

which was being undertaken by him. It was also submitted  

that since it is never possible to anticipate the outcome of a  

criminal trial or disciplinary proceedings which may  

eventually lead to acquittal or exoneration, as the case may  

be, suspension of the petitioner cannot be termed as  

“wholly unjustified”. In addition, Mr. Shishodia pointed out  

that the petitioner was acquitted by the trial court on  

“benefit of doubt”.  Further, dismissal of the appeal against  

acquittal does not in any manner affect the legal position.

22. It had also been pointed out by Mr. Shishodia that since  

there is no allegation of suspension being “mala-fide,  

vindictive or otherwise motivated”, there remains no reason  

to interfere with the impugned order dated 24th January,  

2009, as affirmed by the order dated 16th May, 2011.  The  

learned senior counsel had also submitted that there is no  

challenge to the order dated 16th May, 2011 in the present  

writ petition, nor the petitioner had made a submission that  

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his prosecution by the CBI was malicious or otherwise  

vitiated. In the light of aforesaid submissions, it was  

contended that suspension pending criminal proceedings  

and/or departmental enquiry was fully justified.  Mr.  

Shishodia has also argued that the order denying full pay to  

the petitioner was passed by the High Court, in bonafide  

exercise of its powers and on the basis of well settled  

interpretation of Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules.  

23. The learned senior counsel, relying upon a number of  

judgments of this Court, had further contended that  

matters relating to the grant of salary, promotions and  

other benefits to an employee during the period of his  

suspension are subject to the discretion of the employer.  

The employer has to strike a balance between the rights of  

the employee and the imperatives of an institution. He  

submitted that the High Court, acting in a fair, objective  

and reasonable manner, has drawn the line so as to avoid  

any disproportionate penalty. It has struck a balance  

between the entitlement of the petitioner and imperatives of  

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the institution charged with public duty of administration of  

justice.   

24. The learned counsel had further submitted that whatever  

amount was legally due to the petitioner has already been  

paid to him. It had been stated that Rupees Twelve Lac  

Seventy Three Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Two Only, i.e.  

Rs. 12,73,842/-, have been paid to the petitioner under  

various heads, like dearness allowance, subsistence  

allowance, etc. Also, the petitioner gets a monthly pension to  

the tune of Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Three Hundred  

Eighty Five Only, i.e. Rs. 22,385/-.  

The counsel relied upon the following judgments to  

substantiate his contentions:

Management     of     Reserve     Bank     of     India,     New     Delhi   Vs.  

Bhopal     Singh     Panchal  17, Krishnakant     Raghunath    

Bibhavnekar Vs. State     of     Maharashtra     and     Ors.  18, K.  

Ponnamma     (Smt.)   Vs. State     of     Kerala     &     Ors.  19,  

Dhananjay Vs. Chief     Executive     Officer,     Zilla     Parishad,    

17 (1994) 1 SCC 541 18 (1997) 3 SCC 636 19 (1997) 9 SCC 36

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Jalna20, Union     of     India     &     Ors.   Vs. Jaipal     Singh  21,  

Baldev     Singh   Vs. Union     of     India     &     Ors.  22, N.     Selvaraj    

Vs. Kumbakonam     City     Union     Bank     Ltd.     &     Anr.  23,  

Banshi     Dhar   Vs. State     of     Rajasthan     &     Anr.  24,  

Divisional     Controller,     Gujarat     SRTC   Vs. Kadarbhai     J.    

Suthar25, Union     of     India   Vs. B.M.     Jha.  26

25. We have considered the submissions made by the learned  

senior counsel for the parties.  

26.  The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as  

to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the  

subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary  

and allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal case  

and the exoneration in departmental proceedings.  Related  

to the aforesaid issue would be a consequential issue of  

notional promotion from the date an officer junior to him  

was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and the  

consequential entitlement to the emoluments on the  

promotional post, which in turn would determine the  

20 (2003) 2 SCC 386 21 (2004) 1 SCC 121 22 (2005) 8 SCC 747 23 (2006) 9 SCC 172 24 (2007) 1 SCC 324 25 (2007) 10 SCC 561 26 (2007) 11 SCC 632

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amount of suspension allowance and the other retiral  

benefits.  

27. In our opinion, it is not really necessary to notice the ratio  

in each of the judgments cited, as all of them reiterate  

certain well known principles of law. We may, however,  

notice some of the principles highlighted in the judgments  

cited by the learned counsel. In the case of Corporation of  

the City of Nagpur (supra), it is observed that it may not  

be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very  

same charges or grounds or evidence, where the accused  

has been acquitted honourably and completely exonerated  

of the charges. At the same time, it is pointed out that  

merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the  

authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is  

not taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered.  

28. The same principle is reiterated in the case of  

Commissioner     of     Police,     New     Delhi   Vs. Narender     Singh    

(supra).  

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29. In Jasbir Singh’s case (supra), the appellant was a  

confirmed peon in the respondent Bank. On an allegation  

that he had forged the signature of a depositor R and  

fraudulently withdrawn a certain sum, a departmental  

proceeding was initiated against him. A criminal case was  

also initiated simultaneously under Sections 409/201 IPC.  

He was acquitted in the criminal case. However, despite  

acquittal, the departmental proceedings continued and  

ultimately ended in an ex parte report to the effect that the  

charges had been proved. The respondent Bank also filed a  

suit against the appellant for recovery of the said sum. The  

suit was decreed but the appellate court held that the Bank  

failed to prove that the appellant had withdrawn or  

embezzled the said sum. It was held that the Bank was not  

entitled to recover the said amount. That judgment was not  

challenged. Thus, the same attained finality. However, the  

writ petition filed by the appellant, challenging the  

disciplinary proceedings and the order of punishment was  

dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.  Without  

taking note of the decision of civil court and relying on a  

provision of the Bipartite Settlement, the High Court held  

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that the departmental proceedings could have been initiated  

even after the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.  

The appellant employee then filed an appeal in this Court.  

Allowing the appeal, this Court held that the respondent  

Bank invited findings of a competent civil court on the issue  

as to whether the appellant had committed any embezzlement  

or not. Embezzlement of fund was the principal charge  

against the appellant in all the proceedings. The respondent  

Bank failed to prove any of the charges before any court of  

law. The judgment in civil matter having attained finality, was  

binding on the respondent Bank.   

It was further observed that in a case of this nature, the  

High Court should have applied its mind to the facts of the  

matter with reference to the materials brought on record. It  

failed to do so and did not take note of the decision of the civil  

court. It could not have refused to look into the materials on  

record. Therefore, the impugned judgment was set aside.   

30. In O.P. Gupta’s case (supra), this Court emphasised the  

principle that any order which would cause adverse civil  

consequences, can only be passed upon observance of the  

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rules of Natural Justice.  There is, therefore, insistence  

upon requirement of a “fair hearing”. It was also  

emphasised that long, continued suspension affects the  

government servant injuriously. Since the order of  

suspension entitles the government employee only to  

“subsistence allowance”, resulting in penal consequences, it  

should not be lightly passed. The court also emphasised  

that the expression “life”  does not merely connote animal  

existence or a continued drudgery through life. These are all  

well known principles of law. We only make a reference to  

the same, since the cases have been cited.

31.  Similarly the judgments cited by Mr. Shishodia reiterate  

the principle that “no hard and fast rule” can be laid down  

as to whether on reinstatement the employee is entitled to  

full back wages or no back wages at all. All the cases  

reiterate the principle that the facts and circumstances of  

each case have to be examined by the concerned authority.  

It has to take an informed decision on the basis of the  

material on record. These judgments also reiterate that  

acquittal of an employee would not automatically entitle  

him to reinstatement or to payment of full back wages. The  

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power is normally vested with the disciplinary authority to  

hold a departmental enquiry, even upon conclusion of the  

criminal trial where the employee is acquitted.  

32. We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid  

principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating  

to the entitlement of petitioner to the salary and other  

allowance(s) upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be  

examined at the different stages/point of time. The first  

stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was  

initially suspended on 22nd December, 1985 w.e.f. 20th  

December, 1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot  

legitimately protest against his suspension, at the initial  

stage, when he had remained in police custody for more  

than forty eight hours, though unfortunately for  

circumstances for which he was not responsible. This  

suspension was naturally continued when he was facing the  

trial for murder.  

33. The next stage is when he was acquitted by the trial court  

on 1st May, 2002.  The observations made by the Additional  

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Session Judge, Delhi whilst acquitting the petitioner are as  

follows:-

“285. The case in hand does not pass the  muster.  The circumstances that can be safely held  as duly proved would include only that there was  long-standing friendship between the accused and  the deceased, and discovery of dead body of the  latter in circumstances indicating unnatural death.  The prosecution has failed to prove beyond all  reasonable doubts the theory of accused having  taken an amount of Rs. one lakh 20 thousand from  the deceased on the promise of helping him in  securing appointment as Member in Board of  Revenue, or upon failure faced by the deceased in  getting the said appointment refusing to, or  haggling over, return of the said amount of money.  The theory of accused having returned Rs. one lakh  to PW 1 after the incident is suspect.  There is a  inordinate delay in the lodging of FIR which, seen  against the backdrop of claims by all and sundry  that they suspected involvement of the accused  from the very beginning, has remained unexplained  and is bound to prove fatal to the case (AIR 1996 SC  607).

286. The evidence regarding “last seen”  does  not inspire confidence and has rather come out as a  fabricated one.  Efforts to cook up evidence in the  course of investigation, for example the recovery of  blood stained clothes of the accused at his instance,  coupled with unauthorized handling of the material  exhibits recovered from the scene where the dead  body had been found, have given the impression  that the same might have been doctored.  This  erodes confidence in the prosecution case.  The  investigation conducted smacks of bias and  prejudice under influence of certain elements  inimically placed vis-à-vis the accused.  The benefit  of doubts arising as a result must accrue in favour  

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of the accused, since suspicion, however strong,  cannot take the place of proof in the final analysis.”  

These observations would indicate that the trial court  

disbelieved the very foundation of the prosecution case.  The  

alleged motive has been found to be without any basis.  The  

judgment of the trial court clearly indicates that the evidence  

produced does not reach even the bare minimum standard  

required for establishing the guilt of the petitioner.  The theory  

of the prosecution that petitioner had demanded or taken  

money from the deceased was not supported by any  

independent evidence.  The trial court also noticed that there  

was an inordinate delay in the registration of the FIR, which  

had to be seen against the backdrop of claims, by all and  

sundry, that they suspected the involvement of the petitioner  

from the very beginning. The trial court categorically observed  

that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the delay in  

registration of the FIR was fatal to the case of the prosecution.  

The trial court also observed that the evidence with regard to  

“last seen”  was fabricated and, therefore, did not inspire  

confidence. It is also observed that the investigation in the  

case had not been conducted fairly.  The Trial Court was left  

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with a definite impression that the evidence had been  

“doctored”.  The Court categorically observed that “the  

investigation conducted smack of bias and prejudice under  

influence of certain elements inimically placed vis-à-vis the  

accused”.  These observations, in our opinion, would bring the  

present case within the realm of those cases which are often  

described as cases of “no evidence”.  Merely because the Court  

ultimately used the term that prosecution has failed to prove  

the case “beyond reasonable doubt”  would not raise the  

stature of the evidence, produced by the prosecution, in this  

case from the level of being thoroughly unreliable.  

34. As noticed above, Mr. Calla has submitted that the  

suspension of the petitioner should have been revoked at  

this stage. It will not be possible to accept the proposition  

that as soon as the trial court had acquitted the petitioner,  

the Rajasthan High Court was required to forthwith revoke  

the order of suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could  

have been given a non-sensitive posting, not involving  

judicial functions. But, it was not imperative for the High  

Court to revoke the suspension, at that stage.  It is a matter  

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of record, that the prosecution agency decided to file an  

appeal against the judgment and order passed by the trial  

court, acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by the CBI  

was admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained  

pending till it was decided on 27th September, 2005.  

Therefore, the conclusions recorded by the trial court, were  

not final.  They were liable to be reversed in appeal by the  

High Court.  Thus, during the said period/stage, it cannot  

be said that the continuance of the suspension of the  

petitioner was wholly unjustified. Merely because the High  

Court could have revoked the suspension, would not render  

the decision to continue the suspension, wholly unjustified.  

35. The Rajasthan High Court was placed in a very piquant  

situation till the petitioner’s acquittal was reiterated by the  

Delhi High Court.  The High Court, literally, had no option  

but to place and keep the petitioner under suspension. It  

was not as if the petitioner had unwittingly breached a  

traffic regulation, which may not invite, even a frown from  

the general public. It was also not where he may had a  

minor altercation with someone which may well be  

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overlooked by a reasonable man, as it would not involve any  

moral turpitude. He was facing a trial for the offence of  

murder, a crime of highest moral turpitude.  Since time  

immemorial, Judges have been placed on a very high  

pedestal in every civilized society.  Such high status is  

accompanied by corresponding responsibility of a judge  

maintaining an unusually high standard of dignity, poise  

and integrity.  There can be no two ways about it! Therefore,  

the decision of the High Court to continue the suspension of  

the petitioner can not be said to be wholly unjustified till his  

acquittal by the Delhi High Court.   

36. At this stage, we may just mention observations of this  

Court in two decisions of this Court in relation to the high  

standards of behaviour expected from a Judge.  For  

instance, in Daya     Shankar   Vs. High     Court     of     Allahabad     &    

Ors.     Through     Registrar     &     Ors.  27, this court observed as  

under:

“Judicial officer cannot have two standards, one in  the court and another outside the court. They must  have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and  

27 (1987) 3 SCC 1

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integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy  of the office they occupy.”

Further, in the case of C.     Ravichandran     Iyer   Vs. Justice  

A.M.     Bhattacharjee     &     Ors.,  28   again while elucidating the  

nature of the position held by a judicial officer, this Court  

observed as under:   

“21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust.  Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge  must be a man of high integrity, honesty and  required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and  impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is  required to keep most exacting standards of  propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which  tends to undermine public confidence in the  integrity and impartiality of the court would be  deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process.  Society, therefore, expects higher standards of  conduct and rectitude from a Judge......It is,  therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official  and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the  same must be in tune with the highest standard of  propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is  higher than that expected of a layman and also  higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact,  even his private life must adhere to high standards  of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed  acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill- afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the  society.”

37. The decision of the High Court to keep the petitioner under  

suspension has to be judged by keeping the aforesaid  

28  (1995) 5 SCC 457

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standards in mind. Therefore, we are unable to accept the  

submission of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the  

petitioner was wholly unjustified after he was acquitted of  

the criminal charges by the trial court.   

38. We now come to the stage after the appeal against the  

acquittal was dismissed by the High Court. It appears that  

a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court re-appreciated the  

entire evidence and dismissed the appeal filed by the CBI.  

In its judgment, the High Court has clearly held that the  

prosecution had failed to prove any motive for the alleged  

murder. It is noticed by the High Court that the entire  

prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence.  It is  

further observed that the injuries suffered by the deceased  

were not inconsistent with the plea that it was a case of  

accidental death.  The High Court also disbelieved the  

witnesses of the prosecution with regard to the deceased  

having been “last seen”  alive with the petitioner. Having  

disbelieved the evidence with regard to the motive and with  

regard to the victim being “last seen”  alive with the  

petitioner, the High Court proceeded to examine the  

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evidence with regard to the disclosure statement under  

Section 27 and the recoveries of incriminating pieces of  

evidence.  Upon examination of each issue, the High Court  

observed that the facts brought on the record “put a  

question mark on the genuineness of the story of the  

recoveries made”.  The High Court disbelieved the recovery  

of the clothes allegedly belonging to the deceased. The story  

of recovery of blood stains was also disbelieved.  Ultimately,  

the High Court recorded the following conclusions:-

“43. In the present case, the major links between  the alleged offence and the accused are entirely non- existent. The above discourse shows positively that  the prosecution has failed at every step to bring  home the guilt of the accused. The first step was to  prove that it was a case of murder rather than a  case of accident. The prosecution has failed to prove  beyond reasonable doubt that it was a case of  murder and not that of an accident.

44. The second step was to prove that the accused  and the deceased were last seen together soon  before the incident. The prosecution has also failed  to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. Apart  from what has already been stated above an  important fact in this case is that post-mortem  report along with the CFSL report, Ex.PW-34/DA  proves existence of alcohol in the stomach of the  deceased. This tends to support the accident theory.

45. The third step was to prove that the prosecution  had recovered incriminating articles, either  

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following the disclosure statement or on its own  initiative. The prosecution has failed even at doing  the same. In this situation, even if the prosecution  is able to prove existence of motive, the same by  itself would not be of any value. The trial court has  disbelieved the story of motive. However, for us it is  not necessary to go into those details.

46. ………..The prosecution has failed to prove firstly  that there was any murder and secondly that the  accused is the one who committed it. There is  absolutely no merit in the appeal and the same is  accordingly dismissed.”

39. The acquittal of the petitioner having been affirmed by the  

High Court of Delhi, in our opinion, it was necessary for the  

High Court of Rajasthan to take a decision: (a) whether to  

revoke the order of suspension and permit the petitioner to  

perform judicial functions; (b) whether to hold a  

departmental enquiry with regard to the receipt of money  

allegedly received by him from the deceased; (c) as to how  

the period of suspension was to be treated; (d) whether the  

petitioner was entitled to full salary, part salary or no salary  

at all for the period of suspension.

40. It appears to us that given the findings recorded by the  

trial court, subsequently reiterated by the High Court of  

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Delhi, the decision to continue the petitioner under  

suspension, thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the  

suspension of the petitioner was continued as the High  

Court had decided to hold a departmental enquiry against  

the petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted  

certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of  

record that both the trial court as well as the High Court  

had found the entire story with regard to the alleged receipt  

of money to be false. The enquiry was founded on the same  

facts and the same evidence which have had been examined  

by the trial court as well as the High Court. In such  

circumstances, it was necessary for the High Court to  

examine the findings of the trial court as well as the High  

Court in detail before taking a decision to initiate  

departmental proceedings against the petitioner, founded  

on the same set of facts and the evidence. It is apparent  

from the record that no such examination of the judgment  

was undertaken by the High Court. Even after taking a  

decision to initiate departmental proceeding against the  

petitioner, it was no longer imperative to continue the  

petitioner under suspension. The petitioner was no longer  

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charged with any criminal offence as both the trial court as  

well as the High Court had literally concluded that the  

charges against the petitioner had been concocted. The  

petitioner had been subjected to continued suspension  

since 22nd December, 1985. During the period of  

departmental proceedings, even if the petitioner was not to  

be assigned any judicial work, the High Court could have  

conveniently given him suitable posting on the  

administrative side. In our opinion, from the time of  

dismissal of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the  

continued suspension of the petitioner was wholly  

unjustified.  

41. Again it is a matter of record, that even in the departmental  

enquiry the charges against the petitioner were not proved  

and he was exonerated of the same. It was only at that  

stage that the suspension of the petitioner was revoked. The  

petitioner had already moved the present writ petition  

immediately after the order of acquittal was upheld by the  

Delhi High Court. The enquiry proceedings were completed  

during the pendency of the writ petition.  Undoubtedly, the  

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order of suspension was revoked by the High Court  

on 26th March, 2008 but without giving any direction as to  

how the period of suspension was to be treated. It was only  

subsequently that the matter with regard to regularization  

of his period of suspension was considered by the Full  

Court in the meeting held on 29th November, 2008. Even at  

that stage though the Full Court passed a resolution that  

period of suspension shall be treated as period spent on  

duty, but it was to be without payment of any salary except  

for the subsistence allowance already paid to him. On the  

basis of the aforesaid resolution, the High Court passed the  

order dated 24th January, 2009. So even by order dated 24th  

January, 2009, the petitioner was granted only partial  

relief. This necessitated the amendment of the writ petition  

by the petitioner questioning the legality of the aforesaid  

order. It was only at that stage that this Court by order  

dated 5th April, 2011 directed the High Court to pass  

appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. It appears  

even at that stage the High Court did not consider it  

necessary to grant any further relief to the petitioner.

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42. We are of the considered opinion, having regard to the  

sequence of events narrated above, that it would be unjust  

to deny the salary to the petitioner with effect from the date  

the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the High  

Court of Delhi. We see no cogent reason as to why it was  

necessary to continue the suspension of the petitioner  

during the pendency of the departmental proceedings.  

There was no distinction between the facts or the evidence  

relied upon in the criminal trial as well as the department  

proceedings. This apart, the petitioner had been acquitted  

of any involvement in the crime of murder. Whilst exercising  

its jurisdiction under Rule 54, it was necessary for the High  

Court to pass a detailed and reasoned order as to whether  

the period of suspension was wholly unjustified.  

Undoubtedly, the power under Rule 54 is discretionary but  

such discretion has to be exercised reasonably and by  

taking into consideration the material relevant to the  

decision. Upon acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal  

charges, it was no longer necessary to keep him under  

suspension during the pendency of the departmental  

enquiry. In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its  

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jurisdiction properly under Rule 54, as directed by this  

Court in the order dated 5th April, 2011. In our opinion, the  

suspension of the petitioner ought to have been revoked  

upon acquittal by the High Court even during the pendency  

of the departmental enquiry.

43. This now leads us to the last submission of Mr. Calla that  

upon exoneration in the departmental proceedings, the  

petitioner was required to be considered for promotion from  

the date a person junior to him was promoted.

44.  In view of the authoritative judgment rendered by this  

Court in the case of Jankiraman (supra), the submissions  

made by Mr. Calla would have to be accepted. In the  

aforesaid judgment it was held that:-

“26.  We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with  the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is  completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is  not found blameworthy in the least and is not  visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to  be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post  along with the other benefits from the date on which  he would have normally been promoted but for the  disciplinary/criminal proceedings.”

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45. In this case, it is a matter of record that upon exoneration  

in the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was reinstated  

in service.  No punishment was inflicted on him at all.  

However, during the pendency of the criminal trial as also  

the departmental proceedings, he was not considered for  

promotion, when the cases of persons junior to him were  

considered. In our opinion, the High Court erred in  

directing in the Full Court Resolution dated 29th November,  

2008, and the communication dated 24th January, 2009  

that the petitioner shall not be entitled for any promotion.  

46. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition.  We reject the  

submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the  

petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by  

the trial court.  We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla  

that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified  

during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court.  

We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the  

petitioner during the pendency of the departmental  

proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is,  

therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27th  

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September, 2005, i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by  

the Delhi High Court onwards.  We further hold that the  

petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion  

notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was  

promoted.  We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider  

the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise  

satisfies the requirements as per the rules) from the date  

when a person junior to him was considered and promoted  

to the next higher post.  Let such a decision be taken by the  

High Court within a period of three months from the date of  

receipt of this order.  We further direct that the petitioner  

would be entitled to all consequential benefits, such as  

salary and other allowances by treating him on duty with  

effect from the date the appeal against acquittal was  

dismissed by the Delhi High Court and after fixing his last  

pay drawn correctly. The consequential benefits shall be  

paid to him with 6% interest from the date of the dismissal  

of the appeal by the High Court on 27th September, 2005.  

The enhanced retiral benefits shall be released to him  

within three months of the receipt of a copy of this order.  

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47. Assuming that, the Rajasthan High Court wanted to  

conduct its own departmental enquiry after the acquittal of  

the petitioner being confirmed by the Delhi High Court, his  

suspension during that period was wholly uncalled for  

because of which he unnecessarily suffered and had to  

litigate further.  We, therefore, award costs of Rs. 25,000/-  

to the petitioner to be borne by the respondent High Court.   

                             ..………………….….…....J. [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

..………………….….…....J.               [H.L.Gokhale] New Delhi; November 27, 2012.

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