Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5276 OF 2008

Govindammal (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors.      ...Appellants

Versus

Vaidiyanathan and Ors.                 ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

The legal representatives of the original defendant in O.S

No.45/85 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore are the

appellants before this Court. For the sake of convenience, the

parties are referred by their status before the Trial Court.

2 The suit was filed by the respondents herein, seeking a

declaration that  ‘A schedule’ property (as described in the plaint)

belongs to them or in the alternative for partition of half share in ‘B

1

schedule’ property (as described in the plaint) of which ‘A schedule’

is a part. According to the plaintiffs (respondents herein), the

properties originally belonged to two brothers namely, Pazanivelu

Mudaliar and  Chokalingam; Pazanivelu  Mudaliar had two sons,

namely, Narayanaswamy Mudaliar and Manickam. Narayanaswamy

had a son named Gnanasambandam Mudaliar.  The plaintiffs are

the grandsons of Narayanaswamy being the sons of

Gnanasambandam. On 21.7.1912, partition took place between the

branches of Pazanivelu and Chokalingam, and the same was signed

by  Narayanaswamy (since Pazanivelu had expired by then) and

Chokalingam. In the said partition, ‘A schedule’ property was

allotted to Narayanaswamy and Manickam (who was then a minor),

while the remaining 50% of the property  left in  ‘B schedule’ was

allotted to Chokalingam. It is relevant to note here itself that the

suit property totally measured 3.18 acres at the time of partition in

1912,  which  subsequently got reduced to  2.72  acres in view of

natural  calamities,  sale  of  certain portions  and resettlement  etc.

Thus, the share of each branch was reduced to 1.36 acres each.

The property consisted of Survey No. 67. Narayanaswamy and

2

Manickam being the sons of  Pazanivelu Mudaliar partitioned the

property allotted to the branch of their father in such a manner so

as to allot the entire ‘A Schedule’ property to Manickam, on

5.4.1933, as per Exhibit A­39. The said property allotted in favour

of Manickam was sold by him to one Appavu Mudaliar on

11.9.1940   as per   Exhibit   A­2. On 26.2.1942, the property

purchased by Appavu  Mudaliar  was in turn sold in favour of

Sambandam Mudaliar.  On  9.2.1950, the property purchased  by

Sambandam Mudaliar was sold to Narayanaswamy Mudaliar as per

Exhibit A­3. After the death of Narayanaswamy   Mudaliar  in the

year 1965,  the plaintiffs  being the grandsons of  Narayanaswamy

Mudaliar inherited the whole ‘A schedule’ property.  

Meanwhile, Chokalingam’s half share was sold in a court

auction on 21.12.1933 and was purchased by the original

defendant’s father.  There are no records to show that  there was

delivery of possession pursuant to the court auction sale; at any

rate, the court sale could not confer more than the right, title and

interest of the judgment debtor, namely Chokalingam’s half

interest,  which is  1.36 acres out of 2.72 acres recorded in the

3

resettlement. Unfortunately, the entire ‘B Schedule’ property which

was partitioned  in 1912 was never demarcated  inasmuch as the

same  was always  used as a  house site. Since the resettlement

proceedings  in  1976, this  property  comprises 3 pattas numbers.

The plaintiffs’ father had also been paying house tax. The defendant

had no right in ‘A schedule’ property. The defendant’s father and

consequently the defendant did not have any right over the property

in excess of Chokalingam’s half share, i.e., 1.36 acres. On

5.11.1978, in the partition in the family of the plaintiffs and their

father, the ‘A Schedule’ property was allotted to Plaintiff No.2 as per

Exhibit A­40. Since the defendant attempted to trespass into the

south western portion of the  suit  property (which  falls  under ‘A

Schedule’) and prevented the plaintiffs from enjoying the same, the

suit came to be filed.

The case of the defendant is that  his father  purchased the

entire extent of Survey  Number 67, i.e., 2.72 acres in a court

auction (in execution of the decree in  O.S.No. 20 of 1918) on

21.12.1933,  which  was  confirmed on 29.9.1934,  and possession

was delivered to him; after his father’s death in 1940, the defendant

4

continued to be in possession. In the year 1975, Shri

Puthumariamman Temple,  Kurinjipadi filed  O.S.  No.  66  of  1975

against the defendant and Gnanasambandam Mudaliar (the father

of the plaintiffs) in respect of the said property. The said suit came

to be dismissed, holding that the temple had no right to the

property and that the defendant and his father were entitled to the

same. The appeal filed by the temple also came to be dismissed.

Thus, the title of the defendant and his father was upheld in the

litigation wherein  the father  of the  plaintiffs  was  a  co­defendant

along with the defendant as stated above. Subsequently, the SKV

High School filed O.S. No. 1289/1974 for declaration of its title over

the property, claiming that it had got title over the entire property.

The defendant filed  O.S.  No. 1290/1974 against the SKV  High

School. The father of the plaintiffs was one of the defendants in O.S.

No.1289/1974 filed by the school whereas he was not made party

by the defendant in O.S. No.1290/1974.  After joint trial in both the

suits, the suit filed by the present defendant was decreed declaring

his title over the suit property, and the suit filed by the school was

dismissed. Such judgment of the Trial Court  was confirmed in

5

appeal.  The defendant denied the validity of  the subsequent sale

deeds dated 11.9.1940 and 9.2.1950 in his written statement. Even

the later partition dated 5.11.1978 was attacked as a fraudulent

and collusive transaction. The defendant claimed to be in exclusive

possession of the entire property from the date of the court auction,

i.e., from 1933 continuously,  and that  he had acquired right  by

adverse possession.  It was also pleaded by the defendant that the

defendant’s title has already been declared twice by the Civil Court

as mentioned supra and therefore, the present suit is barred by the

principles of  res judicata. The claim of joint possession by the

plaintiffs was denied by the defendant.

3. On a full­fledged trial, the Trial  Court decreed the suit and

granted the alternative relief of partition. In the first appeal filed by

the defendant, the learned Single Judge reversed the judgment of

the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. The Letters Patent Appeal

filed by the plaintiffs was allowed by the impugned judgment and

consequently the suit came to be decreed by the Division Bench of

the High Court.

6

4. Shri  V. Prabhakar, appearing on behalf of the appellants/LRs

of the defendant submitted that the suit for partition is not

maintainable inasmuch as even according to the plaintiffs, partition

had taken place way back in the year 1912 between the branches of

their ancestor Pazanivelu Mudaliar and his brother Chokalingam.

The auction sale conducted by the court in the year 1933 remained

unquestioned  by the  plaintiffs  and their  predecessors; since the

entire property was sold in the auction sale, the defendant being the

purchaser of the property was entitled to the entire property. It was

submitted that in the earlier litigations filed by the temple and the

school in respect of the entire property, the father of the plaintiffs

was a co­defendant along with the father of the defendant and had

pleaded or given evidence to the effect that the entire property was

purchased by the father of the defendant by way of court auction,

and that the father of the defendant was in possession as the owner

of the same. Such disputes were decided in favour of the father of

the defendant, upholding his title, and therefore by operation of the

principles of  res judicata as well as estoppel, it could be said that

the defendant and his father had the right to own the property and

7

consequently, the plaintiffs did not have any right over ‘A Schedule’

property. It was also contended that the defendant and his father

had remained in uninterrupted possession and had been asserting

the right consistently and openly from 1933 onwards, and therefore

it could be safely said that the defendant had perfected his title by

virtue of adverse possession.  

Per contra, Smt. V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate,

appearing  on behalf  of the  respondents/plaintiffs  submitted  that

the  question  of any  conflict regarding  inter se  title  between the

plaintiffs’ father and the defendant’s father had not been in issue in

any of the earlier litigations and, therefore, there was no question of

attracting the principles of res judicata with respect to the plaintiffs’

claim. Similarly, the admission of the plaintiffs’ father regarding the

right of the defendant’s father could not operate as an estoppel as it

could not be said that the defendant and his father had acted to the

detriment  of their interest  on  the  basis  of  any admission of the

plaintiffs’ father; even otherwise, such admission could be explained

satisfactorily. Since the partition between the branches of the two

brothers Pazanivelu and Chokalingam which occurred in the year

8

1912 through a registered partition deed was not in dispute, 50% of

the share vested with the legal heirs of Pazanivelu Mudaliar, i.e.,

the plaintiffs. It was for the defendant to plead and prove that he

had remained in exclusive possession in respect of such 50% of the

property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, adverse to the interest of

the plaintiffs for the requisite period; otherwise the question of

acquiring right by adverse possession would not arise.

5.  It is not in dispute that the entire property of 3.18 acres (now

reduced to 2.72 acres) was owned by two brothers, Pazanivelu and

Chokalingam. It is also not in dispute that a partition took place

between the families of the two brothers i.e., Chokalingam and his

brother’s son namely Narayanaswamy Mudaliar on 21.7.1912 (since

Pazanivelu had expired by then) through a registered partition

under which each of them got 50% of the property which ultimately

amounted to 1.36 acres each. It is needless to observe that the said

Narayanaswamy Mudaliar is the son of Pazanivelu Mudaliar.

Subsequently, further partition took place between the two sons of

Pazanivelu namely, Narayanaswamy and Manickam on 5.4.1933 in

respect of aforementioned  1.36  acres, i.e., ‘A’  Schedule  property

9

allotted to their branch, which was entirely allotted to Manickam in

the partition of  1933.  This  share was subsequently  alienated by

Manickam, and eventually repurchased by his brother

Narayanaswamy. Thus, it is clear that 50% of the entire property

had fallen to the share of the sons of Pazanivelu Mudaliar and the

remaining 50% remained with Chokalingam.   It is not in dispute

that the plaintiffs are the grandsons of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar.

Thus they have inherited 50% of the property, i.e., to the extent of

1.36 acres. It seems Chokalingam fell into debt and his property in

question was brought to sale through court auction. The auction

was held on 21.12.1933 and Subbaraya Mudaliar, i.e., father of the

defendant was the purchaser in this court auction. Said Subbaraya

Mudaliar died in the year 1940 leaving behind the defendant. Thus,

what could be sold in the court auction was only 50% of 2.72 acres

which was  held  by  Chokalingam, i.e.  1.36  acres.  The  remaining

50% of the property (i.e. ‘A’ Schedule) which vested with

Narayanaswamy and  his family could not be sold in the court

auction. The order relating to the confirmation of sale in Execution

Proceeding Registration No. 2/33 was produced and marked before

10

the Trial Court, which contains the schedule of the property.

Unfortunately, none of the parties  have produced the judgment

passed in O.S. No. 20/1918 which ultimately ended in court sale in

E.P. No.2/33. Thus, this Court is not in a position to say exactly as

to whether the entire property was the subject matter of the court

sale or not. Be that as it may, since Chokalingam was the judgment

debtor, at most only his share in the property could be sold and it is

not open for the purchaser to contend that he purchased the entire

property though only 50% of the property belonged to the judgment

debtor. The purchaser can not get a higher right, title or interest in

the property than  what vested  with the seller.   Ultimately the

purchaser takes the risk, if he purchases the property which does

not belong to the judgment debtor.  The purchaser at an auction

sale takes the property subject to all the defects of title, and the

doctrine of caveat emptor (let the purchaser beware) applies to such

a purchaser. Therefore, even assuming that the court auction sale

was held in respect of the entire property, it cannot be said that

such sale was valid to the entire extent. At most, it can be said that

it was valid to the extent of the property which was owned by the

11

judgment debtor i.e. Mr. Chokalingam, i.e. 1.36 out of 2.72 acres.

The remaining 50%, i.e., schedule ‘A’ property was owned by

Narayanaswamy Mudaliar and his legal representatives.

6. The suit out of which this appeal arises is not a mere suit for

partition. On the other hand, primarily it is a suit for declaration of

the plaintiffs’ title to the suit property,  i.e., ‘A schedule’ property

and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from

entering the possession of ‘A schedule’ property, which is nothing

but 50% of the entire ‘B Schedule’ property which fell to the share

of  Narayanaswamy Mudaliar.  Alternatively, it  was  prayed by the

plaintiffs that if the plaintiffs and defendant are found to be in joint

possession, they be granted the relief of partition and separate

possession to the plaintiffs’ half share in ‘B schedule’ property. It is

relevant to note here itself that ‘B schedule’ property measures 2.72

acres  in  its  entirety,  whereas  ‘A schedule’  property is  50% of ‘B

schedule’ property, measuring 1.36 acres, which fell to the share of

Narayanaswamy Mudaliar in the partition of 1912. Since the

partition had taken place in 1912 between Chokalingam and

Narayanswamy Mudaliar (being the son of Pazanivelu), and as the

12

plaintiffs inherited the property from  Narayanaswamy  Mudaliar,

they are entitled to 50% of the share in ‘B schedule’ property.  The

Division Bench has rightly held that the plaintiffs are entitled to ‘A

Schedule’ property, which is the half share allotted to their branch

in the partition of  1912, out of ‘B Schedule’  property.  Thus,  the

question of maintainability raised by the defendant fails.  

7. The plaintiffs need not question the auction sale which was

conducted in  1933  inasmuch as, firstly, they  are  not  parties to

those proceedings  including  the execution proceedings and court

auction. Secondly, by virtue of auction sale, the purchaser would

get only the share vested with Chokalingam inasmuch as

Chokalingam alone was the judgment debtor. The property which is

not  owned by the judgment debtor  could not  be sold at  all  and

therefore, even assuming that the sale certificate is wrongly issued

in respect of the entire property, the same does not bind the

plaintiffs inasmuch they continued to be the owner of 50% of the

whole of the property.

8. It is no doubt true that in the suit filed by the temple against

the father  of the  defendant, the father  of the  plaintiffs  was also

13

arrayed as Defendant No. 2. It is also not in dispute that the father

of the plaintiffs and the father of the defendant  by engaging a

common advocate filed a common written statement pleading that

the temple was not the owner of the property and that Defendant

No.1 was the owner of the property. It is also not in dispute that the

father of the plaintiffs admitted in the said suit that Defendant No.1

in the said suit, namely, the father of the defendant herein, was the

owner of the property. So also, in the suit filed by the school, the

father of the plaintiffs was also arrayed as one of the defendants

along  with the father  of the  defendant. In the said suit  also, a

common written statement was filed. Even in the suit filed by the

school, the defendants therein, i.e., the father of the plaintiffs

herein and father of the defendant herein jointly pleaded that the

school was not the owner of the property and that the defendants

were the owners. Both the suits filed by the temple and the school

came to be dismissed, holding that the temple as well as the school

were not the owners of the property. From the aforementioned facts

and the pleadings as well as the evidence recorded in the said suits,

it is amply clear that there was no dispute  inter  se  between the

14

defendants. In other words, there was no dispute whatsoever

regarding title between the father of the plaintiffs and the father of

the defendant in those two suits. The main question to be decided

in those suits was whether the third parties who had claimed rights

were entitled the property. Since the question of  inter se  title

between the defendant’s father and the plaintiffs’ father was not in

issue and was also not required to be decided in the disputes then

raised,  obviously, the  doctrine  of  res judicata  cannot  be  applied

between such co­defendants.

9. However, there exist certain situations in which principles of

res judicata may apply as between co­defendants.   This has been

recognized by the English Courts as well as our Courts for more

than a century. The requisite conditions to apply the principle of

res  judicata  as between co­defendants are that (a) there must be

conflict of interest between the defendants concerned, (b) it must be

necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the

relief he claims and (c) the question between the defendants must

have  been finally  decided.  All the three requisite conditions  are

absent in the  matter on  hand.  Firstly, there  was  no conflict of

15

interest between the defendants in the suits filed by the temple and

the school. Secondly, since there was no conflict, it was not

necessary to decide any conflict between the defendants in those

suits in order to give relief to the temple or the school, which were

the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the father of the plaintiffs and the

father of the defendant were colluding in those suits filed by Temple

and School.  Both of them unitedly opposed those suits.  In view of

the same, the principles of res judicata would not apply. The Privy

Council in the case of Mt. Munni vs. Tirloki Nath, AIR 1931 PC 114

has observed thus:

“The doctrine of res judicata finds a place in S.11 Civil P.C., 1908, but it has been held by this Board on many occasions that the statement of it there is not exhaustive; the latest recognition of this is to be found in Kalipada De v. Dwijapada Das [AIR 1980 PC 22]. For the general principles upon which the doctrine should be applied it is legitimate to refer to decisions in this country: see Soorjamonee Dayee v. Suddamund Mahapatter [I.A. Sup, Vol. 212], Krishna Behari Roy v. Banwari Lal Roy [(1874) 1 Cal. 144], Raja Run Bahadur Singh v.  Mt.  Lachoo Koer  [(1885) 11 Cal.  301].  That there  may  be res judicata  as  between  co­defendants has been recognized by the English Courts and by a long course of Indian decisions. The conditions under which this branch of the doctrine should be applied are thus stated by Wigram V.C., in Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury [ (1843) 3 Hare 627] at 638:

16

“If a plaintiff cannot get at his right without trying and deciding a case between co­defendants, the Court  will try  and decide that  case,  and the  co­ defendants will be bound, but if the relief given to the plaintiff does not require or involve a decision of any case between co­defendants, the co­ defendants will not be bound as between each other by any proceeding which may be necessary only to the decree the plaintiff obtains.”

This statement of the law has been accepted and followed in many Indian cases:  see Ahmad Ali  v.  Najabat Khan [(1895) 18 All. 65], Ramchandra Narayan v.Narayan Mahadev [(1887) 11 Bom. 216], Magniram v. Mehdi Hossein Khan [(1904) 31 Cal. 95]. It is, in their Lordships’ opinion, in accord with the provisions of S. 11, Civil P.C., and they adopt it as the correct criterion in cases where it is sought to apply the rule of res judicata as between co­ defendants. In such a case therefore three conditions are requisite: (1) There must be a conflict of interest between the  defendants  concerned; (2) it  must  be  necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided.”

                                                                (emphasis supplied)

10. Once again, the very principles were restated in the case of

Syed Mohammad Saadat  Ali  Khan vs.  Mirza Wiquar  Ali  Beg and

others,   AIR (30) 1943 Privy Council  115,  in which the  following

observations were made:

“In order that a decision should operate as res judicata between co­defendants three  conditions  must  exist: (1)

17

There must be a conflict  of interest  between those co­ defendants; (2) it must be necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3) the question between the co­ defendants must have been finally decided.   There can be no doubt that in the case under consideration the first and third conditions were fulfilled.  Whether the second condition existed is the question to be answered. The Chief Court held that it did not exist for the reasons appearing in the following extract from their judgment.”   

11. Almost the same principles  were reiterated in the case of

Chandu Lal vs. Khalilur Rahaman, AIR (37) 1950 Privy Council 17,

in which the following observations were made:

“In Munni Bibi and Another vs. Tirloki Nath, 58 I.A. 158: [AIR (18) 1931 PC 114] the conditions for the application of the doctrine  of res judicata  as between parties  who have been co­defendants in a previous suit are thus laid down: there must be (1) a conflict of interest between the co­defendants, (2) the necessity to decide that conflict in order to give the plaintiff the appropriate relief, and (3) a decision of that question between the co­defendants.  It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question. But to this the qualification must be added that, if such a party is to be bound by a previous judgment, it must be proved clearly that he had or must be deemed to have had notice that the relevant question was in issue and would have to be decided.”                                                          (emphasis supplied)

18

In the case of  Md. Saadat Ali  (supra),  though the first and third

conditions were fulfilled, the second condition was not fulfilled and

hence it was held that the principles of res judicata will not apply,

meaning thereby that all the three conditions should be fulfilled in

order to apply the principles of res judicata.

12. It is true that under Section 11 of the CPC, when the matter

has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between

the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of

them claim, litigating under the same title, the decree in the former

suit  would operate  as  res judicata  between  the  plaintiff  and  the

defendant or as between the co­plaintiffs or co­defendants. For

instance, if in a suit by P against D1 and D2, the matter is directly

and substantially in  issue between D1 and D2 and adjudication

upon that matter was necessary to determine the suit to grant relief

to P, the adjudication would operate as res judicata  in subsequent

suits between D1 and D2  in which either of them is plaintiff  or

defendant.  In other words, if a plaintiff cannot get his claimed relief

without trying and deciding a case between the co­defendants, the

court  will try and decide the case in its entirety including the

19

conflict of interest between the co­defendants and the co­

defendants will be bound by the decree. But if the relief given to the

plaintiff does not require or involve a decision of any case between

co­defendants, the co­defendants  will not be bound as between

each other.  This  Court in the  case  of  Mahboob Sahab vs.  Syed

Ismail and others, (1995) 3 SCC 693, considering the applicability of

the doctrine  of  res judicata  between co­defendants held  that the

following four conditions must be satisfied, namely,

“(1) there  must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2) it must be necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the reliefs which the plaintiff claims; (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided; and  (4) the co­defendants were necessary or proper parties in the former suit.”

To reach the conclusion  mentioned above, this  Court relied

upon the judgments in the cases of  Syed. Mohd. Saadat Ali Khan

vs. Mirza Wiquar Ali Beg, AIR 1943 PC 115;  Shashibushan Prasad

Mishra vs.  Babuji  Rai,  AIR 1970 SC 809 and  Iftikhar Ahmed vs.

Syed Meharban Ali, (1974) 2 SCC 151.

20

13. Coming to the question of estoppel as argued by the

defendant’s  counsel  based on the admission of the  father  of the

plaintiffs in the pleadings and in his deposition regarding the title of

the father of the defendant in the aforementioned earlier litigations,

it is no doubt true that an admission is the best piece of evidence.

However, an admission can always be explained, unless such an

admission gives rise to the principle of estoppel. The principle of

estoppel could have arisen if the father of the defendant had acted

to his detriment on the basis of the representation made by the

plaintiffs’ father as the basic requirement for attracting the principle

of estoppel, is that the person to whom the representation has been

made must have acted on the basis of  such representation,  and

particularly to his own detriment. In the matter on hand, the father

of the defendant knew about the correct position on facts and he

very well knew that he was the owner to the extent of 50% of the

property only, and as he did not act to his detriment, the question

of estoppel does not arise. As mentioned supra, it is well settled that

in an auction purchase, the auction purchaser does not acquire any

right over the property higher than that of the  judgment debtor.

21

Since the principles of  res judicata  between co­defendants are not

applicable in this case, and since a  mere admission does not

operate as an estoppel, such admission does not create or pass any

title in favour  of the  defendant’s father  and consequently to the

defendant. On the other hand, it is apparent that the defendant’s

father had right over only half of the property in question, which he

had purchased.

14. The Division Bench has rightly negated the contention of the

defendant relating to adverse possession.  From  the evidence on

record, the trial Court and the Division Bench of the High Court

have come to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove

that  he  and  his  predecessor­in­interest  had  possession  over the

entire property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs and their

predecessor.   No material  is found on record which emphatically

discloses that  the physical  delivery of  possession of the property

was given to the auction purchaser by evicting or in exclusion of all

the persons including the plaintiffs’ father and the plaintiffs. In the

absence of such material, the Trial Court and the Division Bench

have rightly concluded that there was symbolic delivery of

22

possession in favour of the auction purchaser. However, the

subsequent documents show joint possession of the plaintiffs and

the defendant. Even now the names of both the parties are found in

the revenue records. The documents do not show exclusive

possession of either of the parties, but would indicate that they are

in joint possession. Exhibits A­7, A­8 and A­9 are the pattas which

disclose the names of both the parties in the revenue records. Even

the house tax receipts are in the name of the plaintiffs’ predecessor.

‘A schedule’ property has already been subjected to partition inter

se among the plaintiffs after the death of Narayanswamy Mudaliar

and the allotment of property in question, i.e. ‘A Schedule’ has been

made in favour of the second plaintiff  as per   Exhibit  A­40. The

aforementioned records and certain other material on record would

negative the contention of the defendant relating to adverse

possession.   The plaintiffs have proved satisfactorily that they are

the owners of ‘A Schedule’ property, i.e., 50% of the property

partitioned in 1912, which had ultimately fallen in the share of Mr.

Narayanaswamy (grandfather of plaintiffs) as mentioned supra.   

23

15. In view of the same, we do not find any reason to interfere with

the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court

passed in L.P.A. No. 70/2002 dated 29.01.2007.   The instant

appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed.

……..………………………………….J. [N.V. RAMANA]

NEW DELHI; …….……………………………………J. OCTOBER 23, 2018. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]

24