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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1102 OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.10677 of 2008)

Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. & Anr.                .. ….Appellants

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                        …..Respondents

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1103  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10760 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1104  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11055 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1105   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11057 of 2008)

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 1 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

Page 2

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1106   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11393 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1107   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11398 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1108   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11401 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1109   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11509 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1110  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11622 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1111  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11634 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1112  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11640 of 2008)

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 2 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

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WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1113   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12408 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1114  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21389 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1115   OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15791 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1116  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 16470 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1117  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 24149 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1118  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10730 of 2008)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1119  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25747 of 2010)

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 3 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

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WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1120  OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25748 of 2010)

AND              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 34691 of 2011

J U D G M E N T  Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The principal question for consideration is whether the mere  

issuance of a notice under the provisions of Section 35(3) of the  

Indian Forest Act, 1927 is sufficient for any land being declared a  

“private forest” within the meaning of that expression as defined  

in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)  

Act, 1975. In our opinion, the question must be answered in the  

negative. Connected therewith is the question whether the word  

“issued” in  Section 2(f)  (iii)  of  the Maharashtra  Private Forests  

Acquisition Act,  1975 read with Section 35 of the Indian Forest  

Act,  1927  must  be  given  a  literal  interpretation  or  a  broad  

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meaning.  In our opinion the word must be given a broad meaning  

in the surrounding context in which it is used.  

3. A  tertiary  question  that  arises  is,  assuming  the  disputed  

lands are forest lands, can the State be allowed to demolish the  

massive constructions made thereon over the last half a century.  

Given the facts and circumstances of these appeals, our answer  

to this question is also in the negative.  

4. This is a batch of 20 appeals and they were argued on the  

basis of the facts as in the appeal of Godrej. In each appeal, the  

minute details would, of course, be different but the legal issues  

are the same and all the appeals were argued by learned counsel  

on the basis that the legal issues and questions of law are the  

same.  For  convenience,  we  have  taken  into  consideration  the  

facts in the appeal of Godrej.  

Facts

5. Godrej  acquired  land  in  Vikhroli  in  Salsette  taluka  in  

Maharashtra by a registered deed of conveyance dated 30th July  

1948  from  Nowroji  Pirojsha,  successor  in  interest  of  Framjee  

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Cawasjee  Banaji  who,  in  turn,  had  been  given  a  perpetual  

lease/kowl for the land by the Government of Bombay on 7th July  

1835.  

6. The  land  was  described  in  the  perpetual  lease/kowl  as  

“waste land” and one of the purposes of the lease was to cultivate  

the waste land. We are concerned in this appeal with an area of  

133  acres  and  38  gunthas  of  land  bearing  Old  Survey  Nos.  

117,118 and 120 (New Survey Nos. 36 (Part),  37 and 38).  For  

convenience this land is hereafter referred as the “disputed land”.

Consent decree in the Bombay High Court 7. On 27th August 1951 the Legislative Assembly of the State of  

Bombay passed the Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption  

Abolition) Act,  1951.  This statute was brought into force on 1st  

March 1952.  Section 4 of the Salsette Estates Act provided that  

waste  lands  granted  under  a  perpetual  lease/kowl  not  

appropriated or brought under cultivation before 14th August 1951  

shall vest in and be the property of the State.1  1

Section 4 - Waste lands, etc.. to vest in Government  (a)  All  waste lands in any estate which under the terms of  the kowl  are not  the  

property of the estate-holder,

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8. According  to  the  State,  the  disputed  land  was  not  

appropriated or brought under cultivation before 14th August 1951  

and, therefore, it vested in or was the property of the State by  

virtue of Section 4 of the Salsette Estates Act.  

9. This factual position was disputed by Godrej and to resolve  

the  dispute,  Suit  No.  413  of  1953  was  filed  by  Godrej  in  the  

Bombay High Court praying,  inter alia,  for a declaration that it  

was  the  owner  of  the  disputed  land  in  village  Vikhroli  as  the  

successor in title of Framjee Cawasjee Banaji; that the provisions  

of the Salsette Estates Act had no application to the disputed land  

and,  that  the  disputed  land  had  been  appropriated  by  Godrej  

before 14th August 1951 for its industrial undertaking.

(b) all waste lands in any estate which under the terms of the kowl are the property of  the estate-holder but have not been appropriated or brought under cultivation before the  14th August 1951, and

(c)  all  other  kinds of property referred to in Section 37 of the Code situate in an estate which is not the  property of any individual or an aggregate of persons legally capable of holding property  other  than  the  estate-holder  and  except  in  so  far  as  any  rights  of  persons  may  be  established in or over the same and except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the  time being in force, together with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto,

and are hereby declared to be the property of the State and it shall  be lawful  to  dispose of and sell the same by the authority in the manner and for the purposes prescribed  in Section 37 or 38 of the Code, as the case may be.

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10. The  suit  was  contested  by  the  State  by  filing  a  written  

statement  but  eventually  the  Bombay  High  Court  passed  a  

consent decree on 8th January 1962 to the effect that except for  

an  area  of  31  gunthas,  all  other  lands  were  appropriated  and  

brought under cultivation by Godrej before 14th August 1951 and  

are the property of Godrej. The consent decree reads,  inter alia,  

as follows:-  

“AND THIS COURT by and with such consent DOTH  FUTHER DECLARE that it is agreed by and between  the parties of the following lands namely S. No. Area

A.G.A. 15 Part 0-21-0 16 Part 0-10-0

0-31-0

in the village of Vikhroli  vest in Government under  Section 4(c) of the said Act” [Salsette Estates Act].

“AND THIS COURT by and with such consent DOTH  FURTHER DECLARE that it is agreed by and between  the parties that save and except the lands mentioned  above all other lands in the village of Vikhroli were  appropriated or brought under cultivation before the  fourteenth day of August one thousand nine hundred  and fifty-one and are the property of the Plaintiff….”

11. These events establish two facts: (i) Even according to the  

State, the disputed land was ‘waste land’ and not a ‘forest’. This  

is significant since the Indian Forest Act, 1927 did not apply to  

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‘waste land’ (due to the Indian Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act,  

1948)  with  effect  from  4th December  1948.  (ii)  It  was  

acknowledged by the State that the disputed land (even if it was  

a forest) was appropriated or brought under cultivation by Godrej  

before 14th August 1951.

Development Plan for the City of Bombay

12. A  development  plan  for  the  City  of  Bombay (and Greater  

Bombay including Vikhroli) was published on 7th January 1967 and  

the  next  development  plan  was  published  in  1991.  In  both  

development plans, the disputed land was designated as ‘R’ or  

‘Residential’. On publication of the first development plan, Godrej  

applied for and was granted permission, on various dates, by the  

Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay to construct residential  

buildings on the disputed land.  Godrej is said to have constructed  

four such buildings on the basis of permissions granted from time  

to time and these building were occupied for residential purposes  

by its staff.  

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13. On  17th February  1976  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  

Regulation) Act,  1976 came into force. Since the disputed land  

was in excess of the ceiling limit, Godrej filed statements (under  

Section 6 of the Act) and sought exemption from the Competent  

Authority  for  utilizing  the  excess/surplus  vacant  lands  for  

industrial and residential purposes (under Section 20 of the Act).  

Pursuant  to  the  request  made  by  Godrej,  it  was  granted  

exemption by the State Government, as prayed for and subject to  

certain conditions which included (both initially and subsequently  

by a corrigendum) the construction of tenements for the benefit  

of its employees to be used as staff quarters.  

14. Pursuant to the grant of exemption, Godrej applied for and  

was granted permission by the Municipal Corporation of Greater  

Bombay  to  construct  multi-storeyed  buildings  on  the  disputed  

land.  According  to  Godrej,  over  a  period  of  time,  it  has  

constructed  more  than  40  multi-storeyed  residential  buildings  

(ground+4 and ground+7), one club house and five electric sub-

stations.  It  is  said that  over  a couple of  thousand families  are  

occupying these buildings and that further construction has also  

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been made, pursuant to permission granted, of a management  

institute and other residential buildings.  

Amendments to the Indian Forest Act, 1927

15. Chapter  V  of  the  Indian  Forest  Act,  1927  relates  to  the  

control  over  forests  and  lands  not  being  the  property  of  

government.  It  was amended (as far as we are concerned) on  

three occasions by the State of Bombay or Maharashtra, as the  

case may be.2  

16. The  first  amendment  was  by  the  Indian  Forest  (Bombay  

Amendment) Act, 1948 being Bombay Act No. 62 of 1948. By this  

amendment (which came into force on 4th December 1948), the  

three significant  changes that  we are concerned with  were:  (i)  

Insertion of Section 34A in the Forest Act3 whereby an inclusive  

definition  of  “forest”  was  incorporated  for  the  purposes  of  the  2

Changes brought about by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws)   Order,  1937 and the Adaptation of Laws Order,  1950 have not been incorporated in the  narration of facts.  

3

34A. Interpretation.- For the purposes of this Chapter 'forest' includes any land  containing trees and shrubs, pasture, lands and any other land whatsoever which the  Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a forest.

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 11 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

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chapter; (ii) Substitution of Section 35(1) of the Forest Act4 dealing  

with  protection  of  forests  for  special  purposes,  including  

regulatory and prohibitory measures; (iii) The words ‘waste lands’  

or ‘land’ occurring in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 35 of the  

4

Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes   

(1) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,-

(i) regulate or prohibit in any forest -

(a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for cultivation;

(b) the pasturing of cattle;

(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;

(d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the stripping off the bark or leaves from  any tree;

(e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;

(f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber; or

(g) the quarrying of stone or the burning of lime or charcoal or the collection or removal  of any forest produce or its subjection to any manufacturing process;

(ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of forests and their protection from fire;

when such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any of the following purposes :-

(a) for the conservation of trees and forests;

(b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or the reclamation of saline or water- logged land, the prevention of land-slips or of the formation of ravines and torrents, or the  protection of land against erosion, or the deposit thereon of sand, stones or gravel;

(c) for the improvement of grazing;

(d) for the maintenance of a water supply in springs, rivers and tanks;

(e) for the maintenance increase and distribution of the supply of fodder, leaf manure,  timber or fuel;

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Forest Act5 were deleted.  Therefore, ‘waste lands’ were taken out  

of  the purview of  the Forest Act  (as applicable to the State of  

Bombay) with effect from 4th December 1948.

17. The  next  amendment  was  made  by  the  Indian  Forest  

(Bombay  Amendment)  Act,  1955  being  Bombay  Act  No.  24  of  

1955. The three significant changes that we are concerned with  

(f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works and hydro-electric works;

(g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling stones, floods and drought;

(h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways and other lines of communication; and

(i) for the preservation of the public health.

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Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

(2) The State Government may, for any such purpose, construct at its own expense, in  any forest, such work as it thinks fit.

(3) No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shall any work be begun under  sub-section (2), until after the issue of a notice to the owner of such forest calling on him  to show cause, within a reasonable period to be specified in such notice, why such  notification should not be made or work constructed, as the case may be, and until his  objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been  heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf and have been considered by the State  Government.

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were:  (i)  Amendment  to  Section  35(3)  of   the  Forest  Act;6 (ii)  

Insertion  of sub-sections (4),  

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Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

(3) No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shall any work be begun under  sub-section (2), until after the issue by an officer authorised by the State Government in  that behalf of a notice to the owner of such forest calling on him to show cause, within a  reasonable period to be specified in such notice, why such notification should not be  made or work constructed, as the case may be, and until his objections, if any, and any  evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been heard by an officer duly  appointed in that behalf and have been considered by the State Government.

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(5) and (6) in Section 35 of the Forest Act;7 (iii) Insertion of Section  

36A (manner of serving notice and order under Section 36) in the  

Forest Act.8

18. The next amendment was by the Indian Forest (Maharashtra  

Unification and Amendment) Act, 1960 being Maharashtra Act No.  

6 of 1961. The two changes brought about were: (i) The words  

“six months” in sub-section (4) of Section 35 of the Forest Act  7

Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under subsection (1) should not be made,  may require that for any period not exceeding six months, or till the date of the making of  a notification, whichever is earlier, the owner or such forest and all persons who are  entitled or permitted to do therein any or all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub- section (1), whether by reasons of any right, title or interest or under any licence or  contract or otherwise, shall not, after the date of the notice and for the period or until the  date aforesaid, as the case may be, do any or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub- section (1), to the extent specified in the notice.

(5) A notice issued under sub-section (3) shall be served on the owner of such forest in  the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons  and shall also be published in the manner prescribed by rules.

(6) Any person contravening any requisition made under sub-section (4) in a notice to  show cause why a notification under sub-section (1) should not be made shall, on  conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or  with fine or with both.

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36-A.  Manner  of  serving  notice  and  order  under  section  36.-  The  notice  referred to in sub-section (1) of section 36 and the order, if any, made placing a forest under  the control of a Forest Officer shall be served on the owner of such forest in the manner  provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons.

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were substituted by the  words “one year”;9  (ii) Sub-sections (5A)  

and  (7) were inserted in Section 35 of the Forest Act.10  

Notice issued to Godrej

19. Completely  unknown  to  Godrej  and  not  disclosed  by  the  

State in Suit No. 413 of 1953 even till 8th January 1962 when the  

consent decree was passed by the Bombay High Court, a Notice  

bearing No. WT/53 had been issued to Godrej under Section 35(3)  9

Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under subsection (1) should not be made,  may require that for any period not exceeding one year, or till the date of the making of a  notification, whichever is earlier, the owner or such forest and all persons who are entitled  or permitted to do therein any or all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1),  whether by reasons of any right, title or interest or under any licence or contract or  otherwise, shall not, after the date of the notice and for the period or until the date  aforesaid, as the case may be, do any or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub- section (1), to the extent specified in the notice.

10

Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

(5-A) Where a notice issued under sub-section (3) has been served on the owner of a  forest in accordance with subsection (5), any person acquiring thereafter the right of  ownership of that forest shall be bound by the notice as if it had been served on him as  an owner and he shall accordingly comply with the notice, requisition and notification, if  any, issued under this section.

(7) Any person contravening any of the provisions of a notification issued under sub- section (1) shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may  extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

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of  the  Forest  Act  (as  amended)  and  published  in  the  Bombay  

Government  Gazette  of  6th September  1956  in  respect  of  the  

disputed land in village Vikhroli. Godrej subsequently learnt of the  

notice from a search in the records of the Department of Archives.  

The search revealed that the notice, as published in the Gazette,  

bore no date and according to Godrej, the notice was not served  

upon it and, it was submitted, that the notice was never acted  

upon.  Indeed,  subsequent events cast a doubt on whether the  

notice was at all issued to or served on Godrej. Notice No. WT/53  

reads as follows:-

“Notice. No.WT/53

In pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 35 of  the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927), read with  rule  2  of  the  rules  published  in  Government  Notification,  Agriculture  and  Forests  Department,  No.5133/48513-J,  dated the 19th day of September,  1950,  I,  J.V.  Karamchandani,  the  Conservator  of  Forests, Western Circle, hereby given notice to –

The  Manager,  Godrej  Boyce  &  Manufacture  Factory, at and post Vikhroli, B.S.D. calling on him to appear within two months from the  date  of  receipt  of  this  notice  before  the  Divisional  Forest Officer,  West Thana, to show cause why the  accompanying notification (hereinafter referred to as  “the  notification”)  should  not  be  made  by  the  Government of Bombay under sub-section (1) of the  said section 35 in respect of the forest specified in  the Schedule hereto appended and belonging to him.

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2.  If  the  said  The  Manager,  Godrej  Boyce  and  Manufacture Factory, at and post Vikhroli, B.S.D., fails  to comply with this notice, it shall be assumed that  the  said  The  Manager,  Godrej  Boyce  and  Manufacture Factory, at and post Vikhroli, B.S.D., has  no objection to the making of the notification.

3. I further require that for a period of six months or  till  the  date  of  the  making  of  the  notification,  whichever is  earlier,  the said The Manager,  Godrej  Boyce and Manufacture Factory, at and post Vikhroli,  B.S.D. and all  persons who are entitled or permitted  to do,  therein,  any or all  of  the things specified in  clause (1) of sub-section (1) of the said section 35,  whether by reason of any right,  title or  interest or  under any licence or contract, or otherwise, shall not  after the date of  this  notice,  and for the period or  until the date aforesaid, as the case may be, do any  of the following things specified in clause (1) of sub- section (1) of the said section 35, namely :- (a) the cutting and removal of trees and timber (b) the firing and clearing of the vegetation.

Schedule      District Thana, taluka Salsette, village Vikhroli S.No.118;  area,  63  acres  23  gunthas,  Boundaries:-  North-Boundary of Pavai;  East-Boundary of Haralayi;  South-S.No.117; West-Boundary of Ghatkopur. S.No.117; area,  36 acres,  35 gunthas,  Boundaries:-  North-S.No.118;  East-S.No.120;  South-S.No.112;  West-Boundary of Ghatkopur. S.No.120; area,  33 acres,  13 gunthas.  Boundaries:-  North-Boundary of Haralayi;  East-Agra Road; South- S.No.115; West-S.Nos.116, 117.”

Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975

20. Sometime  in  1975  the  State  Legislature  passed  the  

Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. The Private  

Forests  Act  came into  force  on  30th August  1975  when  it  was  

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published  in  the  Official  Gazette.  We  are  concerned  with  the  

definition of “forest” and “private forest” as contained in Section  

2(c-i)  and  Section  2(f)  respectively  in  the  Private  Forests  Act.  

These definitions read as follows:

“2(c-i) "forest" means a tract of land covered with trees (whether standing, felled,  found  or  otherwise),  shrubs,  bushes,  or  woody  vegetation,  whether  of  natural  growth  or  planted  by  human  agency  and  existing  or  being  maintained  with  or  without human effort, or such tract of land on which such growth is likely to have an  effect  on  the  supply  of  timber,  fuel,  forest  produce,  or  grazing  facilities,  or  on  climate, stream flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such matters and  includes,--

(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;

(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was lying  within a forest on the 30th day of August 1975;

(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable or non-cultivable land, lying within  or linked to a forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State Government;

(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture or for any purposes ancillary  thereto;

(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise;”

“2(f) "private forest" means any forest which is not the property of Government and  includes,--

(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under section 34A of  the Forest Act;

(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued under sub-section (1) of  section 35 of the Forest Act, is in force immediately before the appointed day;

(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under sub-section (3) of  section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding two hectares in  extent as the Collector may specify in this behalf;

(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued under section 38 of the  Forest Act;

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(v) in a case where the State Government and any other person are jointly  interested in the forest, the interest of such person in such forest;

(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be  necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and lands appurtenant  thereto;”

21. We are  also  concerned  with  Section  3  (vesting  of  private  

forests  in  State  Government),  Section  5  (power  to  take  over  

possession  of  private  forests)  and  Section  6  (settlement  of  

disputes)  of  the  Private  Forests  Act.  These  provisions  read  as  

follows:

“Section 3 - Vesting of private Forests in State  Government

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law  for  the  time  being  in  force  or  in  any  settlement,  grant,  agreement,  usage, custom or any decree or  order of any Court, Tribunal or authority or any other  document,  with  effect  on  and  from  the  appointed  day,  all  private  forests  in  the  State  shall  stand  acquired and vest,  free from all  encumbrances,  in,  and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over  the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the  State Government, and all rights, title and interest of  the  owner  or  any  person  other  than  Government  subsisting in any such forest on the said day shall be  deemed to have been extinguished.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply  to  so  much  extent  of  land  comprised  in  a  private  forest  as  in  held  by an occupant  or  tenant  and is  lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day and  is  not  in  excess  of  the  ceiling  area  provided  by  section  5  of  the  Maharashtra  Agricultural  Lands  (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Mah. XXVII of 1061),  

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for  the  time  being  in  force  or  any  building  or  structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto.

(3) All private forests vested in the State Government  under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved  forests within the meaning of the Forest Act.”

“Section 5 - Power to take over possession of  private forests

Where any private forest stands acquired and vested  in the State Government under the provisions of this  Act, the person authorised by the State Government  or by the Collector in this behalf, shall enter into and  take  over  possession  thereof,  and  if  any  person  resists the taking over of such possession, he shall  without  prejudice  to  any  other  action  to  which  he  may be liable, be liable to be removed by the use or  such force as may be necessary.”

“Section 6 - Settlement of disputes

Where any question arises as to whether or not any  forest  is  a  private  forest,  or  whether  or  not  any  private  forest  or  portion  thereof  has  vested  in  the  State  Government  or  whether  or  not  any  dwelling  house constructed in a forest stands acquired under  this Act, the Collector shall decide the question, and  the  decision  of  the  Collector  shall,  subject  to  the  decision  of  the  Tribunal  in  appeal  which  may  be  preferred to the Tribunal within sixty days from the  date of the decision of the Collector, or the order of  the State Government under section 18, be final.”

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22. Finally, it may be mentioned that by Section 24 of the Private  

Forests  Act,  Sections  34A,  35  and  36A of  the  Forest  Act  were  

repealed.11

23. The narrative of the events discloses that Notice No. WT/53  

after  its  publication  in  the  Gazette  was  not  acted  upon  either  

under the provisions of the Forest Act as amended from time to  

time or under the Private Forests Act.  Admittedly, no attempt was  

made by the State to take over possession of the disputed land at  

any point of time.  On the contrary permissions were granted to  

Godrej from time to time for the construction of buildings on the  

disputed land, which permissions were availed of by Godrej for  

the benefit of thousands of its employees.

Judgment in the case of Waghmare

11

Section 24 - Repeal of sections 34A to 37 of Forest Act (1) On and from the appointed day, sections 34A, 35, 36, 36A, 36B, 36C and 37 of the  

Forest Act shall stand repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), on and from the date of  

commencement of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)  (Amendment)  Act,  1978  (Mah. XIV of 1978), sections 34A, 35, 36, 36A, 36B, 36C and 37 of the Forest Act, shall, in  respect of the lands restored under section 22A, be deemed to have been reenacted in the  same form and be deemed always to have been in force and applicable in respect of such  lands, as if they had not been repealed.

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24. The  constitutional  validity  of  the  Private  Forests  Act  

(including Section 3 thereof) was challenged in the Bombay High  

Court  on  the  ground  of  legislative  competence  of  the  State  

Legislature  to  enact  the  statute.  This  issue  was  referred  to  a  

Bench  of  five  Judges  and  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  is  

reported  as  Janu  Chandra  Waghmare v. State  of  

Maharashtra.12 During  the  course  of  hearing,  the  Bench  also  

considered as to “what is it that the State legislature has intended  

to include in the expression ‘forest produce’ for the purpose of  

vesting the same in the State Government under -

Section 3 of  the Act.”  While answering this  question,  the High  

Court felt it necessary to “consider the true effect of the artificial  

definitions  of  the  two  expressions  ‘forest’  and  ‘private  forest’  

given in Section 2(c-i) and Section 2(f) read with Section 3 of the  

impugned Act”.  

25. In doing so, the High Court held that a land owner who had  

been issued a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act (but  

was not heard) has an opportunity to contend that his or her land  12

AIR 1978 Bombay 119

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is not a ‘forest’ within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private  

Forests Act and that the land does not vest automatically in the  

State  by  virtue  of  Section  3  of  the  Private  Forests  Act.  This  

position  was  not  contested,  but  conceded  by  learned  counsel  

appearing for the State of Maharashtra in the High Court.  

26. The  High  Court  held  in  paragraph  30  of  the  Report  as  

follows:-

“It is thus clear that Sub-clauses (i), (ii)  and (iv) of  Section  2(f)  deal  with  declared,  adjudicated  or  admitted  instances  of  forests.  Sub-clause  (iii)  of  Section 2(f) no doubt seeks to cover land in respect  of  which  merely  a  notice  has  been  issued  to  the  owner of a private forest under Section 35(3) and his  objections may have remained unheard till 30-8-1975  as Section 35 has stood repealed on the coming into  force of the Acquisition Act. Here also, as in the case  of  owners  of  land  falling  under  Sub-clause  (iii)  of  Section  2(c-i),  his  objections,  if  any,  including  his  objection that his land cannot be styled as forest at  all can be heard and disposed of under Section 6 of  the Acquisition Act, and this position was conceded  by Counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra.  Sub-clause  (v)  includes  within  the  definition  of  private  forest  the  interest  of  another  person  who  along  with  Government  is  jointly  interested  in  a  forest, while Sub-clause (vi) includes sites of dwelling  houses  constructed  in  such  forest  which  are  considered  to  be  necessary  for  the  convenient  enjoyment  or  use  of  forest  and  lands  appurtenant  thereto.”

It was further held in paragraph 32 of the Report as follows:

“In the first place, the scheme [of the Private Forests  Act]  clearly  shows that  under Section 3  all  private  

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forests vest in the State Government and since both  the expressions - 'forest' as well as 'private forest' -  have been defined in the Act what vests in the State  Government is 'private forest' as per Section 2(f) and  in  order  to  be 'private forest'  under  Section  2(f)  it  must  be  'forest'  under  Section  2(c-i)  in  the  first  instance and read in this manner the expression 'all  the private forests' occurring in Section 3 will include  'forest  produce.'  It  is  not  possible  to  accept  the  argument  that  the  word  'forest'  occurring  in  the  composite expression 'private forest'  should not be  given the meaning which has been assigned to it in  Section 2(c-i)…………….. Definitions in Interpretation  Clauses may have no context (though this may not  be true of all definitions) but therefore, all the more  reason,  why  the  word  'forest'  in  the  composite  expression 'forest-produce' in Section 2(f) should be  given the meaning assigned to  it  in  Section 2(c-i).  Moreover,  as  stated  earlier,  the  scheme  itself  suggests that what vests in the State under Section 3  are  private  forests  as  defined  by  Section  2(f)  but  such  private  forests  must  in  the  first  instance  be  'forests' as defined by Section 2(c-i) and read in that  manner the forest produce would vest in the State  Government  along  with  the  private  forest  under  Section 3 of the Act.”

27. The view of the High Court has been accepted by the State  

of  Maharashtra  and  has  not  been  challenged  and  has  now  

attained finality.     

28. It is important to note that the High Court was not concerned  

with, nor did it advert to the right of a land owner to object to the  

notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act before the Private  

Forests Act came into force on the ground that his land was not a  

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forest as defined in or notified under Section 34A of the Forest  

Act.  This will be dealt with below.

Judgment in the case of Chintamani Velkar 29. The right to file objections to a notice under Section 35(3) of  

the  Forest  Act  came  up  for  consideration  in  Chintamani  

Gajanan  Velkar v.  State  of  Maharashtra.13  In  that  case,  

Chintamani was issued a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest  

Act on 29th August 1975.  The notice was served on him on 12th  

September 1975.  In the meanwhile, the Private Forests Act came  

into  force  on  30th August  1975.   Chintamani  raised  a  dispute  

under  Section  6  of  the  Private  Forests  Act  (as  postulated  in  

Waghmare) contending that his land was not a forest and did not  

vest in the State in terms of Section 3 of the Private Forests Act.  

30. The only question that arose for consideration was whether  

or not Chintamani’s land was a forest within the meaning of that  

word as defined in Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act.  That  

issue  had  already  been  decided,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  by  the  

Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against Chintamani and it was held  

13

(2000) 3 SCC 143

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that his land was a forest. The matter ought to have rested there.  

However, this Court went into a further question, namely, whether  

the mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest  

Act  per  se  attracted Section 2(f)(iii)  of  the Private Forests  Act.  

This Court noticed (in paragraph 18 of the Report) that where a  

final notification is issued under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act  

(obviously  after  hearing  the  objections  of  the  land  owner  in  

compliance with the requirements of Section 35(3) thereof), the  

entire  land  of  the  land  owner  would  automatically  vest  in  the  

State on the appointed date, that is, 30th August 1975 when the  

Private Forests Act came into force. In such a case, the land owner  

would,  ex  hypothesi have  an  opportunity  of  showing  in  the  

objections  to  the  Section  35(3)  notice  that  the  land  is  not  a  

‘forest’ as defined under Section 34A of the Forest Act.  If the land  

owner succeeded in so showing, then clearly a final notification  

under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act could not be issued. But if  

the land owner did not succeed in so showing, only then could a  

final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act be issued. It  

must be recalled, at this stage, that the words “or land” under  

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Section 35(3) of the Forest Act had been deleted by the Indian  

Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 being Bombay Act No.62  

of  1948  and,  additionally  therefore,  such  an  objection  could  

validly have been raised.

31. Consequently,  the  situation  that  presented  itself  in  

Chintamani was that  though a notice was issued to  the land  

owner under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act before 30 th August  

1975, it could not be decided before that date when the Private  

Forests Act came into force. (Such a notice was referred to as a  

‘pipeline notice’ by Mr. F.S. Nariman).  Clearly, the recipient of a  

pipeline notice would be entitled to the benefit of Waghmare but  

this seems to have been overlooked by this Court in Chintamani.  

However, to mitigate the hardship to a pipeline noticee who is not  

given the benefit of Waghmare this Court read Section 2(f)(iii) of  

the Private Forests Act and observed (perhaps as a sop to the land  

owner) that the “Maharashtra Legislature thought that the entire  

property covered by the notice in the State need not vest but  it  

excluded 2 hectares out of the forest land held by the landholder.  

That  was  the  consideration  for  not  allowing  the  benefit  of  an  

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inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not allowing the notification to  

be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act”.

32. It is in this background that this Court narrowly construed the  

words “a notice has been issued under sub-section (3) of section  

35 of the Forest Act” occurring in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private  

Forests Act as not requiring “service of such notice before 30-8-

1975,  nor  for  an  inquiry  nor  for  a  notification  under  Section  

35(1).”14

33. In a sense, therefore, not only is there a difference of views  

between Waghmare and Chintamani but Chintamani has gone  

much further in taking away the right of a landholder.  

Proceedings in the High Court 34. On or about 24th May 2006, Godrej received six stop-work  

notices  issued  by  the  concerned  Assistant  Engineer  of  the  

Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  stating  that  the  Deputy  

Conservator of Forests, Thane Forest Division, by a letter dated 8th  

May 2006 had informed that the disputed land was “affected” by  

the reservation of a private forest and therefore no construction  

14

Paragraph 19 of Chintamani

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could be carried out therein without the permission of the Central  

Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

35. On enquiries made by Godrej subsequent to the receipt of  

the stop-work notices, it came to be known that the Bombay High  

Court had given a direction on 22nd June 2005 in PIL No. 17/2002  

(Bombay  Environment  Action  Group  v. State  of  

Maharashtra) on the claim of the petitioner therein that in the  

entire State of Maharashtra the land records were incomplete and  

a  large number  of  problems were encountered because of  not  

updating the land records which in any event is also an obligation  

on  the  State.   Accordingly,  the  High  Court  gave  a  direction  

granting time to the State of Maharashtra up to 31st May 2006 to  

complete the entire land records in the State and further directed  

that quarterly reports regarding the progress of the work be filed  

before the Registrar General of the High Court.   

36. Godrej learnt that this triggered an ex parte mutation of the  

revenue records by the State to show that the disputed land was  

‘affected’ by the provisions of the Private Forest Act. Godrej also  

learnt that the Notice No. WT/53 (referred to above) had been  

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published in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6th September  

1956, but not served on it.  

37. On these broad facts, Godrej filed Writ Petition No. 2196 of  

2006  in  the  Bombay  High  Court  praying,  inter  alia,  for  a  

declaration that the lands owned by it in village Vikhroli are not  

forest  land;  that  the  letter  dated  8th May  2006  issued  by  the  

Deputy  Conservator  of  Forest  as  well  as  six  stop-work  notices  

dated 24th May 2006 be declared as illegal, ab initio null and void  

and that the mutation in the revenue records be also declared  

illegal.   

38. During  the  proceedings  in  the  High  Court  it  came  to  be  

known that about 170 notices similar  to  notice No.  WT/53 had  

been  issued  to  various  parties  in  1956-57,  including  to  the  

Bhabha  Atomic  Energy  Complex  and  the  Employees  State  

Insurance Scheme Hospital. However, the lands of Bhabha Atomic  

Energy  Complex  and  the  Employees  State  Insurance  Scheme  

Hospital were not touched by the State.

39. The  writ  petition  (along  with  several  other  similar  writ  

petitions) was contested by the State and it was submitted inter  

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alia that in view of the judgment of this Court in Chintamani, the  

disputed land stood vested in the State in terms of Section 3 of  

the Private Forests Act.  By the impugned order dated 24 th March  

2008, the High Court dismissed all the writ petitions. Among other  

things, it was held in paragraph 152 of the impugned judgment:   

“In the light of the authoritative pronouncement in  Chintamani's  case  we  see  no  substance  in  the  argument that the construction activities on the land  being in accordance with the sanctioned plans and  approvals  so  also  the  lands  being  part  of  the  development  plan  and  affected  by  Urban  Land  Ceiling  Act,  State's  action  impugned  in  these  petitions  is  without  any  jurisdiction  or  authority  in  law. All arguments with regard to the user of the land  today  has  no  legal  basis.  User  today  is  after  development  or  continuing  development.  Once  development  is  on  private  forest,  then,  the  same  could not have been permitted or carried out. Mere  omission or inaction of the State Government cannot  be  the  basis  for  accepting  the  arguments  of  the  petitioners.”

40. The High Court rejected the contention that “mere issuance  

of  a  notice  under  Section  35(3)  without  any  notification  being  

published in  the official  gazette  within  the meaning of  Section  

35(1) would not mean that the land is excluded from the purview  

of the Private Forest (Acquisition) Act enacted by the Maharashtra  

Government.”15  15

Paragraph 123

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It was also held that:

“Once  the  State  Government  issues  such  notice  [under  Section  35(3)  of  the  Forest  Act],  then,  the  intention is apparent. The intention is to regulate and  prohibit  certain  activities  in  forest.  Merely  because  such a notice is issued by it in 1957 and 1958 but it  did not take necessary steps in furtherance thereof,  does  not  mean  that  the  notices  have  been  abandoned as contended by the petitioners. There is  no concept of "abandonment or disuse" in such case.  Apart from the fact that these concepts could not be  imported in a modern statute, we are of the view that  they cannot be imported and read into statute of the  present  nature.  Statutes  which  are  meant  for  protecting and preserving forests and achieve larger  public  interest,  cannot  be  construed  narrowly  as  contended.  The  interpretation,  therefore,  if  at  all  there is any ambiguity or scope for construction has  to be wider and sub-serving this  public  interest so  also  the  intent  and  object  in  enacting  them.  The  reason for the State Government not being able to  pursue the measures for  preserving and protecting  the forest wealth is obvious.”16  

Further, it was held that:  

“The Development Plan proposal and designation so  also the user cannot conflict with the character of the  land as a private forest. To accept the arguments of  the petitioners would mean that despite vesting the  private  forest  continues  as  a  land  covered  by  the  development  plan  and  being  within  the  municipal  limits  it  loses  its  character  as  a  private  forest.  A  private forest is a forest and upon its vesting in the  State  Government  by  virtue  of  the  Private  Forest  (Acquisition) Act would remain as such. Therefore, we  see  no  conflict  because  of  any  change  in  the  

16

Paragraph 126

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Page 34

situation.  Vesting  was  complete  on  30th  August,  1975. On 30th August, 1975 the lands with regard to  which  the  notice  was  issued  under  Section  35(3),  being a private forest vested in the State, it was a  private  forest  always  and,  therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  the  development  plan or  any proposal  therein superimposing itself on its status.”17

41. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petitions in the  

Bombay High Court, Godrej and other aggrieved writ petitioners  

preferred petitions for special leave to appeal in this Court.  

Proceedings in this Court 42. During the pendency of these appeals,  the State filed I.A.  

Nos.  2352-2353  of  2008  in  W.P.  No.  202  of  1995  [T.N.  

Godavarman v. Union of India (Forest Bench matters)] in which  

it was prayed, inter alia, as follows:

(1) The lands coming under the provisions of the  Maharashtra  Private  Forests  (Acquisition)  Act  1975 which were put to non forestry use prior  to  25th October  1980  [when  the  Forest  (Conservation)  Act,1980  came  into  force]  by  way of having been awarded Approval of Plans,  Commencement  Certificates,  IODS  or  Non  Agriculture  Permissions  by  the  Competent  Authorities  be  treated  deleted  from  the  category of forests and the non forestry activity  be allowed on such lands without charging CA,  NPV  or  equivalent  non  forest  land  or  any  charges whatsoever.

17

Paragraph 149

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(2) - (3) The Collectors of all the districts be directed to  

pass appropriate orders under section 6 or 22A  of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)  Act, 1975 either on an application or suo motu  as  provided  for  it  under  the  Act,  for  all  the  pieces of lands coming under the provisions of  the Act under their jurisdiction within 30 days.  

(4) For the lands restored under the Act on which  residential  complexes  have  come  up/are  coming up wherein Non Agriculture Permissions  (N.A.) and buildings were fully constructed and  completion  certificate  and  occupation  certificate  were  issued  by  the  Competent  Authorities after 25th October, 1980 but before  18th May  2006  when  the  “stop  construction  work”  notices  were  issued,  only  afforestation  charges be collected for afforesting equivalent  forest land. Neither equivalent non forest land  nor the Net Present Value be charged to them,  as these areas are their own private lands.”    

Significantly, it was stated in the applications as follows:-

“26. As stated earlier since the records did not reveal  that these are acquired Private Forests the erstwhile  owners  went  on  selling  these  lands  to  several  persons who also in turn went on selling them to the  strangers without there being any fault on their part.  Subsequently developers purchased these lands and  after getting requisite permissions from the Planning  Authority  carried  on  constructions  thereon.  Thereafter  individuals  and  members  of  the  public  who  wanted  accommodation  for  housing  probably  invested their  lifetime savings  and/or  raising loans  entered  into  transactions  of  purchasing  the  flats  constructed  on  these  lands  without  their  fault.   In  some of these areas commercial activities have also  come up with due permission from the Government  authorities.  In such cases, injustice is being alleged  by  the  subsequent  purchasers  who  claimed  to  be  bonafide purchasers.  This has necessitated the State  of  Maharashtra  to  come  out  with  the  present  

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 35 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

Page 36

application.   Abstract  of  constructions  made  on  private forest lands in Mumbai Suburban and Thane  City  makes  it  very  clear  that  the problem is  more  severe  for  the  common  man.   Errors  were  also  committed while declaring the lands as having been  acquired by the Government under the Maharashtra  Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975.  Some of the  lands/properties  owned  by  the  Government  like  Bhabha Atomic Energy complex and Employees State  Insurance Scheme hospital also came to be declared  as  acquired  under  the  Maharashtra  Private  Forest  (Acquisition) Act, 1975.”

43. The  Forest  Bench  referred  the  matter  to  the  Central  

Empowered Committee which, in its Report dated 13th July 2009  

noted in paragraphs 25 and 26 as follows:-

“25. It  is  thus clear that after the issue of  notices  under Section 35(3) or Notification under 35(1) of the  Indian Forest Act, no follow-up action was taken by  the  State  Govt.   Even  after  the  Private  Forest  Act  came into force, neither physical possession of the  land  was  taken  nor  were  the  areas  recorded  as  ‘forest’. A substantial part of such area falls in urban  conglomerations  and  have  been  used  for  various  non-forest  purpose  including  construction  of  buildings for  which permissions have been granted  by  the  concerned  State  Government  authorities.  Sale/purchase and resale have taken place and third  party  interests  have  been  generated.   People  are  residing for last 30-40 years in hundreds of buildings  constructed  with  the  then valid  approvals.   It  was  only after the order dated 26.5.2005 of the Hon’ble  Bombay High Court, that these areas are now being  treated as falling in category of  “forest”.   Many of  such  areas  are  surrounded  all  around  by  other  buildings and within metropolitan areas and are no  longer suitable for afforestation or to be managed as  ‘forest’.   

Civil Appeal Nos.1102 of 2014           Page 36 of 60 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10677 of 2008 etc.)

Page 37

“26.  In  the  above  complex  background,  at  this  belated  stage,  it  is  neither  feasible  nor  in  public  interest to demolish the existing buildings/structures,  re-locate  the  existing  occupants/owners  and  physically convert such area into forest.  The CEC in  these  circumstances  considers  that  the  balance  of  convenience  lies  in  granting  permission  under  the  Forest (Conservation) Act for de-reservation and non- forest use of such area on a graded scale of payment  depending upon the category/sub-category in which  such land falls.”

44. The  Central  Empowered  Committee  made  certain  other  

recommendations as a result of which Godrej paid an amount of  

Rs.14.7 crores towards NPV and this  has been recorded in  the  

order passed by the Forest Bench in its order dated 17th February  

2010.  The relevant extract of the order dated 17th February 2010  

passed by the Forest Bench reads as under:-

“Pursuant to the report filed by the C.E.C. regards the  property  owned  and  possessed  by  the  Godrej  and  Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., a sum of Rs.14,71,98,590/- was  deposited as NPV and the deposit of this amount has  been confirmed by the learned counsel appearing for  the State.  

We  have  passed  an  interim  order  of  status  quo  restraining the petitioners from further construction  on the lands and also not to create third party rights.  That interim order is vacated.  The petitioners are at  liberty to go on with the construction and complete  it.  The direction of not to create third party rights is  also  vacated.  This  order  is  subject  to  the order,  if  any, to be passed by MOEF in this regard and also  subject to the final outcome of this matter.  

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Page 38

Learned counsel for the petitioner states that he will  not claim any refund of the amount so deposited. ”    

45. When the present set of appeals came up for hearing before  

this Court on 9th February 2011, the correctness of Chintamani  

was  doubted  by  learned  counsel  on  the  question  whether  the  

word “issued” as occurring in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest  

Act in the context of “any land in respect of which a notice has  

been issued under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Forest Act”  

should be interpreted literally or whether it postulates service of  

notice  on  the  landholder.  It  is  under  these  circumstances  that  

these appeals were listed before us.

The primary question 46. The initial question is whether the disputed land is at all a  

forest within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests  

Act.

47. It  is  quite  clear  from  a  reading  of  Waghmare that  the  

“means and includes” definition of forest in Section 2(c-i) of the  

Private  Forests  Act  does  not  detract  or  take  away  from  the  

primary meaning of the word ‘forest’.  We are in agreement with  

this view.

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Page 39

48. In Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar18 the interpretation of the  

word “owner” in Section 2(d) of the Bihar Taxation on Passengers  

and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961  

came  up  for  consideration.  While  interpreting  “owner”  which  

‘means’ and ‘includes’, this Court held:

“The definition of the term “owner” is exhaustive and  intended  to  extend  the  meaning  of  the  term  by  including within its  sweep bailee of  a public  carrier  vehicle or any manager acting on behalf of the owner.  The intention of the legislature to extend the meaning  of  the  term  by  the  definition  given  by  it  will  be  frustrated  if  what  is  intended  to  be  inclusive  is  interpreted to exclude the actual owner.”

49. The  proposition  was  more  clearly  articulated  in  Black  

Diamond Beverages v. Commercial Tax Officer19 wherein this  

Court considered the use of the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ in  

the definition of “sale price” in Section 2(d) of the W.B. Sales Tax  

Act, 1954. It was held in paragraph 7 of the Report:

“The first part of the definition defines the  meaning  of the word “sale price” and must, in our view, be  given its ordinary, popular or natural meaning. The  interpretation  thereof  is  in  no  way  controlled  or  

18

(1976) 2 SCC 942

19

(1998) 1 SCC 458

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Page 40

affected by the second part which “includes” certain  other things in the definition.  This  is  a well-settled  principle of construction.”

50. In coming to this conclusion, this Court referred to a passage  

from  Craies  on  Statute  Law20 which  in  turn  referred  to  the  

following  passage  from  Robinson v.  Barton-Eccles  Local  

Board21:

“An interpretation clause of this kind is not meant to  prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular, and  natural  sense  whenever  that  would  be  properly  applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act  … to be applied to something to which it would not  ordinarily be applicable.”

51. In  the  case  of  Godrej,  the  admitted  position,  as  per  the  

consent decree dated 8th January 1962 is that the disputed land  

was not a waste land nor was it a forest. In so far as the other  

appeals are concerned, the disputed lands were built upon, from  

time  to  time,  either  for  industrial  purposes  or  for  commercial  

purposes or for residential purposes.  Under the circumstances, by  

no stretch of imagination can it be said that any of these disputed  

20

7th Edition 1.214

21

(1883) 8 AC 798

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Page 41

lands are ‘forest’  within  the  primary meaning of  that  word,  or  

even within the extended meaning given in Section 2(c-i) of the  

Private Forests Act.

52. The next question is whether the notice said to have been  

issued to Godrej being Notice No. WT/53 can be described as a  

‘pipeline notice’.  Again, the answer must be in the negative in as  

much as it cannot be reasonably said that the pipeline extends  

from 1956-57 up to 1975.  Assuming that a notice issued in 1956-

57 is a pipeline notice even in 1975, the question before us would,  

nevertheless,  relate  to  the  meaning and impact  of  “issued”  of  

Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act read with Section 35 of  

the Forest Act.  This is really the meat of the matter.     

53. Undoubtedly, the first rule of interpretation is that the words  

in a statute must be interpreted literally. But at the same time if  

the context in which a word is used and the provisions of a statute  

inexorably suggest a subtext other than literal, then the context  

becomes important.  

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Page 42

54. In  R.L.  Arora v.  State of U.P.22 it  was observed that  “a  

literal  interpretation  is  not  always  the  only  interpretation  of  a  

provision in a statute and the court has to look at the setting in  

which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law  

came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit  

behind the words actually  used which would control  the literal  

meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute.”  

Similarly, in  Tata Engg. & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State  

of Bihar23 it was held:

“The  method  suggested  for  adoption,  in  cases  of  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words  used  is  to  explore the intention of  the legislature through the  words,  the  context  which  gives  the  colour,  the  context,  the  subject-matter,  the  effects  and  consequences or the spirit and reason of the law. The  general words and collocation or phrases, howsoever  wide  or  comprehensive  in  their  literal  sense  are  interpreted from the context and scheme underlying  in the text of the Act.”

22

(1964) 6 SCR 784

23

(2000) 5 SCC 346

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Finally,  in  Joginder Pal  v.  Naval  Kishore Behal24 it  was  

held:

“It  is  true  that  ordinary  rule  of  construction  is  to  assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries.  But  the  subject  of  legislation  and  the  context  in  which a word or expression is employed may require  a departure from the rule of literal construction.”  

55. Applying the law laid down by this Court on interpretation, in  

the context of these appeals, we may be missing the wood for the  

trees if a literal meaning is given to the word “issued”. To avoid  

this, it is necessary to also appreciate the scheme of Section 35 of  

the Forest Act since that scheme needs to be kept in mind while  

considering “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.

56. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to  give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why,  inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in  respect of that forest. It is important to note that such a notice  pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner of the forest is  expected to file objections within a reasonable time as specified in  the notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in  support of the objections. After these basic requirements are met,  the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the objections.  This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State  and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the  

24

(2002) 5 SCC 397

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notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under Section 35(3)  of  the Forest  Act  is  inherent in  the very language used in  the  provision and the very purpose of the provision.  

57. Additionally, Section 35(4) of the Forest Act provides that a  notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act may provide that for  a period not exceeding six months (extended to one year in 1961)  the owner of the forest can be obliged to adhere to one or more of  the  regulatory  or  prohibitory  measures  mentioned  in  Section  35(1) of the Forest Act. On the failure of the owner of the forest to  abide by the said measures, he/she is liable to imprisonment for a  term upto six months and/or a fine under Section 35(7) of the  Forest Act. Surely, given the penal consequence of non-adherence  to a Section 35(4) direction in a Section 35(3) notice, service of  such a notice must be interpreted to be mandatory. On the facts  of  the  case  in  Godrej,  such  a  direction  was  in  fact  given  and  Godrej was directed, for a period of six months, to refrain from the  cutting  and  removal  of  trees  and  timber  and  the  firing  and  clearing  of  vegetation.  Strictly  speaking,  therefore,  despite  not  being  served  with  Notice  No.  WT/53  and  despite  having  no  knowledge of it, Godrej was liable to be punished under Section  35(7) of the Forest Act if it cut or removed any tree or timber or  fired or cleared any vegetation.    

58. This interplay may be looked at from another point of view,  namely, the need to issue a direction under Section 35(4) of the  Forest Act, which can be only to prevent damage to or destruction  of a forest. If the notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is  not served on the owner of the forest, he/she may continue to  damage the forest defeating the very purpose of the Forest Act.  Such an interpretation cannot be given to Section 35 of the Forest  Act nor can a limited interpretation be given to the word “issued”  used in the context of Section 35 of the Forest Act in Section 2(f) (iii) of the Private Forests Act.   

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Page 45

59. Finally,  Section 35(5) of the Forest Act mandates not only  service of a notice issued under that provision “in the manner  provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the service of  summons” (a manner that we are all  familiar with) but also its  publication  “in  the  manner  prescribed  by  rules”.  This  double  pronged receipt and confirmation of knowledge of the show cause  notice by the owner of a forest makes it clear that Section 35(3)  of the Forest Act is not intended to end the process with the mere  issuance of a notice but it also requires service of a notice on the  owner of the forest. The need for ensuring service is clearly to  protect the interests of the owner of the forest who may have  valid reasons not only to object to the issuance of regulatory or  prohibitory  directions,  but  to  also  enable  him/her  to  raise  a  jurisdictional  issue  that  the  land  in  question  is  actually  not  a  forest. The need for ensuring service is also to prevent damage to  or destruction of a forest.  

60.   Unfortunately,  Chintamani  missed  these  finer  details  because it was perhaps not brought to the notice of this Court  that Section 35 of the Forest Act as applicable to the State of  Maharashtra had sub-sections beyond sub-section (3). This Court  proceeded on the basis of Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act,  1927 as it existed without being aware of the amendments made  by the State of Maharashtra and the erstwhile State of Bombay.  This, coupled with the factually incorrect view that two hectares of  forest land25 were excluded for the benefit of the landholder led  this Court to give a restrictive meaning to “issue”.  

61. In Chintamani this Court relied on the decision rendered in  CIT v. Bababhai Pitamberdas (HUF)26 to conclude that a word  has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a statute  25

The correct factual position is that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act excluded   “an area not exceeding two hectares”.  

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Page 46

and that, therefore, the decisions rendered in  Banarsi Debi v.  ITO27 and CWT v. Kundan Lal Behari Lal28 to the effect that “the  word ‘issue’ has been construed as amounting to ‘service’ are not  relevant for interpreting the word ‘issued’ used in Section 2(f) [of  the Private Forests  Act].”  It  is  true,  as observed above,  that  a  word has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a  statute. By making a reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private  Forests Act to ‘issue’ in Section 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that  the word is dressed in borrowed robes. Once that is appreciated  (and it was unfortunately overlooked in  Chintamani) then it is  quite clear that ‘issued’ in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests  Act must include service of the show cause notice as postulated in  Section 35 of the Forest Act.  

62. We have no option, under these circumstances, but to hold  that to this extent, Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is  overruled to this extent.  We may add that in  Chintamani  the  land in  question  was  factually  held  to  be a  private forest  and  therefore the subsequent discussion was not at all necessary.  

63. Assuming that the word ‘issued’ as occurring in Section 2(f) (iii)  of  the  Private  Forests  Act  must  be  literally  and  strictly  construed, can it be seriously argued that it also has reference to  a show cause notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act  at any given time (say in 1927 or in 1957)? Or would it be more  

26

1993 Supp (3) SCC 530

27

(1964) 7 SCR 539

28

(1975) 4 SCC 844

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reasonable to hold that it has reference to a show cause notice  issued in somewhat closer proximity to the coming into force of  the Private Forests Act, or a ‘pipeline notice’ as Mr. Nariman puts  it?

64. In the absence of any time period having been specified for  deciding  a  show  cause  notice  issued  under  Section  35  of  the  Forest Act, it must be presumed that it must be decided within a  reasonable time. Quite recently, in Ramlila Maidan Incident, In  re29 it was held: “It is a settled rule of law that wherever provision  of a statute does not provide for a specific time, the same has to  be done within a reasonable time. Again reasonable time cannot  have  a  fixed  connotation.  It  must  depend  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances of a given case.”  

65. Similarly, in  Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak30 it  was held: “But  when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be  exercised  in  a  reasonable  manner.  Exercise  of  power  in  a  reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a  reasonable time.”

So also, in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb  

Tukaram Shevale31 it was held:  

29

(2012) 5 SCC 1 paragraph 232

30

(1984) 1 SCC 125

31

(2009) 9 SCC 352

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“It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does  not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional  power,  it  does  not  mean  that  such  power  can  be  exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised  within a reasonable time.  It  is  so because the law  does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after  a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not  provide for any length of time within which the power  of revision is to be exercised by the authority,  suo  motu or otherwise, it  is  plain that exercise of such  power within reasonable time is inherent therein.”

66. According to the State, a show cause notice was issued to  

Godrej in 1957 (and assuming it was served) but no decision was  

taken  thereon  till  1975  that  is  for  about  18  years.  This  is  an  

unusually  long  period  and  undoubtedly  much  more  than  a  

reasonable  time had  elapsed  for  enabling  the  State  to  take  a  

decision on the show cause notice. Therefore, following the law  

laid  down  by  this  Court,  the  show  cause  notice  must,  for  all  

intents and purposes be treated as having become a dead letter  

and the seed planted by the State yielded nothing.  

67. The  entire  problem  may  also  be  looked  at  from  the  

perspective of the citizen rather than only from the perspective of  

the State. No citizen can reasonably be told after almost half a  

century that he/she was issued a show cause notice (which was  

probably not served) and based on the show cause notice his/her  

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land was declared a private forest about three decades ago and  

that it vests in the State. Is it not the responsibility of the State to  

ensure that its  laws are implemented with reasonable dispatch  

and is it not the duty of the State to appreciate that statute books  

are not meant to be thrown at a citizen whenever and wherever  

some  official  decides  to  do  so?  Basic  principles  of  good  

governance must be followed by every member of the Executive  

branch of the State at all times keeping the interests of all citizens  

in mind as also the larger public interest.

68. In our opinion, the failure of the State to take any decision on  

the  show  cause  notice  for  several  decades  (assuming  it  was  

served on Godrej) is indicative of its desire to not act on it. This  

opinion is fortified by a series of events that have taken place  

between 1957 and 2006, beginning with the consent decree of 8th  

January 1962 in Suit No. 413 of 1953 whereby the disputed land  

was recognized as not being forest land; permission to construct a  

large number of buildings (both residential and otherwise) as per  

the Development Plans of  1967 and then of  1991;  exemptions  

granted  by  the  Competent  Authority  under  the  Urban  Land  

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(Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976  leading  to  Godrej  making  

unhindered  but  permissible  constructions;  and  finally,  the  

absence of any attempt by the State to take possession of the  

‘forest land’ under Section 5 of the Private Forests Act for a couple  

of  decades.  The  subsequent  event  of  the  State  moving  an  

application in  Godavarman virtually denying the existence of a  

private forest on the disputed land also indicates that the State  

had come to terms with reality and was grudgingly prepared to  

accept  that,  even if  the law permitted,  it  was now too late  to  

remedy the situation.  This view was emphatically reiterated by  

the Central  Empowered Committee in its  report dated 13th July  

2009.

69. In its written submissions, the Bombay Environment Action  

Group has alleged collusion between Godrej and other appellants  

and the State of Maharashtra to defeat the purpose of the Private  

Forests Act. It is stated that prior to the said Act coming into force,  

the Secretary in the Revenue and Forests Department of the State  

Government  had  written  to  the  Collector  on  27th August  1975  

enclosing a copy of the said Act and informing that under Section  

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5  thereof,  the  Range  Forest  Officers  and  the  Divisional  Forest  

Officers  will  be  authorized  to  take  possession  of  the  private  

forests  from the  land  owners.  It  is  stated  that  the  letter  was  

issued to enable the Collector to coordinate with the Divisional  

Forest Officers to ensure that the large private forests are taken  

over physically as early as -

possible. Subsequently, by another letter (variously described as  

dated  3rd February  1977,  14th February  1977  and  3rd February  

1979)  the  Secretary  in  the  Revenue  and  Forests  Department  

advised the Conservator of Forests to go slow with the taking over  

of possession of private forests in Thane,  Kulaba and Ratnagiri  

districts.  

70. It is difficult at this distant point of time to conclude, one way  

or  the  other,  whether  there  was  or  was  not  any  collusion  (as  

alleged) or whether it was simply a case of poor governance by  

the State. The fact remains that possession of the disputed land  

was not taken over or attempted to be taken over for decades  

and the issue was never raised when it should have been. To raise  

it now after a lapse of so many decades is unfair to Godrej, the  

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other appellants, the institutions, the State and the residents of  

the tenements that have been constructed in the meanwhile.  

71. Given this factual scenario, we agree that Section 2(f)(iii) of  

the Private Forests Act is not intended to apply to notices that had  

passed their  shelf-life  and that  only ‘pipeline notices’  issued in  

reasonably close proximity to the coming into force of the Private  

Forests Act were ‘live’ and could be acted upon.  

72. In  Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur  

Chenai32 this  Court  dealt  with  the  provisions  of  the  Land  

Acquisition  Act  and  held  that  the  legislation  being  an  

expropriatory legislation, it ought to be strictly construed since it  

deprives a person of his/her land. In this decision, reliance was  

placed on State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma33 and Khub  

Chand v. State of Rajasthan.34 The same rationale would apply  

32

(2005) 7 SCC 627

33

(1966) 3 SCR 557

34

(1967) 1 SCR 120

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to Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act since it seeks to take  

away, after a few decades, private land on the ostensible ground  

that it is a private forest. Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act  

must not only be reasonably construed but also strictly so as not  

to discomfit a citizen and expropriate his/her property.

73. The fact that the Private Forests Act repealed some sections  

of the Forest Act, particularly Sections 34A and 35 thereof is also  

significant.  Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act is in a sense  

a saving clause for pipeline notices issued under Section 35(3) of  

the Forest Act but which could not, for want of adequate time be  

either withdrawn or culminate in the issuance of a regulatory or  

prohibitory final notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act,  

depending on the objections raised by the land owner. Looked at  

from any point of view, it does seem clear that Section 2(f)(iii) of  

the Private Forests Act was intended to apply to ‘live’  and not  

stale notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act.

The second question:  74. The next question is whether at all the unstated decision of  

the  State  to  take  over  the  so-called  forest  land  can  be  

successfully  implemented.  What  the  decision  implies  is  the  

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demolition,  amongst  others,  of  a  large  number  of  residential  

buildings,  industrial  buildings,  commercial  buildings,  Bhabha  

Atomic  Energy  Complex  and  the  Employees  State  Insurance  

Scheme Hospital and compulsorily rendering homeless thousands  

of  families,  some  of  whom  may  have  invested  considerable  

savings in the disputed lands. What it also implies is demolition of  

the  municipal  and  other  public  infrastructure  works  already  

undertaken  and  in  use,  clearing  away  the  rubble  and  then  

planting trees and shrubs to ‘restore’ the ‘forest’ to an acceptable  

condition. According to learned counsel for the State, this is easily  

achievable.   But  it  is  easier  said  than  done.  According  to  the  

Bombay Environment Action Group a patent, incurable illegality  

has been committed and the natural consequences (demolition)  

must  follow.   Reliance was placed,  inter  alia,  on  K. Ramadas  

Shenoy v. Chief Officer35,  M.I.  Builders v.  Radhey Shyam  

Sahu36,  Pleasant  Stay  Hotel  v.  Palani  Hills  Conservation  

35

 (1974) 2 SCC 506

36

(1996) 6 SCC 464

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Council37 and Pratibha Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State  

of Maharashtra38  to suggest that no party should be allowed to  

take the benefit or advantage of their own wrong and a patent  

illegality cannot be cured.

75. The broad principle laid down by this Court is not in doubt.  

An unauthorized construction, unless compoundable in law, must  

be  razed.  In  question  are  the  circumstances  leading  to  the  

application of the principle and the practical  application of the  

principle.  More  often  than  not,  the  municipal  authorities  and  

builders conspiratorially join hands in  violating the law but the  

victim  is  an  innocent  purchaser  or  investor  who  pays  for  the  

maladministration.  In  such  a  case,  how  is  the  victim  to  be  

compensated or is he or she expected to be the only loser? If the  

victim is to be compensated, who will do so? These issues have  

not  been  discussed  in  the  decisions  cited  by  the  Bombay  

Environment Action Group.  

37

(1995) 6 SCC 127

38

(1991) 3 SCC 341

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76. In  so  far  as  the  practical  application  of  the  principle  is  

concerned,  in  Shenoy  permission  was  granted  to  convert  a  

Kalyana Mantap-cum-Lecture Hall into a cinema hall. A reading of  

the decision suggests that no construction was made and it is not  

clear whether any money was actually spent on the project.  The  

question of compensation, therefore, did not arise.

77.  M.I.  Builders  was  an  extreme  case  in  which  partial  

demolition  was  ordered  since  the  agreement  between  the  

Lucknow  Nagar  Mahapalika  and  the  builder  was  not  only  

unreasonable for the Mahapalika, but atrocious. In paragraph 59  

of the Report, this Court said,

“The  agreement  defies  logic.  It  is  outrageous.  It  crosses all  limits of  rationality.  The Mahapalika has  certainly acted in a fatuous manner in entering into  such an agreement.”

It was further held in paragraph 71 of the Report that,

“The agreement smacks of arbitrariness, unfairness  and  favouritism.  The  agreement  was  opposed  to  public policy. It was not in public interest. The whole  process of law was subverted to benefit the builder.”

78. Pleasant Stay Hotel was a case of deliberately flouting the  

law.  The Hotel was granted sanction for the construction of two  

floors but despite the rejection of its revised plan, it went ahead  

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and constructed seven floors.  This  Court  noted that,  therefore,  

five  floors  had  been  constructed  illegally  and  unauthorisedly.  

Under these circumstances, and subject to certain clarifications,  

the  demolition  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  was  upheld.  

Payment of compensation in a case of knowingly and deliberately  

flouting the law does not arise.

79. In  Pratibha the eight unauthorized floors were constructed  

in  clear  and  flagrant  violation  and  disregard  of  the  FSI.  The  

demolition order had already attained finality in this Court and  

thereafter six of the unauthorized floors had been demolished and  

the  seventh  was  partially  demolished.  This  Court  found  no  

justification to -

interfere with the demolitions.   Again, the issue of compensation  

does not arise in such a situation.

80. The  application  of  the  principle  laid  down  by  this  Court,  

therefore, depends on the independent facts found in a case. The  

remedy of demolition cannot be applied per se with a broad brush  

to all cases.  The State also seems to have realized this and that  

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is perhaps the reason why it moved the application that it did in  

Godavarman.

81. Looking at the issue from point of view of the citizen and not  

only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  State  or  a  well  meaning  

pressure  group,  it  does  appear  that  even  though  the  basic  

principle  is  that  the  buyer  should  beware  and  therefore  if  the  

appellants  and  purchasers  of  tenements  or  commercial  

establishments  from  the  appellants  ought  to  bear  the  

consequences  of  unauthorized  construction,  the  well-settled  

principle  of  caveat  emptor  would  be  applicable  in  normal  

circumstances and not in extraordinary circumstances as these  

appeals present, when a citizen is effectively led up the  garden  

path  for several decades by the State itself.  The  

present appeals  do not  relate to  a stray or a  few instances of  

unauthorized constructions and, therefore, fall in a class of their  

own. In a case such as the present, if a citizen cannot trust the  

State  which  has  given  statutory  permissions  and  provided  

municipal facilities, whom should he or she trust?   

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82. Assuming the disputed land was a private forest, the State  

remained  completely  inactive  when  construction  was  going  on  

over  acres  and  acres  of  land  and  of  a  very  large  number  of  

buildings thereon and for a few decades. The State permitted the  

construction  through  the  development  plans  and  by  granting  

exemption  under  the  Urban Land (Ceiling  and Regulation)  Act,  

1976 and providing necessary  infrastructure  such as  roads  and  

sanitation  on  the disputed land and the surrounding area.  When  

such a large scale activity involving the State is being carried on  

over  vast  stretches  of  land  exceeding  a  hundred  acres,  it  is  

natural for a reasonable citizen to assume that whatever actions  

are being taken are in accordance with law otherwise the State  

would certainly step in to prevent such a massive and prolonged  

breach of the law.  The silence of the State in  all  the appeals  

before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to  

believe that there was no patent illegality in the constructions on  

the disputed land nor was there any legal risk in investing on the  

disputed land.  Under these circumstances, for the State or the  

Bombay  Environment  Action  Group  to  contend  that  only  the  

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citizen  must  bear  the  consequences  of  the  unauthorized  

construction may not be appropriate.  It is the complete inaction  

of the State, rather its active consent that has resulted in several  

citizens being placed in a precarious position where they are now  

told  that  their  investment  is  actually  in  unauthorized  

constructions which are liable to be demolished any time even  

after  several  decades.  There  is  no  reason  why  these  citizens  

should be the only victims of such a fate and the State be held  

not responsible for this state of affairs; nor is there any reason  

why under such circumstances this Court should not come to the  

aid of victims of the culpable failure of the State to implement and  

enforce the law for several decades.

83. In none of these cases is there an allegation that the State  

has acted arbitrarily or irrationally so as to voluntarily benefit any  

of the appellants.  On  the  contrary,  the  facts  show  that the  

appellants  

followed the due legal process in making the constructions that  

they did and all that can be said of the State is that its Rip Van  

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Winkleism enabled the appellants to obtain valid permissions from  

various authorities, from time to time, to make constructions over  

a long duration. The appellants and individual citizens cannot be  

faulted or punished for that.  

84. These appeals raise larger issues of good administration and  

governance and the State has, regrettably, come out in poor light  

in this regard.  It is not necessary for us to say anything more on  

the  subject  except  to  conclude that  even if  the  State were  to  

succeed on the legal issues before us,  there is no way, on the  

facts and circumstances of these appeals, that it can reasonably  

put the clock back and ensure that none of the persons concerned  

in these appeals is prejudiced in any manner whatsoever.

Conclusion:

85. Accordingly,  for  the  reasons  given,  all  these  appeals  are  

allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the Bombay  

High Court is set aside in all of them and the notices impugned in  

the writ petitions in the High Court are quashed.

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Orders in Interlocutory Applications

Civil  Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.25747/2010 and  25748/2010  

86. Delay condoned.

SLP (C) No.34691/2011   

87. Permission  to  file  the  special  leave  petition  is  declined.  

However,  the  petitioner  is  at  liberty  to  take  such  appropriate  

action as is now permissible under the law.

Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10677 of 2008,  10760 of 2008, 11509 of 2008 and 11640 of 2008

88. Applications for impleadment/intervention stand allowed.

Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10760 of 2008  and  11509 of 2008

89. Applications for modification  of  the order dated 5th May,  

2008  

in these appeals and the applications for directions in all  other  

appeals are disposed of in terms of the judgment pronounced.

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...….……………………..J.    (R.M.Lodha)

..….……………………..J.              (Madan B. Lokur)

......……………………..J.               (Kurian Joseph)

New Delhi; January 30, 2014

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