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PETITIONER: GODAVARI PARULEKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1952

BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) BENCH: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1953 AIR   52            1953 SCR  210

ACT: Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention  (Second  Amendment) Act,  1952,  s.  11-A-Whether discriminatory-ValiditY-Constiiution  of India, 1950,  Arts. 14, 22 (7) (b)-"Unless a shorter period is specified in  the order", meaning of.

HEADNOTE: Section 11-A which was inserted in the Preventive  Detention Act  of 1950 by the Preventive Detention (Second  Amendment) Act,  1952, provided that the maximum period for  which  any person  may be detained in pursuance of any detention  order which  has been confirmed under section 11 shall  be  twelve months from the date of detention.  But subs. (2)  qualified this by dividing do tentions into two classes: (a) those  in which  the  detention order was confirmed  before  the  30th September, 1952, and (b) those in which the confirmation was after  that date, and it provided that in the  former  case, unless  a  shorter period was specified in  the  order,  the detention shall continue either till the 1st of April, 1953, or  for twelve months from the date of detention,  whichever expires later: I  Held, (i) that the section did not contravene art. 14  or art.  22  (7)  (b) of the  Constitution  merely  because  it introduced  a fresh classification which divided  detentions into  those  before  the Act and those  thereafter,  as  the classification  was a reasonable one.  The section  did  not involve any discrimination between persons whose  detentions were  confirmed  before  the 30th  September,  1952,  Merely because,  as a result o f the section, in the case  of  some persons  the  period of detention may be longer and  in  the case of others it may be shorter; Shamrao  Parulekar  v. The District  Magistrate,  Thana  and Others ( [1952] S.C.R. 683) followed. (ii)that  a detention order made   the 16th  October,  1951, which did not specify any period of detention was not a case where " a shorter period was specified in the order " within the  meaning  of s. 11-A (2) merely  because  the  detention would have expired either ’  the 31st March, 1952, or   30th

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September, 1952, but for the Amendment Act.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Petition No. 399 of 1952.   Petition under article 32 of the Constitution  of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, Godavari  Parutekar,  the  petitioner,  in  person.  M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G.N. Joshi and P.  A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent. 1952.   December 5. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by BosE J.-This is a habeas corpus petition under article 32 of the Constitution. The  petitioner was detained   the, 16th of  October,  1951, under  the  Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as  amended  in 1951.   Her detention was actually longer than this but  the earlier  detentions  were under a different  set  of  orders which  are not relevant to the present matter.  The  present detention  is based   an order of the  District  Magistrate, Thana,  and  merely says that the  petitioner  be  detained, without  specifying any period.  The order  of  confirmation was  passed   the 4th of January, 1952, and there  again  no period  was specified.  The petitioner’s case is that as  no period  was specified in the order her period  of  detention expired    the 31st of March, 1952, because of the  amending Act  of  1951 ; or at the outside   the 30th  of  September, 1952, because of Act XXXIV of 1952 which effected a  further amendment. The  reply    behalf  of the State of  Bombay  is  that  the Preventive  Detention Act of 1950 was again amended  by  Act LXI  of  1952 and that the effect of this amendment  was  to carry  the  petitioner’s detention   to the 31st  of  March, 1953,  because  of  section  11-A which  was  added  to  the original Act of 1950. The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act does  not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about  its  duration and so section 11-A does not  serve  to extend  the  period  of her  detention.   She  relies    the following portion of section II -A (2) "...  every detention order which has been  confirmed  under section  11  before  the  commencement  of  the   Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act 1952,  shall,  unless a shorter priod is  specified  in  the order,  continue  to remain in force until the  Ist  day  of April, 1953..." The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is  specified in her order of detention but contends that as her detention would  have  expired either   the 31st of  March,  1952,  or the 30th of September, 1952, one of those two dates must now be  read  into the order and when that is done  we  have  an order  which specifies as shorter period, therefore  section 11-A (2) does not serve to extend her detention. We  are  unable to accept this contention.  The  section  is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order, section I 1-A(2) applies.  We cannot add the words "or  must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry  of the  earlier Act" into the section.  We hold  therefore-that section  11-A(2)  validly extended the period  of  detention till the Ist of April, 1953. 1 The  petitioner’s  next  point is based    articles  14  and 22(i)(b)  of  the  Constitution.’ It  arises  in  this  way. Section  3 (1) (a) of the Preventive Detention Act  of  1950 classifies  grounds  of  permissible  detention  into  three

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categories.   Article  22  (7) (b)  empowers  Parliament  to prescribe  the maximum period for which any person  may  "in any class or classes of cases" be detained.  The  petitioner argues that this permits only one maximum for each class and that if different maxima are provided for "equals" within  a class  it  offends  not only article 22  (7)  (b)  but  also article  14 as interpreted by the decisions of  this  Court, She  next  argues that section 11-A, now introduced  by  the second  amending  Act of 1952 (Act LXI of 1952),  does  just that and so is ultra vires.  Her point is put as follows. Sub-section  (1)  of section 11-A states  that  the  maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance  of any detention order- which has been confirmed under  section 1 1 shall be twelve months from the date of detention.   But sub- section (2) qualifies this by dividing detentions  into two classes; 213 (a) those in which the detention order was confirmed  before 30th  of  September,  1952,  and  (b)  those  in  which  the confirmation  was after that date, and it provides that.  in the former case, unless a shorter period is specified in the order,  the detention shall continue either till the 1st  of April,  1953,  or  for  twelve  months  from  the  date   of detention,   whichever  expires  later.   This,  she   says, introduces  a fresh classification which divides  detentions into those before the Act and those after.  That, she  says, is   ultra   vires,   first,   because   it   introduces   a discriminatory  classification  in the class  to  which  she belongs  under section 3 of the Act and, second, because  it entails  discrimination even in the fresh class  into  which she  has  been thrown by the new sub-division, made  by  the second amending Act of 1952.  As regards the first point, the ratio decidendi in Shamrao V.   Parulekar  v.  The  District  Magistrate,  Thana,   and Others(1)  applies  here.   In that  case,  detentions  were divided  into those which had already been considered by  an Advisory  Board and those which had not.  This  was  upheld. The dividing line here is different, namely a certain  date, but  the  principle is the same and  its  reasonableness  is apparent  from  a consideration of  the  various  amendments which have been made from time to time.  The life of the Act of 1950, which was the principal  Act, was extended till the 1st of October, 1952, by section 2  of the  amending  Act (Act XXXIV of 1952), and  the  effect  of section  3  was to prolong the’ life  of  all-detentions  in force  on  14th  of  March 1952,  (provided  they  had  been confirmed before that date) for so long as the principal Act was  in  force.   At that date this meant till  the  1st  of October, 1952.  But the second amending Act of 1952 extended the   life   of  the  principal  Act  till   the   31st   of December,1954. Therefore, in the absence of section 11-A all those     detentions  would  have been  extended  till  that date.  But  section  11-A  modified  that  and  put  1st  of April,1953, as the latest date for these old detentions, (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 683 at 691 and 693. 214  It  therefore  conferred a benefit and  cannot  be  deemed unreasonable.   Sub-section (3) of ’section 11-A shows  that that was the object.  But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the   ground of  discrimination.   She said that even  assuming  the  new classification of detentions into those before and after the 30th  of  September,  1952,  to be  good,  section  11-A  is nevertheless discriminatory because it discriminates amongst those in her class,, namely those whose detentions were made

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and  confirmed before the 30th of September.  She put it  in this way.  Taking  the  case of her own detention, she  pointed,  out that  if section II- A is good, it  will continue  till  the 1st of April, 1953, that is to say, her detention will  have been for a period of 17-1/2 months from the 16th of October, 1951,  till the 1st of April, 1953.  ’On the other  hand,  a person  detained after her on, say, the last  of  September, 1952,  would  also be due for release on the 1st  of  April, 1953, and so would have had only six months’ detention.  This,  in  our opinion, is not discrimination  within  the meaning  of article 14.  A maximum can be fixed,  either  by specifying a particular period, such as twelve months, or by setting  an outside limit, land it is inevitable in  such  a case  that  the  length  of  detention  will  vary  in  each individual case.  Those taken into detention at a later date are bound to be detained for a shorter time.  Government  is not bound to detain everybody for the same length of  time., It  has a discretion.  Moreover, the appropriate  Government has boon left power to revoke or modify the detention  order at  any earlier time.  This point was considered in  Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, & Others (1) and was decided against the detenu.  The   petitioner  endeavoured  to  have  her   application reopened on the merits contending again that the grounds  of detention are vague.  She relies on Shamrao V. Parulekar  v. The State, of Bombay (2) where (1) [1952] S.C.R. 683 at 691 at 693.  (2) Petition No. 86 of 1952. 215 another  detenu was released by another Bench of this  Court in circumstances which., according to her, are very similar. We are unable to allow this as her petition has already been rejected  on the merits.  She was only allowed to appear  on constitutional  points.  We  understand that  in  the  other petition  this  fact was not brought to the  notice  of  the Court. The application is dismissed.                Application dismissed. Agent    for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.