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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1547  of 2013

Girraj Prasad Meena                              …Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.                                    …Respondents

 J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment  

and order dated 23.4.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature of  

Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1260 of  

2012, by which the High Court rejected the application filed by the  

appellant  under  Section  482 of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  

(hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C.’) for setting aside the judgment and  

order  dated  15.7.2011  passed  by  the  Judge,  Gram  Nyayalaya,  

Gangapur City, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, in Case No. 269

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of 2011, whereby the  trial  court  has  allowed the application of  the  

respondents-accused  for  pleading  guilty  for the offences punishable  

under  Sections  323  and  343  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  

(hereinafter referred to as the `IPC’)  and has further given them the  

benefit  of Section 12 of  the Probation of  the Offenders Act,  1958,  

(hereinafter referred to as the `Act 1958’), in the case  arising out of  

FIR No. 115 of 2009 lodged at Police Station Wazirpur under Section  

365 IPC.  

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

A. The learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 156 (3)  

Cr.P.C. for the investigation whereunder FIR No. 115 of 2009 under  

Section 365 IPC was lodged on the complaint filed by one Kamlesh  

Meena,  who  is  brother-in-law  of  the  appellant,  alleging  that  the  

appellant had been kidnapped by the private respondents alongwith  

other  accused  when  he  was  returning  from  the  school  duty  as  a  

teacher.

B. Police  investigated  the  matter,  located  the  appellant  from  

village  Jeevli  on  4.7.2009  and  recorded  the  statements  of  various  

persons under Section 161 Cr.P.C, and the statement of the appellant  

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was  recorded  under  Section  164  Cr.P.C.  After  completing  the  

investigation, the police filed a charge sheet dated 4.8.2010 against  

the  accused  –  namely  private  respondents  only  for  offences  

punishable under Sections 323, 343 read with Section 34 IPC.    

C. After  filing  of  the  charge  sheet,  the  trial  commenced.  On  

3.1.2011, the court ordered the presence of the witnesses for recording  

their statements on 9.6.2011. However on the said date, the summons  

were issued to three witnesses, including the appellant for recording  

their evidence on 7.7.2011. But on the date so fixed, the trial could not  

proceed.    

D. On 15.7.2011,  both  the  accused-respondents  appeared  before  

the learned trial court and filed an application pleading guilty for the  

offences under Sections 323 and 343 IPC. The said application was  

entertained forthwith and the learned trial court concluded the trial on  

that day itself, without issuing notice to the appellant, convicting the  

respondents under Sections 323 and 343 IPC and imposing a fine of  

Rs.500/-,  and  further  granting  them  the  benefit  of  provisions  of  

Sections 3 & 12 of the Act 1958. The learned Magistrate further held  

that  the  order  passed  in  criminal  case  herein  shall  not  have  any  

adverse affect on the government service of the accused persons.   

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E. Aggrieved,  the  appellant  challenged  the  said  judgment  and  

order  dated  15.7.2011  before  the  High  Court  on  various  grounds  

including that the court below had committed an error in not taking  

into consideration the statement of the appellant under Section 164  

Cr.P.C.,  wherein  serious  allegations  had  been  made  against  the  

accused  persons  and  others  particularly  that  the  appellant  was  

kidnapped  and  illegally  detained  from  29.6.2009  to  4.7.2009;  

terrorising  and  threatening  him  that  his  hand  and  legs  would  be  

chopped  of;   abusing  the  complainant  persistently.   The  case  was  

disposed off hastily in one day without notice to the appellant.  More  

so, the court below had no right to make the observation that the order  

of  conviction  would  not  adversely  affect  the  services  of  the  

respondents-accused.   

F. The High Court dismissed the said application vide order dated  

23.4.2012 on the  ground that  the  appellant  has  not  challenged  the  

order taking cognizance nor any objection was raised when charges  

were read over to the accused and the respondents-accused had been  

convicted on their  pleading guilty regarding the aforesaid offences.  

The High Court held that there was no obligation in law to hear the  

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appellant or any other witness at this stage and the trial court was right  

in passing the impugned order.  

Hence, this appeal.  

3. Shri H.D. Thanvi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  

appellant, has raised a large number of issues and insisted that the trial  

court had no right to make any observation that the conviction could  

not have adverse affect on the service of the respondents.  More so,  

the courts below had committed an error in exceeding the scope of the  

provisions of Section 12 of the Act 1958. The trial stood concluded  

without framing the charges, without issuing notice to the appellant.   

4. On  the  other  hand,  Ms.  Nilofar  Qureshi,  learned  counsel  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  private  respondents,  has  opposed  the  

appeal contending that the judgment and order impugned is passed in  

consonance with law and does not require any interference.  In fact,  

appellant  is  the  father  of  son-in-law  of  respondent  no.2-accused  

Kirodi  Lal  Meena.  Respondent’s  daughter  Hemlata  had  been  ill-

treated by the appellant and his family. There had been various civil  

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and criminal cases between the parties and the present case is just a  

counter blast to such proceedings.  

Shri Vivek Singh, learned Standing counsel appearing on behalf  

of the State of Rajasthan, has supported the case of the respondents-

accused  contending  that  the  orders  of  the  courts  below  are  in  

consonance with the statutory provisions and once a charge sheet is  

filed, the charges become final, and as the charges so framed were not  

so serious,  the benefit  of Act 1958 has rightly been granted to the  

private respondents. Thus, the appeal is liable to be rejected.   

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

6. Filing of charge sheet and taking cognizance has nothing to do  

with the finality of charges, as charges framed after the cognizance is  

taken by the court, can be altered/amended/changed and any charge  

can be added at any stage upto the stage of conviction in view of the  

provisions of Section 216 Cr.P.C. The only legal requirement is that,  

in  case  the  trial  court  exercises  its  power  under  Sections  228/251  

Cr.P.C.,  the  accused  is  entitled  to  an  opportunity  of  show-

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cause/hearing as required under the provisions of Section 217 Cr. P.C.  

(Vide: Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., JT 2013 (12) SC 213).

7. In fact, the appellant has been raising the grievance from the  

very  beginning  that  the  police  has  not  been  investigating  the  case  

properly and for that purpose, he had also approached the High Court  

by filing Writ Petition No. 14272 of 2009, wherein several directions  

had been issued by the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan  

to the Director General of Police for a fair investigation vide orders  

dated  10.2.2010  and  11.8.2010.   In  the  statement  of  the  appellant  

recorded  under  Section  164  Cr.P.C.  before  the  learned  magistrate,  

appellant has given a full version as to how he had been kidnapped  

while returning from school duty and forcibly lifted by the private  

respondents and five others in a Innova Car and was illegally detained  

from 29.6.2009  till   4.7.2009  when  he  was  located  by  the  police.  

Appellant  named  7  persons  and  serious  allegations  of  criminal  

intimidation, threats, terrorising and causing physical harm had been  

levelled.  The police after concluding the investigation filed a charge  

sheet only against the two accused and, that too, only for the offences  

punishable under Sections 323 and 343 IPC.

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8. Had the trial  court  applied its  mind to the material  collected  

during  investigation  and  particularly  the  statement  recorded  under  

Section 164 Cr.P.C., the charges could have been framed also  under  

Section 365 IPC. In that case, the Gram Nyayalaya would have no  

jurisdiction to deal with the matter as the maximum sentence for that  

offence is 7 years imprisonment with fine, and the Magistrate in that  

situation,  was  bound  to  commit  the  matter  to  the  Sessions  court.  

Further, before the statements of the witnesses could be recorded, the  

private respondents filed an application admitting their guilt. Had the  

statements of  the witnesses  been recorded,  perhaps the court  could  

have issued summons to other accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. or  

charges could have been amended/altered/modified under Section 216  

Cr.P.C. More so, at that stage, the appellant was not heard as no notice  

had been issued to him.  The trial court proceeded in great haste and  

disposed  off  the  matter  on  15.7.2011  the  same  date  when  the  

application was filed by the private respondents.  

9. On the said  facts,  we are  of  the considered opinion that  the  

learned trial court proceeded not only in great haste, but adopted a  

procedure not known in law, and the judgment and order of the trial  

court therefore stands vitiated.    

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10.  In  State of  U.P. v.  Ranjit  Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201,  this  

Court has held that the High Court, while deciding a criminal case and  

giving the benefit of the U.P. First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938, or  

similar enactment, has no competence to issue any direction that the  

accused shall not suffer any civil consequences. The Court has held as  

under:  

“5. We also fail to understand how the High Court   while  deciding  a  criminal  case,  can  direct  that  the   accused  must  be  deemed  to  have  been  in  continuous   service without break and, therefore, he should be paid   his full pay and [dearness allowance] during the period   of  his  suspension.  This  direction  and  observation  is   wholly without jurisdiction….”(Emphasis added)

11.  In  Shankar Dass v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1985 SC  

772,  this  Court  has  held  that  the  order  of  dismissal  from service,  

consequent  upon  a  conviction,  is  not  a  disqualification  within  the  

meaning of Section 12 of the Act 1958 observing as under:  

“4. … There are statutes which provide that persons who   are  convicted  for  certain  offences  shall  incur  certain   disqualifications.  For  example,  Chapter  III  of  the   Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951,  entitled   ‘Disqualifications  for  membership  of  Parliament  and   State  Legislatures’  and  Chapter  IV  entitled   ‘Disqualifications for Voting’ contain provisions which   disqualify  persons  convicted  of  certain  charges  from  being members of legislatures or from voting at elections   to  legislatures.  That  is  the  sense  in  which  the  word   

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‘disqualification’ is used in Section 12 of the Probation   of Offenders Act. [Therefore, it is not possible to accept   the reasoning of the High Court that Section 12 of the   1958  Act  takes  away  the  effect  of  conviction  for  the   purpose of service also.”

12. The provision of the Act 1958 has been dealt with by this Court  

elaborately in Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Regional Manager, Punjab  

National  Bank, (2010)  8  SCC 573,  wherein  after  considering  the  

judgments of this court in Aitha Chander Rao v. State of A.P., 1981  

Supp SCC 17;  Harichand v.  Director of  School  Education,  AIR  

1998 SC 788; Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway &  

Anr. v. T.R. Chellappan, AIR 1975 SC 2216; and  Trikha Ram v.  

V.K. Seth & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 285, the court held as under:  

“In  view  of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  can  be   summarised  to  the  effect  that  the  conviction  of  an   employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority   to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee   or  to  take  appropriate  steps  for  his  dismissal/removal   only  on  the  basis  of  his  conviction.  The  word   “disqualification” contained in Section 12 of the 1958   Act refers to a disqualification provided in other statutes,   as explained by this Court  in the abovereferred cases,   and the employee  cannot  claim a right  to  continue  in   service merely on the ground that he had been given the   benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.”

(See also: Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 178).  

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13. Thus, we are also of the considered opinion that the trial court  

had  no  competence  to  make  any  observation  having  civil  

consequences so far as the private respondents are concerned.  

The  High  Court  rejected  the  application  under  Section  482  

Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant only on the ground that the appellant  

neither  challenged  the  order  of  taking  cognizance  nor  raised  any  

objection at the time of reading over of the charges to the accused.  

The High Court failed to appreciate that before the statement of the  

appellant  or  any  other  witness  could  be  recorded,  the  trial  court  

disposed off the matter on the date when the application itself had  

been submitted admitting the guilt.  Even otherwise if the trial court  

wanted to entertain any issue of plea bargaining under Chapter XXI-

A, inserted w.e.f. 5.7.2006, then too the court was obliged thereunder  

to put  the victim to notice before extending any such benefits  that  

have been given in the present case. The procedure therefore appears  

to  have  been  clearly  violated.  Therefore,  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, the appellant had no opportunity to raise  

any grievance before the appropriate forum.  

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14. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The  

judgment and order of the trial court dated 15.7.2011 as well as of the  

High Court dated 23.4.2012 are set aside. The matter is remitted to the  

trial court to be decided afresh in accordance with law. As the matter  

is  very  old,  we  request  the  trial  court  to  conclude  the  trial  afresh  

adopting  the  procedure  as  explained  hereinabove  expeditiously,  

preferably  within  a  period  of  six  months  from  the  date  of  filing  

certified copy of the order before it.    

Before parting with the case,  we would clarify that  we have  

expressed no opinion on the merits of the ensuing trial.

….………………..........J.  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

…...................................J.                                                (S.A. BOBDE)  

NEW DELHI;  September 30, 2013       

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