GIRIMALLAPPA Vs SPL.LAQ OFFICER & ANR
Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,SWATANTER KUMAR
Case number: PC(CC) 11497 of 2012
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAIL LEAVE PETITION(C) No……….of 2012 (CC No. 11497 of 2012)
Girimallappa …Petitioner
Versus The Special Land Acquisition …Respondents Officer M & MIP & Anr.
O R D E R
1. Delay condoned.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that:
A. A huge area of land was notified under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the `Act’) on
30.5.1984 including the petitioner’s land measuring 11 Acres 32
Guntas at Gobbur (K) Village in District Gulbarga for the purpose of
construction of a tank. The possession of the said land has been
taken by the respondent authorities on 23.6.1985. The Land
Acquisition Collector made an Award under Section 11 of the Act
fixing the market value of the land at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per Acre.
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B. One LAC Case No. 500 of 1993 filed by another person was
decided by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act on
28.9.1994. While placing reliance on the same, the petitioner filed
application under Section 28-A of the Act. The said application was
allowed fixing the market value of the dry land at the rate of
Rs.10000/- per Acre. Petitioner preferred a further reference against
that order claiming Rs.45000/- per Acre for dry land and Rs.75000/-
per Acre for irrigated lands. The said reference was decided vide
order dated 27.9.2003 assessing the market value at the rate of Rs.
15000/- per Acre for dry land and Rs.21500/- per Acre for irrigated
land.
C. Aggrieved from the said reference award, petitioner
preferred LAC Appeal No. 64 of 2008 before the District Judge,
Gulbarga, seeking enhancement of compensation assessing the
market value of the land at the rate of Rs.24000/- per Acre which
stood allowed vide judgment and decree dated 27.10.2009.
D. Petitioner filed MSA No. 510 of 2010 against the said
judgment and decree dated 27.10.2009 before High Court which has
been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated
12.9.2011.
Hence, this petition.
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3. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
vehemently submitted that courts cannot defeat the claim based on
substantial justice on mere technicalities. Learned counsel would
submit that when technicalities are pitted against substantial justice,
the latter must prevail; in case petitioner was entitled for a higher
compensation, awarding a lesser amount of compensation,
tantamounts to expropriation of the property in violation of mandate
of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Petitioner has been
deprived the higher compensation as he could not afford to pay the
court fees though he was entitled for higher compensation claimed
by him.
4. Record of the case reveals that petitioner’s land measuring
11 Acres 32 Guntas had been acquired though there is nothing on
record to show as to whether petitioner had some more land. But the
area of land acquired makes it clear that petitioner was a man of
means. We fail to understand, in case, he did not file a reference
under Section 18 of the Act, under what circumstances his
application under Section 28-A of the Act could be entertained.
5. This Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, JT
2009 (13) SC 388, considered this aspect and held :
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“The scope of provisions of Section 28-A of the Act was considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC 45, and the Court placed emphasis particularly on para 2 (ix) of the object and reasons of the Amendment Act, 1987 which provided for a special provision for inarticulate and poor people to apply for re- determination of the compensation amount on the basis of the court award in a land acquisition reference filed by comparatively affluent land owner. The Court observed as under:
Section 28-A in terms does not apply to the case of the petitioners..... They do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit the provision is intended and meant, i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
This Court approved and reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram (Supra) in Scheduled Caste Cooperative Land Owning Society Ltd. Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1991 SC 730. In Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 689, this Court again reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram (Supra) observing as under:-
Legislature made a discriminatory policy between the poor and inarticulate as one class of persons to whom the benefit of Section 28-A was to be extended and comparatively affluent who had taken advantage of the reference under Section 18 and the latter as a class to which the
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benefit of Section 28-A was not extended. Otherwise, the phraseology of the language of the non-obstante clause would have been differently worded..... It is true that the legislature intended to relieve hardship to the poor, indigent and inarticulate interested persons who generally failed to avail the reference under Section 18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, Section 28-A was enacted giving a right and remedy for re- determination......The legislature appears to have presumed that the same state of affairs continue to subsist among the poor and inarticulate persons and they generally fail to avail the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 due to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of expropriation.
Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has carved out an exception in the form of Section 28- A and made a special provision to grant some relief to a particular class of society, namely poor, illiterate, ignorant and inarticulate people. It is made only for “little Indians”. (Emphasis added)
6. Petitioner cannot claim, by any means to fall under the said
category of “little Indians”. However, as the said order has not been
challenged by the respondent(s), we cannot examine the issue
further, even if the order is totally unwarranted.
7. Petitioner’s claim in the first appeal before the learned
District Judge had been only to the tune of Rs.24000/- per Acre. The
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prayer before the learned District Judge in LAC No. 64 of 2008
reads as under:
“ Hence, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order passed by the court below in LAC No. 193/01 and enhance it to Rs.24,000/- per Acre with all statutory benefits and excluding the interest for the delayed period in the interest of justice for which the appellants shall ever pray.”
8. It may be pertinent to mention here that while hearing the
appeal, the learned District Judge at Gulbarga condoned the delay of
1717 days in filing the appeal.
9. In the appeal before the High Court, no specific amount was
demanded by the petitioner. The prayer made before the High Court
reads as under:
“Therefore, it is most humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to allow this appeal and modify the judgment and Award dated 27.10.2009 passed in L.A.C. Appeal No. 64/2008 by the learned III Addl. District Judge at Gulbarga, modifying the judgment and award dated 27.9.2003 passed in LAC No. 193/2001 by the Prl. Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Gulbarga and pass any other appropriate orders, in the interest of justice.”
10. Thus, it is apparent that no specific demand was raised by
the petitioner before the High Court. The Memo of Appeal reveals
that Rs.25/- was paid as the court fees. The High Court dealt with
the issue elaborately taking note of earlier proceedings/orders
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including the order passed under Section 28-A of the Act, and
condonation of delay of 1717 days by the first appellate court.
Finally the High Court held that the claim itself was restricted to Rs.
24000/- per Acre. There was no justification to interfere as the claim
of the petitioner stood fully satisfied by the order passed in the first
appeal.
11. This special leave petition is filed with a delay of 154 days,
with an explanation that petitioner suffered from the ailment and
could not approach the court within limitation.
12. The question does arise as to whether such a vague prayer
can be entertained by the court. The memo of appeal before the High
Court does not even reveal as to what was his demand. Reliance is
being placed on the judgment of this Court in Chandrashekhar &
Ors. v. Addl. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2009 SC
3012, wherein after considering the earlier judgments, this Court
held that court should not be too technical in awarding the
compensation in case there is a shortfall of court fees. The said
judgment is not an authority on the proposition advanced before us
in this petition that court is bound to enhance the amount of
compensation though no specific amount is demanded by the
petitioner.
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13. It was not a case where an order could be challenged on the
ground that the same is a nullity for want of competence of the
issuing authority and proper pleadings including appropriate grounds
challenging the same have been taken, but no prayer has been made
for quashing the said order. In such an eventuality the order can be
examined only after considering the statutory provisions involved
therein. The court may reach a conclusion that the order suffers
from lack of jurisdiction. (See: Godrej Sara Lee Limited v.
Assistant Commissioner (AA) & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 338).
14. In case, the petitioner was serious about the matter, he could
have amended the Memo of Appeal and that application could have
been considered sympathetically by the High Court as held by this
Court in Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43.
15. The facts mentioned in this petition depict entirely different
picture and it gives an impression as if the High Court had not
enhanced the compensation though demanded by the petitioner for
want of payment of court fees which he could not afford to pay due
to paucity of funds.
16. The case relied upon by Ms. Kiran Suri is the case where the
prayer was for a particular enhancement and it was further made
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clear that the applicants therein could not afford to pay the court fees
for financial constraints. In the instant case, the first appeal filed by
the petitioner was barred by 1717 days and the delay was condoned.
This petition is also barred by 154 days. Petitioner for the reasons
best known to him did not make the demand for a specific
enhancement. Mere making a reference in the Memo of Appeal that
the High Court had awarded a higher amount in respect of a land
covered by the same Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not
enough. The claimant has to satisfy the court that his land was
similar in quality and had same geographical location or was situated
in close vicinity of the land covered by the exemplar relied upon by
him. In the instant case, no such attempt has ever been made by the
petitioner. Thus, it is not that a meritorious case has been thrown out
and the cause of justice stood defeated.
More so, the exemplar cited first time before the High Court
in Second Appeal has not been referred to in the First Appeal. In
absence thereof, it is beyond imagination as how findings recorded
by the first Appellate Court could be termed as perverse and be a
subject matter of appeal.
17. Justice is an illusion as the meaning and definition of
‘justice’ varies from person to person and party to party. Party feels
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having got justice only and only if it succeeds before the court,
though it may not have a justifiable claim.
Justice is the virtue, by which the Society/Court/Tribunal
gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong. Justice
is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who
has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the justice with
mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in
exact conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human
actions are found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with
or in opposition to the law. (Vide: Delhi Administration v.
Gurudeep Singh Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737).
18. Thus, in view of the above, we do not see any justification to
accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the High Court
preferred technicalities over substantial justice.
Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
....…………….....................J. ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN )
.…………............................J. ( SWATANTER KUMAR ) New Delhi, July 16, 2012
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