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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2302 of 2010

Gian Chand & Ors.                                                      …Appellants

Versus

State of Haryana                                                         …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated  

4.11.2008  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at  

Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 392-SB of 2001, by which it has  

affirmed the judgment and order dated 2.2.2001 passed by the trial  

court,  Sirsa  by  which  the  appellants  were  convicted  under  the  

provisions  of  Section  15  of  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic  

Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).  By that  

order, they were sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 10 years each

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and to pay a fine of rupees 1 lakh each, and in default of payment of  

fine, to undergo further RI for a period of one year.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

A. On 5.9.1996,  at  about  2.15 a.m.,  Bhan Singh, ASI of  Police  

Station,  Rania  alongwith  other  police  officials  was  present  in  the  

village Chakka Bhuna in an official jeep. The police party saw a jeep  

coming at high speed from the opposite direction and asked the said  

jeep to stop.  However, instead of stopping, the driver accelerated the  

speed of the jeep. This created suspicion in the minds of the police  

officials. Thus, they chased the jeep.  The occupants of the jeep took a  

U-turn and in that process the jeep struck the wall of a house in the  

village.  The three occupants of the jeep tried to run away but they  

were  caught  by  the  police.   The  said  three  occupants  were  later  

identified as the appellants. They were asked whether they would like  

to be searched before a Gazetted officer  or  a Magistrate,  however,  

they  chose  the  former.  The  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  was  

called and a search was conducted in his presence. The vehicle had 10  

bags  containing  41  kg  poppy  husk  each.   The  police  party  took  

samples of 200 grams of poppy husk from each bag and the same was  

sealed by the Dy.S.P.

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B. On the basis of same, an FIR was lodged on 5.9.1996 itself at  

3.15 a.m. at the Rania Police Station against the appellants-accused.  

After  investigation,  a  chargesheet  was  filed  against  them  and  the  

appellants claimed trial. Hence, the trial commenced.  

C. The prosecution led the evidence in support of its case and also  

produced the case property in the court alongwith the damaged jeep in  

which the appellants were carrying 410 kg. poppy husk.  In the FSL  

report all positive results were shown.  Appellants did not lead any  

evidence in defence and pleaded that they had falsely been implicated  

in the crime.   

D. After conclusion of the trial, the appellants were convicted and  

sentenced as referred to hereinbefore vide judgment and order dated  

2.2.2001, and the said judgment and order has been affirmed by the  

High Court vide its judgment and order dated 4.11.2008.  

Hence, this appeal.  

3. Mr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel appearing for the appellants  

has  submitted  that  no  independent  witness  was  examined  by  the  

prosecution in the case, though a large number of people had gathered  

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at the place of the alleged incident which led to the appellants-accused  

being  apprehended.  No  independent  witness  was  involved  in  

preparation of the panchnama of the recovered substances.  Further,  

the prosecution  failed to  prove that  the appellants-accused  were  in  

conscious possession of the contraband material.  This incriminating  

circumstance had not even been put to the appellants-accused while  

recording their  statements  under  Section  313 of  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’). The appellants  

have  already  served  about  8  years  of  sentence.  Thus,  the  appeal  

deserves to be allowed.  

4. Per  contra,  Mr.  Brijender  Chahar,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the State has opposed the appeal contending that even if  

some  persons  had  gathered  at  the  place  of  occurrence  when  the  

appellants  were  apprehended,  nobody  was  willing  to  become  a  

witness.  Therefore,  the  prosecution  could  not  examine  any  

independent witness. The case of the prosecution does not deserve to  

get  disbelieved  simply  because  police  officials  themselves  are  the  

witnesses, nor there is any requirement in law that in every case an  

independent  witness  should  be  examined.  Further  all  incriminating  

material  was  put  to  the  appellants-accused  while  recording  their  

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statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Once it is established that an  

accused is in possession of contraband  substance, the burden to prove  

that he had no knowledge of the same, shifts to the accused to prove  

the same. More so, the accused is supposed to explain his conduct  

while  making his  statement  under  Section 313 Cr.P.C.  particularly  

where there are certain presumptions against him under Section 35 of  

the Act.  There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts  

below. Thus, no interference is called for and the appeal is liable to be  

dismissed.  

5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

6. No dispute has been raised regarding the poppy husk recovered  

from the jeep or the damaged jeep.  Further, the appellants did not  

challenge the result shown in the FSL report wherein the qualitative  

tests  in  respect  of  Meconic  Acid,  Morphine,  Codeine,  Thebaine,  

Papaverine and Narcotine had all been shown as positive.

7. All three occupants, i.e. the appellants abandoned the vehicle  

just after it dashed against the wall and made a desperate attempt to  

escape but were apprehended by the police party.  The Trial Court  

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examined the matter elaborately and after appreciating the evidence of  

the witnesses, came to the conclusion that there were no discrepancies  

in  the  statements  of  the  three  officials,  i.e.  prosecution  witnesses.  

Their statements inspired tremendous confidence and thus, there was  

no  reason  for  the  court  to  discard  the  testimony  of  the  official  

witnesses.  The grievance had also been raised before the Trial Court  

that the chit carrying contents of case property was not available on  

the bags.  However, this did not give any benefit to the accused as  

there was overwhelming evidence on record to prove that the seizure  

of ten bags had actually been made from the accused.  Further the  

contents  of  the  samples  sent  for  chemical  analysis  gave  positive  

results on analysis in the laboratory.   

8. The  High  Court  dealt  with  the  issue  elaborately  regarding  

knowledge i.e. conscious possession, and held as under:     

“There  were  only  three  occupants  in  the  jeep,  at  the  relevant time.  As many as 10 bags, each containing 41  kgs. Poppy husk, were lying in the jeep.  It was not a  small  quantity  of  poppy husk,.….and could escape  the  notice of the accused.  It was a big haul of poppy husk,  ……The  accused  were  having  special  means  of  knowledge,  with  regard  to  the  bags,  containing  poppy  husk,  lying  in  the  jeep.   It  was  for  the  accused  to  explain, as to how the bags, containing poppy husk,  were being transported.  Not only this, the conduct of  the accused, is also relevant, in this case.  They instead of  

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stopping  the  jeep,  when  the  signal  was  given,  by  the  policy party, accelerated the speed thereof and sped away  towards Village Keharwala.  It was only after hot chase,  given by the members of the police party, in their jeep,  that the driver of the jeep got nervous, could not properly  negotiate the turn and lost control, as a result whereof,  the said jeep struck against the wall and stopped.  In case,  there  was no contraband,  in  the  jeep,  and the  accused  were not in the knowledge of the same then what was the  necessity  of  speeding  away  the  jeep,  was  for  them to  explain.  This material circumstance goes against them.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  could  be  said  that  they  were in possession of, and in control over the bags, lying  in the jeep.  

 Once the possession  of  the accused,  and their  

control  over  the  contraband,  was  proved,  then  statutory presumption under Section 54 and 35 of the  Act,  operated  against  them,  that  they  were  in  conscious  possession  thereof.  Thereafter,  it  was  for  them,  to  rebut  the  statutory  presumption,  by  leading  cogent  and  convincing  evidence.   However,  the  appellants, failed to rebut the said presumption either  during the course of cross-examination of the prosecution  witnesses, or by leading defence evidence.”    

(Emphasis added)

9. Further,  in  their  statement  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C.,  the  

appellants took the plea of false implication only and the appellants  

miserably failed to rebut the statutory presumption, referred to above.  

The High Court further held as under:-

“In the instant case, no plea was taken up by the accused,  during the course of  trial  or  in  their  statements,  under  Section 313 Cr.P.C. that they were not the occupants of  the jeep.   No plea was taken by the accused that  they  

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were not aware of the contents of the bags, lying in the  jeep.  No plea was taken up by the driver of the jeep that  he was taking the bags, containing poppy husk, as per the  directions of the owner thereof, and did not know, as to  what was contained in the bags.  No plea was taken up,  by the other occupants, of the jeep, that they were merely  labourers  engaged for  loading and unloading the bags,  containing poppy husk, at the destination.  No plea was  taken up by the accused, other than the driver, sitting in  the jeep, that they only took lift therein, and as such were  passengers.  They did not take up the plea, that the driver  of the jeep knew them earlier and since they could not  find any public transport, for going to their villages, he  gave them lift therein on friendly basis.  The facts of the  cases, relied upon by the Counsel for the appellants, and  referred to, in this paragraph, being distinguishable, from  the facts of the instant case, no help can be drawn by the  counsel for the appellants therefrom.  In this view of the  matter, the submission of the counsel for the appellants,  being  without  merit,  must  fail,  and  the  same  stands  rejected.”

10. So far as the condition of the property is concerned, the court  

observed that “as the witnesses have been examined after four years  

from the date of recovery.  The case property remained lying in the  

malkhana.  On account of shortage of space, in the malkhanas, the  

case properties cannot be stacked properly and the bags, containing  

poppy husk, underwent the process of decay, however, did not mean  

that  the  case  property  produced  in  the  court,  did  not  relate  to  the  

instant case.”  There was nothing on record to show that the said case  

property had been tampered with.

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11. The  effect  of  not  cross-examining  a  witness  on  a  particular  

fact/circumstance has been dealt with and explained by this Court in  

Laxmibai (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Anr. v. Bhagwanthuva (Dead) Thr.  

L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 1204 observing as under:  

“31.  Furthermore,  there  cannot  be  any  dispute  with   respect  to the settled legal proposition,  that  if  a party   wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of   the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given   an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his   attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by   the other party, as being untrue. Without this, it is not   possible to impeach his credibility. Such a law has been   advanced in view of the statutory provisions enshrined in   Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the   opposite  party  to  cross-examine  a  witness  as  regards   information  tendered  in  evidence  by  him  during  his   initial  examination  in  chief,  and  the  scope  of  this   provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence   Act, which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia,   in order to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged   part of his evidence is to be relied upon, for the reason   that  it  is  impossible  for  the  witness  to  explain  or   elaborate upon any doubts as regards the same, in the   absence  of  questions  put  to  him  with  respect  to  the   circumstances which indicate that the version of events   provided by him, is not fit to be believed, and the witness   himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party intends to   impeach  a  witness,  he  must  provide  adequate   opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to give a   full  and  proper  explanation.  The  same  is  essential  to   ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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(See also: Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam & Ors., AIR  

1999 SC 3571;  Ghasita Sahu v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh,  AIR  

2008 SC 1425; and Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, JT 2013  

(8) SC 181)  

12. The  defence  did  not  put  any  question  to  the  Investigating  

Officer in his cross-examination in respect of missing chits from the  

bags  containing  the  case  property/contraband  articles.   Thus,  no  

grievance could be raised by the appellants in this regard.  

13. The appellants were found travelling in a jeep at odd hours in  

the  night  and  the  contraband  material  was  found.  Therefore,  the  

question arises whether they can be held to have conscious possession  

of the contraband substances.  

This Court dealt with this issue in Madan Lal & Anr. v. State  

of  Himachal  Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 3642,  observing that  Section  

20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20  

appears  in  Chapter  IV  of  the  Act  which  relates  to  offences  and  

penalties  for  possession  of  such  articles.  Undoubtedly,  in  order  to  

bring  home the charge of illicit possession, there must be conscious  

possession.  The  expression  ‘possession’  has  been  held  to  be  a  

polymorphous  term  having  different  meanings  in  contextually  

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different  backgrounds.  Therefore,  its  definition  cannot  be  put  in  a  

straitjacket formula. The word ‘conscious’ means awareness about a  

particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.  

Possession in a given case need not be actual physical possession and  

may be constructive i.e. having power and control over the article in  

case  in question,  while  the person to  whom physical  possession is  

given holds it subject to that power or control. The Court further held  

as under:  

“Once possession is established the person who claims   that it was not a conscious possession has to establish   it, because how he came to be in possession is within his   special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory   recognition  of  this  position  because  of  presumption   available  in  law.  Similar  is  the  position  in  terms  of   Section  54  where  also  presumption  is  available  to  be   drawn from possession of illicit articles….It has not been   shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was   not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35   and 54 of the Act.”                                (Emphasis added)

14. From the conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 35 and  

54 of the Act, it becomes clear that if the accused is found to be in  

possession  of  the  contraband  article,  he  is  presumed  to  have  

committed the offence under the relevant provisions of the Act  until  

the contrary is proved. According to Section 35 of the Act, the court  

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shall presume the existence of mental state for the commission of an  

offence and it is for the accused to prove otherwise.  

Thus, in view of the above, it is a settled legal proposition that  

once possession of the contraband articles is established, the burden  

shifts on the accused to establish that he had no knowledge of the  

same.   

15. Additionally, it can also be held that once the possession of the  

contraband material with the accused is established, the accused has to  

establish how he came to be in possession of the same as it is within  

his special knowledge and therefore, the case falls within the ambit of  

the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter  

referred to as `the Act 1872’).  

16. In  State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors.  

etc.  etc.,  AIR  2000  SC  2988,  this  Court held  that  if  the  fact  is  

specifically  in  the  knowledge  of  any  person,  then  the  burden  of  

proving that fact is upon him. It is impossible for the prosecution to  

prove  certain  facts  particularly  within  the  knowledge  of  accused.  

Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to  

prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  But  the  

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Section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in  

proving  facts  from  which  a  reasonable  inference  can  be  drawn  

regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by  

virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer  

any  explanation  which  might  drive  the  Court  to  draw  a  different  

inference.  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  designed to  meet  

certain exceptional cases, in which, it would be impossible for the  

prosecution  to  establish  certain  facts  which  are  particularly  

within the knowledge of the accused.  

(See also: Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer AIR 1956  

SC 404;   Gunwantlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh  AIR 1972  

SC 1756;  Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab  AIR  2001 SC 1436;  

Sahadevan @  Sagadevan  v. State rep.  by  Inspector  of  Police,  

Chennai AIR 2003 SC 215;  Durga Prasad Gupta v. The State of  

Rajasthan thr. CBI,  (2003) 12 SCC 257; Santosh Kumar Singh v.  

State  thr.  CBI,  (2010)  9  SCC 747;  Manu Sao  v.  State  of  Bihar  

(2010)  12  SCC  310;  Neel  Kumar alias  Anil  Kumar  v.  State  of  

Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766).

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17.      Learned counsel for the appellants has placed much reliance  

upon the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Hari Singh &  

Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1966, wherein placing reliance upon the earlier  

judgment in Avtar Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab,  AIR 2002 SC  

3343, it  was  held  that  if  the  incriminating  material  i.e.,  the  issue  

relating to possession had not been put to the accused under Section  

313 Cr.P.C.  the principles of  natural  justice  stand violated and the  

judgment stands vitiated.  

18. So far as the judgment in Avtar Singh (supra) is concerned, it  

has been considered by this Court in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab  

AIR 2003 SC 3184. The Court held  that the circumstantial flexibility,  

one  additional  or  different  fact  may  make  a  world  of  difference  

between conclusions in two cases or between two accused in the same  

case.  Each  case  depends  on  its  own  facts  and  a  close  similarity  

between  one  case  and  another  is  not  enough  because  a  single  

significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more pronounced in  

criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact based.  In  

Avtar Singh (supra), the contraband articles were being carried in a  

truck. There were several persons in the truck. Some of them fled and  

it  could  not  be  established  by  evidence  that  anyone  of  them  had  

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conscious possession. While the accused was examined under Section  

313 Cr.P.C. the essence of accusations was not brought to his notice,  

particularly  with  respect  to  the  aspect  of possession.  It  was  also  

noticed that the possibility of the accused persons being labourers of  

the  truck  was  not  ruled  out  by  evidence.  Since  the  decision  was  

rendered on special consideration of several peculiar factual aspects  

specially noticed in that case, it cannot be of any assistance in all the  

cases.  

19. Therefore, it is evident that  Avtar Singh (supra) does not lay  

down the law of universal application as it had been decided on its  

own facts.   

20. So far as Section 313 Cr.P.C. is concerned, undoubtedly, the  

attention of  the accused must  specifically  be brought to  inculpable  

pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity  to offer an explanation  

if he chooses to do so.  A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Wasim  

Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,  AIR 1956 SC 400; and Bhoor  

Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab,  AIR 1974 SC 1256 held that every  

error or omission in compliance of the provisions of Section 342 of  

the old Cr.P.C. does not necessarily vitiate trial.  The accused must  

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show that some prejudice has been caused or was likely to have been  

caused to him.

21. In  Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328, a similar  

view has  been  reiterated  by  this  Court  observing  that  all  material  

circumstances  appearing  in  the  evidence  against  the  accused  are  

required to be put to him specifically and failure to do so amounts to  

serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was  

prejudiced.

22. In  Shivaji  Sahebrao  Bobade  &  Anr.  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, a three-Judge Bench of this Court  

held that “basic fairness of a criminal trial may gravely imperil the  

validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has  

flowed.”  However, where such an omission has occurred it does not  

ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned  by such  

defect, must be established by the accused.

23. In Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR  

2011 SC 200, after considering large number of cases on the issue,  

this Court held as under:-

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“Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of   Section 313 Cr. P.C make it obligatory for the court to   question the accused on the evidence and circumstances   against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to   explain the same.  But, it would not be enough for the   accused  to  show that  he  has  not  been questioned or   examined  on  a  particular  circumstance,  instead  he   must show that such non-examination has actually and   materially  prejudiced  him  and  has  resulted  in  the   failure  of  justice. In  other  words,  in  the  event  of  an   inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question   the accused on any incriminating circumstance  cannot   ipso facto vitiate the trial  unless it is shown that some   material  prejudice  was  caused  to  the  accused  by  the   omission of the court”                                                               (Emphasis added)

24. In the instant case the issue relating to non-compliance of the  

provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has not been raised before the High  

Court, and it is raised for the first time before this Court.  Learned  

counsel for the appellants could not point out what prejudice has been  

caused to them if the fact of “conscious possession” has not been put  

to them. Even otherwise such an issue cannot be raised in the existing  

facts and circumstances of the case wherein the burden was on the  

accused to show how the contraband material came to be found in the  

vehicle  which was driven by one of  them and the other  two were  

travelling in that vehicle.   

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25. The next question for consideration does arise as to whether it  

is  necessary  to  examine  an  independent  witness  and  further  as  to  

whether a case can be seen with doubt where all  the witnesses are  

from the police department.     

In  Rohtash v. State of  Haryana  JT 2013 (8)  SC 181, this  

court considered the issue at length and after placing reliance upon its  

earlier judgments came to the conclusion that where all witnesses are  

from the police department, their depositions must be subject to strict  

scrutiny.  However,  the  evidence  of  police  officials  cannot  be  

discarded merely on the ground that they belong to the police force,  

and  are  either  interested  in  the  investigating  or  the  prosecuting  

agency.  However,  as  far  as  possible  the  corroboration  of  their  

evidence on material particulars should be sought.  The Court held as  

under:  

“Thus,  a  witness  is  normally  considered  to  be   independent,  unless he springs from sources which are   likely to be tainted and this usually means that the said   witness  has  cause,  to  bear  such  enmity  against  the   accused, so as to implicate him falsely.  In view of the   above,  there can be no prohibition to the effect that a   policeman cannot  be  a  witness,  or  that  his  deposition   cannot be relied upon.”   

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(See  also:  Paras  Ram v.  State  of  Haryana,  AIR 1993 SC 1212;  

Balbir Singh v. State, (1996) 11 SCC 139; Akmal Ahmad v. State  

of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1315;  M. Prabhulal v. Assistant Director,  

Directorate  of  Revenue  Intelligence, AIR  2003  SC  4311;  and  

Ravinderan @ John v. Superintendent of Customs, AIR 2007 SC  

2040).  

26. In  State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil & Anr.  (2001) 1  

SCC 652,  this  Court  examined a  similar  issue  in  a  case  where  no  

person had agreed to affix his signature on the document.  The Court  

observed that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer  

should be viewed with initial distrust. At any rate, the court cannot  

begin with the presumption that police records are untrustworthy. As a  

proposition of law the presumption should be the other way around.  

The wise principle of presumption, which is also recognised by the  

legislature, is that judicial and official acts are regularly performed.  

Hence, when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain  

article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by  

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the accused it is open to the court to believe that version to be correct  

if  it  is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. The burden is on the  

accused,  through  cross-examination  of  witnesses  or  through  other  

materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is unreliable.  

If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such  

records of the police the court could certainly take into account the  

fact  that  no  other  independent  person  was  present  at  the  time  of  

recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume that  

police action is  unreliable to start  with,  nor  to  jettison such action  

merely  for  the  reason  that  police  did  not  collect  signatures  of  

independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with  

such actions.

27. In  Appabhai & Anr. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696,  

this  court  dealt  with  the  issue  of  non-examining  the  independent  

witnesses and held as under:   

 “The prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted   on  that  ground  alone.  Experience  reminds  us  that   civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is   committed even in their  presence.  They withdraw both   from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves   away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think   that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or   parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind   of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but   

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it is there everywhere whether -in village life, towns or   cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the   investigating agency has to discharge its duties.”

28. The principle of law laid down hereinabove is fully applicable  

to the facts of the present case.  Therefore, mere non-joining of an  

independent witness where the evidence of the prosecution witnesses  

may be  found to be  cogent,  convincing,  creditworthy and reliable,  

cannot cast doubt on the version forwarded by the prosecution if there  

seems to be no reason on record to falsely implicate the appellants.   

29. In the instant case at the time of incident some villagers had  

gathered there. The Investigating Officer in his cross-examination has  

made it clear that in spite of his best persuasion, none of them were  

willing to become a witness.  Therefore,  he could not  examine any  

independent witness.  

Section 114 of the Act 1872 gives rise to the presumption that  

every official act done by the police was regularly performed and such  

presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur  

rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solenniter esse acta i.e., all the  

acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly, applies.  

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When  acts  are  of  official  nature  and  went  through  the  process  of  

scrutiny by official  persons,  a presumption arises that the said acts  

have regularly been performed.  

            In view of the above, the submissions of the learned counsel  

for the appellants in this regard, are held to be without any substance.  

30. In  view  of  the  above,  the  appeal  does  not  present  special  

features warranting any interference by this court. Appeal is devoid of  

any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

……………………………..........J.  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

                                                                                        ……………..................................J.                                                             (S.A. BOBDE)  

NEW DELHI;  July 23, 2013         

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