REPORTABL E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

            CIVIL APPEAL NO.6344 OF 2009

Gayathri Womens Welfare Association                .. Appellant

VERSUS

Gowramma & Anr.              ..Respondents      

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and  

decree/order dated 23rd of July, 2008 passed by the  

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in  

RFA No.1732 of 2005 filed by the respondents whereby  

the High Court in part modified and in part set aside  

the  judgment  and  decree  dated  4th August,  2005  

passed by the              Vth Additional City Civil Judge,  

Bangalore in OS No.163 of 1999.

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2. The short issue which arises before us is whether the  

High Court was justified in permitting the respondents  

to raise the counter claim at a stage after the issues  

had been framed by the trial court.

3. In  order  to  decide  the  aforesaid  issue,  it  is  not  

necessary  to  make  a  detailed  reference  to  the  

chequered history of the litigation between the parties.  

We may, however, briefly narrate the facts.

4. The  appellants  herein  were  the  plaintiffs  before  the  

trial court and the respondents were the defendants.  

5. The appellant is an Association registered under the  

Societies Registration Act. The appellant contends that  

it purchased 2 acres 30 guntas of land in Sy.No.110/2  

of  Laggere  Village  (the  schedule  property)  under  an  

agreement of sale dated 26th November, 1988 from its  

vendors Sri B.C. Vijayakumar and Smt. Mayamma. In  

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part  performance  of  this  agreement  of  sale,  the  

appellant  was  put  in  possession  of  the  schedule  

property.  The  appellant  and  is  members  are  in  

peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. In the  

month  of  December,  1998,  the  respondents  tried  to  

interfere  with  the  appellant’s  possession  and  

enjoyment of the schedule property and therefore, they  

filed  O.S.No.163  of  1999  for  grant  of  decree  of  

permanent injunction.  

6. The respondents 1 and 2 entered appearance before  

the trial court, filed written statement inter alia contended  

that they are the owners of a portion of land in Sy.No110/1  

of  Laggere village and the appellants are trespassing into  

their  property.  The  respondents,  therefore,  opposed  the  

claim of the appellants. On the basis of the pleadings, the  

trial  court  framed  the  following  three  issues  for  its  

consideration:  

“1. Whether the appellant proves that it has been in  

lawful possession of the suit schedule property ?

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2.    Whether the appellant proves interference?

3.   To what order and reliefs the parties are entitled ?”

7. Before  the  trial  court,  the  appellant  examined  six  

witnesses as PWs1 to 6 and got marked Exs.P1 to P58. The  

respondents  examined  one  witness  as  DW-1  and  got  

marked Ex.D1 to D44. The trial court after hearing both the  

parties  and  on  appreciation  of  the  pleadings  oral  and  

documentary evidence on record held that  the  appellants  

are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule  

property;  there  is  interference  by  the  respondents  and  

consequently,  decreed  the  suit  of  the  appellants  for  

permanent  injunction  vide  judgment  

dated 4th August, 2005.  

8. Aggrieved  by  this  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  

court,  the  respondents  approached  the  High  Court  of  

Karnataka in RFA No.497 of 2002. The High Court by its  

judgment  dated  18th June,  2002  allowed  the  appeal,  set  

aside  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  court  and  

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remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal in  

accordance with law. The High Court while remanding the  

matter observed as under :

“Therefore,  keeping  in  view  the  submissions  made, I deem it desirable that fresh survey is  to be carried out in this suit by the Assistant  Director of Land Records (hereinafter referred  to  as  ‘ADLR’)  by  giving  notice  to  both  the  parties and in their presence the survey is to  be made.  The appellants are however entitled  to  produce  the  records  of  the  survey  done  earlier  as an additional  document  before  the  trial  Court  and after  survey,  considering  the  reports  of  the  Surveyor  and  the  additional  documents,  if  any,  and  if  necessary  by  allowing  oral  evidence,  the  trial  court  shall  dispose of the suit in accordance with law.”     

9. After  remand from the  High Court,  the  respondents  

amended their written statement and incorporated counter  

claim to direct the appellants to demolish the structures put  

up subsequent to passing of the status quo order by the  

trial  Court  on  the  schedule  property  mentioned  in  the  

written statement.  To this counter  claim of respondents,  

the appellants filed written statement.  On the basis of the  

amended pleadings, the trial court framed the following two  

additional issues:

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“1. Whether the respondents prove that the appellant  

Association have erected temporary sheds on the  

schedule  property  subsequent  to  passing  of  

interim order in the above said suit.

2. Whether the respondents are entitled to the relief  

of  Mandatory  Injunction  by  way  of  counter  

claim.”    

10. After  remand and framing of  additional  issues,  both  

the parties adduced oral evidence and produced additional  

documents. Pursuant to the directions issued by the High  

Court  in  RFA  No.497  of  2002,  the  trial  court  appointed  

Assistant Director of Land Records (hereinafter referred to  

as ‘ADLR’) as Court Commissioner to survey the schedule  

property in the presence of both the parties.  Accordingly,  

the Court Commissioner conducted survey of the schedule  

property and submitted his report  to the trial  court.  The  

Court Commissioner was examined as CW-1 and through  

him  three  documents  came  to  be  marked  as  Ex.C1  to  

Ex.C3.

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11. Again the trial court after hearing both the parties and  

upon  appreciation  of  the  pleadings,  oral  as  well  as  

documentary  evidence,  on record  decreed the  suit  of  the  

appellants by judgment and decree dated 4th August, 2005.  

At  the  same  time,  the  trial  court  dismissed  the  counter  

claim filed by the respondents.  

12. Aggrieved by the dismissal  of  the counter claim, the  

respondents again came before the High Court in Regular  

First Appeal No.1732 of 2005. It was conceded before the  

High Court that the respondents do not have any grievance  

in so far as the trial court decreed the suit of the appellants.  

The only marginal issue raised by the respondents was that  

the judgment and the decree of the trial  court had to be  

classified  with  reference  to  the  survey  conducted  by  the  

ADLR after the matter was remanded by the High Court.  

The other grievance made by the respondents was that the  

trial court had committed a serious error in not decreeing  

the counter claim. This, according to the respondents, has  

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resulted failure of justice. In support of this submission, the  

respondents had relied upon the following judgments :-  

a. Ishwardas   Vs.  The State  of  Madhya Pradesh &  

Ors.  1   

b. Sampath Kumar   Vs. Ayyakannu and Another  2  .

c. Jag Mohan Chawla & Anr.   Vs. Dera Radha Swami  

Satsand & Ors.  3   

d. K.Moosa Hajji’s Widow Smt.Kannadiyil Ayissu &    

Ors. Vs.  Executive  Officer  Sree  Lakshmi  

Narasimha Temple  4  .

e. Nanduri  Yogananda  Lakshminarasimhachari  &    

Ors. Vs. Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru  5  .

f. Surinder Singh   Vs.  Kapoor Singh (dead) through  

Lrs. & Ors.  6    

13. On  the  other  hand,  the  appellants  supported  the  

judgment  of  the  trial  court  on the ground that  they had  

1 1979 (4) SCC 163 2 JT 2002 (7) SC 182 3 1996 (4) SCC 699 4 AIR 1996 SC 2224 5 AIR 1960 SC 622 6 2005 (5) SCC 142

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been  put  in  possession  of  the  land  on  the  basis  of  the  

survey conducted in the year 1981, under the agreement of  

sale dated 26th November, 1988. The survey in 2003 after  

remand,  by  virtue  of  order  of  the  High  Court  

dated  18th June,  2002 in  RFA No.497 of  2002,  however,  

indicated that the appellants were in possession of a portion  

in  Survey  No.110/1  and  another  portion  in  Survey  

No.110/2. It was the case of the appellants that unless they  

are legally dispossessed by due process of law, they were  

entitled  to  continue  in  the  portion  occupied  by  them  in  

Survey  No.110/1.  In  support  of  their  submission  the  

appellants  relied  on  a  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Rohit Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.  7  .        

14. Upon  consideration  of  the  entire  issues,  the  High  

Court  concluded that  the plaint  schedule  property of  the  

appellants to the extent of 2 acres and 30 guntas was in  

survey  No.110/2 of  Laggere Village.  The High Court  also  

held that the survey dated 24th March, 1981 on the basis of  

7 2006 (12) SCC 734

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which  the  appellants  had  been  put  in  possession  on  a  

portion of survey No.110/1 and portion of survey No.110/2  

had been set aside by the Joint Director of Land Records  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘JDLR)  on  22nd June,  1998  in  

Appeal  No.4/98.  The High Court  noted that this order of  

JDLR was prior to the filing of the suit before the trial court  

on 6th January, 1999.  The fact that the appellants were in  

possession  of  portions  of  Sy.No.110/1  and  Sy.No.110/2  

ought  to  have  been  pleaded  in  the  original  plaint.  It  is  

further observed that, in any event, the appellants ought to  

have  amended  the  plaint  contending  that  they  are  in  

possession  of  a  portion  of  Sy.No.110/1  and a  portion  in  

Sy.No.110/2. Instead of making the necessary averments in  

the original plaint or amending the pleadings, the prayer of  

the  appellants  remained  that  they  are  in  possession  

of 2 acres and 30 guntas in Survey No.110/2.  The High  

Court  further  noted  that  the  location  of  2  acres  and  

30 guntas in Survey No.110/2 was clearly specified in the  

survey sketch prepared by the ADLR in the year 2003. This  

is also depicted in Ex.C3. The High Court noted that the  

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learned counsel  for  the  respondents had no objection for  

grant of decree for permanent injunction in favour of the  

appellants, classified by the survey of 2003. Relying on the  

submission of learned counsel for the respondents, the High  

Court has confirmed the decree of permanent injunction in  

favour of the appellant, with the modification in reference to  

the survey sketch Ex.C3.

15. With reference to the counter claim, the High Court  

observed that upon remand of the matter by the High Court  

in  RFA  No.497  of  2002,  the  trial  court  permitted  the  

respondents to amend the written statement to incorporate  

the relief of counter claim for mandatory injunction. After  

the respondents had filed the amended written statement,  

the  appellants  filed  the  written  statement  to  the  counter  

claim.  On  the  basis  of  the  amended  pleadings,  the  trial  

court had framed additional issues. Upon the pleadings of  

the  parties  and  upon  consideration  of  the  material  on  

record, as noticed earlier, the trial court again decreed the  

suit of the appellants but dismissed the counter claim.  

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16. During  the  pendency  of  the  appeal  before  the  High  

Court,  the  respondents  filed  an  application  seeking  

amendment  of  the  written  statement  to  include  the  

additional  prayer  in  the  counter  claim  for  recovery  of  

possession  of  the  suit  schedule  property  falling  within  

Survey  No.110/1.  The  High  Court  noticed  that  in  the  

normal course an application for amendment of the written  

statement at the stage of  appeal  from the original  decree  

was  not  entertainable.  However,  since  the  dispute  was  

pending between the parties from the year 1981 and the  

suit was pending since 1999, no injustice would be caused  

to  the  appellant  if  the  prayer  for  possession  was  also  

permitted  to  be  incorporated  in  the  counter  claim.  

Justification  given  for  taking  such  a  view  was  to  avoid  

multiplicity of proceedings.  To buttress its conclusion, the  

High Court relied on a judgment of this Court in the case of  

Sant Lal Jain Vs.  Avtar Singh  8  . Allowing the appeal filed  

8 AIR 1985 SC 857

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by the  respondents,  the  High Court  passed the following  

order :-

“1. The appeal is partly allowed.

2. The impugned  judgment  and decree of  the  trial  court  decreeing  the  suit  of  appellant  for  permanent  injunction  is  modified  specifying  that  the  plaint  schedule  property  as  ABFH  shown  in  green colour in survey sketch.

3. The  respondents  or  anybody  claiming  under  them  are  hereby  permanently  restrained  from  interfering  from  the  peaceful possession and enjoyment of the  plaint schedule property as stated above.

4. The  impugned  judgment  and  decree  of  the  trial  court  dismissing  the  counter  claim  of  the  respondents  is  hereby  set  aside.  

5. The application filled by the respondents  for  amendment  of  the  counter  claim  is  hereby allowed.

6. The learned counsel for the respondents  to amend the counter claim of the written  statement  before  the  trial  court  within  two weeks from the date of receipt of the  order.  The  trial  court  to  provide  an  opportunity  to  the  appellants  to  file  additional  written  statement  for  this  counter claim and to decide the matter in  accordance to both the parties.

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7. In view of the fact that already abundant  evidence  available  on  record  and  the  matter  is  pending  for  a  long  time,  a  direction  is  issued  to  the  trial  court  to  expedite  the  matter  and  to  dispose  the  counter claim of  the of  the respondents  as expeditiously  as possible  and in  any  event not later than four months from the  date of receipt of copy of this order.”

It  is  the  aforesaid  order  which  is  challenged  by  the  

appellants herein.

17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  

18. Mr.  Vishwanatha  Shetty,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants submitted that the judgment of the High Court  

runs counter to the law laid down by this Court in the case  

of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani  9   and the  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Rohit  Singh’s  case  (supra).  

Learned counsel further submitted that the mere fact the  

respondents  now  wish  to  incorporate  the  prayer  of  

possession  of  the  suit  schedule  property  falling  within  

Survey  No.110/1,  is  sufficient  proof  of  possession  of  the  

9 2003 (7) SCC 350

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property by the appellants.  Therefore,  the trial  court  had  

not  committed  any  error  in  granting  the  decree  of  

permanent injunction for the entire suit schedule property.  

The  appellant  and  its  members  have  built  a  number  of  

residential building and their members are residing in those  

houses. Now if the respondents wish to take possession of  

the  aforesaid  property  they  would  have  to  seek  the  

necessary relief in appropriate proceedings, i.e., by filing a  

separate  suit  for  possession.  According  to  the  learned  

counsel,  the  High  Court  had  committed  an  error  of  

jurisdiction  in  permitting  an  amendment  of  the  counter  

claim when the dispute had already been pending between  

the  parties  for  more  than  27  years.  It  is  further  the  

submission of he learned counsel that by now incorporating  

the  prayer  for  possession,  the  respondents  have  

successfully obliterated the decree passed in their favour by  

the  trial  court.  He  submits  that  by  adopting  such  a  

circuitous  route,  the  respondents  are  trying  to  avoid  the  

legal  objection  including  that  the  suit  for  possession  is  

barred by limitation which would be open to the appellants,  

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if  such suit was to be filed now by the respondents with  

regard to the portion of the suit schedule property falling  

within Survey No.110/1.  

19. On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Balgopal,  learned  senior  

counsel appearing for the respondents also relied on certain  

judgments of this Court, in support of his submission that  

an amendment can be allowed by the court, at any stage of  

the proceedings notwithstanding the law of limitation.  He  

has  pointed  out  that  the  law  is  well  settled  that  the  

amendments in the pleadings are to be liberally permitted  

by the court. The only rider is the court being satisfied that  

such amendment is necessary for the determination of the  

real question in controversy. In support of his submissions,  

the learned counsel  has made particular  reference to the  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Revajeetu  Builders  &  

Developers Vs.  Narayana Swamy & Sons  10   and  Dhanpal  

Balu Lhawale Vs. Adagouda Nemagouda Patil  11  .  

10 2009 (10) SCC 84 11 2009 (7) SCC 457

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20. Learned counsel by making a detailed reference to the  

factual situation has submitted that the boundaries of the  

land  were  fixed  in  the  presence  of  the  parties  

on 3rd March, 2000 by the ADLR. The order of the ADLR was  

upheld  by  the  Revenue  Authorities.  The  Karnataka  

Appellate Tribunal dismissed Appeal No.398 of 2001 filed by  

the appellants  on 13th December,  2001.  The order of  the  

Tribunal  was  challenged  by  the  appellants  in  the  High  

Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition Nos.2661-64 of 2002.  

The  High  Court  dismissed  the  aforesaid  writ  petition  by  

order  dated  4th March,  2002.  In  view  of  the  above,  the  

matter  regarding  hudbust  and  fixing  of  boundaries  and  

rights  of  interest  over  the respective  portions of  the land  

between the vendors of the appellants on the one hand and  

the respondents had attained finality.  

21. This apart, after the remand of the matter by the High  

Court in RFA No.497 of 2002, the ADLR again conducted  

the  survey  on  25th July,  2003.  At  that  time,  the  survey  

showed  only  27  constructions  in  the  disputed  area  i.e.  

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survey No.110/1. Only 16 constructions were in the land  

belonging to the appellants in survey No.110/2. The survey  

report of the ADLR clearly demonstrated that the appellants  

had encroached on the land belonging to the respondents.  

This had necessitated the amendment to the counter claim  

for incorporation of the plea for possession of the same. It  

was next submitted by the learned counsel that the High  

Court was fully justified in allowing the application under  

Order VI Rule 17 seeking amendment of the counter claim,  

the aforesaid application was filed along with RFA No.1732  

of 2005.  According to the learned counsel, the order passed  

by the High Court under appeal was fully justified in the  

interest of justice.  

22. Learned counsel then submitted that the judgment of  

this Court in  Rohit Singh’s case (supra) is not applicable  

to the facts of this case. It is still further submitted by the  

learned counsel that the counter claim of the respondent is  

independent of the claim made by the appellants. It stands  

on a different footing. The counter claim is required to be  

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treated as an independent suit in view of the provisions of  

Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Finally, it  

is submitted by the learned counsel that the appellants are  

not a bonafide litigants. Till date, the sale deed has not been  

executed in their favour by the vendors. They are raising all  

frivolous  objections  only  on  the  basis  of  an  alleged  

agreement for sale.  According to the learned counsel,  the  

appellants  have  been  put  up  by  the  legal  heirs  of  the  

original owners from whom the respondents had purchased  

the land.

23.   We  have  considered  the  submissions  made  by  the  

learned  counsel  for  the  parties.   The  trial  court  upon  a  

detailed  appreciation  of  the  evidence  led  by  the  parties  

concluded that on the basis of the material on record, it can  

be said that the possession of the appellant in respect of the  

plaint  schedule  property  as  against  the  respondents  was  

long,  settled  and  uninterrupted.  On  the  basis  of  the  

aforesaid conclusion, the trial court proceeded to decide the  

issue with regard to the counter claim of the respondents.   

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24. It was noticed that the respondents wanted a direction  

in the nature of the Mandatory Injunction, to be given to the  

appellant to demolish the illegal construction, which came  

subsequent to the passing of the status quo order.  We may  

notice here that the status quo order referred to by the trial  

court  had  been passed  on  7th January,  1999.   The  trial  

court, however, observed that “the order of status quo was  

granted  in  respect  to  disputed  property.   The  disputed  

property is what is described in the plaint schedule and not  

in the schedule to the written statement.”  Therefore, it was  

observed  that  the  respondents  would  have  the  cause  of  

action available to seek possession based on title and not on  

the basis of mandatory injunction on account of violation of  

status quo order.   In these circumstances, the trial court  

observed  that  the  appropriate  remedy  available  to  the  

respondents is to sue for possession.   

25. In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court,  while  allowing  the  

claims  of  the  respondent  to  include  the  prayer  for  

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possession in the counter claim, failed to appreciate that  

the  order  passed  by  the  trial  court  did  not  cause  any  

prejudice to the respondents.  The trial  court had merely  

held that the remedy of an independent suit was available  

to the respondents.

26. In  our  opinion,  the  judgments  relied  upon  by  the  

respondents  are  really  of  no  assistance  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of this case.  

27. In  Nanduri  Yogananda  Lakshminarasimhachari Vs.  

Sri Agastheswaraswamivaru12, this Court observed that the  

amendment could be permitted in a plaint as there was no  

new fact to be alleged and the parties were alive to the real  

nature of the dispute.   

28. In the case of  Pandit Ishwardas (supra), it has been  

observed as follows :-   

12 AIR 1960 SC 622

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“There  is  no  impediment  or  bar  against  an  appellate  Court  permitting  amendment  of  pleadings so as to  enable  a party  to  raise  a  new  plea.  All  that  is  necessary  is  that  the  appellate Court should observe the well known  principles  subject  to  which  amendments  of  pleadings are usually granted. Naturally one of  the  circumstances  which  will  be  taken  into  consideration before an amendment is granted  is the delay in making the application seeking  such amendment and, if made at the appellate  stage, the reason why it was not sought in the  trial court. If the necessary material on which  the plea arising from the amendment may be  decided is already there, the amendment may  be more readily granted than otherwise. But,  there  is  no  prohibition  against  an  appellate  Court  permitting  an  amendment  at  the  appellate stage merely because the necessary  material is not already before the Court.”

These  observations  clearly  indicate  that  one  of  the  

circumstances which will be taken into consideration before  

an  amendment  is  granted  is  the  delay  in  making  the  

application seeking such amendment and, if  made at the  

appellate sage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial  

court.  In  the  present  case,  not  only  there  is  wholly  

untenable delay in the application but the appellants had a  

decree for permanent injunction in their favour.   

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29. In the case of  Jagmohan Chawla (supra), this Court  

considered the scope of Rule 6A to 6G of Order VIII CPC and  

observed as follows:-

“It is true that in money suits, decree must be  conformable to Order 20, Rule 18, CPC but the  object of the amendments introduced by Rules  6-A to 6-G are conferment of a statutory right  on  the  defendant  to  set  up  a  counter-claim  independent of the claim on the basis of which  the appellant laid the suit, on his own cause of  action.  In  sub-rule  (1)  of  Rule  6-A,  the  language  is  so  couched  with  words  of  wide  width as to enable the parties to bring his own  independent cause of action in respect of any  claim that would be the subject-matter of an  independent  suit.  Thereby,  it  is  no  longer  confined to money claim or to cause of action  of  the  same nature  as  original  action of  the  plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected  with  the  original  cause  of  action  or  matter  pleaded by the plaintiff. The words “any right  or  claim  in  respect  of  a  cause  of  action  accruing with the defendant” would show that  the  cause  of  action from which the  counter- claim arises need not necessarily arise from or  have any nexus with the cause of action of the  plaintiff  that  occasioned to  lay  the  suit.  The  only  limitation  is  that  the  cause  of  action  should arise before the time fixed for filing the  written statement expires.”

The  aforesaid  observations,  in  our  opinion,  have  no  

relevance  to  the  controversy  in  the  present  case,  as  the  

claim of the respondent has been rejected by the trial court  

on the ground that the cause of action arose a long time  

ago.   

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30. In the case of Revajeetu Builders (supra), this Court  

reiterated the very wide discretion the Courts have in the  

matter  of  amendment  of  pleadings.   These  observations  

were in the context of an application filed by the appellant,  

seeking  amendment  of  the  original  plaint  including  the  

prayer clause being rejected by the High Court upon coming  

to  a  definite  conclusion  that  the  appellant  while  seeking  

permission to amend the plaint is trying to introduce a new  

case, which was not his case in the original plaint and the  

proposed amendment, if allowed, would certainly affect the  

rights of the respondents adversely.  It was also held that  

any such amendment, which changes the entire character  

of  the  plaint,  can not  be permitted  and that  too,  after  a  

lapse of four years and after the institution of the suit.  This  

Court,  upon  a  detailed  consideration  of  the  historical  

background of Order VI Rule 17 and upon a comprehensive  

survey of the case law, concluded that the amendment can  

be permitted, if it was necessary for the determination of the  

real  question  in  controversy.   If  that  condition  is  not  

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satisfied, the amendment can not be allowed.  It was also  

observed as follows:-

“22. …. The power to allow an amendment is  undoubtedly  wide  and  may  at  any  stage  be  appropriately  exercised  in  the  interest  of  justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding.  But  the  exercise  of  such  far-reaching  discretionary  powers  is  governed  by  judicial  considerations  and  wider  the  discretion,  greater  ought  to  be  the  care  and  circumspection on the part of the court.”       

31. In  our  opinion,  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  is  in  

conformity with the aforesaid principles.  The trial court has  

clearly  held  that  the  cause  of  action  for  the  relief  of  

possession arose to the respondents many years ago.  They  

may,  therefore,  have  a  cause  of  action,  if  any,  for  an  

independent suit.  In the aforesaid case, the Court further  

reiterated  the  principle  in  Ganga Bai Vs.  Vijay  Kumar  13    

wherein it was rightly observed :

“The  power  to  allow  an  amendment  is  undoubtedly  wide  and  may  at  any  stage  be  appropriately  exercised  in  the  interest  of  justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding.  But  the  exercise  of  such  far-reaching  discretionary  powers  is  governed  by  judicial  considerations  and  wider  the  discretion,  greater  ought  to  be  the  care  and  circumspection on the part of the Court.”  

13 1974 2 SCC 393

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32. Similarly  in  Dhanpal  Balu  (supra),  this  Court  

permitted the amendment in the facts and circumstances of  

that case. Thus the judgment would not advance the case of  

the appellant in any manner.    

33. We  may  notice  here  the  observations  made  by  this  

Court in the case of Ramesh Chand  (supra) which may be  

of  some  relevance.  Upon  considering  the  ratio  of  earlier  

cases  in  the  case  of  Sangaram  Singh Vs.  Election  

Tribunal,  Kotah  14  ,  Arjun  Singh Vs.  Mohindra  Kumar  15    

and  Laxmidas  Dayabhai  Kabrawala Vs.  Nanabhai  

Chunilal Kabrawala  16  , it was held that a right to make a  

counter  claim  is  statutory  and  a  counter  claim  is  not  

admissible  in  a  case  which  is  admittedly  not  within  the  

statutory provisions. It is further observed that :

“Looking to the scheme of Order 8 as amended  by Act 104 of 1976, we are of the opinion, that  there are three modes of pleading or setting up  

14 AIR 1955 SC 425 15 AIR 1964 SC 993 16 AIR 1964 SC 11

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a  counter-claim  in  a  civil  suit.  Firstly,  the  written statement filed under Rule 1 may itself  contain a counter-claim which in the light of  Rule 1 read with Rule 6-A would be a counter- claim  against  the  claim  of  the  appellant  preferred in exercise of legal right conferred by  Rule  6-A.  Secondly,  a  counter-claim  may  be  preferred by way of  amendment incorporated  subject to the leave of the court in a written  statement  already  filed.  Thirdly,  a  counter- claim  may  be  filed  by  way  of  a  subsequent  pleading under Rule 9. In the latter two cases  the counter-claim though referable to Rule 6-A  cannot be brought  on record as of  right  but  shall be governed by the discretion vesting in  the court, either under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC if  sought to be introduced by way of amendment,  or, subject to exercise of discretion conferred  on  the  court  under  Order  8  Rule  9  CPC  if  sought  to  be  placed  on  record  by  way  of  subsequent  pleading.  The  purpose  of  the  provision enabling filing of a counter-claim is  to  avoid  multiplicity  of  judicial  proceedings  and  save  upon  the  court’s  time  as  also  to  exclude  the  inconvenience  to  the  parties  by  enabling claims and counter-claims, that is, all  disputes  between  the  same  parties  being  decided in the course of the same proceedings.  If  the  consequence  of  permitting  a  counter- claim either by way of amendment or by way of  subsequent  pleading  would  be  prolonging  of  the  trial,  complicating  the  otherwise  smooth  flow of proceedings or causing a delay in the  progress of the suit by forcing a retreat on  the steps already taken by the court, the court  would be justified in exercising its discretion  not in favour of permitting a belated counter- claim. The framers of the law never intended  the  pleading  by  way  of  counter-claim  being  

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utilized  as an instrument  for  forcing upon a  reopening  of  the  trial  or  pushing  back  the  progress of proceeding. Generally speaking, a  counter-claim  not  contained  in  the  original  written statement may be refused to be taken  on  record  if  the  issues  have  already  been  framed and the  case  set  down for  trial,  and  more  so  when  the  trial  has  already  commenced.”

These  observations  make  it  clear  that  generally  speaking  

the  counter  claim  not  contained  in  the  original  written  

statement may be refused to be taken on record, especially  

if issues have already been framed. In the present case, the  

counter  claim is  sought  to  be introduced at  the  stage of  

appeal before the High Court.    

34. In such circumstances,  we are unable  to accept the  

conclusions of the High Court that the discretion exercised  

by the trial court was in any manner, illegal or arbitrary in  

rejecting  the  counter  claim  of  the  respondents.  We  may  

notice  here  the  observations of  this  Court  in the  case of  

Rohit Singh (supra) which are as follows :-

“A counterclaim, no doubt, could be filed even  after  the  written  statement  is  filed,  but  that  

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does  not  mean  that  a  counterclaim  can  be  raised after issues are framed and the evidence  is closed. Therefore, the entertaining of the so- called counterclaim of Respondents 3 to 17 by  the trial court, after the framing of issues for  trial,  was  clearly  illegal  and  without  jurisdiction.”  

These observations would show that the dismissal  of  the  

counter  claim  by  the  trial  court  was  neither  illegal  nor  

without jurisdiction. In fact the direction issued by the High  

Court  would  clearly  run  counter  to  the  aforesaid  

observations.  In  the  aforesaid  case,  this  Court  was  

considering a situation where the evidence had been closed,  

arguments  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  had  been  

concluded,  the  suit  was  adjourned  for  arguments  of  the  

appellants,  the  suit  was  dismissed  for  default.  

Subsequently,  it  was restored. Thereafter the respondents  

filed an application for amending the written statement. The  

counter  claim  was  filed  by  the  intervener.  In  these  

circumstances, it was observed that at this stage no counter  

claim could be entertained.  

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35. In  the  present  case,  after  the  matter  had  been  

remanded back, the trial court again decreed the suit of the  

appellants, the counter claim was dismissed for the reasons  

stated in the judgment of the trial court. We may restate  

here that the prayer in the original counter claim was only  

for  a  mandatory  injunction  to  demolish  the  illegal  

structures in Sy.No.110/1.  It  was only when the Regular  

First  Appeal  was  filed  for  challenging  the  original  decree  

that the respondents made an application under Order VI  

Rule 17 for amendment of the original written statement to  

incorporate the counter claim with a prayer for possession  

of  the  land  in  dispute  in  Survey  No.110/1.  In  such  

circumstances,  the  High  Court  erred  in  disturbing  the  

findings recorded by the trial court.  

36. The matter herein symbolizes the concern highlighted  

by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Ramesh  Chand  (supra).  

Permitting a counter claim at this stage would be to reopen  

a decree which has been granted in favour of the appellants  

by the trial court. The respondents have failed to establish  

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any  factual  or  legal  basis  for  modification/nullifying  the  

decree of the trial court.

37. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court  

committed  a  serious  error  of  jurisdiction  in  allowing  the  

appeal filed by the respondents. Consequently, the appeal is  

allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside.   

…………………………..J.                       [B.Sudershan Reddy]

                            .………………………….J.                      [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi; January 11, 2011.                                       

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