IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1384 OF 2011

GANDHE VIJAY KUMAR            ...  APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS MULJI @ MULCHAND                          ... RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:

1. The appellant before this Court is aggrieved by order passed

by  the  High  Court  wherein  concurrent  findings  on  facts  with

regard to the bonafide requirements of the appellant have been

upset holding that “the court can re-appreciate the evidence to

test whether the findings of the Rent Controller are correct”.  We

are afraid, the High Court has misdirected itself and exceeded its

jurisdiction. In revisional jurisdiction, the Court is expected to see

only whether the findings are illegal or perverse in the sense that

a reasonably informed person will not enter such a finding.  For

proper  guidance,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  refer  to  a  recent

Constitution  Bench  judgment  in  Hindustan  Petroleum

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REPORTABLE

Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh  1, at paragraphs-30, 31 and

43:  

“30. We have already noted in the earlier part of  the  judgment  that  although  there  is  some difference  in  the  language  employed  by  the  three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for  revisional  jurisdiction  but,  in  our  view,  the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional  jurisdiction  suo  motu  unless  so  provided expressly. None of these statutes confer on revisional authority the power as wide as that of the appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does  not  permit  the  High  Court  to  invoke  the revisional  jurisdiction  as  the  cloak  of  an  appeal  in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the trial court/Rent Controller and  the  appellate  court/appellate  authority  for rehearing  of  the  issues  raised  in  the  original proceedings.

31. We  are  in  full  agreement  with  the  view expressed  in  Sri  Raja  Lakshmi  Dyeing  Works that where both expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed  in  a  statute,  obviously,  the  expression “revision”  is  meant  to  convey  the  idea  of  a  much narrower  jurisdiction  than  that  conveyed  by  the expression  “appeal”.  The  use  of  two  expressions “appeal”  and  “revision”  when  used  in  one  statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think,  is  not  without  purpose  and  significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of  an  “appeal”  and so  also  of  a  “revision”.  If  that were  so,  the  revisional  power  would  become coextensive  with  that  of  the  trial  court  or  the subordinate  tribunal  which  is  never  the  case.  The

1 (2014) 9 SCC 78  

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classic statement in Dattonpan that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the  High  Court  a  second  court  of  first  appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three rent control statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second court of first appeal  and the High  Court  should  not  enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.”

xxx xxx  xxx  xxx

43. We  hold,  as  we  must,  that  none  of  the above Rent Control  Acts  entitles the High Court  to interfere  with  the  findings  of  fact  recorded  by  the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on  reappreciation  of  the  evidence,  its  view  is different  from  the  court/authority  below.  The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of  the evidence or  is  grossly erroneous that,  if  allowed  to  stand,  it  would  result  in  gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event,  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its  revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not  legal  or  proper.  The  High  Court  is  entitled  to satisfy  itself  as  to  the  correctness  or  legality  or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity,  correctness,  legality  or  propriety  of  the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not  exercise  its  power  as  an  appellate  power  to

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reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and  cannot  be  equated  with  the  power  of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine  whether  the  order  impugned  before  it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”

These  principles  hold  good  generally  for  exercise  of

revisional power.

2. There  is  no  dispute  with  respect  to  the  landlord-tenant

relationship. The bonafide requirement also has been concurrently

found by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority.

The  High  Court  should  not  have  ventured  to  look  into  the

evidence as if  in a first appeal and entered a different finding,

though another finding might also be possible.  Merely because

another view is possible in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction,

the High Court cannot upset the factual findings.

3. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is

allowed. The order passed by the Rent Controller, as upheld by

the Appellate Authority, is restored.

4. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent seeks some

time to surrender the vacant possession to the appellant. Learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that since the

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last 70 years, the respondent has been enjoying the property and

the appellant is in pressing and bonafide need. Be that as it may,

having regard to the fact that the respondent is  carrying on a

hotel business, we permit him to continue upto 31st March, 2018.

On or before 1st April, 2018, the respondent shall surrender vacant

and peaceful possession of the premises to the appellant. During

the interregnum, the respondent shall not create any third party

rights and shall not cause any damage to the property. He shall

also file  a usual  undertaking in  the Registry  within four  weeks

from today.

5. There shall be no order as to costs.

.........................J.         (KURIAN JOSEPH)  

.…..…………………J.                     (R. BANUMATHI)

New Delhi; July 27, 2017.   

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